Logistics of filming in North Korea

April 8th, 2008

My friend Paul at Knife Tricks recently interviewed the producers of Crossing the Line about the logistics of filming in the DPRK.  Here are some excerpts:

Gordon and his crew brought their own equipment to North Korea because local film technology was not compatible with the needs of a modern documentary shoot. “As far as equipment goes, they film on 35mm, and we were filming on DigiBeta for the first two films and hi-def video for Crossing the Line,” says Gordon.

“I used standard Canon lenses,” notes Bennett. “When I needed to light, I used Kino Flos, but much of the film was shot with available light.” Gordon adds, “In North Korea, the electricity isn’t necessarily on, and when it’s on, it isn’t necessarily constant, so we tried to use available light wherever we could.” He carried batteries at all times and hooked into mains when possible.

In addition to Gordon, Bennett, soundman Stevie Haywood and co-producer Nicholas Bonner, the crew included one or two North Koreans assigned to the shoot by the Ministry of Culture. Gordon notes, “Your immediate suspicion is that they’re government plants — security people pretending to be film people. But the longer you work with people, you tend to find out what they are and what they’re not, and the people we worked with day by day were absolutely film people.”

“They basically took it upon themselves that they were going to work for us and get us the access that we wanted, whatever that took and whatever personal risks that took on their part,” he continues. “Had it all gone wrong, there would have been quite nasty consequences for everyone involved.”

The filmmaking process involved many nights of discussions with the North Koreans about access or other issues concerning the next day’s shooting. The topics to be discussed with Dresnok were provided to the North Koreans in advance, with the understanding that new topics would arise over the course of the interview. The minders occasionally reviewed the dailies. “There was never an occasion when they said, ‘No, you can’t shoot that,’” Bennett recalls. “There were lots of occasions where they’d hem and haw as to whether they wanted us to film something, and we shot it, and they had a look at it afterwards and said, ‘Yeah, it’s fine.’ You’re not always aware of what they’re looking for.”

“No footage was ever taken away from us,” adds Bennett. “We came away with everything we shot.”

The North Koreans had no hand in the edit, either. Gordon says the final cut was not shown to North Korean officials until after it was screened at the Busan Film Festival in South Korea.

Read the full article here:
Documentary filmmakers are granted rare access to shoot a project that provides glimpses of life in the closed-off society.
American Cinematographer
Paul Karl Lukacs
March 2008

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Haggard-Noland on North Korea’s economic integration

April 8th, 2008

Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland published a piece focusing on North Korea’s economic integration.  Download it here: petersoninstitute.pdf

Although not the focus of the piece, here is an excerpt:

A first corollary of the injunction to avoid top-down approaches is that any collective development assistance must be extended in support of economic reform. Experience throughout the developing world demonstrates that assistance will have only marginal effects and may even have negative consequences if not coupled with policy changes. It is not simply that aid sustains the regime; since aid is fungible, even purely humanitarian aid will have that effect. The problem is that too much aid can delay or even undermine the reform process. Whatever the multilateral mechanism that ultimately emerges, it should encourage reform and economic opening in the North.

A second corollary of the injunction against top-down approaches is the importance of engaging the private sector: through trade, foreign direct investment, private capital flows (including remittances), and sheer expertise. Economic rehabilitation will require investment in social overhead capital, which will be led primarily by the public sector. But if North Korea is to evolve toward a self-sustaining market-oriented economy, private-sector involvement will be crucial. Participation of foreign firms means that projects are subject to the market test of profitability, and it encourages North Korean authorities to think of economic engagement in terms of joint gain rather than as political tribute.

(and)

North Korea is in need of depoliticized technical assistance for a whole panoply of issues running from the mundane but critical, such as developing meaningful national statistical capabilities, through basic agricultural and health technologies, to social infrastructure of a modern economy. This infrastructure includes policy mechanisms to manage macroeconomic policy, including through reform of the central bank; specify property rights and resolve commercial disputes; regulate markets, including financial markets as they emerge; establish and implement international trade and investment policies; and so on.

