Archive for the ‘Economic reform’ Category

How the North Korean government manages the economy

Thursday, August 8th, 2019

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

One of the most poorly understood aspects of policy change in North Korea in the past few years is the extent to which the North Korean government manages the economy in some ways like any government would in a market economy. Consider, for example, this story by Daily NK:

Amidst signs that housing prices in North Korea are falling due to economic stagnation, the authorities are assessing the state of the housing market in order to implement measures to stabilize the situation.

“The authorities recently began a survey of housing prices and will likely intervene in transactions and setting house prices,” a South Pyongan Province-based source told Daily NK.

The authorities have also begun to set prices for land designated for urban housing plans as part of efforts to control housing transactions, the source added.

These efforts are ostensibly aimed at setting an upper limit for house prices, but the authorities have yet to announce any official numbers.

The aim appears to be to prevent price spikes and ensure that buyers and sellers can conduct transactions within a stable housing market.

In North Korea, the state traditionally owns all land and housing by law, which is supposed to mean that the government provides housing to its citizens without any monetary transactions.

After the widespread famine in the 1990s, however, residents acquired the “right to use” housing and began conducting housing transactions on the basis of market prices. Even before the economic crisis, North Koreans in the upper class engaged in housing transactions on the black market, although such transactions could typically be considered a form of housing “trade.”

These changes came about because North Koreans began proactively taking advantage of the “right to use” housing. Essentially, the authorities gave them the right to inherit and transfer the ownership of the houses they lived in, and North Koreans actively bought and sold these rights on the market.

“The authorities have invested a massive amount of money in building new housing and these efforts have led to an increase in ‘donju’ who have made money out of the projects,” said the source. “The authorities probably thought they needed to step in and control the housing market because of the sheer number of new apartments.”

Full article and source:
Government conducts survey on housing prices in North Korea
Jang Seul Gi
2019-08-05

Now, we still know very little about how these market interventions may come to work. The state just stepping in and fixing prices may be it, but measures like that tend not to work for long.

Consider, also, this story about how the government may come to lower market stall operations fees on some markets. The reason cited is the general economic downturn (presumably following sanctions). In lowering fees, the North Korean government is doing what most governments would do in that situation: launching a fiscal stimulus, of sorts. By lowering taxes (because that’s essentially what these fees are), the government is hoping to stimulate economic activity.

Whatever language it may use to describe how the economy works, this is market management, albeit not of a very sophisticated kind.

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Daily NK on foreign currency shortages

Thursday, August 8th, 2019

Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

This is an interesting article by Daily NK. It highlights how little we actually understand about how the exchange rate works in North Korea. Basically, their sources say that foreign currency is available in increasingly short supply, but confirm that despite reports to the contrary, exchange rates haven’t moved noticeably:

Sources report that sanctions have reduced the flow of foreign currency into and out of the country, while the amount in circulation has further fallen because residents are hoarding it. While foreign currency is still being used to pay for major transactions, residents are increasingly using local currency to pay for daily items in the local markets.

“North Koreans are using local currency more often to buy things at the market. They’d prefer Chinese yuan or US dollars, but there’s just not enough of it in circulation to use,” a source in South Pyongan Province told Daily NK.

“There are concerns that the situation could lead to an increase in counterfeit bills circulating in the country.”

“International sanctions have definitely led to a fall in circulating foreign currency,” added a North Hamgyong Province-based merchant in his 40s. “The authorities implement measures to entice people to use foreign currency at particular shops and restaurants, or demand that the wealthy make donations to the regime’s loyalty fund, but there’s no avoiding the fact that the circulation of foreign currency has fallen compared to a couple of years ago.”

“There are rumors that the Arduous March [widespread famine of the mid-1990s] is returning, so people are trying to save up and not spend anymore,” he said, adding that broader forces are at play.

Despite the developments, the exchange rate remains relatively stable. Generally, a fall in foreign currency in the market would lead to an increase in the value of foreign bills and a rise in the exchange rate. But the exchange rate between the US dollar and North Korean won has fluctuated only slightly at 1 USD to 8,000 North Korean won, while the exchange rate between the Chinese yuan and North Korean won has remained at 1:1200.

However, if there is an increase in the use of foreign currency in the markets while the overall circulation of foreign bills continues to fall, it could lead to a significant impact on exchange rates.

