China port deal still ‘on’ after nuke test

October 15th, 2006

From NK Zone:
Michael Rank
10/15/2006

The Chinese businessman who is planning to develop the North Korean port of Rajin under a 50-year agreement with the border city of Hunchun says the deal remains on track despite NK’s nuclear test.

Fan Yingsheng, a property developer from Hunan province, said a road between the two cities should be completed within 15 months but gave few other details.

He told the Shanghai Evening Post [in Chinese] that U.N. sanctions “are something that we are expecting, and won’t have much effect on us.”

“After the nuclear test, North Korean colleagues did not tell my company about anything being different, I didn’t even receive any phone calls from them, which shows that it’s business as usual.

”So I am still planning to fly to Pyongyang to sign an agreement as planned, and haven’t thought of changing my schedule.“

Fan was speaking from Hunchun on October 12, shortly after meeting a group of North Korean officials, and was about to head across the border to Raseon where his company apparently has its main North Korean office. He said this visit had been scheduled a month ago.

The ceding of Rajin, an ice-free port with a handling capacity of three million tonnes a year, will give access to the sea to inland areas of northeast China which at present must send freight long distances by rail to the port of Dalian on the Bohai gulf.

The agreement also provides for the construction of a 5-10 square km industrial zone and a 67 km highway, and envisages that the Rajin area will become a processing zone for Chinese goods which will then be re-exported to southern China.

Fan is reported to have put up half the initial capital investment of 60 million euros ($70 million). The sum could not be denominated in dollars for political reasons.

Fan said in July that the Chinese side had approved the leasing of the port as had the city of Raseon, and “all we are waiting for is for the Korean central government to give its approval…”

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China should accept more DPRK immigrants

October 15th, 2006

From the Wall Street Journal:
Let Them Go: China should open its border to North Korean refugees
10/15/2006
Melanie Kilbatrick

If China is to assume what it considers to be its rightful place as a great power, now is the moment. The world is looking to Beijing as the only government with a measure of influence over its lunatic nuclear ward in the Hermit Kingdom. The question is, will it use it?

China says it favors “punitive” actions on Pyongyang for its apparent nuclear test last week, and there’s talk–so far desultory–of sanctions. But no one is speaking publicly about Beijing’s biggest source of influence: the 900-mile border it shares with North Korea. Opening the frontier to refugees would put pressure on Kim Jong Il to give up his nukes or watch his regime implode. As Mark Palmer, U.S. ambassador to Hungary in 1989, has noted, the East German refugees who passed through that country en route to West Germany sped the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The plight of North Korean refugees hiding in northeastern China is a humanitarian crisis that has received scant global notice. No one knows how many are in hiding or how many Beijing has deported back to North Korea in violation of its obligations under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. China refuses to let the United Nations or other countries help the North Koreans.

Now, three official Chinese government documents–obtained privately and smuggled out of the country–show that the humanitarian crisis may be more dire than widely believed and the burden on China heavier. Two of the documents are from the Public Security Bureau–one from the Border Police and the other from a police station along the border. The third is from the Finance Bureau of the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture in Jilin Province, home to many ethnic Koreans.

The documents were obtained by a U.S.-South Korean group that helps North Korean refugees navigate the underground railroad to safety out of China. The group prefers to remain anonymous for fear that its work could be endangered. They have been vouched for to me by two other sources, one on Capitol Hill and another at an international human-rights organization.

The Border Police document, dated Jan. 10, 2005, begins blandly enough: “From the start of illegal border crossings in 1983,” it says, “the number of illegal immigrants from North Korea that have stayed in China has increased every year.” It adds, “Public Security and Armed Police departments have strengthened preventative and deportation efforts.”

The numbers it reports are newsworthy–and staggering: “To date, almost 400,000 North Korean illegal immigrants have entered China and large numbers continue to cross the border illegally.” And, “As of the end of December 2004, 133,009 North Korean illegal immigrants have been deported.” While Chinese authorities obviously know how many refugees they have deported, by definition they can’t know how many are in hiding. The estimate of 400,000 is sure to be low.

