North Korean Economy Watch

Daily NK
Yang Jung A
1/27/2008

An expert on North Korea has recently disputed a widely circulated claim that North Korea’s hard line diplomacy is due to influence from the North Korean military.

Park Young Tack, an active duty officer at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) said, “The North Korean military usually influences the policy decisions that are related to military roles and functions only.” Park wrote this in his recent article published on January 15 in the 2007 winter edition of the Korean Journal of Defense Analysis entitled ‘The Increasing Standing of the North Korean Military and the Military’s Influence on Decision Making’.

Park said, “Unless Kim Jong Il asks the military for opinions, the military cannot take part in matters other than its own.”

It is widely believed at home and abroad that the North Korean military exerts huge influence on the country’s major policy decisions and therefore is responsible for driving the country to take a hard line.

U.S, envoy Christopher Hill said prior to his visit to Pyongyang last year that he would like to meet high-ranking military officials and persuade them to give up the country’s nuclear programs.

Park said, “It is mistaken to believe that the standing of the military is superior to that of the Party as was the case in the past, and that the military plays a key role in decision making regarding the country’s fate.”

“Many believe that the North Korean military is trying to get in the way of the inter-Korean dialogues. However, that is exactly how the Party wants the world to assess the current situation in North Korea. It is my judgment that the Party has been manipulating the situation so that the military appears to take on the role of the hard-liners,” Park said. Park stressed that the General Political Bureau of the People’s Army by itself cannot voice opposition to the nation’s current policy toward South Korea.

Park said that Secretary for Military Munitions Jun Byung Ho, United Front Department Director Kim Yang Gon, and First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Suk Ju have established and are operating a direct reporting system to Kim Jong Il. Secretary Jun is currently responsible for conducting the country’s nuclear tests, Director Kim for operations of the policy through the direct reporting system [to Kim Jong Il], and Minister Kang for foreign announcements.

“It seems that Kim Jong Il allows the military to exert influence on decision making to some extent as a reward for the military’s pledge to help build and defend the absolute dictatorship of Kim Jong Il,” Park said.

“The military circles take part in making policy decisions by offering specialized suggestions and by advocating the Kim Jong Il regime which adopted the ‘Military-First’ policy among the ruling elite, the leaders from the middle class and the lower class,” Park said. However, Park added that the military has limited influence over matters other than its own.

Park said that Kim Jong Il is also strengthening the military-friendly system to watch and hold in check the military, which can pose the biggest threat to his regime.

“When making decisions, Kim Jong Il calls the ruling elite individually for consultations and has them report to him directly,” Park said, adding, “In any case, Kim Jong Il is at the center of the decision making process and stands at the top of the decision making ladder.”

“Kim Jong Il is a policy developer who issues policy proposals more frequently than anyone in the country. Any policy proposed by Kim is considered a supreme order and becomes a law,” Park said. “If an individual at the lower levels of the state wants to make a policy proposal, he usually first contacts an authority in the relevant field who then tries to read Kim Jong Il’s mind on the policy to be proposed. Only after he receives convincing words from the authorities, the low-level cadre is able to submit his proposal. That way, he can escape censure that would result from making an unsuccessful policy proposal.”

Park said that those working at the lower level of the state authorities cooperate with each other even if they work in different departments. If there are any policy shortcomings, they try to solve them together and share the responsibilities. They also create a task force between departments for policy implementation.

Park said, “This kind of political operation has come into existence for the following reasons: First of all, Kim Jong Il prefers to have an inner-circle, minimize the number of personnel, and simplify office procedures. Second, people at the working level have to worry about censure waiting for them when their policy implementation efforts end in failure.”

“Kim Jong Il’s administration style shows that he relies on an informal channel of communication with the ruling elite.” Park said, “He keeps a tight reign on all power groups within the country including the military, and no power group dares to challenge Kim’s authority. Even if united, these groups can hardly exercise any significant influence over decision making.”

Daily NK
Sohn Kwang Joo
12/6/2007

It was in Yanji where I met the 25-year-old defector, Kim Soo Mee. She was born and raised in the mountains that separated her village from larger towns in Hamkyung Province.

Because of her mother’s ferver for educating her children, Kim Soo Mee was able to attend the First Senior Middle School, a specialized school for gifted students, following her timely graduation from primary school.

