North Korea between collapse and reform

December 19th, 2008

Asian Survey Vol. 39, No. 2 (Mar. – Apr., 1999), pp. 287-309
Kongdan Oh and Ralph Hassig

Download PDF here or download from Jstor.org here

The refusal of North Korea’s letters to institute serious economic reforms has frustrated those who study the country and those who seek to alleviate the suffering of the North Korean people.  Two French medical aid organizations have withdrawn from the country complaining that the Pyongyang government interfered with their work.  This is but one sign of a growing donor fatigue.  The muddling through plan that the Kim regime has adopted involves soliciting foreign aid, bargaining with its military and nuclear products, making minimal unofficial changes in the domestic economy, and waiting for the international environment to become more favorable—perhaps even expecting a resurgance of international communism.  Equally important, Kim and his ruling cohorts are willing to sacrifice the economic health of their nation for the security of their regime, just as other dictators, both communist and non-communist have done.  The painful difference in North Korea’s case is that it is half of a divided nation, posing an immediate humanitarian dilemma for the millions of Koreans in the Southern half of the penninsula whose families are suffering in the north.  For this reason more than any other, the future of North Korea cannot be ignored.  

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Assessing the economic performance of North Korea,1954–1989: Estimates and growth accounting analysis

December 19th, 2008

Journal of Comparative Economics, 35 (2007) 564–582
Kim, Byung-Yeon, Kim, Suk Jin, and Lee, Keun

PDF of paper here

Abstract: This paper adjusts the official data from North and South Korean sources, taking into account hidden inflation to estimate North Korea’s GNP growth rates from 1954 to 1989. The factors of economic growth are decomposed subsequently into changes in inputs and factor productivity. Finally, a panel cointegration technique is used to assess the level of productivity in the North Korean economy in comparison with that of the former Soviet Union. We find that the average of annual growth rates of North Korean GNP and GNP per capita from 1954 to 1989 was 4.4 and 1.9%, respectively. The results from decomposition suggest that the prime cause of slow economic growth was extremely low or even negative total factor productivity. According to the panel cointegration estimation, productivity in North Korea was lower than that of the Soviet Union by 33%.

JEL classification: P27; E01; O47
Keywords: North Korea; Growth; Growth accounting; Panel cointegration

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Lessons in insurance

December 19th, 2008

In September 2006 the first questions about North Korean reinsurance contracts hit the media (Joong Ang Daily, Sept. 20).  North Korea’s Minjok Insurance General Company filed claims in London and Moscow for two railway crashes, a ferry sinking, and a helicopter crash.  The Joong Ang Daily reported that that the accident sites were examined by industry representatives—though the checks had not been cut.  At the time the filings were interpreted in the west as a sign of tough financial times in the DPRK. Others suggested Pyongyang was learning how to manipulate global financial systems.

By December 2006, many underwriters began to (publicly) suspect fraud in these cases.  

North Korea Suspected of Collecting Millions in Reinsurance Fraud
Monday , December 04, 2006
By George Russell

[Excerpt] The central focus of concern is the absolute control of ownership and information in North Korea by Kim Jong-Il and his regime. All North Korean insurance is controlled by one state-owned firm, the Korea National Insurance Corporation (KNIC), formerly known as the Korea Foreign Insurance Company, which in turn purchases reinsurance coverage abroad for risks that it has assumed in its domestic market.

The alleged fraud involves a wide variety of North Korean industrial and personal calamities where insurers have been presented with perfect government-controlled documentation of accidents, including deaths, along with carefully gathered photographic evidence, all compiled in a startlingly brief time.

That paperwork is coupled with a resistance to letting foreign insurance adjusters examine some of the most crucial physical evidence, except after long delays and under a watchful eye, if at all.

The growing concern in the reinsurance industry is that the property damage being claimed is vastly overstated, and the circumstances of some alleged accidents may have been altered, or that deaths for which insurance payment is claimed may have had nothing to do with the accidents.