Article source:
North Koreans turn to local currency due to foreign currency shortages
Ha Yoon Ah
Daily NK
2019-08-06

I’ve written quite a few times about how all this is possible. Logically, it is. That doesn’t make it less of a mystery.

If current conditions continue, I’d be very surprised if we don’t see a sharp fall in the won soon enough. But then again, the market has defied a lot of reasonable, logical expectations already…

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Market fees may be lowered on some North Korean markets

Tuesday, July 30th, 2019

Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Daily NK:

“Merchants working in the markets feel that business this year is worse than last. I’m not sure if the authorities were thinking about the merchants when they made the decision, but it’s good that they have reduced the taxes in Pochon, Sinpa and Kimhyongjik County,” said the source in Ryanggang Province during a telephone interview.

According to the source, market fees in Pochon and Sinpa County are relatively low compared to other areas. The fees for industrial goods were reduced from 1000 won to 500 won. Fees charged to vendors of food and ice cream were lowered from 500 won to 300 and 200 won, respectively.

The market fees are determined based on the size of the city, the size of the stall and the type of product being sold. The rough national average fees being charged per day as of early this year was 1500-2000 KPW for meat stalls, 1000-1500 KPW for industrial products (clothes) and 500-1000 KPW for food and vegetables.

According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ analysis of markets in North Korea, the authorities collect over $56 million USD per year from the markets. The largest market in North Korea, Sunam Market in Chongjin, generates an estimated $840,000 USD for the government.

Before the markets were formally recognized, market fees were 3-5 won until the early to mid 1990s, before being raised ten-fold in 2001, to 30-50 won. After the regime legalized the country’s private markets in 2002 with its ‘New Economic Management Improvement Measures,’ the fees rose another ten-fold.

Source:
Market fees in North Korea set for reduction in parts of border region
Kang Mi Jin
Daily NK
2019-07-30

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China’s Xi promised funding for bridge connections in North Korea, reports say

Tuesday, July 30th, 2019

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

This is quite interesting, and hardly surprising. Overall, I’ve seen very little to suggest that China regards the current sanctions pressure as anything but a temporary measure. That would fit the historical pattern well. (For more on this, feel free to check out my chapter on Trump’s “maximum pressure” strategy and its impacts on the North Korean economy.) This time is very different because of the longevity and extent of the Chinese sanctions pressure, but in nature, I don’t believe China’s medium- to long-term strategy on North Korea and sanctions has changed. Talk of China “abandoning” North Korea, which used to be rife when Chinese trade data on North Korea pointed in a downward direction, has often been and remains much overblown.

The news is that Xi Jinping, during his June visit to North Korea, supposedly promised that China would fund facilities on the North Korean side of the new-ish border bridge between southwestern Dandong, as well as fund work on the Hwanggumpyong SEZ. Asahi Shimbun:

China has promised to foot the bill for the construction of related facilities for an already-completed bridge across the border between China and North Korea, sources said.

Chinese President Xi Jinping made the pledge when he visited North Korea in June, they said.

During the visit, Xi also promised that China will promote construction of an economic development zone on North Korea’s Hwanggumpyong Island in the Yalu River, which forms a natural border between the two countries, the sources added.

Construction of the bridge and the economic development zone were agreed on when former North Korean leader Kim Jong Il was still alive. But the projects were effectively frozen after his son and successor Kim Jong Un became the country’s leader.

Xi’s willingness to pay the costs of building an access road to the bridge on the North Korean side of the border, as well as customs-related facilities, suggest that economic relations between the two neighbors are moving to a firmer footing.

According to sources knowledgeable about trade between the two countries and those with links to North Korean authorities, Xi’s promises were conveyed to high-ranking North Korean government officials during meetings to report on the outcome of a summit meeting between the two countries.

Xi’s largesse was also shared in the North Korean military as it will be involved in the construction of bridge-related facilities as well as the economic development zone.

The New Yalu River Bridge connects Dandong in China with Sinuiju in North Korea. Although the bridge has been completed, it is not yet open to traffic.

China will provide about 2.5 billion yuan (39 billion yen, or $360 million) for the construction costs. Chinese engineers have been conducting field surveys since late June.

