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Japan renews sanctions after rocket launch

Saturday, April 11th, 2009

From the National Comittee on North Korea:

On April 10, 2009 the Japanese government renewed sanctions on the DPRK that were set to expire on April 13. The sanctions, first implemented in 2006, ban entry into Japanese ports of all North Korean flagged vessels and charted flights between Japan and the DPRK, as well as ban, in principle, visits by Japanese government officials to the DPRK and visits by DPRK government officials to Japan. The sanctions also ban all DPRK imports and payments for imports from the DPRK. The 2006 sanctions, initially implemented for six months and renewed for six month periods thereafter, were renewed for a full year on April 10.

The Japanese government also instituted stricter reporting requirements on the amount of funds people in Japan can remit or transfer to the DPRK. The new regulations reduce the amount of funds that can be transferred undeclared to the DPRK from 30 million yen (US$298,000) to 10 million yen ($99,000). In addition, travelers can bring only 300,000 yen cash ($2,990) to the DPRK without reporting it; this is down from a previous limit of over a million yen.

Although the new reporting requirement has been called a “new sanction,” it does not seem to be a genuine sanction since it does not limit remittances to the DPRK. According to Xinhua, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Takeo Kawamura told reporters, “The measure is aimed at getting a clearer picture of fund flows to North Korea (DPRK).” He also said that the move is “appropriate giving consideration to the unsettled abduction issue.”

Japan considered but rejected a ban on all exports to the DPRK. Newspapers report that the Japanese government thought such a ban would have little impact.

And according to Bloomberg:

Trade between Japan and North Korea fell 97 percent to 793 million yen in 2008 — all in Japanese exports — from 21.4 billion yen in 2005, according to Japan’s Finance Ministry.

You can read the full Bloomberg story here:
Japan Imposes New North Korea Sanctions After Missile Launch
Bloomberg
Takashi Hirokawa and Toko Sekiguchi
4/10/2009

Posted in International trade, Japan, Statistics, Trade Statistics | Comments Closed

Chinese investment in DPRK

Wednesday, April 8th, 2009

Writing in the Wall Street Journal, Evan Ramstad offers some information on China’s investments in North Korea:

The diplomatic minuet is taking place after China increased trade with North Korea over the past four years. Last year, trade between China and North Korea jumped 41% to $2.79 billion, with most of that coming from increased exports by China.

On Tuesday, truck traffic between the two countries resumed after a break Monday for a Chinese holiday. Dozens of trucks made the crossing in Dandong, a major city along the North Korean border.

China has been North Korea’s chief political and economic sponsor since the Soviet Union collapsed nearly 20 years ago. For much of that time, it served as donor of last resort, making up the difference when energy, food and donations to North Korea dropped off from other countries. That often amounted to $100 million to $200 million in aid.

China broke from that pattern in 2005 by boosting its exports and widening its trade surplus with North Korea. Outside experts view China’s trade surplus as the chief measure of its economic aid to North Korea because North Korea has no measurable debt instrument and little ability to narrow the trade gap.

Chinese companies, sometimes with help from the Chinese government, are investing heavily in North Korea’s mining industry, construction and light manufacturing such as textiles. Chinese consumer goods line store shelves and market stalls in North Korea.

Many executives of Chinese companies in North Korea say it’s a difficult place to operate. Among the challenges: getting money out of the country. China helped Panda Electronics Group, based in Nanjing, start a computer assembly factory with Taedong River Computer Corp. in North Korea five years ago.

North Korea’s currency, the won, can’t be converted. To move money out of the country, Panda must buy commodities in North Korea and sell them in China for cash, an executive said.

The increased business activity in North Korea reflects China’s desire to treat North Korea more as a “normal country” rather than a socialist brother entitled to unlimited assistance, scholars and analysts in China say. They say China also hopes its companies in North Korea will encourage the North’s government to open its economy as China began to do in the 1980s.

Wang Kai, a manager of Liaoning Fuxin Tianxin Technology and Development Co., says the company decided to build a pipe-making factory in North Korea because the country’s economy has few places to go but up.

