North Korean Economy Watch

Asia Times
Andrei Lankov
7/13/2007

Over the past couple of weeks, the small community of Seoul-based Pyongyang watchers was busy discussing a minor professional sensation. The Wolgan Chungang monthly, widely known for its good insights on all things North Korean, published a lengthy transcript of a speech, allegedly delivered last December, by a high-level Central Committee official. He was obviously talking to a group of prominent academics and engineers. The official’s name is cited as Chang Yong-sun, but he seems to be a complete unknown to the North Korea experts.

The authenticity of the transcript cannot be proved beyond doubt, but the Seoul expert community tends to believe that this tape was indeed secretly recorded somewhere in Pyongyang a few months ago and then smuggled to the South.

Being a former Soviet citizen, this author is inclined to believe this view as well. The tape rings true. This is how a high-level official would talk when lecturing lower layers of elite on the current situation, and such regular lectures were typical for many communist countries.

The semi-privileged met the bigwigs to get instructions on recent events, as well as some alleged insiders’ stories and anecdotes. The semi-privileged cadres felt themselves partaking in the enigmatic world of grand politics, and also learned something about the new trends in their leadership’s thinking about the world.

Most people who deal with “Chang’s lecture” concentrate on those parts of the lengthy presentation that deal with US-North Korea relations and the six-party talks on nuclear disarmament. Indeed, such issues are treated at great length by this document. Many others pay attention to rather unfavorable depictions of the Chinese or outbursts of threats against Japan.

However, I believe that there are more important things in the transcript than merely a North Korean version of what happened during former assistant secretary of state James Kelly’s visit to Pyongyang or during the first rounds of the six-party talks. The tape allows us to have one more glimpse at the world view held by the North Korean elite or, at least, by its lower reaches.

What are the features of the world as seen from Pyongyang? First of all, the significance of North Korea is blown out of all proportion. Somebody would describe this as Pyongyang megalomania, but perhaps author Bruce Cummings found a better term when he talked about “North Korean solipsism”, an assumption that North Korea lies at the center of the world, and that the world itself surely must be aware of this.

The North Korean press now tells its readers that the major international conflict of the modern world is the ongoing struggle between US imperialism and heroic North Korea. Chang Yong-sun even told his audience that the development of North Korean missiles has produced a serious impact on the public-health issues in the US: “Nobody can intercept our missiles now. All the people in the US are aware of this.

“This is why all the people in the United States are completely allergic to missiles of our republic. Once they learn that we test-fired missiles, they become so worried about the rockets changing their directions and exploding over them and killing them, so they develop nervous diseases and nettle rash breaks out all over their bodies. This is what is happening in the United States.”

One should not feel too sorry about the bastards, however. According to the official North Korean world view, once again reiterated by Comrade Chang, the US is responsible for everything that goes badly in Korea, and the constant military threat from the warmongering Washington is the major fact of North Korean life.

The audience was reminded that in 1950 it was the Americans who attacked North Korea, bringing death and destruction to the country (this official version of 1950 events seems to be almost universally believed by North Koreans). This great crime of 1950 has not been avenged yet, Comrade Chang reminded his listeners.

Many people in the US want to believe that such hostility stemmed from President George W Bush’s policies, but Comrade Chang reminded his audience a number of times that there is no real difference between the Republicans and Democrats: both US parties are pathologically hostile to the Country of the Beloved General. The differences between them are of a purely tactical nature, Chang Yong-sun told his audience. He said Republicans rely more on brute force, while Democrats are more canny and more willing to use ideological subversion and economic pressures.

Chang Yong-sun repeated a number of times that the major threat from the US is not that of a sudden military attack. The imperialists are not that simplistic: these days their major weapon is internal subversion. He said: “Although it appears as if the Americans do good things to us, their real nature has not changed at all. Their primary objective is, from start to finish, to undermine us from within and melt us down by disarming us ideologically.”

Chang Yong-sun repeated the message that has been delivered countless times by North Korean leaders big and small: the ideological threat of the outside world constitutes a greater danger than all imaginable military threats. He alleged that the foreign enemies have designed some grand plan of subversion. Chang said specially designated think-tanks work on this issue day and night. If his fantasies are to be believed, one of such centers is somewhere in Washington and employs no fewer than 370 retired generals whose only job is to find ways to undermine North Korea from within.

Being an enthusiastic supporter of soft power, the present author knows perfectly well that there is no coordinated plan of applying soft pressure on Pyongyang. The amount of money and efforts spent on broadcasts aimed at North Korea, on support of refugee groups and other similar activities, is ridiculously small. It is a dream to have a US research center specifically dealing with North Korean issues and stuffed with even, say, five post-doctoral candidates (let alone with 370 ex-generals).

But this raises a question: If this the case, why do Pyongyang politicians keep repeating similar statements? Why do they refer to a non-existent threat? Perhaps because they know what they should be really afraid of. They know only too well how potentially precarious against such a challenge their position is, and they probably cannot even believe that their adversaries fail to appreciate the major vulnerability of Pyongyang and do nothing to exploit the related opportunities. Comrade Chang would be really surprised to learn how weak and disorganized are actual efforts of the “class enemies” in the area that he (perhaps correctly) considers decisive.

