Archive for the ‘State Offices’ Category

DPRK continues to supply new laborers to KIC

Thursday, July 16th, 2009

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-7-15-1
7/15/2009

Despite the fact that inter-Korean relations continue to be stalled, North Korea authorities reportedly provided approximately 1,300 new workers in June for businesses entering the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC). Despite the fact that there has been no progress in inter-Korean working-level talks between authorities involved in the KIC, the North is continuing to provide a labor force for South Korean businesses in the complex.

An official from the Kaesong Industrial District Management Committee verified that “approximately 1,300 new laborers were supplied last month,” and that “there are some young workers, as well, but the majority are 30 to 40-year-old women.” The official also explained, “the number of laborers was reduced slightly at the beginning of the year; while [their number] was insufficient, laborers continue to come…up until June of this year, while the number fluctuated, an average of around 700 per month [were provided].” Last year, the number of new workers each month was around 1,000.

New workers continue to be provided to the KIC, but there has also been a sharp increase in the number of workers quitting or being removed from their positions. At the end of June, there were 40,255 North Korean laborers; the overall number of workers provided by the North has only increased by 1,324 since the end of last year.

The source explained that at the beginning of 2009, more than 2000 construction workers quit. It appears, according to the numerous reports on the status of employment in the KIC, that the supply of workers is still insufficient, but that the North Korean authorities are working as hard as possible to provide what manpower they can.

North Korea’s Central Special Zone Development Guidance General Bureau recently held a general assembly for all North Korean labor representatives, and ordered them to “work to the max” in order to alleviate all complaints by South Korean businesses. However, as there has still been no resolution to the issue of constructing additional dormitories for the workers, this issue will continue to restrict growth in the number of North Korean laborers, regardless of the attitude in Pyongyang.

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UN, US, ROK, sanction DPRK arms companies–and partners

Tuesday, June 30th, 2009

On January 21, the day after the Obama administration took office, the White House approved certain trade sanctions–initiated by the Bush administration–to be printed in the Federal Register.  These sanctions targeted specific Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean companies that the US believes were/are violating arms export regulations governing missile technology and other proliferation activities.  [Read more, including Federal Register text, here]

After North Korea conducted a long-range missile test in April, the US pushed the UN Security Council to adopt a presidential statement which blacklists several additional North Korean firms. [Read more here].

After North Korea conducted a second nuclear test, in violation of UNSC resolution, the UNSC adopted a resolution which tightened sanctions on the DPRK. [Read more here]

In June, the South Korean government imposed sanctions on these DPRK companies for the first time [Read more here]

The US followed up the UNSC resolution by announcing an inter-agency team that will focus exclusively on enforcing DPRK sanctions [Read more here

Today, the US Treasury Department announced it was targeting Hong Kong Electronics (Kish Island, Iran) [from where a former FBI agent is still missing] for supporting the balcklisted North Korean organizations.  According to Market Watch:

The Treasury Department said Tuesday that it has targeted another player in North Korea’s missile proliferation network. The agency designated Hong Kong Electronics, located in Kish Island, Iran, for providing support to North Korea’s Tanchon Commercial Bank and Korea Mining Development Trading Corp. Those two firms have been targeted by the U.S. and the United Nations as part of North Korea’s nuclear proliferation network. “Today’s action is a part of our overall effort to prevent North Korea from misusing the international financial system to advance its nuclear and missile programs and to sell dangerous technology around the world,” said Stuart Levy, Treasury under-secretary for terrorism.

What does this mean? It means that any bank accounts or other financial assets found in the United States belonging to the company must be frozen. Americans also are forbidden from doing business with the firm. This probably does not amount to much economically, but is probably intended to discourage banks outside of the US from doing business with these firms.

UPDATE 1: It looks like the State Departmet is also going after a North Korean company believe to be involved in weapons proliferation today.  According to a statement by the Treasury Department:

The U.S. Department of the Treasury today targeted North Korea’s missile proliferation network by designating Hong Kong Electronics under Executive Order 13382.  E.O. 13382 freezes the assets of designated proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their supporters and prohibits U.S. persons from engaging in any transactions with them, thereby isolating them from the U.S. financial and commercial systems.  Hong Kong Electronics, located in Kish Island, Iran, has been designated for providing support to North Korea’s Tanchon Commercial Bank (Tanchon) and Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID).

Tanchon and KOMID have also been designated by the United States under E.O. 13382 and the UN Security Council under Resolution 1718. The Department of State also today targeted North Korea’s nuclear proliferation network by designating Namchongang Trading Corporation (NCG), a North Korean nuclear-related company in Pyongyang, under E.O. 13382. 

