In the most recent issue of Foreign Trade (2016, No. 2), the DPRK publishes “REGULATIONS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA ON ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PARKS“.
In the most recent issue of Foreign Trade (2016, No. 2), the DPRK publishes “REGULATIONS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA ON ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PARKS“.
Pictured above (Google Earth): The approximate locations of the Waudo and Jindo Export Processing Zones
The North Korean quarterly magazine, Foreign Trade, published information on the Jindo and Waudo economic development Zones (straddling the Ryongnam Ship Repair Factory).
According to Foreign Trade (2016 vol 2, p6):
Economic development parks in the DPRK are booming recently.
The city of Nampho is conducting processing trade by relying on the bases in Jindo and Wau Islet, taking advantage of its favourable economic and geographical conditions.
As a gate city on the coast of the West Sea of Korea, the industrial city has an international port.
The city, situated on the lower reaches of the Taedong River, boasts metallurgical, machine building, glass-making industries, and lead and zinc refi ning, silk fabrics and shipbuilding bases.
It has the country’s biggest salt works and a fishing station, a fishing implements manufacturing factory and a refrigerating plant.
The Port of Nampho, the biggest of its kind in the western part of the country, is at the northern shore of the Taedong’s entrance to the sea. The water is deep, the port itself is far inside the estuary of the Taedong River and the dams of the West Sea Barrage stand high, assuring safe navigation by ships.
There are around ten major berths and crane ships, loading bridges and conveyor belts.
Wau Islet off the port is one of the famous tourist spots.
The port is linked with over a hundred foreign countries and regions for commercial trade.
Jindo Processing Trade Zone
The zone aims at producing various kinds of light industry and chemical goods made from duty-free raw materials for export.
Cooperation period: 50 years
Project plan: The coverage of the zone is about 1.8 sq km. By taking advantages of the Port of Nampho nearby and tens of years of development of the machine-building, electronical and light industries in Nampho, it processes various goods and exports them. Enterprises are admitted to it on the principle of conserving the environment and saving energy. It strives to develop new products and industrial fields, realize technical transfer with other countries and thus contribute to revitalizing the domestic industry. It is also making efforts to develop into a processing trade and bonded trade area.
Waudo Processing Trade Zone
The zone aims at developing into an intensive processing trade zone by introducing advanced development and operation mode and by placing stress on export-oriented processing and assembling.
Cooperation period: 50 years
Gross Investment: About USD 100,000,000
Project plan: The zone covers an area of about 1.5 sq km. By utilizing its favourable conditions, it puts main emphasis on bonded processing, processing to order, barter trade and other types of export-oriented processing industry.
It aims to develop into a comprehensive zone with financial, tourist, real estate and foodstuff industry bases in the areas around the port and the scenic area around the West Sea Barrage.
Cooperation mode: Joint venture between corporate bodies of the DPRK and foreign investors or wholly foreign-owned enterprises.
Location: Some parts of Ryongnam-ri, Waudo District by the estuary of the Taedong River southwest of the city.
Infrastructure condition: Only 50km away from Pyongyang and a few kilometres between the port, the biggest international port in the country, and the railway station.
From the port it is 330km to Dalian, 332km to Weihai, Shandong, 930km to Shanghai and 695km to Tianjin, China, and 1 575km to Chinese Taipei. The Youth Hero Road between Pyongyang and Nampho facilitates the few scores of kilometres of travel to the Pyongyang International Airport. These all provide favourable conditions for domestic marine transport and entry and exit of foreign personnel, materials and funds.
A 600,000kW-capacity power station and 10,000kW-capacity tidal power station are intended to be built near Kwangnyang Bay beside the West Sea Barrage. The Taedong fully guarantees water supply.
The site was formerly occupied by a salt farm, so problem of removing structures does not arise. The area is 40m above sea level and flat.
National Economic Development Guidance Bureau, DPRK Ministry of External Economic Relations
Add: Taedonggang District, Pyongyang, DPR Korea
According to Foreign Trade (2016 v. 2, p.7):
News from DPRK Chamber of Commerce in 2015
The DPRK Chamber of Commerce invited a delegation of the Slovenian Chamber of Commerce headed by Yan Mishra, director of the external cooperation agency, to discuss the issues related with developing nongovernmental economic exchanges and trade and investment in the Wonsan-Mt Kumgang International Tourist Zone.
