Archive for the ‘Statistics’ Category

Kaesong goods to find export market in India

Saturday, February 14th, 2009

The South Korean and Indian governments are finalizing a trade concession agreement that will lower Indian import tariffs on some goods produced in the Kaesong Zone. According to India’s Economic Times:

Sounds odd, but some select North Korean goods may soon get special trade concession in India after New Delhi signs a trade pact with South Korea. In fact, the North Korean city of Gaesung will emerge as a major beneficiary as part of the terms and conditions of the India-South Korea comprehensive economic partnership agreement (CEPA), which is likely to be signed soon, sources close to the development told SundayET. The North Korean city is located just 60 km north of Seoul, the capital of South Korea.

Though Indian negotiators initially showed reluctance to such a deal, South Koreans were very keen as many of their companies have invested heavily in the region and set up many factories in that city, using cheap North Korean labourers. Goods produced at Gaesung include low-end engineering products, leather goods, jewellery, chemicals and textiles.

When contacted, commerce secretary GK Pillai confirmed to SundayET that India would extend the same concession to goods produced at Gaesung too. “It’s a matter of 30-40 products which are not very high-end. Those are not cars or steel. Yes, Gaesung is in North Korea, but it’s very much a part of South Korea’s economic co-operation plan. Both the Indian and the Korean (South Korean) governments have agreed to the CEPA, and it should be coming into effect from June or July this year,” he said.

Once the partnership agreement is signed, it will be the first such instance in which India recognises the outward processing concept and gives the same status to goods produced outside the negotiating country with those produced inside. Though Mr Pillai said there was no issue regarding Gaesung, sources close to the development added that India was not very keen on allowing those products.

“India was opposed to the idea as other countries too may demand the same model later. What if a country entering into a trade agreement with India chooses a place in Bangladesh or Pakistan for outward processing,” said a senior government official.

The trade volume between India and North Korea is quite insignificant if it’s compared with that of India-South Korea. During FY08, India’s import from North Korea was worth a mere $161 million, which was 2.6% of that from South Korea. In case of exports, the figures are somewhat better. The total export from India to North Korea was $850 mn in FY08 which was 29% of India’s export to South Korea.

The Bank of Korea, the South’s central bank and most cited source of DPRK economic statistics, estimates North Korea’s gross exports (to all countries except South Korea) in 2006 and 2007 at $950 and $920 (USD in millions) respectively.  They estimate the DPRK’s imports in these years at $2,050 and $2,020 (USD in millions) respectively

According to the data in this article, North Korea’s exports to India ($161 million) are a non-trivial 17.5% of its total exports (assuming the 2007 number is approximately current and changes in inflation and exchange rates are trivial).  The DPRK’s imports from India, $850 million in 2008 (according to the article), are a whopping 42% of North Korea’s estimated 2007 total imports.  Either India is now one of the DPRK’s major trading partners, or there was a short-term spike in DPRK-India trading activity, or these numbers are fishy.

Setting this debate aside, a further question arises—how will these transactions be recorded?  Since the DPRK has a trade relationship with India, will goods from Kaesong be flown/shipped from the DPRK to India and counted as North Korean trade, or will goods be shipped from Kaesong to South Korea and then sent to India—to be counted as South Korean trade? 

My suspicion is that the Kaesong goods will be counted as South Korean merchandise trade since this is a South Korea-India trade deal.  If the goods are recorded as South Korean, agreements of this sort will make it much more difficult in the future to determine the DPRK’s trade volume using mirror statistics.  This is because the country of origin records kept by the DPRK’s trading partners will show goods produced in the Kaesong zone as originating in South Korea.  As a result, the DPRK’s merchandise exports could go underestimated.

Read the full story here:
Ever heard of Gaesung? Gear up for its products
The Economic Times
Shantanu Nandan Sharma
2/15/2009

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Remittances to DPRK grow

Tuesday, February 10th, 2009

From the Choson Ilbo:

The number of North Korean refugees who remit money to their families in the North is rising. “Some 15,000 North Korean refugees have settled in the country, and over 6,000 of them are remitting money to North Korea,” a government official said. “We understand the size of the remittances is also growing.” An official with a refugee organization said there must be more than 10,000 who remit money to their families in the North.

If some 6,000 North Korean refugees here send money North, and a refugee remits US$1,000 a year, some $6 million is sent to North Korea per year. To that should be added 20,000-30,000 of the 100,000 North Koreans estimated to live in China.

Remittance routes are clandestine. Money is remitted to a Chinese broker, who contacts another in North Korea, who pays the recipient with his own money and settles the account with the Chinese broker later, leaving no documentary trail.

Currencies are usually American dollars and Chinese yuan. Commissions range between 15 and 20 percent, according to sources. “Remittances through brokers designated by North Koreans generally reach the recipient without a hitch, but Chinese brokers contacted in China are liable to steal the money,” a refugee said. The brokers handle tens of millions of dollars and are linked to organized gangs.

In the past, remittances required enormous bribes. First a man had to be sent to North Korea to bribe guards, with commissions exceeding 40 percent. But with the emergence of remittance brokers and the establishment of an organized system, the amount of money that reaches North Korean families has increased substantially.

