Mobile Phone Detectors, Borders Blocked

January 18th, 2007

Daily NK
Han Young Jin
1/18/2007

In order to block an “open hole,” North Korean authorities have been installing mobile phone detectors on the northern border to prevent further defectors from leaving the country.

In a phone conversation with family in Hoiryeong, Kim Man Sung (55, pseudonym) a defector residing in Yangchon, Seoul discovered on the 15th “In the neighborhood of Hoiryeong, 6 mobile phone detectors have been installed” and that “if a phone call is received, the detectors activate within a minute and trace your whereabouts.”

In the past, if a person was caught being in contact with South Korea, they would receive punishment from the labor training camps and the matter was over. However, now the National Security Agency are going around saying “if you are caught using a mobile phone, you and all your family will be expelled from your village,” informed Kim. In spite of this, no one knows the make of the detectors set up along the border, nor its performance quality.

For the past 3 years Kim has acted as an intermediary for South Korean families and defectors in search of their relatives on location at the border. He said “Particularly because of intensified border controls, we are experiencing many difficulties.”

He said “Lately, whenever the police (officers from the Safety Agency) board the trains they conduct ‘fastidious inspections’ on city dwellers” and added “The Safety Agency incessantly inspects lodging facilities and motels regulating citizens that may be roaming near the border in attempt to contact their family.” It seems that the ‘fastidious inspections’ are being strictly enforced.

Since mid-December, North Korean authorities have established 5 united forces with the aim of conducting extensive control. These groups, the Party, National Security Agency, Safety Agency, prosecutors and military security will enforce action and punish boarder guards who receive bribes and help defectors.

As inspections tighten, the expenses of defectors secretly crossing to China has also increased. In the region of Hoiryeong, Musan, defecting to China would cost 400~500 yuan per person but now the disbursements have exceeded 1,000 yuan and in Haesan the price has even reached 2,000~3,000 yuan.

Recently, rather than receiving bribes from individual defectors, boarder guards have been reluctant to receive bribes from families. Though there is a possibility that individuals may return it is rare that families return and hence the greater investment lies on individuals. Also, if a defector is caught by Chinese police and repatriated, there is a possibility that the escape route will be discovered. In that case, the border patrol in charge of that region will be punished.

More recently, the National Security Agency has reinforced their efforts to catch defectors in China themselves. Kim informed, that the workers of restaurants and hotels in Yanji and Longjing in China, are all staff from the National Security Agency and that more than 90% of visitors to China are connected with the Safety Agency acting as “spies” with orders to aid the abduction of defectors.

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North Koreans given cause to beef

January 18th, 2007

Asia Times
Robert Neff
1/18/2007

In a country infamous for famines, it is no wonder that cattle in North Korea are prized so highly and considered “national property”. According to government sources, North Korea had about 575,000 head of cattle in 2002, but considering the recent floods and food shortages this number may have dropped. In addition to the floods and food shortages, North Koreans must contend with the bovine diseases that cause health concerns not only to the cattle, but also for the people.

The most serious incident took place last summer. It began in the North Korean region of Yanggang. A horrible and mysterious disease that the frightened residents called “leprosy” for the impact on victims, causing them to break out in boils and oozing skin that progressed to the point that, as one North Korean defector described it, left its victims looking “like pieces of sliced meat”.

The story was first reported by the North Korea Daily (July 27, 2006), which described the disease as an epidemic, but no one knows just how many victims it has claimed. One defector living in South Korea told a newspaper reporter that he had spoken with some members of his family still in North Korea who informed him the “rotten flesh disease” was spreading throughout the northern provinces.

Many North Korean residents believed that the disease originated from contaminated beef sold in the Jangmadang markets. Apparently there was some truth to their suspicions. According to the North Korea Daily, the sale of beef and the movement of cattle in the region were banned or tightly controlled.

What was the disease? Several veterinarian experts contacted suggested that it was anthrax, a naturally occurring disease among cattle and other hoofed mammals. All agreed that if a person ate the flesh of an anthrax-diseased animal he had a high risk of dying.

But not all of the experts agreed that it was anthrax. Dr Martin Hugh-Jones of Louisiana State University conceded that the “oozing skin sores” might well be anthrax cutaneous lesions, but “while it is tempting to suggest ‘anthrax’, I know of no lesions involving peeling skin or people looking like ‘sliced meat’.”

It is almost inconceivable that people would willingly eat the flesh of a possibly diseased animal, but it has happened several times in North Korea. In fact, many North Korean people believe that contaminated meat can be eaten if it is boiled at 100 degrees Celsius or higher.

Last January, farmers in the Tuman River region began to lose cattle to a disease they simply called the “cow disease”. The cattle all displayed the same symptoms: hooves splitting, heavy drooling, and sores in their mouths and on their tongues. Local health officials were called in. They determined that the disease had traveled across the Tuman River from China.

In December 2005, China reported several outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease in the interior provinces, but it was suspected that the disease had also spread to Heilongjang province, one of China’s key cattle raising areas located along the North Korean border, and possibly into neighboring Russia.

Dr Peter Roeder of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and Dr Hugh-Jones agree that the symptoms appear to be indicative of foot-and-mouth disease. Roeder stated, “I did not have information that it had got into North Korea but I am not surprised.”

At least one region was quarantined to prevent the spread of the disease. Cattle that displayed any of the symptoms were quickly killed and buried in deep pits in a further effort to prevent the spread of the disease. Despite the North Korean officials’ precautions to ensure that the cattle carcasses were buried, it was soon discovered that two of the infected cows were missing. Someone had dug them up.

The local officials warned the people that eating the contaminated meat could kill children under the age of five. Roeder insisted that foot-and-mouth disease did not affect humans, and Hugh-Jones supported him by adding, “Eating such a carcass should not of itself be dangerous other than the usual dangers from eating meat from sick and moribund animals.”