Since around that time, the upper parts of the bridge have been lit up at night.

In mid-July, cars carrying Chinese government officials traveled to a border gate in the middle of the bridge.

Construction of the bridge started in 2011 when Kim Jong Il was in power. China spent about 1.8 billion yuan in construction costs. The bridge was completed in 2014 under Kim Jong Un’s regime.

Source:
China to fund costs so bridge to North Korea can open to traffic
YOSHIKAZU HIRAI
Asahi Shimbun
2019-07-29

On the North Korean side, the bridge has been lacking a connection to the broader road network (or to anywhere, really) since construction began in 2011, as these pictures show:

The new Yalu river bridge, October 1st, 2011. Image from Google Earth/Digital Globe.

The new Yalu river bridge, March 2nd, 2019. Image from Google Earth/Digital Globe.

Overall, this emphasizes the reality that China really is the only country that North Korea has close, substantive and sustainable trade links with. It was truly unlikely that Xi’s visit to North Korea would occur without any promises for economic benefits or the like. Kim Jong-un’s visits to China have rendered similar benefits, though perhaps not of the same economic magnitude.

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North Korea’s (April) constitutional revision and economic change

Friday, July 12th, 2019

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

A quick comment on the reported change of the North Korean constitution (back in April): I don’t have access to the revised version as of now (or a working VPN from Seoul…). But judging by the reporting by outlets like Hankyoreh (here), this seems like a quite important confirmation that changes in the economic governance system of enterprises in North Korea continues and is still seen as a priority by the state:

The publication of the full text of North Korea’s constitution, which was amended back in April, reveals that language about the “Taean Work System,” its traditional party-centric method of managing the economy, has been replaced by language about the “Responsible Management System for Socialist Corporations,” which increases the autonomy of managers at production sites and introduces market elements. This creates a constitutional basis for Kim Jong-un’s reform-oriented approach to the economy. The amended constitution also adds an expression about the chairperson of the State Affairs Commission “representing the state,” which effectively constitutes a formal declaration that Kim Jong-un, as chair of the State Affairs Commission, is the “head of the state.” The constitution was amended during the first session of North Korea’s 14th Supreme People’s Assembly, on Apr. 11, but the full text wasn’t released to the outside world until now.The full text of all 171 articles of North Korea’s revised “socialist constitution” was released on Naenara, a North Korean foreign propaganda outlet, on July 11.

Article 33 of the constitution says that “the state shall execute the Responsible Management System for Socialist Corporations in economic management while ensuring the correct use of economic spaces such as production costs, prices, and profitability.” This replaces language in the previous version of the constitution that read, “The state shall execute a self-supporting accounting system in line with the demands of the Taean Work System while ensuring the correct use of economic spaces such as production costs, prices, and profitability.” The key change here is a shift in the state’s economic management method from the Taean Work System to the Responsible Management System for Socialist Corporations. The constitutional amendment also adds language to Article 33 about “decisively increasing the role of the cabinet” in the management of the economy.

(Source: Hankyoreh, July 12th, 2019)

Why is this important?

In short, because these bureaucratic processes often stall. Kim Jong-un’s first few years in power saw a virtual flurry of new frameworks introduced for economic governance, most of them enshrining and institutionalizing rules and practices that had already been in place in much of the country for a while. Still, government recognition for these practices really matters, because at the very least, it indicates they won’t be curtailed or rolled back for a while. But this flurry appears to have ceased from around 2016 or so, or at least decreased in intensity and scope. Some have argued that some in the government may not have seen the results they anticipated on economic growth, and therefore turned their attention elsewhere. Including a strong reference to enterprise management autonomy may not indicate a change per se, but at the very least, it confirms that the broad strokes of the changes that have already happened seem to still be generally embraced by the government.

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Renewable energy power plant for Sinuiju modernization project

Friday, June 21st, 2019

Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Daily NK reports:

“A massive renewable energy power plant was built to deal with the chronic lack of electricity in North Pyongan Province,” a source in North Pyongan Province told Daily NK. “The power plant now supplies Sinuiju and other areas of the province.”

Meari, a North Korean propaganda outlet, published an article on June 2 entitled “The Construction of a Renewable Energy Power Plant that Produces 1,000 kW by the North Pyongan Province Electricity Department.”