The Yanbian Finance Bureau document, dated Oct. 19, 2004, provides further evidence of the extent of the crisis. It is a letter to provincial authorities requesting more money to help with deportation efforts. “According to statistics from the Public Security, border police and civil administration, more than 93,000 refugees are still living in Yanbian Prefecture.” The letter goes on to say that although the Border Police Bureau has established “six new refugee-deportation and detention centers,” it does not have sufficient funds to do the job. Yanbian requests 30 million yuan ($3.8 million) a year “to solve this financial problem.”

It’s the third document, though, that puts this “financial problem” in human terms. It’s a report, dated Oct. 7, 2003, from a police station in Badaogou Precinct, near Baishan City, in Zhangbai Korean Autonomous County, also in Jilin Province.

“At 7 a.m. on Oct. 3, 2003,” Case Report No. 055 begins, “a report was received from the public of several corpses floating in the Yalu River. Officers from the Precinct immediately responded and organized personnel and by 10 a.m. 53 corpses had been recovered.

“At 5 a.m. on Oct. 4 an additional three corpses were recovered for a total of 56 corpses. There were 36 males and 20 females, including seven children (five male and two female). After examination of the personal effects it was determined that the dead were citizens of the DPRK [North Korea]. Autopsies confirmed that all 56 had been shot to death. It is estimated that the dead were shot by Korean border guards while attempting to cross into China.”

While Pyongyang bears ultimate responsibility for the abuse of its citizens, China is complicit. Its policy of tracking down and repatriating refugees amounts to a death sentence for many returnees. It’s a crime to leave the workers’ paradise, and North Koreans who are caught and deported are shipped off to internment camps or worse.

If Beijing wants to send a message to Pyongyang about its nuclear program, it could announce that, effective immediately, it is taking several steps: It will stop deporting North Koreans, allow the United Nations to set up refugee camps, and permit the resettlement of refugees in third countries, from which they could go to South Korea, whose constitution codifies its moral responsibility to accept its Northern cousins, or to other countries willing to take them in. The U.S., which so far has accepted a mere eight North Koreans, could step up to the plate here.

The Border Police document notes that since the early 1980s there have been six instances of mass migrations that have coincided with North Korea’s famines. Now, winter is coming, and there are already reports of food shortages. Allowing the world to help the North Korean refugees in China would help Beijing deal with a problem that is likely to get worse.

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Is North Korea a religious state?

October 14th, 2006

From counterpunch.org:
10/14/2006
Gary Leupp

All three countries labeled “the Axis of Evil” by President Bush in 2002 are presently religious states. Iran is of course a Shiite theocracy, while the government of formerly secularist Iraq—to the extent it has a government at all—is dominated by Shiite fundamentalists. North Korea has long practiced its state religion, Kim Il-songism.

According to North Korean scriptures, when the Great Leader Kim Il-song died in 1994, thousands of cranes descended from Heaven to fetch him, and his portrait appeared high in the firmament. Immediately villages and towns throughout the nation began to construct Towers of Eternal Life, the main one rising 93 meters over Kim’s mausoleum in Pyongyang. The Great Leader’s son, the Dear Leader Kim Jong-il, took power, declining to assume the title of President. The Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea restricts that title forever to the Great Leader, whom the Dear Leader has proclaimed, “will always be with us.” The Dear Leader himself was born on Mt. Paektu, the highest mountain in Korea and Manchuria long revered by Koreans as sacred and the birthplace of their nation, in 1942. (Unbelievers say he was born in 1941 in Vyatskoye, in Siberia, in the Soviet Union.) His birth in a humble log cabin brought joy to the cosmos: a double rainbow appeared over the peak, a new star rose in the heavens, and a swallow descended to herald his birth. (Thus he is called, among other monikers, the Heaven-Descended General.) When he was 32 years old, the Workers’ Party of Korea and the people of Korea unanimously elected him their leader. When he visited Panmunjom, a fog descended to protect him from South Korean snipers, but when he was out of danger, the mist dramatically listed and glorious sunlight shone all around him. . . You get the idea.