Did contaminated meat cause the strange leprosy-like disease that allegedly plagued Yanggang? Were diseased cattle carcasses dug up from pits, butchered, sold and eaten by hungry or greedy residents? Both doctors agreed that North Korea is a black hole for disease information and that in such countries nasty diseases will be politically unattractive and therefore official reports will be played down and minimal.

Both doctors were again in agreement when they observed that defectors and refugees have a poor record of reliability in what they say and write. Exaggeration is the commonest characteristic, they said.

But not all possibly contaminated meat originated in North Korea.

In 2001, during the height of the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (mad-cow disease) scare in Europe, many countries slaughtered hundreds of thousands of head of cattle in an effort to check the disease. Famine-stricken North Korea agreed to accept some of the possibly contaminated beef from Germany and Switzerland (see German meat may be North Korean poison, Asia Times Online, February 23, 2001).

As retired veterinarian Patricia Doyle noted, “It is a very nasty stunt to pass on infected cattle to any people, regardless of their ideology. It is the government who may have political differences not the people.”

But if a government would be desperate enough to feed its citizens meat possibly contaminated with a fatal disease, how far are starving people willing to go to satisfy, if only for a short time, the hunger in their bellies? Further, it seems, than most of us would like to acknowledge.

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Drug Smuggling Caught on Tape

January 18th, 2007

Daily NK
Yang Jung A
1/18/2007

On the 9th, a Japanese broadcast “tv asahi” exposed footages of drug smuggling at a boarder station between North Korea and China.

The footage caught a North Korean dealer crossing the Tumen River via a tube. On meeting a female Chinese dealer, the North Korean dealer unraveled a pink package which contained an envelope written “Opium powder” in red.

The drug seems to have been manufactured at “Ranam pharmaceutical factory.” This factory is known for its manufacture of mediocre drugs. Although opium is normally supposed to be packaged as medication, it is common that the drug falls into the hands of smugglers.

The moment the Chinese dealer gets hold of the package, she confirms the quality of the drug and hands over Chinese currency. The North Korean dealer counts the money and scurries back over to North Korea. It was agreed that additional dealings would be made via the telephone.

The transaction that was made on this day was 8~9 bags, each containing 100g of opium. 

As the international community continues to enforce its regulations against drugs and counterfeit dollars, drugs dealings have taken effect in North Korea with increasing illegal trades occurring between China and North Korea, the broadcast claimed. In addition, the number of drug addicts in North Korea is also on the rise.

The footage also captured the North Korean drug dealers sniffing the drugs as well as the dealers talking about the transaction. Of the dealers, one person was a worker managing the level of humidity at a manufacturing factory and seemingly the intermediary supplier who obtained the drugs.

It seems that the 3~4 people sitting in a circle are personally testing the quality of the drugs before purchase. Although the dealer’s child has entered the room, the buyers continue to inhale the drugs.

The woman who seems to be buying the drugs in this footage, scrupulously inhales the drug as if her body was very accustomed to it.

The woman showed signs of drug addiction murmuring “I’m so used to it (taking drugs). My hardest moment was when I was in custody. If I can’t sniff any drugs, my nose is runny and my head spins.”

Also, she suggested that drug addiction had spread throughout North Korea “It has spread from the top, right to the bottom.”

As the dealers need to give bribes to the border guards, a deposit is first received then the balance paid after the goods given.

Comments were also made on the distribution of the latest drugs. The latest drug, blue in color is made naturally and is much more effective than the original, so is very popular amongst the rich.

Of the people there, one man was acting as the link to the boarder patrol, whereas the remaining people examined the issue of reliable Chinese buyers.

The first footage exclusive of North Koreans communally taking drugs was exposed in Korea by the DailyNK in October 2005.

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Turkmenistan-2006

January 17th, 2007

(This site is under construction)

In October 2006 I visited Turkmenistan with Koryo Tours.  After visiting North Korea  the previous two years, I was eager to compare the legendary personality cults of Kim Il Sung/Kim Jong Il to Turkmenbashi the Great, Saparmurat Niazov.  Additionally, I knew nothing of Central Asia, an increasingly strategic region of the globe, particularly in terms of the escalating competition for energy resources between Russia/Europe, China, and the US. I flew to Ashgabat from London Heathrow.  Most of the passengers on the flight were continuing on to India, so the in flight reading was pretty limited.  A photo of Turkmenbashi stared directly at me from the panel in front of my face.  A nice warm smile,”gangster gold ring,” and that blue suit kept me company as I struggled to sleep on the overnight flight.  I was not able to sleep well on the flight, so I arrived at Ashgabat Turkmenbashi the Great International Airport somewhat delirious. As I deplaned, I pulled out my camera and snapped a shot of the plane.  The security official on the tarmack did not like this and ordered me to hand over my film.  What a great start to thrip.  I was not even into the airport and already my film was being confiscated!  I convinced him that I was just taking apicture of the plane for tourist reasons and he eventually relented.  1.JPG 2.JPG bashi pose.JPG 3.JPG 4.JPG  turkmenistan airways.JPG ashair.JPG Looking at Ashgabat from Google Earth you can’t enjoy the full ambiance of soviet architecture.  From the sky the airport looks like a modern marvel built from the largess of natural gas exports. Guess, what…it is a dump.  It looked as though it was constructed in the 1970s and not a thing had been touched since then.  I also think the metal detectors screwed up my film! Clearing the airport itself took HOURS.  We all first had to purchase our visas and obtain the proper entry forms, which were more complicated than the old Soviet procedures.  I signed a total of at least twelve signatures and was given duplicate copies of numerous forms to keep with me throughout my visit.  The price of the visa fluctuated by $10 throughout the whole process. Next we had to retain our luggage.  this could have been quick but the security agents in charge of the luggage room made sure that all of the baggs owners had the proper sticker with matching serial numbers so the owners could be properly identified.  Next we had to clear customs.  Customs agents checked the papers and bags of every single passenger to get off the plane.  As best I could tell there was no difference between the “declare” and “nothing to declare” line, except the nothing to declare line was longer. Several hours later, we emerge in Turkmenistan.  Ashgabat Lenin Statue The Turkmen are not Russians.  They consider themselves Central Asians not Middle Easterners (even though they share a border with Iran). Nor do they consider themselves Europeans, despite the heavy influence of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin.  This Lenin statue was interesting precisely for its attempt to give Lenin an indeginious flavor.
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Around Ashgabat The currency in T-stan is the Manat.  There were approximately 25,000 of them for each US$.  The highest valued note, however, was only US$.50–So if you changed $50 into Manat, you got a big pile of cash.  How fun.  Architecturally, the city is a combination of Soviet-era communist apartment and office buildings mixed with new Niazov inspired marble-domed buildings.  Blocks and elephants. propaganda 1.JPG  monument buiding.JPG  university buiding across street from Nisa.JPG drama theater.JPG  cash-USD50.JPG new style homes.JPG russia style homes.JPG  People.JPG  family.JPG health walk.JPG ashgabat.JPG  ashgabat 1.JPG ashgabat 2.JPG  ashgabat 3.JPG  ashgabat 4.JPG  ashgabat 5.JPG berk beer.JPG british pub.JPG british pub 2.JPG ashgabat 6.JPG  ashgabat 7.JPG 