During their stay the delegation exchanged opinions about the practical issues arising in realizing economic exchanges and trade between the businesses of the two countries and agreed to develop bilateral relationship and cooperation to activate non-governmental economic exchanges.
And they discussed the issues about a possible visit to Pyongyang in 2016 by a delegation of the Slovenian Chamber of Commerce comprising businesses that wish economic exchanges and trade with the DPRK and its presentation of rolling stock and electric products like tractor, timber transporter and motor generator at the forthcoming Pyongyang International Trade Fair.
Another agenda item of discussion was a possible participation by the trade companies of the DPRK in the international trade fair to be held in Slovenia in 2016 and their visit to factories in the country.
The investment policy and environment in the DPRK and the work of economic development parks like the Wonsan-Mt Kumgang International Tourist Zone were introduced, and possibilities of investment and cooperation by businesses of the two countries in these parks were discussed.
In addition, the DPRK Chamber of Commerce arranged meetings between tens of local organs like the Korean Association for the Research and Development of Greening, Plant Import and Export Company, Kumsu Corporation, Korea Titanium Development and Trading Company, Central Imports Exchange Company and members of the Slovenian delegation so that they can exchange opinions on the matters of mutual concern.
DPRK Chamber of Commerce
Add: Central District, Pyongyang, DPR Korea
According to the Choson Ilbo:
Trade with North Korea is expected to be practically zero this year now the joint Kaesong Industrial Complex has been shut down.
According to a 2016 White Paper published by the Unification Ministry on Thursday, last year’s cross-border trade volume was a record US$2.7 billion, up 15.9 percent from 2014, thanks to an increase in trade through the industrial park.
But that accounted for 99.6 percent of all cross-border trade since other trade had already been suspended under earlier sanctions in the wake of the sinking of the Navy corvette Cheonan in 2010.
Now the industrial park has been closed there is no trade left, the ministry said.
Since the North’s latest nuclear test in January, Seoul has also halted humanitarian aid to the North. Last year, Seoul gave Pyongyang humanitarian aid worth W25.4 billion, up 30 percent from 2014 (US$1=W1,167).
Read the full story here:
Trade with N.Korea Falls to Near-Zero
By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein
At this time of writing, the 7th Party Congress of the Korean Worker’s Party is only one day away. In the runup to the congress, as is natural, there has been much speculation about what the congress content will actually be. Most analyses seems to believe that personal and institutional decisions will be at the center, but there have also been speculations that policy proclamations may be made in areas such as agriculture.
This post is not an attempt at forecasting, an often fruitless endeavor. Rather than predictions, this post offers a few reasons why agricultural reform may be on the agenda for the congress in some shape or form, and a few reasons to believe the opposite.
Why agricultural reform may show up…
The first thing to note is that the North Koreans themselves rarely (or never) use the term “reform” to describe economic policy changes. If such changes are announced, they will probably be called “improvements” or simply “changes”. In any case, the arguably strongest reason to believe that liberalizing policy changes may appear on the congress agenda is that they seem to be working, at least from the perspective of the North Korean government.
Recall that last summer, North Korean press touted the efficiency of the small work-team structures and similar management policy changes in agriculture. Contrary to recent reports about reduced harvests due to the drought, North Korean media claimed that harvests were going up. Earlier, in 2012, journalists were invited to farms to hear farmers themselves speak about the policy changes, a clear indication that the regime was comfortably and formally toying with the rules. At least for some farmers: it is very possible that the reforms were rolled out on a trial-basis, and that they later got stuck in the bureaucratic mills or were deemed too radical. In sum, North Korean media outlets themselves have touted the reforms as successful, and though media reports do not amount to official policy proclamations, they are often good indicators for what’s going on behind the scenes.
…and why it might not.