When she was 12 years old, the national famine greatly affected her town. People scattered about the streets looking for food, and dead bodies could be seen everywhere. Many students stopped going to school and instead spent their days searching for food. However, Soo Mee’s mother urged her to continue with her studies. With her mother’s encouragement, Soo Mee gained acceptance into a prestigious university in North Korea.

She received good grades at the university and had high hopes of working in a well-established company in Pyongyang. However, due to her family background, she was forced to remain and work in the small rural town.

The living conditions in North Korea’s capitol are surprisingly different compared to the local cities.

Kim Soo Mee explained about the corruption surrounding university admissions in North Korea. “Only children who grow up in rich families can be admitted to the universities in Pyongyang, as huge sums of money are needed to bribe institution administrators. For example, if a student wants to attend Kim Il Sung University, often times a family will pay upwards of 1,000 dollars just to afford the child a chance of getting accepted. Pyongyang Medical College and Kim Hyong Jik College of Education usually require approximately 500 dollars in bribes.”

I was curious to ask, “Can a student bribe their way into a school even if he or she does not have good grades?”

She explained that such students are instructed to leave certain indicating marks on their test paper at the college entrance examination as a way for evaluators to discern whether the student offered a bribe or not. The evaluators rank the students by the amount in bribes their families have paid, and then rank them according to their family background.

Her college life was unbearable because she had no financial power or a strong family background to support her.

385 days out of her college years were spent practicing for the 40 seconds of the military parade it would take to pass by Kim Jong Il’s podium. The average student spends almost two and a half years preparing for national events such as military parades and agricultural support activities that take place in the Spring and Fall. These hardships led Soo Mee and many of her fellow students to dream of going abroad.

The most popular jobs after graduation include diplomatic posts and working in foreign currency-making companies. She went on to explain that it is now undesirable to work as a discharged soldier or a member of the Party.

As for the common perception of Kim Jong Il among North Korean youths, she maintained that “through propaganda, the people are made to believe that the General (Kim Jong Il) ‘s meals consist of only a few rice balls and salted radish. However, I was shocked to find out that preparation of the General’s meals costs 1,000 dollars.” This information was told to her by a researcher from Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il’s Longevity Institute.

Most of the intellectual students have an unfavorable opinion about Kim Jong Il, but the general public does not see the truth behind his lies.

“In the movie, ‘Geumjin River’ (2004), there is a line that states, ‘We are poor because the heavens took away our Supreme Leader (Kim Il Sung) in wrath because the people did not respectfully take care of him.’ The authorities are currently insisting that our country is now poor because of imperialistic pressures and economic sanctions imposed on us by America.”

I asked, “What do the Pyongyang citizens think about the future of North Korea?”

“Most think that we should open and reform our state, but they can never mention the words ‘open’ and ‘reform’ in public,” she replied. “The authorities often proclaim that we can attain wealth by properly following the Military-First Policy and by establishing a strong economic society. But the problem is they do not tell us how to do so. The only people not doing business in the jangmadang are cadres of the Party, generals of the Army and National Security or Safety Agents; they maintain favorable living conditions by collecting bribes from the citizens.”

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 07-10-18-1
10/18/2007

One year after the DPRK nuclear test, North Korea is still focusing all of their policy efforts on restoring their economy. North Korean leaders are convinced that an economic revival is crucial for the survival and stability of their regime.

The DPRK stated in this year’s New Year Joint Editorial, a publication that presents the regime’s policy direction for the year, that “the founding of a strong national economy is a crucial requirement for the revolution and advancement of our society, and is a historic undertaking toward becoming a fully prosperous and powerful nation.” The emphasis on “focusing all the state’s efforts on solving the economic issue,” was indicative of their sense of imminence regarding economic revival.

The Joint Editorial presenting the DPRK’s national goal of “founding a strong national economy” came out three months after the October nuclear test, which took place just over one year ago. Since its publication, the North Korean media has been stressing that the DPRK already realized powerful military strength and strong political ideology, and must now strive to establish a strong national economy. The military might of the nation was epitomized by the success of the nuclear test.

A copy of the North Korean quarterly publication “Politics & Law Review” obtained on September 14th emphasized the need to establish a strong national economy, stating that “without a strong national economy, it is impossible to strengthen the forces of political ideology and military power,” and, “the only way to block the infiltration of economic imperialism is by strengthening economic power.” It also added that “if we are weaker than South Korea, we will naturally look to them and depend on them.”