Ashgabat’s Propaganda In the last days of the Niazov regime (it was brought to an end by a heart attack just a few weeks after my visit), his vision of Turkmenistan’s future was promoted through the education system, the political system, and through public propaganda.  Some aspects were less subtle, such as public billboards, and others were more ostentatious-like the gold statue of Turkmenbashi that rotates so it always faces the sun (Pictured below with the Arch of Neutrality)! 

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Ashgabat Russian Market (North West of the Arch of Neutrality) Although the market has another formal name, everyone calls it the Russian Market.  It is very colorful and all manner of foods are temptingly displayed.  When in Ashgabat, I ate here at least once a day.  Kebabs, bread, lamb, yogurt, fresh fruit, meat pastries, alcohol, and tobacco were all readily available.  Outside the central part of the market, you can purchase clothes, school supplies, books, etc.  There is a store near the market that exclusively sells volumes 1 and 2 of the Rukhnama.  These books did not appear in any of the market stalls, which gives you a signal of the book’s actual demand.  One beggar did approach me in the market.  He was Russian and tried to explain to me in English about his mother’s large hospital bill.  I said “Sprechen sie Deutsch?”–and he switched over immediately to German.  I rolled my eyes, laughed, and moved on.

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Presidential Square This first photo of the presidential palace is actually illegal.  Luckily I took it when no other security agents were around.  Others I was traveling with tried this as well and had to delete the pictures from their camera.

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Arch of Neutrality My guide, Ata, was a nice guy and very helpful.  We had elections in the US a couple of days earlier, so I gave him my “I Voted” sticker to wear.  I figured it would be a while before he got one himself.  Check out the gold statue of Turkmenbashi! arch of neutrality.JPG  arch of neutrality 2.JPG  Arch of Neutrality 3.JPG  arch of neutrality 4.JPG Arch of neutrality 5.JPG  Ata.JPG  Arch.JPG  

Earthquake Monument  

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Ertogrul Gazy Mosque Turkmen are not very religious.  Of course, they self identify as sunnis, but people do not bother to go to mosque very often, and I never once heard a call to prayer.  The Soviets took different strategies in dealing with Catholocism in the Baltics and Islam in Central Asia.  Is the Baltics, they faught it and made it into the premier organization for resisting communism.  In central Asia, the mosques were all brought under state control and the Imams made party members and put on the state payroll.  Fast forward a few generations and most people do no care about being that religious.  Still, I heard a couple of Turkmen express anger at the Rukhnama (Turkmenbashi’s book on all things Turkmen) being elevated to the status of a holy book in Islam. Ertogrul Gazy Mosque.JPG  Ertogrul Gazy Mosque 1.JPG  Ertogrul Gazy Mosque 2.JPG  Ertogrul Gazy Mosque 3.JPG Ertogrul Gazy Mosque1.JPG Ertogrul Gazy.JPGErtogrul Gazy Mosque 21.JPG   

Independence Tower

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Ashgabat Puppet Theater (No puppets in performance)

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Underground Lake

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Mosque

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Tolkuchka Bazar

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Nisa

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Desert Village

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Trip to Mary

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Merv

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Dashoguz

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Konye Urgench

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Kony Urgench 2

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North Korea’s Kim wants to cancel handshakes

January 17th, 2007

NKeconWatch: I actually agree with Kim Jong Il with this one.  Call me neurotic, but after shaking many peoples’ hands, I head straight for the sink at the first opportunity!

ITAR-TASS
1/17/2007

North Korean leader Kim Jong Il has urged his countrymen to abstain from shaking hands and greet people with a traditional Korean slight head bow.

The Rodon Sinmun newspaper published Kim’s article where he wrote in particular, “it is necessary to great each other Korean style. Handshake is a European custom and it is no good hygienically.”

However, a day after the publication many North Koreans, especially males, continued to shake hands as they used to do this before, a Tass correspondent reported from the capital of North Korea Tuesday.

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N. Korea’s Kang becomes acting minister after Paek’s death

January 17th, 2007

Yahoo News
1/17/2006

North Korea’s state media said Wednesday that First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju congratulated the appointment of Nicaragua’s new foreign minister, a sign that Kang has become North Korea’s acting foreign minister after Paek Nam Sun’s death earlier in the month.

Kang “sent a congratulatory message to Samuel Santos Lopez upon his appointment as foreign minister of Nicaragua,” the Korean Central News Agency said.

Paek died Jan. 2. No announcement has been made regarding his successor.

