North Korean Economy Watch

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
2012-1-25

A month into Kim Jong-un’s ascension to power, it is reported that food distribution is likely to resume nationwide in North Korea.

Many experts evaluate this as a symbolic measure to propagate the construction of a powerful economy and improve the lives of the people. For the North Koreans, the most apparent and obvious economic accomplishment is the improvement of the food situation. Thus, North Korea is most likely to take action to normalize food rations as its top priority.

According to a statement made by a South Korean government official on January 20, “Kim Jong-un and his leadership will begin the food distribution as a way to prove to its people about changes forthcoming in the new regime.”He also added, “After years of propagation for the building of a strong and prosperous nation, they must demonstrate it to the people with noticeable results.”

The amount of rations to be provided is still unclear. However, the source emphasized that it was very likely for rice rations to resume, especially with the approaching national holidays, such as the Lunar New Year and Kim Jong-il’s birthday (February 16).

He also commented that “the food distribution will be a nationwide movement and the food ration system will go into effect based on the distribution network of available food supply.”

According to the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP), North Korea’s food production in 2011 compared to the previous year rose by 8.5 percent, sitting at about 5.48 million tons (of rough grains or 4.66 million tons of milled grains).

The minimum amount of food consumption in North Korea is 5.4 million tons, but a shortage of about 400,000 tons is expected, including the international food aid and industrial food imports. Among the recent years, this marks the largest deficiency in food supply.

However, such shortages can be overcome with additional food imports and distributing mainly rice reserves.

The last national food distribution in North Korea was in 2005, seven years ago.

North Korea is also likely to exert more effort in food processing production to improve the distribution of daily necessities. With relatively little dependence on raw material imports, North Korea is planning to improve the food situation through expanding the food processing production in agricultural, fishery, and livestock industries, with less competition with Chinese products.

According to Yonhap:

The U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) said Tuesday it will help North Korea eradicate pests at forests near ancient tombs.

The Complex of Koguryo tombs, located in the North’s cities of Pyongyang and Nampo, has some 30 individual tombs from the late period of the Koguryo Kingdom, which controlled the northern half of the Korean Peninsula and northeastern China for more than 700 years until 668 A.D.

Read more about the UNESCO World Heritage sites in the DPRK here.

Read the full story here:
UNESCO to help N. Korea’s pest control efforts at ancient tombs
Yonhap
2012-1-24

Huichon Power Station on Google Earth
The Huichon Power Stations 1 & 2 (희천1호발전소, 희천2호발전소) are too new to appear on Google Earth satellite imagery. I have, however, mapped them out by hand on the old imagery to give a better idea of their locations. I have also tagged them on Wikimapia.

In the picture above you can see that the Huichon Power Station’s headwaters begin in Ryongrim County (룡림군) where the newly-built Ryongrim Dam holds back a large reservoir. This reservoir drains through a tunnel [in orange in the image above] approximately 30 km long (18.5 miles) and empties through the Huichon Power Station No. 1 in Tongsin County into the Chongchon River. The river flows south where it crosses into Huichon County and builds up behind a second reservoir.  From this second reservoir the water drains out directly through the Huichon Power Station No. 2.

The construction of the Ryongrim Dam has resulted in the destruction of at least two villages, Toyang-ri (도양리) and Sinchang-ri (신창리).  Toyang-ri was destroyed for the dam itself. Sinchang-ri was flooded by the reservoir.  A third village, Kuryong-ri (구룡리), was also likely flooded or relocated—although this cannot be confirmed with current satellite imagery. The destroyed villages were probably relocated to Ryongrim Town itself. On several recent occasions North Korean television has highlighted improvements in housing and leisure facilities within the town.

When Kim Jong-il gave guidance visits to this site he often stood on the eastern side of the dam which offers the view captured in the image above (R).

The Huichon Power Station No. 1 itself is located in Tongsin County aproximately 30km due south from the Ryongrim Dam (40.273568°, 126.526565°).

In the satellite image above I have drawn the physical location of the power plant.  Next to and below it I have posted images from KCTV dated 2011-3-10.

The Huichon Power Station No. 2 lies on the Chongchon River just south of the border with Tongsin.

This project might have resulted in the destruction of one village, Kyonghung-ri (경흥리), in Tongsin County, but this is impossible to confirm without better satellite imagery.

So where will the electricity produced at these new power stations be consumed? On January 21, 2012, Rodong Sinmun reported the answer:

Like the warm hands of leader Kim Jong Il, the transmission lines from the Huichon Power Station are now almost stretching out for the capital city of Pyongyang.

