North Korean Economy Watch

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 08-5-29-1
5/29/2008

It has come to light that North Korea has lowered, and in some cases abolished, medical requirements for new recruits conscripted in this year’s spring military draft. A source inside North Korea told the “Daily NK” on May 26th, “Originally, men had to be over 148cm tall and over 43 kg in order to enter the military, but this year conscripts under 148cm and less than 43kg are also required to enter military service provided they suffer from no diseases.” The medical requirements for military conscription in North Korea were lowered to 148cm height, 43kg weight, and 40/40 vision in 1994.

The source went on to say, “Originally, people with eyesight less than 40/40 could not enter the military, but this year even middle-school students with eyesight so bad they need to wear glasses are all being drafted,” and that since fall of last year, authorities from the military mobilization bureau in charge of carrying out medical checks have been working on orders that the only thing to prevent conscription is disease.

Adolescents being conscripted this year are those that were born between 1991~1993, the first generation from the period of North Korea’s devastating famine during the mid 1990s to be sent to the military. In addition, as the generation born at a time when the North’s birthrate was falling sharply, the population of the generation now facing conscription is considerably smaller than that of the older generations.

Daily NK’s source also added, “Because the number and health of the new conscripts is less than wanted, [authorities] pressed for enlistment of female students as well…Last March, a guideline was set that women not carrying out military service could not be promoted to executive positions.”

Beginning in spring of this year, parents of female students in middle schools in farming communities were summoned to “family conferences” at which they heard a political address telling them that “from now on, in order to become executives and develop socially, women also must go to the military, without exception.”

Rumors are spreading among North Korean middle-schoolers that “from now on, military service is being lengthened,” and, “Now women are also required to serve in the military.” The source added that there is also a sense of unease among commissioned soldiers, who do not know whether their time will be extended, as well.

In March of 2003, during the sixth session of the tenth Supreme People’s Committee, the ‘System of Military Service for All Citizens’ was adopted, requiring men to serve ten years in the military and women to serve in supporting roles for seven years. Those eligible for conscription are between the ages of 17 and 25, have completed middle school, and have no blemishes on their family tree.

On Wednesday I attended a panel discussion featuring Marcus Noland, co-author (with Stephan Haggard) of Famine in North Korea, and three North Korean defectors.  Here is the video of the event.  Below is the information on the event from the Peterson Institute website:

Press release (slightly updated w/ comments from the talk)
North Korea is once again headed toward widespread food shortage, hunger, and risk of outright famine. According to Peterson Institute Senior Fellow Marcus Noland, “The country is in its most precarious situation since the end of the famine a decade ago.”

Click for larger view

Calculations by Noland and Stephan Haggard, University of California, San Diego, indicate that the country’s margin of error has virtually disappeared. For technical reasons, estimates produced by the United Nations’ World Food Program and Food and Agriculture Organization (total demand) probably overstate demand implying recurrent shortages year after year (figure 1 above). Noland and Haggard argue that in recent years available supply has exceeded more appropriately calculated grain requirements (adjusted total demand) but that this gap has virtually disappeared. “This is a yellow light about to turn red,” says Noland.

 
Click for larger view

Food prices have almost tripled in the last year, skyrocketing at a rate faster than either the overall rate of inflation or global food prices (figure 2 above). Anecdotal reports describe a breakdown in institutions and increasingly repressive internal behavior. Noland and Haggard forecast that the North Korean regime will ultimately weather this challenge politically by ratcheting up repression and scrambling, albeit belatedly, for foreign assistance.

The North Korean food crisis, now well into its second decade, presents a difficult set of ethical choices. North Korea is critically dependent on food aid, but the government has recklessly soured its relations with the donor community. Yet in the absence of vigorous international action, the victims of this disaster will not be the culpable but the innocent. As of this writing, it already may be too late to avoid at least some deaths from hunger, and shortages of crucial agricultural inputs such as fertilizer are setting the stage for continuing food problems well into 2009.

Paper presentation
Noland discussed two recent papers, written with Haggard and Yoonok Chang, Hansei University, which are based on a pathbreaking survey of more than 1,300 North Korean refugees in China (11 different cities).  The survey provides rare and extraordinary insight into both life in North Korea and the experiences of the refugees in China.