Some twists of Pyongyang’s official mindset might come as a surprise to many readers. For example, Comrade Chang found a source of great pride in the North Korean penchant for secrecy. He used one peculiar example to explain why this secretiveness is great. According to him, the Americans defeated the Iraqis because they imitated the voice of Saddam Hussein and then sent fake orders to Iraqi troops in his name.

However, as he proudly reminded everyone, Marshal Kim Jong-il had spoken in public only once, so Americans will never find enough material for their perfidious schemes. The entire secrecy is necessary to keep foreigners at a disadvantage: “A long time ago, the Great General taught us to make sure that our internal things appears to be hazy as if covered by fog when the Americans spy on us. So we have made sure that internal things of our country appear really hazy as if in a fog when our country was viewed from outside.”

It is remarkable that the country’s economic woes are explained in a novel way, which was made possible by the nuclear test. Until 2006, North Koreans were supposed to believe that the only reasons for the recent famine were huge floods that “might happen only once a century”. Now it is admitted that the government needed money for missile and nuclear development, and hence had no other choice but to sacrifice some people to save the nation.

Chang Yong-sun said: “To be frank with you, even if one sells 50 plants as large as Kim Ch’aek Steel Mill, the money is not enough to develop a missile. During the ‘arduous march’ [Pyongyang-speak for the famine of the late 1990s], if there [was] a bit of money, it had to be spent on developing missiles, even though the generals knew that factories did not work and people were starving. This is why we have survived, and were not eaten up by those bastards. Had it not been like this, the bastards would have eaten us a long time ago.”

This line of argument is psychologically more powerful than the earlier version. Nowadays, people’s suffering can be presented not as the result of some blind misfortune caused by nature, but as a part of heroic sacrifice. People died because their country was at war and needed everything to save itself from complete destruction by the brutal enemy. Their deaths were those of heroes.

Such a change of tune is indeed typical of North Korean propaganda during the past few months. However, it might have some political consequences. This propaganda line makes it more difficult to surrender nuclear weapons even if such a notion will ever be seriously entertained by Pyongyang. If North Korea chooses to give up its nuclear arsenal, these sacrifices will be rendered meaningless.

Another propaganda line is that now people should expect a certain improvement of their lot, since the major work has been done: “Now we have conducted a nuclear test and other things, so we have to improve the people’s living standards by concentrating on economic construction.”

Still, Comrade Chang does not want his audience to entertain an excessively optimistic picture of their country’s future. Improvement will be minor and, as one might guess from some other parts of the speech, is likely to be limited to, say, complete reintroduction of Kim Il-sung-era consumer standards, which were not exactly luxurious (550 grams or cereal a day, plus a few pieces of meat on special occasions, four or five times a year).

Chang Yong-sun explained that North Korean industry is surely capable of producing quality consumption goods but cannot do it, because the ever present threat of an imperialist attack deems austerity and sacrifices necessary. He also made clear that his listeners should not await serious improvement of their lot any time soon.

The statement resonates very well with what another life-long analyst of North Korean propaganda, Tatiana Gabroussenko, wrote recently: unlike earlier eras when masses were extolled to make sacrifices for the sake of some identifiable future, nowadays North Korean leaders tell their people that no significant improvement is in sight. Comrade Chang even made a joke of this: “Since the end of the Korean War, we have lived with our belts tightened … One thing I can assure you: we’ll have to live with our belts tightened until the day our country is unified. If we do not have any more holes in our belts, let us make them.”

However, the audience was reminded that in the final count it is again the foreign forces who are to be blamed for these hardships. To quote Comrade Chang once again: “It is not because we do not know how to live better that we are not well off. Who is responsible for this? The US imperialists are responsible for this. That is why we call the US imperialists our mortal enemy with whom we cannot live under the same sky!”

Most of the speech consisted of US-bashing and Japan-bashing, but what about South Korea? Here Comrade Chang used the new tactics that have become typical for North Korean propagandists since the 2002 inter-Korea summit. Brian Myers, another remarkable specialist on North Korean culture and propaganda (not quite distinguishable areas, actually), recently wrote at length about a change of tune in Pyongyang propaganda: South Korea ceased to be depicted as the living hell, the land of depravation. The new image of the South is that of the country whose population secretly (or even not so secretly) longs to join its Northern brethren in their happiness under the wise care of the Beloved General.

This society might be relatively affluent, but it is inherently corrupt and lacks integrity, so its population knows that the only way to regain the moral purity is to join the spiritually superior North Korean civilization. The only force that prevents the South from achieving such happiness is the brutal US occupation army and a tiny handful of traitors on the Central Intelligence Agency payroll, but even those perverts are losing control over South Korean society.

Sometimes Chang’s fantasies went positively wild. He said, for example: “A portrait of the General is [respectfully] placed on the wall of the Main Hall on the fourth floor at the [Seoul] Government Building. Right now!” Then the flight of fantasy goes even further: “These days, South Korean publications do not sell in South Korean society if they do not carry the images of the General … 45% of the entire population in South Korea say that in case of a war they will fight on the side of the General.”

The domestic situation did not attract much of Chang Yong-sun’s attention, but he still made some comments on these issues. He admitted that even last December, in spite of all the government’s efforts, it was impossible to provide rations for the entire population, and that most people had to rely on the market for their needs, which is not good but was unavoidable.