The number of apparently ordinary people in the dictatorship who have suddenly been found to have foreign-backed life insurance is raising insurers’ eyebrows.  The chief concern is that only the Kim Jong-Il regime controls the information required to trigger the payments.

So what specifically looked suspicious?

Suspicions in London began to gel in July 2005, when North Korea reported that a medical rescue helicopter had crashed into a government-owned warehouse that authorities said was crammed with disaster relief supplies.

The entire contents of the warehouse, which ran to hundreds of thousands of items, were destroyed, KNIC said, submitting within 10 days a list compiled by the relief center of every single commodity that it said had been lost.

Along with the lengthy list came a reinsurance claim for more than 40 million euros, or almost $50 million at then-current rates, for 95 percent of the damages. The reinsurance was placed through London, but the risk was spread among reinsurers worldwide.

“They provided details including tens of thousands of children’s gloves, handkerchiefs, leather gloves, toilet soap and washing soap, within 10 days,” Payton said. “In the chaos which follows an accident of this kind, that is unheard of.

“A similar loss report in Britain might take months to compile.”

The North Koreans also supplied photos of the devastation, which insurers turned over to leading experts at photographic estimates of fire damage. The experts concluded that the volume of debris remaining within the warehouse, as assessed from the photographs, did not support the high volumes of relief supplies that were claimed to be there before the fire.

“The North Korean claims are supported by meticulous paperwork, something at which the North Koreans excel,” Payton (senior partner in the London-based international law firm of Clyde & Co.) said.

“For example, where death certificates and hospital reports are required, the regime’s attitude is ‘tell us what you want, we’ll give it to you.’”

In the case of a ferry accident that allegedly took place last April, near the coastal city of Wonsan, North Korean authorities declared that 129 people had died aboard the vessel after it struck a rock about 1,000 yards off the Korean coast, and only about 100 yards from an island. All of them, the Koreans claim, had been automatically covered with life insurance when they bought their ferry ticket, and that insurance risk had been passed on to the London market through a common reinsurance product known as “excess loss personal accident reinsurance.” Here the claims from reinsurers totaled about 5 million euros, or roughly $6 million.

The North Koreans claimed that most of the victims had died of hypothermia in the freezing water. Industry sources say that when insurance investigators discovered that weather conditions were warmer than claimed at that time, the North Koreans responded that severe winds were blowing from Siberia in the spring, making the water unusually frigid.

When insurers asked for permission to send an independent diver to inspect the ferry wreck, they were refused.

Britain’s Foreign Office says the lack of firm proof of fraud is why it hasn’t taken action on the reinsurance issue, although British diplomats say they are aware of it.

Apparently, these circumstances led the insurers to refuse payment, and the North Koreans took them to court in London. Quoting from the Times of London (January 2007): 

The state-owned Korea National Insurance Corporation (KNIC) is demanding €44 million in a London court from a group of reinsurers, including Lloyd’s syndicates, for damage caused in a catastrophic helicopter crash in 2005.

The North Koreans have supplied exhaustive documentation and their claims have been authenticated by independent loss adjusters and upheld in a North Korean court. But the reinsurers argue that the nature of the regime makes it impossible to trust and that the claim is a fraudulent one intended to bring in desperately needed foreign exchange.

The accident took place in April 2005 when, it is claimed, a helicopter owned by Air Koryo, the North Korean state airline, was dispatched from Pyongyang, the capital, to collect a woman who was in labour with triplets from a remote island. On the return flight it crashed into a warehouse on the outskirts of the city, causing a fire that destroyed a large amount of humanitarian relief goods.

The KNIC settled an insurance claim by the airline, which had compensated the owner of the warehouse, and claimed this back from its London reinsurers. According to the contract, disputes were to be settled under North Korean law and last month a court in Pyongyang ordered the reinsurers to pay the North Korean company the €44 million. They refuse to do so.

