North Korean Economy Watch

Yonhap
4/3/2007

Incoming Prime Minister Han Duck-soo said Tuesday that goods produced in a joint industrial complex in North Korea will benefit from a free trade pact agreed upon with the United States the previous day.

Denying reports that the free trade agreement put aside the country-of-origin issue for future negotiations, Han said that the two countries cleared the way for treating goods produced in the Kaesong Industrial Complex as made in South Korea.

“The media reports that the Kaesong Industrial Complex was put on as a ‘built-in’ agenda are not true,” Han, who took office early in the day, told reporters in his inaugural press conference at the government building.

A “built-in” agenda refers to a negotiating scheme for sensitive issues in which the countries involved agree to put them on hold and discuss them in the future. Local reports have called the Kaesong issue “built-in,” as Seoul has been pushing for its inclusion in the trade deal despite Washington’s objection.

Under the deal, the two sides agreed to establish a “committee on outward processing zones on the Korean Peninsula” to discuss the Kaesong issue as part of their trade liberalization. But they also stipulated that such a step will be made under specific circumstances, such as the progress in denuclearizing North Korea, according to a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

Han said the agreement is in line with South Korea’s constitution that its territory is the entire Korean Peninsula, and it does not recognize North Korea as a state.

Han also said the government will make public all of the contents of the agreement in mid-May when it is expected to be completed, and all the documents related to the agreement will be released three years later.

The Kaesong complex, just north of the inter-Korean border, is one of two flagship projects the South operates in the spirit of reconciliation with the North following the historic inter-Korean summit in 2000. Over 11,000 North Korean workers are employed by dozens of South Korean companies there, where they produce garments, utensils and other labor-intensive goods. Another reconciliation project is the operation of tours to the North’s scenic Mount Geumgang.

South Korean companies operating in Kaesong say the inclusion of the goods in the FTA is crucial, as this will allow them to export goods to the world’s largest market, as well as provide a template for future trade deals with other countries. 

U.S. Accepts Kaesung Industrial Complex as an “Outward Processing Zones”
Daily NK
Kim Song
4/3/2007

A press conference was held following the conclusion of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) on the 2nd where Korea’s Trade Minister Kim Hyun Chong announced, “The U.S. agreed to recognize the Kaesung Industrial Complex as a remote location.” By this he meant that goods manufactured in Kaesung complex would be accepted as goods made in Korea.

As annexes to the agreement, Committee on Outward Processing Zones on the Korean Peninsula must be established. Undeniably, the article also states that the contents would have to be approved by the U.S.

It seems that both sides agreed that this approach would be the U.S.’s minimal request and compromise on the Kaesung issue and a built-in tactic to keep the negotiating flame burning rather than a deal-breaker.

Previously, the U.S. made concessions regarding Outward Processing Zones with Singapore and Israel’s FTA. As for Korea, these preferential tariffs, not only acknowledges goods manufactured from Kaesung by the FTA, but sets a standard to other sectors in the world such as the European Free Trade Association and ASEAN.

It appears that the recognition of Kaesung as an Outward Processing Zone was based on an agreement that the Korean Peninsula would advance towards denuclearization.

The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula will eventually lead to the removal of laws that will further eliminate hostile diplomacy and trade between the U.S. and North Korea. It is possible that denuclearization will establish the normalization of U.S.-North Korea relations and solve the issue of Kaesung naturally, in due time.

However, the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is not something to be solved within a short time. As a U.S. official once revealed, amity between the U.S.-North Korea can only be possible when North Korea decides to comply with the rules of the international community. In the bigger picture of the Korean Peninsula and economic conglomerate, Kaesung in relation to denuclearization is only a long-term sketch.

Furthermore, there is one minor glitch. Kaesung complex does not match the international standards accepted by the U.S. in relation to labor requirements and such. At any opportunity given, Jay Lefkowitz, U.S. Special Envoy on Human Rights in North Korea, has continuously targeted wage issues at Kaesung complex. Additionally, there have been many criticisms on pay issues regarding North Korean laborers working even within the nation, as well as violations to contracts of employment.

Throughout the FTA, President Roh Moo Hyun has been striving to protect rice while trying to negotiate the Kaesung Industrial Complex. Though President Roh argues that political calculations were omitted from the negotiations, these two issues contradict his words.

