Archive for the ‘Automobiles’ Category

In Kim’s North Korea, cars are scarce symbols of power, wealth

Tuesday, July 10th, 2007

Bloomberg
Bradley Martin
7/10/2007

A black Volkswagen Passat with smoked windows glides down a suburban Pyongyang road. Its license plate begins with 216 — a number signifying Kim Jong-il’s Feb. 16 birthday, and a sign the car is a gift from the Dear Leader.

Even without a 216 license plate, a passenger sedan bestows VIP status in a country where traffic is sparse and imports are limited by external sanctions and domestic restrictions alike.

Just across the border, South Korea is the world’s fifth-largest automotive manufacturer. To an ordinary North Korean, though, a private car is “pretty much what a private jet is to the ordinary American,” says Andrei Lankov, author of a new book “North of the DMZ: Essays on Daily Life in North Korea.”

He estimates there are only 20,000 to 25,000 passenger cars in the entire country, less than one per thousand people.

Discouraging private car ownership is not just a matter of ideology in a communist country, Lankov said in a phone interview from Seoul, where he teaches at Kookmin University. The passenger car, usually black and chauffeur-driven, “is the ultimate symbol of the prosperity of high officials,” he says. They keep the vehicles scarce “so everybody knows they are the boss.”

Measuring, copying

North Korea moved early — shortly after the Korean War, and ahead of the South — to mass produce trucks and 4-wheel-drive Jeep-type military vehicles. Craftsmen took apart imported Soviet tractors, trucks and utility vehicles, measuring the parts to make copies.

The indigenous civilian passenger-car industry, too, mostly made knockoffs of models produced elsewhere. After importing a fleet of Mercedes-Benz 190s, the country produced replicas under local model names into the 1990s. Unfortunately, the domestically-made copies were dogged by reports about “terrible overall quality,” says Erik van Ingen Schenau, author of a new pictorial book, “Automobiles Made in North Korea.”

Lee Keum-ryung, a former used-car trader who defected from North to South Korea in 2004, agrees. The knockoffs came with “no air conditioning, no heater, and they’re not tightly built or sealed,” he says. “If you drive out of the city and return, your car will be full of dust. It’s like an oil-fueled cart.” Lee, 40, uses a pseudonym because he fears repercussions from North Korea.

Slow recovery

Material and energy shortages that accompanied a famine in the 1990s brought state-run factories to a halt. Recovery has been slow, and Schenau said he believes even domestic production of Jeep-style vehicles has been replaced by imports from Russia and China.

Imports have similarly come to dominate what passes for the passenger-car market. Used cars — mostly Japanese-made — are the mode of transit for many members of the new trading and entrepreneurial class that has emerged in the last couple of decades. Under a loophole in the country’s long-standing private-car ban, these vehicles typically enter the country disguised as gifts to North Koreans from their relatives in Japan’s Korean community, Lankov says.

Lee says “a relative abroad” helped him buy his first car when he was 23. “But as an ordinary person, I couldn’t keep it under my name, and I didn’t have a number plate of my own,” he says. “A friend was a high police official with many cars under him. I borrowed a plate.”

‘A very affluent life’

Lee had “a very affluent life” before he defected, importing 10-year-old cars from Japan and selling them both in North Korea and, for a time, across the border in China. “I had money, status,” he says. “I enjoyed everything people my age could have.”

A small passenger vehicle for which his agent paid $1,500 at the docks in Japan would sell for $2,500 to $3,000, Lee says. A bigger car — say, a Toyota Crown — might cost him $4,000 to $5,000; he would sell it for $8,000.

While Japanese trade figures show annual exports of some 1,500 passenger cars, mostly used, to North Korea in 2005 and 2006, the total for this year is zero. After Kim’s government tested a nuclear device last October, Japan placed passenger cars on a list of banned luxury exports.

Perhaps as a sign of displeasure with Japan’s sanctions, Kim ordered most Japanese cars confiscated, according to a February 2007 dispatch by South Korea’s Yonhap news agency. The order, if it indeed was issued, hadn’t been carried out by the time of a May visit to Pyongyang, when a number of Japanese cars could be seen.