North Korean press claims that Kim Jong Il’s decision to carry out a nuclear test was the reason the 6-party talks have been working since January’s meeting between the United States and the DPRK in Berlin, thus easing tensions on the Korean peninsula by ameliorating the U.S.-DPRK relationship and advancing inter-Korean relations. The fact that 18 out of 55 public appearances (a significantly higher proportion than that of last year) made by Kim Jong Il this year were visits to economic bureaus also reflects North Korea’s economic ‘all-in.’ North Korea’s pro-active movement toward ameliorating relations with the United States, and its determination to expand inter-Korean economic cooperation, all stem from its urgency to develop their economy in order to stabilize their regime.

Frontline Club (h/t Kitten Wars)
1/17/2007

Paul French, Director of Access Asia–a market research and business intelligence company specialising in China and North Asia’s economics and markets, spoke to the Economist’s Simon Long about what he has witnessed and learned about North Korea.

He focuses mainly on his perceptions of the US/DPRK relationship, but he also talks about the difficulties of bringing investment capital into the DPRK.

Click on “Frontline club” at the top of the picture above to see the video.

Yonhap
8/15/2007

North Korea, celebrating the 62nd anniversary of Korea’s liberation from Japan’s 1910-45 colonial rule on Wednesday, called on its people to make concerted efforts to build a strong socialist economy.

The Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the North’s Workers’ Party, said in an editorial that there is no more urgent task than reconstructing the national economy and improving the people’s livelihood.

“On the economic front, the principles of socialism and utilitarianism should be thoroughly observed … All potentials and resources should be fully mobilized to boost production and construction,” said the paper.

“Food problem has to be addressed, while the light industry sector has to be revolutionized in order to mass-produce high-quality consumer products. Economic reconstruction and improvement of public livelihood are the most urgent tasks facing the nation.”

But the editorial still allotted much of its space to eulogizing the accomplishments of the North’s late founding leader Kim Il-sung and his Songun (military first) policy.

“The president’s plan for building a rich and powerful country is being carried out in all fields thanks to the Songun leadership of Kim Jong-il. The country in which the great Songun politics is being successfully applied will make ceaseless creations and leaping progresses and the president’s behest will come true in the socialist country,” said the paper, referring to the elder Kim as the president.

Yonhap
5/21/2007

North Korean leader Kim Jong-il recently made a reshuffle of his top military officials that may solidify his already firm grip on the country’s military, intelligence officials said Monday.

Ri Myong-su, former operations director of the North’s Korean People’s Army (KPA), has been named a resident member of the National Defense Commission (NDC), the highest decision-making body under the communist nation’s constitution that was revised in 1997 to reflect its military first, or “songun,” policy, an official said while speaking anonymously.

Ri was replaced by Kim Myong-guk, who had served in the post from 1994-1997, while Jong Thae-gun, an Army lieutenant general, has been named the propaganda director of the KPA’s General Political Bureau, according to the sources.

The reshuffle first appeared to be a routine rearrangement of personnel, but the sources said it may have been aimed at expanding the role and power of the already powerful NDC.

“The NDC seems to have become, at least externally, the North’s highest decision-making body as a number of top military officials have recently been appointed to (new) permanent posts of the defense commission,” a source said.

“We believe the NDC may become an actual organization in the near future with hundreds of resident staff like the other top decision-making bodies” such as the Workers’ Party, the official added.

Headed by the North’s reclusive leader, the defense commission has been the most powerful organization in the country where the military comes before everything.

But it has mostly been regarded as a faction of a group, namely the KPA, as most of its members concurrently served in other posts of the army, according to the sources.

Kim Yong-chun, the former Chief of General Staff of the KPA, was named the first deputy chairman of the NDC in April.

The sources said it is too early to determine why the commission’s permanent staff has been increased, but they said it may be linked to Pyongyang’s ruling system after Kim Jong-il.

The 65-year-old Kim has yet to name his successor, raising questions worldwide whether the reclusive leader is considering a collective ruling system after his death.

Kim was named as successor to his father, the founder of North Korea Kim Il-sung, at the age of 32 in 1974.

He has three sons from two marriages, but his oldest son, Jong-nam, 35, has apparently fallen out of favor following a 2001 incident in which the junior Kim was thrown out of Japan after trying to enter the country with a forged passport.

His two other sons, Jong-chul and Jong-un, both in their early 20s, have not held any official posts.

