Archive for August, 2008

Evolution of the DPRK’s cigarette market

Tuesday, August 12th, 2008

North Korean Cigarette Production: Chinese Cigarettes Disappear
Daily NK
Moon Sung Hwee
8/12/2008

The market share of North Korean cigarette manufacturers has been increasing because North Korean cigarette factories have turned their gaze on domestic low-priced brands instead of counterfeit products.

A source from North Korea explained on the 8th that “There are lately dozens of cigarette brands which are being produced in North Korea, from low-priced ones to expensive ones made for high officials. Now, we rarely see people looking for foreign-made cigarettes in the markets.”

He added that “We can see 500 won per pack cigarettes and also cheap brands, like 300 won cigarettes which are made by individuals. When compared to rice prices, cigarette prices have sharply declined, as well as their quality having advanced when compared to the pack price.”

According to the statistics of the Korean International Trade Association, since 2000 imports of Chinese cigarettes have increased every year and in 2003, reached a maximum of 9.4 million dollars.

The source continued, “Competition to obtain Chinese cigarettes among Cigarette smugglers was keen, but now, consumers of North Korean cigarettes are increasing in number and the productivity of manufacturers is increasing as well. Therefore, individuals who produced cigarettes at home took a heavy blow to their business.”

North Korean cigarette makers converted from counterfeit to private development

Since the early 1990s, North Korea has felt keenly the necessity of earning foreign currency after suffering the aftereffects of the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe. Accordingly, North Korean authorities have had an interest in producing and trading drugs and counterfeit cigarettes that need a low initial investment and quickly convert into money. Since 1992, North Korea has mass produced imitations of Mild Seven, Crown, 555, Dunhill and other international brands.

When suffering the “March of Tribulation” in the late 1990s, middle managers started taking an interest in counterfeit cigarette markets, which had been occupied by the authorities. In Nampo, Pyongsung, Pyongyang and other big cities, with the appearance of counterfeit cigarettes made by individuals, competition between the national cigarette traders and private manufacturers in the jangmadang started. Workers of cigarette factories kept secretly packing papers of the counterfeit cigarettes and sold them to the private manufacturers.

The North Korean authorities eventually took measures to punish the private manufacturers, to confiscate their products and search the workers’ bodies one by one.

However, after printers were allowed to be used in some factories related to IT departments of universities in 2002, managers of printers being in collusion with private manufacturers started printing the packing papers of cigarettes.

Production of tobacco leaves privately, manufacturing of cigarettes by the factory

After the start of the 2000s, North Korean authorities turned their gaze on domestic demand for cigarettes. The biggest North Korean cigarette factory is Ryongsung Cigarette Factory, where most counterfeit cigarettes made by North Korea were produced. As sales increased since 1997, the No. 39 Department of the Workers’ Party, which operates, accumulates and manages Kim Jong Il’s slush funds, has been directly operating the factory. The top quality counterfeit cigarette in North Korea, CRAVEN “A,” so called “Cat cigarette” by North Koreans, are produced in the factory.

The past price of CRAVEN “A” was much more expensive than Chinese cigarettes, such as Hongmei, BAT, Zhangbaishan and Tianping, being equivalent to two kilograms of rice. However, among cadres and the wealthy they were excessively popular. At the time, Chinese brands of cigarette in North Korea were generally valued at around the price of one kilogram of rice.

With profits increasing since 2003, North Korean authorities have tried to increase production by re-opening ruined factories that had closed their doors for lack of resources during the March of Tribulation.

In 2002, “Rasun” and “Sunbong,” which were produced in cooperation with Chinese entrepreneurs, came out in the Rajin-Sunbong area at a lower price than Chinese cigarettes.

Competition between factories to produce high quality and tasty cigarette toughens

Meanwhile, some of private manufacturers who went under in the competition have disappeared from the cigarette market or been merged with big factories.

There is no reason for being poor if North Korea works like it produces cigarettes

The source said that “These days, affiliates with cigarette factories buy dried tobacco leaves from individuals.”