“North Korea’s situation and economic status are pretty similar to China’s before the start of the opening up and reform policy,” Mr. Wang said in an interview before the rocket launch.

Others note China’s desire is to prevent North Korea’s collapse, which might pour refugees into China’s northeast.

The increased business is yielding a payoff in political influence for China in Pyongyang that’s become more important since North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il was incapacitated by illness in August. One signal that Mr. Kim was back in control came when he met in late January with a delegation of visiting diplomats from Beijing.

Read the full story here:
Economic interests shape Beijing’s Pyongyang Policy
Wall Street Journal Online
Evan Romstad
4/8/2009

Posted in China, Construction, Foreign direct investment, International Aid, International trade, Light Industry, Manufacturing, Mining/Minerals | 2 Comments »

Seoul stock market at 5.5 month high…

Wednesday, April 1st, 2009

UPDATE: According to the Wall Street Journal, Friday was even better:

The Korea Composite Stock Price Index, or Kospi, gained 6.78 points, or 0.5%, to end at 1283.75. The index is up 3.7% on this week following last week’s 5.7% gain.

“Improving economic data and overnight gains in offshore markets lent support to the market, but Asian markets generally lagged U.S. and European peers as they needed to slow down after steep gains over a short period,” said Kim Hak-kyoon, an analyst at Korea Investment & Securities.

“But the upward march has not stopped and foreigners continued to show strong appetite for local stocks again today,” added Kim.

Meanwhile, market participants didn’t react much to news that North Korea may launch a rocket as early Saturday.

“Isn’t it the fact that North Korea will launch a rocket? The key to determine the mood in the financial market will be how South Korea and the U.S. will handle the case. So far market participants, in particular foreigners, don’t seem to worry too much about that,” said Kim at Korea Investment & Securities.

Market analysts continued to treat the potential missile launch as a short-term event to the financial market.
“North Korea’s main goal seems to be to push for a lifting of current sanctions and get economic aid flowing by showing off its ability to attack the mainland of the U.S.,” said You Seung-min, an analyst at Samsung Securities. “In reality any direct military clash seems to be unlikely….The stock market will likely return fast to its normal track after experiencing short-term volatility caused by the launch.”

ORIGINAL POST:Just the news I expected (sort of). According to Reuters:

Meanwhile investors largely ignored news that North Korea had begun fueling a long-range rocket it plans to launch between April 4-8, starting a process that experts say means the rocket will be ready for lift-off in three to four days.

“Yes, the North will probably launch the missile, and that certainly can’t be good. But markets will probably bounce backafter a couple days as they always do…market participants have learned over time to remain calm to North Korea-related developments,” Lee added.

Read the full articles here:
S Korean Shares End Tad Up On Econ Recovery Hopes
Wall Street Journal
Soo-Kyung Seo
4/3/2009

Seoul shares hit 5-½ mth high;North news ignored
Reuters
Jungyoun Park
4/1/2009

Posted in Military, South Korea | 1 Comment »

Limits of the “Lips and Teeth” Alliance: New Evidence on Sino-DPRK Relations, 1955-1984

Monday, March 30th, 2009

From the Wilson Center’s North Korea International Documentation Project:

The North Korea International Documentation Project is pleased to announce the publication of the latest addition to NKIDP Document Reader Series, Limits of the “Lips and Teeth” Alliance: New Evidence on Sino-DPRK Relations, 1955-1984.

The collection was specially prepared for the joint NKIDP-United States Institute of Peace conference, North Korean Attitudes Toward China: A Historical View of Contemporary Difficulties, and contains newly obtained documentary evidence on North Korea’s relations with China throughout the Cold War from Russian, (East) German, Albanian, and Hungarian archives. The 24 documents contained in the reader shed new and invaluable light on Pyongyang’s perspective of the Sino-DPRK relationship, and may force a reevaluation of the U.S. strategy of relying on China’s political leverage over North Korea to resolve contemporary disputes over North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs.