Some argue that the future will depend on South Korea’s attitude to the U.S. It is even possible that this is a political attempt by the U.S. to lure North Korea into denuclearization.

Urgent: How to Topple Kim Jong Il
Foreign Policy Magazine
March/April 2007, P.70-74
Andrei Lankov

From: Andrei Lankov
To: Condoleezza Rice
RE: Bringing Freedom to North Korea

When North Korea tested a nuclear weapon late last year, one thing became clear: The United States’ strategy for dealing with North Korea is failing. Your current policy is based on the assumption that pressuring the small and isolated state will force itto change course. That has not happened—and perhaps never will.

North Korea’s Kim Jong Il and his senior leaders understand that political or economic reforms will probably lead to the collapse of their regime. They face a challenge that their peers in China and Vietnam never did—a prosperous and free “other half” of the same nation. North Korea’s rulers believe that if they introduce reforms, their people will do what the East Germans did more than 15 years ago. So, from the perspective of North Korea’s elite, there are compelling reasons to resist all outside pressure. if anything, foreign pressure (particularly from Americans) fits very well into what Pyongyang wants to propagate— the image of a brave nation standing up to a hostile world dominated by the United States.

Yet, sadly, the burden of encouraging change in North Korea remains the United States’ alone. China and Russia, though not happy about a nuclear North Korea, are primarily concerned with reducing U.S. influence in East Asia. China is sending considerable aid to Pyongyang. You already know that South Korea, supposedly a U.S. ally, is even less willing to join your efforts. Seoul’s major worry is not a North Korean nuclear arsenal but the possibility of sudden regime collapse. A democratic revolution in the North, followed by a German-style unification, would deal a heavy blow to the South Korean economy. That’s why Seoul works to ensure that the regime in Pyongyang remains stable, while it enjoys newfound affluence and North Koreans quietly suffer.

Do not allow this status quo to persist. Lead the fight for change in North Korea. Here are some ideas to make it happen:

Realize a Quiet Revolution Is Already Under Way: For decades, the Hermit Kingdom was as close to an Orwellian nightmare as the world has ever come. But that’s simply not the case anymore. A dramatic transformation has taken place in North Korea in recent years that is chronically underestimated, particularly in Washington. This transformation has made Kim Jong Ii increasingly vulnerable to internal pressures. Yes, North Korea is still a brutal dictatorship. But compared to the 1970s or 1980s, its government has far less control over the daily lives of its people.

With the state-run economy in shambles, the government no longer has the resources to reward “correct” behavior or pay the hordes of lackeys who enforce the will of the Stalinist regime. Corruption runs rampant, and officials are always on the lookout for a bribe. Old regulations still remain on the books, but they are seldom enforced. North Koreans nowadays can travel outside their county of residence without getting permission from the authorities. Private markets, once prohibited, are flourishing. People can easily skip an indoctrination session or two, and minor ideological deviations often go unpunished. It’s a far cry from a free society, but these changes do constitute a considerable relaxation from the old days.

Deliver Information Inside: North Korea has maintained a self-imposed information blockade that is without parallel. Owning radios with free tuning is still technically illegal— a prohibition without precedent anywhere. This news blackout is supposed to keep North Koreans believing that their country is an earthly paradise. But, today, it is crumbling.

North Korea’s 880-mile border with China is notoriously porous. Smuggling and human trafficking across this remote landscape is rampant. Today, 50,000 to 100,000 North Koreans reside illegally inside China, working for a couple of dollars a day (a fortune, by North Korean standards). In the past 10 years, the number of North Koreans who have been to China and then returned home may be as large as 500,000. These people bring with them news about the outside world. They also bring back short-wave radios, which, though illegal, are easy to conceal. It is also becoming common to modify state-produced radios that have fixed tuning to the state’s propaganda channels. With a little rejiggering, North Koreans can listen to foreign news broadcasts.