According to the source, on seeing the high quality of cigarettes, people currently say, “That’s the reason why we should open and reform our market and system. If we produce other goods like we produce cigarettes, we won’t have any reason for being poor anymore.”

The Ryongsung Cigarette Factory in Pyongyang produces “Pyongyang,” “Geunseol (construction),” “Hyunmoo (a kind of mythological animal),” “GGoolbeul (Honey Bee),” “MT. Daesung,” “Dongyang (the Orient),” “Saseum (Deer),” and “Galmaegi (Sea Gull)” and the Sungcheon Cigarette Factory produces “Haedangwha (Sweetbrier),” “Yonggwangro (Furnace),” “Deungdae (Lighthouse),” and “Manbyungcho (a name of a herb).”

Koksan Factory in Hoiryeong produces cigarettes for soldiers; “Baeseung (ever-victorious),” “Ildangbaek (a match for a hundred),” “Chobyung (Sentry),” and “Poongnyon (a fruitful year).”

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(UPDATED) How Big is the North Korea Deal?

Monday, August 11th, 2008

UPDATE:  (Reuters) Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told Japan that Washington would not remove North Korea from a US list of state sponsors of terrorism on the initial deadline of Monday, Japan’s foreign minister said.

ORGINAL POST: Marcus Noland comments in a Newsweek International op-ed how recent US policy changes towards North Korea (delisting the DPRK as a state sponsor of terror and exempting sanctions under the Trading with the Enemy Act) amount to very little:

Lifting the trade restrictions will have a minimal impact. North Korea will remain one of a few countries that does not have normal trade relations with the United States, meaning its exports will continue to be subjected to punitive tariffs of up to 90 percent.

Removing North Korea from the terrorism list means that Washington can now legally support it for membership in international financial organizations such as the World Bank. But the White House is under no obligation to actually do so. North Korea also remains excluded from US government programs that encourage trade and investment.

North Korea’s declaration will trigger a reconvening of the Six-Party Talks, which includes China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia. The inadequate nature of the declaration guarantees there will be yet another round of negotiations in which North Korea will reveal a bit more in return for further concessions. It is no accident that up to 50,000 metric tons of US food aid is expected to arrive in North Korea early this month. 

Writing in 2004 (yet relevant today), Marcus Noland wrote about these issues in depth.  Below are excerpts from his op-ed on US tariffs:

US importers of DPRK products are required to obtain prior approval from the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets, certifying that the products were not produced by North Korean entities designated as having engaged in missile proliferation. Subject to this condition, approval is routine. US government officials report that they receive only a handful of such requests each year. Their impression is that business conditions in the DPRK pose a greater impediment to bilateral trade than the regulatory regime.

So, at present, with the exception of military-related products, there are few specific legal restrictions on the ability of Americans to export to or invest in the DPRK. Imports are subject to a prior approval process, but this is based on a transparent and narrowly delineated certification requirement.

Yet there is little trade between the United States and the DPRK. North Korea is among the few countries that the United States does not grant normal trade relations (NTR) status to, and North Korean exports are subject to the so-called column 2 tariff rates established by the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. These tariffs tend to be the highest on labor-intensive products such as garments, in which North Korea is conceivably competitive. Though their incidence is an accident of history, and not an intentional slap, the column 2 tariffs represent a serious potential impediment to trade. Some countries, notably China, have successfully exported to the United States despite being subject to the higher column 2 tariffs (though even China eventually gained NTR status on a year-to-year basis). Most countries that have recently obtained permanent NTR, such as China, have done so through the World Trade Organization (WTO) accession process. The DPRK has shown no interest in joining the WTO.

This disinterest is unfortunate. The United States does not grant the DPRK quotas under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA), a worldwide network of bilateral trade quotas on textiles and apparel (due to expire in 2005), and WTO accession could aid the DPRK in this regard. In the case of the similarly diplomatically problematic Burmese government, the US government found it politically easier to accept an increase in Burmese exports to the United States than to negotiate publicly a textile agreement under WTO auspices with the repressive regime. WTO membership has its privileges. In any event, the DPRK is one of the rare countries that chronically do not fill their MFA quotas in Europe, where there are no sanctions, suggesting that the problem lies in DPRK’s inability to compete, not in trade barriers.