German inroads

When a European-made import passes by, it’s often owned by the state, used by high officials and foreign dignitaries. Sweden’s Volvo had a hefty market share in the 1970s; Germany’s Audi and Volkswagen have made inroads lately. Mercedes is particularly well-represented in Kim’s personal fleet of hundreds of vehicles, according to Lee Young Kook, a defector who served in Kim’s bodyguard force.

In a 2003 Yonhap story, Lee said the security-conscious leader traveled in motorcades of identical cars to confuse would-be assassins and generally maintained 10 units each of any model so five would always be road-ready.

With the nation’s access to imports constricted, a relatively new player in the market, Pyonghwa Auto Works, has attempted to fill the gap. The company was created when Seoul-based Pyonghwa Motors, which began as a car importer affiliated with Rev. Sun Myung Moon’s Unification Church, teamed up as majority partner in the 70-30 venture with the North Korean state-owned trading firm Ryonbong Corp.

Kits of parts

The first assembly line was set up in 2002 at the west coast port city of Nampo to produce, from kits of parts, a version of the small Fiat Siena, called the Hwiparam (Whistle) in Korean.

So far, the factory has built about 2,000 cars and pickup trucks, according to Noh Jae Wan, a spokesman in Seoul for Pyonghwa Motors, who said it is the only manufacturer now turning out passenger cars in North Korea. According to a February announcement by Brilliance China Automotive Holdings, Pyongyhwa has agreed to let Brilliance use part of the Nampo plant to assemble Haise minibuses.

While some news accounts have mentioned the possibility that the North Korean cars may eventually be sold in the South, “this will take time,” Noh said in an interview. “It can only happen when the two Koreas reach some significant agreement on trade or other international circumstances change.”

Share

A Scientific City Pyongsung Became a Distributors Haven for Goods

Monday, July 9th, 2007

Daily NK
Kim Min Se
7/9/2007

Pyongsung, a city located in the province of South Pyongan has recently been targeted as a scientific city transformed into distribution hub.

In the late 1960’s, North Korean authorities established Pyongsung as an area for scientific research with a population of 300,000.

In Pyongsung, there are 25 scientific research centers beginning with a nature centre. Further, there is Pyongsung Scientific University and a training centre for scientists and engineers. Pyongsung lies on the outer-skirts of Pyongyang near the districts of Soonan, Samsuk and Yongsung.

Park Chan Joo (pseudonym) a North Korean tradesman on business in Dandong, China introduced the changes occurring in Pyongsung in a telephone conversation with reporters.

Park currently works as an employee for the Myungjin Trade Company and imports goods needed for everyday living into North Korea.

Park said, “All goods made from China pass through Shinuiju and are generally dispatched from Pyongsung to each region for sale. This includes eastern regions such as Hamheung and Wonsan. Of course traders from Sariwon, Haeju and Nampo in southern provinces also come to Pyongsung to receive their goods.”

Regarding Pyongsung which developed into a distributor of imports, Park said, “The delivery cost is double if goods made from China pass through Shinuiju and are delivered directly to eastern and southern regions. However, stopping over at Pyongsung can make a profit on time and cost effective.”

Further, he said, “It’s close to eastern regions and in the vicinity of southern regions. This area has increasingly become an intermediary wholesalers district with the rise of warehouses.”

Park said, “We are located right next to Pyongyang where the population is greatest. Also, many Pyongyang citizens with high standards of living compared to other regions come and buy the goods.”

“It only takes about one hour to travel from Pyongyang to Pyongsung via car or train. Tradesmen and citizens must obtain a travel permit to enter Pyongyang, but any North Korean citizen can easily come to Pyongsung with an ordinary identification card. Nowadays, you can travel to any special district (excluding Pyongyang and border regions) as long as you have an identification card” he added.

Also, Park said “There are more and more people wanting to living in Pyongsung because of trade” and informed, “All this happened as Pyongsung changed into a centre for wholesalers. Even up until a few years ago, it wasn’t so hard to live in Pyongsung, but now you have to pay thousands of dollars to move in the area to Pyongsung’s People’s Safety Agency (police).”