Limits of the “Lips and Teeth” Alliance: New Evidence on Sino-DPRK Relations, 1955-1984 was edited by NKIDP Coordinator James Person with indispensable assistance from Tim McDonnell. NKIDP is part of the Center’s History and Public Policy Program directed by Dr. Christian Ostermann. This publication, like all NKIDP publications, was made possible by a generous grant from the Korea Foundation and is available for download free of charge from the NKIDP website.

Download a PDF of the NKIDP reader here.

Posted in China, North Korea International Documentation Project (NKIDP) | Comments Closed

The first red Koreans

Friday, March 27th, 2009

Writing in the Korea Times, Andrei Lankov points out the interesting history of Koreans within the early communist movement:

The [Russian] revolution was followed by the Civil War which lasted to 1922, and during this conflict few ethnic groups supported the Communist Red Army with the same devotion and enthusiasm as the Koreans.

Some 8,000 Koreans joined the Red forces. This might not appear to be a large number, but the ethnic Korean community was roughly 100,000 strong in 1917, so it means that roughly one out of four able-bodied males joined the Communist army.

In most cases these people were volunteers, not draftees: for a long time, the Russian Far East was beyond the reach of the regular Red Army, so operations were conducted largely by guerrillas who relied on wide popular support.

At the same time, there were very few ethnic Koreans who chose to fight on the other side, with the anti-Communist Whites.

Such enthusiasm for the militant left was easy to explain. First, the battle cry of the Communists was “land to the farmers!” Most Koreans were farmers, but they often faced serious discrimination.

Russian authorities preferred to give land to the ethnic Russian settlers whose plots were then often toiled by Korean tenants. The Communists explicitly promised to change the situation by distributing land equally among all people who needed it.

Second, Koreans faced a certain amount of discrimination in old Russia, and Communists, being patiently anti-imperialist and anti-racist, promised that in a Communist Russia there would be no ethnic or racial discrimination whatsoever.

Third, in the Russian Far East the anti-Communist forces were supported and supplied by the Japanese. A large Japanese expeditionary force was actually dispatched to Siberia.

Taking into consideration that most Korean intellectuals (and nearly all politically active Korean leaders) had been active in the national liberation movement, they naturally enough became allies with their enemies’ enemy, that is with the Reds ― even if they did not initially harbor much sympathy for the Communists’ radical social program.

Thus, the Koreans entered the red guerrilla ranks in large numbers ― and in the early Communist armies they knew how to indoctrinate soldiers.

A number of those people, especially Russian speakers, soon became devoted Communists and active propagandists of the new teaching among their fellow Koreans.

The first prominent leader of the Korean Communists was a woman, Alexandra Stankevich (Nee Kim). Actually, she was more Russian than Korean in culture and education.

Her Korean father, a fluent Russian speaker and a professional interpreter, died when she was very young, and the girl was adopted by her father’s friend and his Russian family.

Alexandra received a good education, married (unhappily) a Russian man whom she later divorced, and traveled far across Russia.

From around 1915 she became very involved with underground socialist politics. In 1917-18 she was a prominent Communist leader in the maritime province and also a chief foreign policy negotiator for the local Communist government.

When in 1918 the government was overthrown by the Whites and their Japanese allies, Alexandra Kim was captured and killed.

Around the time of Alexandra Kim’s death, Yi Tong-hwi, a former officer of the Korean army, and by then a guerrilla commander, established the first Korean Communist group, called the Korean Socialist Party.

This happened in the city of Khabarovsk, and most party members were local Russian Koreans. Soon afterward, Yi Tong-hwi was even invited by Lenin to have a discussion about the Korean situation, in Moscow, and his small group became the first sprout of the Korean Communist movement, which for better or (more likely) worse influenced Korean history for the next hundred years.

Read the full story here:
First Red Koreans
Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
3/26/2009

Posted in Russia | Comments Closed

EU backs radio broadcasts into DPRK, RoK backs VOA

Friday, March 27th, 2009

Several foreign organizations are broadcasting radio content into North Korea: Free North Korea Radio, Open Radio for North Korea, Radio Free Chosun, Voice of America and Radio Free Asia.