To meet the great expectations of Kim Jong Il who entrusted them to such a gigantic work, the builders of the power station have gained great successes.

They have erected big dams, cut waterway tunnels and carried out other bulky tasks that were said to take ten years and more; and in the wake of trial operation of generating equipment at the Huichon Power Station No. 1, they successfully assembled the hulks of generators at the Huichon Power Station No. 2.

These successes had an immediate chain reaction on the scaffold workers laying transmission cables from the power station to the capital city.

They have already laid transmission cables in scores of kilometer long section, while preceding the construction of pylons in two months.

By their heroic labor, the excavation work to lay the foundation for the pylons have been wound up, too.

Now, their job is concrete tamping of the pylons’ foundations. By introducing new work methods they are hastening their work of erecting pylons as firm as would stand for many hundred years.

Now that power lines have been lain in major sections, they have buckled down to laying the power lines in the remaining sections and erecting transformer substations to reach the capital city as early as possible.

It won’t be long before we can see the power lines reach Pyongyang amid the cheers of the citizens.

Since I have mapped out a significant portion of the North Korean electricity grid on Google Earth, I can point out an area where I believe these power cables are being constructed. In the image below, dated 2010-9-14, I have connected the power cable tower construction sites with a yellow line:

In the image above there are approximately 146 power cable towers under construction between Pakchon (North Pyongan-top of image) and Sunan (Pyongyang-bottom of image). Of course, to be certain that these are the specific lines connecting Huichon and Pyongyang,  I will need more imagery.

Ryesonggang Power Station 2 update

I previously wrote about the Ryesonggang Power Station No. 2 here. Since a newer satellite image has come to my attention that shows the project completed, however, I thought I would post an update.

Ryesonggang Power Station No. 3 

On June 25, 2011 North Korean television showed construction of the Ryesonggang Power Station No. 3 had begun.  The DPRK submitted this project to the UNFCC’s Carbon trading program. Using satellite imagery, we can see that construction is indeed well under way:

The satellite images above are dated 2007-10-4 (L) and 2011-3-23 (R). In the right-hand photo I have boxed in the construction site and the quarters and facilities of the construction workers.

UPDATE: This was picked up by Radio Free Asia.

According to Yonhap:

The joint South-North Korean industrial complex in the North’s border city of Kaesong saw its production expand 14.4 percent in 2011 from a year earlier, Seoul’s unification ministry said Monday.

The total production at the Kaesong Industrial Complex reached US$369.9 million during the January-November period last year, up from $323.3 million worth of production for all of 2010, according to the Ministry of Unification.

The output during the last month of 2011 has not been tallied yet, the ministry said, adding the on-year growth rate may be far greater.

Production for the first 11 months of 2011 marks a 25.7-percent growth from the same period in the previous year, the ministry also noted.

Monthly production hit $31.1 million in January last year and hovered near the $30-million mark every month last year, except in February, according to the ministry.

The ministry attributed last year’s output growth to an increasing number of workers at Kaesong.

North Korean laborers working at the complex reached a peak of 48,708 as of November last year, the ministry said. The comparable figure at the end of 2010 was 46,284, it said.

Yonhap also reports the following:

The provision of new laborers is seen as a signal of the new North Korean leadership attempting to maintain the joint industrial complex, the symbol of inter-Korean economic cooperation, despite the North’s repeated denunciations of the Lee Myung-bak administration for allowing only a former South Korean first lady and a businesswoman to visit Pyongyang to mourn Kim’s death.

“North Korea will provide about 400 more laborers to the Kaesong Industrial Complex on the 26th (of January) immediately after the Lunar Yew Year’s holiday,” a source at the Kaesong complex said.

A Unification Ministry official also said that he “heard that North Korea will soon increase the laborers at the Kaesong Industrial Park.”

The North had planned to increase the number of North Korean laborers late last month but suspended the plan due to the sudden death of Kim on Dec. 19.

Hundreds of South Korean factories in the industrial park employ 48,708 North Koreans as of the end of November last year, up 2,400 from a year earlier.

Read the full stories here:
Production at joint industrial Kaesong park expands 14.4 pct in 2011
Yonhap
2012-1-23

N. Korea to provide 400 new laborers to S. Korean firms in Kaesong: sources
Yonhap
2012-1-24

Pictured above (Yonhap): Food aid to be delivered to the DPRK (2012-1-27)

According to Yonhap:

Representatives of a South Korean charity group plan to visit North Korea next week to deliver 180 tons of flour aid to North Korea to help ease its chronic food shortages, officials said Friday.

