Archive for 2008

Zimbabwe’s 5 Brigade

Tuesday, January 29th, 2008

Last night I attended a presentation by The Honorable David Coltart of Zimbabwe, Shadow Justice Minister and Member of Parliament for Bulawayo South.   Aside from the sad story he told of the disastrous toll the policies of Zanu-PF and Robert Mugabe are taking on the lives of Zimbabwe’s people, he mentioned the role that President Kim il Sung of North Korea played in facilitating Comrade Mugabe’s rise to power…

The full story can be found in the report  “Breaking the Silence.”

Starting on Page 45 of the report:

…in October of 1980, an agreement was signed between Prime Minister Mugabe and President Kim Il Sung, in which North Korea offered to train and arm a brigade for the newly independent Zimbabwe.

The First News of this agreement in the Zimbabwe media was almost a year later, in August 1981, when 106 Korean instructors arrived to begin training the brigade. Prime Minister Mugabe then announced that the Korean-trained brigade was to be known as the 5 Brigade.”

This squad was colloquially named ‘Gukurahundi’ which is Shona for “the rain that washes away the chaff before the spring rains,” and it was separate from the normal Zimbabwe National Army. 

The 5 Brigade soldiers made it clear themselves that they should be regarded as above the law.[…] answerable to nobody but Mugabe.

In addition to Korean-made equipment,

5 Brigade had completely different communication procedures: their codes and radios were incompatible with other units. Their uniform was also different, its most distinctive feature by the time they became operational in 1983 being their red berets. […]The use of AK-47s, recognized by their distinctive bayonets and curved magazines,is another distinguishing feature. In addition, the 5 Brigade traveled in a large fleet of vehicles which were Korean in origin, although this fleet did not last long, falling to pieces on the rough Zimbabwean terrain.

The 5 Brigade’s brutal activities are outlined in the report, but essentially they were used to eliminate rival political parties that could threaten Mugabe’s (and ZANU-PFs) control of the state.

UPDATE: from the Marmot’s Hole:

“What is historically known is that six months after independence in October 1980, Mugabe signed an agreement with the brutal communist dictatorship of North Korea, for assistance in training a new army brigade to deal with internal dissidents. 5 Brigade (here and video of the North Koreans and Zimbabwean soldiers), as it came to be known, wore different uniforms, with distinctive red berets; it used different equipment, transport and weaponry. Codes and radios were incompatible with other units. It is likely that the same North Korean instructors that became known to the press some time later, had also been entrusted with the training of the Maltese government’s own Special Mobile Unit.”

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North Korea to conduct first national census in 14 years

Monday, January 28th, 2008

Yonhap
Shim Sun-ah
1/28/2008 

North Korea will conduct its first national census in 14 years this fall with help from a U.N. agency, the Unification Ministry said Monday.

“South Korea signed a memorandum of understanding with the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) on Dec. 11 to finance part of the cost of the national census in North Korea,” the ministry said in a statement.

The project will be launched in October. A pilot census already began last year, according to the statement.

The project will cost around US$5.6 million, of which South Korea will provide $4 million, the ministry said, adding the remaining funds will come from the UNFPA’s own fund and donations from other countries. No complete census has taken place in North Korea since 1994 when the UNFPA helped the communist state conduct a national census. Pyongyang announced after the survey that its population was 21.21 million people as of 1993.

According to an almanac released Sunday by the North’s official Korean Central News Agency, North Korea’s population increased gradually to 23.6 million in 2004 despite the chronic economic plight of the isolated communist state.

The World Factbook released by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency last year put the North Korean population at 22.6 million in 2004.

“We decided to finance the census from the inter-Korean cooperation fund considering that the census will help us understand North Korea’s overall social situation and the lifestyle of the country’s people,” the statement said.

“The population data can also be used to establish comprehensive measures to deal with the North, including inter-Korean economic cooperation projects,” it added.