“North Korea uses front companies like Hong Kong Electronics and a range of other deceptive practices to obscure the true nature of its financial dealings, making it nearly impossible for responsible banks and governments to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate North Korean transactions,” said Stuart Levey, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. “Today’s action is a part of our overall effort to prevent North Korea from misusing the international financial system to advance its nuclear and missile programs and to sell dangerous technology around the world.”

Since 2007, Hong Kong Electronics has transferred millions of dollars of proliferation- related funds on behalf of Tanchon and KOMID. Hong Kong Electronics has also facilitated the movement of money from Iran to North Korea on behalf of KOMID. Tanchon, a commercial bank based in Pyongyang, North Korea, is the financial arm for KOMID – North Korea’s premier arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.

Tanchon plays a key role in financing the sales of ballistic missiles for KOMID. Tanchon has also been involved in financing ballistic missile sales from KOMID to Iran’s Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG), which is the Iranian organization responsible for developing liquid-fueled missiles. SHIG has been designated under E.O. 13382 and sanctioned by the United Nations under UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737. Since 2005, Tanchon has maintained an active relationship with various branches of Iran’s Bank Sepah, an entity designated under E.O. 13382 and sanctioned by the United Nations under UNSCR 1747, for providing financial services to Iran’s missile program. The U.S. has reason to believe that the Tanchon-Bank Sepah relationship has been used for North Korea-Iran proliferation-related transactions.

Here is the press release by the State Department:

The U.S. Department of State today targeted North Korea’s nuclear proliferation network by designating Namchongang Trading Corporation (NCG) under Executive Order 13382. E.O. 13382 is an authority aimed at freezing the assets of proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their supporters, and at isolating them from the U.S. financial and commercial systems. Entities designated under E.O. 13382 are prohibited from engaging in all transactions with any U.S. person and are subject to a U.S. asset freeze.

NCG is a North Korean nuclear-related company in Pyongyang. It has been involved in the purchase of aluminum tubes and other equipment specifically suitable for a uranium enrichment program since the late 1990s.

The Department of the Treasury also today designated Hong Kong Electronics, located in Kish Island, Iran, for providing support to North Korea’s Tanchon Commercial Bank (Tanchon) and Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). Tanchon and KOMID were designated by the United States under E.O. 13382 on June 28, 2005 and the UN Security Council under Resolution 1718 on April 24, 2009.

North Korea’s April 5, 2009 launch of a Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2) missile and May 25, 2009 nuclear test demonstrate a need for continued vigilance with respect to North Korea’s activities of proliferation concern. The designations add to continuing U.S. efforts to prevent North Korean entities of proliferation concern from accessing financial and commercial markets that could aid the regime’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons and the missiles capable of delivering them.

McClatchy has more here.

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DPRK military strenghtens hold on economic interests

Wednesday, June 10th, 2009

UPDATE: IFES has contacted us with an update to this report:

“North Korea exports between 2-3 million tons of coal, collecting approximately 200 million USD.”

Original Post:
Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-6-9-1
6/9/2009   

The North Korean military, which has recently taken a hard-line position internationally with rocket launches, a nuclear test and inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch preparation, appears to be strengthening its position domestically, as well. It has reportedly taken charge of coal exports, previously the responsibility of the Cabinet, and other key economic interests.

According to sources inside North Korea, authority to export anthracite, the North’s most valuable export item, was transferred from a trading company under the control of the Cabinet to a military trading company earlier this year. North Korea exports between 200-300 tons of coal each year, collecting approximately two billion USD in foreign currency. Previously, this was shared among branches of the government, with the military, the Korean Workers’ Party and the Cabinet all similar export quotas.

One source stated, “Recently, China’s trade minister signed a contract for 60,000 tons of coal from a military-run trading company, and delivered one million USD-worth of corn as payment,” noting, “previously, North Korea’s trade partner [with China] was the Cabinet-controlled trade company.” The same source went on to note that it was “exceptional that as North Korea suffers from foreign capital shortages, it demands payment not in cash, but in corn…it looks like it is measure for military use.”

Other sources reported that, as of this year, the military has also taken control of the Bukchang Thermoelectric Power Plant, the country’s largest steam-powered electrical station. The Bukchang plant, built with Soviet supplies in 1968, can produce up to 2 million kW of electricity. It was formerly operated by the Ministry of Electric Power Industry, which is under the control of the Cabinet, but at the beginning of year, some authorities were purged on charges of bribe-taking and providing power designated for government facilities to foreign capital enterprises and other businesses. Since then, the military has run the plant.

The increased number of economic assets in control of the military reflects the military’s recently-strengthened position within the regime. The North Korean economy can be divided into several sectors: Kim Jong Il’s private fund, managed by Party operations; the military-industrial ‘second economy’; and the official economy, under the control of the Cabinet. The military’s increasing control over the official economy appears to be a move to completely implement ‘Military-first Politics.’