The planned shipment by the Seoul-based Korea Peace Foundation marks the first flour assistance to the communist country following the death last month of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il.

The UNDP also made public that it will place a priority on the DPRK this year:

Radio Free Asia says the United Nations Development Programme will place a priority on improving food security in North Korea by reducing crop losses after harvests.

The U.S. based broadcaster said the UNDP plans to save more crops and improve seed production by revamping North Korea’s crop storage facilities and farm equipment such as threshers and grinders.

Around 15 percent of crops harvested in Pyeongyang are said to be damaged every year, while only 13 percent of the 150-thousand tons of seed produced meet international standards.

Food security is achieved by securing a certain amount of food, taking into account potential population increases, natural disasters and war.

Additional Notes:
1. I believe the “Korea Peace Foundation” is also the “Korean Conference of Religion and Peace (KCRP)”

2. Read about South Korea’s aid to the DPRK in 2011 here.

3. CNN also covered the story about South Korean food aid.

Read the full Yonhap article here:
S. Korean group to send first flour aid to N. Korea after Kim’s death
Yonhap
2012-1-20

UPDATE 2 (2012-1-20): The DPRK has released two Japanese men recently detained in Rason. According to the Associated Press:

Two Japanese men detained in North Korea 10 months ago have returned home, a minister said Friday, adding it could be a “positive” diplomatic sign from the reclusive state.

The two arrived back in Japan this week, said Jin Matsubara, head of the National Public Safety Commission.

“I think this could be taken as a positive message from North Korea,” he told reporters.

Police declined to comment on whether the two men paid any money or why they were released.

The men, reportedly in their 30s and 40s were detained in a special economic zone near the communist state’s border with Russia. They returned via China.

…

Three Japanese men had initially been taken into detention in March last year, but one of them, who was in his 80s, was freed and returned to Japan in April, Jiji Press news agency and public broadcaster NHK said.

Reports said the three men were employees of a machine maintenance firm in Tokyo who had visited Rason city near North Korea’s border with Russia in March to check machines at a food manufacturing factory.

They were reportedly detained on charges of hiding drugs in canned goods to be exported to China and currency counterfeiting.

The release of these men was also covered in Bloomberg.

UPDATE 1 (2011-5-4): According to KCNA:

Japanese Detained in DPRK for Their Crimes

Pyongyang, May 4 (KCNA) — The Korean Central News Agency Wednesday issued the following report:

Masaki Furuya, former representative managing director of JP Dairin Co. Ltd., Hidehiko Abe, representative managing director of Realise Co. Ltd, of Japan, and Takumi Hirooka, managing director of Sugita Industrial Co. Ltd, of Japan, were put in custody by a relevant body on charges of drug trafficking and counterfeit after entering Rason City of the DPRK on March 14.

They admitted their crimes and their gravity.

Masaki Furuya had already been expelled from the DPRK and the two Japanese are called to legal accounts.

What they did is a very grave violation of the law of the DPRK and international law and they will, therefore, face proper legal actions.

The Wall Street Journal also reports that the DPRK held a Japanese man for drug smuggling from 2003-2009.

ORIGINAL POST (2011-4-20): According to Yonhap:

North Korea detained three Japanese men on apparent drug smuggling charges in its special economic zone last month, but it later released one man, a news report said Wednesday.

The three Japanese employees of a machine maintenance firm in Tokyo visited the city of Rason, near North Korea’s border with Russia, in March to check machines at a food manufacturing factory, Japan’s Asahi Shimbun newspaper said, citing unidentified sources.

They were detained on charges that they hid drugs in canned goods to be exported to China, though the North later allowed one of them to return to Japan, the newspaper said.

The North has demanded a large bail for the two detainees, it said.

South Korea’s Unification Ministry, which handles inter-Korean affairs in Seoul, and the pro-North Korean association in Tokyo said they had no information.

The North’s state media have not reported on the case.

North Korea arrested a Japanese man on drug smuggling charges in 2003 before allowing him to return home on humanitarian grounds in 2009.

The news came days after North Korea confirmed the detention of a Korean-American man on a crime against the North.

The North said it will indict Jun Young-su, who was arrested in November, claiming he admitted his crime in the course of the investigation, the North’s official Korean Central News Agency reported Thursday.

According to the Korea Times the men were detained in Rason.