On the other hand, agriculture has been conspicuously absent from several major publications and proclamations about policy priorities and successes over the past year. For example, agriculture only showed up once in the slogans the regime published earlier this year, while industry received several central shout-outs. Reforms or policy changes in agriculture were not mentioned at all. There are also reasons to doubt that agricultural reforms really did have a strong impact on harvests in 2015 — the increase in harvest output began earlier than state media started mentioning reforms.
Moreover, reports on economic output which the regime published only a few days ago only mentioned agriculture almost in passing. The reports only spoke about how farmers had diligently met their quotas for gathering fertilizer, and did not mention policy changes:
Farming preparations were brisk on the agricultural front, resulting in a 1.7 and 2.8 times growth in the securing of hukposan and microbial fertilizers and an over 1.3 times increase in the acreage of field carpeted with humus soil.
The production of homemade fertilizers and their transport, tractor overhauling and maintenance and other farming preparations are nearing completion thanks to the devoted drive of agricultural workers across the country.
Such successes are reported from railway, agricultural and other industrial sectors.
It’s socialist economics as usual, in other words: people work hard according to the planned quotas, and fulfill them because the state told them to do so. Moreover, the Washington Post’s report on Wednesday from a collective farm near Pyongyang did not mention any talk of policy changes in agriculture.
None of this sounds like the propaganda buildup one would expect in the weeks before a grand policy announcement. At least we won’t have to wait too long before we know.
By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein
Donju life might not always be what it is cracked up to be. Radio Free Asia reminds us that regardless of how well North Korea’s upper-middle class traders might be doing, the economic framework is still highly arbitrary:
North Korean hard currency shops providing foreign products for sale to the country’s wealthier citizens may soon see a full government takeover of its supply chains, leading to a drop in the quality and hike in the price of hard-to-obtain goods, North Korean sources say.
The stores, which require payment in Chinese yuan or U.S. dollars, have operated in recent years in Pyongyang and other large cities under the management of private businessmen who pay large portions of their profits to the central government.
Government-run trading firms are now poised to take over the purchase and pricing of products sold in the lucrative stores, though, a source in China’s Dandong city, just across the Yalu river from North Korea, told RFA’s Korean Service.
Until now, shop managers have gone to China themselves to bring back products—including clothing, cosmetics, and furniture—or sale in their stores, RFA’s source said, speaking on condition of anonymity.
“If this system of supply changes, not only will store managers be prevented from going to China, but no use will be made of their marketing and management skills,” the source said.
Once the new system is implemented, stores will have to submit a list of needed products to their city’s local trading firm, which will then make the purchases from China itself, the source said.
“There are doubts that [the government] will be able to supply needed products on time, though, and the change in quality and price of the items may lead to conflicts between store managers and the trading organizations handling product supply,” he said.
Profit grab seen
Separately, a source in the capital Pyongyang said no official statement announcing the change has yet been made.
“But there is a high possibility the new system will be established after the [ruling Korean Workers’ Party] convention in May,” he said.
If put in place, the move may be aimed partly at further reducing the profits earned by store managers, who already pay most of what they earn to the government of the reclusive, U.N.-sanctioned state, the source in Pyongyang said.
“North Korea’s foreign currency situation is urgent now,” the source said.
“From now on, the managers of foreign-currency shops will receive only a small salary, as they did in the past,” he said.
“Sales will drop, though, and the management will experience difficulties,” he said.
Full article here:
North Korean ‘Foreign Currency’ Stores Face State Takeover
Radio Free Asia
By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein
As this blog noted yesterday, South Korean daily Joongang Ilbo claims that the North Korean government may formally reintroduce a tax system before May this year, when a Worker’s Party convention will be held.
The goal, according to Joongang’s source, is primarily to formalize the private economy further. The latest UNSC sanctions are forcing the government to seek out more sources of revenue, and the growing private economy is seen as a resource that can still be tapped further.
Moreover, the source says, the state is planning to expand trading permits for private merchants, both on the formal markets and in private business in general. Under the new system, the state would essentially let merchants get access to land, water and electricity in exchange for a fee, much like in other countries where the state holds a monopoly on goods that often fall into the category of natural monopolies.