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South Korea sanctions DPRK firms

Tuesday, June 9th, 2009

Earlier this year the UN Security Council issued a Presidential Statement in response to the DPRK’s April rocket (missile) test. In the Presidential Statement, three North Korean firms were blacklisted–Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation, Tanchon Commercial Bank, and Korea Ryongbong General Corporation–all of whom are suspected of having ties with the North’s missile and nuclear programs.

According to Yonhap, the South Korean government has also blacklisted these firms, though no South Korean firms have realtions with any of them:

This is the first time that South Korea has imposed financial sanctions on a North Korean company in relation to Pyongyang’s ballistic activity, the ministry said.

The ministry said that it will consider taking additional measures if the U.N. comes up with separate actions against the North for conducting its second nuclear test on May 25.

Read the full sotry here:
Seoul slaps sanctions on N. Korean firms for missile test
Yonhap
Koh Byung-joon
6/9/2009

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On the North Korean legal system

Monday, May 18th, 2009

From Slate (regarding the upcoming trial of Euna Lee and Laura Ling):

We do have some basic understanding about how the North Korean justice system is organized. The journalists will be tried by the Central Court, the nation’s highest judicial body. Usually, the Central Court only hears appeals cases from the lower, provincial courts, but for grievous cases against the state, it has initial jurisdiction. The Central Court is staffed by judges elected by the Supreme People’s Assembly, North Korea’s one-party parliament. The North Korean Constitution stipulates that each trial is to be conducted by one judge and two “people’s assessors”—i.e., lay judges—though special cases may be heard by a three-judge panel. (Appeals cases usually get the panel.) Legal education or experience is not an official prerequisite for becoming a judge, and rulings from the Central Court are not subject to appeal.

North Korean law does recognize the right of the accused to defend herself and to be represented by an attorney. According to the country’s penal code, either the defendant, her family, or her “organizational representatives” may select the defense attorney. As the two arrested journalists were not allowed access to any counsel during pretrial investigation, however, there are doubts that they will actually be allowed to select their own counsel. According to the U.S. State Department, there is “no indication that independent, nongovernmental defense lawyers [exist]” in North Korea in the first place.

The proceedings will be conducted in Korean, but the North Korean Constitution does grant foreign citizens the right to use their own languages during court proceedings. Trials are supposed to be open to the public, unless they might expose state secrets or otherwise have a negative effect on society. According to testimony from North Korean defectors, though, trials are often closed in practice. Announcements of the court’s findings and executions of sentences are often carried out in public as a means of educating the citizenry.

Thursday’s announcement from North Korea’s news agency did not specify what crime the two journalists are being charged with, though Pyongyang has previously accused them of “hostile acts” and illegal entry into the country. If they were prosecuted under a law regarding foreigners who “abuse” or “provoke national difficulty in order to antagonize” the North Korean people, they would face five to 10 years of “re-education” in a labor camp. Illegal entry carries a sentence of two to three years.

Previously, prisoners could be sentenced to death for a number of vague crimes, such as “ideological divergence” or “opposing socialism.” But subsequent to the enactment of a new penal code in 2004, the death penalty is reserved for four crimes: participating in a coup or a plot to overthrow the state, terrorism, treason, or “suppressing the people’s movement for national liberation.” In practice these four crimes seem to cover a wide range of activities, including, in one reported case from 2007, the making of international phone calls. Judicial proceedings are apparently not required for executions to be carried out.

As supplemental material, I have posted numerous DPRK statutes on this web page.  To see the full list, scroll down the menu to “DPRK policies,” under which you can see them all.  Of course, the DPRK is not a “rule of law” country, so the statutes themselves and even the constitution are not worth that much in terms of defining the “rules of the game” or defining/predicting the scope of “legitimate” government activity. 

There have been several foreign law firms that have attempted to set up shop in the DPRK.  Currently the only firms with legal offices or a periodic presence are: Hay, Kalb, and Associates, Kelvin Chia Partnership, and Chiomenti  of Italy (formerly Birindelli e Associati ).

Read the full article below:
Objection, Dear Leader!
Slate.com
Nina Shen Rastogi
5/14/2009

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UNSC blacklists three DPRK companies

Friday, April 24th, 2009

In response to the DPRK’s rocket launch, the UN Security Council issued a presidential statement containing the following:

The Security Council reiterates that the DPRK must comply fully with its obligations under Security Council resolution 1718 (2006).

The Security Council demands that the DPRK not conduct any further launch.

The Security Council also calls upon all Member States to comply fully with their obligations under resolution 1718 (2006).