According to Yonhap, the EU government and Reporters Without Borders (RSF) are throwing financial support behind FNKR, ORNK, and RFC:

The European Union (EU) and an international group of journalists forged a deal on Tuesday to provide 400 million won (US$290,000) to help anti-Pyongyang radio broadcasting stations run mostly by defectors from North Korea.

The EU and the Reporters sans Frontiers (RSF) signed the deal with three stations — Free North Korea Radio, Open Radio for Korea and Radio Free Chosun — in Seoul to fund their programs for the next three years.

The stations have been producing and sending shortwave anti-communism and human rights radio broadcasts across the border. In the past, North Korea has asked South Korea to suspend the stations, calling them an obstacle to unification.

In a related Associated Press story, the South Korean government is allowing Voice of America access to South Korean transmission equipment for the first time since the 1970s:

That makes the signal much clearer than VOA’s long-running shortwave broadcasts from far-flung stations in the Philippines, Thailand and the South Pacific island of Saipan. Moreover, it’s an AM signal, so listening in doesn’t require a shortwave radio.

“Radio can play a big role in changing people,” said Kim Dae-sung, who fled the North in 2000 and is now a reporter at Free North Korea Radio, a shortwave radio broadcaster in Seoul. “Even if it’s simply news, it’s something that North Koreans have never heard of.”

Still, the move could be seen as yet more provocative policymaking by a government already at loggerheads with the North over Lee’s tough policy on Pyongyang, and comes at a time of heightened regional tensions over North Korea’s plans to launch a rocket early next month. Nuclear envoys from South Korea and Japan flew to Washington for talks Friday with top U.S. diplomats about North Korea.

Since Jan. 1, VOA has been using the antenna facilities of the Far East Broadcasting Company-Korea, a Christian evangelical radio station, for half of its three-hour nighttime broadcast into the North. The antenna is only 40 miles (65 kilometers) from the border.

South Korea prohibited VOA from broadcasting from its soil for carrying a 1973 report on the kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung, then a leading South Korean dissident. The authoritarian Seoul government at the time is widely believed to have been behind the abduction.

North Korea condemns such broadcasts as “U.S. psychological warfare” and often jams the signals. So far, it has not interfered with VOA’s new AM broadcast, said radio expert Park. Doing so requires more equipment than blocking shortwave signals, and the fact that North Korea isn’t doing so may indicate the North is struggling economically, he said.

Read the full stories here:
EU, reporters promise 400 million won to promote radio broadcasts into North
Yonhap
3/24/2009

VOA wins powerful base for broadcasts into NKorea
Associated Press (via Herald Tribune)
3/28/2009

Posted in Communications, EU, Radio | 2 Comments »

European insurers and LinkedIn nervous about the Swiss

Friday, March 20th, 2009

Over the last few years, the European Union has pursued an engagement policy with North Korea. MEP Glyn Ford makes regular trips to Pyongyang to facilitate diplomatic progress; the German Freidrich Naumann Foundation runs economic education courses; European donors founded the Pyongyang Business School; and a small group of European ex-pat businessmen formed a de facto chamber of commerce, the European Business Association in Pyongyang. Although European companies have experienced mixed success in the DPRK they continue to look for new opportunities.

This morning, however, Felix Abt, a Swiss director of the PyongSu Pharmaceutical Joint Venture Co. in Pyongyang informs me that his life insurance policy (purchased from a European company) has been cancelled.

“A European life insurance company cancelled my life insurance because I am a dangerous person living in a dangerous country. Credit card organisations cancel credit cards for such persons in such countries, health insurance companies come up with other reservations and limitations and the latest organisation that has just expelled me is LinkedIn with a very curious explanation.”

I am unsure how the cancellation of life insurance policies could impact other Europen investments in the DPRK, but the marginal effect cannot be positive. Mr. Abt has been a resident of Pyongyang for years where he manufactures Western-quality pharmaceuticals. Needless to say, the DPRK is very much in need of his services, so it is a shame that after all this time he is now considered a liability by his insurer.

Mr. Abt also forwarded his rejection from the business networking site LinkedIn, which is posted below:

Apparently LinkedIn‘s legal department considers logging into the server as “receiving goods of US origin” (the software I presume), and so it prohibits account holders, or even logging in, from Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan and Syria—even if they are Swiss.

