Archive for the ‘Trade Statistics’ Category

North Korea between collapse and reform

Friday, December 19th, 2008

Asian Survey Vol. 39, No. 2 (Mar. – Apr., 1999), pp. 287-309
Kongdan Oh and Ralph Hassig

Download PDF here or download from Jstor.org here

The refusal of North Korea’s letters to institute serious economic reforms has frustrated those who study the country and those who seek to alleviate the suffering of the North Korean people.  Two French medical aid organizations have withdrawn from the country complaining that the Pyongyang government interfered with their work.  This is but one sign of a growing donor fatigue.  The muddling through plan that the Kim regime has adopted involves soliciting foreign aid, bargaining with its military and nuclear products, making minimal unofficial changes in the domestic economy, and waiting for the international environment to become more favorable—perhaps even expecting a resurgance of international communism.  Equally important, Kim and his ruling cohorts are willing to sacrifice the economic health of their nation for the security of their regime, just as other dictators, both communist and non-communist have done.  The painful difference in North Korea’s case is that it is half of a divided nation, posing an immediate humanitarian dilemma for the millions of Koreans in the Southern half of the penninsula whose families are suffering in the north.  For this reason more than any other, the future of North Korea cannot be ignored.  

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Assessing the economic performance of North Korea,1954–1989: Estimates and growth accounting analysis

Friday, December 19th, 2008

Journal of Comparative Economics, 35 (2007) 564–582
Kim, Byung-Yeon, Kim, Suk Jin, and Lee, Keun

PDF of paper here

Abstract: This paper adjusts the official data from North and South Korean sources, taking into account hidden inflation to estimate North Korea’s GNP growth rates from 1954 to 1989. The factors of economic growth are decomposed subsequently into changes in inputs and factor productivity. Finally, a panel cointegration technique is used to assess the level of productivity in the North Korean economy in comparison with that of the former Soviet Union. We find that the average of annual growth rates of North Korean GNP and GNP per capita from 1954 to 1989 was 4.4 and 1.9%, respectively. The results from decomposition suggest that the prime cause of slow economic growth was extremely low or even negative total factor productivity. According to the panel cointegration estimation, productivity in North Korea was lower than that of the Soviet Union by 33%.

JEL classification: P27; E01; O47
Keywords: North Korea; Growth; Growth accounting; Panel cointegration

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Chinese-DPRK trade shrinks

Wednesday, November 19th, 2008

The Hong Kong daily newspaper Ta Kung Pao (excerpted in the Donga Ilbo) did some field work on the China-DPRK border which helps us get a better idea of how trade between the two nations has fared in the latest financial crisis. 

Quoting from the article:

The volume of border trade between North Korea and China has plunged in the wake of the global financial crisis, the Hong Kong daily Ta Kung Pao said yesterday.

Trading in the market along the border line and approved by the Chinese government has effectively stopped, the report said. Such trading is also not categorized as international trade.

“We found such a result after inspecting 1,334 kilometers from Dandong down the Yalu River to the Tumen River over 20 days,” the daily said.

The trade of mineral resources was hit hardest. The price of yellow copper has fallen from 60 yuan (around 12,000 won) in March to 12 yuan. That of red copper has dropped from 100 yuan (around 20,000 won) per kilogram in April to 24 yuan.

Over the same period, the price of iron ore has plummeted nearly 70 percent from three to four yuan to 1.2 yuan.

The daily said North Korea’s largest copper mine in Hyesan suspended production as prices of mineral resources for export have fallen.

North Korean exports to South Korea via China have also sharply decreased.

A trader in Longjing said, “The global financial crisis has significantly affected border trade since last month. It is hard for North Korean merchants to bring goods to Chinese markets. But it is far harder to find North Korean merchants who cross the border to buy goods in China.”

Read previous posts on this topic here.