N. Korea enhances Kim’s defense commission
Korea Herald
Jin Dae-woong
5/21/2007

North Korea is beefing up the National Defense Commission, a top military decision-making body directly controlled by Kim Jong-il, Seoul intelligence sources said.

Pyongyang recently conducted a major reshuffle of its top military leadership, including the repositioning of Kim’s closest confidants to the committee, they said on condition of anonymity.

Chaired by Kim, the committee is an organization independent of the Cabinet and the ruling Korean Workers’ Party. It is next only to the communist country’s president, a post permanently held by the late founder and Kim’s father Kim Il-sung since his death in 1994.

The sources said that Gen. Ri Myong-su, former operation director of the Korean People’s Army, has been appointed as a standing member of the NDC. Gen. Kim Myong-kuk has been named to replace Ri as the top operations commander.

The reshuffle followed the appointment of Vice-Marshal Kim Yong-chun, former chief of the general staff of the Korean People’s Army, as vice chairman of the NDC during last month’s general session of the Supreme People’s Assembly, the nation’s parliament.

The personnel reconfiguration, which also affected key posts in the North Korean armed forces, is seen as part of Pyongyang’s move to further enhance the NDC, a powerful state body, under North Korea’s military-first policy.

The generals have been regarded as the most influential figures in the military as they frequently accompany Kim during his field unit inspections.

The commission has the power to direct all activities of the armed forces and national defense projects, establish and disband central defense institutions, appoint and dismiss senior military officers, confer military titles and grant titles for top commanders. It also can declare a state of war and issue mobilization orders in an emergency.

The National Defense Commission, presently chaired by Kim Jong-il, consists of the first deputy chairman, two deputy chairmen and six commission members. All members are selected for a five-year term.

The reshuffles are the latest known change to the commission. Gen. Hyon Chol-hae, former vice director of the KPA General Political Bureau, moved to the post of NDC vice director in 2003.

Experts noted that the figures are taking full-time posts in the NDC and relinquishing their posts in the People’s Army.

Other current members concurrently hold posts at both organizations, sources said.

Vice Marshal Jo Myong-rok, the first vice-chairman of the NDC, also assumes the position of director of the KPA General Political Bureau. Vice Marshal Kim Il-chol concurrently serves as a member of the NDC and minister of the People’s Armed Forces.

“As high-ranking military officers have moved to the NDC as full-time members, the NDC may be preparing to take follow up measures to expand its role and function in the future,” the sources said.

The NDC has been known as a consultative body of top military leaders without extensive subordinate organizations comparable to the ruling party and the Cabinet.

The intelligence sources said the NDC may have more manpower and organization under its wing.

“The NDC began equipping itself with organizational apparatuses with the 2003 transfer of Hyon Chol-hae from the KPA position to the post of NDC,” another source said.

In addition, the NDC has continued recruiting personnel such as Kim Yang-gon, councilor of the NDC, from other government departments, to strengthen the NDC’s policy functions, sources said.

“It is in line with North Korea’s long-term move to concentrate the country’s decision-making power on Kim Jong-il and his close subordinates,” said Nam Sung-wook, North Korean studies professor at Korea University. “It is mainly aimed at preventing possible regime dissolution amid rising international pressures over its nuclear weapons program. Kim is also seen directly intervening in a resolution of the nuclear issue.”

Kim Yong-hyun, a professor at Dongguk Univsersity, also agreed that the enhancement of the NDC will lead to the centralization of power in North Korea, reducing the role of the Korea Workers’ Party.

“Through the organizational reform, the North’s regime seeks to further streamline decision-making procedures to more effectively tackle an array of issues,” Kim said.

The North Korean studies expert said it is an answer of North Korean leadership to continuing economic hardship. The leadership has given over a comparatively extensive amount of power to the Cabinet for dealing with economic stagnation.

Kim also said it could be interpreted as preparation for the post-Kim Jong-il system.

“After his death, a collective leadership led by core subordinates of Kim Jong-il is expected to emerge, so, the move could be one related to future changes,” he said.

Daily NK
Yang Jung A
5/16/2007

“Kim Jong Il will not forgive even a scent of capitalism.”

The news concerning North Korea’s Park Bong Joo, the former prime minister who was dismissed last April after having received severe criticism from party members for insisting on implementation of an incentive-based system to encourage economic growth, has been generating interest.