Posted in Economic reform, EU, European Business Association, Foreign direct investment, GPI Consultancy, Health care, Manufacturing, Pharmaceuticals, PyongSu Pharma, USA | 6 Comments »

Currency Conversion during Korean Unification

Wednesday, March 18th, 2009

Writing for the Brookings Institution’s Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, Yeongseop Rhee, Nonresident Fellow in Foreign Policy, takes on the topic of eventual currency union between North and South Korea, assuming that the two Koreas will eventually be unified and that the unification will follow a rapid process rather than a gradual one.

Under these conditions, Rhee discusses the complications of determining a proper conversion rate for the DPRK won, rejecting the official and black market rates, ultimately determining that an undervlued DPRK won conversion rate is preferable to a situation in which the DPRK won is converted at a rate above its true exchange value (a la German reunification). Quoting from the article:

The decision on a conversion rate will depend upon which policy objective is the most important. Considering their relative impacts and past experiences, I suggest that price/macroeconomic stability and competitiveness of North Korean industries should have the high priority: undervaluation of North Korean currency is therefore more desirable.[3] The experiences of other socialist countries show that inflation was one of the most difficult problems at the beginning of economic reforms. Even though the details of each country’s reform path depend upon the state of the economy, price/macroeconomic stabilization has to be the initial priority. Once price/macroeconomic stability is guaranteed, foreign capital – which North Korea eagerly needs for its successful transformation and development – can be attracted.

The undervaluation of North Korean currency is also desirable in terms of labor migration. According to studies on German unification,[4] the most important reason for migration from East to West was not the high incomes in West Germany, but the lack of job opportunities in East Germany. This implies that the overvaluation of North Korean currency to improve the standard of living of the North Korean people would cause more migration because of suffering competitiveness of North Korean firms and job opportunity, and would further place a higher burden on the government budget.

The author then goes on to address the timing of monetary unification (rapid vs. delayed conversion), prefering to emulate the German model of early conversion. Quoting from the article:

First, most proponents of a late currency union argue that currency unification needs to be delayed for a few years until North Korean economy is stabilized and improves to a certain level. However, a temporary delay of a few years will not guarantee the improvement of the North Korean economy to a certain level but is more likely to lead to its deterioration. Even though the North Korean economy may improve, it actually must grow much faster than South Korean economy for a long time to reach a certain compatible level. For example, even assuming North Korean economic growth of 10 percent per year – which would be extremely difficult – it will still take nearly one generation for North Korean per capita income to reach one half of the South Korean level. This suggests that it is impossible to improve the North Korean economy to a certain level compatible with South Korea’s within a few years. Thus, in terms of feasibility, an early union is better.

Second, a gradual strategy for economic reform and opening, such as China has chosen, would not be applicable to North Korea. In comparison with China, North Korea is over-industrialized like Eastern European countries. In this type of economy where the state sector is dominant, there is little reserve of labor outside the state sector that can provide the engine for growth for a new non-state sector, and gradualism cannot work in that context. A sharp downturn in industrial production upon the outset of market reforms is inevitable, and a significant loss of employment in the industrial sector should be expected and accepted as a structural adjustment in North Korea. Thus, the unified fiscal and monetary policy framework to promote structural reforms should be prepared as soon as possible through an early currency union.

Third, according to the theory of optimum currency area, if there exists an adjustment mechanism such as flexible prices and wages or other measures to absorb asymmetric shocks, it is more likely for two countries to form an optimum currency area. When the two Koreas are unified, large fiscal transfers from South Korea to North Korea can play that role of adjustment mechanism because asymmetric shocks to North Korea can be compensated by these fiscal transfers. The two Germanys could form an optimum currency area after the unification because of the centralization of the fiscal system. Thus, as long as fiscal transfers are guaranteed, which will be a sure fact in the case of Korean unification, the loss of the exchange rate policy instrument would not matter much in terms of absorbing asymmetric shocks, and an early monetary union is preferable.

Read the full article on the Brookings web page here.