He also explicitly stated that growth of the markets is not compatible with the socialist system: “All the people’s talk is money and again money. Is this socialism?” It is remarkable, however, that the virtues of socialism were seldom mentioned in the speech: its rhetoric was overwhelmingly nationalistic.

Chang Yong-sun also admitted that some North Koreans are very rich, and that their fortunes are now measured as a few hundred million North Korean won (100 million won is roughly equivalent to US$50,000). He did not make a secret that under less critical conditions the government would strike these reactionary elements hard, but under the current circumstances such a radical solution is impossible because of ongoing economic difficulties.

In essence, he admitted that government is not capable of controlling society as tightly as it wishes (or as it used to in the good old days of Kim Il-sung’s ultra-Stalinist rule): “Those ideological perverts are no longer counted as our people. Why are we not able to strike [them]? We are not able to strike them because we are not able to provide rations to the entire population.”

So the picture is quite clear. North Korea as depicted by Comrade Chang is a small but proud state that lives under the constant threat of annihilation by brutal enemies, betrayed by money-hungry allies. It fights for a great goal of national unification. There are signs that this goal is getting nearer, but people should not expect too much: life will not become easy any time soon.

Compromise with enemies is impossible since they, especially the Americans, will never change their nature, will never stop dreaming about destroying the small and proud republic led by the Beloved General. However, the country has finally developed military means that make all enemies’ schemes powerless. This project required great sacrifice, but the people who died during famine were in essence soldiers: their deaths saved many more lives.

There are internal problems in this society, largely because the government lacks resources to make sure things move smoothly (and it is assumed that government should be ultimately responsible for everything). However, these problems should not distort the larger view of ongoing heroic struggle and new victories.

Dr Andrei Lankov is an associate professor in Kookmin University, Seoul, and adjunct research fellow at the Research School of Pacifica and Asian Studies, Australian National University. He graduated from Leningrad State University with a PhD in Far Eastern history and China, with emphasis on Korea. He has published books and articles on Korea and North Asia.

Korea Herald
7/12/2007

North Korea has ordered the closure of karaoke bars in an apparent attempt to stem outside influences on the isolated communist country, AP reported, quoting a South Korean civic group as saying Wednesday.

Separately, the North’s Ministry of People’s Security conducted house-to-house overnight inspections in areas near the border with China earlier this month to search for cell phones and illegal video CDs, the Good Friends aid agency said in a newsletter, according to the report.

It reported that the ministry said in a directive last week that the move against karaoke outlets was a ”mopping-up operation to prevent the ideological and cultural permeation of anti-socialism,” according to the aid group.

Violators were warned they would face punishment, including deportation to other regions within North Korea.

The group did not say how it obtained the information. Its previous reports on the North’s isolated regime have been reliable.

It was not clear how many karaoke bars the country has.

AP said officials at South Korea’s top spy agency, the National Intelligence Service, were not immediately available for comment.

Daily NK
7/13/2007

Even in North Korea, there are a variety of fine dining restaurants. Of these restaurants the number 1 and finest restaurant catered for Kim Jong Il is located at his private villa. Undoubtedly, the dishes placed on Kim Jong Il’s dining table are nothing less than sumptuous.

Next there is a seafood restaurant in Pyongyang and Hwanggeumbul (golden field) Restaurant which is targeted at foreigners. The Okryu-kwan in Pyongyang is also one of the restaurants reaping in foreign money.

North Korean restaurants of these standards can also be found in foreign countries such as in China, Australia, Vietnam or Cambodia.

Nonetheless, for the majority of North Korean citizens, restaurants such as these are no different to a pot of gold at the end of the rainbow. In North Korea, entering through restaurant doors itself is a special occasion. Further, there aren’t many restaurants with formal entrances hence it is rare that common people enter restaurants.

The average North Korean eats from the restaurant visible in this footage. The restaurant looks rather empty.

Though this is a restaurant, there are only 3 tables. Nonetheless, this is a place where North Korean people can go to fill their hunger. It seems that a person ordered a bowl of noodles as the waitress delivers a large tray of food.

There aren’t many side dishes. Nevertheless, a grandfather and grandmother eat their food with gratitude.

Electricity is not available regularly in North Korea. Hence, there does not seem to be any globe as such on the ceiling to even provide light. Electricity in North Korea is yet another dire issue.

Many people boast of Pyongyang to be a glamorous and fashionable city as there are many beautiful workers and numerous catchy restaurants.

Though there are restaurants where you can have a bowl of rice soup and radishes, there is another need to address the issue that dining five times at such simple restaurants would cost a person a whole months wage.

Free North Korea Broadcasting, a broadcast operated by defectors has been broadcasting 10 part series on the lives of North Korean people. The video footage was filmed last August by an inside source in North Korea.

Bloomberg
Bradley Martin
7/10/2007

A black Volkswagen Passat with smoked windows glides down a suburban Pyongyang road. Its license plate begins with 216 — a number signifying Kim Jong-il’s Feb. 16 birthday, and a sign the car is a gift from the Dear Leader.

Even without a 216 license plate, a passenger sedan bestows VIP status in a country where traffic is sparse and imports are limited by external sanctions and domestic restrictions alike.

Just across the border, South Korea is the world’s fifth-largest automotive manufacturer. To an ordinary North Korean, though, a private car is “pretty much what a private jet is to the ordinary American,” says Andrei Lankov, author of a new book “North of the DMZ: Essays on Daily Life in North Korea.”