It is known that Park Bong Joo was dismissed for an economic policy failure and using $8,000,000 of fertilizer money to purchase oil.

According to the Japanese media, Park, at last January’s “Cabinet Meeting,” suggested the implementation of an hourly, daily, and weekly plan to domestic companies as a way to inspire labor power. However, he was criticized by a Party leader who participated in the meeting at the time. The criticism was that Park was scheming to introduce capitalism.

Former Prime Minister Park also suggested in 2005 that it would be good to hold on exports of coal to China due to the influence it will have on civilian’s energy situation.

However, after the nuclear experiment, the National Defense Committee unfolded an emphasis on the acquisition of foreign currency for strengthening military power as being indispensable to the nation and strongly demanded the reopening of exports. This effectively reversed cabinet’s decision to terminate coal exports.

Concerning these matters, it is the evaluation of former International Secretary of the Party Hwang Jang Yop that “Park Bong Joo is the kind of person who speaks out about such things (to speak for reform).”

Former secretary Hwang said however, “(In North Korea), the Party secretary’s right to speak is much more powerful than the Prime Minister and even if Kim Jong Il could accept the contract work system (a piece rate system), if one advocates to reform like China, such speech to imitate capitalism or foreign country absolutely cannot be forgiven because Kim Jong Il himself can lose his position.”

”Basic economic reforms are impossible because of the need to preserve the basis of the military-first policy.”

Former Secretary Hwang explained, “Dr. Lee Seung Gi’s (abducted scientist who created a synthetic fiber, named as “Vinallon”) grandson, Park Chul went around saying China increased its production through agricultural reforms, but Dr. Lee’s pupil, Kim Hwan who was a secretary of the Party, supported Park Chul’s speech and was severely treated, falling to the position of assistant minister. From this we can see, speech to open and reform like China or even a scent of democratic opening and reform will not be forgiven.”

Kim Jong Il is known to have promised to lend his strength to the cabinet for normalization of North Korea’s destroyed economy after he elevated then Minister of Chemical Industry Park Bong Joo to the position of Prime Minister. (Park had previously been an economic bureaucrat).

When former Prime Minister Park reported to Kim Jong Il in 2003 that the Party and administration were infringing on the national economy, Kim Jong Il took the ministry’s side saying, “If I gave authority to the ministry, you have to be able to use it.”

However, as can be seen from more recent developments, the shake up involving Park Bong Joo shows how the cabinet is powerless in the face of the military and Party. Furthermore, this example reflects well how the system ultimately chooses the side of the anti-reform minded military in tension between it and reform-centered practical powers.

If the basis of the military-first policy remains unchanged, even if a brilliant economic bureaucrat assumes the duties of Prime Minister, the resuscitation of North Korea’s economic is fundamentally difficult, experts say.

Also, it has been pointed out that Kim Jong Il has been indulging the Party and the Army by dumping the responsibility for economic failure on the public administrative staff.

On the other hand, some North Korea experts suggest the dismissal of former Minister Park could be a symbolic acknowledgement of fear over the enlargement of China’s influence on North Korea.

Former Minister Park visited China in March 2005 and held talks with President Hu Jintao and Premier Wan Jiabao and inspected Chinese industrial cities. In January 2006, he was part of Kim Jong Il’s China visit as well.

N. Korea’s premier sacked due to his capitalist move
Yonhap
5/13/2007

North Korea fired its prime minister last week holding him responsible for making a suggestion that the reclusive communist country introduce an incentive-based capitalistic wage system, a Japanese newspaper said Sunday.

North Korea replaced Premier Pak Pong-ju with Transport Minister Kim Yong-il in April in a sudden reshuffle. The North gave no reasons for the change.

Citing unidentified diplomatic sources, Japan’s Mainichi Shimbun newspaper reported that Pak came under attack from party officials in January after suggesting the introduction of an incentive-based wage system to spur labor productivity.

The row apparently discouraged Pak to stay in his job, the paper said.

Mainichi said Pak was already at odds with the military over the North’s coal export policy. Pak banned coal exports to China, citing the shortage of fuel for households, but the military wanted coal exports to resume in an apparent bid to earn hard currency to boost the country’s defense capability, it said.

Daily NK
Han Young Jin
5/8/2007

Looking after the army back-to back rapidly changing to a “hard-line attitude towards the U.S.?” 

While observing the economic facilities for a while, Kim Jong Il, who has put on the gesture of emphasizing “economics,” has recently come forward to look after the army once again.