(more…)

Posted in Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, South Korea | Comments Closed

DPRK preparing for spring fertilizer shortages

Wednesday, March 18th, 2009

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-3-17-1
2009-03-17

North Korea, facing chronic food deficiencies, is again looking at fertilizer shortages as the spring farming season approaches. North Korean authorities and farmers are particularly troubled by the fact that, just as last year, the likelihood of receiving chemical fertilizer aid from the South is practically non-existent.

A February 26th (North) Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) article titled “Korea’s Effort to Overcome the Food Problem” reported strenuous efforts were underway to “independently” overcome the lack fertilizer in order to ease food shortages throughout the nation. According to the KCNA, “While giving on-the-spot guidance at the Heungnam Fertilizer Complex, Comrade Kim Jong Il explained that in order to ease the food problems, much fertilizer needs to be sent to farming villages.” In addition, it was explained that organic fertilizer production needs to be stepped up in order to compensate for the lack of chemical fertilizer. The report added, “The People’s Army as well as enterprises, institutions, villages, and civic organizations across the country are sending farming utensils and compost to agricultural villages.”

According to Tae-Jin Kwon, leading researcher at the Korea Rural Economic Institute, North Korea drastically increased chemical fertilizer imports from China in order to prepare for the possibility of a continued hold on South Korean fertilizer aid, purchasing approximately 40 times more fertilizer at the end of last year and this January than it imported during the same period a year earlier. According to Chinese customs statistics, North Korea imported 25,608 tons of fertilizer between November 2008 and the end of January 2009. During the same period a year prior, North Korea imported a mere 635 tons. Kwon stated that the reason for this sharp increase in chemical fertilizer imports was a measure to stockpile necessary amounts of resources in preparation for the eventuality that South Korean fertilizer aid would not be forthcoming.

During this same period, North Korea imported 12,694 tons of Chinese grains, a notable drop from the 108,109 tons imported one year ago. Kwon argued that this was a reflection of North Korea’s advance import and stockpiling of grain in light of last year’s Chinese measures restricting the export of grain, and the fact that this spring, fertilizer is a more pressing need.

“If South Korean fertilizer aid to the North is not forthcoming this year, it will have a severe impact on the North’s grain production. This is already reflected in grain prices within North Korean markets, and could serve to drive them up even further.”

Over the last 10 years, more than 65 percent of the fertilizer used in North Korea has been provided by the South, with Seoul providing between 300 and 350 thousand tons each year. This is enough to boost North Korean grain production by 600 thousand tons annually. Kwon pointed out, “North Korea owes its increasing grain production since 2000 to South Korean fertilizer aid.”

He went on to add, “Even if the missile situation were resolved and an atmosphere conducive to dialog could be created within 6-Party Talks, the South Korean government would not be able to open dialog with North Korea until after April,” and, “If dialog were reestablished and aid transport were arranged, in order for fertilizer to be effective it would have to be sent to North Korea by May, at the latest.”

Posted in Agriculture, Agriculture statistics, Food, South Korea, Statistics, Trade Statistics | Comments Closed

DPRK scales back humanitarian work

Monday, March 16th, 2009

Below are excerpts from the Financial Times:

Pyongyang has told Washington that United Nations World Food Programme [WFP] staff will be barred from distributing food aid after March. The Stalinist regime has also told US non-governmental organisations to leave this month, and rescinded permission for other humanitarian groups to visit, the Financial Times has learned.

In an agreement last year, the US agreed to provide North Korea with 500,000 tonnes of food. The WFP was responsible for distributing 400,000 tonnes, with a consortium of NGOs led by MercyCorps in charge of the remainder.

…

In recent months, however, after North Korea refused to allow sufficient numbers of Korean speakers to join the WFP team, Washington halted food supplies.

Pyongyang has responded by barring food aid workers from operating in the country. So far, the US has supplied 100,000 tonnes to the WFP, and another 70,000 tonnes to the NGOs, which has not been completely distributed.

