China Eyes Mt. Pektu V

February 2nd, 2007

Chinese schools renamed after border mountain
Joong Ang Daily
2/2/2007

China has renamed 18 primary and secondary schools after [Pektu] a scenic mountain that straddles the border with North Korea, a Chinese committee said.

The Committee for the Protection, Development and Management of the Changbaishan Protection Zone under the control of the Jilin Province, northeast China, said Wednesday it changed the names in July of last year to boost the protection of the mountain. The provincial government administers the Chinese part of the mountain.

The schools now have 11,000 students and 1,720 teachers, according to the committee.

The 2,750-meter (9,000-foot) peak, the highest on the Korean Peninsula, is a major tourist attraction for both Koreans and Chinese. North Korea signed an agreement in the 1960s to secede the territorial rights to about half of Mount Paekdu to China.

China has irritated Koreans by claiming the ancient Goguryeo Kingdom (B.C. 37-A.D. 668), which ruled most of northeastern China as well as the northern half of the Korean Peninsula, was a Chinese provincial government.

Some South Koreans insist the 1904 agreement between China and Japan on the transfer of China’s Yanbian region, which encompasses Mount Paekdu, should be nullified because Korea’s diplomatic sovereignty was deprived at that time, several years before Japan formally colonized the Korean Peninsula in 1910.

In September last year, China issued a directive to about a dozen hotels operating there, including four run by South Koreans and one by an ethnic Korean resident of Japan, to cease operations and leave by year’s end. The move was seen as part of its initiative to make the Mount Paekdu area a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization World Heritage site.

In a related move, Jilin Province has announced its plans to develop the mountain as the country’s highest-level tourism zone.

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Dear Leader’s Exiled Son Surfaces in Macau

February 1st, 2007

Chosun ilbo
2/1/2007

A man presumed to be North Korean leader Kim Jong-il’s eldest son Kim Jong-nam appeared in Macau on Tuesday, the Yomiuri Shimbun reported. A South Korean government official confirmed the report on Wednesday. It seems Kim Jong-nam has not been allowed to return to North Korea and been wandering the globe for six years.

Once heir apparent of the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-nam first grabbed international headlines when he was caught trying to enter Japan on a fake passport with his wife and son in May 2001. The reasons for his departure from North Korea are unclear. According to former high-ranking North Korean officials who defected, Kim junior was branded a traitor to the revolution by his father after he talked about a Chinese-style reform and opening policy at a private gathering in 2000. They say he was forced to leave the country over a power struggle with his stepmother Ko Young-hee, the mother of his younger half-brothers Jong-chul and Jung-woon.

Since then, he has reportedly been staying in China. He was spotted at expensive restaurants in Beijing several times in January last year. Kim contacted an ethnic Chinese trader who was arrested on charges of espionage in South Korea in April 2006, a government official said. He gets along with members of the so-called Taizidang or princes’ club comprising children of prominent Chinese leaders like former president Jiang Zemin.

Kim is said to have made money from a trade business, which he set up with the Taizidang group. He has shown interest in the IT sector since his Pyongyang days and now is in touch with IT experts he met when he visited Hong Kong and Macau to gather information. Despite being a stateless refugee, Kim does not appear restrained either socially or financially.

Analysts say China does not treat him as an unwelcome guest. Kim Jong-nam tried to return to Pyongyang after his stepmother died in June 2004, but to no avail. Security strategy specialist Lee Ki-dong says anti-Kim Jong-nam forces remain strong in North Korea, adding the fact that Kim junior has not returned proves that the North’s succession structure remains unstable.

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Weird but Wired

February 1st, 2007

the Economist
2/1/2007

Online dating in Pyongyang? Surely not

KIM JONG IL, North Korea’s dictator, has interests in modern technology beyond his dabbling in nuclear weaponry. In 2000 he famously asked Madeleine Albright, then America’s secretary of state, for her e-mail address. Mr Kim believes there are three kinds of fool in the 21st century: smokers, the tone-deaf and the computer-illiterate.

One of his young compatriots is certainly no fool. “Officially, our computers are mainly for educational and scientific purposes,” he says, before claiming: “Chatting on our web, I also met my girlfriend.”