Read the full paper here:
A Security and Peace Mechanism for Northeast Asia: The Economic Dimension
Staphen Haggard and Marcus Noland
Peterson Institute Policy Brief
April 2008

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An In-depth Look at North Korea’s Postal Service

April 8th, 2008

Daily NK
Moon Sung Hwee
4/8/2008

April 8th is Postal Service Day in North Korea. Each province has a branch office of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications and Communication Maintenance Bureau. The postal system manages the distribution of letters, telegrams, telephone calls, TV broadcasts, newspapers and magazines. Additionally, they mint stamps and also operate an insurance agency in name only.

In the late 1990s, the national postal system was completely ruined

In North Korea, postal service offices are set up in each “ri”—a small village unit–, of each county to deliver letters, parcel posts and telegrams. Following the March of Tribulation in the late 1990s, the delivery system was completely destroyed and its formal structure was left in tatters. Even in the 1980s when the North Korean economy and people’s lives were relatively stable, it took around 15 days to two months on average to deliver a letter from Pyongyang to a rural village.

In the case of a telegram, it took generally 3 or 4 days to reach a postal office in a rural area. In the late 1980s, to guarantee efficiency within the telegram delivery system, the authorities supplied the offices with second-hand bicycles from Japan.

After the March of Tribulation, letters disappeared due to train delays and frequent blackouts, and the telegram service was virtually incapacitated due to the lack of electricity.

Telephones were restricted to control the outflow of national secrets

North Korea uses a separate electricity supply for its telephone system. Even if there is a power blackout in a village, villagers can still use the telephone network. In 1993, fiber-optic cables were installed and the use of mail and telegram services began to decline. North Korean people call fiber optic cable a “light telephone.”

North Korea built an automatic telecommunicates system by developing multi-communication technology with imports of machinery and by inviting engineers from China in 1998.

In 2003, authorities allowed cadres to use telephones in their houses and in 2005, they also allowed people to use the telephone at home as long as they paid 2,000 North Korean won (approx. USD0.6) a month (a monthly salary is 1,500 won per laborer).

In August, 2007, the government tightened regulations regarding the telephone system. People could make calls only within their province. Authorities said the reason was to prevent the outflow of national secrets.

The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications controls TV and other broadcasting. There is no cable TV in North Korea. Authorities set up an ultra-short wave relay station in each county to relay television broadcasts.

North Korea signed a contract with Thailand for satellite broadcasting and installed U.S.-made transmission and relay facilities in 2000.

People can now listen to “Chosun Central Broadcasting,” but in rural areas, it is difficult to recieve signals because the broadcasting facilities and cables have already begun to deteriorate.

People sarcastically say a “newspaper is not about news but about “olds.” The authorities pay special attention to the successful delivery of the Workers Party Rodong Shinmun bulletin. To deliver Rodong Shinmun from Pyongyang to each province or even to each city and county by train, it normally takes 4-5 days. Sometimes, it takes more than a week.

People also say they use an “oral-paper” to get information because rumors are faster than the Rodong Shinmun.

Postal service workers were dragged to prison camps

In 1992, the Minister and all related officials of Posts and Telecommunications were fired, and the Minister, the Vice Minister and their families were sent to political prison camps for having wasted national finances for the import of factory machinery to produce fiber-optic cables from the U.K.

They submitted a proposal to Kim Jong Il to buy factory machines in order to earn foreign currency through the production and export of fiber optic cables. However, in the end they eventually bought worn-out machines from the U.K. and failed to earn profits. In addition, they embezzled some of the funds.

In 2001, in Lee Myung Soo Workers-District of Samjiyeon, Yangkang Province, two office workers and a manager of a relay station broadcasted Chinese TV programs that they were watching to residents by mistake, so they were sent to a political prison camp and their families were expelled to a collective farm.

Agents of the National Security Agency are stationed at the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications in order to scrutinize mail, parcels, to tap telephone wires and to supervise residents.

The Ministry regularly dispatches professional engineers to the 27th Bureau, to the airwaves-monitoring station, and to the 12th Bureau, which was newly established to censor mobile phones.

On Postal Service Day, Chosun Central Agency often delivers praise for the development of North Korea’s postal system and facilities under the General’s direction.

However, most ordinary citizens will not be able to watch or read about it in time, for the lack of paper, electricity, infrastructure, and delivery systems.