A US State Department official said that while the US was satisfied with the number of Korean speakers who were allowed to join the NGOs, it was unhappy that the same situation was not true for the WFP, which is responsible for distributing 80 per cent of the food. In addition to MercyCorps, the other NGOs are World Vision, Global Resource Services, Christian Friends of Korea and Samaritan’s Purse.

The official said the US was also responding to North Korea blocking aid workers from conducting a nutritional survey, which was included in the agreement.

“US aid workers have enjoyed tremendous co-operation in the countryside from North Koreans and we hope the DPRK government in Pyongyang will allow them to continue to feed the hungry,” said a Senate aide involved in North Korean issues. “Food aid should be separated from politics.”

Even before the North Korean threat, WFP had been forced to scale back operations because of the break in US funding. The WFP has only received 4.5 per cent of its $504m budget for North Korean operations. A WFP spokesperson said 4.5m of the 6.2m North Koreans targeted under the programme were not receiving assistance as of December.

“WFP hopes that the US will review the humanitarian situation and that food shipments will resume soon,” the spokesperson added.

North Korea recently informed the US that Eugene Bell, World Care and Kirk Humanitarian – three other US NGOs operating in North Korea – would not be allowed to make visits that were already approved. Pyongyang told the US that the planned visits were being cancelled because of “recent developments”.

Nancy Lindborg, president of MercyCorps, said North Korea sometimes temporarily blocked NGOs from visiting. However, she added that she was “hopeful and confident” that the visits would resume. She said her consortium had a “good working relationship” with its North Korean partners.

Read the full article here:
N Korea-US distrust halts food aid
Financial Times
Demetri Sevastopulo
3/17/2009

Below: State Department Briefing, Mercy Corps Press Release
US State Dept press briefing
Robert Wood, Acting Department Spokesman
March 17, 2009

QUESTION: Do you have anything to say or to confirm about North Korea cutting off or saying it does not want U.S. food aid —
MR. WOOD: Yeah.
QUESTION: — and kicking out U.S. NGOs over an accelerated timeline?
MR. WOOD: Yeah, yeah. North Korea has informed the United States that it does not wish to receive additional U.S. food assistance at this time. And we will work with U.S. NGOs and their North Korean counterparts to ensure that food that’s already been delivered – excuse me, food that’s already in North Korea is distributed to the intended recipients. And one of the things I also want to mention is that we have aimed to implement the U.S.-DPRK food aid program according to the terms agreed to by the United States and the North Korean Government in May 2008.
And I will give you just a breakdown in terms of the amount of food aid that we have provided. The U.S. has delivered 169,000 metric tons of U.S. food to North Korea in 2008 and 2009. The last shipment of U.S. food aid, which was nearly 5,000 metric tons of vegetable oil and soy blend, arrived in North Korea in late January and is being distributed by U.S. NGOs.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) of that?
MR. WOOD: Of which one, the 5,000 metric tons? Yeah, I am sorry. I don’t have any – any value here. We can try and get that to you in the Press Office.
QUESTION: Could you say when you were notified of this and how you were notified?
MR. WOOD: I don’t know, but it was obviously communicated to us by the North Koreans. I don’t know how that was done, whether it was done through the New York channel or some —
QUESTION: (Inaudible)?
MR. WOOD: Yeah, I just – I don’t know.
QUESTION: Last week maybe?
QUESTION: Just a clarification?
MR. WOOD: Yeah.
QUESTION: You said it’s being distributed by U.S. NGOs or UN NGOs?
MR. WOOD: U.S.
QUESTION: U.S.
QUESTION: Of the (inaudible) metric tons, what is it of? Is it grain? Is it – what is it?
MR. WOOD: Well, I’ll have to get the specifics on it, but I refer to our last shipment of U.S. food, which was, you know —
QUESTION: Oil and soy blend.
MR. WOOD: That’s right. I don’t have that breakdown. We can certainly try and get that for you, Sue.
QUESTION: Okay. .
QUESTION: (Inaudible), are you disappointed in this?
MR. WOOD: Of course. Absolutely. I mean, this was a program intended to try to help get food to needy North Koreans, and we’re obviously disappointed in that. This, you know, does not help us implement this agreement that we reached with the North back in 2008, so —
QUESTION: Well, not only does it not help you implement it, it kind of – I mean, are they abrogating the agreement?
MR. WOOD: Well, I don’t have the actual text of the agreement, so I can’t say with absolute specificity that they’re in violation of it. But we have an agreement to try to deliver, you know, this food assistance, and now the North is saying they do not want to receive any more assistance. So you know, we’re concerned about it.
But the food that is there right now in North Korea, we’re going to work with U.S. NGOs, with their North Korean counterparts, to make sure that this assistance gets to the people who —
QUESTION: Can you be a little bit more explicit about why you’re concerned about it, why you’re disappointed?
MR. WOOD: Well, I mean, clearly this is food assistance that the North Korean people need. That’s why we’re concerned. You know, this humanitarian assistance that we provide to the North has nothing to do with the Six-Party Talks. This is about our true humanitarian concern for these people. And as you know, the food situation in North Korea is not a good one, and so we’re very concerned about it.
QUESTION: Did they give you any explanation why they won’t – they didn’t want any more?
MR. WOOD: They have just said that they do not want to receive any additional food assistance at this time. That’s about as far as they went.
QUESTION: But no reason was provided at all? Just a one-sentence note you got?
MR. WOOD: I mean, it’s – I don’t know if it was one sentence that was given to us, but you know, that was the bottom line. And that’s the most important part of this.
QUESTION: And when did they inform you?
MR. WOOD: It was, I think, over the last couple of days, I believe.
QUESTION: Robert, do you know what the accelerated timeline for the withdrawal of the NGOs will be?
MR. WOOD: I don’t know.
QUESTION: It was supposed to be the end of May.
MR. WOOD: Yeah, I don’t know. Again, probably the best folks to address that are the North Koreans.