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NK Military Has Little Influence on Major Policy Decisions

Sunday, January 27th, 2008

Daily NK
Yang Jung A
1/27/2008

An expert on North Korea has recently disputed a widely circulated claim that North Korea’s hard line diplomacy is due to influence from the North Korean military.

Park Young Tack, an active duty officer at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) said, “The North Korean military usually influences the policy decisions that are related to military roles and functions only.” Park wrote this in his recent article published on January 15 in the 2007 winter edition of the Korean Journal of Defense Analysis entitled ‘The Increasing Standing of the North Korean Military and the Military’s Influence on Decision Making’.

Park said, “Unless Kim Jong Il asks the military for opinions, the military cannot take part in matters other than its own.”

It is widely believed at home and abroad that the North Korean military exerts huge influence on the country’s major policy decisions and therefore is responsible for driving the country to take a hard line.

U.S, envoy Christopher Hill said prior to his visit to Pyongyang last year that he would like to meet high-ranking military officials and persuade them to give up the country’s nuclear programs.

Park said, “It is mistaken to believe that the standing of the military is superior to that of the Party as was the case in the past, and that the military plays a key role in decision making regarding the country’s fate.”

“Many believe that the North Korean military is trying to get in the way of the inter-Korean dialogues. However, that is exactly how the Party wants the world to assess the current situation in North Korea. It is my judgment that the Party has been manipulating the situation so that the military appears to take on the role of the hard-liners,” Park said. Park stressed that the General Political Bureau of the People’s Army by itself cannot voice opposition to the nation’s current policy toward South Korea.

Park said that Secretary for Military Munitions Jun Byung Ho, United Front Department Director Kim Yang Gon, and First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Suk Ju have established and are operating a direct reporting system to Kim Jong Il. Secretary Jun is currently responsible for conducting the country’s nuclear tests, Director Kim for operations of the policy through the direct reporting system [to Kim Jong Il], and Minister Kang for foreign announcements.

“It seems that Kim Jong Il allows the military to exert influence on decision making to some extent as a reward for the military’s pledge to help build and defend the absolute dictatorship of Kim Jong Il,” Park said.

“The military circles take part in making policy decisions by offering specialized suggestions and by advocating the Kim Jong Il regime which adopted the ‘Military-First’ policy among the ruling elite, the leaders from the middle class and the lower class,” Park said. However, Park added that the military has limited influence over matters other than its own.

Park said that Kim Jong Il is also strengthening the military-friendly system to watch and hold in check the military, which can pose the biggest threat to his regime.

“When making decisions, Kim Jong Il calls the ruling elite individually for consultations and has them report to him directly,” Park said, adding, “In any case, Kim Jong Il is at the center of the decision making process and stands at the top of the decision making ladder.”

“Kim Jong Il is a policy developer who issues policy proposals more frequently than anyone in the country. Any policy proposed by Kim is considered a supreme order and becomes a law,” Park said. “If an individual at the lower levels of the state wants to make a policy proposal, he usually first contacts an authority in the relevant field who then tries to read Kim Jong Il’s mind on the policy to be proposed. Only after he receives convincing words from the authorities, the low-level cadre is able to submit his proposal. That way, he can escape censure that would result from making an unsuccessful policy proposal.”

Park said that those working at the lower level of the state authorities cooperate with each other even if they work in different departments. If there are any policy shortcomings, they try to solve them together and share the responsibilities. They also create a task force between departments for policy implementation.

Park said, “This kind of political operation has come into existence for the following reasons: First of all, Kim Jong Il prefers to have an inner-circle, minimize the number of personnel, and simplify office procedures. Second, people at the working level have to worry about censure waiting for them when their policy implementation efforts end in failure.”

“Kim Jong Il’s administration style shows that he relies on an informal channel of communication with the ruling elite.” Park said, “He keeps a tight reign on all power groups within the country including the military, and no power group dares to challenge Kim’s authority. Even if united, these groups can hardly exercise any significant influence over decision making.”