Now, how did it come about that a socialist republic established by a Marxist-Leninist party in 1948 came under the spell of this state religion and its peculiar mythology? Some might say that Marxism-Leninism is itself a religion, but they misapply the term. “Religion” proper doesn’t refer to just any ideology or thought system, but only to those that posit supernatural phenomena such as life after death, miracles and the existence of deities. Marxism as a variant of philosophical materialism explicitly rejects such phenomena. Some socialist societies have surely produced personality cults, distorted or fabricated histories, dogmatism and fanaticism. And of course when a leader dies, the party has said, “He will always be with us” in a metaphorical sense. The Soviets early on adopted the custom of embalming revolutionary leaders, and the Chinese, Vietnamese and Koreans have followed suite. But what we see in the DPRK is more than a personality cult. It seems to me more akin to the State Shinto imposed on the Korean peninsula by the Japanese imperialists after 1905.

State Shinto, itself developed after 1868 in specific emulation of European state churches, emphasized the divine origins of the Japanese emperors, descended in an unbroken family line from the establishment of the Empire by Jinmu, great-great-grandson of the Sun Goddess Amaterasu. State Shinto emphasized the kokutai or “national essence,” the unbreakable unity of the Japanese islands (born from the bodies of the kami or gods), the Japanese people, their divine emperor, and all the kami with the Sun Goddess at their head. It was a vague concept that boiled down to obedience to state authority and to that solar disk national flag. (We find this sun worship meme in Kim Il-songism too. The DPRK Constitution states, “The great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung is the sun of the nation and the lodestar of the reunification of the fatherland.” A monumental artwork called “the Figure of the Sun” erected to mark the 100-day memorial service for Kim in 1994, adorns a hill overlooking Pyongyang.)

The Meiji-era reformers who created Japan’s state religion were well-educated men who probably didn’t believe the mythology literally, but thought it would allow for the effective control of the indoctrinated masses. It did in fact work fairly well, up until Japan’s crushing defeat in 1945. The U.S. Occupation then abolished it (leaving “folk Shinto” as opposed to State Shinto alone), and forced Emperor Hirohito to publicly renounce any claim to divinity. He could have been tried for war crimes; the Allies could have ended the myth-shrouded monarchy right then. But the U.S. Occupation authorities found the residual aura of sanctity surrounding the office useful. Hirohito was, to Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the “queen bee” whose cooperation would ensure mass compliance with Occupation objectives. The emperor remains a sacerdotal figure, the High Priest of the Shinto faith, enthroned in a religious ceremony, offering prayers on behalf of the nation to the gods.

Growing up under Japanese occupation, Kim Il-song could have observed the usages of a state religion in the service of a hereditary monarchy linked to Heaven. Maybe these observations subconsciously affected the evolution of his thinking. Once in power in North Korea, from 1945, he increasingly built a personality cult, initially modeled after Stalin’s but by the 1970s plainly monarchical in nature. It integrated Confucian values of filial piety and obedience, and glorified the entire family of the Great Leader, including especially the crown prince Jong-il.

Tens of thousands of “research rooms” have been constructed throughout the country, which persons are required to visit at regular intervals, bowing to the portraits of the two Kims the way that all Japanese (and colonized Koreans and Taiwanese) used to have to bow to the Japanese emperor’s portrait.

As Hwang Jang Yop, once International Secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party, has written, “Kim Jong Il went to great lengths to create the Kim Il Sung personality cult, and Kim Il Sung led the efforts to turn Kim Jong Il into a god.” (It is perhaps not surprising that the Great Leader warmly welcomed the Rev. Billy Graham to Pyongyang in 1992 and 1994, where he preached his brand of Christianity in Protestant and Catholic churches and at Kim Il-song University. Kim was no doubt appreciative of the power of religion, having created his own.)