Read the full article above here:
N. Korea’s Border Trade With China Plunging 
Donga Ilbo
11/19/2008

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North Korea statistics

Sunday, November 16th, 2008

I get many requests for North Korea’s economic statistics.  In order to make these things easier to find, I have created a page on the menu to the right called “North Korea Economic Statistics.”  This resource provides links to the most frequently quoted and cited statistics.  It is not yet complete, but I will be continually expanding it. 

I believe these should be taken with buckets of salt, but here they are nonetheless.

Also on the menu are links to the following information:
North Korea Academic Resources
North Korea Blogs
North Korea Books
North Korea CRS Reports
North Korea Films

If you have anything to add to any of these resources, please let me know. 

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(UPDATED)Financial crisis hits DPRK

Sunday, November 2nd, 2008

Although many would assume that North Korea’s economic isolation would insulate it from recent global financial instability, this does not appear to be the case.  According to the Wall Street Journal:

North Korea does little trade with the rest of the world — about $2 billion annually — and now it’s being hurt by lower prices paid by its biggest trading partner, China, according to report from a South Korean institute that specializes in North Korea research.

In recent weeks, the Chinese companies that buy North Korean ores and minerals like zinc, which are some of its biggest exports, have slashed the prices they’re willing to pay. That’s forced some North Korean mining firms to halt production and even produced a drop in the smuggling of ore and scrap, trade that’s illegal in the North but is believed to play an important role in supporting the impoverished country.

Lim Eul-chul, a professor at the Seoul-based Institute for Far Eastern Studies who wrote the report issued Thursday, said he learned about the commodity-trade problems from North Koreans doing business in China

“Chinese companies that are affected by global trends don’t want to pay as much as they used to for North Korean raw materials or resources,” Mr. Lim said. “Thus, North Korean merchants can’t make profits from trade.”

The price pressure exerted by Chinese traders on North Korean companies is in line with the broader drop in commodity prices in recent months. But it has imposed new burdens on North Korea in what is shaping up to be a terrible year there.

Official North Korean media have published reports saying the global financial crisis will ruin the U.S. and other industrial powers. But in the report, the Institute for Far Eastern Studies said “North Korean people are becoming very anxious over the possibility of the international economic crisis having a long-term impact.”

Below is the IFES report mentioned in the Wall Street Journal:

Global Financial Crisis hits DPRK economy by way of China 
NK Brief No. 08-10-29-1
10/29/2008

Contacts within North Korea are reporting that the North Korean people are becoming very anxious over the possibility of the international economic crisis having a long term impact as not only exports have dropped, but even cross-border smuggling is taking a hit.

Recently, as Chinese traders have more than halved the price of North Korea’s main export goods such as minerals and scrap iron, North Korea’s markets and even construction industry have felt the blow.

As North Korean state-run media outlets report the current financial crisis as the ruin of the United States and other capitalist world powers, they report as if North Korea were completed unaffected by it. On the 20th, the Rodong Sinmun emphasized that the the U.S.’ financial management system was ‘like a candle in the wind.’

However, it has been leaked that since last week, businesses in North Korea have been shutting their doors as a result of the financial crisis. In particular, the value of the North Korean Won has dropped sharply against the Chinese Yuan, and combined with Chinese traders’ reluctance to purchase North Korean goods and calls to lower prices, very little business is being conducted. This has led mines in Hyesan to halt exports of lead and zinc, and with the drop in legitimate exports, of course smuggling has dropped of, as well.

Furthermore, as raw materials from China are not being supplied, construction projects in the North are also grinding to a halt. 

(UPDATE) Barbara Demick reports in the Los Angeles Times:

Despite efforts to keep North Korea’s extreme poverty out of view, a glance around the countryside shows a population in distress. At the root of the problem is a chronic food shortage, the result of inflation, strained relations with neighboring countries and flooding in previous years.

Aid agencies say the level of hunger is not at the point it was in the 1990s, when it was defined as a famine, although they have found a few cases of children suffering from kwashiorkor, the swollen belly syndrome associated with malnutrition. Mostly what they are seeing is a kind of collective listlessness — the kind shown by the people on the streets of Nampo.