But there are few broadcasts that North Koreans can hope to intercept. It was once assumed that South Korea would do the best job broadcasting news to its northern neighbor. And that was true until the late 1990s, when, as part of its “sunshine policy,” South Korea deliberately made these broadcasts “non-provocative.” There are only three other stations that target North Korea. But their airtime is short, largely due to a shortage of funds. Radio Free Asia and Voice of America each broadcast for roughly four hours per day, and Free North Korea (FNK), a small, South Korea-based station staffed by North Korean defectors, broadcasts for just one hour per day.

Being a former Soviet citizen, I know that shortwave radios could be the most important tool for loosening Pyongyang’s grip. That was the case in the Soviet Union. In the mid-1980s, some 25 percent of Russia’s adult population listened to foreign radio broadcasts at least once a week because they were one of the only reliable sources of news about the world and, more importantly, our own society A dramatic increase in funding for broadcasts by Voice Of America is necessary.  It is also important to support the defectors’ groups that do similar broadcasting themselves. These groups are regularly silenced by South Korean authorities, and they have to do everything on a shoestring. A journalist at the FNK gets paid the equivalent of a janitor’s salary in Seoul.  Even a small amount of money- less than U.S. military forces in Seoul spend on coffee-could expand their airtime greatly. With an annual budget of just $1 million, a refugee-staffed station could be on air for four hours a day, 365 days a year.

Leverage the Refugee Community in the South: There are some 10,000 North Korean defectors living in the South, and their numbers are growing fast. Unlike in earlier times, these defectors stay in touch with their families back home using smugglers’ networks and mobile phones. However, the defectors are not a prominent lobby in South Korea. In communist-dominated Eastern Europe, large and vibrant exile communities played a major role in promoting changes back home and, after the collapse of communism, helped ensure the transformation to democracy and a market economy. That is why the United States must help increase the influence of this community by making sure that a cadre of educated and gifted defectors emerges from their ranks.

Today, younger North Korean defectors are being admitted to South Korean colleges through simplified examinations (they have no chance of passing the standard tests), but a bachelor’s degree means little in modern South Korea. Defectors cannot afford the tuition for a postgraduate degree, which is the only path to a professional career. Thus, postgraduate scholarships and internship programs will be critical to their success. Without outside help, it is unlikely that a vocal and influential group of defectors will emerge. Seoul won’t fund these programs, so it will be up to foreign governments and non-governmental organizations to do so. Fortunately, these kinds of initiatives are cheap, easy to enact, and perfectly compatible with the views of almost every U.S. politician, from right to left.

Fund, Plan, and Carry out Cultural Exchanges: The Cold War was won not by mindless pressure alone, but by a combination of pressure and engagement. The same will be true with North Korea The United States must support, both officially and unofficially, all policies that promote North Korea’s Contacts with the outside world. These policies are likely to be relatively expensive, compared to the measures above, but cheap in comparison to a military showdown with a nuclear power.

It makes sense for the U.S. government to bring North Korean students to study overseas (paid for with U.S. tax dollars), to bring their dancers or singers to perform in the West, and to invite their officials to take “study tours.” Without question, North Korean officials are wary of these kinds of exchanges with the United States. However, they will be less unwilling to allow exchanges with countries seen as neutral, such as Australia and New Zealand. In the past, Pyongyang would never have allowed such exchanges to happen. But nowadays, because most of these programs will benefit elite, well- connected North Korean families, the temptation will be too great to resist. in-other words, a official in Pyongyang might understand perfectly well that sending his son to study market economics at the Australian National University is bad for the communist system, but as long as his son will benefit, he will probably support the project.

Convince Fellow Republicans That Subtle Measures Can Work: Some Republicans, particularly in the U.S. Congress, might object to any cultural exchanges that will benefit already-privileged North Koreans. And, for many, funding Voice of America isn’t as attractive as pounding a fist in Kim’s face. But these criticisms are probably shortsighted. As a student of Soviet history, you know that mild exposure to the world outside the Soviet Union had a great impact on many Soviet party officials. And information almost always filters downstream. A similar effect can be expected in North Korea. During the Cold War, official exchange programs nurtured three trends that eventually brought down the Soviet system: disappointment among the masses, discontent among the intellectuals, and a longing for reforms among bureaucrats. Money invested in subtle measures is not another way to feed the North Korean elite indirectly; it is an investment in the gradual disintegration of a dangerous and brutal regime.