The article states that a “renewable energy power plant was built on around a 300 square meter lot on the lower part of the Yalu River” and that “The Electricity Department built around 3,600 solar panels, electricity transformers, and electric cables to ensure the continued, self-sufficient supply of electricity.”

The source told Daily NK that the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) and government officials in North Pyongan Province made the decision to embark on the construction of the new power plant. Officials emphasized the use of renewable energy and new ways to supply electricity to the province.

A separate source in North Pyongan Province said that the decision to move forward with the project led to the construction of an “electricity base” with wind power and solar panels in the Sinuiju area.

“They are now moving forward with expanding the existing infrastructure by four-fold,” he said.

[…]

The Rodong Sinmun published an article on March 20 entitled “Let’s Imitate Them [North Pyongan Province’s Electricity Department] and Widely Develop and Use Renewable Energy.” The article states that the Electricity Department in North Pyongan Province “recently constructed a massive renewable energy power plant that is supplying electricity to important areas in Sinuiju and the local people.”

Source:
Renewable energy power plant built for Sinuiju modernization plans
Mun Dong Hui
Daily NK
2019-06-21

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Farmers in North Korea sent to labor camps for stealing potato seeds

Tuesday, June 11th, 2019

Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Perhaps this wouldn’t be a problem if farmers worked for themselves to a greater extent, rather than primarily to fill the state quota…

Daily NK reports:

A farmer at a potato farm in Yanggang Province was recently sent to a forced labor camp for stealing seeds meant for planting, a Daily NK source reported on June 3. The incident provides a glimpse into the difficulties faced during the potato planting season  in May.

The farm, a major producer of potatoes located in Taehongdan County, Ryanggang Province, is in an area where locals plant potato seeds for a two-week period starting in early May to ensure the seeds are planted on time. Potatoes in North Korea are important because they can replace rice and wheat and are the major source of calories for some parts of Ryanggang Province.

North Korean farmers refrain from removing the germinal disk from potato seeds and plant potatoes whole to increase yields. The state-run publication Rodong Sinmun recently reported that potato production reached record levels last year.

“There have been many cases where farmers have stolen potato seeds during the ‘potato planting battle’ period,” a source in Ryanggang Province told Daily NK. “The authorities made an example out of two farmers who stole seeds by sending them to a disciplinary labor center for six months.”

At larger farms in Taehongdan County, farmers use trackers to plant whole potatoes. Farmers working on smaller farms, however, plant the potatoes themselves. The potatoes need to be planted 4-5 centimeters apart, but farmers frequently do not follow this rule. Instead, they plant the potatoes farther apart and then hide the potato seeds that are leftover underground to take home later.

“Farm managers have worried constantly about this issue, so they have told farmers that stealing seeds is tantamount to destroying the Party’s agricultural policies,” said the source.

Poorer farmers, however, are faced with hunger during the planting season so they steal potato seeds regardless of these warnings and even sell the seeds in local markets, the source said.

Taehung-dan is, of course, the site for Kim Jong-il’s famous speech on the “potato revolution“.

Full article:
North Korean farmers sent to labor camp for stealing potato seeds
Kim Yoo Jin
Daily NK
2019-06-11

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Famine, Amartya Sen, and the Markets of North Korea

Monday, May 20th, 2019

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

The market factor in North Korea’s current food crisis* sometimes seems unclear. Some have talked about the market compensating for what the state doesn’t provide in the event of a food shortage. But the WFP’s methodology should cover for that. They don’t only calculate collective farms yields specifically, but arable land and production in general. Their estimates may (it’s not entirely clear) be based on data for total farmland available provided by the state, and there are some types of plots that wouldn’t be covered in that case. But WFP uses satellite imagery to verify official information on production figures (see p. 5 of their rapid food security assessment for North Korea).

We don’t know how big a proportion of the total amount of food produced in North Korea is sold on the markets, and how much is distributed through state and semi-state channels such as enterprises and factories, which are sometimes partially operated privately. In any case, when they measure total harvests, this likely, at the very least, includes most sources for the food that’s sold on markets. So a drop in total production still means lower market supply.