“Teachers report that children lack energy and are lagging in social and cognitive development,” reported a group of five U.S. humanitarian agencies in a summer assessment of the food situation. “Workers are unable to put in full days and take longer to complete tasks — which has implications for the success of the early and main harvests.”

Hospitals complained to aid workers of rising infant mortality and declining birth weights. They also said they were seeing 20% to 40% more patients with digestive disorders caused largely by poor nutrition.

The U.N. World Food Program reached similar conclusions. In a recent survey of 375 households, more than 70% were found to be supplementing their diet with weeds and grasses foraged from the countryside. Such wild foods are difficult to digest, especially for children and the elderly. The survey also determined that most adults had started skipping lunch, reducing their diet to two meals a day.

These are some of the same signs that augured the mid-1990s famine, which killed as many as 2 million people, 10% of the population.

“The current situation hasn’t reached the famine proportions that it did during the 1990s. Our hope and goal is to keep it from going over the precipice,” said Nancy Lindborg, president of Mercy Corps, one of the U.S. aid organizations working in North Korea. “You have a number of factors that have conspired to create a really tough food situation.”

In Pyongyang, the capital, residence in which is reserved for the most politically loyal North Koreans, plenty of food is available on sale. A grocery inside the Rakwon Department Store carries Froot Loops and frozen beef. At open-air markets, you can find mangoes, kiwis and pineapples

But the products are far too expensive for most North Koreans, whose official salaries are less than $1 a month — 60 to 75 cents monthly for the workers surveyed by the World Food Program. And the farther you get from Pyongyang, the poorer are the people.

Nampo is 25 miles southwest of the capital, on the Yellow Sea. It used to be a thriving port city, but nowadays its harbor is used mostly for shipments of humanitarian aid. On a weekday morning, many people sit along the sidewalk watching the few cars pass by. They appear to be unemployed or homeless.

North Koreans say that the food situation is improving and that a good harvest is expected this autumn, as a result of improved weather conditions. The last two years were disastrous because of heavy flooding.

“There was a problem before, but it is getting better. We expect a bumper harvest,” said Choe Jong Hun, an official of the Committee for Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries.

North Korea experts, however, are skeptical. “One good harvest is not really going to alter the picture,” said Stephan Haggard, a UC San Diego professor who has written widely on the North Korean famine.

The World Food Program and the U.S. aid organizations are providing food for the most vulnerable, including children and pregnant women. A U.S. ship carrying more than 27,000 tons of bulk corn and soy is slated to arrive in Nampo within days.

International agencies have been trying to raise money to expand their food aid to the general population. Many urban North Koreans are dependent on food rations, which have dwindled to 150 grams a day, or a little more than 5 ounces.

Even in Pyongyang, one can see signs of scarcity behind the facade of what is supposed to be a showcase capital. Foreign residents say they have seen homeless children in the last few months — a notable sight in a totalitarian country where nobody is supposed to wander away from their legal residence. (Los Angeles Times)

Read the full Wall Street Journal articles below:
North Korea Feels Effects of the Crisis
Wall Street Journal
Evan Ramstad and Sungha Park
10/31/2008

North Korean facade of self-sufficiency can’t hide signs of hunger
Los Angeles Times
Barbara Demick
11/2/2008

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(UPDATE) North Hamgyong by rail

Monday, October 27th, 2008

(UPDATE) These adventurers set up a couple of blogs to catalogue their trip.
1. Approaching Russia/Korea border
2. Entering North Korea at Tumangang
3. By train across North Korea (1/2)
4. By train across North Korea (2/2)
5. Pyongyang-Myohyangsan

 

railimage.jpg

I just finished reading an incredibe DPRK travel account by two Swiss and Austrain rail enthusiasts who recently traveled the Trans-Siberian Railway from Europe to Pyongyang.  If you are interested in Russia and/or the DPRK you need to treat yourself to their pictures and travel journals as much of their material has not been published in the West.