North Korea has changed, and its changes should be boldly exploited. The communist countries of the 20th century were not conquered. Their collapse came from within, as their citizens finally realized the failures of the system that had been foisted on them. The simple steps outlined here will help many North Koreans arrive at the same conclusion. It may be the only realistic way to solve the North Korean problem, while also paving the way for the eventual transformation of the country into a free society. This fight will take time, but there is no reason to wait any longer.

Yonhap
4/2/2007

North Korea has welcomed the just-signed free trade agreement between the South and the United States on Monday, seeing its possible role of promoting an inter-Korean industrial complex in its territory, Pyongyang’s management body of the complex said.

In the trade pact, the two sides agreed to hold further negotiations on goods produced in the Kaesong industrial complex, which Seoul wants to be treated as made in South Korea.

Pyongyang sounded upbeat that the pact has left room for the inclusion of Kaesong goods in the trade deal.

“We welcome sincerely (the fact) that the South Korea-U.S. FTA agreement has prepared the foundation for the goods from the Kaesong industrial complex to be treated as made in South Korea,” the Kaesong Industrial District Management Committee, which oversees the joint project between South and North Korea.

The Kaesong complex, just a few kilometers north of the inter-Korean border, is one of two flagship projects the South operates in the spirit of reconciliation with the North following their historic summit in 2000. Over 11,000 North Korean workers are employed by dozens of South Korean companies producing garments, utensils and other labor-intensive goods. Another reconciliation project is the operation of tours to the North’s scenic Mount Geumgang.

South Korean companies operating in Kaesong say the inclusion of the goods in the FTA is crucial, as this will open the doors for their exports to the world’s largest market and will also provide a template for future trade deals with other countries.

Choson Ilbo
Yun Duk-min
3/19/2007

It was set off by a nuclear test. The Bush administration, which insisted it could not reward a wrong and wouldn’t conduct bilateral negotiations with North Korea, made a U-turn and promised the North political and economic compensation in bilateral talks. North Korea’s response has been equally astonishing. North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-kwan recently had a long meeting with former U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger. What he said sounds unbelievable. Expressing a deep interest in improving U.S.-China relations, he asked if the U.S. has “strategic interests” in North Korea and added, “The Korean Peninsula has been invaded by foreign powers like China and Japan. Strategic relations with the U.S. will be of help to North Korea and regional stability.”

The U.S.-China rapprochement early in the 1970s involved two factors. The U.S. wanted to use China’s strategic value to check the Soviet Union’s expansion, so it broke close relations with Taiwan in exchange for diplomatic relations with China. By the same token, it seems that North Korea is now willing to cooperate with the strategic U.S. interest of restraining China.

North Korea will inwardly have been concerned about its deepening economic reliance on China and increasing Chinese influence on its domestic affairs. In view of the rumors that China could be attempting a change in the North Korean leadership in the wake of the North’s nuclear test, the North may be trying to check the attempt by drawing in the U.S. As the U.S. abandoned Taiwan for the sake of diplomatic ties with China, North Korea may attempt to isolate and restrain South Korea through strategic relations with the U.S.

Kim Kye-gwan’s remarks suggest that the North intends to check South Korea and China by drawing in the U.S. Why does North Korea, after saying it only developed nuclear weapons because of the U.S., now embrace Washington to restrain the South and China? Having introduced a capitalist system in the 1970s, China is emerging as a serious threat to the North Korean regime. What’s more, Beijing in the wake of the collapse of the Berlin Wall forsook Pyongyang and established diplomatic ties with Seoul. South Korea’s rapid economic growth and democratization posed a threat of unification by absorption. In order to avoid either absorption by the South or becoming a Chinese satellite, Pyongyang needed two approaches; nuclear armament and establishment of strategic relations with Washington.

A close review of the 17-year process of negotiations on the North’s nuclear weapons development program clearly reveals North Korea’s intent. The only counterpart in negotiations was the U.S. But unlike the Clinton administration, which negotiated with North Korea directly, the Bush administration, with its top priority on the creation of a new order in the Middle East, had practically left the issue to China. Two aircraft carrier fleets are deployed in seas near Iran, but none came anywhere near the Korean Peninsula when North Korea test-fired missiles and tested a nuclear device. Thanks to its nuclear test, North Korea has now managed to bypass China and secure direct negotiations with the U.S.