Last 5th and 6th, North Korea’s Workers Party-sponsored Rodung Shinmun reported that Kim Jong Il visited the 967th and the 977th army one after another.

According to this source, Kim Jong Il relayed, “The fate of our military-first revolution as our great revolutionary inheritance and our socialist enterprise depends on the military power.” At the 977th army, he revealed, “I am pleased that the soldiers have an awakened mind and are responsibly carrying out inspections work.”

This year, Kim Jong Il’s army inspections include seven visits, including the recent ones: 593rd army (January 15th), 398th joint army (January 16th), 105th army (March 19th), 350th army (March 19th), and the 75th anniversary parade of the establishment of the People’s Army.

Last year, when nuclear experiments were enforced, 66 army inspections and army-related events were achieved while raising a confrontational front to the United States. Immediately after the nuclear tests, it spared 16 events in the economic areas of Wonsan Farm and South Hankyung Province Industry Scene while putting forth a confident image under “improvement of civilian lives.”

North Korean advertising media have cast their spotlight as if to show their interest in economic issues while relaying the news of Kim Jong Il’s inspections of Chungjin in North Hamkyung last February, the 4th Taechun power plant, and Jakangdo industry scene.

Further, the North Korean media, through sound arguments via Rodung Shinmum, maintained, “The days when our people can live well are not too far off.” Accordingly, Kim Jong Il’s back-to-back industry inspection walks were portrayed as intentions to renew the impoverished civilian lives in contrast with the past that stressed army inspections.

Advertising “improvement of civilian lives” but people do not believe

However, the grandiose promise of “improving civilian lives” did not show much difference after the economy-related facility visits. Therefore, looking after the army by Kim Jong Il, who does not have a vision or will regarding opening and reforms, may be an inevitable course of action.

Even after entering the spring poverty season last March to April and the busy faming season in May, not having any possibility of resolving the problem of provisions is one of the reasons why civilians are having a difficult time purely accepting Kim Jong Il’s walks related to the public welfare and the national advertisements.

Kim Jong Il’s back-to-back army visits seem to be a gesture to arouse distrust in the wilted popular sentiment by rotating the policy towards the U.S. to a hard-line one. By turning the blame on the U.S. for the BDA asset problem, he seems to be stepping up the solidarity of the army and civilian mind around anti-American sentiment. 

Daily NK (Part 1)
Han Young Jin
3/10/2007

The reason North Korea’s regime can persevere is because of the central class’ fear of regime collapse.

As a result of this perseverance, North Korea has been able to resist isolation and pressure for more than half a century, with the system even defeating the “March of Suffering” where tens and thousands of people died of starvation.

Today, powers maintaining the North Korean system are the hierarchical upper class including the North Korean Workers’ Paryy, the National Security Agency, the National Protection Agency, prosecutors and adjudicators.

Overall, there are about 4 millions members in the North Korean Workers’ Party (statistics as of 1995), this being roughly 20% of the population. Retrospectively, these people control the 23mn North Korean citizens.

The central class incorporating junior secretaries to the party, training officers, novice elites, generals from the army, safety and protection agents use their power position to control directly the North Korean people.

The most of these people have strong loyalty for the regime. In particular, military generals or party officials especially fear punishment and the thought that their privileges may be removed. Though they may be leaders, it is not one’s own desire to escalate in power but fear of retaliation from new powers.

Local party officers, security agents and protection agents directly control, inspect and punish civilians. In essence, they absolutely control the North Korean people and hence fear direct retaliation from the people. The collapse of the regime, also means that they may become jobless and troublesome.

In the 80’s, there was an incident where the Kangkye Munitions Factory incurred an explosion. The people who thought that a war had risen killed the security agent in charge and threatened to evacuate the country regardless of war or not. The people armed with weapons even raided the home of the security agent in charge, with stones and batons. As this rumor spread, security officers throughout the country felt the tension and were all on alert. Hence, control forces even to the lowest rank have become the trustworthy pillar to the North Korean regime.

Since the early stages of the regime, North Korea trained members of anti-Japan protestors and their families, Mankyungdae Revolutionary Academies and distinguished servicemen from the Korean War. As a result, the mindset of North Korea’s central class is relatively high in societal class awareness, as is their loyalty to Kim Jong Il.