Lawyers for the KNIC say that, having pocketed premiums for the previous nine years without any claims, the reinsurers are simply reluctant to pay out such a large sum.

“There is no evidence at all to suggest that the helicopter claim is fraudulent,” says Tim Akeroyd, of the law firm Elborne Mitchell, which is acting for the KNIC. “All the evidence available, including the reports of loss adjusters appointed by Mr Payton’s clients, clearly established that this was a bona fide claim.”

The contract also states that claims in North Korean won will be converted at a rate of 160 won to the euro, close to the Government’s exchange rate. But the black market rate, which is used for all practical purposes in North Korea, is closer to 2,000 won to the euro. If this were applied it would reduce the reinsurers’ bill from €44 million to €3.5 million.

This month the European reinsurers settled the case–delivering the DPRK’s KNIC nearly totoal victory in the suit pertaining to the helicopter crash. Quoting from the Financial Times:

Court proceedings in London have ended after a group of re­insurers, including Allianz of Germany, Generali of Italy, [Misr Insurance of Egypt], and three Lloyd’s of London syndicates, agreed to pay 95 per cent of the reinsurance claim, or €39.2m ($58.2m).

[One member of the reinsurance consortium, Aviabel of Belgium, has refused to accept the settlement and legal proceedings are continuing.]

The reinsurers also agreed to retract and withdraw all allegations of fraud and impropriety made against the Korea National Insurance Company.

It is not unusual for reinsurers robustly to contest claims. But it is thought this is the first victory of its kind in an overseas court for [North Korea’s monopoly insurance provider].

Apparently the other cases (particularly the ferry sinking) are still pending. Quoting from Reuters:

The lawsuit is one of several which North Korea is pursuing, with claims exceeding $150 million dollar according to some estimates, involving several calamities.

Why did the European insurers settle the case?

[L]awyers representing the North Koreans argued that the insurance claim was a legitimate commercial debt owed to KNIC by reinsurers who were fully aware of the nature of the contract when they signed it, and had even agreed to let a North Korean tribunal adjudicate the claim.

English judges evidently agreed. The reinsurer’s position was first rejected in England’s High Court of Justice in August, 2007, and again on appeal two months later. Another trial began on November 12, 2008 before the Commercial Court in London before the two sides came to their agreement.

The settlement amounts to roughly 95 percent of what KNIC had originally demanded. It includes a specific confirmation that the reinsurers “have retracted and withdrawn all allegations of fraud and impropriety against KNIC.”

Settlement here (via Fox News): dprk_settlement_agreement.pdf

UPDATE: Aidan Foster-Carter issued a personal comment on the case.  You can read a PDF of it here.

Read articles here:
North finds reinsurance a source of hard cash
Joong Ang Daily
Lee Young-jong, Shin Eun-jin, Sohn Hae-yong
9/20/2006

North Korea Suspected of Collecting Millions in Reinsurance Fraud
Fox News
By George Russell
12/4/2006

North Korea ‘trying £30m insurance scam’
Times of London
Richard Lloyd Parry
1/26/2007

N Korea state insurance group wins case
Financial Times
Sundeep Tucker
12/10/2008

Reinsurers pay North Korea claim, drop fraud case
Reuters
Nadine Jakobs
12/10/2008

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The (Non) Impact of UN Sanctions on North Korea

December 19th, 2008

Working Paper (Download PDF here)
Marcus Noland, Peterson Institute for International Economics

Abstract: This study finds that North Korea’s nuclear test and the imposition of UN Security Council sanctions have had no perceptible effect on North Korea’s trade with its two largest partners, China and South Korea. Before North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test, it was widely believed that such an event would have cataclysmic diplomatic ramifications. However, beginning with visual inspection of data and ending with time-series models, no evidence is found to support the notion that these events have had any effect on North Korea’s trade with its two principal partners.

In retrospect, North Korea may have calculated quite correctly that the direct penalties for establishing itself as a nuclear power would be modest (or, alternatively, put such a high value on demonstrating its nuclear capability that it outweighed the downside risks, however large). If sanctions are to deter behavior in the future, they will have to be much more enthusiastically implemented.

