DPRK also acknowledges Shin was in Camp 18 (unintentionally)

January 18th, 2015

On October 26, 2014, Uriminzokkiri uploaded two videos to YouTube to discredit human rights activist Shin Dong-hyuk. Video one is here. Video two is here.

Below are some notes I took from the videos (back in October). I shared them with a couple of friends, but never published them. Point number 4 seems most relevant to the news this weekend, that Shin spent time in Camp 18.

1. Shin’s father, Shin Kyong-sop (신경섭?) claims he was born in Ryongbuk-ri, Mundok County: 룡북리, 39.498574°, 125.455410°. However, this ri was made part of Chongnam District. Chongnam District was initially carved out of Mundok County in 1980. In 1998 it was abolished and reincorporated into Mundok County. However, in 1999 Chongnam District was re-established with Ryongbuk-ri and Sin-ri of Mundok County. Either Shin’s father did not know that his home village had been moved into a new jurisdiction [because he has been incarcerated and not updated], or he is reporting that the ri was part of Mundok when he was born (it was). Ryongbuk-ri is appx 67km from Tukjang (as the crow flies), where Shin’s father lives now (according to the videos). More on Tukjang below.

Ryongbuk-ri-DPRK-ATLAS Tukjang-SP-Province

2. The video asserts that Shin was born in 1980 (1:01, in video 1) and that his original name is Shin In-gun (신인근). Shin acknowledged this name, I am unsure about the birth year.

3. Shin claims he is from Oedong-ri (외동리, 39.575453°, 126.071407°) which is inside [officially unacknowledged] Camp 14. (1:37, Video 1). Camp boundaries in yellow.

Oedong-ri-GE

4. Shin’s father claims that they did not live in a political prison camp [Camp 14] (1:52, Video 1), but in Pongchang-ri (봉창리, 39.562650°, 126.077345°). Pongchang-ri is on the opposite side of the Taedong River from Oedong-ri in Camp 14, where Shin claims he is from. Pongchang-ri became part of Pukchang County in February 1984. Before that, Pongchang-ri was officially part of Kaechon County (where Camp 14 is located).

Pongchang-ri-Oedong-ri

However more importantly, Pongchang-ri is inside the former Camp 18. Shin’s father offers a photo he claims is of a six-year-old Shin in Pongchang-ri. The year would be 1986, but Camp 18 was not closed until the 2000s. So revealing that Shin lived in Pongchang-ri as a child is admitting he was in a prison camp (Camp 18)…just not the one he claims to have been from (Camp 14). So now the North Koreans and Shin can at least agree he was in Camp 18.

camp-18-outline-shin

I have posted 2010 KCTV footage of Pongchang-ri (coal mine) here which matches the satellite imagery of the site.

5. Dad says Shin went to primary school in Pongchang and secondary school in Tukjang (2:07, Video 1). But graduated from a different secondary school (“Suwon Secondary School”) and got a job in the “Suwon Pit”.  [How common is it for North Korean schoolchildren to change secondary schools? Under what conditions does this happen?]  Mr. Song Yoon-bok, chief secretary of “No Fence in North Korea,” has told me that the father did not say “Suwon” but rather “Suan,” and Uriminzokkiri misspelled it in English on the videos. “Suan” is a small area of eastern Pongchang-ri, and “Several former Camp 18 survivors now living in Seoul certainly remember the name and location…in Camp 18.” I cannot find this area on any maps, but a defector named Kim Hye-Suk identified it in this publication.

After the Suwon/Suan pit, Shin’s father claims he left home and moved to Puhung Mine in Unsan (2:53, Video 1). However when Shin was 12, (December 1992), Puhung Workers` District was incorporated into Sunchon City. It is still in Sunchon City. So his father is incorrect about the county/city that his son’s mine was in (unless Shin started working there before he was 12).

Puhung-mine-shin

Shin’s father also says that most of Shin’s injuries come from mining accidents (3:23, Video 1). As of 2015-1-17, Shin still maintains his injuries are from torture.

Also, the father does not seem surprised when he is asked about family members being “raped to death” (4:05) [Like he does when he is asked about “reward Marriage”]. I believe that even most North Koreans would have a more visceral reaction to that question. Implies more coaching.