Ideology amidst the central class and brainwashed passion

These people believe that the survival of the North Korea system is directly connected to their lifeline. They fear that they will not be able to receive the same privileges given by Kim Jong Il, if the current North Korean regime were to collapse. They believe that Kim Jong Il’s fate is their fate.

The North Korean regime is currently strengthening the multiple control system for their central class so that the ideology of the class is not shaken and the principals of Kim Jong Il kept intact.

In North Korea, every position and decision is focused around Kim Jong Il and his every single word is glorified. In one sense, it is a specialty of the dictatorial regime, but in reality it is a way to force the upper class to stand in awe and even dread the grand Kim Jong Il. Some defectors, once members of North Korea’s elite say that people work having no conscious awareness of their heavy duty or how to modify words spoken by Kim Jong Il.

Educational jobs by the central class are different to that of the common citizen. As the former Soviet Union and Eastern European bloc was merging in the 90’s inflicting collapse to the regime, elite officials internally passed video tapes on the end of Romania’s former President Nicolae Ceausescu to calm other comrades but in the end stirred greater fear.

Recently, it is said that tapes on the Iraq situation have been televised for commanders and military elites to see. The aim of this viewing, to plant into the minds of the commanders that compromises to the protection of the system means death.

The Kim Jong Il regime gives privileges to inspire the people supporting them. For example, people who work for the Central Committee systems department or the elite propagandists, receive a Mercedes Benz with the number plate ‘2.16’ symbolizing Kim Jong Il’s own birthday, and depending on the position, the car series is upgraded.

Other elites from the Central Committee and figures in key military posts are provided with luxurious apartments in Pyongyang. The apartment blocks are built and located separately to the average house. Soldiers guard the homes, even restraining relatives from entering the apartment premises. These homes are furnished with electrical goods, sofas, food and goods made in Japan, as well as being accompanied with western culture.

As Military First Politics was implemented in the late 90’s, private nurses, full-time house maids, private apartments and country residences, private cars, office cars, as well as “recreational clubs” with beautiful women, were granted as privileges to the head military and provincial officers.

Every Lunar New Year, expensive foreign gifts are presented to the core central class. However, across the bridge, local and system secretaries, public control officers await common goods that can be found in South Korea’s supermarkets such as mandarins, apples, cigarettes and alcohol. Nonetheless, people who work for North Korea’s local offices are more than happy to receive these gifts are it distinctly segregates them from the common North Korean citizen.

OK to Capitalist Goods But NO to Capitalist Regime
Daily NK (Part 2)
Han Young Jin
3/11/2007

The higher the class, the closer one is to the 2nd and 3rd tier network. If a person is discovered to be in opposition to the regime they will be brutally punished and so a person is cut off early if they are found to show any signs of anti-Kim Jong Il.

The people who inflict the greatest control are the military high commanders. North Korea’s military can be seen as a branch of national politics that really does represent half of the regime. Political elites from the military closely control high commanders with under cover spies whose job is to specifically tattle on suspicious officers to the Party. Then, the protection agency in command contacts an expert who equipped with bugging devices carefully monitors the high commander’s every move, 24 hours a day.

In addition to this, control over university students who are being trained to become North Korea’s next elite group is also severe. In order to intensify regulations on university students, the protection agency initiates secret movements. Protection agents and even information staff are grouped to control the student’s movement with one information staff in charge of monitoring every each 5 students.

Even amidst the Workers’ Party and the ministries, national safety agents are dispatched to monitor the elite.

“Capitalist goods are good, but reform is unacceptable”

Though envious of South Korea’s economic development, North Korea’s upper class are opposed to growth and reform.

There is a popular story of an elite North Korean official who visited the South and frankly revealed “Though we may crawl and be worn, we cannot follow South Chosun’s economy.” It is also a well known fact that elite officials preferred Samsung digital cameras and showed interest in Hyundai cars at a South-North Cabinet talks and Aug 15th event in Seoul. Nonetheless, when it comes to acknowledging the need for capitalist reform, North Korea’s central class discards it with a wave of the hand.

The reason that capitalist goods are preferred but reform rejected is a result of the ideology that their individual power will be lost with change to the regime. Those who have loyally followed authorities have no mindset nor special skills that will enable them to survive a capitalist system. Rather than confronting a competitive society, they prefer their current position and the glory that comes with it.