Paper 1: Exit Polls: Refugee Assessments of North Korea’s Transition 
Results from a survey of more than 1,300 North Korean refugees in China provide insight into changing economic conditions in North Korea. There is modest evidence of slightly more positive assessments among those who exited the country following the initiation of reforms in 2002. Education breeds skepticism; higher levels of education were associated with more negative perceptions of economic conditions and reform efforts. Other demographic markers such as gender or provincial origin are not robustly correlated with attitudes. Instead, personal experiences appear to be central: A significant number of the respondents were unaware of the humanitarian aid program (40%) and the ones who knew of it almost universally did not believe that they were beneficiaries (96%). This group’s evaluation of the regime, its intentions, and accomplishments is overwhelmingly negative—even more so than those of respondents who report having had experienced incarceration in political detention facilities—and attests to the powerful role that the famine experience continues to play in the political economy of the country.

Paper 2: Migration Experiences of North Korean Refugees: Survey Evidence from China 
Chronic food shortages, political repression, and poverty have driven tens of thousands of North Koreans into China. This paper reports results from a large-scale survey of this refugee population. The survey provides insight not only into the material circumstances of the refugees but also into their psychological state and aspirations. One key finding is that many North Korean refugees suffer severe psychological stress akin to post-traumatic stress disorder. This distress is caused in part by their vulnerability in China, but it is also a result of the long shadow cast by the North Korean famine and abuses suffered at the hands of the North Korean political regime: first and foremost, perceptions of unfairness with respect to the distribution of food aid, death of family members during the famine, and incarceration in the North Korean gulag, where the respondents reported witnessing forced starvation, deaths due to torture, and even infanticide and forced abortions. These traumas, in turn, affect the ability of the refugees to hold jobs in China and accumulate resources for on-migration to third countries. Most of the refugees want to permanently resettle in South Korea, though younger, better-educated refugees prefer the United States as a final destination.

Other speakers: Several North Korean defectors also spoke as part of North Korean Freedom Week here in Washington DC.  Comments and biographies below:

Kim Seung Min: Founder and Director of Free North Korea Radio, the broadcasting program providing news and information to North and South Korea and China. Kim attended both elementary and high school in Pyongyang before serving in the North Korean Army. He escaped from North Korea to China in 1996 but was arrested and repatriated. While traveling from Onseong to Pyongyang to face punishment for leaving the country without government permission, he jumped from a moving train to escape to China again and eventually made his way to South Korea. He worked as a laborer at a coal factory in Yenji, China, until his uncle in South Korea helped him to escape to South Korea. He attended Yonsei University and Graduate School at Joong Ang University, where he received a Master of Arts degree. After serving in leadership roles in the North Korean defector groups, he founded Free North Korea Radio, which was available on the internet beginning April 2004 and began broadcasting on shortwave in December 2005 with regular daily broadcasting beginning in April 2006. (Born 5/6/62 in Jangang Do, North Korea)

*Mr. Kim was a captain in the KPA for 16 years.  He talked about how soldiers were no better off in terms of access to food than ordinary North Koreans.  Starting in 1986, the DPRK state limited food supplies to the military to only rice, leaving the generals up to their own devices for feeding the army.  This led to a break-down in discipline and now people resent the personal behavior of many soldiers who are looking for food.

Kang Su Jin:Founder and Representative of the Coalition for North Korean Women’s Rights, the only organization focused specifically on increasing awareness of the horrors facing North Korean women in China, the role of women in democratizing North Korea, empowering and encouraging North Korean women who have resettled in South Korea, and building cooperation with other organizations. Kang was a member of the elites from Pyongyang and was the Manager of Supply from 1991 to 1998 of the Bonghwasan Hotel in Pyongyang, the biggest hotel in Pyongyang, which catered to high-ranking party and army officials and was used for special events. When food distribution stopped in Pyongyang in 1996, the regime announced that all hotels had to operate on their own, and conditions became very difficult for the workers. Kang visited China and saw how much better off the people were and decided to defect to South Korea. (Born 10/23/66 in Pyongyang, North Korea)