Internet dating is only one of the surprises about the internet in North Korea, a country almost as cut off from the virtual world as it is from the real one. At one of the rare free markets open to foreigners, brand-new computers from China are sold to the local nouveaux riches complete with Windows software. Elsewhere, second-hand ones are available far more cheaply. In most schools, computer courses are now compulsory.

In the heart of the capital, Pyongyang, visitors are supposed to be able to surf freely through the 30m official texts stored at the Grand People’s Study House, the local version of the Library of Congress. The country’s first cyber café opened in 2002 and was soon followed by others, even in the countryside. Some are packed with children playing computer games.

But the world wide web is still largely absent. Web pages of the official news agency, KCNA, said to be produced by the agency’s bureau in Japan, divulge little more than the daily “on the spot guidance” bestowed by Kim Jong Il. No one in Pyongyang has forgotten that glasnost and perestroika—openness and transparency—killed the Soviet Union.

The local ideology being juche, or self-reliance, the country installed a fibre-optic cable network for domestic use, and launched a nationwide intranet in 2000. Known as Kwangmyong (“bright”), it has a browser, an e-mail programme, news groups and a search engine. Only a few thousand people are allowed direct access to the internet. The rest are “protected” (ie, sealed off) by a local version of China’s “great firewall”, controlled by the Korean Computer Centre. As a CIA report puts it, this system limits “the risks of foreign defection or ideological infection”. On the other hand, North Koreans with access to the outer world are supposed to plunder the web to feed Kwangmyong—a clever way to disseminate technical information to research institutes, factories and schools without losing control.

Yet even today, more and more business cards in Pyongyang carry e-mail addresses, albeit usually collective ones. A west European businessman says he is astonished by the speed with which his North Korean counterparts respond to his e-mails, leading him to wonder if teams of people are using the same name. This is, however, North Korea, and sometimes weeks go by in virtual silence.

In some places, North Korea’s internet economy seems to be overheating. Near the northern border, Chinese cell phones—and the prepaid phone cards needed to use them—are a hot black-market item, despite government efforts to ban them. The new web-enabled phones might soon give free access to the Chinese web which, for all its no-go areas, is a paradise of liberty compared with Kwangmyong. In this region, known for its casinos, online gambling sites are said to be increasingly active.

Last summer the police were reported to have cracked down on several illegal internet cafés which offered something more daring than the average chatting and dating. Despite the signs that North Korea’s web culture is ready to take off, internet-juche remains a reassuring form of control in the hermit regime.

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N. Korea’s English-language newspaper distributed in some 100 countries

February 1st, 2007

Yonhap
2/1/2007

North Korea’s weekly English-language newspaper is distributed in some 100 countries abroad, and its reporters are regularly sent overseas to receive intensive foreign language education, a pro-Pyongyang newspaper based in Japan reported Thursday.

The tabloid eight-page Pyongyang Times, launched in 1965, also runs a Web site featuring both English and French-language editions, reported the Chosun Sinbo, a Korean-language newspaper published by the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan.

“All of its reporters and newsroom staff receive professional language education, and North Korean authorities are eager to send the reporters and translators abroad for hands-on experience,” the newspaper said.

Choe Chun-sok, editor-in-chief of the Pyongyang Times, said North Korea’s October nuclear device test inspired them to continue to engage in media activities with an eye toward the world. “Recently, we dealt a lot with stories on U.S. policy to stifle and isolate our country, as well as Japan’s crackdown on Koreans living there,” he said.

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Kim Jong-il’s eldest son lives in Macau: Hong Kong paper

February 1st, 2007

Yonhap
2/1/2007

The eldest son of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, has been living with his family in Macau for the past three years, a Hong Kong-based newspaper reported Thursday.

The South China Morning Post quoted one diplomat as saying that Kim Jong-nam, 35, has been using the city as his base, putting Macau’s government in a difficult position. He flew back into the city this week after one of many overseas trips, the paper reported.

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N. Korea steps up efforts to prevent spread of S. Korean pop culture

February 1st, 2007

Yonhap
2/1/2007

North Korea has intensified efforts to stem the spread of South Korean pop culture in the communist state, even as South Korean movies and TV dramas gain popularity there, informed sources said Thursday.