Keywords: Sanctions, North Korea, Nuclear, United Nations, Trade equations
JEL codes: F51, P2, D74

This subject was covered in the Washington Times this morning.

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DPRK to remove inactive Chinese companies from Rajin

December 19th, 2008

Quoting from the article (h/t Oliver):

North Korea is preparing to remove inoperative foreign companies from a special economic zone in the country’s northeast, officials said after a report that some Chinese firms in the area were asked to leave.

“North Korea appears to have conducted a survey in October to sort out companies that exist only on paper from the Rajin-Sonbong economic zone,” Kim Ho-nyoun, spokesman for the Unification Ministry, told reporters.

He was responding to a request to confirm a recent report by a local daily, the Dong-a Ilbo, that Pyongyang has asked an unspecified number of Chinese firms there to evacuate by the end of November. The firms did not comply with the request since it was not mandatory. About 250 Chinese firms are on the registry, according to the daily.

Although pure speculation, this could also be due to the influence of the Russian government—who has made no secret of its desire to invest in the Rajin.  Russia is also upgrading the railway track from Kashan to Rajin. 

Source:
N Korea to remove inactive cos from Rajin-Sonbong Economic Zone
Asia Pulse Businesswire
(Yonhap)
December 16, 2008

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Inter-Korean economic cooperation office closes after 3 years; cross-border cooperation withering

December 19th, 2008

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 08-12-19-1
12/19/2008

On October 28, 2005, an office housing the Inter-Korean Council for Economic Cooperation was established in order to create a channel for routine dialog between North and South Korean authorities and to assist with direct business deals between the two countries. Now, three years later and as inter-Korean relations have stalled, the office has completely closed its doors, causing economic cooperation to wither.

For over three years, the office served as a window fro North and South Korean businesses and workers, assisting with agreements between businesses, passing on documents, delivering samples, and more. In particular, it facilitated a total of 1,269 consultations and deliberations, with a mere 43 in 2005, growing by more than one thousand percent to 446 in 2006 and continuing to grow to 510 in 2007, while only 270 were held this year, bringing together a total of 4070 South Koreans with 3634 North Koreans, for a total of 7704 people making use of the services this office had to offer.

The office also served as a go-between for 10,539 documents sent from the South and 10,656 documents drafted by the North, and mediated the drafting of 668 new regulations for enterprises in the complex. This includes company proposals and promotions, delivery of samples, letters of recommendation, notarization of authentication, and other documents related to economic cooperation.

Of the 1354 samples that passed through the office, 560 were from the South, while 794 were from the North. There were eleven officials from the Ministry of Unification, Ministry of Finance, and other related South Korean government bureaus in the office, as well as another ten officials from the South Korean Trade Council, KOTRA, the Export-Import Bank, the Small and Medium Business Corporation, and the North Korean National Economic Cooperation Federation.

However, on March 24 of this year, North Korea ordered all South Koreans to evacuate the office after Unification Minister Kim Ha-joong stated that “it would be difficult to expand the Kaesong Industrial Complex if the North Korean nuclear issue is not resolved,” and three days later, all eleven government officials were ordered out, leaving only three officials, from KOTRA, the Export-Import Bank, and the Small and Medium Business Corporation behind, along with two employees to manage the facilities.

Now, with North Korean measures restricting land crossings over the military demarcation line, the full closure of the Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Office, and the expulsion of South Korean workers implemented on the 24th of last month, all South Korean workers in the office had to return to South Korea on the 28th. This is causing considerable difficulties for small and medium businesses that could previously trade with or invest in North Korea at lower costs through the office.

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Orascom 3G wrap up

December 19th, 2008

UPDATE: Here is an older paper by Stacey Banks which I have not read: North Korean Telecommunication: On Hold.