The Security Council agrees to adjust the measures imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006) through the designation of entities and goods, and directs the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) to undertake its tasks to this effect and to report to the Security Council by 24 April 2009, and further agrees that, if the Committee has not acted, then the Security Council will complete action to adjust the measures by 30 April 2009.

(Read the full text of the statement here

Today the Security Council followed up this statement (and resolution 1718) by voting to blacklist three North Korean companies.  According to Reuters (via the Washington Post):

The North Korea sanctions committee met a Friday deadline set by the Security Council on April 13 to produce a list of goods and North Korean entities to be blacklisted under Security Council resolution 1718, passed after Pyongyang’s October 2006 nuclear test.

The three companies put on the list are Korea Mining Development Trading Corp., Korea Ryongbong General Corp. and Tranchon (Tanchon) Commercial Bank, according to a copy of the committee’s decision obtained by Reuters.

The decision said the three companies were linked to the military and active in procuring equipment and financing for North Korea’s ballistic missile and other weapons programs.

The blacklisting prohibits companies and nations around the world from doing business with the three firms, but the impact of the action might be largely symbolic.

One Western diplomat said the three blacklisted firms had subsidiaries that also would be subject to U.N. sanctions.

Committee members also decided to ban the import and export of items on an internationally recognized list of sensitive technologies used to build long-range missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.

The US imposed sanctions on three North Korean companies in the Federal Register earlier this year.  Of these three companies, one has made the UNSC list: the Korea Mining and Development Corporation.  I can only speculate as to the fate of the other two mentioned in the US Federal Register, Mokong Trading Corporation and the Sino-Ki company. 

Read more below:
UNSC Presidential Statement

U.N. committee puts 3 North Korea firms on blacklist
Reuters (via the Washington Post)
Louis Charbonneau
4/24/2009

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DPRK cell phone subscribers top 20,000- costs, services detailed

Wednesday, April 22nd, 2009

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-4-22-1
2009-04-22

Since 3G cellular phones were first offered in North Korea last December, more than 20,000 customers have signed up for service. According to a recent report by the Choson Sinbo’s Pyongyang correspondent, the North’s cellular network is capable of providing voice and SMS services to as many as 126,000 customers in the Pyongyang area and along the highway between Pyongyang and Hyangsan, and is available to North Korean residents as well as foreigners in the North.

Anyone can procure a cell phone in the North by submitting required information on an application to a service center, along with an application fee of 50 Yuan, or approximately one Euro, or 130 Yen. Currently, telephones are selling for between 110 Euros for basic handsets, to as much as 240 Euros for phones with cameras and other functions. When a phone is turned on, a white ‘Chollima’ horse graphic appears over ‘Koryolink’ in blue, all with a red background. The trademark is said to mean, “The Choson spirit, moving forward at the speed of the Chollima to more quickly and more highly modernize the information and communication sector.”

To use one’s phone, a pre-paid phone card must be purchased. Three types of phone cards are sold for 850 won (A), 1700 won (B), and 2500 won (C), with ‘B’ and ‘C’ cards offering 125 and 400 minutes ‘free air time’, respectively. In order to see to it that its customer base continues to grow, the communications company plans to adjust prices, and offer services such as television and data transmission. Video and picture transmission and other technological preparations have already been made.

As has been previously reported, the service is provided by CHEO Technology Joint Venture Company, owned by the Choson Posts and Telecomm Corporation (KPTC) and Egypt’s Orscom Telecom Holding. There are now two service centers within Pyongyang. In December of last year, only one International Communications Center was established, but as service grew, a temporary sales office was set up in mid-March. The North Korean government purports to provide cellular service as part of its plan to improve the lives of the masses, and the number of subscribers is climbing daily. CHEO Technology plans to extend the coverage area to every major city, along all highways and along major rail routes throughout the country by the end of the year, with the ultimate goal of providing cellular service to every residential area in the nation by 2012. 

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Last week in North Korea’s government

Sunday, April 12th, 2009

jangsongtaek.jpgJang Song-taek, Kim Jong il’s brother in law, and his senior aid were promoted to the DPRK’s top governing body the National Defense Commission.  Jang was recently elected to the Supreme People’s Assembly last month. 

Of slightly less interest was the fact that Kim Jong il was reappointed to the National Defense Commission as well.

According to Yonhap, the Supreme People’s Assembly, which formally “elected” Kim and Jang to the NDC also unanimously voted to revise the DPRK’s constitution for the first time in 11 years.  They did not announce what those changes were intended to be.

This session of the Supreme People’s Assembly saw the first video appearance by Kim Jong il since last summer when he is reported to have suffered a stroke.