As Pyongsung emerged into a distributors haven, more and more long distance bus services have been operated connecting rural districts to Pyongsung city.

Kim Jong Hoon (pseudonym) a Shinuiju resident who came to Dandong to visit his relatives said, “People with money hire second hand buses made from China and register the vehicle at the traffic registry and operate the services while offering some profits” and “It takes 3 days to get from Shinuiju to Dancheon in South Hamkyung. It took me 3 days to go to Pyongsung, then from Pyongsung to Wonsan and then Wonsan to Dancheon.”

Presently, the only direct bus services in operation from Pyongsung are to Shinuiju, Wonsan, Sariwon, Nampo and Haeju.

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 07-7-9-1
9/7/2007

The North Korean city of Pyongsung, situated in the South Pyongan province, is undergoing a transformation. Previously known as the center of North Korean scientific research, it is now becoming a distribution hub for goods imported from neighboring China. Pyongsung, with a population of approximately 30,000, was established by DPRK authorities in the mid 1960s in order to serve as a center for scientific studies. It is a satellite city on the outskirts of Pyongyang, bordering the Soonan, Samsuk, and Yongsung areas of the capital. The Institute of Natural Sciences and 24 other scientific research centers are located there, along with the Pyongsung College of Science and numerous scientific and technical training facilities.

These days, most Chinese imports being brought into the country through Shinuiju are coming though Pyongsung before being sold to various regions throughout the country. Traders from the east-coast cities such as Hamheung and Wonsan, as well as Sariwon, Haeju, Nampo and other areas regularly travel to Pyongsung in order to stock up on goods.

Located close to eastern cities and bordering southern provinces, Pyongsung is becoming the new distribution center of Chinese goods due to the considerably lower cost of delivering wares through Shinuiju and directly to these regions. This new route is much more lucrative in terms of both cost and time. Therefore, the number of wholesalers erecting warehouses and filling orders in the city has been growing quickly.

Pyongyang, the capital city with a population greater than any other city in the North and a higher standard of living than the rest of the country, is only one hour away by train or car, and so many Pyongyang residents have been purchasing high-end goods from there.

Traders and ordinary North Koreans need a travel permit with an approval number in order to enter Pyongyang, but anyone can easily travel to Pyongsung with only a general registration permit. In recent times, North Koreans can travel throughout the country with only a resident permit, with the exception of some particularly sensitive areas such as the border region or the capital city. Recently the number of people wishing to live in Pyongsung in order to trade has been on the rise. Only a few years ago, it was relatively easy to move to Pyongsung, but today someone wishing to relocate in this new market must hand over several thousand dollars. 

Share

Purchase Popular Jangmadang Goods at State-Operated Stores

Tuesday, July 3rd, 2007

Daily NK
Yang Jung A
7/3/2007

A North Korean insider source relayed on the 2nd that citizens’ complaints have been rising because the North Korean government recently gave guidelines to sell a portion of products which have been selling with popularity at the jangmadang (markets) only at state-operated stores.

This source, who resides in North Pyongan, revealed in a phone conversation with DailyNK, “Recently, plastic floors have been popular, so “plastic sales” is earning a lot of money. However, government authorities have mandated that the commerce office directly oversee plastic floors and that they be sold at state-operated stores.”

The insider relayed, “Families above middle-class have been showing a lot of interest in acquiring furniture. Besides floors, drawers on which TV can be placed and cabinets displaying wines and others are very popular.”

Previously, floors made of paper covered the floors of houses, but since North Korean civilians’ standard of living started rising recently, Chinese-made plastic floors decorated in flowers is drawing popularity.

He said, “Rumor has been leaking that pork (1,700 North Korean won per kg), the price for which has declined recently, is also directly managed by the commerce office, along with plastic floors.” “Besides this, the complaints of merchants have been rising since rumor starting circulating that the list of items to be overseen by the office will increase.”