ORIGINAL POST: On Monday the Orascom 3G mobile network launched in North Korea.  Just about everyone covered this story…so here are the highlights:

Telecommunications in North Korea: Has Orascom Made the Connection?
Working Paper: Marcus Noland

The topicality of the second paper, on the Egyptian firm Orascom’s role in North Korea’s telecommunications modernization, received a boost this week with the announcement in Pyongyang that Orascom was finally rolling out its cell phone service and creating a joint venture bank with a North Korean partner.  The planned Orascom investments are large: if actualized, they would be the largest non-Chinese or non-South Korean investments in North Korea, and would exceed total private investment in the Kaesong Industrial Complex to date

Financial Times

Orascom is confident North Korea is opening up its economy and says it has been assured by the ­government that everyone will be allowed to buy a mobile. However, experts think that such a volte-face is highly unlikely and reckon only senior military and government officials will be allowed access, and then only to a closed network.

When asked how many people would ultimately use the service, Orascom’s chairman Naguib Sawiris said: “We have a modest target of 5 to 10 per cent of the population.” The population is about 23m. Mr Sawiris expects 50,000 subscriptions in the first three-to-six months.

Jim Hoare, Britain’s former chargé d’affaires to Pyongyang, says the new network is bound to have severe restrictions.

“It’s unlikely that a country that doesn’t allow you to have a radio unless it’s set to the state frequency will suddenly allow everyone to have mobile phones. It’s more credible that there will be a limited network for officials in Pyongyang and Nampo.”

Dong Yong-sung, chief of the economic security team at the Samsung Economic Research Institute in Seoul, believes another obstacle to ordinary North Koreans owning phones will be the cost. “As far as I know, mobile phone registration costs about $1,000,” he said, a sum equivalent to the average annual income.

(NKeconWatch: Others put the price at $700…and there are many problems with asserting that the DPRK’s per capita income is $1,000 per year.)

Bloomberg

The inauguration of Koryolink took place today in North Korea, Orascom Telecom said in an e-mailed statement. Orascom Telecom Chief Executive Officer and Chairman Sawiris attended the event, a company official said, requesting anonymity. The Cairo- based company got a 25-year license and exclusive access for four years in January. It plans to spend as much as $400 million on a high-speed network and the license for the first three years.

The North Korean venture is “in line with our strategy to penetrate countries with high population and low penetration by providing the first mobile telephony services,” Sawiris said in a statement earlier this year.

CHEO Technology JV Company, the North Korean unit that will operate under the Koryolink name, is 75 percent owned by Orascom Telecom and 25 percent by the state-owned Korea Post and Telecommunications Corporation.

The unit will see average revenue per user of $12 to $15 this year as Orascom Telecom targets three of the country’s biggest cities, according to company forecasts.

Koryolink has rolled out its so-called third-generation grid to initially cover Pyongyang, with a population of 2 million.

Orascom is counting on four potential markets in the Stalinist nation, according to a study by Marcus Noland of the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

The military and government officials are the top targets, followed by foreigners working for UN organizations and diplomats. The others are customers from South Korea, which has several economic projects with its neighbor, and local demand from rich North Koreans.

To protect its investment, Orascom “hedged its bet, committing only half of its investment at the outset and making additional investment conditional on its assessment of conditions going forward,” Noland said.

If the deal is threatened, Orascom may withdraw specialized equipment or technicians, reducing the value of the network to Pyongyang, Noland said in his study.

“Orascom may have spread the wealth informally, creating beneficiaries within the decision-making apparatus who would stand to lose if the agreement failed,” according to the study.

Bloomberg

Orascom Telecom, the Middle East’s biggest wireless company, opened Ora Bank in Pyongyang in the presence of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Naguib Sawiris, a company official said on condition of anonymity. Ezzeldine Heikal, who is also head of Koryolink, Orascom’s North Korean mobile-phone network, was appointed president of the bank, the official said without providing further details.