And according to IFES, the SPA approved the state budget:

DPRK sets 2009 budget at USD$3.45 billion
Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-4-13-1
2009-04-13   

On April 9, North Korea opened the first session of the 12th Supreme People’s Committee, at which this year’s budget, 5.2 percent larger than that of last year, was passed. Pyongyang set the 2009 budget at 482.6 billion Won (1 USD=140 Won).

At this meeting, North Korea’s newly appointed Minister of Finance Kim Whan-su reported on last year’s budget and introduced the spending plan for 2009. While details were not revealed, it was noted that the overall budget had grown by 5.2 percent, with expenditures up 7 percent. The 2008 budget had been set at 451.5 billion won. It was also reported that last year’s spending was 1.6 percent over-budget, but that 99.9 percent of budgeted expenditures had been carried out.

Minister Kim reported that taxes from Chinese enterprises and related national businesses had grown by 5.8 percent, and that cooperative organizations were up 3.1 percent, production earnings were up 6.1 percent, real estate income had grown 3.6 percent, and social insurance had brought in an addition 1.6 percent.

As for the expenditure plan, city administration was allotted an additional 11.5 percent, while mining of metal, coal, steal, and other natural resources was boosted by 8.7 percent, education received an additional 8.2 percent, public health care grew by 8 percent, farming was bumped by 6.9 percent, physical education by 5.8 percent, light industry by 5.6 percent, and cultural activities by 3.2 percent. National defense accounted for 15.8 percent of the overall budget, just as it did last year, meaning that 545 million USD will be put toward the military.

Kim explained that the 2009 budget was based on the idea of “reducing unproductive expenditures in order to find the utmost source of revenue to ensure perfect support for the funds necessary to strengthen national security, improve the lives of the people, and build an economically strong nation.”

At this meeting, Kim Jong Il was reappointed to the post of chairman of the national defense commission, and Kim Yong Nam was reaffirmed as the head of the Cabinet.

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2009 Supreme People’s Assembly (s)elections

Friday, March 6th, 2009

UPDTE 5: (h/t Werner) Here is a link to the full list of SPA members (in Korean).   Kim Jong il’s district, 333, is the only one not published.  Jang Song Taek (Kim’s borther in law) is representing district 31.

UPDATE 4: Michael Madden sends in more biographies of prominent North Koreans:

Kim Kyong Hui, biography here
Ju Sang Song, biography here
Ji Yong Chun, biography here
Choe Ryong Hae,  biography here
Kim Yong Ju, biography here

UPDATE 3: Daily NK coverage of the election results here. 

UPDATE 2: Yonhap reports that fewer lawmakers were replaced than in the 2003 election, when there was a 50% turnover.  Choe Sung-chol, vice chairman of the Asia-Pacific Peace Committee handling inter-Korean affairs, was removed from the Assembly, according to its new list. 

UPDATE 1: The AP is reporting that none of Kim Jong il’s sons were (s)elected to the SPA.  Who was (s)elected?  I am still waiting on the full list, but the AP reports the following:

Members of the new parliament announced Monday included Kim Yong Nam, the North’s No. 2 official and the ceremonial head of state; Jang Song Taek, head of the Workers’ Party’s administrative department and Kim Jong Il’s brother-in-law; and Kang Sok Ju, the first vice foreign minister.

Read the full story here

ORIGINAL POST: On Sunday, March 8, the DPRK will hold “our-style elections” for members of the Supreme People’s Assembly.  Organizaitonal charts of the North Korean government can be found here, although they are based on the a de jure reading of DPRK’s legal procedures not the de facto operation of the political system.  A list of top policymakers (in state offices) can be found here.  I will post relevant material as it becomes available.  In the meantime, here is some related information:

1. DPRK recent military personnel changes.

2. Kim Jong il nominated for SPA.

3. CIA publishes list of policymakers.

4. DPRK ministerial shakeup.

5. Election day pictures: 1, 2, 3.

6. KCNA coverage of the election: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.

7. Biographies if prominent NK policy-makers by Michael Madden posted below.

The Associated Press provides some context for the (s)election:

North Korea holds elections Sunday for its legislature, the Supreme People’s Assembly. A look at key factors in the upcoming poll:

WHAT’S AT STAKE: Voters will elect the country’s 12th Supreme People’s Assembly for a five-year term. The assembly currently has 687 deputies but the number, which is linked to the country’s population, could change.

WHY IT’S IMPORTANT: Legislatively, the assembly is a rubber-stamp body. But since members double as key officials, the election provides a glimpse of the ruling elite in the secretive country.

WHO’S RUNNING: Only one candidate runs in each constituency. By law, individuals and organizations can recommend candidates, but the ruling Workers’ Party is widely believed to pick candidates. North Korean leader Kim Jong Il is running in constituency No. 333.