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Succession – A Dictator’s Dilemma

January 17th, 2007

Nautilus Institute
Bryan Port
1/17/2007

North Korea’s recent nuclear test clearly demonstrates that the Korean peninsula is the crux of Asian Security. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), North Korea’s official name, poses a range of challenges. Though the nuclear challenge appears to be the most extreme and urgent, developments in the DPRK could lead to violent conventional military spasms or humanitarian disaster, each with consequences as grave as those posed by DPRK weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Regardless of the challenges, Korea’s future has significant ramifications for the balance of power in East Asia and by extension on American security and prosperity. One day, DPRK leader Kim Chong-il will pass the keys to the kingdom and the nuclear launch codes to a successor. Kim’s choice and how he goes about the succession process will impact East Asia for decades and consequently requires significant consideration in US strategic planning.

Effective foreign policy requires an in depth understanding of the historical, social, and cultural context of other nations, their leaders, and their people. Though the DPRK is opaque, much is known about its history and even its people. From what we know we can develop significant insight. However, the balance of what we don’t know requires that we conduct considerable alternative analysis to define a range of possibilities to facilitate effective planning and policy development. Alternative analysis is imperative regarding the succession issue. Though it is nearly impossible to confidently predict who Kim will choose to succeed him, much less the successor’s prospects, analysts can define a range of plausible scenarios which can play a positive role in strategic planning, and leave the US a fighting chance of avoiding strategic surprise.

DPRK CONTEXT. Before analyzing scenarios for DPRK leadership succession, one must first consider the context and circumstances of the DPRK. The dearth of information available on the DPRK and its leaders can lead analysts to over emphasize a given aspect of the DPRK and through this narrow prism turn the DPRK into a caricature. We commonly see this in how the media and others portray Kim Chong-il. Analysts are also at risk of mirror imaging or applying one’s own cultural and historical frames of reference to the DPRK.

The DPRK is a deeply stratified society. An individual’s place in DPRK society is based largely on one’s family history (Songbun) and political reliability. Those with blood connections to Kim Il-sung or those who fought with Kim Il-sung against the Japanese (partisans), and their offspring, comprise the majority of the DPRK’s elites. It is rare for someone without this background to ascend to elite status in the DPRK. Some may gain a certain level of stability, power, or privilege, for example members of the military or scientists, however without the right bloodlines they will not climb to the pinnacle of power in the DPRK.

Despite its societal stratification, there is a shared societal and historical perspective that must be taken into account when thinking about North Korea or North Koreans. Understanding what the DPRK is, or understanding its leaders, requires placing oneself in the historical mindset of a North Korean. The DPRK is the most Orwellian society the world has ever known. The DPRK is not a communist nation; certainly not in the sense of Marx or the perversion of Marx that was the Soviet Union. North Korea has never known a pluralistic political system, much less democracy.

For nearly its entire history Korea has been a feudalistic society, constantly on the edge of survival at both the societal and individual level. Korea has been under constant threat of invasion. Koreans have struggled merely to subsist, with bouts of hunger or famine a common occurrence. Even in South Korea, stability, to say nothing of prosperity, is a recent development. It is only in the last 20 to 30 years that South Korea moved beyond its history.

Even for the most elderly of today’s North Koreans, the historical context is Japanese colonization, Korean War, emerging totalitarian state under Kim Il-sung, relative stability, Kim Chong-il’s accession to power, famine, and economic depression. North Koreans lack outside information and thus lack the basis for comparative thought about their society. Of course, comparative thought about politics presumes the freedom, sustenance, energy and time required to engage in political thought or activity. Only the elite in the DPRK are positioned to have the luxury of political thought, and they are the stakeholders in the current system.

Though it is difficult to understand from an American perspective, many in the DPRK, including its leaders, do genuinely fear the United States and for that matter other foreign powers including Japan and perhaps even China. This is based on Korea’s history of being subject to multiple foreign conquests and leads to the desire for self-sufficiency. Kim Il-sung very effectively manipulated this historical perspective and Kim Chong-il continues to do so.

DPRK CIRCUMSTANCES. The DPRK is in dire straights. A crumbling infrastructure, local ad hoc solutions to problems and corruption are the common denominators of government, economy, and society. Resources, privileges and even security are obtained through barter or by outright buying the services of a corrupt official. Almost everyone is corrupt from the lowest private in the Army to the senior members of the Korean Workers Party.

The DPRK remains a pervasive police state with a population that lacks even the most rudimentary elements of a functioning civil society. Though corrupt, the security services are powerful. While individuals within the security services are “for hire,” when the regime is threatened the security services can mobilize quickly and effectively against individual or group opposition, real or perceived.

Still, KCI cannot take for granted the continued effectiveness or loyalty of the security services. Although Kim has multiple security services to perform checks and balances, eventually the deterioration of ideological integrity, to say nothing of ruinous state of physical infrastructure and corruption, are emboldening entrepreneurial security personnel. More mischief is possible, and emboldened individuals are more likely to seek out other like-minded individuals, at first for profit, and then perhaps for power.

At this point it appears that members of the security services are happy to simply use and abuse their positions to survive, or in the case of senior members enrich themselves. However, the security services as a whole, and their individual members, will face tough questions about their futures deriving from succession. Some may still consider a successor in ideological terms. Is the successor worthy? Pure enough? Others may consider the successor in terms of their position in the security services and the maintenance of their privileged positions in society. Is the successor capable enough? Will they be demoted or purged? How the security services react to the successor issue will be a key determinant to the successful installation of a successor, and ultimately the stability of the DPRK.

DPRK ELITES. North Korea’s elites face a paranoid, schizophrenic existence. This is not to suggest that KCI, or other DPRK elites, suffer from mental disease. Though it is not unreasonable to believe that like people everywhere, even leaders, that some North Korean leaders suffer from mental illness. Rather, elites in the DPRK have much to loose in the event of political change and corresponding to the stakes are at best anxious and likely paranoid about maintaining their positions. The only person who is secure in his position in the current regime is Kim Chong-il.