He added, “Would they want to do any business given that individual sales are discouraged and turned over to national control when sales go even remotely well? There are grievances due to the fact that earning a livelihood through jangmadang sales is not even allowed, on top of the lack of provisions.”

Further, he said, “Regulations regarding people engaging in “Chapan-Jangsa (sales by trucks)” using privately-owned buses or trucks exceeding eight tons have begun. If one is caught, the vehicles become registered as national property and the vehicle owner receives a salary from the country instead.”

“Chapan Jangsa” refers to carrying out wholesale while ferrying the load on trucks. The “plastic floor” and “Chapan Jangsa,” along with what is popularly known as “ice (drug) sales” are counted are the top three business that brings in the most amount of money.

“The complaints of people are high, but the scope of regulation is wide-ranging, so there are people who think that the inspections will stop after several times.”

Even guideline to prevent wearing of wedding dresses

He also said, “Since October 2006, there were even guidelines to prevent wearing of wedding dresses at weddings. Not only wedding dresses, but wearing white gloves were also prohibited.”

In North Korea, wearing wedding dresses at weddings became a trend seven to eight years ago. Nowadays, many civilians are known to wear them. Even if they do not wear wedding dresses, North Korea’s general wedding culture is donning flowers on the chest part of dresses and on the head and putting on white gloves.

Additionally, the insider relayed, “The size of the flower of the groomsmen and the bridesmaids should not be bigger than the groom’s and the bride’s. The flower of the groom and the bride is fixed at 7cm and the flower of the groomsmen and bridesmaids fixed at 5cm. In the case with those who go against the orders and get their pictures taken after marriage, the photo volunteer in charge’s volunteer card (employment permit) can be revoked.”

Share

To Mount Kumgang, cabbie, and step on it!

Monday, April 16th, 2007

Joong Ang Daily
Seo Ji-eun
4/17/2007

Hyundai Asan also plans to offer ‘doctor fish,’ which eat dead skin, at the Mount Kumgang spa.

Hyundai Asan Co. said yesterday it will launch a call taxi service at Mount Kumgang in North Korea on Friday to allow better tourist access to the scenic mountain area.

The van-sized taxis will run from the lodging facilities in the neighborhood of Onjeonggak rest area, where restaurants and souvenir shops are located, to Guryeong Falls and Manmulsang, an area with a number of unique rocks and cliffs.

Hyundai Asan, the exclusive operator of inter-Korean businesses, said taxi charges will be similar to the rate applied to van-sized call taxis in Seoul, except paid in dollars. The basic fare will be $5 for the initial distance of 4 kilometers and $1 per additional 800 meters.

Currently, shuttle buses are the sole means of transportation, but these operate only during designated hours and to designated places. An increasing demand for private transportation motivated Hyundai to execute the taxi plan, according to the company spokesman.

Tourists will only have to ask Hyundai Asan employees in any of the districts in the Mount Kumgang area to use the taxis, which will be driven by ethnic Koreans living across the Yalu River in Northwest China, often called joseonjok. The drivers of the buses currently running at the North Korean resort area are also joseonjok.

Hyundai Asan also said it will release doctor fish, a species of fish known to feed on dead skin, at the Mount Kumgang spa. The fish are in the midst of the quarantine process and will be unveiled to tourists by late this month. Using the fish at the spa will cost $10, according to Hyundai Asan.

Share

Imported cars from North Korea?

Saturday, March 24th, 2007

Joong Ang Daily
Seo Ji-eun
3/24/2007

Automobile statistics from the Korea Customs Service show that South Korea imported 778 cars from North Korea from 2003-2006. Is it true that the North exports its cars to the South? Not entirely.

Under related regulations, when South Korean cars are shipped to the North for use in inter-Korean business, including commerce at Mount Kumgang and the Kaesong Industrial Complex, the cars are classified as “exports” to the North. For the same reason, when passenger cars, commercial vehicles, and trucks from South Korea break down or wear out in the North, they return to the South in the form of “imports.”