“This is a big deal, especially as far as North Korea is concerned, because the current banking system is virtually non- existent,” Marcus Noland of the Peterson Institute for International Economics said in a telephone interview from Washington, D.C. “It’s a ground that others have feared to tread and is perhaps an endorsement for North Korea that says ‘we’re open for business.’”

Ora Bank is a joint venture between Orascom Telecom and North Korea’s state-owned Foreign Trade Bank, North Korea’s official news agency reported today. The director of North Korea’s central bank Kim Chon Gyun and Egypt’s ambassador to Pyongyang Ismail Abdelrahman Ghoneim Hussein, were also present at the opening ceremony, the news agency said.

Radio Free Asia

Chinese traders who regularly travel back and forth to North Korea said local residents showed little enthusiasm for the new service, which cost more than U.S. $900 to set up before the Ryongchun explosion.

North Korean defector Kim Kwang-jin, a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Strategy in Seoul, said the fact that the government had once pulled the plug on North Korean cell phones meant that it could easily do so again.

“In the beginning, people will be hesitant, because a few years ago many of them made a big investment in cell phones. But service was suspended abruptly, so they are still very concerned that might happen again,” Kim said.

“People are also worried that the ability to pay such a high amount of money for a cell phone may raise a red flag and bring them under scrutiny by the North Korean authorities.”

Most foreigners are banned from using cell phones while in North Korea, although a network for government officials is believed to exist in the capital, Pyongyang.

(NKeconWatch: I personally saw elite North Koreans use mobile phones and even some western journalists in 2005.)

The Guardan

North Korea first experimented with mobile phones in 2002, but recalled the handsets 18 months later after a mysterious train explosion that killed an estimated 160 people. Some experts argue that officials feared the incident was an attempt to assassinate the regime’s “dear leader”, Kim Jong-il, and that mobile phones were involved.

BBC

Some reports suggest that handsets for the new network will cost around $700 each, putting them far beyond the reach of the vast majority of people in the impoverished country.

Choson Ilbo

Although the technology would enable users to send and receive text messages and video content, North Korean customers will only be allowed to speak over their phones.

BMI Political Risk Analysis, Dec 16, 2008 (h/t Oliver)

BMI View: North Korea has officially begun third-generation (3G) mobile phone services, thanks to Egypt’s Orascom Telecom (OT). However, the growth of the network could be limited by the regime’s fear that mobile phones will increase the scope for anti-regime activities.

North Korea has officially commenced third-generation (3G) mobile phone services, thanks to an investment by Egypt’s Orascom Telecom (OT). The firm’s initial target is 100,000 subscribers in three major cities, including Pyongyang, and it eventually hopes to develop a nation-wide network connecting North Korea’s 23mn citizens. OT has promised to invest US$400mn in network infrastructure over the next four years. It has signed a 25-year contract with the North Korean government, and owns 75% of their joint-venture (known as Korealink). OT’s exclusivity rights will last for four years. Orascom’s foray is something of a coup, given that North Korea’s communications network is so rudimentary (for further background see December 8 2008, Industry Trend Analysis – North Korea Prepares For Mobile Network Launch).

Why Pyongyang Fears Mobile Phones
North Korea launched a mobile phone service operated by a Thai subsidiary firm in 2002, but reversed course in 2004, apparently because of a devastating bomb blast on a train in Ryongchon in April of that year. Given that North Korean leader Kim Jong Il’s personal train had passed through the area only a few hours earlier, there was speculation that the explosion had been an assassination attempt, possibly triggered by mobile phone. Since then, only those living in areas close to the border with China have had access to mobile phones, thanks to the proximity of the Chinese network.

Aside from the notion of mobile phones as bomb triggers, they can also make it easier for citizens to communicate with one another. This would increase citizens’ ability to organise anti-government activities – such as protests or sabotage. For example, the popular uprising that led to the overthrow of Philippine president Joseph Estrada in 2001 was dubbed the ‘text message revolution’, because that is how the marches were announced and coordinated. Admittedly, the Philippines is a far more open society than North Korea, but the subversive aspect has not been lost on the regime.