“This year, North Korean authorities waged what they call ‘psychological warfare’ against ‘exotic lifestyles’ by cracking down on South Korean pop culture,” a senior government official said, asking to remain anonymous because of the sensitive nature of the issue.

According to a survey conducted on recent North Korean defectors to the South, South Korean video tapes and CDs enter North Korea via China. North Koreans having TVs, video players or personal computers at home watch them, and then swap the programs among peers or friends, another source said.

The popularity of South Korean media has been so great that a lead actress’s line in the hit South Korean movie “Sympathy for Lady Vengeance” became a household word in the North, while some North Korean youth are glued to such mega-hit TV dramas as “Fall Fairy Tale” and “Immortal Admiral Yi Sun-shin,” the sources said.

They further explained that the wave of South Korean pop culture does not stop at movies and videos. North Korean youth also enjoy sporting South Korean hairstyles and fashion, preferring tight pants and long front hair.

Since the 1950-53 Korean War, about 9,300 North Koreans have defected to South Korea, including about 1,578 in 2006 alone. The sealed border between the two Koreas has nearly 2 million troops deployed on both sides.

Wave of South Korean Trends in North Korea
Daily NK
Park Hyun Min
2/1/2007

A wave of South Korean actors and trends such as Jang Dong Gun, Bae Yong Joon and Won Bin which has washed throughout China, Japan and Taiwan has finally hit North Korean shores. Consequently, North Korean authorities are racking their brains trying to find a solution to this problem.

This wave of South Korean trends in North Korea comes from an influx of foreign movies and dramas in the form of VCD’s and videos. In particular, the phrase “worry about yourself!” from a Korean movie “Sympathy of Lady Vengeance” has become the latest catchphrase to spread throughout the country.

Regarding this, a South Korean government official said on the 31st “North Korean youths are becoming infatuated with popular South Korean dramas such as “Autumn in my heart” and “General Lee Soon Shin’” and revealed “Defectors say that people who do not watch South Korean dramas are treated as outcasts.”

In fact, according to a survey from Hanawon, an educational training centre for defectors, a growing number of travelers now cross the boarder possessing video tapes and C.D.’s. These goods then circulate amongst families in possession of T.V.’s videos and computers, particularly Pyongyang, where South Korean dramas and music are often heard.

Popular South Korean dramas have gradually infiltrated North Korea since the late 90’s. At the time, dramas such as “The Sandglass” describing the S. Korean Kwangju affair in 1980 and “Asphalt man” gained much popularity and since 2000, dramas such as “Winter Sonata” and “Stairway to heaven” have caught the attention of North Korean youths.

These South Korean movies and dramas do not stop at mere entertainment but rather are influencing the hairstyles and fashion of young North Koreans. Nowadays, many North Korean youth adopt “knife hair,” a hairstyle with thin sharp fringe points and “drainpipe trousers” are also a hit item.

A defector who entered South Korea in 2004 said “If a person is caught circulating any copies of capitalist materials, he or she may be dragged to the political gulags. However, if a person is found to be a viewer, then he or she may receive re-education or sent to the labor training camp or the re-educational camp for 6 months.”

In response to foreign culture which is finding its way into North Korea, authorities are aiming to strengthen public propaganda in order to block foreign ideologies. In particular, North Korean authorities have began considering mobilizing its groups of military youths for rearmament.

North Korea is concerned about the balance of its regime with the demands of the whole society increasingly changing. In preparation for this, it seems that North Korea is actively investing more in the light industry in an effort to stabilize public welfare.

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Rice Price Stable around 1,000 Won

January 31st, 2007

Daily NK
Kim Young Jin
1/31/2007

The Daily NK had conducted commodity price research in northern and southern North Korea from the end of last year to this January. According to the research result, rice price, despite some regional difference, averaged around 1000 NK won per kilogram. The price of North Korea’s most fundamental grain differed based on local rice production and whether it was inland or border area.

In Sinuiju, a city bordered with Chinese Manchuria, residents enjoyed relatively low price of rice due to the city’s proximity to China and breadbasket of the country, Pyongan Province. Sinuiju’s rice price was as follows: North Korean rice 850 won per kg, South Korean one 870 per kg, and Chinese imports 800/kg. Other than rice, every item showed little increase in price except for pork meat (2500 won per kg).