This is all interesting for several reasons. First, since the notion of North Korea as a tax free society might appear puzzling to some, it is worth taking a look at why the government decided to abolish taxes in the first place.
Ironically, had Joongang waited a few weeks before publishing the news, they would have hit the 42nd anniversary of the decision to make North Korea formally tax free. For it was on March 21st in 1974, at the Third Session of the Fifth Supreme People’s Assembly that Kim Il Sung officially announced that taxes were abolished. According to a KCNA-piece published in 2009, highlighting the occasion, the decision was taken as a step towards full socialism and framed in a historical context.
Taxation was a vestige of the past: the Japanese colonial power had instituted a “predatory” tax system that Kim Il-sung had vowed already in the 1930s that he would get rid of. (The Choson Dynasty (1392-1910), too, of course, had a tax system that could at times well be called predatory, but the KCNA piece does not mention this).
The ideological rationale, of course, is that under socialism, you don’t need taxation because private property has been abolished. In North Korea, collectivization of agriculture, for example, occurred only gradually. According to KCNA, agricultural taxes-in-kind were fully abolished by 1966. Given recent policy changes where farmers supposedly now get to keep a more significant share of their production than before, one could argue that taxation has in effect already been brought back to agriculture, and that the tax-in-kind-rate is around 70 percent.
So why could the government want to bring back taxation? Aside from the reasons given by the Joongang article, one could speculate about a possible connection with the remarks cited by KCNA earlier this year about party officials “seeking privileges, misuse of authority, abuse of power and bureaucratism manifested in the party” (February 4th, 2016).
Corruption is often an integral part of everyday life for anyone involved in business in a country that lacks a functioning rule of law. Corruption is known to be strongly institutionalized in North Korea, and when news of discontent come out of North Korea, it often has to do with arbitrary rule changes and regulations regarding market trading and business. A formalized tax system doesn’t itself guarantee a transparent set of rules and regulations, or that these rules are followed. But it is an almost necessary prerequisite.
By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein
In the past few days, Daily NK has carried a number of interesting reports on how the latest round of UNSC sanctions have impacted the domestic economy in North Korea. Below, I’ve gathered a compendium of sorts. I’ll continue updating it as more stories surface.
Only a short while after the sanctions were announced, trucks carrying mineral exports were blocked from entering China. Some businesspeople were apparently surprised at China’s relatively forceful implementation of the sanctions, given that little impact had been seen from past sanctions:
Chinese authorities began prohibiting mineral exports from North Korea on March 1st in a move not strictly related to the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 2270, which outlines sanctions against North Korea. North Korean authorities and foreign-earning currency enterprises tied to the military did not see this move coming and expressed embarrassment and shock.
In a telephone conversation with the Daily NK on March 4, a source from North Pyongan Province said, “Beginning on March 1, mineral exports such as coal and ore have not been allowed to pass through Chinese customs into China. Trucks loaded with mineral deposits have been idly waiting in front of Chinese customs near Dandong. The foreign trading companies are simply waiting for instructions from the higher authorities.”
Trucks loaded with mineral exports blocked from entering China
Seol Song Ah
A few days later, Daily NK reported that “panic” had begun to set in, not just among high-level businesspeople and traders involved in the mineral extraction industry, but also among market vendors who worry that they won’t be able to buy products for import from China:
“The news that the UN resolution containing sanctions against North Korea passed unanimously is spreading like wildfire through [domestic] cell phones. People in the North had little interest in sanctions in the past, but these days they are expressing concern that ‘this time things are going to be different,’” a source in South Pyongan Province reported to Daily NK on March 7.
A source in North Hamgyong Province corroborated this news, reporting the same developments on the ground in that region.
“Sinuiju is known as the gateway to China and the ultimate symbol of friendly relations between our two nations. That’s why news of its closure to mineral exports is causing dismay,” she explained, adding that a rumor has also taken off that international customs offices in other border towns such as North Hamgyong’s Rajin and Hoeryong will be shuttered.
Further anxiety is being stoked by the fact that trusted allies such as China and Russia are participating in the sanctions and the fact that residents are getting detailed information about the resolution’s specific clauses.