Mobile phones would also make it easier for North Koreans to communicate with the outside world, and thus allow the real-time transmission of information or intelligence to foreign media or spy agencies, and vice versa. They would also allow the North Korean elite to communicate more efficiently, allowing dissident elements to plot against the regime.

Thus, even something as basic as mobile phones are seen as potentially regime threatening.

Mobile Service Difficult To Spread
Consequently, Orascom will surely find it difficult to spread its mobile service across the country. For a start, registration will be tightly watched. Secondly, the cost of the handsets, at several hundred dollars, will mean that only the political and moneyed elites will be able to afford mobiles. Of course, elements of the elite can ‘misuse’ their phones to arrange subversive actions if they deem it worthy, but it seems that the regime are counting on loyalty. Indeed, depending on the sophistication of their equipment, the regime will probably be able to snoop in on the elite’s conversations and movements, giving them an additional layer of security.

Read the full articles below:
Orascom eyes North Korean network
Financial Times
Christian Oliver
12/14/2008

Orascom Telecom’s Sawiris Signs North Korean Deal
Bloomberg
Tarek Al-Issawi
12/15/2008

Orascom Telecom of Egypt Opens Bank in North Korea
Bloomberg
Tarek Al-Issawi
12/16/2008

North Korea Brings Back Cell Phones
Radio Free Asia
Jung Young
12/16/2008

Secretive North Korea launches restricted mobile phone service
The Guardian
Tania Branigan
12/16/2008

N Korea launches 3G phone network
BBC
Steve Jackson
12/15/2008

N.Korea Restarts Cell Phone Service
Choson Ilbo
12/17/2008

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Koryo Tours December newsletter

December 17th, 2008

The Koryo Tours December newsletter went out this week.  You can read it here. Interesting highlights below:

1. Apparently the areas open for tourism in the DPRK are expanding.

“We opened a few new areas to tourism over the course of the year including the East Coast city of Chongjin and the nearby Chilbo mountain area, Haeju in the south west of the country and various sites around Pyongyang. We stayed in a few different hotels, many of which we are now able to offer to our clients and in 2009 we intend to go to even more places than ever before, some wholly new areas and some new and expanded attractions in more familiar places – we can’t give out all details (some innovate, others imitate – have to keep some of it off the website for now to protect our interest!) but trust us – you’ll never have another holiday quite like this one if you choose to go with us next year. We have vastly expanded our range of tours to be ever-more inclusive to all demands.”

“2008 was also the year in which we continued our innovation in new kinds of tours; we ran a football tour where a foreign side played against a Korean team in a friendly, and the first ever Ice Hockey, Volleyball, and even Cricket (yes, cricket!) tours took place, all of them between visiting westerners and local Koreans. We continued our school trips and cultural exchange programs and assisted in several interesting and worthwhile projects, some of which are outlined further below. We also ran Pyongyang’s first ever pub quiz. It was a very interesting year for us all and we hope to repeat this innovation in 2009 so if you have any ideas for trips to DPRK then we would be more than happy to hear them, there are a great many restrictions on what can be done there but we have many years of experience and a track record of getting things done which is second to none, if it can be done, then we will organise it for you.”

2. Koryo Tours took in about 950 tourists this year.
3. Mass Games are presumed to be on in 2009.
4. Tour dates here.

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DPRK pushes to meet yearly production plans

December 17th, 2008

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 08-12-17-1
2008-12-17

As the end of the year approaches, North Korea has launched a ‘Year-end Battle’ in order to encourage every sector of the economy to meet annual production targets, without exception.

On December 1, (North) Korean Central Broadcasting announced, “workers, laborers and technicians of the harvesting industry sector overcome difficulties and barriers with indomitable moral strength, while thoroughly accomplishing the (New Year) Joint Editorial’s fighting tasks, focusing all strengths on the struggle to brightly wrap up the deeply meaningful year,”while also reporting on the production innovation of the nation’s mining and smelting facilities.