6. According to the video, Shin’s parents live in Kalgol-dong No. 146 of Tukjang Workers’ District. 39.577267°, 126.225550°. The North Korean video footage matches satellite imagery of Tukjang Workers’ District, but not of Kalgol-dong (3:20, Video 1). Tukjang Workers’ District lies just outside boundaries of former Camp 18.

 kalgol-146-Uriminzokkiri kalgol-146-GE

7. The neighbor who discusses the alleged murder committed by Shin’s mother and brother seems to know about Shin’s “treasonous activities” in South Korea. How could she (or his father) have any idea what he is up to outside of the country unless they were coached? Also, the North Koreans are claiming that Shin’s mother and brother are guilty of axe murder! This is the second instance of axe murder in the DPRK of which I am aware (the first instance is quite famous).  How many axe murders are there in the DPRK?

8. Shin’s father says he married his second wife in 1996 and Shin was 19 then (8:18, video 1). But if Shin was born in 1980, he should only be 16 (8:26, Video 1). The math on this is pretty easy, so the fact that he got it wrong implies it could have been fabricated. Shin’s father claims the newly-married couple lived with Shin for five years (8:40, Video 1), that would be from 1996 until 2001. Shin should be 16-21 years old during this period, but according to dad’s erroneous age he would be 19-24. This would mean that he moved to Puhung Mine when he was 21 (or 24 by fathers count).

When Shin’s father states that Shin was 19 when they were married, the mother-in-law nods her head in agreement (8:31, Video 1). At 8:40, however, there is a subtle cut in the video. The reason for the cut remains unknown (more coaching?). After the cut, Shin’s step-mother says that they lived with Shin for 3 years (1996-1999). She did not correct the age error. If Shin left their home in 1999, he would have moved to Puhung Mine in 1999 at the age of 19.

The manager at the Puhung Mine claims that Shin arrived in August 2002 (1:54, video 1), so there is a gap here of approximately one year by the father’s data and three years by the step-mother’s data. The mine manager describes Shin as “burly” (4:25). Not a description I would use.

9. The video claims Shin raped 13-year old at Puhung Mine (5:31) in June 2001 (5:45). Shin would be 21 then. This is over a year before he was employed at the Puhung Mine according to the manager. Why was he there? He should have still been living with his parents in Tukjang. Why was he never arrested or tried for the crime?

Other notes:
A. Shin’s uncle is in the video. Has Shin said anything about him?
B. Shin’s father was able to remarry a younger woman? 70 vs 56.
C. Shin’s father has a nice tv and radio. Is this really his home?
D. Finally: The DPRK previously tried to discredit Shin with this written statement. This written statement claims that Shin is from Soksan-ri (now part of Tukjang–the part that matches the video footage above). Soksan-ri is not ever mentioned in these videos by name, and it is not the same area of Tukjang as Kalgol-dong. There is also additional information on crimes committed by Shin’s father which are never address in the videos. This statement also mentions a first border crossing in 2002, after which Shin was sent back to the DPRK.

Hopefully Mr. Harden can get Mr. Shin to address some of these points in a revised publication.

Addendum: For the record, I have met Mr. Shin a couple of times at events in Washington. The extent of my interaction with him has been limited to a couple of handshakes. I have never emailed him, interviewed him, or had an extensive conversation with him.

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Kim Jong-un’s new runway

January 16th, 2015

Satellite imagery of the east coast of Korea dated 2014-7-4 has recently been uploaded to Google Earth. Among the more noticeable items is that Kim Jong-un had a new runway built at his family compound in Wonsan right next to his private train station.

 Wonsan-runway-2014-3-17

Wonsan-runway-2014-7-4

In the top picture you can see a small helipad (where Dennis Rodman landed) which was torn down to make way for a runway,  approximately 560m in length. The new runway should be able to accommodate small aircraft and helicopters. Although Kim Jong-il favored trains, the North Korean media has shown Kim Jong-un traveling by car, boat (military and yacht), and plane (even sort of flying one).

Last summer Kim’s guidance tour schedule seemed to suggest he was spending much of the time in Wonsan. With a runway like this, he will presumably be able to get around the country more easily from his “summer home”. Maybe in future satellite imagery we will get a view of his personal craft on the runway!

This was picked up by Radio Free Asia.

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New apartment construction in Sinuiju

January 14th, 2015

Chaeha-sinuiju-apartments

Pictured above (Google Earth: 2014-8-6): New apartment housing in Chaeha-dong, Sinuiju.