Chang Song-taek is married to Kim Chong-il’s younger sister Kim Kyong-hui. Until 2003, Chang was considered the second most powerful man in the DPRK, and held the title of first deputy director of the Organization and Guidance Department. In 2003 KCI had Chang arrested. No one is certain as to the reasons for Chang’s fall from power, but speculation exists that Chang had been too overt in his support of Kim Chong-il’s oldest son, Kim Chong-nam, in the race for succession. Even though Chang has been rehabilitated and returned to a position of power, his situation shows that no member of the DPRK elite is secure. The security apparatus is ever present and mistakes often lead to a concentration camp or death.

North Korea’s elites face incredible challenges and pressure. They must at once protect their own interests and also take actions that preserve the regime, which is the source of their relatively privileged existence. These two goals are often at odds, and may even be mutually exclusive. North Korean elites must apply the filter of Juche ideology to their actions and/or be prepared to explain or justify actions in ideological terms.

Elites in the DPRK share in common with elites everywhere a calculating nature and wish to position themselves and their allies to survive and prosper in the future. For this reason, it is imperative for elites in the DPRK to analyze the succession issue, and conduct their affairs so as to maintain favor with KCI, but also be at the vanguard of a successor’s regime.

Some elites may reach the conclusion that Kim Chong-il’s successor has little chance of consolidating power. Such a determination requires not only confidence in predicting who KCI will choose, but also mandates determining who will be powerful enough to supplant the successor. Following is the even trickier task of currying favor with KCI, the individual they believe KCI will choose to succeed him, and the individual who they believe will actually take power.

At the top of the elite and the pinnacle of the succession issue is Kim Chong-il. Almost all of the analysis of the succession issue assumes that Kim will choose a successor and that it will be one of his sons. However, Kim has surprised us in the past and will likely do so again. Before moving on to consider a range of options available to KCI in terms of choosing a successor, it would help to more specifically consider the context and circumstances of Kim Chong-il.

KIM’S CONTEXT AND CIRCUMSTANCES. Even though we are not really able to understand how KCI views the world, we can roughly understand the context and circumstances in which KCI exists. Kim presides over a failed, if not collapsed, state. While North Korea’s military remains intact, it is not the existential threat to South Korea that it once was. Kim’s security services are effective, perhaps too effective. Kim must have multiple security services, not to produce the best intelligence or efficiently secure the state, but to watch one another.

China, North Korea’s one remaining ally of any significance, supports the DPRK for negative reasons. China doesn’t want to deal with the humanitarian consequences of a complete DRPK collapse. KCI and other DPRK elites must consider that China has significant potential to play an active role in the DPRK’s succession dilemma, and has ample motive to do so. Still, China is unlikely to be overt and direct in the application of its influence, knowing that doing so could prompt a backlash. However, China can indirectly bring its influence to bear on who KCI chooses as successor by providing access to resources and senior Chinese leaders to select North Korean elites. It is also likely not lost on DPRK elites that China has the capability to more directly intervene in North Korean politics should its vital interests be threatened.

South Korea is in much the same position as China in that it does not wish to deal with the humanitarian consequences of a complete DPRK collapse. However, South Korea has a significant financial stake and also a much more “personal” stake in the DPRK’s future. Collapse or violent military spasm on the part of the DPRK will be hugely costly to the South both in financial and human terms. Due to North Korea’s desperate situation, one cannot rule out that the DPRK could lash out, but truly North Korea’s only effective remaining leverage is the gun it holds to its own head (collapse) and the nuclear tipped missiles it claims to point elsewhere.

Although other countries disagree with US policy toward the DPRK, this does not mean they support the DPRK. Unfortunately for Kim, Japan, the one country that is most able to help the DPRK in the short term with cash and resources, is not inclined to do so for a variety of reasons, including the DPRK nuclear and missile threat to Japan, DPRK international criminal activity, and past DPRK abductions of Japanese citizens. About the only thing that may motivate Japan to reconsider its stance is the prospect of normalizing relations in the near-term to pay out its World War II reparations prior to a collapse of the DPRK to avoid potentially more responsibility in the event of a collapse and absorption of the North by the South.

KCI likely understands the Chinese, Japanese and South Korean perspective. Thus KCI likely appreciates not only the dire domestic straights of the DPRK, but also its grim international position.

NOT HIS FATHERS SON. Though Kim Il-sung (KIS) is not the man that DPRK propaganda portrays him to be, and though he is guilty of horrible crimes against humanity, Kim Il-sung did fight the Japanese and suffered in doing so. Through cunning and calculation, as well as brutality, KIS led the DPRK into existence. For much of the first half of its existence, the north outperformed the south. After the Korean War, life improved for many North Koreans under KIS and there was relative peace and the possibility of future prosperity. Still in spite of his power and the genuine love and respect of many in the DPRK, Kim Il-sung spent the better part of 20 years preparing to transfer power to KCI.

Kim Chong-il lacks the credibility and stature of his father. KCI never served in the military, much less fight in a war. Though he has displayed cunning and brutality, he did not overcome challenges on par with those faced by his father. Instead, whether it was completely his fault or not, since KCI assumed power in 1994, the DPRK has suffered military decline, economic failure, famine, and even in at least one case, organized resistance from the segment of society it most relies on, the military.

KCI faces significant challenges with respect not only to the succession issue, but generally with respect to running the DPRK. Conventional analysis assesses that KCI will choose a successor and that he will choose his second son Kim Chong-ch’ol. There is nothing that starkly contradicts the conventional wisdom, however, there is nothing that boldly confirms it either.

CONVENTIONAL WISDOM. There are three acknowledged sons of Kim Chong-il. In order from oldest to youngest, KCI’s sons are Kim Chong-nam, Kim Chong-Ch’ol, and Kim Chong-un. The conventional wisdom holds that KCI will opt for one of his sons to succeed him, probably Kim Chong-ch’ol (KCC).