He estimates there are only 20,000 to 25,000 passenger cars in the entire country, less than one per thousand people.

Discouraging private car ownership is not just a matter of ideology in a communist country, Lankov said in a phone interview from Seoul, where he teaches at Kookmin University. The passenger car, usually black and chauffeur-driven, “is the ultimate symbol of the prosperity of high officials,” he says. They keep the vehicles scarce “so everybody knows they are the boss.”

Measuring, copying

North Korea moved early — shortly after the Korean War, and ahead of the South — to mass produce trucks and 4-wheel-drive Jeep-type military vehicles. Craftsmen took apart imported Soviet tractors, trucks and utility vehicles, measuring the parts to make copies.

The indigenous civilian passenger-car industry, too, mostly made knockoffs of models produced elsewhere. After importing a fleet of Mercedes-Benz 190s, the country produced replicas under local model names into the 1990s. Unfortunately, the domestically-made copies were dogged by reports about “terrible overall quality,” says Erik van Ingen Schenau, author of a new pictorial book, “Automobiles Made in North Korea.”

Lee Keum-ryung, a former used-car trader who defected from North to South Korea in 2004, agrees. The knockoffs came with “no air conditioning, no heater, and they’re not tightly built or sealed,” he says. “If you drive out of the city and return, your car will be full of dust. It’s like an oil-fueled cart.” Lee, 40, uses a pseudonym because he fears repercussions from North Korea.

Slow recovery

Material and energy shortages that accompanied a famine in the 1990s brought state-run factories to a halt. Recovery has been slow, and Schenau said he believes even domestic production of Jeep-style vehicles has been replaced by imports from Russia and China.

Imports have similarly come to dominate what passes for the passenger-car market. Used cars — mostly Japanese-made — are the mode of transit for many members of the new trading and entrepreneurial class that has emerged in the last couple of decades. Under a loophole in the country’s long-standing private-car ban, these vehicles typically enter the country disguised as gifts to North Koreans from their relatives in Japan’s Korean community, Lankov says.

Lee says “a relative abroad” helped him buy his first car when he was 23. “But as an ordinary person, I couldn’t keep it under my name, and I didn’t have a number plate of my own,” he says. “A friend was a high police official with many cars under him. I borrowed a plate.”

‘A very affluent life’

Lee had “a very affluent life” before he defected, importing 10-year-old cars from Japan and selling them both in North Korea and, for a time, across the border in China. “I had money, status,” he says. “I enjoyed everything people my age could have.”

A small passenger vehicle for which his agent paid $1,500 at the docks in Japan would sell for $2,500 to $3,000, Lee says. A bigger car — say, a Toyota Crown — might cost him $4,000 to $5,000; he would sell it for $8,000.

While Japanese trade figures show annual exports of some 1,500 passenger cars, mostly used, to North Korea in 2005 and 2006, the total for this year is zero. After Kim’s government tested a nuclear device last October, Japan placed passenger cars on a list of banned luxury exports.

Perhaps as a sign of displeasure with Japan’s sanctions, Kim ordered most Japanese cars confiscated, according to a February 2007 dispatch by South Korea’s Yonhap news agency. The order, if it indeed was issued, hadn’t been carried out by the time of a May visit to Pyongyang, when a number of Japanese cars could be seen.

German inroads

When a European-made import passes by, it’s often owned by the state, used by high officials and foreign dignitaries. Sweden’s Volvo had a hefty market share in the 1970s; Germany’s Audi and Volkswagen have made inroads lately. Mercedes is particularly well-represented in Kim’s personal fleet of hundreds of vehicles, according to Lee Young Kook, a defector who served in Kim’s bodyguard force.

In a 2003 Yonhap story, Lee said the security-conscious leader traveled in motorcades of identical cars to confuse would-be assassins and generally maintained 10 units each of any model so five would always be road-ready.

With the nation’s access to imports constricted, a relatively new player in the market, Pyonghwa Auto Works, has attempted to fill the gap. The company was created when Seoul-based Pyonghwa Motors, which began as a car importer affiliated with Rev. Sun Myung Moon’s Unification Church, teamed up as majority partner in the 70-30 venture with the North Korean state-owned trading firm Ryonbong Corp.

Kits of parts

The first assembly line was set up in 2002 at the west coast port city of Nampo to produce, from kits of parts, a version of the small Fiat Siena, called the Hwiparam (Whistle) in Korean.

So far, the factory has built about 2,000 cars and pickup trucks, according to Noh Jae Wan, a spokesman in Seoul for Pyonghwa Motors, who said it is the only manufacturer now turning out passenger cars in North Korea. According to a February announcement by Brilliance China Automotive Holdings, Pyongyhwa has agreed to let Brilliance use part of the Nampo plant to assemble Haise minibuses.

While some news accounts have mentioned the possibility that the North Korean cars may eventually be sold in the South, “this will take time,” Noh said in an interview. “It can only happen when the two Koreas reach some significant agreement on trade or other international circumstances change.”

Daily NK
Kim Min Se
7/9/2007

Pyongsung, a city located in the province of South Pyongan has recently been targeted as a scientific city transformed into distribution hub.