Read the Yonhap story here:
N. Korea detains two Japanese men: report
Yonhap
2011-4-20

Pictured above: The North Korean embassy in eastern Berlin and the hostel located on its embassy compound.

According to Der Spiegel:

In recent years, there have been numerous reports of foreign diplomats in Berlin abusing their diplomatic immunity by committing crimes. Traffic violations appear to be the most common offense, but diplomats have also been accused of exploiting domestic employees and even theft. Most of the time, all they have to do is show their diplomatic passport to get off scot-free.

This week, it would seem, a new transgression must be added to the list. Berlin newspapers are reporting that the North Korean ambassador to Germany did a bit of fishing on Sunday — albeit without a license.

According to reports in dailies Berliner Morgenpost and BZ, Berlin police discovered a man fishing on the Havel River in the city’s Spandau neighborhood on Sunday afternoon. When the officials asked to see the man’s fishing license, he apparently responded by saying he was the North Korean ambassador.

According to the reports, the angler did not have any proof of identity on him, nor did he have a fishing license. The police then asked their colleagues to bring them a current photograph of the ambassador and his personal details. When they arrived, the officers reportedly confirmed that the man was indeed the ambassador, Si Hong Ri, who took his current position in September 2011.

The officers then apparently told the ambassador to cease his illegal fishing activities. According to the police report quoted by the Berliner Morgenpost and the BZ, “the ambassador politely acknowledged (the request) with a smile and continued with the offense.” The police were unable to do anything, given the man’s diplomatic immunity.

When contacted by SPIEGEL ONLINE on Thursday, a Berlin police spokesman confirmed that a report had been filed on Sunday but declined to comment on the identity of the person involved. Fishing without a license is a crime in Germany punishable with up to two years in prison or a fine.

Yonhap also reported on the incident.

Read the full story here:
North Korean Ambassador Caught and Released
Der Speigel
2012-1-19

Radio Free Asia posted the following information:

The latest UN statistics showed that in 2010, North Korea imported 430,000 mobile phones from China, its primary ally and biggest trading partner, a six-fold jump from imports the previous year.

North Koreans forked out U.S. $35 million to buy these mobile phones, six times more than the money spent in 2009, according to the UN figures.

At the same time, Koryolink, North Korea’s only 3G mobile phone network operator, saw a rapid increase in subscribers—from about 90,000 at the end of 2009 to 430,000 a year later and more than 800,000 in the third quarter of 2011, according to majority owner Egypt’s Orascom Telecom.

While the rapid increase in mobile phone users is allowing greater communications within and outside the country, there are various restrictions in usage and it does not signal any major opening up of North Korea, experts told RFA.

Read the full story here:
Cellphones No Signal Of Reforms
RFA
2012-1-19

Since the New York Times just published an interesting account of the Pyongyang Restaurant in Siem Reap, I thought I would write a quick post about my recent trip to the North Korean Restaurant in Vientiane, Laos (평양식당)–my first North Korean restaurant experience outside of the DPRK.

The restaurant is located just a couple of blocks from one of Vientiane’s most popular landmarks, Wat Pha That Luang:

I arrived at the restaurant on December 28, 2011, the date of Kim Jong-il’s funeral.  I was eager to see if the restaurant would be doing anything special to mark the occasion…and they did: they were closed for the week.  A sign on the door read in English and Lao something close to “Apologies, but we are closed for five days”.

As I stood at the front door reading the “closed” sign, one of the waitresses walked out and offered to serve me a drink in the adjacent outdoor seating area (where the grills are located). I accepted.

In what I believe was perfect Korean (sarcasm here), I asked if they served Taedonggang Beer.  But they only served “Beer Lao” (Which is just about the only beer you can get in the country—fortunately it is a tasty one). As I enjoyed my drink, I asked the waitress if the restaurant was closed because of the General’s death, and she made a sad face and nodded her head. So I finished my drink, paid, and continued on with my vacation.

On January 9, 2012, I returned to the restaurant for a proper meal. When I walked into the restaurant I felt like I was back in the DPRK. The decorations and smell came rushing back to memory.

There were no overt signs of propaganda in the restaurant—likely because the bulk of the customers are South Koreans.  The only subtle symbol that could be construed as propaganda would be the pictures of Mt. Paektu.  These, however, would likely be interpreted as just a symbol of Korea to the South Korean patrons. Mt. Paekdu was featured outside on a big sign posted to the front of the building and inside on a smaller painting…right next to the restaurant’s Christmas tree. The wall decoration and paintings primarily featured pictures of Korean landscapes, crashing waves, women in hanboks and of course Leonardo da Vinci’s Last Supper and Mona Lisa.