According to the Daily NK:

The real estate market in a strategic location of North Korea is heating up, with a recently new venture seeing apartment units being traded for up to 30,000 USD , the Daily NK has learned.

“Real estate development in Sinuiju City has been pretty active since two years ago,” a source based in the province told the Daily NK on Tuesday. “Starting last July or August, construction for high-rises has been underway in the Chaeha-dong neighborhood.”

The apartments in Chaeha-dong are being built on joint investments from foreign currency-earning enterprises and the donju [the new affluent middle class], according to the source. To clear the way for the lucrative project, Chaeha Market, the largest distribution market in the city, has been relocated to park grounds located in Namsang-dong.

While private property purchases remain illegal in North Korea, beleaguered by economic hardship, the state dolls out tacit consent to these endeavors, encouraging increasingly more illicit trade within the burgeoning real estate market.

In areas like Sinuiju, a main portal to and from China, there is no shortage of solvent buyers eager and willing to pay for property in the area, knowing its value will only continue to increase. The apartments taking over the Chaeha Market grounds are modern buildings of roughly 100 square meters, constructed from materials exclusively imported from China. Situated in a prime location near Sinuiju Customs House, the complex offers convenient transportation options compared to other locations, warranting the relative high prices, according to the source.

Units in the complex come in three varieties, depending on their stage of completion: “If only the framework of the apartment is put up, it is sold for 20,000 USD; if interior construction is completed, it trades for 25,000 USD; and if decorative touches are added, it fetches 30,000 USD,” she explained. According to exchange rates in North Korean markets on the 7th, 1 USD trades for roughly 8,000 KPW.

Labor for the cause consists of workers from state-run enterprises and “8.3 Workers” with special expertise. The term, “8.3 Workers,” stems from a system where workers earn money outside their state-mandated workplaces and present de facto tax payments back to their employers but also keep a portion of the profits. In this case, the “8.3 Workers” are sectioned off into “8.3 Units” of five to eight people, tasked with plastering or putting down tiles in one unit within the residential complex.

Regarding compensation for their work on the new building, “8.3 Groups” reach an agreement with the construction company, affiliated with a foreign-currency earning enterprise, on rates and then work around the clock once ground breaks on the project. “Time equals money,” as the source said, adding that one worker is estimated to receive roughly 30,000 [3.75 USd] to 50,000 KPW [6.25 USD] a day of work and is guaranteed rations and meals.

For investors, however, the project yields far more significant returns. “If an individual invests in one of these companies’ real estate construction project, the profits are divided up 3:7 and the investor receives a 30 percent share from sales of the completed property,” the source explained.

Donju invest in housing construction projects with these firms because they are unable to receive legal permission from the Ministry of Construction to engage in such personal investments. Although donju involvement in these undertakings has been known to sometimes take the form of loans offered to construction firms at lofty interest rates, this method proves less popular for the simple fact that there is less guarantee for them to receive what they are owed; needless to say, no laws exist to protect these–by official North Korean law–illicit transactions.

This fact propels most of the donju to invest in the permanence and relative stability property offers, all while skimming 30 percent of the overall profits from the sale; it is also why the source speculated this form of investment to continue to gain traction.

She added that demand for news persists on with unhindered growth. Party cadres and the donju continue to purchase completed units; in fact, many even buying two or three units using their relatives’ names to ensure future usage.

Meanwhile, residents of Chaeha-dong in Sinuiju are currently residing at the Sinuiju Medical University dorms or at homes of their relatives. The source reported that these temporarily displaced persons will be moving in, free of charge, to the newly built apartments following their completion. She noted, however, that this contingent forms a disproportionate percentage to those who have purchased units within the complex.

Read the full story here:
Real Estate Market Booming in Sinuiju
Daily NK
Seol Song Ah
2015-01-14

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DPRK expands trade with China up to 2013

January 14th, 2015

According to Yonhap:

More than 90 percent of North Korea’s exports were bound for China in 2013, a report showed Wednesday, indicating that Pyongyang’s trade dependence on its main ally has deepened significantly over the past decade.

According to the report compiled by the Beijing office of the Korea International Trade Association, North Korea exported 90.6 percent of its products to China in 2013, much higher than the 50.9 percent tallied in 2003.

North Korea’s exports to China were estimated at US$400 million in 2003, but they jumped by more than sixfold to $2.9 billion in 2013, the report said.