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Air Koryo fleet expanding

Sunday, January 27th, 2008

TU-204-300 touches down at a North Korean airport
(Hat tip to Mateusz)
12/28/2007

A TU-204-300 has touched down at a North Korean airport in what became Russia’s first successful deal to supply its most advanced long-range jet abroad. With its 500-8500 flying range, the plane is capable of swiftly transforming its fuselage on the ground. The plane has already been making shuttle non-stop flights inside and outside Russia. North Korean flag Carrier Air Koryo has ordered the TU-204-300.

TU-204-300 with PS-90A engines is a mid-range passenger a/c is intended to carry passengers, luggage and cargo on domestic and international trunk routes of 500 to 8500 km distance . The airliner was built on the basis of TU-204-100 a/c and represents the continuation of TU-204/214 a/c family. TU-204-300 a/c performed its maiden flight 18 August, 2003. The aircraft is produced in series at “:Aviastar-SP” Closed Stock Company in Ulianovsk. Opposite to TU-204-100 the TU-204-300 a/c has a shortened fuselage (by 6 m) and increased fuel reserve. Set of equipment was updated. Improved comfort level of the cabin helps the passengers to withstand long flights. Maximal payload is cut down to 18000 kg at increased flight range.

Click here to get specs on all the planes in Air Koryo’s fleet (h/t DPRK Studies)

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Cancor Report #297: Knowledge Sharing with the DPRK

Sunday, January 27th, 2008

November 12, 2007

The latest edition of the CanKor Report has only one longer-than-usual item.  It is the preparatory document of a workshop recently held in Seoul, Korea, in which NGOs, academics, practitioners and diplomats from Europe, Asia, Australia and North America consulted about the prospects for international cooperation regarding education and training programmes that need to be undertaken with the DPRK if denuclearization proceeds according to the Six-Party timetable.  Experts in economic development believe that the next step in international engagement will have to be the building up of DPRK expertise and intellectual capacity to absorb the significant development assistance that may follow successful completion of the Six-Party process. In this working paper, loyal CanKor reader and former World Bank official Bradley Babson defines “knowledge sharing”, explains why the time is ripe for all sectors to become involved, outlines potential pitfalls, and suggests guiding principles for future engagement by the international community.
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Contents:

1.   KNOWLEDGE SHARING WITH THE DPRK
    Bradley O. Babson, CanKor original
       Introduction
       Why knowledge sharing?
       Strategic considerations
       DPRK internal challenges
       Nuclear politics
       Inter-Korean reconciliation
       China, Russia and Northeast Asia regional perspectives
       Operational challenges in the DPRK context
       An underlying tension
       Relationships
       Information
       Absorptive capacity
       Coordination
       Resources
       International experience and best practices
       Conclusions and principles for future engagement
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(more…)

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A little self-promotion…

Sunday, January 27th, 2008

North Korean Economy Watch has been named Most Specialised Niche Newcomer  by Aaron Schiff on his list of top 200 economics blogs.

See the full list here.

Thanks to all the readers out there. 

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Travel to Kaesong Restricted to Prevent Awareness of South Korea

Friday, January 25th, 2008

Daily NK
Yang Jung A
1/25/2008
 
A job in a factory at the Kaesong Industrial Complex is fast becoming the ideal job for North Korean citizens, and positive feelings toward the South are continuing to grow.

Good Friends reported on the 23rd that most North Koreans are aware that economic cooperation at Kaesong is thriving as South Korean enterprises supply advanced materials and management, and North Korea supplies labor.

“South Korean advisory managers supervise workers. If workers do not come to work on time in the morning or they do not work diligently, the managers simply say, ‘You don’t need to come here tomorrow’” reported one North Korean citizen through Good Friends.