The Chinese communists (when they were communists) referred poetically to “heaven,” as in the 1970s expression “There is great disorder under heaven, the situation is excellent.” Chinese Confucianism and Daoism both allude to Heaven (Tian) in the sense of a moral cosmic order that confers its mandate on successive dynasties of Chinese rulers. The word occurs in Chinese literature in so many contexts that it’s natural for Chinese Marxists to use it metaphorically. But Kim Il-song chose “believing in the people as in heaven” as his motto, implying perhaps that one should believe in both; and wrote a poem on the occasion of his beloved son’s 50th birthday: “Heaven and earth shake with the resounding cheers of all the people united in praising him.” He really seems to have wanted the people to believe in a celestial realm conferring its mandate on his dynasty.

In a Tungusic myth, the ancient Korean nation of Choson was founded by the son of a bear who had been transformed into a woman by Hwanung, ruler of a divine city on Mt. Paektu, and a tiger. I’ve read that this myth has been reworked to suggest to North Korean school children that the Kims came down from heaven to the top of the sacred mountain, where they were transformed into human beings. (There may be some shared memes with Shinto here. In the Japanese myth, the grandson of the Sun Goddess descends to earth, to a mountain peak in Kyushu, marries the daughter of an earthly deity, loses his immortality, and begets two sons one of whom sires the first emperor, Jinmu, by a sea princess who turns out to be a dragon. The Japanese imperial family also came down from heaven, and became human.) Heaven clearly plays a role in Kim Il-songism as it did in State Shinto.

Where does Marxism-Leninism fit in here? According to one report, while there are portraits of the Great and Dear Leaders all over Pyongyang, “there are only two public pictures in Pyongyang of people who do not belong to the Kim family–in the main square are two smallish images, one of Marx and one of Lenin.”

That suggests at least some small formal deference to the communist pioneers. But the Dear Leader stated in a major speech in 1990:

“We could not literally accept the Marxist theory which had been advanced on the premises of the socio-historic conditions of the developed European capitalist countries, or the Leninist theory presented in the situation of Russia where capitalism was developed to the second grade. We had had to find a solution to every problem arising in the revolution from the standpoint of Juche.”

This is the supposedly brilliant idea of “self-reliance” or as the Great Leader put it, the principle that “man is the master of everything and decides everything.” (The “standpoint” of course sounds rather trite and vague at worst, while not overtly religious. But born out of Kim’s brain supposedly when he was only 18 years old, it is the faith of the masses and the ideological basis for the state—rather like kokutai in prewar and wartime Japan.) The DPRK’s new (1998) Constitution omits any reference to Marxism-Leninism whatsoever. Rather the document “embodies Comrade Kim Il-song’s Juche state construction ideology.”

Still, those portraits of Marx and Lenin are there in Pyongyang. DPRK propaganda continues to describe the late Kim as “a thoroughgoing Marxist-Leninist.” Juche is described as a “creative application of Marxism-Leninism.” The Korean Workers’ Party continues to cultivate ties with more traditional, perhaps more “legitimate,” Marxist-Leninist parties including the (Maoist) Communist Party of the Philippines.

Some material by Marx, Engels and Lenin circulates in North Korea, and the Marxist dictum, “Religion is the opium of the masses” is universally known. But according to a Russian study in 1995, “the works by Marx, Engels, and Lenin are not only excluded from the standard [school] curriculum, but are generally forbidden for lay readers. Almost all the classical works of Marxism-Leninism, as well as foreign works on the Marxist (that is, other than [Juche]) philosophy are kept in special depositories, along with other kinds of subversive literature. Such works are accessible only to specialists with special permits.” (One thinks of the Catholic Church in the Middle Ages restricting Bible reading to the trusted clergy, and discouraging it among the masses.)

I imagine some with those special permits are able to read Marx’s famous 1844 essay in which the “opium of the masses” phrase occurs:

“Religious distress is at the same time the expression of real distress and the protest against real distress. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of a spiritless situation. It is the opium of the people. The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is required for their real happiness. The demand to give up the illusion about its condition is the demand to give up a condition which needs illusions.”

Maybe the rare North Korean student of Marxism, acquiring some real understanding of the Marxist view of religion, can see all around him or her conditions which require mass illusions and delusions in order to continue. There are some signs of resistance here and there to the Kim cult, which would seem to be a good thing.