THE VOTE: Officially, it’s a secret vote. In reality, it’s not. To vote against a candidate, voters go to a special booth to cross out the name, making it obvious who is doing so. Defectors say opposing a candidate is unthinkable. Polls typically open from 9 a.m. to 6 p.m. and results are announced the following day.

TURNOUT: In the last election in 2003, turnout was 99.9 percent, state media said. All citizens aged 17 or older are eligible to vote.

The Donga Ilbo offers, “6 Rising Stars in the North Korean Elite”:

A report by the South Korean Unification Ministry presented to the National Assembly yesterday mentioned six politicians among the 20 most frequently mentioned by the North’s official daily Rodong Shinmun last year as rising stars in Pyongyang’s hierarchy.

The six were not mentioned in 2007.

One North Korea expert said, “North Korea’s leadership has been controlled by Kim Jong Il. Those frequently mentioned by media can be considered powerful politicians. After the elections Sunday, North Korea’s political elite will be replaced. In the process, we need to pay more attention to the rising stars.”

The most notable among the six is Ri Yong Chol, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Kim Il Sung Socialist Youth League. He ranks 15th for being mentioned 45 times last year.

Since being elected secretary in December 2007, Ri has often appeared on the political scene. He even had an interview with the state-run (North) Korean Central News Agency on the implementation of projects announced in a New Year’s joint editorial.

Kim Jong Il established the league, a fringe organization of the ruling Workers’ Party whose previous name was the Socialist Working Youth League, to strengthen the political foundation of his successor.

To lure the “third and fourth generations of revolution,” Kim renamed the body the Kim Il Sung Socialist Youth League after his late father.

In 2007, the list of the North’s top 20 politicians had nobody from the league. Ri’s rapid rise indicates Kim Jong Il’s strategy to strengthen the power of his successor.

Kim Thae Jong, vice director of the international department of the party’s Central Committee, ranks ninth for appearing 62 times in the media. He was a frequent player in diplomacy last year and even appeared in the royal box when North Korea held a national event to commemorate the 17th anniversary of Kim Jong Il’s taking office as supreme commander of the North’s military in December last year.

In 2007, Vice Marshal Kim Il Chol was the sole military officer among the top 20 elites but fell out of last year’s list.

Replacing him were marshals Hyon Chol Hae (11th) and Ri Myong Su (13th). Hyon accompanied Kim Jong Il most often last year and Ri ranked second in that category.

Among Cabinet members, Foreign Trade Minister Ri Ryong Nam, who was mentioned by media 43 times, ranked 17th. Kim Jong Il appointed nine new ministers including Ri last year.

Most of the six ministers appointed since October last year have been emerging technocrats.

Michael Madden submits these brief biographies of some DPRK notables:

Kim Ki-nam, biography (PDF), photo
Ri Yong-mu, biography (PDF)
Kim Il-chol, biography (PDF), photo
Jon Pyong-ho, biography (PDF)

Jang Brothers

Jang Sung-taek, PDF biography here, recent photo with Kim Jong il here.

Jang Sung-gil
Birth date: January 13, 1939
Last known position: Lieutenant General, KPA

Positions held:
1981: Colonel, and Vice-Commanding Officer, Second Corps, KPA
1982: Colonel, and Commanding Officer, 13th Division, Second Corps, KPA
Vice-Commanding Officer, Second Corps, KPA
1985: Major General, Commanding Officer, 32nd Division, Fifth Corps, KPA
1992: Vice-Commanding Officer, Fourth Corps, KPA
1992: Promoted to Lieutenant General, KPA (April)*
1996: Commanding Officer, 105th Division, Ryu Kyong-su Tank Command, KPA (December)

Presumed to be relieved of command of the 105th Tank Division, during JST’s p.n.g. status.

*General Jang is part of the same 1992 class that promoted Kim Yong Chun

Jang Sung-u
Born: 1935, Kangwon Province
Education
Kim il Sung Military Academy

Positions held:
1971: Vice Department Director, Organization and Guidance Department, CCKWP
1977: Promoted to Major General, KPA
1980: Member, CCKWP (October)
1982: Dlegate, 7th SPA (February)
Awarded Order of Kim il Sung (April)
1984: Promoted to Lieutenant General, KPA (May)
1986: Delegate, 8th SPA (November)
1988: Director-General, Reconnaissance Bureau, MPAF
1989: 1st Vice Director, Public Security Department (January)
1990: Delegate, 9th SPA, representing Saenal, South Hwanghae (April)
Promoted to Colonel-General, KPA (presumed April)
Member, Qualification Screening Committee, SPA (May)
1991: Director, General Political Bureau, State Security Department (December)
1992: Interim Position in the Central Command, KPA (April)
Director-General, General Political Bureau, State Security (May)
1994: Commanding Officer, Third Corps, KPA
Member, Kim il Sung Funeral Committee [#85]
1995: Dismissal, as Director-General, General Political Bureau, State Security Department (November)
1996: Commanding Officer, Third Corps, KPA (July)
1998: Delegate 10th SPA (July)