However, should the DPRK obtain NTR status, the United States would likely classify it as a nonmarket economy (NME) and subject it to onerous antidumping rules on the Chinese template. The point is that improved diplomatic relations is no panacea—the United States can be protectionist on purely economic grounds, regardless of politics.

Conversely, the United States trades with some low-income countries preferentially, unilaterally granting them limited tariff-free access through the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), subject to standards concerning workers’ rights, intellectual property protection, and drug trafficking. Given North Korea’s disregard for internationally accepted labor standards, it is inconceivable that the United States would grant North Korea GSP privileges under current practices, even if diplomatic relations were normalized. Yet China, which has never received GSP privileges, vividly demonstrates that it is quite possible to prosper without such advantages.

Today, internal conditions and practices in North Korea, not legal restrictions, greatly impede bilateral trade. However, with sufficient reform and improvement in competitiveness, a broad range of policy issues would become increasingly relevant. In this regard, DPRK accession to the WTO would be advantageous. In the meantime, rather than complaining about US policy, North Korean officials would be better served by redoubling their reform efforts.

For more information, read the full articles below:
Partially True Confessions: How Big is the North Korea Deal?
Marcus Noland, Peterson Institute
Newsweek (Link via the Peterson Institute)
7/7/2008

The Legal Framework of US–North Korea Trade Relations
Op-ed in JoongAng Ilbo, via the Peterson Institute web site.
Marcus Noland
4/27/2004

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DPRK food production seen as a political issue

Friday, August 8th, 2008

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 08-8-8-1
08/08/08

According to Choi Hyun-soo, vice director of the DPRK Department of Agriculture, “The issue of increasing agricultural production is related to the serious political issue of the fate of the construction of a strong and prosperous socialist nation, and even moreso, the fate of our style of socialism,” rather than simply an issue of economic affairs.

In an interview published in the latest issue (July 24) of the DPRK Cabinet publication, “Democratic Chosun”, Vice Director Choi stressed that several years of natural disasters had prevented last year’s grain production from reaching a satisfactory level, making increased grain production this year an even more important issue. While Choi recognized the impact of the natural disasters, he also blamed the “villainous isolation and oppression machinations of the imperialists” for causing the North’s scant grain production. He also pointed out that the sudden jump in rice, corn, wheat and other grain prices around the world has been cause for concern, and “these days, there are no countries offering food or in a position to provide it.”

He went on to state, “If countermeasures to prevent damage during the monsoon season cannot be implemented, farmland and crops could be severely damaged,” and the lack of heavy rains is no reason for complacency, but rather, efforts to prevent flood damage need to continue. The (North) Korean Central Broadcasting Station also reported on July 24, “Good agricultural cultivation is an important political task,” and, “Good agricultural cultivation and easing of the eating problem is precisely the utmost important matter for the success of socialism and the protection of our system and ideology.”

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N.Korea Likely to Provide Internet Service from 2009

Thursday, August 7th, 2008

Choson Ilbo
8/7/2008

It seems likely that North Korea will finally join the worldwide web and provide Internet service from next year. Kim Sang-myung, the chief of the North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity, a group of former North Korean professionals, at a symposium in the National Assembly on Wednesday said, “According to the Internet Access Roadmap it launched in 2002, North Korea will begin providing Internet service for special agencies and authorized individuals as early as next year.”

Kim defected from North Korea in 2004, when he was a professor of computer engineering at Communist University. An expert on North Korea’s information technology, he is currently an adjunct professor at Kyonggi University and a fellow at the Institute of North Korea Studies.

Implementation of the roadmap, which major agencies such as the Workers’ Party, the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications, the Ministry of Electronic Industry, and the North Korea Academy of Sciences have pushed for under the instructions of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il since 2002, is now at its final stage, he said.