Having said that (and always trying to think dialectically), I don’t believe that life in the DPRK is quite the hell—another religious concept—that the mainstream media would have us believe it is. One should try to look at things in perspective. We hear much of the terrible famine that lasted from about 1995 to 2001, killing hundreds of thousands if not millions. But North Korea was not always a disaster. As of 1980, infant mortality in the north was lower than in the south, life expectancy was higher, and per capita energy usage was actually double that in the south (Boston Globe, Dec. 31, 2003). Even after the famine and accompanying problems, a visitor to Pyongyang in 2002 declared:

“Housing in Pyongyang is of surprising quality. In the past 30 years–and mostly in the past 20–hundreds of huge apartment houses have been built. Pyongyang is a city of high-rises, with probably the highest average building height of any city in the world. Although the quality is below that of the West, it is far above that found in the former Soviet Union. Buildings are finished and painted and there is at least a pretense of maintenance; even older buildings do not look neglected. Nothing looks as though it is on the verge of falling down. . .

“Although a bit dreary, the shops in Pyongyang are far from empty. Each apartment building has some sort of shop on the main floor, and food shops can usually be found within one or two buildings from any given home. Apart from these basic, Soviet-style shops, there are a few department stores carrying a wide range of goods. . . “While not snappy dressers, North Koreans are certainly clean and tidy, and exceptionally well dressed. . . There is no shortage of clothing, and clothing stores and fabric shops are open daily.”

There’s apparently one hotel disco and some karaoke bars in Pyongyang. No doubt Kim Il-songism can provide some with the “illusory happiness” about which Marx wrote, and it is possible that genuine popular feelings as well as feelings orchestrated from above have contributed to the production of the North Korean faith. The DPRK might not be all distress and oppression. But neither is it a socialist society in any sense Marx or Lenin would have recognized, to say nothing of a classless, communist society. It is among other things a religious society in a world where nations led by religious nuts are facing off, some seemingly hell-bent on producing a prophesized apocalypse. I find no cause for either comfort or particular alarm in the Dear Leader’s October 9 nuclear blast; if it deters a U.S. attack it’s achieved its purpose, and however bizarre Jong-il may be he’s probably not crazy enough to provoke his nation’s destruction by an attack on the U.S. or Japan. I’m more concerned that Bush will do something stupid in response to the test.

In any case, the confrontation here isn’t between “freedom” and “one of the world’s last communist regimes,” nor even between fundamentalist Christian Bush and Kim Il-songist Kim Jong-il. It’s between a weird hermetic regime under threat and determined to survive in its small space, using a cult to control its people, and a weird much more dangerous regime under the delusion that God wants it to smite His enemies and to control the whole world. Both are in the business of peddling “illusions of happiness.” Neither is much concerned about the “real happiness” of people. Both ought to be changed—by those they oppress, demanding an end to conditions requiring illusions.

Gary Leupp is Professor of History at Tufts University, and Adjunct Professor of Comparative Religion.

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On your bike, Dongjie

October 14th, 2006

bikes.jpgThere was a great picture in the New York Times today.  The article was about the politics of a UN trade embargo in response to the nuclear test.  I was disappointed that the article was not about the story of the bikes being exported from Japan.  Who is importing them into the DPRK?  How are the funds transferred?  Is there a title? How are they being distributed in the DPRK?  Who is insuring them?  Who is buying them and where did they get the money?  This would have been a far more interesting article.  

Although stories of counterfitting currency and cigarattes, or exporting missles and drugs dominate news headlines, one story that never gets covered in the media, probably because it is so mundane, is how thousands of traders, motivated by nothing but self-interest and survival, are undertaking significant risks which are easing the hardships of the poor citizens of North Korea.  Will stopping this sort of trade make anyone better off? 

Image caption: Bicycles being loaded Friday onto a North Korean ship in Maizuru, west of Tokyo. A proposed Security Council resolution would restrict cargo. 10/14/2006

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Cutting ROK/DPRK trade hurts the ROK

October 13th, 2006

From Yonhap:
Suspension of inter-Korean business only hurts S. Korea: official
10/13/2006

Suspending South Korea’s joint business projects with North Korea would do more harm to the South than the North while doing little to convince the communist state to halt additional nuclear tests, a ranking South Korean official said Friday.