In the late 1960’s, North Korean authorities established Pyongsung as an area for scientific research with a population of 300,000.

In Pyongsung, there are 25 scientific research centers beginning with a nature centre. Further, there is Pyongsung Scientific University and a training centre for scientists and engineers. Pyongsung lies on the outer-skirts of Pyongyang near the districts of Soonan, Samsuk and Yongsung.

Park Chan Joo (pseudonym) a North Korean tradesman on business in Dandong, China introduced the changes occurring in Pyongsung in a telephone conversation with reporters.

Park currently works as an employee for the Myungjin Trade Company and imports goods needed for everyday living into North Korea.

Park said, “All goods made from China pass through Shinuiju and are generally dispatched from Pyongsung to each region for sale. This includes eastern regions such as Hamheung and Wonsan. Of course traders from Sariwon, Haeju and Nampo in southern provinces also come to Pyongsung to receive their goods.”

Regarding Pyongsung which developed into a distributor of imports, Park said, “The delivery cost is double if goods made from China pass through Shinuiju and are delivered directly to eastern and southern regions. However, stopping over at Pyongsung can make a profit on time and cost effective.”

Further, he said, “It’s close to eastern regions and in the vicinity of southern regions. This area has increasingly become an intermediary wholesalers district with the rise of warehouses.”

Park said, “We are located right next to Pyongyang where the population is greatest. Also, many Pyongyang citizens with high standards of living compared to other regions come and buy the goods.”

“It only takes about one hour to travel from Pyongyang to Pyongsung via car or train. Tradesmen and citizens must obtain a travel permit to enter Pyongyang, but any North Korean citizen can easily come to Pyongsung with an ordinary identification card. Nowadays, you can travel to any special district (excluding Pyongyang and border regions) as long as you have an identification card” he added.

Also, Park said “There are more and more people wanting to living in Pyongsung because of trade” and informed, “All this happened as Pyongsung changed into a centre for wholesalers. Even up until a few years ago, it wasn’t so hard to live in Pyongsung, but now you have to pay thousands of dollars to move in the area to Pyongsung’s People’s Safety Agency (police).”

As Pyongsung emerged into a distributors haven, more and more long distance bus services have been operated connecting rural districts to Pyongsung city.

Kim Jong Hoon (pseudonym) a Shinuiju resident who came to Dandong to visit his relatives said, “People with money hire second hand buses made from China and register the vehicle at the traffic registry and operate the services while offering some profits” and “It takes 3 days to get from Shinuiju to Dancheon in South Hamkyung. It took me 3 days to go to Pyongsung, then from Pyongsung to Wonsan and then Wonsan to Dancheon.”

Presently, the only direct bus services in operation from Pyongsung are to Shinuiju, Wonsan, Sariwon, Nampo and Haeju.

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 07-7-9-1
9/7/2007

The North Korean city of Pyongsung, situated in the South Pyongan province, is undergoing a transformation. Previously known as the center of North Korean scientific research, it is now becoming a distribution hub for goods imported from neighboring China. Pyongsung, with a population of approximately 30,000, was established by DPRK authorities in the mid 1960s in order to serve as a center for scientific studies. It is a satellite city on the outskirts of Pyongyang, bordering the Soonan, Samsuk, and Yongsung areas of the capital. The Institute of Natural Sciences and 24 other scientific research centers are located there, along with the Pyongsung College of Science and numerous scientific and technical training facilities.

These days, most Chinese imports being brought into the country through Shinuiju are coming though Pyongsung before being sold to various regions throughout the country. Traders from the east-coast cities such as Hamheung and Wonsan, as well as Sariwon, Haeju, Nampo and other areas regularly travel to Pyongsung in order to stock up on goods.

Located close to eastern cities and bordering southern provinces, Pyongsung is becoming the new distribution center of Chinese goods due to the considerably lower cost of delivering wares through Shinuiju and directly to these regions. This new route is much more lucrative in terms of both cost and time. Therefore, the number of wholesalers erecting warehouses and filling orders in the city has been growing quickly.

Pyongyang, the capital city with a population greater than any other city in the North and a higher standard of living than the rest of the country, is only one hour away by train or car, and so many Pyongyang residents have been purchasing high-end goods from there.

Traders and ordinary North Koreans need a travel permit with an approval number in order to enter Pyongyang, but anyone can easily travel to Pyongsung with only a general registration permit. In recent times, North Koreans can travel throughout the country with only a resident permit, with the exception of some particularly sensitive areas such as the border region or the capital city. Recently the number of people wishing to live in Pyongsung in order to trade has been on the rise. Only a few years ago, it was relatively easy to move to Pyongsung, but today someone wishing to relocate in this new market must hand over several thousand dollars. 

Daily NK
Kim Song A
7/5/2007

“In North Korea, the up and coming wealthy class is increasing with each day. They will try to preserve the military regime to keep their property.”

A Russian expert analyzed that while a majority of North Korean citizens are barely sustaining their livelihoods and are suffering from extremely grim realities of life, the rich who are eating and living well are consistently rising and will become the main foundation for the maintenance of North Korea’s military-first ideology and political power.

Sergey Kurbanov, a Korean Studies Research Head at Russia’s University of Petersburg, participated in a seminar held by Seoul University’s Reunification Research Institute on the 4th. “In North Korea, in the minds of “socialist capitalists” which is what the up and coming wealthy class are called, socialist ideology already does not exist.”