Despite the increase, North Korean products accounted for only a small portion of China’s imports. The ratio of North Korean products in China’s total imports inched up from 0.1 percent to 0.15 percent over the measured period.

North Korea’s investment in China grew 12.6 percent to $2.68 million, most of which consisted of small-sized spending on shops and stores, the report showed.

China’s investment in North Korea, meanwhile, expanded sharply from $1.12 million to $86.2 million over the same period.

The number of North Koreans visiting China also surged 162.5 percent from 80,000 in 2003 to 210,000 in 2013. The report said that a large number of the people seemed to have visited the neighboring country in search of work.

Additional notes:

1. It is worth noting that the figure “90%” is slightly inflated. South Koreans do not count the DPRK’s trade with them as international trade–but rather “inter-Korean trade”. If you include South Korean trade in these data, the % of total trade conducted with China drops a small amount.

2. More 2013 trade statistics can be found here.

3. South Korean trade with the DPRK dropped from $1.976 billion in 2012 to approximately $1.1 billion in  2013 owing to a temporary closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. It will be interesting to see how the 2014 numbers turn out.

Read the full story here:
N. Korea’s trade dependence on China deepens: report
Yonhap
2015-1-14

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Pyongyang’s official haircut prices

January 11th, 2015

A friend passes along some pictures (taken in 2014) of Pyongyang haircuts and prices.

Men:

2014-mens-hair-prices-1 2014-mens-hair-prices-2

Here is what the chart says:

Haircut for Men Price Table
Approval “No.4540″ on November 11, 2011, by the National Pricing Bureau (State Price Commission)

Cut (long hair)–25 won
*Vigor style cut–50 won
Dry–10 won
Shaving–10 won
Self-shaving–5 won
Curling hair with heated tongs–15 won
Dyeing–50 won

*The “Vigor Style cut (Pae-Ki Mo-Ri)” resembles Kim Jong-un’s hair style

Women:

2014-women-haircut-chart-1 2014-women-haircut-chart-2

Here is what the chart says:

Haircut for Women Price Table
Approval “No.4540″ on November 11, 2010, by the National Pricing Bureau (State Price Commission)

Permanent (long hair)–100 won
Permanent (short hair)–70 won
Permanent (bangs)–45 won
Hair cut–20 won
Hair cut, Permanent, Hair cut, Dry–110 won
Set (long hair)–30 won
Set (short hair)–20 won
Dry–20 won
Brush (long hair)–20 won
Brush (short hair)–20 won

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Master development plans [for EDZs] begin to work

January 6th, 2015

According to the Pyongyang Times (2015-1-6):

The development of EDZs (economic development zones) is going full steam ahead in the country after the publication of decrees on the establishment of economic development zones in provinces by the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly on November 21 2013 and July 23 2014.

EDZ is a special economic zone in which preferential treatment is given to economic activities pursuant to the DPRK law on economic development zones.

After the publication of the decrees, provincial people’s committees began to work out master plans for economic development zones and create environment for investment.

As a result, master plans for such development zones have been approved by provincial people’s assemblies including the Amnokgang economic development zone in North Phyongan Province, Manpho economic and Wiwon industrial development zones in Jagang Province, Sinphyong tourism development and Songnim export processing zones in North Hwanghae Province, Hyondong industrial development zone in Kangwon Province, Hungnam industrial and Pukchong agricultural development zones in South Hamgyong Province, Chongjin economic, Orang agricultural and Onsong island tourism development zones in North Hamgyong Province, Hyesan economic development zone in Ryanggang Province, Waudo export processing zone in Nampho City, and Chongnam industrial and Sukchon agricultural development zones in South Phyongan Province.

Master plans for other development zones are being worked out at the final stage.

With master development plans approved, provincial people’s committees are now working to attract more foreign investors and developing businesses to cooperate with their projects.

In October last year the Russian minister of Development of Far East visited the Chongjin EDZ together with Russian businesspersons to check the state of development and discuss matters of investment and development with officials concerned of the North Hamgyong Provincial People’s Committee.

Cooperation is being stepped up with Chinese businesses in the Onsong island tourism development zone in the wake of the opening ceremony of tourism in the Chongsu tourism development zone in Sakju County, North Phyongan Province in October last year.

Governments of some Southeast Asian nations are showing particular interest in the investment in the Sukchon agricultural development zone in South Phyongan Province.