“People are further concerned because things have apparently changed significantly since China helped the country to overcome the difficulties during the ‘Arduous March,’ [famine] in the mid 1990s. People from all over the country are concerned that China might shut the border down totally. If that happens, it will become difficult for everyone to make a living,” the source indicated.
“Wholesalers and market vendors are feeling the most vulnerable to the UN sanctions. Their greatest fear is that they won’t be able to buy products. Merchants who have been selling Chinese products at cheap prices are expecting a cost increase and have momentarily discontinued sales.”
Panic sets in as sanctions specifics circulate
Choi Song Min
Not just mineral exports to China have taken a hit. Food products specialties like hairy crab, frequently imported to cities like Yanji in China from North Korea’s northern fishing cities like Rajin, are now being sold at domestic markets instead:
“These days items that were previously hard to find because they were earmarked for export are suddenly emerging at the markets,” a source from North Hamgyong Province told Daily NK on Thursday. “The price haven’t gone down enough yet, so you don’t see too many people actually buying them. But you do see flocks of curious people coming out to the markets to see all the delicacies for sale.”
She added, “High-end marine goods like roe, sea urchin eggs, hairy crab, and jumbo shrimp and produce like pine nuts, bracken, and salted pine mushrooms were once considered to be strictly for export, but now they’re easy to find. The number of such products, referred to as ‘sent back goods,’ at Sunam Market and other markets around Chongjin is growing by the day.”
Additional sources in both North and South Hwanghae Provinces reported the same developments in those regions.
Despite the sanctions that have already kicked in, products from China are still flowing into North Korea. however, the goods sold in bulk to China–minerals like coal, marine products, etc.– have nowhere to go and are therefore making their way back into the country.
Would-be food exports to China popping up in jangmadang
Choi Song Min
Politically, too, the topic of sanctions has become highly sensitive. According to reports by Daily NK, surveillance authorities have increased their focus on certain groups that they deem as more likely than others to speak out about the added pressures from the sanctions:
The boost in surveillance is interpreted as a move by the regime to nip in the bud any rumblings of political unrest engendered by members of society more likely to speak out about the pressure squeezing North Korea. Those tracing the lines of the circumstances leading to this pressure, namely a volley of sanctions lobbed at North Korea by the international community in response to its nuclear test and rocket launch, are a threat to the regime’s authoritarian grip over the population.
A source with the Ministry of People’s Security [MPS, or North Korea’s equivalent of a police force] informed Daily NK on March 8 that internal orders came down at the beginning of March for the MPS to survey and track the recent movements of those anyone ascribed to the “wavering” cohort. Two separate sources in the same province verified this information, but Daily NK has not yet confirmed if the same orders are in effect in other provinces.
MPS steps up surveillance to suppress potential ‘pot stirrers’
Kang Mi Jin
(UPDATE 2016-02-18): a couple of days ago, Daily NK published another piece on this topic. They note that market prices have remained relatively stable, and that many people don’t seem to treat this sanctions round as anything out of the ordinary:
Market prices in North Korea have remained relatively stable despite stronger sanctions enforced by the international community, including China, as well as greater limitations on market operationsdue to nationwide preparation for Pyongyang’s May Party Congress.
Multiple Daily NK sources within the country have confirmed that rice prices in Pyongyang, South Pyongan Province’s Sinuiju, and Ryanggang Province’s Hyesan are trading at 5,100 KPW, 5,150 KPW, and 5,080 KPW per kilogram, respectively, similar to levels before sanctions were stepped up (5,100 KPW, 5,100 KPW, 5,260 KPW).
This is also the case on the foreign exchange front, with 1 USD trading for 8,150 KPW in Pyongyang, 8,200 KPW in Sinuiju, and 8,170 KPW in Hyesan, showing some signs of strengthening for the local currency from pre-sanction rates (Pyongyang 8,200 KPW, Sinuiju·Hyesan 8,290 KPW).
“There had been concern we would see fewer goods in the market because of UN sanctions, but in reality, there hasn’t been much difference,” a source from North Pyongan Province told Daily NK in a telephone conversation on Sunday. “The state is placing restrictions on opening hours for the market for the ‘70-day battle’ (mobilization for the Party Congress), but the markets have remained lively, and there’s not much change in terms of market prices.”