North Korea has a handful of car manufacturing factories, but there is only one still in operation, Pyeonghwa Motors. The plant is run by the 70-30 joint venture between South and North Koreas and started mass production in April 2002. It has churned out an annual average of 600 vehicles in all segments, except for trucks and large buses, for exclusive supply to North Korea. According to a Pyeonghwa Motors spokesman, the carmaker accounts for the majority of vehicle demand, with some used cars unofficially imported from Japan.

Special-purpose vehicles, including dump trucks, account for most of the vehicles sent back from North Korea to the South. Other vehicles crossing the border are multi-purpose cars, trucks and vans.

Share

Firms venture into North Korea

Tuesday, March 13th, 2007

Asia Times
3/13/2007

Chinese auto maker Brilliance Auto recently signed an agreement with PMC of South Korea on jointly launching an assembly plant in North Korea.

The North Korean facility will be Brilliance Auto’s third after its operations in Egypt and Vietnam.

Brilliance Auto is neither the first nor the most active of the Chinese auto makers making direct investments abroad. Quite a few have already done or are doing so. Among them are Chery, Geely, Jianghuai, Chang’an, Great Wall, and BYD Auto, which have launched greenfield auto plants abroad, and Shanghai Automotive and Nanjing Automotive, which have invested abroad through merger and acquisition.

Chery is a leader in this regard, making great efforts on building CKD (complete knockdown) factories abroad in recent years. Aside from the existing assembly plants in Iran and Russia, it is looking for such opportunities in Egypt, Romania, Turkey, Indonesia, Italy and Argentina. Its Argentina joint-venture project with the local Socma group, involving investment of US$100 million, will be controlled by Chery. If it goes ahead, it will be the first China-invested auto venture in South America. Chery plans to own 12 assembly plants worldwide within a short time.

Geely also has been active in going global. It has invested in Malaysia and is preparing for another new factory in Russia.

Jianghuai, meanwhile, has established light-truck assembly plants in Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia.

Industry analysts hold that excessive capacity in the domestic market after rapid expansion in recent years is prompting Chinese auto makers to look for overseas markets. However, they are often hit with tariff barriers from the importing nations. For instance, Russia levies about a 25% tariff on complete vehicle imports, but only about 3% on knockdowns.

Direct investment overseas is regarded as a solution to such barriers.

So far, the overseas investments of Chinese auto makers have been concentrated in emerging markets such as the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Africa.

Share

North Korea’s Central Class Fear Kim Jong Il’s Ruin Will Lead to Their Ruin

Saturday, March 10th, 2007

Daily NK (Part 1)
Han Young Jin
3/10/2007

The reason North Korea’s regime can persevere is because of the central class’ fear of regime collapse.

As a result of this perseverance, North Korea has been able to resist isolation and pressure for more than half a century, with the system even defeating the “March of Suffering” where tens and thousands of people died of starvation.

Today, powers maintaining the North Korean system are the hierarchical upper class including the North Korean Workers’ Paryy, the National Security Agency, the National Protection Agency, prosecutors and adjudicators.

Overall, there are about 4 millions members in the North Korean Workers’ Party (statistics as of 1995), this being roughly 20% of the population. Retrospectively, these people control the 23mn North Korean citizens.

The central class incorporating junior secretaries to the party, training officers, novice elites, generals from the army, safety and protection agents use their power position to control directly the North Korean people.

The most of these people have strong loyalty for the regime. In particular, military generals or party officials especially fear punishment and the thought that their privileges may be removed. Though they may be leaders, it is not one’s own desire to escalate in power but fear of retaliation from new powers.

Local party officers, security agents and protection agents directly control, inspect and punish civilians. In essence, they absolutely control the North Korean people and hence fear direct retaliation from the people. The collapse of the regime, also means that they may become jobless and troublesome.

In the 80’s, there was an incident where the Kangkye Munitions Factory incurred an explosion. The people who thought that a war had risen killed the security agent in charge and threatened to evacuate the country regardless of war or not. The people armed with weapons even raided the home of the security agent in charge, with stones and batons. As this rumor spread, security officers throughout the country felt the tension and were all on alert. Hence, control forces even to the lowest rank have become the trustworthy pillar to the North Korean regime.