Jang’s inner circle

Cho Chun Hwang
Position: First Vice Department Director, Propaganda and Agitation Department, CCKWP
Education:
Baccalaureate, History, Kim il Sung University

Previous positions:
1972-1990: Mr. Cho worked as a staff member, division director, and department deputy director in the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the CCKWP.
1991: Vice Department Director, Propaganda and Agitation Department, CCKWP
1997: First Vice Department Director, Propaganda and Agitation Department, CCKWP (June)
2000: Vice Department Director Propaganda and Agitation Department, CCKWP (July)

Ri Yong Bok
Position(s): Chief Secretary, Nampho City People’s Committee
Member, 11th SPA
Member, Qualification Screening Committee, SPA

Positions held:
1972: Chairman, KIS League of Socialist Working Youth (December)
Presidium member and delegate, 5th SPA (December)
1982: Vice Department Director, Youth Guidance and Three Revolutions Department, CCKWP (June)
1998: Delegate (606 ED), 10th SPA (July)
Appointed Chief Secretary, Nampho City People’s Committee

Ri Kwang Gun
Position: unknown, possibly in Europe; former Minister of Foreign Trade
Born: 1935
Education:
Namsan Senior Middle School
Pyongyang Foreign Language Institute, German Department
Kim il Sung University

Positions held:
1965: Lecturer, German Department, Pyongyang Foreign Language Institute
1972: Professor, German Department, Kim il Sung University
1977-1978: Ministry of Foreign Trade
1979: State External Economic Affairs Commission
1987: 1st Secretary, Economic Affairs, DPRK Representative to Germany
1991: State External Economic Affairs Commission
1997 (presumed): Korea General Equipment Import and Export Corporation
2000: Appointed Minister of Foreign Trade, DPRK (December)

O Kuk Ryol
Born:  1931, Jilin, PRC
Education:
Mangyongdae Revolutionary School
Kim il Sung University
USSR Croatia Military University (1962)

Positions held:
1964: Promoted Major-General, KPA Air Force
Appointed, Dean, KPA Air Force Academy (November)
1967: Promoted Lieutenant-General and Commanding Officer, KPA Air Force (October)
Delegate, 4th SPA (November)
1970: Appointed Members, CCKWP (November)
1972: Delegate, 5th SPA (December)
1977: Appointed Vice Chief of Staff, KPA (October)
Delegate, 6th SPA (November)
1978: Appointed Alternate Member, Political Bureau, CCKWP
1979: appointed Chief of Staff, KPA (September)
[His command of the KPA Air Force was succeeded by Jo Myong Rok]
1980: Promoted to Colonel General, KPA (September)
Member, CCKWP; Member, Political Bureau (October)
Member, Central Military Committee
1982: Delegate, 7th SPA (February)
Member, Central People’s Committee
Awarded Order of Kim il Sung (April)
1985: Promoted General, KPA (April)
1986: Delegate, 8th SPA (November)
1988: Removed as KPA Chief of Staff (February)
Removed from the Political Bureau, CCKWP (April)
Removed from Central Military Committee (April)
Appointed Director of Civil Defense, CCKWP (November)
1989: Appointed Department Director, Strategy Department, CCKWP (July)
1992: Order of Kim il Sung (April)
1994: Member, Kim il Sung Funeral Committee (#45) (July)
1995: Member, O Jin-U Funeral Committee (#43) (February)
1998: Delegate (356 Electoral District), 10th SPA (July)
2003: Delegate, 11th SPA
2009: Appointed Vice Chair, NDC (February)

Ongoing: Member, CCKWP; State Funeral Committee

Jang rival

Ri Jah Gang
Postion held:  1st Vice Department Director, Organization and Guidance, CCKWP
Born: 1930
Education:
Kim il Sung University

Positions held:
1973: Cadre, Organization and Guidance Department, CCKWP
1975: Vice Director, Organization and Guidance Department, CCKWP
2001: 1st Vice Director, Organization and Guidance Department, CCKWP (July)