Secondly, the North pledges to pose no threat to the U.S. if the latter tacitly approves its limited nuclear armament. It can relinquish long-range missiles capable of attacking America and will never transfer nuclear weapons or materials to third parties or terrorists, the North says. Thirdly, Pyongyang says it can recognize the U.S. forces on Korea. Already in 1991, the senior North Korean leader Kim Yong-sun, deceased in 2003, told high-ranking U.S. officials that North Korea could be a U.S. ally and recognize the USFK. Pyongyang has now only added its willingness to cooperate with Washington’s China strategy.

North Korea’s attempts failed so far because the North wanted both — strategic relations with the U.S. and nuclear armament. Without the premise of resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis, the U.S. could hardly accommodate that. But North Korea’s willingness to cooperate in restraining China must be a very interesting development for the U.S. Rumors are afoot that the U.S. may give tacit consent to the North’s nuclear armament. If the nuclear problem is shelved, it is possible for the U.S. to accommodate North Korea’s demands.

We are at a crucial juncture with denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. While the North endeavors to build a survival framework through nuclear armament and the help of foreign powers, we are bogged down in domestic bickering as to who will benefit more from a possible inter-Korean summit and a peace agreement. We must recognize that our principle of not tolerating any nuclear weapons on the peninsula could prevent a U.S.-North Korea compromise that would be unfavorable to us. North Korea, too, should realize quickly that the survival of its regime and the happiness of its people depend on its relations not with the U.S. but with South Korea, which accounts for two-thirds of the peninsula’s population and 99 percent of its economic strength. 

Donga Ilbo
3/10/2007

820 2nd Avenue, New York City. This is the address of the permanent mission of North Korea in the United Nations, the only North Korean diplomatic arena in the U.S. It is a four-minute walk from the UN headquarters and a two-minute walk from the permanent mission of South Korea to the U.N. It is located on the 13th floor of the “Diplomatic Center.”

About 10 North Korean diplomats including North Korean Ambassador to the U.N. Pak Gil Yon are working in this place. When you look at the list of member states of the U.N., you’ll find names like ‘Mrs. Pak’ and ’Mrs. Kim’ right below the list of North Korean diplomats. These are diplomats’ wives who help their husbands at the office by answering phones.

They live in an apartment on Roosevelt Island located on the opposite side of the U.N. headquarters. Many diplomats from poor countries such as North Korea and African nations live there because the rents are relatively inexpensive compared to those of Manhattan.

The diplomats except for Ambassador Park go to work together via minivan. Deputy Ambassador Kim Chang Guk is in charge of U.N.-related affairs and Minister of Political Affairs Kim Myong Gil handles U.S.-related issues. North Korean diplomats have a good command of English. Minister Kim’s English is fluent enough to communicate with reporters in English. Some young diplomats speak French as well.

However, during North Korea-U.S. talks, Choi Son Hee, a fellow researcher of North Korean Foreign Ministry, interpreted for the North Korean delegation headed by Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan. She is not only an interpreter but also a diplomat. Choi, who visited the U.S. for the third time, drew attention as an excellent interpreter.

North Korean diplomats are required to get permission from the State Department when they travel beyond the 30-mile limit from the Columbus Circle in Manhattan. When Ambassador Park has to go to Washington, he has to get permission.

Recently, Harvard University was going to invite Mr. Park to hold a forum but failed because the State Department did not issue permission. So the host tried to change the location to Columbia University, which is located within the 30-mile limit. .

South Korean diplomats contacting North Korean diplomats directly or indirectly say they are not financially abundant. It is said that ethnic Koreans who are friendly to North Korea help the North Korean representatives in one way or another. The North Koreans sometimes visit a Korean restaurant on the 32nd Street but not often. Some people say they saw them eat at a delicatessen.

North Koreans often use a Chinese restaurant just beside the North Korean mission when they have an official meeting. A lunch set menu costs about 40 dollars per person and the restaurant offers delicious food so that many South Korean diplomats visit the place. North Korea invited the U.S. delegation to the restaurant for lunch as a return courtesy.