Since the early stages of the regime, North Korea trained members of anti-Japan protestors and their families, Mankyungdae Revolutionary Academies and distinguished servicemen from the Korean War. As a result, the mindset of North Korea’s central class is relatively high in societal class awareness, as is their loyalty to Kim Jong Il.

Ideology amidst the central class and brainwashed passion

These people believe that the survival of the North Korea system is directly connected to their lifeline. They fear that they will not be able to receive the same privileges given by Kim Jong Il, if the current North Korean regime were to collapse. They believe that Kim Jong Il’s fate is their fate.

The North Korean regime is currently strengthening the multiple control system for their central class so that the ideology of the class is not shaken and the principals of Kim Jong Il kept intact.

In North Korea, every position and decision is focused around Kim Jong Il and his every single word is glorified. In one sense, it is a specialty of the dictatorial regime, but in reality it is a way to force the upper class to stand in awe and even dread the grand Kim Jong Il. Some defectors, once members of North Korea’s elite say that people work having no conscious awareness of their heavy duty or how to modify words spoken by Kim Jong Il.

Educational jobs by the central class are different to that of the common citizen. As the former Soviet Union and Eastern European bloc was merging in the 90’s inflicting collapse to the regime, elite officials internally passed video tapes on the end of Romania’s former President Nicolae Ceausescu to calm other comrades but in the end stirred greater fear.

Recently, it is said that tapes on the Iraq situation have been televised for commanders and military elites to see. The aim of this viewing, to plant into the minds of the commanders that compromises to the protection of the system means death.

The Kim Jong Il regime gives privileges to inspire the people supporting them. For example, people who work for the Central Committee systems department or the elite propagandists, receive a Mercedes Benz with the number plate ‘2.16’ symbolizing Kim Jong Il’s own birthday, and depending on the position, the car series is upgraded.

Other elites from the Central Committee and figures in key military posts are provided with luxurious apartments in Pyongyang. The apartment blocks are built and located separately to the average house. Soldiers guard the homes, even restraining relatives from entering the apartment premises. These homes are furnished with electrical goods, sofas, food and goods made in Japan, as well as being accompanied with western culture.

As Military First Politics was implemented in the late 90’s, private nurses, full-time house maids, private apartments and country residences, private cars, office cars, as well as “recreational clubs” with beautiful women, were granted as privileges to the head military and provincial officers.

Every Lunar New Year, expensive foreign gifts are presented to the core central class. However, across the bridge, local and system secretaries, public control officers await common goods that can be found in South Korea’s supermarkets such as mandarins, apples, cigarettes and alcohol. Nonetheless, people who work for North Korea’s local offices are more than happy to receive these gifts are it distinctly segregates them from the common North Korean citizen.

OK to Capitalist Goods But NO to Capitalist Regime
Daily NK (Part 2)

Han Young Jin
3/11/2007

The higher the class, the closer one is to the 2nd and 3rd tier network. If a person is discovered to be in opposition to the regime they will be brutally punished and so a person is cut off early if they are found to show any signs of anti-Kim Jong Il.

The people who inflict the greatest control are the military high commanders. North Korea’s military can be seen as a branch of national politics that really does represent half of the regime. Political elites from the military closely control high commanders with under cover spies whose job is to specifically tattle on suspicious officers to the Party. Then, the protection agency in command contacts an expert who equipped with bugging devices carefully monitors the high commander’s every move, 24 hours a day.

In addition to this, control over university students who are being trained to become North Korea’s next elite group is also severe. In order to intensify regulations on university students, the protection agency initiates secret movements. Protection agents and even information staff are grouped to control the student’s movement with one information staff in charge of monitoring every each 5 students.

Even amidst the Workers’ Party and the ministries, national safety agents are dispatched to monitor the elite.

“Capitalist goods are good, but reform is unacceptable”

Though envious of South Korea’s economic development, North Korea’s upper class are opposed to growth and reform.