On the list of so-called reliable members of the KPA, General Jang Song-u is near the top.  General Jang’s last known position was in the Third Army Corps, whose primary mission is the military defense of Pyongyang.  The Third Army Corps is also responsible the maintenance and support of the Kamsusan Memorial Palace, where General Jang serves as a kind of military officer in residence.   General Jang has always had the support of his younger brother, Jang Song-taek, and the brothers’ careers have advanced on parallel paths in the KPA and the KWP.  Although, due most likely to his military affiliation and the advantage of age (he is eleven years older than Song-taek), General Jang was the first brother admitted to the CCKWP apparatus when he was assigned as a Vice Director of the Organization and Guidance Department CCKWP in 1973.  This was the same year that another Kim Jong il associate with KPA duties, Ri Ji Gang, was assigned to Organization and Guidance.  Based on the accounts of KPA and DPRK State events from the KCNA, General Jang was neither reassigned nor demoted when his brother was removed from the Organization and Guidance Department and confined to his chalet.  Among the capacities in which General Jang has served: he was the commanding military officer in the troop review and parade on the 50th Anniversary of the KWP Foundation in 1995 and; he has assumed interim operational command over the Escort/Bodyguard Units.  Jang Song-u occupies the intersection of the politico(politburo)-military structure and the intelligence agencies (including State Security and the Escort/Bodyguard Units).  The conjunction of General Jang’s political connections and military assignments give him a significant role in matters concerning succeeding governments to Kim Jong il.  In many ways, General Jang’s profile resembles that of those close Kim il Sung aides who eased Kim Jong il into his current job.

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“Let’s plant more trees!”

Friday, March 6th, 2009

letsplantmoretrees.JPGAs regular Google Earth users are aware, the DPRK has experienced significant deforestation in recent decades from both private and state actors. The former have cleared land for fuel/heat and private food production. The latter have felled forests to export lumber. However, without private property rights over the lumber and corollary price signals, we have witnessed yet another “tragedy of the commons”–the over extraction of a common-pool resource. 

As can be seen in the image above, official reforestation campaigns have been launched several times.  According to Good Friends, the most recent was announced last September, shortly before the DPRK appointed a new forestry minister, Kim Kwang-yong.  According to the Yonhap article below, however, South Koreans and Europeans have been supporting reforestation projects in the DPRK for nearly ten years:

North Korean workers and students rolled up their sleeves Monday for Tree-planting Day, state-run media said, amid continuing aid from South Korea despite damaged political relations.

North Korea has a high deforestation rate, as residents have cut down trees for fuel. Deforestation is closely linked to the country’s chronic food shortages, as barren mountain slopes leave rice farms prone to severe flooding by summer monsoons, according to aid workers in Seoul.

The North Korean government has banned cutting trees and sought to make its country greener with aid from South Korea and some European governments.

“Covered with trees are mountains and fields of the country from the foot of Mount Paektu, the sacred mountain of the revolution, to the military demarcation line and from the eastern coast to the western coast,” the Korean Central News Agency said in an English-language report titled “Greening and Gardening Campaign Gets Brisk.”

“The tree-planting campaign is being briskly undertaken everywhere in the country … changing the appearance of the country beyond recognition day by day,” it said.

South Korean government and civic groups have been operating sapling fields in the North Korean cities of Kaesong and Pyongyang, as well as near the North’s scenic resort Mount Kumgang, providing seedlings, equipment and technology since 1999. The project has cost South Korea some 9 billion won (US$5.7 million), according to the Ministry of Unification.

Aid workers said the inter-Korean forestry project has continued even though Pyongyang cut off all government-level dialogue in response to Seoul’s hardline policy toward it that began last year.

Ahn Sun-kyong, an aid worker from Green One Korea, an umbrella group of over a dozen non-governmental organizations in Seoul, said it plans to build a seed preservation facility and an apple farm in Pyongyang as new projects this year.

“There may be certain limitations, but this non-governmental exchange project will continue,” Ahn said.

Hwang Jae-sung from the Korean Sharing Movement, which operates the Kaepung sapling field in Kaesong as a member of Green One Korea, said most trees are prematurely cut by residents, who also rake up fallen leaves for fuel.

“Deforestation is directly linked to the food problem,” Hwang, who last visited Kaesong in November, said. “We believe tree planting in North Korea is not only useful for preventing floods, but also can be another means of resolving the food shortages in the North.”

The aid groups say 16-18 percent of North Korean forests, or 1.5-1.6 million hectares out of the North’s 8.9 million hectares of forests, are believed to be deforested. About 80 percent of North Korea is covered by mountains.

Although the support offered by these groups is necessary to restore ecological health and productive power of the DPRK’s agricultural lands, an unfortunate consequence will likely be growing restrictions on private food production which will necessarily require the North Korean people to once again rely on the state for food distribution.

Read previous posts on forestry and environmental protection here.

Read the Yonhap story here:
N. Koreans work to make country green on Tree-planting Day: report
Yonhap
Kim Hyun
3/2/2009

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