The citizen added, “Workers try to complete their appointed tasks under all conditions, while monitoring the South Korean supervisors’ attitudes.”

As the Kaesong Complex grows, the internal customs procedures into Kaesong become more complicated.

Good Friends reported, “Kaesong was originally a strictly controlled zone because of its location just north of the 38th parallel. If a North Korean wanted to visit Kaesong, they had to register, undergo an investigation and get a pass. Now, If they try to go to Kaesong, the process is much more complicated.”

A cadre working at the Kaesong Complex said that this is because people have growing positive feelings toward South Korea. The authorities worry about the great gap between the North and the South and worry about growing public disillusionment.”

He added, “The only place people can talk about South Korea is at Kaesong. They have a yearning for South Korea, especially after they’ve encountered South Korean products.” 

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UNDP statement on Senate investigation into UNDP operations in DPRK

Friday, January 25th, 2008

The UNDP issued a response to the US Senate investigation into their operations in North Korea.  This is from their web site (January 23, 2008):

UNDP welcomed the recent investigation by the US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (the “Subcommittee”) into its former operations in North Korea.  UNDP voluntarily cooperated with the inquiry, including by making its personnel and documents available for review by the investigators.  UNDP’s extensive cooperation is acknowledged in the report.

The Subcommittee initiated the inquiry in June 2007, in the wake of persistent allegations concerning UNDP’s operations in North Korea.  A 31 May External Audit had found that, because of constraints imposed by the North Korean authorities, UNDP and other UN agencies did not operate in North Korea according to the same standards and practices they used elsewhere worldwide.  The same audit found, however, contrary to allegations that UNDP spending totaled hundreds of millions of dollars, that UNDP ran a modest program of less than $3 million per year, and had in place a full range of monitoring mechanisms to verify its spending.  New allegations surfaced shortly afterward, including detailed charges that UNDP had underreported its funding levels, and engaged in illicit transactions with entities tied to the North Korean armaments program, and that a significant amount of UNDP funding had been diverted by the North Korean government.  The Subcommittee initiated its investigation shortly afterward.

Nearly seven month later, after extensive interviews with UNDP staff, as well as a Subcommittee field to visit UNDP headquarters to verify the financial control systems UNDP had in place in North Korea, UNDP emphasizes that the Subcommittee’s report contains nothing to substantiate persistent allegations that:

• UNDP transferred tens of millions of dollars to the North Korean government, as had been alleged;
• UNDP money was used to fund North Korean purchases of real estate, or were diverted to its nuclear or missile programs;
• UNDP dealt in significant amounts of cash, which could be diverted or embezzled in defiance of financial controls;
• UNDP ignored UN controls on prohibited vendors and dealt directly with entities barred by these processes.

The report does contain a series of findings and recommendations.  UNDP’s responses are outlined below.

On UNDP’s management and operational practices in North Korea:
Finding: UNDP operated in North Korea with inappropriate staffing, questionable use of foreign currency instead of local currency, and insufficient administrative and fiscal controls.  

UNDP Response:

– The report states that UNDP operations in North Korea are a case study of an international agency’s attempts to achieve development goals in a restrictive environment, and that By all accounts, operating development projects in North Korea presented management and administrative challenges of the most extreme nature.  By definition, UNDP operates in challenging environments, and has crafted, for the most part, sound rules and procedures to ensure that UNDP development funds benefit the people of a host nation.
– UNDP has said all along that North Korea was a difficult place in which to do business.  It operated there since 1981 at the explicit direction of its Executive Board, which includes the US, and which regularly approved its programs.  The Executive Board was aware of the operational constraints UNDP faced.  All foreign entities in North Korea – UN agencies, national diplomatic missions and international NGOs – face the same constraints. 
– UNDP is committed to addressing any and all management and operational deficiencies that have been identified in its former operations in North Korea, and to applying lessons learned to other countries in which it faces similarly challenging operational environments.