I have included links to their trip from Ussuriyisk and Khasan to Pyongyang below, with some selected comments from their diary:

1. From Ussuriysk to Khasan (Russia):
http://www.railroadforums.com/forum/showthread.php?t=25908

Selected comments:

Trains over the border were not listed, but I knew that there is not only the twice-monthly sleeping car Moscow – Pyongyang, but also a twice-weekly cross-border passenger train Khasan – Tumangan.

I asked him [a Russian border agent], whether and how often he met foreigners here. He said, that he has been working here for about one year and that we were the 1st foreigners (except North Koreans, of course), he met.

The answer was that usually only Russian and Korean citizen cross the border, but that there have been a few third country citizen here, but they didn’t remember when that was the last time…

They also said, that among the passengers of the sleeping car to Pyongyang there are usually not even Russian citizen. Russian citizen crossing the border only go to the so called “Rajin-Sonbong Special Economic zone”, setup by the North Korean administration in cooperation with China and Russia

2. From Khasan to Tumangang Station (DPRK border)
http://www.railroadforums.com/forum/showthread.php?t=25971

3. From Tumangang Station to Pyongyang part 1:
http://www.railroadforums.com/forum/showthread.php?t=25993

Selected Comments:

(North Korea uses normal gauge – 1435mm)

We then talked about other things. They said that they had studied in Pyongyang and now have to serve at the army here in Tumangan. 

One of them told us, that he had seen the Hollywood-movie “Titanic” in the cinema in Pyongyang (I have also read before, that Titanic was shown in North Korean cinemas) and both said that they were glad to practice their language skills together with us. And one of them said, that he also wished to travel around the world like we did and see foreign countries… I hope in future it will be possible for him.

And of course the mobile-phones were of special interest, as they are forbidden in North Korea. The “translator” said, that they would be sealed and that we must open the envelope only when we leave the country. The sealing was quite simple: The customs official asked me for some of paper (obviously they didn’t have their own…) and I gave him two empty DIN-A4-sheets, in which he enwraped the mobile phones and which he closed with a yellow tape, which he then stamped several times…

They told us, that they now have to take the books, the laptop, the camera and the USB-sticks with them for some further inspection by a specialist, and that we would receive our belongings later.

They asked us to put all this items into the two smaller backpack (both of us had a big and a small backpack). Then they took the backpacks and left the sleeping-car.

They also provided the following information:

At http://www.logistics.ru/9/7/i77_6557p0.htm you can find a Russian article about the history of this border crossing point.

The line on the Russian side from Baranovskiy to Khasan was built between 1938 and 1951. The first bridge over the border was a wooden railway bridge opened in 1952. In 1954, when cross-border freight traffic offically started, 4400 tons of freight were transported over the border. That number rose to 12.000 tons in 1955.
In 1959 the new bridge, which still exists today, was opened.
The peak in freight traffic was in 1988 with 4.795.000 tons (USSR > DPRK: 4.070.000 tons, DPRK > USSR 725.000 tons). The numbers show, that the USSR ecenomically supported the DPRK and due to the political and economical changes in the former USSR the mostly unidirectional trade between the two countries decreased after 1988:

1988 – 4.795.000
1990 – 3.526.000
1993 – 2.306.000
1994 – 761.000
1999 – 230.000
2002 – 68.000

Only after 2002 a slight increase is noticeable, in 2004 106.000 tons were transported. However, the infrastrucuture was overdimensioned, and it has therefore been reduced: Several tracks at Khasan station were removed, as well as 3 of 14 passing-tracks between Baranovskiy and Khasan.

Passenger traffic was opened in 1958 and 10582 passengers crossed the border during the first year. Till 1988 this number rose to 21.000/42.000 passengers (I’m not sure, does “vozroslo na 200%” mean “rose to 200%” or “rose by 200%”?).

The new station building in Khasan was opened in 1989 and it was suitable to handle up to 500 international passengers per day. However, also passenger traffic is now lower than it was at it’s best times. During the 1st 6 months of 2005 5315 passengers crossed the border.