Preparations are expected to be made for receiving investment in the development zones and the EDZs offer preferential treatment to developing businesses and investors with independence in management.

Management agencies are being set up in EDZs, experts needed for the development of these areas trained in universities in Pyongyang and provinces and technical personnel dispatched to other countries for practice.

Brisk activities for the development of EDZs in provinces across the country are attracting growing interest of experts and investors in many countries of the world, especially Asia-Pacific and Southeast Asian nations.

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Kim Jong-un’s 2015 new year address

January 1st, 2015

Martyn Williams has posted the best video of it (with English subtitles):

Here is coverage of the speech in the North Korean media (KCNA):

1. Kim Jong Un Makes New Year Address

2. Kim Jong Un Refers to Achievements Made by DPRK Last Year

3. Kim Jong Un Underlines Need to Consolidate Country’s Might as Socialist Political and Ideological Power

4. Kim Jong Un Calls for Fresh Turn in Building Revolutionary Armed Forces and Enhancing Defence Capability

5. Kim Jong Un Advances Tasks to Effect Upswing in Building Socialist Economic Giant and Civilized Nation

6. Kim Jong Un Set Forth Ways of Carrying out This Year’s Tasks

7. Kim Jong Un Deals with Issue of National Reunification

8. Kim Jong Un Deals with Issue of Foreign Relations

9. New Year Address Having Public Response

10. Workers and Farmers Meet to Vow to Implement Their New Year Tasks

Here is coverage of the speech in the international media:

1. N. Korean leader’s speech ‘meaningful': Seoul (Yonhap)

2. N. Korean leader’s speech arouses cautious optimism (Korea Herald)

3. Kim Jong-un says North Korea is open to ‘highest-level’ talks with South (Guardian)

4. Kim Jong Un Makes Apparent Summit Offer to South Korea (Wall Street Journal)

5. New Year’s Address Reveals a Nervous Leader (Daily NK)

6. Kim’s New Year’s speech reveals economic priorities (Lankov/NK News)

7. Jumping to Conclusions…Again (Klingner/38 North)

8. What’s New in Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s Speech (38 North)

9. Kim Jong Un’s New Year Speech: The Prospects for the 2015 Economic Policy (IFES)

10. Pyongyang’s ‘Year in Review’ Package Emphasizes Kim (Wall Street Journal)

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The third anniversary of Kim Jong Il’s death: Urging economic prosperity through economic development

December 31st, 2014

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)

This year marked the end of a three-year mourning period for Kim Jong Il’s death. To solidify Kim Jong Un’s rule, North Korea is urging for economic advancement and emphasizing economic prosperity and people’s happiness.

The Rodong Sinmun, the mouthpiece of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), increased its economy related news content from December 17. The entire December 22nd edition featured news on economic development: the front page headline read, “Let Us Seize All the Battle Goals of This Year”; news highlighted the achievements of the country’s cement factories, thermal power plants, insulation factories, cooperative farms, mines, and other front-line industries. In addition, pages two and four introduced economic development plans about fisheries and medical supplies. It also featured news touting rural villages’ ability to resolve vegetable shortages by growing vegetables rather than lawn in yards and by planting persimmon trees in villages.

The December 20th edition featured news of Kim Jong Un’s field guidance to Kim Jong Suk Pyongyang Textile Factory — his first since the end of the three-year mourning period for his father. The factory is named after Kim Jong Un’s grandmother and is one of the DPRK’s major textile factories. Kim stressed the problem with production of school uniforms and said, “The Party will fully take charge of the issue of school uniforms, shoes, school supplies, and school bags.”

Prime Minister Pak Pong Ju’s visit to the Orangchon Power Station No. 2 in North Hamgyong Province was also reported. This power station is significant in terms legacy. It began with Kim Il Sung’s order to resolve the power shortage problem in the North Hamgyong region. Power Station No. 1 was completed in 2007 during Kim Jong Il’s era. Power Station No. 2 was completed during Kim Jong Un’s regime.

The reason for the increased emphasis on economic issues is likely the desire to earn public support and improve public sentiment toward Kim Jong Un for resolving the country’s economic problems.

Meanwhile, the Voice of Russia reported that DPRK’s grain production increased this year against the previous year, recording 5.71 million tons. The Russian news agency ITAR-TASS also reported this news, quoting a DPRK official from the Ministry of Procurement and Food Administration: “Despite the drought that we had this year, grain yield increased by 50,000 tons from last year at 5.71 million tons.”