Kurbanov pointed out the reality of their living situation, “I have seen students going to China from North Korea and as soon as they arrive in China, they take off their red tie. When they return to the North, they do not even touch the in-flight meals, saying they are no good.”

The newly rising wealthy class who have amassed their money from North Korea’s and China’s trade, etc., despite the fact their confidence in political power has already dissipated, resist regime change because their gains from the Kim Jong Il regime is significant.”

Kurbanov said related to North Korea’s plan for a successor, “As Kim Il Sung remains an eternal Leader, Kim Jong Il will also remain as an eternal general. Even if there is no successor, they will ensure that the regime will work well.”

He said, “Whether it is Kim Jong Il’s son or somebody else is not important. To whomever Kim Jong Il hands the rights of a successor, that power cannot surpass Kim Il Sung nor Kim Jong Il.”

On one hand, Kurbanov upheld regarding North Korea’s military politics, “Historically, this has risen due to the threat received from the Han and Tang Dynasties in China,” and the reign of the military was for the protection of the regime.

He said, “The reason why North Korea has stressed “sovereignty and the juche” is that historically, their mentality of fear is strong regarding threat from the outside. In order to prevent this, the individual, no matter what kind of a difficulty he is going through, can make a sacrifice.”

From such a perspective, he stipulated, “North Korea is not socialist, but a traditional society wearing socialist clothing.”

He emphasized, “Kim Jong Il received the seat of power as a military leader and the Military-first politics is the background for which Kim Jong Il is legally a North Korean leader.”

Daily NK
Kim Min Se
7/5/2007

A counselor of Korean Association against Drug Abuse, Lee Mee Young said, “Drugs are a snare of destruction which give huge suffering to addicts themselves, families, relatives, and neighbors.”

Such drug addicts are rapidly increasing in North Korea. Misuse of drugs with the spread to average civilians as well as the newly rich upper class has become very serious.

Situation #1. Handle drugs due to stress.

Hong Mun Hwa (pseudonym), who became wealthy all of a sudden by acquiring a large sum of money from North and Chinese trade in Chongjin, was a man who was faithful to his family. Three years ago, Mr. Hong started backsliding when he put his hands on Philopon (called “ice” in North Korea).

Jung Myung Ki (pseudonym), brother-in-law of Mr. Hong, said, “Ever since he started touching drugs, his business also became ruined. Mr. Hong was not able to keep appointments and his eye for business became totally went downhill. He turned into a stupid person.”

The story Mr. Jung revealed was this.

“I realized that my brother-in-law was addicted to drugs when I rode together with him a year ago from Chongjin to Shinuiju. Of course, I knew that most people who have money do drugs, but I was frankly quite surprised that a good person such as my brother-in-law became addicted. He ultimately died from a heart attack due to drugs. I even hid the fact from his wife that he was addicted to drugs until after his death.”

However, Mr. Hong, who started drugs at his first try, was gradually dissatisfied with Philopon alone, so started trying “pills” (heroine). According to Mr. Jung, Mr. Hong, in the course of the trade car ride from Chongjin to Shinujui, took Philopon at 5~8 hour increments.

Mr. Hong died from heart attack at the beginning of June in Shinujui, saying, “I will try to make up for lost sleep” and took a large quantity of “pills.”

Situation #2: Taking drugs in private steam baths…even prostitution

The evil influence of drugs in Hamheung, relayed by North Korean civilian Kim Myung Gil (pseudonym), who came to China from Hamheung to visit relatives, is even more shocking. Hamheung is the mass production center of Philopon.

Mr. Kim said, “People who are selling Philopon by trade and are making a living is increasing in Hamheung. The mother of a middle school classmate sold Philopon and even though she initially earned money, the mother and my friend both became addicted later. Not only my peer, but there are many cases where families had to scatter and sell their houses due to drug addiction.”

According to Mr. Kim, the steam bath business is currently booming in Hamheung.

In the steam bath, electricity comes on for 24 hours. Electricity is transferred via a power cable which is connected by giving a bribe to the power distribution plant. Mostly, there are private baths or rooms in the steam baths, and inhalation and prostitution are supposed to take place here. If one gives money to the steam bath operators, then they provide Philopon and even bring a female prostitute.

He said, “One does not have to show his or her citizen card when entering the steam bath and do not need to leave their names, so it is an ideal place for delinquent men and women to do drugs.”

The inspection unit haphazardly handles situation while taking bribes…decrees repeat, “Absolutely Executions”

The current North Korean government has not come up with a way regarding the civilians’ drug sales and taking dosages. Occasionally, the Party issues the decree and inspection unit to prevent drug sales and usage, but they have not been able to exterminate drug deals.

Mr. Kim said, “The Party issued the order last year to capture drug offenders and carry into execution, but even they sweep matters under the table upon receiving bribes.”

He added, “If inspection occurs because drug smugglers earn such a significant amount of money, then the dealers give 3,000~5,000 dollars worth of money at one time. Even if inspection units have come down from the Party, people are easily won over if they receive such a large sum of money.”

Kim Jung Ae (pseudony), Korean-Chinese businesswoman who goes to Pyongyang and Shinuijui often said North Korea’s drug offense regulations cannot be known.”