Further confirming trends previously reported by Daily NK last week, an additional source in North Hamgyong Province reported yesterday that some people had stocked up food worried about sanctions from the UN, but that this hasn’t led to a violent gyration in prices. “Actually, in some regions, we’re seeing prices of certain products drop,” he noted.
This price stability seen in the marketplace, in spite of the sanctions having kicked in earlier this month, can be attributed to the fact that most products are still trading as they would have save one of the North’s main export items: minerals.
The simple reality that people have experienced similar times before is also at play. “In the past, people who had stockpiled food during other sanctions discovered that after the political climate evened out a bit they were unable to get their money’s worth for everything they bought. This is why we’re seeing less of it,” a source from Ryanggang Province explained. “Initially there was a little bit of noise, but in general people are remaining calm.”
Market prices so far showing resilience against sanctions
Kang Mi Jin
Also, Marcus Noland recently launched a “Black Market Contest” at the Witness to Transformation blog, letting readers bet on what will happen with the unofficial exchange rate as a result of the sanctions:
The exchange rate issue has re-emerged with the imposition of sanctions. My colleague Steph Haggard leans toward the view that the imposition of a broader set of sanctions, particularly with respect to mining, together with enhanced Chinese enforcement will generate a balance of payments cum financial crisis with uncertain implications for political stability. I am more skeptical of both the additional coverage and the likely Chinese rigor in enforcement.
But this is an empirical issue. If the sanctions bite, then one would expect to see their effects manifested in the black market rate on the won. So we decided to offer up this conundrum to the wisdom of the crowd, or at least of our readership, in this Witness to Transformation Black Market Contest. Yes, you can ply your wits against North Korean loan sharks and black market traders. Or maybe the North Korean monetary authorities. Here’s how it works.
Steph thinks that within two months, evidence of the impact of sanctions should begin to emerge. So the object of the contest is to guess the black market won-dollar rate two months hence. Since the sanctions resolution passed 2 March, we will use the first DailyNK average rate applying to the post-2 May period as the reference. So you have the next month to analyze trade data, contact spies in Dandong, or call in favors in Switzerland to inform your estimate. Whoever guesses closest to the May black market rate wins. In the event of a tie, whoever submitted their entry first wins.
Please list your estimate in the comments section below. The entry period closes 15 April.
Witness to Transformation Black Market Contest
Witness to Transformation blog
(UPDATE 2016-05-02): DailyNK continues to cover domestic prices in the context of the sanctions. In late April, vegetable prices rose, but rice prices remain notably stabile:
Despite these high prices, movements on the rice and foreign currency front have remained relatively stable, leading people to believe the spike in vegetables will be short lived.
“Vegetables are not export items and therefore their prices are determined by domestic supply and demand,” the Pyongyang-based source noted. “However strong the sanctions may be, rice prices have nonetheless remained the same and, under these conditions, not many will choose to eat expensive cabbages over rice,” the source added, suggesting that prices are likely to return to normal as the markets readjust for supply and demand.
UPDATE 2 (2016-3-17): According to the Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES):
North Korea to Host International Trade Fairs despite UN Sanctions
Despite the newly imposed sanctions by the UN Security Council (UNSC), North Korea does not appear to be deterred from hosting large-scale international events, as Pyongyang plans to host its annual Pyongyang International Trade Fair (PITF) twice this year, in May and September.
North Korea’s official web portal ‘Naenara’ reported that the spring PITF will be held at the Three-Revolution Exhibition House in the Sosong District in Pyongyang from May 16th to the 19th and the autumn PTIF will be held at the same venue from September 5th to the 8th.
‘Naenara’ claimed that the country “has been hosting hundreds of trade shows both in the country and abroad for over 50 years since April 17, 1958 and such events will enable the DPRK to accelerate its friendship and cooperation with other states and boost its international trade.”
According to the website, these trade fairs will exhibit items such as machine tools, mining equipment and their manufacturing technology for minerals—items in a sector now heavily targeted by the new sanctions imposed by the UNSC.