Basic Prices – January 4, 2007
Rice (1kg): 
Sinuiju – 830 (produced in NK), 800(produced in China)
Kangdong – 750(produced in NK), 850 (produced in South Korea)
Kangdong hosts a military hosptial and military camp. Consequently, it maintains an excess supply of rice, making rice cheaper in Kangdong than in Sinuiju. 

Corn (1kg): Sinuiju – 340 (NK), 300 (China)
 
Pork (1kg): 2400~2500
 
An egg: 250
 
A chicken (2kg): 7000
 
Soy bean oil (1kg): 3300
 
Salt (1kg): 230
 
Wheat flour (1kg) 900
 
Diesel oil (1kg)/Gasoline (1kg) 2200 / 2700
 
Exchange rate (a dollar) 3,270 / 1Yuan = 425won 

In northernmost North Korea, Chongjin had had relatively high rice price. The port city close to Russia had been quarantined since outbreak of scarlet fever. In Chongjin, both North and South Korean rice cost around 1000 won/kg, and Chinese 900 won/kg.

The reason for stability of rice price around 1000 won/kg in North Korea is, in spite of what is happening outside the country, steady supply of the grain to meet next year’s demand. And moreover, stocking up or price regulations, which usually occur when shortage in rice production is expected, had not happened yet.

Given current rice circulation in private market, this spring would not be as bad as outsiders worry. Informers say that they could smuggle rice out of China whenever necessary.

Meanwhile, North Korea’s won had been weakened consistently. In second half of last year, market exchange rate was 2950 won per dollar; it is now 3270 won/ US dollar. Won per Chinese yuan has risen from 375 won/ 1yuan to 425 won/ yuan during the same time period.

In general raise in exchange rate forces commodities price to increase; however in North Korea, prices heavily depend on change in supply rate since the country is suffering ongoing shortage of it. For example, last year when the army started selling its gasoline stockpile, oil price fell from 3000 won/ kg to 2500-2600 won/kg in one month.

northern provinces prices for December 2006 
 
NK rice-1000
SK rice-1000
Chinese rice-900
 
Corn-340
 
Wheat flour-800
 
Pork (1kg)-2500
 
An egg-300
 
Cabbage-350
radish-200
Potato-250
 
Soy bean oil-3200
sugar-2200
seasoning-5000
 
Pepper paste-1500
 
Gasoline-3200
 
Socks-1000
There are much cheaper kind of socks, around 200won.
 
Sports shoes (produced in China)-4000
There are lots of different goods according to the qualities.
 
Headache specific- 10
 
Ballpointpen-300
pencil-100
The NK products cost 10 or 20 won
 
A note book-1000
There are price differences depending on the sizes of notebooks.
 
Land tax (per 4 sq. yds)-46
 
Exchange rate (a dollar)-3200
 
1 Yuan-148

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Can Economic Theory Demystify North Korea?

January 31st, 2007

Japan Focus (Hat Tip Gregor)
Ruediger Frank
1/31/2007

Abstract
The starting point of this paper is the assumption that North Korea is de facto a well-defined nation-state, home to a national economy and inhabited by individuals that bear the same basic economic and social characteristics as individuals elsewhere. Despite the obvious specifics of the economic system and institutional structure of the country, standard economic theory should be applicable to the question of North Korean economic development. The article seeks to prove this as broadly as possible, showing that economic theory as diverse as classical and neoclassical, Marxist, Keynesian, institutional, developmentalist, neo-liberal or structuralist, dependency analysis-based and many others, including regionally centered approaches, can be utilized to explain the North Korean case with useful results, although the latter will inevitably vary depending on the chosen framework. Without arguing against or in favor of any of the available theoretical methods, this article advocates further research on North Korea as another case of development in East Asia, rather than as a mystical exception to the rule. This is particularly important in light of the tendency to describe North Korea as unpredictable, bizarre, and incomprehensible. This is clearly not the case.

Full paper below the fold

Read the rest of this entry »

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Ideological Center of North

January 30th, 2007

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
1/30/2007

The North Korean press insists that the “great and immortal” juche idea was designed by the “Great Leader,” Kim Il-sung, in the mid-1920s and has remained the guiding principle of the Korean revolution ever since. But do not expect to find references to juche in Korean publications of the 1950s or even early 1960s.