The Korea Society sponsored a large sum of money for the 7-day stay of the North Korean delegation consisting of 7 members, and Stanford University`s North Korea expert group paid for the money needed for the stay in San Francisco. The National Committee on American Foreign Policy also chipped in. Non-profit organizations in the U.S. sponsored the delegation from hotels, restaurants and musicals, as well as round-trip flights from Beijing to San Francisco and New York.

The Korea Society, an organization founded by Korea experts dedicated to the promotion of greater awareness, understanding and cooperation between the people of the United States and Korea, says funding for its programs is derived from contributions, endowments, membership dues and program fees on its website. Many U.S. branch chiefs of Korean conglomerates such as Hyosung and Posco work in the board of directors, and many U.S. companies trading with South Korea sponsor the organization. The South Korean government is supporting it indirectly through the Korea Foundation. A 2004 document shows that the foundation gave 1.1 million dollars to the Korea Society.

Joong Ang Daily
Yeh Young-June and Ser Myo-ja
3/9/2007

The United States has already agreed to take North Korea off Washington’s list of states that sponsor terrorism and a follow-up development will happen soon, Kim Gye-gwan, North Korea’s vice foreign minister, said yesterday.

The United States is expected to release a new list in April. Mr. Kim said no conditions were placed on North Korea’s removal from the list.

After two days of talks in New York with his American counterpart, Christopher Hill, Mr. Kim arrived at Narita International Airport in Tokyo last night and spoke to reporters briefly on his way back to Pyongyang.

“Spring is coming, so the atmosphere will change,” Mr. Kim said, describing the first round of normalization talks as “constructive.”

He also said the discussion included North Korea’s cooperation in the investigation of a highly enriched uranium-based nuclear arms program.

Mr. Kim said he and Mr. Hill also discussed the possibility of arranging a foreign minister-level meeting among the two Koreas, China, Japan, Russia and the United States. “It will probably take place around April,” Mr. Kim said. “It is, however, not to upgrade the six-party talks. It is for the six ministers to get together to give momentum to the six-party talks.”

Asked whether Pyongyang will make more demands after financial sanctions on North Korean accounts in a bank in Macao, China are lifted, Mr. Kim said, “Just think that things are going well. Don’t try to know too much about it.”

Kim Jong Il’s Word
A U.N. agency yanks its cash and people from North Korea.
Wall Street Journal (Hat Tip One Free Korea)
3/5/2007

North Korean officials arrived in New York over the weekend for discussions on normalizing relations with the U.S. as part of the nuclear disarmament accord struck last month. Chief U.S. negotiator Christopher Hill is scheduled to meet today and tomorrow with his counterpart, Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan.

May we suggest that, before he sits down, Mr. Hill take a look at the brief statement issued quietly Thursday by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). There is no better guide to Kim Jong Il’s negotiating style, nor to the North Korean dictator’s habit of breaking his word. Nuclear negotiators, beware.

The agency announced, in an item on its Web site, that it is suspending all operations in North Korea because the “necessary conditions set out by the Executive Board on 25 January 2007 have not been met.” The UNDP’s 20 or so projects will be shut down, we’re told, and its eight international staffers will be pulled out of the country. The U.N. isn’t known for its tough love, and no one we’ve talked to can recall another example of the UNDP suspending operations in a country that refused to comply with the regulations.

The “necessary conditions” were imposed at the last board meeting in response to an outcry over the UNDP’s lack of oversight over its programs in North Korea. U.N. documents, produced reluctantly after prodding by the U.S. mission to the U.N., showed numerous irregularities dating back into the late 1990s. Tens of millions of dollars for programs that were supposed to help the poor appear instead to have been handed over to Kim’s dictatorship.

As the March 1 deadline for compliance approached, North Korea decided to throw a tantrum to see if it could get excused from its obligations. It deemed the conditions politically motivated–especially the one that limits aid to programs that directly help the people and bans assistance that could aid the government–and demanded a renegotiation.

Never mind that North Korea sits on the Executive Board and had agreed to abide by the terms thrashed out in January. To its credit, the UNDP refused to be bullied into extending the deadline and is holding Pyongyang to its commitments. The suspension applies to all existing projects; the board had already suspended new projects until an audit could be completed and better oversight provided.