On access to internal audits

Finding: By preventing access to its audits … UNDP impeded reasonable oversight.
Recommendation: UNDP should provide UN member states with unfettered access to financial and management audit reports about UNDP activities, including providing timely copies of such reports and allowing UN member states to make audit information public.

UNDP Response:

– As noted by Senator Levin, a proposal that would grant routine access to UNDP Executive Board members to UNDP audit reports is currently before the UNDP Executive Board.

On deceptive financial transactions by the DPRK government:
Finding: In 2002, the DPRK government used its relationship with the United Nations to execute deceptive financial transactions by moving $2.72 million of its own funds from Pyongyang to DPRK diplomatic missions abroad through a bank account intended to be used solely for UNDP activities and by referencing UNDP in the wire transfer documents.

Recommendation: UNDP should take steps to ensure that its name and resources are not used as cover for non-UN activities.

UNDP Response:

– UNDP is not happy that its name may have been used inappropriately by the North Korean government in connection with deceptive financial transactions.  It has formally raised this matter with the North Korean government.
– UNDP is pleased to note, however, that there is no suggestion that UNDP either knew of or could have prevented the transactions.  The report states: The Subcommittee does not conclude that the deceptive financial transactions executed by the North Korean government would have been prevented had UNDP’s management been more vigilant.
– UNDP is also pleased to note that contrary to persistent allegations it has faced, the report finds that the $2.72 million in question was not UNDP’s money.
– UNDP records show that the total sum transferred from 2001 to 2005 to the North Korean entity that was misusing UNDP’s name was approximately $175,000.  This figure is far less than the $7 million UNDP was alleged to have transferred to the entity in during this period.

On UNDP payments to Zang Lok

Finding: UNDP transferred UN funds to a company that, according to a letter from the US State Department to UNDP, has ties to an entity involved in DPRK weapons activity.

Recommendation: Prior to making payments to a contractor, UNDP should take steps to ensure that the contractor is not associated with illicit activity.

UNDP Response:

– UNDP paid a Chinese company named Zang Lok $22,000 in 2002 on behalf of WIPO, and $30,000 in 2004, on behalf on UNESCO.  UNDP did so because although both of these UN agencies have run projects involving North Korea, neither of them has a presence in the country.  In both cases the goods in question (computer equipment) were paid for by WIPO and UNESCO and received in good order.
– The State Department first informed UNDP that Zang Lok had ties to a “designated entity” on 6 June 2007, and UNDP immediately agreed to cease doing business with Zang Lok.
– UNDP and other UN agencies routinely consult control lists maintained by the UN Security Council before making procurement decisions.  It is unclear whether Zang Lok, as a company with ties to a “designated” North Korean entity – but not itself a designated entity – was on any list that could have been consulted in 2002, 2004, or afterward.
– The report acknowledges that UNDP’s vetting procedures appear sound and that It does not appear that UNDP, or the UN agencies on whose behalf UNDP was acting, knew of – or had any way of knowing – whether Zang Lok was connected to an entity involved with DPRK weapons activity at the time the payments were made.
– UNDP agrees that it would benefit from increasing its information-sharing with the other UN agencies and is committed to doing so within the ongoing process of harmonizing the UN standards system-wide, in which it is a leading participant.

On alleged retaliation against a whistleblower:

Finding: By…not submitting to the jurisdiction of the UN Ethics Office … UNDP undermined its whistleblower protections. 

Recommendation: UNDP should ensure that whistleblowers do not face retaliation for reporting irregular or improper conduct.