4. From Tumangang to Pyongyang part 2:
http://www.railroadforums.com/forum/showthread.php?t=25993
Selected comments:

Considering the number of other trains we met, one cannot say that railway traffic in North Korea is in total disorder and in it’s last throes. Trains are running and during our trip from Tumangan to Pyongyang there were obviously no problems with electricity supply for the catenary. Only once we stopped for 5 minutes in the middle of nowhere, but that might have been caused also by something else. However, the tracks are in bad condition, that causes the delay.

Freight trains where quite rare and relatively short (passing tracks at stations have usually a length of 400-500 meters according to Google Earth, so freight traffic inside North Korea might indeed be very low. And we saw less factories than expected considering our experiences in other former Socialist states. The main economic activity in North Korea seemed to be still agriculture.

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DPRK economic statistics roundup

Wednesday, October 22nd, 2008

Reuters published a short article stating many of the DPRK’s economic statistics.  Most of these can already be found on this site, but in terms of a quick update, this is not bad.  The author even acknowledges the wide disparity of the DPRK’s national and per capita income estimates, which is something most articles on these topics fail to address:

*SIZE OF ECONOMY

Annual gross domestic product in 2007 was just over $20 billion, a fall of 2.3 percent from the previous year due to the effects of widespread flooding, according to South Korea’s central bank. However, a report commissioned by a former South Korean unification minister estimated it was less than half that.

*HOW MUCH DO NORTH KOREANS HAVE

Estimates of per capita income range from $400 to $1,000. Whichever figure is true, the population of around 23 million is one of the world’s most destitute. That compares to around $20,000 in capitalist South Korea, once the poorer of the two halves of the Korean peninsula. North Korea’s economy has declined over the past two decades.

*HUNGRY NATION

North Korea’s state doctrine preaches self-reliance. But for years it has been unable to produce enough food for its people and relies heavily on foreign aid. Even in good harvests, it produces about 20 percent less than it needs. An estimated 1 million North Koreans perished during famine in the 1990s.

Last month, the U.N. World Food Programme estimated that North Korea would need some $500 million in food aid over the next year to avoid a humanitarian crisis.

*WHO TRADES WITH NORTH KOREA AND WHAT CAN IT SELL?

Constantly running a trade deficit, North Korea offers cheap labor mostly for relatively low-skilled manufacturing industries, such as textiles. Its chief attraction, especially to neighboring China, is its natural resources, especially coal and minerals.

Some sources, including the U.S. government, believe it bolsters its trade through the illicit exports of weaponry, drugs and counterfeit U.S. dollars.

Its biggest trade partner is China which, by one estimate, accounted for an estimated two-thirds of its total foreign trade last year. By contrast, in the first eight months of this year, Pyongyang accounted for just 0.12 percent of China’s total foreign trade.

Of China’s imports from the North, close to 60 percent were coal and minerals such as iron ore, zinc, lead, molybdenum and precious metals.

South Korea is Pyongyang’s other main trade partner. The two operate an industrial park on the northern side of the border where manufacturers from the South use cheap local labor.

The full article can be found hrere:
FACTBOX: Some facts about the North Korean economy
Reuters
Jonathan Thatcher
10/20/2008

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Korea Business Consultants Newsletter

Sunday, October 19th, 2008

Korea Business Consultants has published their latest newsletter.  You may download it here.

Topics covered include:
Six Party Talk progress
South Korea/Russia gas deal
More factories opening in the DPRK
UN survey of DPRK population
Summit pledges
Pyongynag hosts autumn trade fair
KEPCO to Abandon NK Reactor Gear
Trust Company Handling DPRK’s Overseas Business
DPRK-Russia Railway Work Begins
ROK Opposition Calls for Renewed Cooperation with DPRK
ROK Delegation Leaves for DPRK
ROK Aid Workers Leave for DPRK
“ROK Makes US$27.6 Billion from DPRK Trade”
“Kaesong Output Tops US$400 Million”
DPRK, Kenya Set Up Diplomatic Ties
Medvedev Hails DPRK Anniversary
Claim to North Korean rock fame
International Film Festival Opens
Ginseng

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(UPDATED) US removes DPRK from state sponsors of terror list

Saturday, October 11th, 2008

UPDATE 2: Below are a list of materials from the US Department of State web site related to the DPRK’s list removal:

1. Existing Sanctions and Reporting Provisions Related to North Korea (thorough, but does not mention that the DPRK never obtained MFN or NTR status with the US, making it subject to the higher column 2, Smoot-Hawley, tarrifs.