Mr. Kim said, “In China, a rule exists which decrees drug sales or possessions over 20g to be punishable by death. However, North Korea does not seem to have a regulation about the exact number of grams of possessions or sales which are punishable.”

He explained, “In order to control drugs, punishment has to differ for one-time usage, two-time usage and above, and the amount of grams of possessions or sales. However, because North Korea repeats every time it announces a decree, “A person who makes or sells drugs is punishable by death,” “we cannot kill all drug takers and proper regulation cannot even be carried out.”

Mr. Kim lamented, “If detailed laws regarding the North Korean government’s strong will for regulation is not made, the evil influence of the citizens’ drug use cannot help but to increase at a fast speed.”

Daily NK
Yang Jung A
7/3/2007

A North Korean insider source relayed on the 2nd that citizens’ complaints have been rising because the North Korean government recently gave guidelines to sell a portion of products which have been selling with popularity at the jangmadang (markets) only at state-operated stores.

This source, who resides in North Pyongan, revealed in a phone conversation with DailyNK, “Recently, plastic floors have been popular, so “plastic sales” is earning a lot of money. However, government authorities have mandated that the commerce office directly oversee plastic floors and that they be sold at state-operated stores.”

The insider relayed, “Families above middle-class have been showing a lot of interest in acquiring furniture. Besides floors, drawers on which TV can be placed and cabinets displaying wines and others are very popular.”

Previously, floors made of paper covered the floors of houses, but since North Korean civilians’ standard of living started rising recently, Chinese-made plastic floors decorated in flowers is drawing popularity.

He said, “Rumor has been leaking that pork (1,700 North Korean won per kg), the price for which has declined recently, is also directly managed by the commerce office, along with plastic floors.” “Besides this, the complaints of merchants have been rising since rumor starting circulating that the list of items to be overseen by the office will increase.”

He added, “Would they want to do any business given that individual sales are discouraged and turned over to national control when sales go even remotely well? There are grievances due to the fact that earning a livelihood through jangmadang sales is not even allowed, on top of the lack of provisions.”

Further, he said, “Regulations regarding people engaging in “Chapan-Jangsa (sales by trucks)” using privately-owned buses or trucks exceeding eight tons have begun. If one is caught, the vehicles become registered as national property and the vehicle owner receives a salary from the country instead.”

“Chapan Jangsa” refers to carrying out wholesale while ferrying the load on trucks. The “plastic floor” and “Chapan Jangsa,” along with what is popularly known as “ice (drug) sales” are counted are the top three business that brings in the most amount of money.

“The complaints of people are high, but the scope of regulation is wide-ranging, so there are people who think that the inspections will stop after several times.”

Even guideline to prevent wearing of wedding dresses

He also said, “Since October 2006, there were even guidelines to prevent wearing of wedding dresses at weddings. Not only wedding dresses, but wearing white gloves were also prohibited.”

In North Korea, wearing wedding dresses at weddings became a trend seven to eight years ago. Nowadays, many civilians are known to wear them. Even if they do not wear wedding dresses, North Korea’s general wedding culture is donning flowers on the chest part of dresses and on the head and putting on white gloves.

Additionally, the insider relayed, “The size of the flower of the groomsmen and the bridesmaids should not be bigger than the groom’s and the bride’s. The flower of the groom and the bride is fixed at 7cm and the flower of the groomsmen and bridesmaids fixed at 5cm. In the case with those who go against the orders and get their pictures taken after marriage, the photo volunteer in charge’s volunteer card (employment permit) can be revoked.”

Korea Times
Tong Kim
7/1/2007

Recently I visited Gaeseong with a South Korean humanitarian group that provides anthracite for fuel to underprivileged people in both Koreas. The group carries out a voluntary campaign in the name of “sharing love and anthracite.’’ It so far has provided the poor with over ten million pieces of processed anthracite.

Our trip to Gaeseong was to deliver another 50,000 pieces of processed anthracite in five large trucks. From Seoul we drove only about 45 minutes to reach the southern border of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). I had passed through the Panmunjeom Joint Security Area a couple of times traveling to Pyongyang before, but it was the first time for me to travel on the paved direct highway to the Gaeseong Industrial Complex.

Upon arrival at the Bongdukni railroad station _ about a few miles north of the complex _ we were welcomed by the vice chairman of the Gaeseong People’s Committee, who appreciated the provision of anthracite as well as our offer to help North Koreans unload the anthracite.

From Bongdukni we went to Gaeseong City, where we visited several famous historic sites of the old capital of the Goryeo Dynasty (918-1392), including the Seonjuk bridge, where the stain of bloodshed by a king’s royal servant remains, still detectable. Standing at the courtyard of Sungkyunkwan, which was the dynasty’s highest royal educational institute, were gigantic ginkgo trees more than a thousand years old.

The buildings were impressively well maintained. On display inside the buildings were neatly arranged historical artifacts, which help visitors see what life was like in Korea a millennium ago. With other cultural assets, like the royal tombs and an old Buddhist temple, I thought Gaeseong would present itself as an excellent tourist attraction.

Then we went to a “hotel district’’ where many traditional tiled Korean homes remain undamaged as if they had never withstood the Korean War. An able tourist guide told us that these buildings are now used as lodging for tourists. We were led into one of the homes, where we had a good traditional dinner served in Korean brassware.