UNDP Response:

– Contrary to criticism directed at UNDP over the past year, UNDP has had policies and procedures in place to protect employees from retaliation for some time.  Some of these predated the policies initiated by the Secretary-General in 2005.  Moreover, all personnel (staff and non staff), regardless of level or legal status, are encouraged to bring concerns and claims under these procedures, and all such claims are treated with appropriate seriousness. 
– More recently, and in accordance with the new policies issued by the Secretary General in late 2007, UNDP has appointed an Ethics Officer.  In addition to overseeing the key components of UNDP’s ethical standards and mechanisms, the Ethics Officer will work together with the Director of the Ethics Office of the Secretariat, the new UN Ethics Committee, and the Ethics Officers of other UN entities, to further harmonize the overall ethics regime of the wiser UN system. 
– From a staff perspective, there is now in place a “two step system”.  Staff from UNDP can now appeal to the Chair of the new UN Ethics Committee to have their individual case reviewed by the UN Ethics Office, if they believe that they have not been appropriately treated within UNDP.
– In the case referenced by the Subcommittee, there is no question that Mr. Artjon Shkurtaj raised operational concerns during his time at UNDP North Korea.  There is equally no question that it was his job to do so, that the concerns he raised were similar to those raised by his predecessors, and that UNDP managers responded as appropriate.
– A key point is fundamental to ethics regimes and whistleblower protection mechanisms almost everywhere, including at the UN and UNDP: the complainant must avail him or herself of the mechanisms and cooperate with any inquiry. Mr. Artjon Shkurtaj neither availed himself of existing UNDP mechanisms nor cooperated with a subsequent inquiry.
– Mr. Shkurtaj’s case has been taken up by the External Independent Investigative Review (EIIR), which is being led by former Hungarian Prime Minister Miklos Nemeth.  According to the terms of reference of the EIIR, if the UN Ethics Office is not fully satisfied on the issue of Mr. Shkurtaj, it will itself look into the matter.  UNDP will not offer further comment while the EIIR is ongoing.

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US senate investigation of UNDP’s DPRK programs

Thursday, January 24th, 2008

The US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs published a report detailing the failure of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to adequately monitor its projects in the DPRK. 

By way of background…In March 2007, the UNDP suspended its operations in North Korea because of the government’s refusal to agree to new measures designed to increase the transparency and accountability of the UNDP programs there. 

The subcommittee staff released the following findings:

1. UNDP operated in North Korea with inappropriate staffing, questionable use of foreign currency instead of local currency, and insufficient administrative and fiscal controls

  • UNDP’s DPRK office was staffed in large part with North Korean nationals who were selected by the DPRK, contrary to UNDP policy; 
  • UNDP paid the salaries of local staff directly to the North Korean government without any way of verifying that the salaries were properly disbursed and despite UNDP’s suspicion that the DPRK was, in the words of one UNDP official, “skimming” money from the payments; 
  • UNDP paid salaries and other expenses in convertible currencies, such as US Dollars or Euros, rather than in the local currency, contrary to UN best practices; 
  • UNDP was required to conduct its financial transactions using a DPRK state bank that accepted paperwork only from DPRK personnel, sometimes routed UNDP funds through an unrelated bank account, and, until recently, refused to provide UNDP with copies of cancelled checks;
  • UNDP was allowed to conduct on-site project visits only with prior notice and in the company of North Korean officials, contrary to UNDP best practices; and
  • The UNDP office in Pyongyang operated without secure communications, and the regime routinely monitored UN activity, going so far as to enter and search private residences of UN personnel.

2. By preventing access to its audits and not submitting to the jurisdiction of the UN Ethics Office, UNDP impeded reasonable oversight and undermined its whistleblower protections.

The UNDP commissioned four audits of its North Korean operations, in 1999, 2001, 2004, and 2007. Problems were identified in all four. The first three audits were nonpublic and, in accordance with UNDP policy, unavailable for review even by nations serving on the UNDP Executive Board. After repeated requests, UNDP made an exception to this policy and, in 2007, showed the audit reports to the US Mission to the United Nations, whose personnel were allowed to read but not copy them.