The U.N. has another deadline fast approaching in North Korea. At the end of January, Secretary General Ban Ki Moon ordered a full investigation of all U.N. programs in North Korea, to be completed within three months. Those include Unicef, the World Food Program and the U.N. Population Fund. As the end-of-April deadline for that audit comes closer, it will be instructive to watch Pyongyang’s degree of cooperation.

Meanwhile, the talks on North Korea’s nuclear program are moving ahead, with the U.S., South Korea and Japan all holding bilateral meetings with Pyongyang this month toward the goal of normalizing relations. At the top of Japan’s agenda is the whereabouts of its citizens who were kidnapped by North Korean agents in the late 1970s and 1980s and forced to train North Korean spies. Negotiations with Pyongyang have so far yielded the return of only five abductees along with preposterous explanations for how the rest have supposedly died.

The preference in some diplomatic circles, including the U.S. State Department and perhaps now in the White House, is to dismiss the U.N. corruption in North Korea as well as the abductee and other human-rights violations as side-issues to the more vital objective of getting Kim to give up his nuclear program.

We’d argue that international focus on these issues is an essential part of keeping up the pressure on Kim’s regime. But even if you buy the argument that these are ancillary issues, there’s still an important lesson here: If Kim won’t abide by the pledges he made regarding UNDP aid to his country, how can he be expected to keep his promises on nuclear disarmament?

Former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. John Bolton lays out the troubling case of changing American intelligence judgments toward North Korea in The Wall Street Journal today (article available here). His point about the need for an intrusive inspection and verification regime is especially important. Under the six-party agreement announced on February 13, North Korea has 60 days to account for all of its nuclear programs. If it doesn’t, or if Kim attempts to renegotiate the terms at the last minute, we’d like to think the U.S. would show at least as much fortitude as the United Nations, and tell Kim to take a hike.

Ruediger Frank
Asian Perspective, Vol. 30, No.3, 2006 pp. 536

PDF Here: DPRK sanctions.pdf

Abstract:
This article explores sanctions as a policy tool to coerce North Korea’s behavior, such as by discontinuing its nuclear weapons program. It discusses the characteristics of sanctions as well as the practical experience with these restrictions on North Korea. It becomes clear that the concrete goals of coercion through sanctions and the relative power of the sending country to a large extent determine the outcome. Nevertheless, the general limitations of sanctions also apply, including the detrimental effects of unilateral and prolonged restrictions. It appears that the imposition of sanctions against the DPRK is unlikely to succeed. As an alternative way of changing the operating environment for North Korea, assistance deserves consideration. Despite many weaknesses, this instrument is relatively low in cost and risk, and can be applied continuously and flexibly.

Highlights below the fold:
(more…)

Yonhap
3/3/2007

North Korea’s top nuclear negotiator arrived in New York Friday to attend his country’s first working group session with the United States on normalizing their diplomatic ties.

Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan, leading a seven-member entourage, avoided reporters at the airport and is believed to have headed directly to a hotel.

He was expected to stay in a hotel near the U.N. headquarters, a location which is easy to reach from the North Korean mission to the global body.

The senior official is scheduled to begin the two-day working group session here Monday with his U.S. counterpart, Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, at the U.S. mission to the U.N. in Manhattan.

Kim is the highest-ranking North Korean official to come to the United States since Vice Marshal Jo Myung-rok went to Washington as his country’s special envoy in October 2000.

The vice foreign minister represents North Korea in the six-party talks over Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions, which also involve South Korea, the U.S., China, Russia and Japan. The envoys struck a deal on Feb. 13 under which Pyongyang would shut down its nuclear facilities and eventually disable them in phases. In return, the North would receive political and economic incentives provided by the other participating countries.

The agreement also established five working groups, including one on diplomatic normalization talks between the U.S. and North Korea.

Kim’s schedule has not been made public, but he is expected to attend a closed-door seminar hosted by the Korea Society, a New York-based nonprofit organization working for the promotion of friendship between the U.S. and South Korea, before the working group session begins.

The working group meeting is expected to focus on setting the agenda and schedules for future normalization talks and discussing a possible visit by Hill to North Korea.