Kim Young-il:President and Founder of People for Successful Korean Reunification (P-SCORE), an organization founded in the fall of 2006, specifically to ensure the successful reunification of the Koreas would not adversely affect the South Korean economy. To that end, PSCORE, chiefly composed of young people, studies other reunification models, informs about the human rights conditions in North Korea, and prepares and educates young North Koreans to be ready to help lead a reunified Korea. Because Kim was not born into an elite family in North Korea, he was not allowed to attend university and was destined to become a coal miner after serving his mandatory military service. While in the military he witnessed many people including soldiers dying of starvation. His own uncle died of starvation and his cousins were left to wander the streets. His family made the decision to defect to China in August of 1996 instead of starving to death in North Korea. They survived there for five years bribing the police not to turn them in until they safely defected to South Korea in January 2001. Lim received a BA in Chinese from Hankook University of Foreign Studies in August 2006. (Born 4/10/78 in Hamheung, North Korea)

*Mr. Kim still communicates with people in the DPRK on a regular basis.  He said that the price of rice inside the DPRK is sensitive to external supply shocks (or even the rumors of external supply shocks).  This means that reports of aid cut offs could result in temporary domestic price spikes even if aid is delivered.

UPDATE: Photo and coverage in the Daily NK.

UPDATE: Yonhap reports that the food shortage was also discussed at the cabinet meeting:

North Korea has recently convened a Cabinet meeting to discuss food shortages, China’s Xinhua News Agency said Sunday, as international concerns grow over the North’s economic woes.

The North’s Cabinet recently held an enlarged session and decided to address the chronic shortages of food and consumer goods, the news agency said, citing a recent edition of the cabinet daily Minju Joson.

DPRK budget expenditures grow 2.5% this year
Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 08-4-16-1
4/16/2008

On May 9, the sixth round of North Korea’s 11th Supreme People’s Assembly opened, at which this year’s budget expenditures were announced to be 2.5% greater than last year. It was also reported at the assembly that the Cabinet would pursue a new 5-year plan to develop the nation’s science and technology sector by 2012.

Despite officially holding a seat on the Assembly, General Secretary Kim Jong Il did not attend this year’s assembly meeting. In addition, there was no mention during the assembly of inter-Korean, U.S.-DPRK or other foreign relations.

Cabinet Deputy Prime Minister Roh Doo-chul announced this year’s budget, stating that “this year, in order to strengthen national defense, and while building strength, to decisively advance the people’s economy and existing industry as well as improve the lives of the people, the national budget expenditure plan will be expanded to 102.5% of last year.”

According to this statement, this year’s budget is estimated to be 451.5 trillion won (3.2 billion USD). An estimated 15.8%, or 71.3 billion won (510 million USD), is slated for national defense. Last year’s national defense budget was 15.7%, or 69.2 billion won (490 million USD), of the national budget.

North Korea has also decided to increase budget allocations for energy, coal, and metal industries as well as the railway sector by 49.8% as compared to 2007, and will focus investments on staple industries. In the past, the North had stressed the importance of the ‘four main sectors’ of improvement in the people’s economy, including energy, but this year the government will actually focus investment on these sectors.

Cabinet Prime Minister Kim Young-il stated, “From this year until 2012, we will proceed forward with a new 5-year plan for the development of national science and technology…As we systematically increase national investment in this sector, we will raise the sense of responsibility and the role of technicians and raise the level of science and technology development as quickly as possible.”

In 2012, North Korea will celebrate the 100th anniversary of the birth of national founder Kim Il-sung, and has set a goal of constructing an economically powerful nation by that year.

Read the Yonhap story here:
N.K. discusses food shortage in Cabinet meeting
Yonhap
4/20/2008

Reuters excerpt: 

North Korea has been selling multiple rocket launchers to military-ruled Myanmar since the two countries restored ties last year in violation of U.N. sanctions, Japan’s NHK public broadcaster reported.

Quoting unspecified diplomatic sources, NHK said in a report late on Wednesday that the launchers were the same type as those deployed near the demilitarized zone separating the Korean peninsula.

The report could not be independently confirmed.

A Security Council resolution passed after North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test blocks trade with the secretive communist country in dangerous weapons, heavy conventional weapons and luxury goods.