Until embarrassing his father in 2001 by being arrested in an attempt to visit Tokyo Disneyland, KCI appeared to favor Kim Chong-nam, even though there were few outward signs that a formal succession process had begun. Kim Chong-un is not considered a serious contender, if for no other reason than his age and the presence of two older brothers.

In the past year or so Kim Chong-ch’ol (KCC) has emerged as the front-runner. Indicators include Workers Party of Korea Central Committee Secretariat Instruction No. 0101 (Reported in South Korean Weekly Chosun magazine March 2006). According to this instruction, Kim Chong-ch’ol is the party’s nerve center.

There are several reports, conflicting in detail, but consistent in stating that KCC occupied a formal government position and that he has advanced to a more senior position. Pins and portraits of KCC have appeared, and the KWP has issued instructions on their wear and display. Additionally, some of KCC’s associates accompanied KCI on trip to China to observe economic development, and KCC himself has been in Europe on official business.

Even if KCI has resolved to anoint KCC as successor, that is not a guarantee that the succession itself will go smoothly or that KCC will be able to consolidate power. Many segments of the power elite will view KCC as weak. So long as Kim Chong-il remains a force to be reckoned with, opposition to KCC as successor would be controllable. However, as Kim becomes infirm or dies, challenges to KCC will mount. This will force KCC to share power or do the bidding of factions whose support he requires, presumably the security services or military.

Knowing that KCC may or will not be able to go it alone, KCI may opt to install KCC as ruler of the DPRK, but only as a front man for others who will actually wield power. There may be liberal elements of the power elite who favor Chinese like reform. Should they support KCC, they might be able to begin reviving the DPRK, particularly if they are willing to take steps to gain legitimacy in the international community. On the other hand, factions of the DPRK elite pessimistic about their status in a reformed DPRK, concerned that KCC is too weak to control factions hostile to them, or critical as to KCC’s ability to control the country as could seek to overthrow KCC or force him to keep the DPRK on its present course.

There are other mo[r]e Machiavellian possibilities. KCI may be using KCC to flush out dissent, in effect using KCC as a lightening rod. Due to Kim’s advancing age, questionable health, and the poor condition of the DPRK, many elites are likely questioning their future prospects in terms of not only prosperity, but also basic stability and even survival. At some point, for example if KCI should become infirm or seriously ill, the concerns of the DPRK elite could reach a tipping point. It would be prudent to flush out the most disaffected among the North Korean elite now, rather than later. To this end KCC could serve as a useful target and distraction.

ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS. KCI in his switch from Kim Chong-nam to Kim Chong-ch’ol demonstrated that he is flexible with respect to his choice of successor and has not taken any irreversible steps in designating KCC as successor. However, this will be the 2nd succession in the DPRK and thus there is little ground to talk about patterns or precedent. Conventional wisdom has often not held when analyzing the DPRK, making alternative analysis imperative.

It is important to remember that Kim Il-sung (KIS) spent 20 years preparing for KCI to assume power, and still upon Kim Il-sung’s sudden death in 1994 it took several more years for KCI to consolidate power. Between KCI’s health and the challenges faced by the DPRK it is not at all certain that KCI has 20 years to lay the foundation for one of his sons to assume power, assuming that this is what KCI actually intends and that it is possible to accomplish another hereditary transfer of power.

If not Kim Chong-Ch’ol then who? What other options are there for KCI? Is the choice entirely Kim Chong-il’s to make? KCI lacks the stature of Kim Il-sung and the DPRK faces significant challenges. Even Kim Il-sung faced resistance in installing his son as ruler. KCI will face challenges greater than those faced by his father, and from a weaker position in terms of his credentials, the current situation in the DPRK, and his very legitimacy.

North Korean society is still rooted in Confucian values, even though those values are distorted by North Korea’s ideology (Juche). Thus other Kim family members warrant consideration, including Kim Chong-il’s daughter Kim Sol-song, his half brother Kim P’yong-il, and Chang Song-t’aek or Chang’s children.

Kim Sol-song is Kim Chong-il’s daughter by Kim Yong-suk (Kim Chong-il’s official wife and the only one recognized by Kim Il-sung). There are reports that she currently handles important aspects of her father’s life, including his personal security. Even if not succeeding KCI she could act in a powerful supporting role, even key decision making role, to Kim Chong-ch’ol, or other successor.

Kim P’yong-il is KCI’s half brother. By some accounts, Kim P’yong-il is everything that KCI is not. P’yong-il was an active duty military officer that had genuine respect from many in the military. It is not entirely clear how KCI edged him out as successor, but it is conceivable that Kim Il-sung favored KCI, viewing P’yong-il as a threat. It is also likely that P’yong-il is not ruthless enough to rule the DPRK. Since 1988 P’yong-il has served in a series of ambassadorships, primarily in Europe.

Bearing in mind the North Koreans mindset, P’yong-il would make a good transitional figure. He carries the Kim name, and perhaps continuity with Kim Il-sung’s interrupted dreams for the DPRK. While he would certainly face opposition from segments of the elite, P’yong-il has a huge advantage in that he would likely garner the support of the military. There is a good chance based on his personal background that P’yong-il would change the course of the country. Of course KCI won’t choose P’yong-il, but in the event that Kim fails to entrench a successor, waits too long, or simply does not choose, P’yong-il becomes viable for segments of the elite concerned about their future status.

Chang Song-t’aek is married to Kim Chong-il’s sister Kim Kyong-hui and has powerful family ties to the military. Though recently purged and rehabilitated, Chang has been and is now again a powerful player in the DPRK. Even if he is unlikely to succeed KCI, Chang can still influence the succession issue. KCI might have purged Chang due to Chang’s view on the succession issue, but a rehabilitated Chang will likely not have changed his mind on the subject, but now knows to be more careful.