There is a popular story of an elite North Korean official who visited the South and frankly revealed “Though we may crawl and be worn, we cannot follow South Chosun’s economy.” It is also a well known fact that elite officials preferred Samsung digital cameras and showed interest in Hyundai cars at a South-North Cabinet talks and Aug 15th event in Seoul. Nonetheless, when it comes to acknowledging the need for capitalist reform, North Korea’s central class discards it with a wave of the hand.

The reason that capitalist goods are preferred but reform rejected is a result of the ideology that their individual power will be lost with change to the regime. Those who have loyally followed authorities have no mindset nor special skills that will enable them to survive a capitalist system. Rather than confronting a competitive society, they prefer their current position and the glory that comes with it.

The central class is also well aware of the restraints on North Korea’s economy. Every year as the harvest season arrives, they see citizens march onto the fields malnourished and underfed. They know that the economic policy implemented by authorities has failed and is incoherent. Yet, ultimately they are unwilling to let go of the small privileges they are endowed upon by the preposterous and unreasonable regime.

These people have become accustomed to their power which is utilized to gain them their privileges and tyranny. Even if North Korea enters a famine, they need not worry about food or clothing.

For example, in the case of an official factory secretary, he/she satisfies ones own personal needs by selling factory goods. Using the excuse that factory profits are being raised, he/she orders the workers to engage in more work, on the side. This is how tyranny occurs with the factory secretary manufacturing personal gains. Yet, these officials are not punished with any legal sentences.

Newly-rich dualism, collaborative relationship with official powers

Following the July 1st economic measures in 2002 trade became legal and North Korea experienced a sudden boom in newly rich elites. What led this new rich class to accumulate so much wealth was the fact that they had introduced an enterprise system which allowed trade with China.

The newly rich have a great interest in reform and development, and are well aware that the North Korean regime will not be able to solve the economic issue without facing reform.

However even this class of people are disinterested in bringing an end to the regime. They have already accumulated their wealth and feel no onus in the poverty stricken situation in North Korea. Whether capitalism or the current North Korean regime, as long as they can sustain a living, these people can continue to remain in a dualistic mindset.

While North Korean authorities are strengthening control over this new class, they are in another sense, receiving money and bribes to protect them. Where investigations are involved, authorities are risking their own identities being revealed and hence often ignore the illegalities of the people, even going to the extent of passing on information.

It is a fact that North Korea’s central class is acting as the forefront in sustaining the regime, but then again, these people have greater educational standard than the average commoner and they have had more opportunities to experience Western civilization. Hence, they can compare the North Korean regime with the outside world. Though the majority of this class accommodates to the North Korea regime, the possibility that a fraction of the elites may have some sort of antagonism against the Kim Jong Il regime and the odds that these people may just act upon these feelings cannot be discarded.

In addition, as North Korean society continues to decay, the organization of its systemic corruption may just be hit with danger. As corruption deepens and a crack appears in the regime, authorities will try to control this leak but while doing so, it is possible that endless punishment may just incite some elites to secede.

Particularly, the more information about foreign communities flow into North Korea and the people’s animosity against Kim Jong Il increases, even the elite will not be able to completely suppress feelings of antipathy.

Share

Kim Jong-il orders Japanese cars confiscated

Monday, February 19th, 2007

Yonhap
2/19/2007

North Korean leader Kim Jong-il has ordered most Japanese cars in the communist country seized in a sign of his growing discontent with Japan imposing severe sanctions after the North’s detonation of a nuclear bomb last October, informed sources said Monday.

“After he paid tribute to the Kumsusan Memorial Palace on Jan. 1, he saw a Japanese car that wasn’t working blocking the road and gave a National Defense Committee edict to seize Japanese cars,” a source familiar with the North Korean situation said, asking to remain anonymous. North Korea’s founding leader Kim Il-sung’s embalmed body lies in the memorial in Pyongyang.

Share

Analysis of North Korea’s “Market Economy” I.

Thursday, January 25th, 2007

Daily NK
Kim Min Se
1/25/2007

Since 2002’s 7.1. economic reform measures, North Korea’s markets have become most vital part of peoples life. North Korean market system operates from ‘general market’ with huge process chain to small local ‘yard market’ in the remote countryside. And, in between, there are always some brokers.