Beginning in 2005, Artjon Shkurtaj, then Operations Manager of the UNDP office in Pyongyang, raised concerns about management and operational deficiencies in UNDP operations. After raising these concerns, his employment contract was not renewed. He then filed a complaint with the UN Ethics Office claiming that UNDP had retaliated against him.  In August 2007, however, the Ethics Office determined that, although Mr. Shkurtaj had established “a prima facie case of retaliation,” it lacked jurisdiction to decide his claim and could protect only whistleblowers within the UN Secretariat.

3. In 2002, the DPRK government used its relationship with the United Nations to execute deceptive financial transactions by moving $2.72 million of its own funds from Pyongyang to DPRK diplomatic missions abroad through a bank account intended to be used solely for UNDP activities and by referencing UNDP in the wire transfer documents.

4. UNDP transferred UN funds to a company that, according to a letter from the US State Department to UNDP, has ties to an entity involved in DPRK weapons activity.

UNDP regularly made payments to contractors on behalf of other UN agencies operating in North Korea. During the course of its investigation, the Subcommittee learned that payments on behalf of other UN agencies – totaling approximately $50,000 – were made to an entity named Zang Lok Trading Co. in Macau. According to a letter dated June 7, 2007, to UNDP from the US Permanent Mission to the United Nations, Zang Lok “has ties to a North Korean entity that has been designated [by the US government] as the main North Korean financial agent for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons.” UNDP maintains that it does not know, and has no way of knowing, whether Zang Lok is connected to North Korean weapons sales.

How much money are we talking about?
UNDP estimates that, from 1995 to 2005, it spent a total of about $33.5 million in North Korea. Of that figure, approximately $6 million was spent on UNDP office, staff, and operating expenses, including roughly $100,000 per year in payments to local staff and contractors, and $500,000 per year spent on rent, office supplies, transportation, employee compensation, and other expenses. An ongoing external audit is expected to refine these estimates. In addition, the UNDP office in North Korea made payments and provided administrative support on behalf of other UN Funds and Programs operating in North Korea including the United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Office for Project Services, among others. Total expenditures by all UN agencies in North Korea – excluding the World Food Program – during the same ten-year timeframe have been estimated at roughly $200 million.

Here is the full report: undpreport.pdf

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Hoiryeong Trains for War

Tuesday, January 22nd, 2008

Daily NK
Lee Sung Jin
1/22/2008

The citizens of Hoiryeong are worried about ongoing evacuation training they must undergo as part of a joint winter military drill with the army that began on January 17, said a source.

The winter military drill used to be held in December each year but this year it was delayed.

“People feel uneasy because of the sudden beginning of the drill and the strict regulations on the jangmadang in the cold winter,” one source reported on the 21st.

At 3 am on January 17th, in Hoiryeong, North Hamkyung Province, the North Korean army announced an emergency summons, modified the Worker and Peasant Red Guards, Local Reserve Forces and Youth Red Guard, declared a state of national preparation for war and started inspection of emergency supplies. The Local Reserve Forces rushed to occupy strategic positions and the Worker and Peasant Red Guard started a scouting drill.

During the winter military drill, ordinary citizens must leave their residential districts, taking one day’s worth of food with them, and live in an encampment for Local Reserve Forces around 8-12 km away from their homes.

The average temperature in Hoiryeong drops to around minus 10 degree Celsius in January. As defectors in Seoul testified, it is terribly hard to put up with the lack of heat at the encampments.

This drill is limited only to Hoiryeong. The source said: “It is actually a type of civil defense training. It was ordered by the People’s Safety Agency, but the army participated as well.”

This year’s drill was more intense than previous year’s. Vehicles without camouflage netting were prohibited from the streets and all citizens were forced to wear camouflage while outdoors.

The source said the drill was so similar to actual warfare that Local Reserve Forces and Worker and Peasant Red Guards wore their real rank badges.

When the drill started, factories and People’s Units in Hoiryeong began holding lectures entitled, “Let’s complete preparation for war against the American imperialists’ constant war maneuvers!”

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