According to the report, the trade fairs will also include displays of construction machinery and building materials, energy and environment protection materials, communication and information technology, agricultural equipment and technology, foodstuffs and production technology, print and packing machinery, medical equipment and pharmaceuticals, light-industry products, consumer goods, and even vehicles.
Advertising is of course permitted at the trade fairs, with installation and removal displays and promotional materials requiring pre-approval by the host Korean International Exhibition Corporation. Transportation of the items for exhibition is to be dealt with by the Pyongyang Agent Department of the Italian company OTIM (Organizzazione Transporti Internazionali Marittimi). OTIM, a freight forwarding company established in the late 1940s, has been authorized and in charge of transporting goods between North Korea and Europe.
‘Naenara’ announced that the fairs will accept emailed or faxed applications until 40 days prior to the opening and has requested companies to send along their list of participants.
Apart from domestic enterprises, companies from around 16 countries or more — including Australia, China, Cuba, Cambodia, Germany, Italy, Indonesia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Poland, Russia, Singapore, Switzerland, and Vietnam — have reportedly participated in these trade fairs in the past.
Given North Korea’s isolation from the international system and closed-nature of its economy, the international trade fairs have been important events for its economy. However, while North Korea seems determined to host its annual spring and autumn events despite the international sanctions and pressure, just how many companies from other countries will participate is an open question.
UPDATE 1 (2016-3-1): The 2016-Q1 issue of Foreign Trade is out, and it contains some additional information on the 2016 Pyongyang Spring International Trade Fair.
ORIGINAL POST (2016-2-11): Everyone may be talking about nukes, rockets, sanctions, and the closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, but the North Koreans have begun planning the 2016 Pyongyang Spring Trade Fair. Below you can see images of the first flyers to emerge:
Promotion of the trade fair appears to be in the hands of a Chinese internet firm named Ex-Easy.
Thanks to a reader (Andy) for translating some of the flyer:
“Pyongyang International Business Products Exhibition” is organised by an affiliated company under DPRK’s Ministry of Trade. This international exhibition is DPRK’s largest and most trade-conducive of its kind. It is organised yearly since 1998, and is held twice yearly – in spring and autumn – from 2005. The exhibition will be held in Pyongyang’s Three Revolution Exhibition hall, with a capacity of 6500 square meters. The DPRK has been gradually liberalising its economy in recent years and increasing its trade with neighbouring countries. At the same time, it has raised its domestic living standards, and they are attracted to Chinese products and (manufacturing) techniques.
1. Daily necessities, office supplies, household appliances, manufacturing / packing equipment, sewing equipment, clothes, stitched (embroidered?) products, …
2. Food, flavourings, food additive facilities/techniques, high temperature processed products and equipment, fruits, vegetable processing equipment, techniques, nucleic acid manufacturing facilities/techniques/products, bean processing and techniques, fish/seafood processing/techniques, health product processing/techniques
3. Sealing machinery, vacuum packaging, engraving machinery, food packaging machinery
4. Injection moulding machinery, moulds.
5. Misc hardware and DIY materials: bathroom/kitchen, construction/DIY, locks, safety equipment/accessories, small scale electronics, construction decorations, interior decoration – doors/windows/ceiling/walls/paint/chemicals/ceramics/masonry materials, building tech, environmentally frendly materials, furniture, inspection and certification
6. All sorts of large machinery – mining and related equipment, farming equipment, electronics, light industries, food processing and related equipment, chemical products, medical equipment, medicine manufacturing facilities.
Last exhibitions featured exhibitors from DPRK, China, Germany, UK, Australia, Italy, Poland, Cuba…. 400 over companies from 16 countries/regions. A total of 6372 square meter of exhibition space over two floors, taking up all usable space. Cars and engineering machinery took up about 1000 square meters of space outdoors. Exhibited products included cars, tooling machine, chemical, machines, communication equipment, electrical equipment, transportation machinery, plastics machinery, engineering equipment.
Rason imposed a RMB10 fee for individuals (more for vehicles) to enter the economic and trade zone in December last year.