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Several Hundred Casualties in Train Incidents

April 7th, 2008

UPDATE: It looks like the  DPRK’s market for scrap metal has a human cost.

From the Daily NK:

Train wrecks which occurred in Yangkang Province last month were found to be caused by stolen railroad spikes, a source from the province said.

“The train derailed because somebody had stolen railroad spikes. Four passenger coaches fell into ravine, claiming hundreds of casualties,” said the source in a phone interview with DailyNK on April 9.

[T]he source said that the March 24 accident took place in Youngha-ri, Woonheung of Yangkang Province, not in Yanghwa-ri, Shinpo of South Hamkyung Province as reported by Daily NK on April 4.

The full update can be read here:
North Korean Train Wreck Caused by Missing Railroad Spikes
Daily NK
Lee Sung Jin
4/14/2008

ORIGINAL ARTICLE: 

Several Hundred Casualties in Train Incidents
Daily NK
Lee Sung Jin
4/7/2008

On the 24th and 27th of March, there were two cases of trains overturning, killing or seriously wounding hundreds of people in the workers’ area of Goeup, Kim Hyung Jik (a county), Yangkang Province and in Shinpo, South Hamkyung Province.

A source from North Korea, during a telephone conversation with Daily NK on the 4th, revealed that “At the end of last month, on the Hyesan-Manpo Line and Hyesan-Pyongyang Line, the two trains overturned after leaving Hyesan, causing a few hundreds casualties.”

The source said that “On the 27th of March, the No. 2 train on the Hyesan-Pyongyang was overturned around Yanghwa-ri in Shinpo and a few days earlier than that, on the 24th, the train on the Hyesan-Manpo – bringing people visiting the revolutionary memorial site – was also overturned in Kim Hyung Jik (formerly Hoochang).”

However, the cause, the whole story of the incidents, the exact spots and total casualties were not reported. The instruction to immediately produce coffins was conveyed to each city and county, according to the source.

The source explained the incident in Kim Hyung Jik on the 24th. In Goeup in Kim Hyung Jik, a carriage of trains fell off the tracks and 4 passengers and crew were killed, with dozens of passengers wounded.

The incident site in Yanghwa-ri in Shinpo is located near the light water reactor being supposed to be supported by KEDO in Kangsang-ri. Both Yanghwa and Kangsang-ri are located in Geumho Special Zone.

The source was concerned that “Due to these continuous incidents, people worry that the authorities might end up pressing espionage charges against innocent residents.”

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Film Screening: “The Schoolgirl’s Diary” (2006)

April 7th, 2008

(NKeconWatch: “I hope to see you there”) 

April 09 2008, 4:00 p.m. – 6:30 p.m.
6th Floor Auditorium
Woodrow Wilson Center
One Woodrow Wilson Plaza
1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20004

Learn more and REGISTER here

The Schoolgirl’s Diary (Han Nyeohaksaengeui Ilgi-2006, in Korean–no subtitles) is the story of a self-absorbed North Korean teenager, Soo-Ryeon, who yearns to move to an apartment from her home in the countryside and questions the values of her father and mother; a scientist and a librarian at the academy of sciences who put the good of the nation before that of their family. Soo-Ryeon realizes how selfish she is only after her mother falls ill and her father makes a major breakthrough in his research. The film’s screenwriters reportedly received guidance in drafting the script from North Korean leader Kim Jong Il.

Following the screening: Suk-Young Kim will discuss the film and offer comments.  Suk-Young Kim is assistant professor of theater and dance at the University of California at Santa Barbara and an expert on North Korean propaganda. She is currently completing a book project titled Illusive Utopia: Theater, Film, and Everyday Performance in North Korea, which explores how state produced propaganda performances intersect with everyday life practice in North Korea. Another book project, Long Road Home: A Testimony of a North Korean Camp Survivor (coauthored with Kim Yong) is forthcoming from Columbia University Press.

Sponsored by: North Korean International Documentation Project

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UN pulls out of North Korea Olympic torch ceremony

April 5th, 2008

More politicization of the Beijing Olympics…

The United Nations has withdrawn its staff from the Olympic torch run in North Korea amid concerns that the relay will be used as a propaganda stunt.

The decision followed a heated internal debate among foreign donors, who face a constant battle with Kim Jong-il’s government in their efforts to get food and aid to impoverished people.