An importer buys goods from China and transports them through cargo trains or trucks to large cities in North Korea, such as Hamheung, Chongjin, Pyongsung or Nampo. Wholesale traders take those products and resell to local businesspeople. In North Korean jargon, such process is called “running.”

Usually imported goods from China or North Korean domestic ones take three steps of circulation; one or two laps of ‘run’ is added in case of mountain area.

Wholesale is mostly carried out by cars. Since oil and vehicles are not enough, sometimes wholesalers rent cars by themselves.

A forty one-year old trader working in Dandong, China, Kim, said that he purchases goods from Chinese factories firsthand. If the amount of import is huge, Kim uses freight. If not, a few trucks are fine for him. At maximum, Kim bought 60 tons of texture from China at once and resold it to North Korean wholesaler in one month.

In Hyesan, Yangkang province, 38-year old Choi, a broker of mainly Chinese cloths and shoes, sells his stuff to nearby Chongjin. Choi told the Daily NK “There are two types of so-called running; first run and second run. “Running” requires a lot of capital like money for vehicles. So the person must be patient and cautious when buying and selling something.”

According to the interview with Kim, using vehicle in wholesale business takes from 3.5 million NK wons (roughly 1,000 US dollars) to 35 million wons. The money includes not only car rental but also “transportation permit” application fee. Transportation permit is required when vehicle and personnel move inter-province, and costs relatively large amount of cash.

Kim keeps about twenty percent of total sales as his profit. The other 80% is comprised of original price of goods, car tax, gasoline and multifarious types of ‘extra expenses,’ or bribe.

The “first run” business is apportioned to a few with privilege in North Korea. Those who can earn cooperation from Security Agency and police are able to do the first run. Without bribery, it is impossible to obtain various permits that are essential for any businessperson.

In addition, to trade with overseas Chinese merchants, one must possess enough wealth and credit. Credit enables North Korean businessmen to buy goods in China with comparatively low price. Those first runners are, in most cases, wealthy North Koreans with ten thousand US dollars cash on their hand at any moment.

Share

Female Ratio in KPA Now More Than 10%

Tuesday, January 23rd, 2007

Daily NK
Kim Min Se
1/23/2007

What is the gender ratio in Korean People’s Army?

A 28-year old recent defector Kim and a 38-year old former KPA Air Force engineer Choi said that female members of KPA could take up to ten percent of the total armed forces from administrative positions to front battalions.

Kim testified “Most of small-caliber anti-aircraft guns are operated by women and there are even all-female independent brigades and regiments.”

“North Korean authorities encourage women to be enlisted in coastal artillery by advertising ‘recruiting songs.’”

Kim also said that virtually all of the North Korean train tunnels and bridges were guarded by women forces armed with 14.5mm machine gunnery.

Korean People’s Army, according to the South Korean Ministry of Defense’s White Paper, boasts 1.17 million soldiers, and the government in North Korea has increasingly enlisted women since the population shrank in mid-90s.

Kim is a former female member of the KPA 4-25 Training Camp (equivalent to a corps) 331st Brigade 6th Mechanized Battalion. She had served since 1997, the peak of starvation period. At that time many North Korean parents sent their daughters to the army for them to avoid hunger.

Female officers have been mass-recruited since 1995 among women NCOs of proven party loyalty and good family background. They were trained for two years and then stationed in each unit.

For the enlisted, both men and women are conscripted at their age of 17 while the female soldiers receive trainings specialized in anti-aircraft guns.

However, some others, as their male compatriots, are more fortunate, due to their superb ancestral or family background, to be stationed in army hospitals or other more comfortable places than coastal artillery.

“In more recent days,” another defector Choi said, “even aircraft pilots of Soviet-built IL-28 Bombers are filled with women.”

North Korean enlisted women usually serve six to seven years, in contrast with ten to thirteen years of men’s service.

Female veterans automatically become KWP member as they are discharged and enjoy higher chance to be selected as junior party official, but not as preferable marriage partner.

Share