Surprisingly the menu featured several Tangogi (“Sweet” Dog meat) dishes. It was surprising to me because the Laotians  do not eat dog. But they probably do not eat here much either if only because of the prices. I ordered a Tofu and kimchi dish as a starter and topped it off with some Pyongyang cold noodles and Ryongthongsul (령통술) Soju (from Kaesong).

Of course there was dancing and karaoke as well:

The waitress/performers opened with Arirang, but then sang a couple of songs that the Chinese and South Koreans seemed to know.  I was also able to recognize “Pangap Sunmida” and “Whiperan”.  I requested a song but they just laughed and said no. I guess my tastes are out of date–even in North Korea.

Eventually I was invited to sing a karaoke song as well.  In tribute to Shane Smith, I thought about singing the Sex Piltols’ “Anarchy in the UK”, but I was just too tired and not interested in making a scene.

Before I left, I asked the waitresses where they went to university. They attended the Pyongyang University of Music and Dance (평양음악무용대학)–which was rencetly refurbished:

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
1. I have marked many of the DPRK’s restaurants on Google Earth, but not all of them. If you visit one, or know where one is, please let me know.

2. I have posted many articles on the DPRK’s domestic, joint venture,  and international restaurants.  You can read them here.

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) is the research branch of the US Congress and the number one information source for congressional staff.  CRS is responsible for maintining updated research publications on numerous policy concerns and they recently published a report on the death of Kim Jong-il.

Download the full report here (PDF).

Here is the summary of the report:

North Korea represents one of the United States’ biggest foreign policy challenges due to its production and proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles, the threat of attacks against South Korea, its record of human rights abuses, and the possibility that its internal problems could destabilize Northeast Asia. The North Korean government’s December 19, 2011, announcement of the death of the country’s Dear Leader, Kim Jong-il, has the potential to be a watershed moment in the history of the Korean Peninsula and the region.1 Ever since the death of his father, the Great Leader, Kim Il Sung, in 1994, Kim Jong-il had sat at the apex of a highly centralized, brutal regime. During his tenure, his regime subjected North Korea’s people to profound impoverishment and massive food shortages, developed nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, and sold technology related to both programs abroad.

The effect of Kim Jong-il’s death on North Korea’s stability is uncertain. Many experts doubt that his anointed successor, his third son Kim Jong-un, will over the course of time be able to maintain effective control over his country due to his relative inexperience and the mounting internal and external pressures confronting North Korea. Yet, the North Korean regime under the elder Kim proved to be remarkably resilient, and many of the forces that held it together will continue to operate even if the young Kim himself remains weak. A key to the Kim Jong-un regime’s stability will be its ability to continue obtaining and distributing funds, mostly from external sources. Of particular importance will be China’s willingness to provide commercial, financial, and other support for the regime. Over the years, China reportedly has resisted repeated U.S. and South Korean attempts to discuss North Korea contingency plans. It is unclear whether Kim Jong-il’s death will change this situation, though there have been calls to redouble outreach to Beijing. A possible opportunity for high-level dialogue could come in January 2012, when Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping visits Washington, DC. Xi is widely expected to be chosen as China’s top leader over the coming year.

Very little is known about the inner workings of the North Korean elite, as evidenced by the U.S. and South Korean intelligence services apparent surprise at the announcement of Kim Jong-il’s death. Even less is known about Kim Jong-un, who is believed to be in his late 20s and to have attended primary school in Switzerland in the 1990s. Kim Jong-un was being groomed to be the successor since his father’s August 2008 stroke that put a spotlight on the succession question.

In the days after the announcement, U.S. and South Korean officials issued statements that expressed support for the North Korean people, hope that the new leadership will continue recent diplomatic initiatives with Washington and Seoul, and a desire for a smooth transition in Pyongyang. (For the text of these statements as well as a joint message from several Chinese state and communist party organs, see the Appendix. U.S. and South Korean influence over events in North Korea is widely believed to be limited. In the coming weeks, the Obama Administration will be confronted with a decision of whether to persist with two proposed new agreements that reportedly were in the process of being concluded with the Kim Jong-il government in mid-December: a resumption of U.S. food assistance, and in return, a reported agreement by North Korea to shut down key sites of its nuclear program and open them to international monitoring. Members of Congress will have the opportunity to support or oppose these moves, as well as to propose new pressure and engagement tactics of their own.

I have kept an archive of all recent CRS reports on the DPRK.  You can see them here.