“Cutting off (inter-Korean economic projects) now would only show our firm will (to retaliate against North Korea for its claimed nuclear test) by inflicting wounds on parts of our own body,” the official told reporters, asking not to be identified.

“The damage North Korea would suffer would be very insignificant compared to the damages we would suffer,” the official added.

The remarks came amid calls from here and abroad for the Seoul government to immediately halt cross-border business projects with the North in retaliation for the North’s claimed nuclear test on Monday.

The main opposition Grand National Party (GNP) claims the country’s economic cooperation for the impoverished North has helped the North’s missile and nuclear weapons program.

“In the current situation, (South Korea) must strengthen its alliance with the United States and actively participate in U.N. Security Council sanctions on the North while cutting off all of its cash assistance to the North,” GNP floor leader Kim Hyong-o said Friday at a party leadership meeting.

An average of 40,000 South Koreans travel to a scenic resort on North Korea’s Mount Geumgang every month, paying about US$1 million in admission fees to the North, according to Hyundai Asan, the South Korean developer of the resort.

Fifteen South Korean companies also pay about $600,000 a month on average to North Korea in wages for the 8,700 North Korean employees at an industrial complex being developed by the two Koreas near the North’s border town of Kaesong, according to the Unification Ministry.

The government official, however, said the government had no immediate plans to scrap the inter-Korean projects, claiming the money paid to the North through the projects is not aimed at assisting the North’s weapons program and that the amount is insignificant.

He said the country would align its North Korea policy and economic cooperation with a U.N. Security Council resolution when one is passed, but claimed a U.S. draft of the resolution, even if approved by the Security Council, would not call for a suspension or reduction of inter-Korean economic cooperation.

“Vice Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan said at the National Assembly Thursday that there is nothing in the U.S. draft resolution” that would call for a suspension of the two cross-border projects, the official said.

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The search for Pyongyang’s pressure point

October 13th, 2006

Financial Times
10/13/2006
Anna Fifield

As the countries of the United Nations wrangle over the sanctions to be imposed on North Korea following its nuclear test this week, doubts are being cast on the effectiveness of whatever measures are agreed.

With China and South Korea fearing the collapse of their volatile neighbour, and with a large proportion of North Korea’s income coming from illegal trade, even targeted sanctions would have a limited impact. The regime has already survived the death of its founder and a famine that killed up to 10 per cent of its population.

Rüdiger Frank, a North Korean economy specialist at the University of Vienna, said: “I don’t think there is any more room for more sanctions from the usual suspects. To be effective, China and South Korea have to join.

“But a nuclear North Korea is even more risky in case of collapse than just a humanitarian catastrophe, so why would they increase the chance of a collapse.”

North Korea says its missile launches in July and the nuclear test were “self-defence” in response to US financial sanctions imposed in September last year to curb alleged counterfeiting and money laundering.

Now the US, Europe and Japan are all calling for a tough UN resolution and authorisation for countries to interdict shipments to and from North Korea, both of which China is opposing.

The dispute over the extent of sanctions reflects differences over the purposes of the measure. While the US and perhaps Japan are eyeing regime change, China and South Korea would be happy with a change in behaviour.

Marcus Noland, of Washington’s Institute for International Economics, said economic sanctions were seldom effective in changing behaviour.

“If the sanctions were going to have any shot at working they would have to be comprehensive sanctions, as suggested by Japan,” he said. “That package was big enough to potentially have an impact and it also had the benefit of simplicity, but they would also imply a significant degree of hardship for ordinary people.”

But the suggested targeted sanctions were too weak to be effective and because of their complexity, they almost invited circumvention, Mr Noland said.

“Weak sanctions may be counterproductive because President Bush and President Roh [of South Korea] warn that they will not tolerate a nuclear test but they are not imposing the penalties or incentives to back it up. That might tempt North Korea to push the envelope even further,” he said.