Read the whole story here:
North Korea sells rocket launchers to Myanmar: report
Reuters
4/3/2008

The DPRK is sending a barrage of signals that it is not happy with the policy changes that are on the new South Korean government’s agenda (denuclearize and account for all nuclear activities, reform, repatriate missing South Korean citizens, etc):

1. February 25, 2008: the DPRK increases fighter jet maneuvers near the DMZ. (Source: N.K. flight maneuvers rise near border, Korea Herald, Jin Dae-woong
4/1/2008

2. March 27, 2008: the DPRK expels eleven South Korean officials from industrial zone. (Source: South Koreans kicked out of North Korea’s Kaesong industrial centre, The Times of London, Leo Lewis, (3/27/2008)

3. March 28, 2008: the DPRK test fires missles off its coast. (Source: North Korea sends a missile warning, Asia Times, Donald Kirk, 3/29/2008)

4. March 30, 2008: the DPRK issues blunt statements about deteriorating relations and suggesting complete destruction of the South if it is attacked. (Source: Pro-North Korea newspaper says relations with South at lowest since after nuclear test, Associated Press, 3/31/2008)

5. April 1, 2008: The DPRK breaks its silence on direclty challenging South Korea’s new president, labeling Lee Myung Bak a “traitor” and a “sycophant toward the U.S.” (Source: North Korea Calls South Korean President a `Traitor’, Bloomberg, 4/1/2008)

6. April 3, 2008: North Korea accuses the South Korean Navy of violating its territorial waters, “The South Korean military’s warmongers have sent three battleships deep into our territorial waters in the West Sea (Yellow Sea) at around 11:45 am (0245 GMT) on April 3,” and “South Korea’s military should clearly bear in mind that an unexpected countermeasure will follow if they continue to push battleships into (our waters) and raise tensions.” (Note here they are trying to pin the military escalation on South Korea) (Source: North Korea accuses South of entering its waters, Reuters, 4/3/2008)

7. April 3, 2008: North Korea announces it is suspending all dialogue with South Korea and closing the border to Seoul officials, its toughest action in a week of growing cross-border tensions. (North Korea cuts contacts with South, The Austrailan, Park, Chan Kyong, 4/3/2008)

8. DPRK violates NLL three times (Yonhap) 5/22/2008

Reasons not to panic:

1.  Although eleven South Korean officials have been expelled from the Kaesong Zone, Some 48 South Koreans and five North Koreans still work at a separate inter-Korean management committee overseeing the industrial zone, where about 800 South Koreans work along with more than 25,600 North Korean laborers for 69 South Korean companies.  In other words, it is still business as usual for the most part. (Source: Pro-North Korea newspaper says relations with South at lowest since after nuclear test, Associated Press, 3/31/2008)

2.  DPRK statements about about attacking the South are a response to statements aired in public by General Kim Tae-young at a National Assembly hearing on his nomination as chairman of the joint chiefs of staff where he claimed his people had plans for use any time it was deemed necessary to take out the North’s nuclear facilities. (Source: North Korea sends a missile warning, Asia Times, Donald Kirk, 3/29/2008)

3. While all of this was going on, 159 CEO’s of small- to medium-sized South Korean enterprises toured North Korea in search of investment opportunities. (Source: 159 CEOs Begin Trip to North Korea, Korea Times, Kim Sue-young, 3/19/2008)

4. Tourism to the DPRK continues unhampered.

5.  The Pyongyang International Trade fair in May is on and business delegations are still welcome.

6. April 3, 2008: The South’s unification ministry said it did not believe civilian exchanges would be affected. Two Seoul-funded projects in the North - the Kumgang resort and the Kaesong industrial complex - are major hard currency earners for the impoverished nation. (North Korea cuts contacts with South, The Austrailan, Park, Chan Kyong, 4/3/2008)

7. Inter korean trade this year is up! (Yonhap)

As many readers know, I have been mapping out North Korea’s military facilities (along with many other things) on Google Earth for some time.  Having never served in the military, I am not qualified to speculate on what many military locations are, but I discovered a web page that has a phenomenal explication of specific locations, even including 3-D overlay images (two  of the may comparisons are at the top of this post).

Anyone who is interested in Google Earth, or North Korea’s military infrastructure, needs to check out the full offerings at “Fortress North Korea” on “militaryphotos.net”.

And if you have not done so, download “North Korea Uncovered v.8″ on Google Earth here.  Sorry Google Maps users, the file is too large.

The New York Times (free registration required) ran an article today on Baengnyeong Island, South Korea’s northern most island which is below the NLL (the de jure, though disputed, sea border between the DPRK and the ROK), but only 10 miles from the coast of North Korea.

Fishermen have gone missing from this island for years, and occasionally, naval clashes erupt between the DPRK and ROK.  The latter problem, though not the former, was an agenda item on the most recent Inter-Korea talks between Kim Jong Il and the former South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun.