Chang’s children carry as much of Kim Il-sung’s blood as the children of KCI. There are not presently any signs that Chang’s children are under consideration, at least as far as KCI is concerned. However, they are out there and should KCI loose control over the process, or should other alternative scenarios play out, Chang’s children are viable alternates, particularly as a figure head for a king maker.

BEYOND FAMILY. There are other forces beside Confucianism at work in the DPRK, thus requiring consideration of other succession scenarios including king maker/power sharing, alternate successors, and even that Kim may have no intention of choosing a successor.

Realizing that any one individual is not likely to be powerful enough to rule, KCI may intend to set up a kingmaker(s) to support his successor. KCI may even prefer that his successor require behind the scenes support. If his chosen successor will be too weak to supplant him, KCI can be confident that he can continue to exercise power out front or behind the scenes until his death. Further, KCI could co-opt some of the most effective challengers to his successor and reward them for present good deeds, helping to ensure loyalty.

It is conventional wisdom that KCI desires to anoint one of his sons, or at least a relative, as the next leader of the DPRK. What if he doesn’t? There are scenarios where it is not beneficial to KCI to see one of his blood relatives assume power.

KCI is almost certainly aware that his sons might not be competent enough or ruthless enough to run the DPRK. Even if KCI is still alive and active, he may be unable to stave off his opponents once a successor is appointed or operating. This could have dire consequences for KCI.

History weighs heavily on the minds of dictators, and the fate of other dictators, such as Romanian leader Ceausescu or Cambodia’s Pol Pot likely weigh on Kim’s mind. KCI could seek a successor with the requisite competence to ensure that he doesn’t meet a similar fate. This may lead Kim to choose someone other than his sons. Such a choice, though not comporting well with Confucian values, might ultimately serve KCI well.

Moving further along the spectrum of alternative analysis, what if the most prudent move for KCI is to not name a successor at all. The mere act of naming a successor creates a focal point for opposition. Ironically, at the same time, naming a successor could also set of[f] infighting to curry favor with the chosen successor at Kim’s expense drawing from Kim’s power base. Those patient and shrewd enough could hold fast making a power play at a point in time where KCI is weakening, but the successor is not strong enough to consolidate power.

Alternative power bases might not matter if the successor is not competent enough to consolidate power. The weakened state of the DPRK and Kim’s lack of legitimacy compared to his father could lead Kim to plan to die in office or abdicate at some point to avoid empowering and facing potential adversaries while still in office; something which could lead to his own demise.

One final possibility deserves consideration. KCI could die suddenly as did his father. For the US and the DPRK’s neighbors, the key concerns remain the same and center on DPRK WMD and the possibility of extreme instability that could result in outward military spasms or complete collapse.

Under a sudden death scenario, whatever steps had been made toward anointing a successor may not matter. Opponents to KCI’s choice may likewise be neutralized. It could all boil down to which of the key players learns of KCI’s death first, and whether or not they can control the news, acting quickly to capitalize on their first mover’s advantage. A particularly ruthless individual could quickly act against the key players most threatening to them, changing the whole power dynamic, regardless of whether they are ultimately successful in assuming power. It is difficult to analyze what KCI might do in terms of a deliberate succession process. It is close to impossible to analyze how a sudden death scenario would play out.

The recent nuclear tests serve to highlight the importance of the succession issue to the US and the DPRK’s neighbors. While external reasoning may have lead KCI to test a nuclear device, it is more likely that internal considerations are driving decisions not only on WMD development, but also on the issue of leadership succession in the DPRK. It is even possible that KCI conducted the nuclear test to shore up his legitimacy by doing something his father never managed to accomplish. Possibly due to concerns over succession or just internal dynamics, KCI may also have conducted the tests to strengthen his domestic powerbase and position with the military.

No matter what KCI decides in terms of succession, the consequences could include a twenty something year old leader with nuclear weapons or a collapsed state ultimately resulting in a re-unified nuclear Korea. Regardless of how the succession issue plays out, Korea will continue to be integral to US and East Asian security and prosperity.

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More Than 3,000 Infected With Disease in Chongjin

January 17th, 2007

Daily NK
Yang Jung A
1/17/2007

Recently, infectious diseases have been spreading throughout North Korean regions with North Korean authorities in a state of emergency, sources informed.

A source revealed in a phone conversation with the DailyNK on the 15th “There are 4 different diseases spreading throughout North Korea. Scarlet fever, typhoid, paratyphoid and typhus fever” and said “North Korean regions including Pyongyang are under extreme caution.” However, the source informed that figures indicating the number of deaths caused by the diseases had not yet been released.

He said “Scarlet fever originated in the province of Yangkang last October and has spread to Pyongyang, prevailing throughout the country” and added “though it could be easily treated with antibiotics, the nation cannot give us the supplies and we cannot go to the hospital as the cost of medicine has risen.”

Though it is not the right season for these illnesses to be spreading, the source revealed his thoughts that the diseases had dispersed due to the contamination of drinking water.

He said “As electricity is only supplied 1~2 hours a day, the water pump does not function properly and so water can only be derived from the tap for 1 hour, once a week” and “As a result, people resorted to the mountains and river for water and despite it being winter, it seems the diseases spread this way.”

In the conversation, the source residing in North Korea said “Chongjin is in a severe crisis” and “Undoubtedly schools and enterprises found to be infected have closed doors. Train operations have also been suspended, so all movement has been stopped.”

Also, he reported “As all modes of transportation have been suspended beginning with the trains, whenever transport is used, health permits (certifying that you have no infectious disease) are verified and so travel has become regulated.”

“The whole city has been infected with the disease and has become immobilized” explained the source.

In addition, he said “About 300~400 people from each district have been found to be infected with the disease and are receiving treatment at home. In Chongjing alone, it is likely that more than 3,000 people are disease infected with the majority of people infected with scarlet fever.”

Further, he informed “More and more of the lower class are dying of starvation and are becoming street dwellers as they cannot work due to their sickness” and said “in order to prevent people from dying of starvation, each district is accommodating 200 people in the hospitals.”