Much of the crisis can be traced back to North Korea’s dire economic situation. The differences between the North and South Korean economies could not be more stark. The mineral-rich north had always been the industrial heartland and the more fertile South was traditionally the rice bowl.

Indeed, the South’s gross domestic product did not overtake the North’s until the early 1970s but now at $700bn (£377bn, €558bn), it is about 40 times larger than that of the North’s.

Economic reforms that Pyongyang begrudgingly introduced in 2002, which liberalised prices and wages, have led to some changes in North Korea’s decrepit economy and trade has grown exponentially.

The South’s Korea Trade Investment Promotion Agency estimates the value of North Korea’s legal foreign trade crossed the $3bn mark last year, the highest since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, with trade with China comprising more than half of the total.

But it is North Korea’s sizeable illegal trade that will further dilute any economic sanctions. Analysts suggest North Korea earns about one-third of its revenues from aid, one-third from conventional exports and the remainder from criminal activities.

Crime is such a fundamental part of North Korea’s economy that David Asher, co-ordinator of the US State Department’s North Korea working group from 2003 to 2005, calls the country the “Soprano state”.

“North Korea is perhaps the only country in the world whose embassies and overseas personnel are ex-pected to contribute income to the ‘Party Centre’, not rely on central government funds for their operations,” said Mr Asher in a speech at the Wilson Centre last November.

Several North Korean diplomats have been caught carrying narcotics through eastern European countries in recent years. In 2004, a North Korean ship carrying $150m worth of heroin was seized in Australia.

Pyongyang has also been producing and distributing counterfeit US dollars, cigarettes and pharmaceuticals, especially the erectile dysfunction drugs Viagra and Cialis.

Counterfeit cigarettes are said to depart regularly from the North Korean ports of Rajin and Nampo for shipment through China and South Korea to the rest of the world, and tobacco companies have identified factories producing counterfeit cigarettes in North Korea.

But the international community is now most concerned about the prospect of North Korea trading missile and weapons of mass destruction technology, a concern that is only likely to be heightened with sanctions.

Jon Wolfsthal, of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, said: “North Korea is probably going to want to hold on to their precious weapons technology. But if the US squeezes them, that increases the risk that they might sell weapons to ensure their survival.”

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What is the future of Hyundai Group in post-nuke DPRK

October 13th, 2006

From the Joong Ang Daily
10/13/2006
Seo Ji-eun

Hyun Jeong-eun, the Hyundai Group chairwoman, may face a serious problem soon: If tourist departures for the North Korean resort area of Mount Kumgang continue in their slump, should she end the operation? And if she does, what happens to the Hyundai Group’s leading role in developing business ties with North Korea, including its exclusive right to conduct tours there for South Koreans?

Hyundai Asan, the group subsidiary that operates the tours, said yesterday that only 549 tourists traveled to the mountain area, now ablaze in fall colors. A day earlier, the number was 788. The company said that 4 percent of its travelers canceled on Monday, when the North announced that it had conducted a nuclear test; yesterday, 65 percent of those who had signed up for the trip cancelled.

Even if the problem continues long enough for an “ordinary” company to think about pulling out of the business, Hyundai’s problem involves other elements of the group and more than just cash flow.

Hyundai Asan won exclusive rights to an inter-Korean tourist business in late 1998, and has set a goal of expanding its corporate sphere across the country. It plans to take tourists to Kaesong and to Mount Paektu and has an ambitious construction program to support. Shutting down the Kumgang tours could endanger that strategy because of North Korea’s long memory and penchant to hold grudges. Once out, Hyundai fears it may never again get in.

North Korea has earned about $500 million so far from the Mount Kumgang tours.

And Hyundai Group’s heritage is bound up in North Korea businesses. Cross-border business dealings were initiated by Chung Ju-yung, the group’s founder, and that business was inherited by his son, Chung Mong-hun, who committed suicide during his trial on charges of helping secretly funnel cash to the North to set up the first inter-Korean summit in 2000. Since Ms. Hyun succeeded her husband three years ago, her husband’s other brothers have been jockeying to seize control of the group from her through stock transactions, in order to reinstate the direct blood line from the group’s founder to its current management.