2. Briefing on North Korea With Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks Ambassador Sung Kim, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Sean McCormack, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation Paula DeSutter, and Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation Patricia McNerney.

3. U.S.-DPRK Agreement on Denuclearization Verification Measures.

4. U.S.-North Korea Understandings on Verification

UPDATE 1: Since being removed from the list, it is now easier for the DPRK to obtain avian flu vaccinations from the US:

Yet deep inside an 86-page supplement to United States export regulations is a single sentence that bars U.S. exports of vaccines for avian bird flu and dozens of other viruses to five countries designated “state sponsors of terrorism.”

The reason: Fear that they will be used for biological warfare.

Under this little-known policy, North Korea, Iran, Cuba, Syria and Sudan may not get the vaccines unless they apply for special export licenses, which would be given or refused according to the discretion and timing of the U.S. Three of those nations – Iran, Cuba and Sudan – also are subject to a ban on all human pandemic influenza vaccines as part of a general U.S. embargo.

Under normal circumstances it would take at least six weeks to approve export licenses for any vaccine on the list, said Thomas Monath, who formerly headed a CIA advisory group on ways to counter biological attacks. All such decisions would follow negotiations at a “very high level” of government.

That could makes it harder to contain an outbreak of bird flu among chickens in, say, North Korea, which is in the region hardest hit by the virus. Sudan and Iran already have recorded cases of the virus in poultry and Syria is surrounded by affected countries. Cuba, like all nations, is vulnerable because the disease is delivered by migratory birds.(Associated Press)

ORIGINAL POST:
As reported in the Associated Press Saturday morning:

North Korea has agreed to all U.S. nuclear inspection demands and the Bush administration responded Saturday by removing the communist country from a terrorism blacklist. The breakthrough is intended to salvage a faltering disarmament accord before President Bush leaves office in January.

“Every single element of verification that we sought going in is part of this package,” State Department Sean McCormack said at a a rare weekend briefing.

North Korea will allow atomic experts to take samples and conduct forensic tests at all of its declared nuclear facilities and undeclared sites on mutual consent. The North will permit experts to verify that it has told the truth about transfers of nuclear technology and an alleged uranium program.

Verifying North Korea’s nuclear proliferation will be a serious challenge. This is the most secret and opaque regime in the entire world,” said Patricia McNerney, assistant secretary for international security and nonprofileration.

Proponents of de-listing say it is an important step in accomplishing the goals of the six-party talks which are ultimately aimed at realizing a denuclearized Korean peninsula.  Critics of this agreement claim that it addresses only the DPRK’s plutonium program while ignoring nuclear proliferation and uranium enrichment.  

North Korea stepped up the pressure this week barring IAEA inspectors from the DPRK’s nuclear facilities at Yongbyon:

North Korea “today informed International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors that effective immediately access to facilities at Yongbyon would no longer be permitted,” IAEA spokesman Marc Vidricaire said today in an e-mail. The country “has informed the IAEA that our monitoring activities would no longer be appropriate.”

The demand that inspectors leave the whole complex, which is the source of the country’s weapons-grade plutonium, followed a Sept. 24 instruction that monitors quit the reprocessing plant. The new orders will prevent UN personnel from seeing whether North Korea is removing spent uranium fuel rods from cold-water holding tanks. Spent uranium can be turned into plutonium.

IAEA inspectors will remain in the town of Yongbyon until ordered to leave by North Korean authorities, the agency said. (Bloomberg)

UPDATE: According to Reuters, “North Korea said on Sunday it would resume taking apart its plutonium-producing nuclear plant and allow in inspectors in response to a U.S. decision to remove it from a terrorism blacklist and salvage a faltering nuclear deal.”