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No New Year food rations distributed in N.K. except Pyongyang: civic group

January 17th, 2007

Yonhap
1/17/2007

North Korea has failed to deliver on its promise to distribute food rations across the communist country on the occasion of the New Year, a civic aid group said Wednesday.

“Except for Pyongyang, no special New Year food rations were issued,” Good Friends, a Seoul-based civic relief organization, said in its latest monthly newsletter.

The group said that North Korean authorities had planned to provide food rations equal to the daily household consumption of rice across the country, but three days worth of rice and 500 grams of bean oil were distributed only for residents in Pyongyang.

“Mid-level officials living in Pyongyang received food rations to last a half month and electricity was provided for the city during the New Year,” it said.

North Korea has suffered from a chronic food shortage since the mid 1990s due to a series of natural disasters aggravated by an overall economic downturn. However, the North had always managed to prioritize food distribution to ensure the inhabitants of the capital Pyongyang do not go without it, experts say.

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DPRK scores last place in economic freedom (again)

January 16th, 2007

Heritage 2007 Index of Economic Freedom

North Korea’s economy is 3% free, according to our 2007 assessment, which makes it the world’s least free economy, or 157th out of 157 countries. North Korea is ranked 30th out of 30 countries in the Asia–Pacific region, and its overall score is the lowest in the world.

North Korea does not score well in a single area of economic freedom, although it does score 10 percent in investment freedom and property rights. The opening of the Kaesong industrial venture in cooperation with South Korea has been a start in foreign investment.

Business freedom, investment freedom, trade freedom, financial freedom, freedom from corruption, and labor freedom are nonexistent. All aspects of business operations are totally controlled and dominated by the government. Normal foreign trade is almost zero. No courts are independent of political interference, and private property (particularly land) is strictly regulated by the state. Corruption is virtually immeasurable and, in the case of North Korea, hard to distinguish from necessity. Much of North Korea’s economy cannot be measured, and world bodies like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank are not permitted to gather information. Our policy is to give countries low marks for specific freedoms when it is country policy to restrict measurement of those freedoms.

Background:
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has maintained its Communist system since its founding in 1948. A serious economic decline began in the early 1990s with the end of economic support from the Soviet Union and other Communist-bloc countries, including China. Floods and droughts all but destroyed the agricultural infrastructure and led to severe famine and dislocation of the population during the 1990s. South Korean and Chinese investments in the economy have alleviated dire conditions. The government continues to rely on counterfeiting foreign currency and sales of missiles for money. That and the nuclear ambitions and isolationism of Kim Jong Il reinforce North Korea’s status as the hermit kingdom.

Business Freedom – 0.0%
The state regulates the economy heavily through central planning. The economic reforms implemented in 2002 allegedly brought some changes at the enterprise and industrial level, but government regulations make the creation of any entrepreneurial activities virtually impossible. The overall freedom to start, operate, and close a business is extremely restricted by the national regulatory environment.

Trade Freedom – 0.0%
The government controls all imports and exports, and formal trade is minimal. Data on North Korean trade are limited and compiled from trading partners’ statistics. Most North Korean trade is de facto aid, mainly from North Korea’s two main trading partners, China and South Korea. Non-tariff barriers are significant. Inter-Korean trade remains constrained in scope by North Korea’s difficulties with implementing needed reform. Given the lack of necessary tariff data, a score of zero is assigned.

Fiscal Freedom – 0.0%
No data on income or corporate tax rates are available. Given the absence of published official macroeconomic data, such figures as are available with respect to North Korea’s government expenditures are highly suspect and outdated.

Freedom from Government – 0.0%
The government owns all property and sets production levels for most products, and state-owned industries account for nearly all GDP. The state directs all significant economic activity. The government implemented limited economic reforms, such as changes in foreign investment codes and restructuring in industry and management, in 2002.

Monetary Freedom – 0.0%
In July 2002, North Korea introduced price and wage reforms that consisted of reducing government subsidies and telling producers to charge prices that more closely reflect costs. However, without matching supply-side measures to boost output, the result of these measures has been rampant inflation for many staple goods. With the ongoing crisis in agriculture, the government has banned sales of grain at markets and returned to a rationing system. Given the lack of necessary inflation data, a score of zero is assigned.

Investment Freedom – 10.0%
North Korea does not welcome foreign investment. One attempt to open the economy to foreigners was its first special economic zone, located at Rajin-Sonbong in the northeast. However, Rajin-Sonbong is remote and still lacks basic infrastructure. Wage rates in the special zone are unrealistically high, as the state controls the labor supply and insists on taking its share. More recent special zones at Mt. Kumgang and Kaesong are more enticing. Aside from these few economic zones where investment is approved on a case-by-case basis, foreign investment is prohibited.

Financial Freedom – 0.0%
North Korea is a Communist command economy and lacks a private financial sector. The central bank also serves as a commercial bank with a network of local branches. The government provides most funding for industries and takes a percentage from enterprises. There is an increasing preference for foreign currency. Foreign aid agencies have set up microcredit schemes to lend to farmers and small businesses. A rumored overhaul of the financial system to permit firms to borrow from banks has not materialized. Because of debts dating back to the 1970s, most foreign banks will not consider entering North Korea. A South Korean bank has opened a branch in the Kaesong zone. The state holds a monopoly on insurance, and there are no equity markets.

Property Rights – 10.0%
Property rights are not guaranteed in North Korea. Almost all property belongs to the state, and the judiciary is not independent.

Freedom from Corruption – 10.0%
North Korea’s informal market is immense, especially in agricultural goods, as a result of famines and oppressive government policies. There is also an active informal market in currency and in trade with China.

Labor Freedom – 0.0%
The government controls and determines all wages. Since the 2002 economic reforms, factory managers have had more autonomy to set wages and offer incentives, but the labor market still operates under highly restrictive employment regulations that seriously hinder employment and productivity growth.

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