So why are markets still so important to understand food security, and why is it a problem that WFP cannot access them freely? Rest assured, this is not for a lack of trying. From pp. 6–8 (my emphasis added):

The assessment team also experienced challenges in accessing markets and acquiring market-related data. However, the team was not able to visit farmers’ markets during the field visit. While authorization was granted at national level to visit farmer’s markets, county authorities informed that they were not able to receive any foreign delegation on the day. Market visits are highly recommended to fill this information gap in future assessments. Finally, the team could only gather limited information on people’s incomes and expenditures during the household surveys.

Again, WFP’s conclusions are still highly relevant and meaningful. But as they themselves recognize, markets are crucial for understanding the microeconomic conditions on the ground in North Korea.

The most important reason, perhaps, is that distribution of food is just as important as food production for food security. As Amartya Sen has shown, food security is often more about who has an “entitlement” to food than about precisely how much food is around. This is where North Korea’s markets come in. Total production is an important metric to be sure, but to really understand how food is distributed, and who gets to eat, we have to also understand precisely how the markets work. We need to understand who uses them and how much they’re able to buy. Prices tell us something about overall supply (though as I have argued, probably not the full story).

Especially in a country like North Korea, where access to food and sustenance is a political matter, distribution (or entitlements) is more than total food production for food security. The markets are a crucial mechanism for distribution in North Korea. As long as WFP isn’t allowed to survey them, and to do more extensive household surveys freely in the country, we won’t truly know what food security looks like.

 

*We still don’t know that there is a crisis at hand, although the food situation appears very poor.

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Taxes increase on some North Korean markets

Friday, May 3rd, 2019

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

This sort of news is very interesting, particularly in context: I’ve heard from people who deal with North Korean firms that some of them have received orders to tighten up their accounting, and report their assets to the state in greater detail. Taken together, these snippets of information suggest an overall difficult economic situation, though not desperate or in crisis-mode, where the state is taking more and more measures to drive in cash from the public.

Daily NK:

Sales fees levied on private distributors have risen in some areas of North Korea. The fees are managed by North Korea’s collection agency and essentially provide a source of tax revenue for the state. Private distributors are expressing discontent over the changes as many are suffering under the country’s already poor economic conditions.

“The authorities recently began demanding outrageous and unfair selling fees from private distributors,” said a South Pyongan Province-based source on April 25. “Collection offices (i.e. tax offices) attached to local people’s committees are required to pay varying fees depending on the product, and the number of fees have been doubled.”

These de facto tax offices were established in each city and county as part of the July 1 Economic Management Improvement Measure in 2003 and are managed by the Ministry of Financial Administration. The offices collect fees for land use, market stalls, and various other reasons.

“The authorities are demanding a huge amount of fees to gain control over and restrict the activities of private business people who live in Pyongsong but bring in products from Sinuiju, Rajin-Sonbong, Nampo and Hyesan,” said a separate source in South Pyongan Province.

“Soybean oil sellers, for example, had to pay 3% of their income before, but now have to pay twice that amount.”

The skyrocketing fees are likely due to the fall in tax revenue arising from the economic difficulties the country is facing.

“The government increased the fees they were collecting just as incomes fell among private business people,” she said. “The authorities are simply taking money from the people to make it seem like the state is self-sufficient.”

North Korean authorities have made the fee system more sophisticated while raising fees as part of efforts to generate more income for the regime.

Article source:
North Korea doubles de facto sales tax levied on distributors in some areas
Mun Dong Hui
Daily NK
2019-05-03

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Possible North Korea five-year strategy document leaked, says Japanese newspaper

Monday, April 22nd, 2019

Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

The following is interesting if true, and it makes a great deal of sense. One of North Korea’s main challenges is diversifying itself away from the overwhelming reliance on China for trade and economic ties. It’s easier said than done, though, and a wise (from a North Korean point of view) strategic ambition is one thing; realizing it is entirely different. I’ve written elsewhere about the age-old North Korean aim of diversifying itself economically away from reliance on China. Still, not much has happened since Kim Jong-il’s speech in the 1990s…

Hankyoreh’s re-write of Mainichi Shimbun:

A document titled “National Economic Development Strategy (2016–2020)” that North Korea adopted in the 2016 congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) stated that the country needs to become less dependent on China, the Japanese press has reported.Japanese newspaper the Mainichi Shimbun reported on Apr. 21 that the strategy document set the goal of achieving an average annual economic growth rate of 8% and proposed “reducing our reliance on China and expanding foreign trade in a number of areas, including Russia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East.”