Despite these recent developments, or maybe because of them, the Bush administration quickly negotiated a de-listing agreement with Pyongyang and spent the last few days selling it to other governments involved in the six-party talks. Though South Korea supported the move, the Japanese government was divided.  Japanese Finance Minister Shoichi Nakagawa (a North Korea hard-liner) called the move “extremely regrettable” as Japan was using US terrorism de-listing as leverage to discover the whereabouts of kidnapped Japanese citizens.  This leverage is now gone since the next president of the US will not likely go through the effort of adding the DPRK to the list again.  Other members of the Japanese government, however, believe there will not be any resolution to this issue until the nuclear issue is resolved. 

De-listing marks the end of the second of three phases agreed to in the six-party talks.  The third stage includes completely dismantling Yongbyon and ending atomic development on the Korean peninsula.  This is likely to be even more difficult than the previous stages. (Bloomberg)

De-listing, however, carries more political than economic significance.  According to the State Department web site (here) countries are added to the list for the following reasons:

Countries determined by the Secretary of State to have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism are designated pursuant to three laws: section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act (which expred in August 2001), section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (wikipedia), and section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act. Taken together, the four main categories of sanctions resulting from designation under these authorities include restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance; a ban on defense exports and sales; certain controls over exports of dual use items; and miscellaneous financial and other restrictions.

Designation under the above-referenced authorities also implicates other sanctions laws that penalize persons and countries engaging in certain trade with state sponsors. Currently there are five countries designated under these authorities: Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan and Syria.

As discussed before (here and here), the DPRK still faces a myriad of legal barriers which restrict it from accessing global trade and financial markets, including the US Column 2 tariffs (Smoot-Hawley Tariffs), US Treasury sanctions, bilateral Japanese sanctions (renewed on Friday), and recent UN resolutions 1695 and 1718.  In other words, the DPRK does not have much to gain financially from de-lisitng.

Here is the initial executive order to begin de-listing.  Now that the US terrorism list is one country shorter, who remains? Cuba, Iran, Syria, Sudan.

Read the full article here:
N Korea off US blacklist after nuke inspection deal
Associated Press (via Washington Post)
Matthew Lee
10/11/2008

N. Korea Removed From U.S. List of Terror Sponsors
Bloomberg
James Rowley and Viola Gienger
10/11/2008

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Seoul alters DPRK budget priorities

Thursday, October 9th, 2008

According to Yonhap:

Under the Unification Ministry’s budget plan for next year, the inter-Korean economic cooperation fund, aimed at promoting cross-border human exchanges and economic partnerships, will increase 8.6 percent to 1.5 trillion won from 1.3 trillion won this year.

The budget for humanitarian assistance accounts for 72 percent of the fund, a sharp rise from 43 percent this year, mainly attributable to hikes in rice and fertilizer prices, said the ministry in change of policy on North Korea.

“We plan to send 400,000 tons of rice and 300,000 tons of fertilizer to North Korea if needed,” Vice Unification Minister Hong Yang-ho told reporters.

The ministry has allocated 352 billion won to send rice and 291 billion won for fertilizer aid, he added.

The budget for inter-Korean economic projects, however, has been halved to 300 billion won in accordance with the Lee administration’s policy of linking them with progress in efforts to denuclearize the North, economic feasibility, financial capacity, and public opinion.

Meanwhile, the ministry has created a separate account for denuclearization costs in the inter-Korean cooperation fund, a measure to take into effect on Friday, a day after the second anniversary of North Korea’s nuclear test.

South Korea has delivered fuel oil and energy-related materials to North Korea under an aid-for-denuclearization deal last year in the six-way nuclear talks. Related spending has been categorized as energy aid.

Read the full article here:
S. Korea budgets $460 million for rice, fertilizer aid to N. Korea
Yonhap
10/9/2008

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