The two sides are also expected to open discussions on removing North Korea from the U.S. list of terrorism-supporting nations, lifting sanctions and unfreezing North Korean assets in the U.S.

Kim began his week-long visit to the U.S. when he arrived in San Francisco early Thursday. He is known to have attended a closed-door seminar at Stanford University sponsored by various groups that have dialogue channels with Pyongyang. But the rest of Kim’s schedule in San Francisco was unavailable.

Meanwhile, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) announced that it had no choice but to suspend its operations in North Korea as of March 1 as the necessary conditions set out by the UNDP Executive Board on Jan. 25 have not been met.

“These conditions included adjusting the content of the current Country Program (2005-2006) and the proposed Country Program (2007-2009) for the DPRK to support sustainable human development objectives; ending all payments in hard currency to government, national partners, local staff and local vendors and discontinuing sub-contracting of national staff via government recruitment as of 1 March 2007,” said the U.N. agency on its web site.

But the UNDP noted that its position on operations in North Korea could be reconsidered if these circumstances change..

Korea Herald
3/1/2007

North Korea appears to have started complying with a recent nuclear disarmament agreement, but U.S. intelligence officials are telling skeptical lawmakers they will continue to watch the country’s actions closely.

Lt. Gen. Michael Maples, head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said Tuesday that officials had seen North Korea begin inspections of its main nuclear reactor, which the North pledged to shut down and seal in return for an initial load of fuel oil. More aid would follow once North Korean technicians had disabled its nuclear programs.

“There are parts of this nuclear program that we have to pay a lot of attention to, to see if we have the kind of disclosure and the inspection capabilities that we’re looking for,” he told the Senate Armed Services Committee.

He also said North Korea is technically capable of building a long-range missile that can hit the United States despite a test failure last year.

He said North Korea has probably learned from the failure of its Taepodong-2 missile during a test in July, and made changes to its other missiles.

“I believe they have the technical capability, as we saw by the Taepodong, but they have not successfully tested it yet,” he said.

Asked how long before North Korea would have a missile capable of reaching the United States, he said, “I would probably estimate it’s not a matter of years.”

The Bush administration was likely to face more tough questions on Wednesday, when the chief U.S. negotiator at North Korean disarmament talks, Christopher Hill, was to appear at a House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee hearing.

Many in Washington are deeply skeptical of the Feb. 13 agreement. Conservatives say it rewards North Korea for bad behavior.

In Seoul, a senior U.S. security official expressed “cautious optimism” that Pyongyang will take steps to disable its nuclear facilities and is coordinating with Seoul for progress.

“I think we have a good first start, and I think we are approaching with energy and with cautious optimism,” White House Deputy National Security Adviser Jack Crouch told Yonhap News Agency.

Amid lingering doubt that Pyongyang may backtrack, he said there are now “big differences – we have a coordinated policy with the five members of the six-party talks.”

Crouch was here to meet Seoul’s chief nuclear negotiator Chun Young-woo to coordinate on North Korea’s nuclear disarmament after a stop in Tokyo.

Foreign Minister Song Min-soon also met him before heading to the United States to meet with his U.S. counterpart, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, on Thursday.

A flurry of diplomatic efforts are underway to start carrying out the six-party agreement reached in Beijing on Feb. 13, in which North Korea pledged to shut down and eventually dismantle its nuclear facilities.

Japan said yesterday it will hold talks with North Korea next week in Hanoi, hoping for progress in a row over abductions that has led Tokyo to shun a six-nation nuclear deal with Pyongyang.

“After coordinating with North Korea, the first working-level talks for the normalisation of the Japan-North Korea ties will be held on March 7 and 8 in Hanoi,” Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuhisa Shiozaki told a press conference.

A prepatory meeting will be held in the Vietnamese capital on March 6, he added.

Japan is expected to use the forum to push for answers on the abduction of its citizens by North Korea, which says the issue is closed.

North Korea’s top nuclear negotiator Kim Kye-gwan is expected to arrive in the U.S. this week to meet his U.S. counterpart Christopher Hill in New York and discuss normalizing diplomatic relations. Their meeting may discuss removing the North from the U.S. list of terrorism-sponsoring nations, according to Crouch.

U.S. Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte is also set to visit the region next week, stopping in Japan, South Korea and China.