The program also announced that each North Korean region’s hydroelectric power plants, “brightly bring the year to a close, while the issue more important than any other is ensuring the People’s Economy electrical use, strongly demanding power production, is supported,” reporting that efforts were being focused on ensuring power production equipment was operating at full capacity, and electrical production was being expanded.

Rail transportation in Pyongyang, Kaechun, Anju, and other areas also reported high achievements in distributing coal for electrical production and ores sent to metal factories, as efforts are put into the ‘Year-end Battle’, according to the broadcasters.

One member of the North Korean Cabinet’s office of light industry announced on November 30 that, in accordance with this year’s New Year Joint Editorial’s ‘prioritization of the lives of the people’, the government invested in the Sariwon Weaving Factory, the Haeju Textile Factory, etc., “struggling to produce more good-quality cloth” in textile factories under the guidance of the office of light industry’s department of textile industry management.

North Korea’s broadcasts also reported that the Ranam Coal Mine Cooperative Enterprise, the Musan Mine Cooperative Enterprise, the Chungjin Tractor Accessories Factory and others were also engaged in this ‘Year-end Battle’.

In South Hamgyung Province, a new lecture hall and electronic library were built at the Hamheung Medical Science College, and construction was underway to expand the number of classrooms. Also, the Heungnam Basic Foods Factory, the Hamheung Orthopedic Surgery Hospital and the Sinheung Irrigation were under construction as each locality is pushing forward with selected economic construction projects.

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The NSA Smuggling Ring

December 17th, 2008

Daily NK
Lee Sung Jin
12/17/2008

Recently in the North Korea-China border region, North Korean smuggling groups associated with the National Security Agency have been actively operating.

A source from Yangkang Province relayed in a phone conversation with the Daily NK on the 16th, “On the 9th in Songjeon-ri, Kim Jong Sook County in Yangkang Province, a van ferried on a raft fell into the water, so the border guards and the National Security Agents tried to get it out in the middle of the day. The van was being smuggled from China by the ‘national smuggling group.'”

The “national smuggling group,” or “NSA smuggling group,” which earned its epithet from the North Korean citizens, is directly operated by the National Security Agency and is composed of soldiers, well-to-do merchants, Chinese emigrants, and Chinese relatives of officials.

The group was organized in the fall of last year and has been in operation since then. The source added that its size, members, and range of traded items have significantly increased.

The source stated further, “In Hyesan alone there were at least three smuggling groups by the end of the summer, but with the passing by of the fall harvesting season, there are now about seven in operation. With the National Security Agency making profit from these groups, the No. 8 Bureau of the Chosun (North Korea) People’s Army (in charge of mobilizing war supplies) even formed a group last summer.”

In particular, it has become known that the No. 8 Bureau, under the patronage of the National Security Agency, sold a massive supply of medicinal herbs secured in North Korea to the Chinese merchants in exchange for Chinese rice.

The source emphasized, “Usually, there are four or five active members of a smuggling group. In the past, they only smuggled at night, but the groups have lately been taking advantage of quiet places during the day to hand over goods.”

He said, “When the groups engage in smuggling, the commander or vice-commander of the border guard unit will go on duty. After the National Security Agency calls the border unit, the smuggling group(s) goes out at a pre-determined time and hands over the goods.”

Goods that are currently handled by the groups are not only marine products or scrap iron, but are increasingly high-priced goods such as gold or drugs, because they can be traded for cash.

The source explained, “The smuggling groups have to give approximately 30 million North Korean won (approximately USD8,500) per person a month to the state, but ordinary smuggling does not suffice to make such a sum of money. The state severely punishes trading drugs or gold, but given the exorbitant sum which has to be paid to superiors, there has been a tendency to engage in the trading of such goods.”

He noted, “Nowadays, each unit acquires the necessary goods, so the border smuggling channel created by private individuals for trading has also been used by the national organization.”

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