It is believed to be the first acknowledgment by the world body that the Olympic torch relay is a political event that can be exploited by unscrupulous governments, diplomats said.

and…

“Unicef originally decided to participate in the Pyongyang leg of the Olympic torch run in response to a request from, and as a demonstration of support for, the International Olympic Movement,” said Christopher de Bono, a spokesman for the organisation.

“However, we are no longer convinced that Unicef’s participation in the run will support the aim of raising awareness of the situation of children in the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of, or North, Korea] and elsewhere,” he said.

“Unicef has decided, in concert with other UN family entities, to withdraw from the Pyongyang relay.”

Read the full article here:
UN pulls out of North Korea Olympic torch ceremony amid fears of propaganda coup
Times of London
Michael Sheridan
4/6/2008

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North Korean businesses expanding in Russia

April 5th, 2008

From the Donga Ilbo:

A black Benz with the red license plate of “087” passed by quickly. 087 is a number used exclusively for the sedans of North Korean diplomats. It was easy to tell that the North Korean embassy located on this street recently purchased the luxurious sedan.

“The North Korean embassy has been full of life since the latter half of 2006 because of the increased number of North Korean workers sent to Russia, diversified businesses and growing efforts to secure energy supplies,“ said North Korean defectors that the Dong-A Ilbo report team met in Moscow.

North Korean workers will construct the next APEC forum venue:

In order to prepare for the APEC, the Primorsky regional government (on the North Korean border) plans to issue work permits to 12,000 North Korean workers in 2008, four times higher than the number of those last year. A foreign national, who has hired North Korean workers, said, “North Korean senior officials are lobbying fiercely in order to increase the quota for laborers. They even arrange free tours of North Korea for Russian government officials.”

North Korea companies revived:

Recently, North Korean companies, such as Daedong River, Neungra, Baekdu and Goonpyo, have established their offices in many parts of Russia.

A 39-year-old North Korean defector who has stayed in Russia for 12 years said, “I believe, out of the 49 Russian provinces, North Korean firms have established their offices in about 30 provinces. Some 90 percent of them are responsible for overseeing North Korean workers.”

Joint ventures between Russia and North Korea, which went into hibernation after the United States froze North Korea’s account at Macau’s Banco Delta Asia in 2005, have recently resumed their activities. “Joint companies, which were active in the early 1990s, such as Dongbang Seafood and Far East Marine Transportation, have resumed their businesses,” said one Korean-Russian residing in Nakhodka.

Wages and Taxes:

“North Korean companies, which are spread across Russia, have been collecting about $400 to 500 from each North Korean worker every month. It is then used as high ranking officials’ business expenses,” said a 46-year-old North Korean defector.

“The discontent of workers is growing because high ranking officials dine out at fancy restaurants and their wives purchase expensive clothes with money earned by them,” added the defector.

(Uncle Sam is the only other government I know of that also taxes the income its citizens earn outside of its territory)

The story also makes a big deal out of the fact that the North Koreans pay huge bribes to do business in Russia, but who doesn’t?

Big players, who deliver a large sum of bribes to Russians, have also recently emerged. A captain of a North Korea freight ship was caught March 12 on site while shipping 100 tons of crude oil without reporting to customs at the Slavyanka shipyard, southern Vladivostok. It was found that the captain gave $45,000 to the president of the crude oil storage company as a kickback.

Read the full sotry here:
N.Korea’s Businesses Thriving in Russia
Donga Ilbo
4/4/2008

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The end of ‘Songun’? Part II

April 5th, 2008

Three weeks ago, the Daily NK specualted that preparations for North Korea’s political succession are leading to an end of “Songun” and a resurgence of the Korean Workers Party.  A recent story in the Donga Ilbo seems to be reinforcing this claim, noting that several assets in the military’s portfolio are being moved to various state institutions and ministries (where the Worker’s Party and probably Kim’s key supporters exercise more oversight).

Here is an excerpt from the story:

A knowledgeable source on North Korea said yesterday, “[Leader] Kim Jong Il has ordered the military to transfer its foreign operations to his cabinet and is implementing radical reform of military authorities.”

Kim ordered to reduce the number of executives and the size of the ruling Workers’ Party, government and military by 30 percent at the end of last year.