Ms. Hyun has often stressed that it is she who is the true champion of the founder’s spirit through her persistence in conducting business with North Korea.

In the view of some analysts, that argument could be weakened significantly by shutting down the tours, perhaps inducing group subsidiaries such as the Hyundai Department Store chain, which has remained neutral in the family feud, to turn against Ms. Hyun.

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Graphic Novel Depicts Surreal North Korea

October 13th, 2006

NPR
Morning Edition
10/13/2006

When North Korea recently opened the door to foreign investment, cartoonist Guy Delisle became one of the few Westerners to witness current conditions in the capital city of Pyongyang. Delisle found himself in the city on a work visa for a French film animation company.

Delisle could only explore Pyongyang and its countryside if he was accompanied by his translator and a guide. Among the statues, portraits and propaganda of leaders Kim Il-Sung and his son Kim Jong-Il, Delisle observed the culture and lives of the few North Koreans he encountered. His musings on life in the regime form the basis of the graphic novel: Pyongyang: A Journey to North Korea.

Steve Inskeep speaks with Delisle about his work, his choice of coloring in his novel and what he really thinks is going on inside the heads of North Korean citizens.

There are two great audio clips, so click here to hear them.

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South Korea suspends its rice aid to Pyongyang

October 12th, 2006

Joong Ang Daily:
10/12/2006
Ser Myo-ja

Besides cement, South Korea’s humanitarian aid of rice to North Korea has been temporarily suspended due to the country’s nuclear brinksmanship, the chief of the Red Cross said yesterday.

In an interview with Yonhap News Agency, Han Wang-sang said South Korea, which sends its aid through the Red Cross, had promised to send rice and cement as a part of its flood relief aid.

International rights groups and relief organizations yesterday worried that North Koreans will suffer a worsened food crisis. They said the perennial springtime famine in the North would become more serious next year.

The World Food Program feared that it may have to halt distribution in the North. “If we don’t get more contributions, we won’t have any more food and food aid in January,” Christiane Berthiaume, spokeswoman for the UN agency, said Tuesday in Geneva.

The U.S.-based Human Rights Watch also urged the world not to suspend food aid to the North. The international community “must distinguish between the North Korean government and ordinary citizens,” said Sophie Richardson, deputy Asia director of the nongovernmental agency. “Further restraints on food aid will only make ordinary North Koreans suffer more.”

According to the Unification Ministry, the North each year consumes 6.5 million tons of food including rice, corn and potatoes. Last year, the country’s production was only 4.5 million tons, although the country proudly publicized a bumper crop.

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N. Korea says more sanctions from Japan will spur ‘strong countermeasures’

October 12th, 2006

Yonhap:
10/12/2006

A senior North Korean official said Thursday his country will take “strong countermeasures” against Japan if it implements new sanctions against the communist country, Japan’s Kyodo News said.

“We will take strong countermeasures,” Song Il-ho, North Korea’s ambassador on diplomatic normalization talks with Japan, said in an interview with Kyodo News. “The specific contents will become clear if you keep watching. We never speak empty words.”
The threat came after Japan decided to impose additional economic sanctions against North Korea for its claimed nuclear test Monday, imposing a ban on all imports from the communist country and banning its ships from entering Japanese ports. North Korean nationals will be prohibited from entering Japan, according to Japanese officials.

The sanctions are in addition to the measures already in place following Pyongyang’s missile tests in July, prohibiting the flow of funds and technology from Japan to 15 entities suspected to have links with North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction programs.

Japan’s additional measures are “more serious in nature” compared to sanctions imposed or considered by other countries, Song said. Pyongyang will take countermeasures by calculating Japan’s failure to adequately repent for its colonization of the Korean Peninsula from 1910 to 1945, he added.

He also said Pyongyang is watching closely what Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who took office last month, plans to do regarding relations between the two countries.

“We are watching his words and actions since becoming prime minister in a careful manner,” Song was quoted as saying.

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