Press Release by relief organizations:
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

March 19, 2008

STATEMENT OF NGO PARTNERS ON CESSATION OF FOOD AID PROGRAM IN THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)

Contacts: Joy Portella, +1.206.437.7885, [email protected]

March 19, 2009—The following is a statement issued by the NGO Partners that have been distributing food aid in the DPRK through a program supported by the U.S. Agency fro International Development (USAID). The NGO Partnership is led by Mercy Corps, co-led by World Vision, and includes Christian Friends of Korea, Global Resource Services and Samaritan’s Purse:

This week, North Korean authorities have asked us to close the USAID-supported food assistance program that we have been operating since June 2008. Our joint team, dedicated to this program, will leave the DPRK by the end of March.

We are saddened by this decision, but are very proud of what the program has accomplished. Working closely with our North Korean partner, we have ensured that food reached almost one million vulnerable children, pregnant and nursing mothers and the elderly.

Each of our organizations has worked in the DPRK for more than a decade. We remain committed to assistance in that country, and our individual, on-going programs focused on health, water, sanitation and agriculture will continue as before.

The NGO Food Assistance program is part of a larger 500,000 metric ton initiative supported by USAID in which the World Food Program was to distribute 400,000 metric tons of food and the NGO Partners were to distribute 100,000 metric tons. In the ten months of this program, 169,000 metric tons of food has been delivered to the DPRK, of which the U.S. NGOs have brought in 71,000 metric tons of food. This food from NGOs has benefitted more than 900,000 people in the two north west provinces of Chagang and North Pyongan.

This has been a model program with unparalleled monitoring cooperation to ensure that food gets to those most in need. Our in-country staff of 16 people has worked closely with our North Korean partners.

The NGO food assistance program was scheduled to run until the end of May 2009. Until the end of the month, we will work with our North Korean partners to ensure a proper close-out.

We remain committed to helping the people of the DPRK to overcome hunger and improve their lives. The food program resulted from the tremendous humanitarian need in the DPRK. We will continue to work—as individual agencies and in cooperative partnerships—to address these needs. We hope the success of this program will serve as a model for the future.

Posted in Christian Friends of Korea, Eugene Bell Foundation, Food, International Aid, Mercy Corps, Samaritan's Purse, UN, UN World Food Program, USA, World Vision | 2 Comments »

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