First of all, North Korea will establish infrastructure for a super-speed Internet service network by laying optical cables between Pyongyang and Hamhung and extending them to Chongjin and Shinuiju this year. North Korea has recently succeeded in consolidating security solutions for the prevention of online leaks of data to foreign countries and of online intrusions, and in enhancing service stability.

It has also recently finished necessary consultations with the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) for the Internet service in North Korea. In this situation, North Korea can begin providing Internet service any time provided equipment for server and Internet-based relay systems is supplied, Kim said.

“North Korea is strongly determined to be part of the global community through the Internet,” he said. “After watching China and Vietnam control the Internet effectively although these countries have opened up Internet wireless networks since the early days of their opening, the North has concluded that it can now introduce the Internet service.”

Currently, North Korea provides only a limited service via a kind of Intranet called Kwangmyong, through which it is possible to access databases on scientific and technological information at North Korean central government agencies.

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China’s tax windfall on DPRK border

Thursday, August 7th, 2008

In the last several months the Daily NK has reported on North Korea’s anti-corruption campaigns, particularly in Sinuiju and Hyesan, major DPRK/China trade hubs. Additionally, we have seen stories of how the Chinese are making life harder for resident North Koreans in the run up to the Olympics.

These measures, both of which should have an adverse impact on trade volume between the two coutries—and thus on tax revenues—made this recent report in the Daily NK all the more surprising. China’s Yanji Customs House (along the North Korean border) has reportedly seen a 226% increase in tax revenue this year from trade with North Korea.

How can China and the DPRK make life difficult for traders/entrepreneurs and still see an increase in the value of traded goods and corresponding tax revenue?  According to the article:

Jilin Newspaper in China reported on the 4th that “[…]For the first half of this year, tax revenues vis a vis North Korea totaled 34.22 million Yuan, up 226.2 percent from the year before.

The newspaper continued, “During this period, entrepreneurs in Yanji imported 64 thousand tons of iron ore from North Korea; that is a 2.3 percent increase from the same period a year ago. Accordingly, the tax amount of collected was 29.13 million Yuan, which is 66.1 percent of the total tax revenue derived from North Korea.”

The Yanji Custom House covers seven border gateways with North Korea, such as Juanhe-Wonjeongri, Shazi-Saebyul, Tumen-Namyang, Sanhe-Hoiryeong, Kaishantun-Sambong, Naping-Musan, and Guchengli-Samjangri.

According to the Yanji Custom House statistics, the Naping-Musan border gateway, where iron ore collected from the Musan mine enters China, is the first ranked for commercial traffic, and Guchengli-Samjangri, the gateway for North Korean timber, is second.

Tonghua Steel Group, Yanbian Tianchi Trade Incorporated Compay, and Zhonggang Group purchased 50-year mining rights for North Korea’s Musan mine in 2005. Since late 2007 they had been discussing a seven billion Yuan additional investment in it but that failed due to conflicting views on cooperative investment rate proportions, methods of withdrawing invested funds and other issues. As a consequence of the stalled investment, the Musan mine’s exports to China have not grown relative to last year’s figures.

So most of the trade that goes through Yanji is in raw natural resources, particularly iron ore and timber, and trade in these resources seems to be carried out by Chinese companies and is probably supported (protected) by senior policy makers on both sides of the border.  Rather than looking at politics as an explanation, it might simply be another result of rising global commodities prices.

The tax windfall could come from one of two sources: A volume (unit) import tax (ex: $1 for each ton of iron) or an ad valorem import tax (ex: tax on the monetary value of the goods).  It is not likely they impose much of an export tax to make a difference.

If China imposed a unit tax, the revenue gains would have to come from surging imports.  In this case, it would be likely that the Chinese companies had fixed-price contracts with their North Korean suppliers, and that  the increase in global commodity prices simply made DPRK iron ore comparatively very cheap.  When (if?) global iron prices fell, we would expect to see China decrease imports from North Korea.  But according to the article, iron imports are up only 2.3%—not enough to explain the surge in revenue.