Even if Kim Il-sung first used the term in his speech in December 1955, it took at least five years before the term became widely known in the country _ and five more years for it to become the name of North Korea’s official ideology.

Only in April 1965, while delivering a lengthy lecture in Indonesia, did Kim Il-sung make it clear that from that point on juche would be considered the basic principle of North Korean ideological policy.

The North Korean leadership badly needed a new ideology in 1965. Why? This was the year when the dispute between the Soviet Union and China reached new heights. The two communist powers had been quarrelling for some time, but from 1965 to 1970 the two countries, which had recently vowed “eternal friendship,” were on the brink of war.

North Korea wisely decided to maintain neutrality, allowing it to milk both sponsors. But in the heavily ideological world of oldstyle communism one needed a theoretical justification for one’s position, even if this position was taken exclusively on account of pragmatic considerations (sounds like academia, doesn’t it?).

Nothing could be as handy as a new ideology, especially since the North had been drifting away from Soviet-style Leninism for some time. A locally designed juche was a good solution to the ideological conundrum.

It was easy to say that North Korea had discovered a new truth that was, needless to say, superior to the truth of Sovietstyle Leninism or Chinese-style Leninism-plus-Maoism. Hence, being bearers of the supreme truth, Koreans could not be ordered around.

But what exactly were the relations between juche and Marxism? For our readers this might appear a rather scholastic question, but the world of communism was based on ideology, and ideological disputes mattered. Of course, communist leaders had long learned how to bend their ideology and how to adjust its postulates to any given current political purpose.

In this regard, they were no different from leaders of supposedly religious states, whose actual policy was not too constrained by their loudly professed faith.

Nonetheless, some explanations had to be invented.

Until the late 1960s, juche was presented as a specific form of Marxism-Leninism, which suited the Korean realities and demands of the Korean communist revolution. It was not separated from Marxism. This explanation found its way into the North Korean constitution of 1972. Article 4 described juche as “a creative application of Marxism-Leninism to the conditions of our country.”

The next step in juche’s development took place around 1974 and was perhaps related to the gradual rise of Kim Jong-il. It has been often stated that Kim Jongil introduced new interpretations of juche because he wanted to flatter his father, the founder of juche, and thus demonstrate his loyalty to Kim Il-sung’s cause.

Whatever the reasons, in 1974 some documents signed by Kim Jong-il but actually written by the administration’s chief theoretician, Hwang Jang-yop (currently in Seoul), began to use the term “kimilsungism” as a synonym for juche. In February 1974, Kim Jong-il explained that the works of Marx and Lenin had become outdated.

They described the world as it was 100 or 50 years ago, while juche was suited for the modern world, they argued. Thus, in 1980 the Korean Workers’ Party proclaimed juche the party’s guiding ideology, without mentioning its relationship to Marxism.

That statement doubtless resonated well with the nationalism of Korean cadres because it essentially placed North Korea at the ideological center of the world. Since then, the nationalist element of juche has been increasingly emphasized.

That position was also an open challenge to orthodoxy as understood in Moscow and Beijing. It was as if a local Catholic bishop proclaimed that he had a better grasp of the Holy Scriptures than the pope (or, to take the analogy a bit further, two quarrelling popes) and was able to devise something like a Newest Testament.

These statements made juche-worshipping North Koreans into open heretics within the communist camp, but other “fraternal countries” had to swallow this: Whatever they said, strategic considerations took precedence over ideology. Nobody wanted to alienate Pyongyang, which had been long seen as a strangebehaving sibling of the communist “family.”

However, this family unity did not last. In 1992, the newly amended North Korean constitution completely omitted references to Marxism-Leninism and replaced it with juche as the sole official ideology. Nobody was outraged.

By that time Leninism was patently dead, and even the few countries that still maintained a commitment to that ideology hardly took their own declarations seriously.

However, after the death of Kim Il-sung there were some signs that the significance of the juche idea began to wane.

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1 Out of 5 N. Korean Defectors Swindled

January 30th, 2007

Korea Times
Kim Rahn
1/30/2007

One-fifth of North Koreans who defected to South Korea have gotten swindled here, according to the Korean Institute of Criminal Justice Policy. The majority of the swindlers were other North Korean defectors.