The island is now a sad reminder of the costs of division and isolation:

[F]or Chang Hyung-soo, a 64-year-old retired diver here, this narrow strip of water is what separates him from his hometown [in the PDRK]. It also separates him from three of his friends who were lost in fog while fishing and taken to North Korea three decades ago.

and… 

“A few weeks ago, a 93-year-old man came here to take a last look at his hometown across the channel before he died,” Mr. Chang, the retired diver, said from the hilltop. “But he could see nothing because of the fog. I still remember the old man’s tears of disappointment.”

Complicating the matter, however, is the competition from Chinese fishersmen granted territorial access by the DPRK:

To make matters worse, hundreds of Chinese fishing boats, after paying fees to the North Korean Navy, have sailed into waters between their islands and North Korea in recent years while the South Korean fishermen have been restricted to waters close to their own shores.

“The Chinese trawlers catch anything, everything, and deplete our seas,” said Kim Myong-san, 78, who first came to the island as a marine and settled here with his wife.

Notes:
One Eye on the Fish, the Other on North Korea
New York Times
Choe Sang-Hun
1/31/2008

Top image from Google Earth. Download “North Korea Uncovered” to see this location on your own Google Earth.

Last night I attended a presentation by The Honorable David Coltart of Zimbabwe, Shadow Justice Minister and Member of Parliament for Bulawayo South.   Aside from the sad story he told of the disastrous toll the policies of Zanu-PF and Robert Mugabe are taking on the lives of Zimbabwe’s people, he mentioned the role that President Kim il Sung of North Korea played in facilitating Comrade Mugabe’s rise to power…

The full story can be found in the report  “Breaking the Silence.”

Starting on Page 45 of the report:

…in October of 1980, an agreement was signed between Prime Minister Mugabe and President Kim Il Sung, in which North Korea offered to train and arm a brigade for the newly independent Zimbabwe.

The First News of this agreement in the Zimbabwe media was almost a year later, in August 1981, when 106 Korean instructors arrived to begin training the brigade. Prime Minister Mugabe then announced that the Korean-trained brigade was to be known as the 5 Brigade.”

This squad was colloquially named ‘Gukurahundi’ which is Shona for “the rain that washes away the chaff before the spring rains,” and it was separate from the normal Zimbabwe National Army. 

The 5 Brigade soldiers made it clear themselves that they should be regarded as above the law.[…] answerable to nobody but Mugabe.

In addition to Korean-made equipment,

5 Brigade had completely different communication procedures: their codes and radios were incompatible with other units. Their uniform was also different, its most distinctive feature by the time they became operational in 1983 being their red berets. […]The use of AK-47s, recognized by their distinctive bayonets and curved magazines,is another distinguishing feature. In addition, the 5 Brigade traveled in a large fleet of vehicles which were Korean in origin, although this fleet did not last long, falling to pieces on the rough Zimbabwean terrain.

The 5 Brigade’s brutal activities are outlined in the report, but essentially they were used to eliminate rival political parties that could threaten Mugabe’s (and ZANU-PFs) control of the state.

Daily NK
Yang Jung A
1/27/2008

An expert on North Korea has recently disputed a widely circulated claim that North Korea’s hard line diplomacy is due to influence from the North Korean military.

Park Young Tack, an active duty officer at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) said, “The North Korean military usually influences the policy decisions that are related to military roles and functions only.” Park wrote this in his recent article published on January 15 in the 2007 winter edition of the Korean Journal of Defense Analysis entitled ‘The Increasing Standing of the North Korean Military and the Military’s Influence on Decision Making’.

Park said, “Unless Kim Jong Il asks the military for opinions, the military cannot take part in matters other than its own.”

It is widely believed at home and abroad that the North Korean military exerts huge influence on the country’s major policy decisions and therefore is responsible for driving the country to take a hard line.

U.S, envoy Christopher Hill said prior to his visit to Pyongyang last year that he would like to meet high-ranking military officials and persuade them to give up the country’s nuclear programs.

Park said, “It is mistaken to believe that the standing of the military is superior to that of the Party as was the case in the past, and that the military plays a key role in decision making regarding the country’s fate.”