It is more likely that China imposes an ad valorem tax on North Korean imports and the contracts between the Chinese companies and North Korean suppliers are set at (near) market prices.  Simply put, taxing the monetary value of increasingly valuable imports has been beneficial for the Chinese government.  Even though production at the Musan Mine has not increased much, revenues are probably way up.

Given the status of the Musan Mine as the DPRK’s largest, it is likely that funds raised from this mine are firmly under control.  It would be interesting to know the customs receipts in Dandong, Laioning Province, across the river from North Korea’s Sinuiju.  Sinuiju seems to have suffered the brunt of the DPRK’s anti-corruption drive, and it is the main railway and trade artery between North Korea China.  Most of the companies targeted for inspection were in Sinuiju.  Have Chinese tax collections/trade rebounded there?

Read the full story here:
226% Rise in Tax Revenues at Yanji Custom House
Daily NK
Lee Sung Jin
8/6/2008

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North Korean posters: the book

Wednesday, August 6th, 2008

nkposters.jpgNorth Korean Posters is a colorful and engaging book for those interested in North Korean, communist, or socialist-realism art. Portraying over 250 North Korean posters from the past fifty years, along with English and German translations, the book is the most comprehensive collection of North Korean political art of which I am aware.

Each page offers vivid images of the values and goals the regime has tried, and continues to try, to instill in its own people.  In order to help readers, particularly those who did not grow up under socialism, get a sense of the themes highlighted in communist political propaganda, the art work is grouped into categories: Constructing the People’s Paradise, Undeterred Defiance (military), Loyalty and Devotion, Defending the Revolution, and United We Stand.

This colleciton was put together by a gentleman named David Heather, who according to Forbes:

… first encountered such work […] when he met a North Korean painter exhibiting at an art fair in Harare, Zimbabwe in 2000. They kept in touch, and in 2004 Heather accepted his friend’s invitation to visit the North Korean capital, Pyongyang, and to get a tour of his atelier: the state-run Mansudae Art Studio. In truth it’s more factory than studio. The complex, says Heather, covers 30 acres and houses around 1,000 artists making paintings, posters and other artwork, including nonideological pottery. Their output is used to decorate public buildings and subways, or is given as gifts to state officials.

While some posters are reproduced as prints, most are copied up to 100 times each by hand. Rarely are two such copies identical; each qualifies as an original artwork. North Koreans, says Heather, are used to doing many tasks by hand. On public lawns, for example, he has seen people cutting grass with scissors.

“I looked around the studios and had certain ideas,” says Heather, whose previous ventures include a child care business in the U.K. that failed in the 1990s. Before leaving Pyongyang he signed a contract with the studio to find markets for its artwork outside Asia.

Starting in 2004 he began shipping hundreds of works of art to London. He rented a gallery in Pall Mall and hoisted a North Korean flag outside. In 2007 he unveiled a public exhibition of his collection–the biggest ever of North Korean art outside Korea. “I was expecting demonstrations outside, people camping out, protests.” Instead he sold–from this exhibit and from a second, smaller one at London’s Foyles bookshop–some 100 propaganda posters, 30 paintings and 5 or 6 pieces of pottery. Most buyers were American. He says he hauled in a total of $220,000 for pieces he had bought for $50,000.

A few posters in the book will be familiar to DPRK visitors, since they often appear at prominent locations.  I commissioned two paintings in Pyongyang, and they are both in this book.  A few others can be seen in travelers’ photos. If you are interested in ordering the book, click here.  To learn a little more about how North Korean art is produced, order Art Under Control in North Korea here.  If you are interested in buying authentic North Korean paintings, contact the Pyongyang Art Studio.

UPDATE: Here are some exapmles from the BBC.