While this strategy was adopted in the 7th WPK Congress, held in May 2016, after a hiatus of 36 years, the specific details and figures in the strategy had not been previously disclosed. The Mainichi explained that the strategy document had recently been acquired by Cho Yun-yeong, a Korean-Japanese researcher on North Korea.This document said that China represented 71.6% of North Korea’s trade value in 2014; Russia, 4.2%; and Germany, 0.8%. “China accounts for an overwhelming share of trade. We’ve been unable to move away from our dependence on China,” the document said.

The solution posited by the document was the diversification of foreign trade.More specifically, North Korea set the goal of increasing the amount of its trade with Russia to US$1 billion by 2020. According to the latest estimate by the South Korean government, North Korea’s trade with Russia amounted to US$77.84 million in 2017. In other words, the North was seeking to increase its trade with Russia more than tenfold in the space of just four years.The Mainichi Shimbun also said the North Korean document proposed gaining funds needed for building hydroelectric plants from Russia, as well as technical cooperation for upgrading facilities such as the Kim Chaek Iron and Steel Complex and the Musan Iron Mine.

North Korea also appears to have drawn up a plan to attract investment from Russian companies in international tourism zones in Wonsan and Mt. Kumgang and an economic development zone in Chongjin, along the the East Sea, in order to “build a cooperative network for producing medical products on consignment, processing marine products and developing natural energy.”The Japanese newspaper predicted that economic cooperation between the two countries could be on the agenda of the summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin, which is likely to be held in Vladivostok on Apr. 24. But given the failure of the second North Korea-US summit, in Hanoi, to live up to its expectations, it won’t be easy for the North to massively boost its trade with Russia, as it hopes to do.

Full article:

N. Korean document reveals strategy to decrease reliance on China, Japanese press reports
Cho Ki-weon
Hankyoreh
2019-04-22

And here’s the original article:

Documents obtained by a South Korean researcher have shed light on the full breadth of North Korea’s top-secret state economic development strategy for 2016 to 2020, including an 8% economic growth target and strengthened ties with Russia and other countries to break dependence on China.

The 157 pages of strategy documents, along with a Jan. 21 paper titled “Cabinet decision No. 2,” which presents North Korea’s agenda for this year, were obtained by Cho Yun-yong, a researcher on North Korea who formerly served as a Tokyo correspondent for South Korean news agency Newsis.

According to the documents, Pyongyang aims to achieve 8% annual economic growth through technological development and trade diversification. While the state economic development strategy had been presented at the seventh convention of the Workers’ Party of Korea in May 2016, its details and numerical targets were not publicly released.

The objectives outlined in the documents likely provided motivation for Pyongyang’s strong demand that economic sanctions on the country be lifted during a February summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and U.S. President Donald Trump. They also likely played a part in the planned summit between Kim and Russian President Vladimir Putin later this month.

With regard to the current status of the North Korean economy, the strategy documents point to low output levels of electricity and coal and the failure to fulfill domestic demand for food supply and daily necessities. As measures to realize the economic development strategy, the documents cite technological development, trade diversification and the full introduction of a new economic management method, which implies de-facto economic reform.

Specifically, the strategy calls for a break from the North’s exclusive devotion to China and expansion of trade to Russia and other countries in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. In particular, the initiative aims to boost the amount of trade with Russia to 1 billion dollars (about 110 billion yen) by 2020. The figure is more than 10 times the North Korea-Russia trade value of 77.84 million dollars in 2017, as reported in South Korean statistics.

The five-year strategic plan also suggests having Russia provide North Korea with the funds necessary to build hydroelectric plants and other facilities, as well as technological cooperation for revamping the Kim Chaek Iron and Steel Complex and the Musan Mine.

Furthermore, the economic strategy proposes inviting investment from Russian companies for special economic zones along the Sea of Japan. These proposals may become topics for discussion at the upcoming summit between Kim Jong Un and Russian President Putin.

Article source:
Docs shed light on scope of N. Korean development strategy through 2020
Koichi Yonemura
Mainichi Shimbun
2019-04-20

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