“Many believe that the North Korean military is trying to get in the way of the inter-Korean dialogues. However, that is exactly how the Party wants the world to assess the current situation in North Korea. It is my judgment that the Party has been manipulating the situation so that the military appears to take on the role of the hard-liners,” Park said. Park stressed that the General Political Bureau of the People’s Army by itself cannot voice opposition to the nation’s current policy toward South Korea.

Park said that Secretary for Military Munitions Jun Byung Ho, United Front Department Director Kim Yang Gon, and First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Suk Ju have established and are operating a direct reporting system to Kim Jong Il. Secretary Jun is currently responsible for conducting the country’s nuclear tests, Director Kim for operations of the policy through the direct reporting system [to Kim Jong Il], and Minister Kang for foreign announcements.

“It seems that Kim Jong Il allows the military to exert influence on decision making to some extent as a reward for the military’s pledge to help build and defend the absolute dictatorship of Kim Jong Il,” Park said.

“The military circles take part in making policy decisions by offering specialized suggestions and by advocating the Kim Jong Il regime which adopted the ‘Military-First’ policy among the ruling elite, the leaders from the middle class and the lower class,” Park said. However, Park added that the military has limited influence over matters other than its own.

Park said that Kim Jong Il is also strengthening the military-friendly system to watch and hold in check the military, which can pose the biggest threat to his regime.

“When making decisions, Kim Jong Il calls the ruling elite individually for consultations and has them report to him directly,” Park said, adding, “In any case, Kim Jong Il is at the center of the decision making process and stands at the top of the decision making ladder.”

“Kim Jong Il is a policy developer who issues policy proposals more frequently than anyone in the country. Any policy proposed by Kim is considered a supreme order and becomes a law,” Park said. “If an individual at the lower levels of the state wants to make a policy proposal, he usually first contacts an authority in the relevant field who then tries to read Kim Jong Il’s mind on the policy to be proposed. Only after he receives convincing words from the authorities, the low-level cadre is able to submit his proposal. That way, he can escape censure that would result from making an unsuccessful policy proposal.”

Park said that those working at the lower level of the state authorities cooperate with each other even if they work in different departments. If there are any policy shortcomings, they try to solve them together and share the responsibilities. They also create a task force between departments for policy implementation.

Park said, “This kind of political operation has come into existence for the following reasons: First of all, Kim Jong Il prefers to have an inner-circle, minimize the number of personnel, and simplify office procedures. Second, people at the working level have to worry about censure waiting for them when their policy implementation efforts end in failure.”

“Kim Jong Il’s administration style shows that he relies on an informal channel of communication with the ruling elite.” Park said, “He keeps a tight reign on all power groups within the country including the military, and no power group dares to challenge Kim’s authority. Even if united, these groups can hardly exercise any significant influence over decision making.”

Daily NK
Lee Sung Jin
1/22/2008

The citizens of Hoiryeong are worried about ongoing evacuation training they must undergo as part of a joint winter military drill with the army that began on January 17, said a source.

The winter military drill used to be held in December each year but this year it was delayed.

“People feel uneasy because of the sudden beginning of the drill and the strict regulations on the jangmadang in the cold winter,” one source reported on the 21st.

At 3 am on January 17th, in Hoiryeong, North Hamkyung Province, the North Korean army announced an emergency summons, modified the Worker and Peasant Red Guards, Local Reserve Forces and Youth Red Guard, declared a state of national preparation for war and started inspection of emergency supplies. The Local Reserve Forces rushed to occupy strategic positions and the Worker and Peasant Red Guard started a scouting drill.

During the winter military drill, ordinary citizens must leave their residential districts, taking one day’s worth of food with them, and live in an encampment for Local Reserve Forces around 8-12 km away from their homes.

The average temperature in Hoiryeong drops to around minus 10 degree Celsius in January. As defectors in Seoul testified, it is terribly hard to put up with the lack of heat at the encampments.

This drill is limited only to Hoiryeong. The source said: “It is actually a type of civil defense training. It was ordered by the People’s Safety Agency, but the army participated as well.”

This year’s drill was more intense than previous year’s. Vehicles without camouflage netting were prohibited from the streets and all citizens were forced to wear camouflage while outdoors.

The source said the drill was so similar to actual warfare that Local Reserve Forces and Worker and Peasant Red Guards wore their real rank badges.

When the drill started, factories and People’s Units in Hoiryeong began holding lectures entitled, “Let’s complete preparation for war against the American imperialists’ constant war maneuvers!”