From there we went to the complex, which I knew was controversial from a political perspective since its inception. Opponents ask why South Korea should help North Korea when it spends scare resources on the development of missiles and nuclear weapons. Proponents argue it is a constructive approach to the eventual resolution of security and political issues.

After I saw the vast area of the industrial park _ one million pyeong (approximately 25 square miles) _ I felt there would be no way to reverse the course of inter-Korean economic cooperation. Under a 50-year lease, Hyundai Asan has cleared the land by leveling off the hills and filling the rice paddies and fields, and it is still building the necessary infrastructure to support the industrial park.

At present 22 South Korean companies _ mostly small- and medium-sized firms _ are operating in the complex and five new plants are under construction. On this North Korean territory, about 12,000 North Korean employees are working with 680 South Koreans, who are largely managers. By 2012, the complex is expected to employ over 100,000 North Koreans.

These companies produce goods _ including shoes, clothes, watches, kitchenware, plastic containers and electric cords _ mostly for South Korean consumers. Under a neo-liberal policy pursued by the ROK government, the complex makes sense as the average monthly wage is only $57, which is only half of Chinese labor costs and less than 5 percent of South Korean counterparts’ salaries.

After an overview briefing at the Hyundai Asan Control Center, we went to the Shinwon Clothing Plant, where 880 North Korean women _ who looked between 20 to 40 years-of-age _ were working hard concentrating on their jobs along the 15 production lines on two floors. There were no dividing walls on each floor. The uniformed workers all looked healthy and productive.

The plant’s manager told me he has only nine people from the South to work with the North Koreans. His company began operating in February 2005 with 330 workers on two production lines. He said his company is satisfied with the productivity and the workmanship of its North Korean employees. His company provides many facilities for the workers, including a large dining hall where the workers receive free meals, recreation rooms, showers and even a Christian chapel.

Perhaps the future of the expanding industrial park depends very much on the exportability of its products to overseas markets including the United States. This brings up two points: resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and the inclusion of the complex as an “outward processing zone’’ as discussed but still pending resolution in the agreed Free Trade Agreement with the United States.

Without exportability, which I doubt would be fully feasible before North Korean denuclearization, the industrial complex may not be able to attract big international companies who keep looking for lower labor costs to compete in the contemporary neo-liberal global market.

There are other problems with the inter-Korean industrial park, including the transparency of the payment system, labor practices and environmental concerns. But these are only peripheral issues compared to the issue of war and peace, which also affects the South Korean economy. As the nuclear issue seems to be moving forward, and as I believe it will be resolved at the end, I do see good prospects for success of the complex.

We went to Gaeseong, a city of 300,000 people, through some poverty-stricken rural villages. It was heartbreaking to see North Korean people who looked undernourished and poorly sheltered in their rundown homes with broken windows. I saw children looking skinny, underdeveloped and hungry _ walking home after school, with their arms on the shoulders of their buddies, just like I used to do when I was their age.

I visited North Korea many times but I never had an opportunity to observe the economic plight of the North Korean people in the rural areas. I could see only a little bit of the deprivation last month when I went to Inner Geumgang Mountain through a few under-populated villages beyond the DMZ.

I know the conservatives blame the North Korean regime for this. My problem with them is such blame or hard-line policy has not helped alleviate the hardship of the poor people whose poverty is not their fault. I support humanitarian aid to the North, despite some negative views.

I know North Korea is trying hard to improve its economy in order to better feed, clothe and house its people. I have seen some encouraging indicators of change in North Korea. Once it feels free of perceived threat from outside, I expect the North to give up its nuclear program and concentrate on transforming the economy, which will eventually lead to political and social transformation as well.

It is time to work harder to resolve the security issue, while providing minimum humanitarian aid to the people in the North. Providing anthracite is a good example of humanitarian assistance, which I believe should enlist broad support from the South Korean public. What’s your take?

Tong Kim is former senior interpreter at the U.S. State Department and now a research professor at Korea University and a visiting scholar at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).

Daily NK
Han Young Jin
7/2/2007

(visit the Daily NK to see pictures)

On the banks opposite the Chongryukwan (a restaurant) in Pyongyang, a newly leisure centre “Sol Pong Centre” was opened on June 19th.

A Chinese webpage to motivate North Korea-China trade advertizes Sol Pong Centre as, “The latest modernized restaurants, leisure and recreational centre has opened in Pyongyang.”

According to the webpage, Sol Pong Centre offers a variety of services including restaurants, recreational activities, shopping, lounge area, communal bathing, swimming, gym, barber and hairdressers.

Even the entrance to the 5 storey building including a basement, is a revolving door, a rarity in North Korea. There is a Korean barbeque restaurant and shops on the 1st floor, and other modern services on the 2nd floor including a barber, massage therapist, wedding hall and piano concert hall.

This is the first time since the 80’s where a major service centre has opened in North Korea, The last centre “Changkwangwon” facilitated shops, restaurants and a wedding hall.

The webpage features, “This centre was designed to match modern lifestyle and western fashion, and will completely satisfy your recreational lifestyle. It will provide you will a space to enjoy Pyongyang’s modernized foods and leisure.”

North Korea media has not officially advertised the centre as yet. It is being introduced on Chinese investment websites and many speculate that this centre will be more for foreigners and Pyongyang’s top elite class.