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DPRK tightening the reigns in order to secure public finance

Tuesday, August 5th, 2008

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
(NK Brief No. 08-8-5-1)
8/5/2008

The latest edition (2008, no. 2) of North Korea’s quarterly economic publication “Economic Research” urged for further regulation of public finance in order to ensure that the public finances necessary for the construction of an ‘Economically Powerful State’ are available.

The journal, which was brought into South Korea on July 29, contained an article titled, “Further Strengthening of Public Finance Regulations at the Present Time [will serve as] Important Collateral to Completely Guarantee the Capital Necessary for Socialist Economic Construction.” In the article, it stressed, “Public finance regulation is one form of state regulation through the monetary sector,” and, “Public financial security for the construction of an economically powerful state varies considerably according to how regulation and distribution functions are carried out.

North Korea has set the goal of construction of a ‘Strong and Prosperous State (Ideologically, Militarily, and Economically Powerful State) by 2012, the 100th anniversary of the birth of the country’s founder, Kim Il Sung. In light of that goal, Pyongyang has prioritized economic prosperity for this year, the 60th anniversary of the DPRK government, calling for a ‘full-scale offensive’ by all the people of the North.

“Economic Research” stresses the following three points for strengthening public finance: 1) further strengthening the coordination of the state’s guidance for economic enterprises, 2) ensuring the utility of economic enterprises, and, most importantly, 3) strictly establishing public finance regulations.

In particular, the establishment of public finance regulations was defined as, “guaranteeing efficient use of capital through the protection and endless expansion of the country’s public financial resources, as well as the complete protection of the capital necessary for state and business operations and efficient elimination of all current misappropriation.” This type of statement makes it appear as if diversion and misappropriation of North Korean finances are regular occurrences.

The journal called for strengthening of management and organization for the financial offices of public finance centers, businesses, and organizations in order to effectively enforce public finance regulations, and for the creation of auditing committees at enterprises and organizations to ensure this takes place.

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East German and North Korean husband reunited

Tuesday, August 5th, 2008

UPDATE 3 (2014-12-16): A documentary has been made about the Hong family reunion. You can see it here.

UPDATE 2: I added video of the family reunion to Youtube. You can see it here. 

UPDATE 1 (2008-8-5): Herald Tribune/Joong Ang have update and photo of reunion.

In February 2007 the Joong Ang Daily reported the sad story of Renate Hong, and East German citizen who married a North Korean student at Jena University named Hong Ok-geun.  Shortly after their marriage, Mr. Hong was called back to the DPRK in 1961, and the couple eventually lost touch.

Early last year, North Korea verified that Mr. Hong was still alive in Hamhung, though remarried and with a new family.   Ms. Hong, still in Germany with two children born of the short relationship, never remarried.

The couple was finally able to exchange letters with the help of German authorities. When the first arrived from Mr. Hong, it was the first time in 44 years that Renate had heard from her husband since her last letter came back with an “address unknown” stamp in 1963.

The DPRK government initially denied requests for a reunion, but this week the couple, as well as their children, were allowed to meet in Pyongyang.  According to the Hong family and diplomatic sources in Germany, Renate Hong, 71, and her two sons arrived in Pyongyang on July 25.  This will be the first time the two sons, now 47 and 48, will see their father.

Read more here:
Joong Ang Daily
Ryu Kwon-ha
2/13/2007

North Korea allows a separated couple to reunite after 47 years
Joong Ang Daily
Ryu Kwon-Ha and Ser Myo-ja
8/5/2008

German travels to NKorea to reunite with husband
Associated Press(Via Huffington Post)
8/5/2008

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DPRK humanitarian relief update

Sunday, August 3rd, 2008

NKeconWatch blogged earlier about the US-based organizations permitted to enter the DPRK and distribute US humanitarian relief.  A list of those organizations can be found here.

Number three on the list, Samaritan’s Purse, is headed by “US religionist” Franklin Graham, son of Rev. Billy Graham, who just arrived in Pyongyang for a 4-day humanitarian relief tour.  Franklin visited the DPRK once before, in 2000 according to KCNA, and met with Kang Yong Sop, chairman of the central committee of the Korean Christian Federation, Paek Nam Sun, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kim Kye Gwan, vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Kim Yong Dae, vice-president of the presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, and delivered a sermon at Pyongyang’s Pongsu Protestant Church. 