The central class is also well aware of the restraints on North Korea’s economy. Every year as the harvest season arrives, they see citizens march onto the fields malnourished and underfed. They know that the economic policy implemented by authorities has failed and is incoherent. Yet, ultimately they are unwilling to let go of the small privileges they are endowed upon by the preposterous and unreasonable regime.

These people have become accustomed to their power which is utilized to gain them their privileges and tyranny. Even if North Korea enters a famine, they need not worry about food or clothing.

For example, in the case of an official factory secretary, he/she satisfies ones own personal needs by selling factory goods. Using the excuse that factory profits are being raised, he/she orders the workers to engage in more work, on the side. This is how tyranny occurs with the factory secretary manufacturing personal gains. Yet, these officials are not punished with any legal sentences.

Newly-rich dualism, collaborative relationship with official powers

Following the July 1st economic measures in 2002 trade became legal and North Korea experienced a sudden boom in newly rich elites. What led this new rich class to accumulate so much wealth was the fact that they had introduced an enterprise system which allowed trade with China.

The newly rich have a great interest in reform and development, and are well aware that the North Korean regime will not be able to solve the economic issue without facing reform.

However even this class of people are disinterested in bringing an end to the regime. They have already accumulated their wealth and feel no onus in the poverty stricken situation in North Korea. Whether capitalism or the current North Korean regime, as long as they can sustain a living, these people can continue to remain in a dualistic mindset.

While North Korean authorities are strengthening control over this new class, they are in another sense, receiving money and bribes to protect them. Where investigations are involved, authorities are risking their own identities being revealed and hence often ignore the illegalities of the people, even going to the extent of passing on information.

It is a fact that North Korea’s central class is acting as the forefront in sustaining the regime, but then again, these people have greater educational standard than the average commoner and they have had more opportunities to experience Western civilization. Hence, they can compare the North Korean regime with the outside world. Though the majority of this class accommodates to the North Korea regime, the possibility that a fraction of the elites may have some sort of antagonism against the Kim Jong Il regime and the odds that these people may just act upon these feelings cannot be discarded.

In addition, as North Korean society continues to decay, the organization of its systemic corruption may just be hit with danger. As corruption deepens and a crack appears in the regime, authorities will try to control this leak but while doing so, it is possible that endless punishment may just incite some elites to secede.

Particularly, the more information about foreign communities flow into North Korea and the people’s animosity against Kim Jong Il increases, even the elite will not be able to completely suppress feelings of antipathy.

KCNA
2/8/2007 

Redoubled efforts are being made to build a socialist economic power in the DPRK. The people are turning out in the grand march for perfecting the looks of a great, prosperous and powerful nation, full of confidence in sure victory and optimism.

The DPRK has consolidated the foundation for building an economic power over the last years.

The Workers’ Party of Korea has developed in depth President Kim Il Sung’s idea on economy as required by the developing revolution and thus provided unswerving guidelines for building an economic power.

While implementing the revolutionary economic policies of the WPK such as the line on economic construction in the Songun era with main emphasis on the development of the munitions industry and the policy of putting the national economy on a modern footing and IT, the Korean people have been firmly convinced that they will certainly build an economic power in this land when they work as indicated by the Party.

The army-people unity has developed as the oneness of army and people in terms of ideology and fighting spirit in the Songun era. It constitutes a powerful impetus to the construction of the economic power.

The Kanggye spirit, torchlight of Songgang and the Thaechon stamina have been created while the whole society following the revolutionary soldier spirit. The efforts have brought about a great change in the overall socialist construction.

Through the heroic endeavors, the people replete with faith in the future of prosperity have put industrial establishments, once stopped, on normalization of production and erected many monumental edifices including the Thaechon Youth Power Station No. 4.

An importance has been attached to science. A large army of intellectuals are paving the shortcut to the construction of an economic power with an extraordinary revolutionary enthusiasm.

A solid material and technical foundation for the construction of an economic power has been laid in the country.

All the sectors of the national economy have pushed ahead with the work of perfecting production structures, renovating technique and putting them on a modern footing, with the result that the number of such model factories in technical renovation and modernization as the Pyongyang 326 Electric Wire Factory is increasing as the days go by.

Production bases such as foodstuff factory, chicken farm, catfish farm, beer factory and cosmetic factory, which are directly contributing to the improvement of the people’s living standard, have mushroomed in different parts of the country.

The DPRK, with all the conditions for leaping higher and faster, will demonstrate the might of an economic power in the near future.