The report released Tuesday was based on a survey of 214 defectors over 20 years old conducted between July and September.

According to the report, 50 of the 214 polled had been the victims of fraud, theft or burglary. The victims constituted 23.4 percent of the total. Only 4.3 percent of South Koreans report having been the victim of similar crimes.

Most of the defectors who reported the crimes were affected once, but one defector was the victim of eight crimes. The 50 who reported crimes were involved in 91 crimes. Of the 91, 46 involved fraud and 11 involved violence.

The percentage of the victims who fell prey to fraud was 21.5 percent. About 0.5 percent of the South Korean population has reported fraud.

Among the 46 fraud victims, 28.6 percent lost money through a business or investment, 26.6 percent lent money to others and were not paid back and 19 percent gave money to someone who said they would bring the defectors’ family in the North to South Korea and didn’t do so.

Most of the victims of business-related fraud lost money after investing in multi-level marketing companies. Those who invited the victims to the join the businesses were mainly other North Korean defectors, according to the report.

Six of the eight cases related to bringing relatives here from the North were committed by North Korean defectors.

Those with more education were more subject to fraud. Some 42 percent of defectors with college degrees and 14.1 percent of high school graduates were swindled, but none of those who had elementary school education was a victim of fraud.

Most of the surveyed defectors did not trust people, with 63.9 percent saying they should be wary of others in South Korean society.

“The government has to prepare counseling centers and give more detailed law education to North Korean defectors when they leave Hanawon, a state-run settlement facility for defectors,” a researcher said.

N. Korean defectors shift attitude to adapt to capitalism
Yonhap
1/11/2007

For a growing number of North Korean defectors to South Korea, the stark reality of capitalism might offset their long-held dream of living in a free, affluent country.

In a capitalistic society like South Korea, a measure of freedom and independence can come only with ability to compete for decent jobs and willingness to adapt to new circumstances.

“They have a sheer illusion that if they arrive in South Korea, the people will treat them well. But they get disillusioned soon, and their lives get devastated if they don’t try hard to adapt themselves,” said Kim Seung-chul, a researcher at the Institute of North Korea Studies.

The total number of North Korean defectors will likely top 10,000 sometime this year, according to government officials.

So far, 9,265 North Koreans have settled down in the South after finishing all the procedures and obtaining social security numbers, while some 400 are receiving adaptive education at a state-run institute. More than 500 defectors are currently under the custody of South Korean embassies or consulates in Thailand, Mongolia and other countries.

“This year, a lot more North Koreans will likely escape and attempt to come to the South because the food situation is expected to worsen following the missile and nuclear device tests,” said a senior official at a Seoul-based aid group for the defectors on condition of anonymity.

Since heavy floods hit the North in the mid-1990s, the annual number of North Korean defectors reached double digits and in 1999 it swelled to a triple-digit level. In 2002, as many as 1,139 defectors arrived in the South, a sharp rise from 583 the previous year, government data showed.

“In the past, we provided direct help, or unilaterally protective aid, but the policy is shifting to an indirect one aimed at helping them stand on their own. The government will provide more job training and employment opportunities,” a Unification Ministry official said, asking to remain anonymous.

Since 2005, South Korea has introduced an incentive system for North Korean defectors on the basis of their performance in job training and the level of adaptation, aside from the money provided to help them settle in the South.

But the prevailing sentiment among the defectors is that they cannot survive in the South only with government subsidies or state-offered jobs.

“What matters is attitude. They should make efforts to understand the South Korean society and prepare themselves for competition,” said Kim Young-hee, 43, president of an aid group for North Korean defectors.

Park Cheol-yong, 32, who fled the North and arrived here in 2002, had difficulties adapting to the different work culture, but he decided to soldier on, believing that he would have a chance to get recognition after years of experience.

“The cultural differences are far greater than expected, but I tried hard to overcome the problem by adjusting to new circumstances,” said Park, who works at a stationery company.

Park, who is married with a three-year-old son, graded himself “mediocre” in the level of adaptation and expressed hope that life will get much better here as time goes by.

“Life will be much more difficult if I quit the job so easily because of the stress I get from work now. I will do my best to succeed,” said Park, who works for the sales of stationery in the morning and delivers stationery in the afternoon.

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