The source also said officers in the chain of command including the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces, the National Security Council, the Ministry of State Inspection and the General Staff Department began retiring in January.

The North Korean leader is also reportedly streamlining troop distribution. The North’s Border Guard Brigade has removed regiments and the role of the minting agency has shrunk.

The Ministry of People’s Security, considered the North’s main police organization, is seeing its status rise. No longer under the control of the prosecution, the ministry can now probe corruption in the prosecution and civilian damage caused by the military.

An Anti corruption campaign and purges might also be a part of this transition.

Read the whole story here:
N.Korea Changing ‘Military-First’ Policy
Donga Ilbo
3/12/2008

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Scrap metal smuggling rampant in North Korea

April 4th, 2008

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 08-4-4-1
4/4/2008

As smuggling scrap metal across the DPRK-PRC boarder has become widespread among North Korean residents lately, police are investigating the illegal trade, leading to the arrest of all of the residents in the border region that were involved in the smuggling. On April 1, the Daily NK quoted a source inside North Korea reporting that a group was arrested while transporting six tones of scrap metal to smuggle out to China via the highway connecting Yanggang Province’s Kabsan Town and Hyesan City, and subsequently imprisoned.

Those arrested were from ‘Unit 8’, an office in Hyesan under the direction of the People’s Trading Bureau regional office tasked with delivering and selling gold, food, oil and other goods in China and returning with materials needed in the North.

According to the source, “An order was handed down by the central government at the beginning of March to ‘come down hard on those scrap metal smugglers’, and the police and security force investigation is ongoing.” The source went on to report that in the Kumsandong Fertilizer Factory in Hyesan, “everything metal that wasn’t bolted down is gone, and only the walls of the factory remain…in the future [authorities] will punish scrap metal smugglers severely.”

It appears that scrap metal smuggling began to become popular in 2004, but these days, in the border areas, starving soldiers are using military vehicles to buy scrap metal from regions further from the border, then selling them in the Hyesan-Jangbaek border region. In the Yanggang and North Hamkyung Regions of North Korea, famine first spread in the mid-1990s, at which time emerged the presence of smugglers who quietly amassed copper, aluminum, nickel, and other metals and sold them in China. In response, North Korean authorities attempted to crack down, using public firing squads as a deterrent, but as border guards were in the pockets of smuggling residents of the border region, they became implicated in the cross-border illegal trading, and the crack downs became effectively useless.

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Former DPRK embassy to become hotel

April 4th, 2008

As has been chronicled before on this website, North Korean embassies generally secure their own  operating funds.  Although this might seem odd to western observers, it is an innovative model that has its benefits (i.e. the embassies earn a profit and economic considerations play a large role in determining whether an embassy is worth the cost).  There is also a downside to this model, and that is that more than one North Korean diplomat has been caught in some sort of shady smuggling or tax avoidance scheme.

The staff at the DPRK’s embassy in Germany, however, have been quite entrepreneurial in managing their real estate holdings.  They are converting their old offices into hotel space:

The Cityhostel Berlin will initially have 37 rooms at a charge of 20 Euros ($31) per head a night, Sankei reported. A reception with a grand piano is being built and a Korean restaurant is due to open in May, the newspaper said.

The embassy buildings, occupying 8,160 square meters (87,788 square feet), were built in the 1970s during the Cold War and are located in old East Berlin, Sankei said. Staff numbers at the embassy were cut after the Cold War ended and the building being converted was previously leased to corporations, Sankei said.

Update 4/5/2008:
From the Daily Telegraph:

A spokesman for the North Korean embassy dismissed the reports as Japanese propaganda, however.

“The rumours about this hostel are based on Japanese media reports, but they are not correct,” the spokesman said.

“The Japanese media are very much influenced by their government and they probably gave out this wrong information because they are our enemies.”

but…

On its website, City Hostel notes that it signed a contract in December to occupy the building, which it describes as “formerly the consulate of North Korea”.

Read the full articles here:
North Korea Converts German Embassy Into Hostel, Sankei Reports
Bloomberg
Hideko Takayama
3/25/2008

Enjoy your stay… at North Korean embassy
Daily Telegraph
Harry de Quetteville
4/5/2008

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