Since Franklin’s mother spent 1934 living in Pyongyang, the family seems to have taken a special interest in the DPRK.  In addition to the relief they are distributing now, Samaritan’s Purse chartered a 747 cargo jet from Charlotte to deliver $8.3 million in medicine and other emergency supplies in August of 2007. It was the first private flight directly from the U.S. to North Korea since the Korean War.

Graham’s organization has been posting information on his trip here and here.  Greta Van Sustern has been posting video here: hospital visit (the most informative), monument 1, monument 2, Grand People’s Study House, Mass Games (most inaccurate), Mr. Graham’s work, taking off from Sunan Airport (interesting), Franklin Graham video 1, Video 2, and interview transcript.

Read more here:
Evangelist Franklin Graham to preach in North Korea
McClatchy Newspapers
Tim Funk
7/31/2008

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The USA’s first naturalized North Korean

Friday, August 1st, 2008

I had never heard of fellow American Zang Gi Hong, the first US citizen naturalized from the DPRK, until a few days ago when a colleague relayed his story to me.  I have been unable to find much information on him via the Internet, except from one article (here) and the Google archive version (here). 

Excerpts from the article:

It was Vienna, Austria, in late December of 1956. Two months earlier, heroic Hungarians next door to the east had erupted against their Soviet oppressors, and for ten glorious days Hungary was in Hungarian hands.

The Kremlin feared that one satellite turned into a shooting star could infect and unravel their whole communist empire. The Red Army rolled back into Hungary with 200,000 troops and 2,000 tanks and flattened the uprising. Hordes of Hungarians fled west to freedom in Austria.

After two years at the University of Budapest this young “enemy” soldier began to view communism not as a submissive North Korean but more as a repressed Western European. When the fighting started, he and 200 other North Koreans helped the Freedom Fighters.

Hungarian youths had not yet had military training. The North Koreans knew how to work every piece of captured and donated communist ordnance, from a hand grenade to a tank!

After the Soviet putdown of the uprising, special squads of Soviet troops helped the Hungarian communist police round up every Korean in Budapest. It’s hard to disguise a Korean in Budapest. Of the 200 young Koreans, only four made it to freedom. The others were shipped back to certain doom in North Korea.

When he and I and a young Hungarian woman interpreter went to the American Embassy the next day, I would have bet even money that President Eisenhower would send the Columbine (His presidential plane, before they thought of Air Force One) over to Vienna to take him and me both back to America. I was stomp-down certain they’d find a quick way to let him into America.

We were led into an upstairs office at the Embassy and I started telling the story to the official behind the desk. Do you know how a comic feels when the laughter doesn’t come through early in the act? Or when the young woman arranges for her hand to be unholdable when you reach out? That’s the feeling I got early in the narrative.

The Embassy official looked on like a zombie. No comments. No questions. If there’d been a little strip-screen across his forehead, it would have read “Non-Reacting!”

Even absent the euphoria of the Hungarian Revolution, as you read this I expect you to feel what I felt. When I finished this incredibly fortunate story for our side, the diplomat-zombie impassively opened his desk drawer and pulled forth a little booklet.

“Your friend can’t come to America as a Hungarian refugee,” he intoned, leafing to a page of rules, “because he’s not Hungarian. And he can’t come in as a North Korean because we’re at war and there’s no quota!”

At least the 200,000 Hungarian refugees in Vienna would be processed and admitted to a free country. My Korean friend was now diplomatically stateless and weightless.

Thanks to the subsequent intervention of broadcaster Tex McCrary and the supposedly villainous immigrant-hating Congressman Francis E. Walter of Pennsylvania, we got that young man into America with a scholarship to Syracuse from which he graduated with honors and became a millionaire architect and builder.

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