This is the first official report released by DPRK authorities on yearly crop yield. It suggests that North Korea’s good harvest of last year continued with a good harvest this year.

Success in the agricultural sector is likely to lessen the burden of chronic food shortage, and Kim Jong Un’s various agricultural reforms are expected to gather momentum including “Punjo” farming management system, which involves the handing out of small plots of land, or “pojon,” to small sub-groups or sub-workteams, usually comprising a family unit.

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DPRK responds to drought

December 20th, 2014

According to the Pyongyang Times (2014-12-20):

Nation set to secure enough water for farming

A long spell of severe drought that hit the country this year lowered the water level of reservoirs and reduced water sources for farming.

As part of the ongoing nationwide drive to meet the challenge and secure enough water for farming next year, cooperative farms in North Phyongan and South Hwanghae provinces are stepping up the repair and construction of reservoirs and waterways and their extension.

North Phyongan Province is focusing on the construction of reservoirs together with the reconstruction of Paengma-Cholsan and Amnokgang waterways.

Builders engaged in the reconstruction of Paengma-Cholsan and other waterways already rebuilt the waterway section in charge and are now laying stones over the surface of the banks.

The province is now carrying on the plans to build the reservoir at the Osong Cooperative Farm in Jongju till April and Hwangpho reservoir in Kwaksan County till June next year.

At the same time, it pushes ahead with the repair of 202 dams, about 600 pools, over 1 000 wells, some 90 tube wells and underground reservoirs to collect as much water as possible for the next year’s farming.

North Hwanghae Province is concentrating on the building of pumping stations to do safe farming by pumping up water from the Taedong River together with that of reservoirs.

After setting an ambitious goal to repair dozens of reservoirs, build dozens of more reservoirs, build and extend hundreds of kilometres of more waterways and construct more wells, tube wells and pumping stations on two stages till March next year, it is pushing forward with them in a planned manner.

Builders of Wangdang Reservoir No. 2 in Singye County are building earth dams successfully.

Songnim City is undertaking a project to draw water from the Taedong River into Inpho, Chongun and other ris. Notable achievements have been made in the building of foundations and waterways in a few days since it began.

The construction of pumping stations and waterways is under way in Hwangju County to draw water from the Taedong River into hundreds of hectares of paddy and dry fields of the Sunchon Cooperative Farm which was severely hit by drought this year and in Sariwon to use water of the Jaeryong River on the Migok Cooperative Farm.

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Ten power plants on Chongchon River under construction to increase power supply to Pyongyang

December 19th, 2014

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)

Japan-based pro-North Korea media outlet Choson Sinbo reported on December 11 that ten hydroelectric dams were being constructed along the Chongchon River stretching over a hundred kilometers.

According to the news, Chongchon River (217 km long) is one of the largest rivers in North Korea’s central region, and derives its name from its crystal clear water.

Multi-tiered power plants are being constructed, a project which runs across Jagang, North and South Pyongan Provinces, spanning approximately 77km. The project consists of ten small and medium-sized power plants of varying generating capacity.

The construction of the dams on the Chongchon River began in January 2013 and is considered as a second phase construction following the completion of the Huichon Power Station (in Jagang Province) in April 2012.

Huichon Power Station 1 and 2 were built in the first phase. The ten plants currently under construction can somewhat be considered as Huichon Power Stations No. 3 to 12.

The Huichon Power Stations 1 and 2 have a maximum power generation capacity of 300,000 kilowatts (KW). Stations 3 to 12 are expected to generate about 120,000 KW. Like the Huichon Power Stations No. 1 and No. 2, the new power plants are expected to provide power to Pyongyang City through direct transmission lines. It is expected that this will address the power shortage problem in Pyongyang.

The city, provincial, and central government agencies are overseeing the construction of the power plants and about 14,000 people have been mobilized for this project. The news reported that “young women’s shock brigades” were seen at the construction sites.

The news reported that many slogan banners are posted across the construction sites that read, “Once Determined, Korea (Choson) Will Accomplish!”, “All towards the Creation of Choson Speed”, and “Let Us Take Charge of Pyongyang’s Night lights.”

The Chongchon River power plants are expected to be completed by next October on the occasion of celebrating the 70th anniversary of the founding of the Workers’ Party of Korea.

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