The North Korean won is practically worthless in international exchange. A North Korean workers’ average salary was between W2,500 and 3,000 as of the end of 2008. Given that US$1 is traded at W3,200, $1,000 is the equivalent of 100 years’ worth of earnings and buys two apartments in places like Chongjin, North Hamgyeong Province, or Hamhung, South Hamgyeong Province.

In the past, the DPRK has promoted remittances—particularly to Koreans repatriated from Japan and their families.  The DPRK government then extracted its share of these funds by offering western goods for sale in hard currency shops at inflated prices.

The DPRK could do worse at promoting its legitimacy than to adopt the same policy in regards to remittances from every other country.  If the DPRK allowed remittances to flow through official channels, the government could simply extract a service fee equal to or slightly below the black market rate.  That is a win-win (except for the smugglers).

UPDATE: Japanese goods were (are?) historically sold at the Ragwan Deaprtment Store next to the Changwang Hotel (North-West of the Central District).

Another point to consider is the unfortunate role of politics in preventing the adoption of efficiency-enhancing economic reforms.  In the case of remittances, the DPRK would certainly have political problems with letting defectors send money to their relatives back home.  Under this particular constraint smuggling might be the next best option.  Since the operation is clandestine, the government does not have to acknowledge it exists, yet at the same time people can receive their remittancs and (some part of) the governance structure collects “taxes”.  

What “taxes”? The few people who are carrying out the financial transactions will have pay decent protection money to a sponsor high in the food chain.  The work is risky for numerous reasons, but we know some important people are behind it becuase the operation requires managers to keep enough hard currency on hand to cover the monthy/anual remittance payments from 6,000+ defectors. 

Read the full article here:
Refugees’ Remittances to N.Korea ‘Growing’
Choson Ilbo
2/10/2009

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Korea Business Consultants Newsletter (1/09)

Wednesday, February 4th, 2009

Korea Business Consultants has published their January newsletter.

Here is a link to the PDF.

Topics covered:
New Year Joint Editorial
Year of DPRK-China friendship
UNDP to resume DPRK operations
Buddhist Leader to Head DPRK’s ROK Affairs
DPRK Railroad Engineers Study in Russia
Housing Construction Progresses Apace
Orascom Opens Bank in Pyongyang
DPRK Tackles Clothing Shortage
“DPRK Harvest Best in Years”
China to Invest in NK Coal
US$ 3.75 Million in Australian Aid for DPRK
The Principles of the DPRK’s Foreign Trade
ROK Farmers Send Rice to DPRK
New SNG Kaesong Plant Idle
“Inter-Korean Trade Slides Due to Weak ROK Won”
ROK to Build Nursery in Kaesong Complex
DPRK Opens Consulate in Dandong
DPRK, China Foreign Officials Meet
Seoul Forum Highlights DPRK Films
“NK Martial Arts Team Best in World”
PUST Opening Delayed
DPRK TV Takes Note of Park Ji-sung
The Korean War

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Assessment of the 2008 DPRK economy, outlook for 2009

Monday, February 2nd, 2009

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
ICNK Forum No. 09-2-2-1
2/2/2009

ASSESSMENT OF THE NORTH KOREAN ECONOMY FOR 2008

In the 2008 North Korean New Year’s Joint Editorial, Pyongyang established the year 2012 as “The Year of the Perfect Strong and Prosperous Nation,” while labeling 2008, “The Year of Turnabout,” and, “The Year of the Betterment of the Livelihoods of the People.” As the year marked the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the regime projected a highly motivated façade, but there was no sign of new changes in the North’s economic policies.

Faced with the inability to produce any substantial results in the realm of international economic cooperation, North Korean authorities focused on how to put a positive spin on international conditions that were tied to the progress of 6-Party Talks. However, no visible measures appeared to emerge. Internally, North Korea’s chronic supply shortages drove further disparities between official and market pricing and monetary exchange rates as authorities were unable to stabilize the domestic economy. The growing global economic instability also caused economic policy makers to act more conservatively.

In 2008, North Korea’s food production in 2008 amounted to 4.31 million tons, recording a 7.5 percent increase over the previous year, while energy production is estimated to have grown by approximately 10 percent. Through joint development projects for North Korea’s underground resources, the North received raw materials for light industries (soap and shoes) amounting to 70 million USD in 2007, and 10 million last year. In addition, DPRK-PRC trade and inter-Korean economic cooperation both grew (DPRK-PRC trade increased significantly, while North-South cooperation grew only slightly), but it is difficult to measure the extent to which these increases impacted the North’s economy.

It appears that overall, North Korean trade and industry has improved since 2007, and the 2008 economic growth rate was positive. However, when estimating the North’s economic growth rate in light of the quickly rising exchange rate for South Korean won, DPRK economic growth for 2008 could be seen as a negative value.

While North Korea’s overall industrial production grew in 2008, when compared to previous years, and the primary reason for such was the refurbishment of equipment in most stable industries, development assistance and heavy oil aid as part of the 6-Party Talks, the provision of raw materials for light industries by South Korea, and the rise in prices on goods internationally.

Because of favorable weather conditions and increased production of fertilizer in the North, the agricultural sector showed a relative increase in production in 2008, despite the suspension of fertilizer aid from South Korea. Grain production was up 300 thousand tons, for an estimated total of 4.31 million tons last year. Boosted energy production was helped by improvements in hydroelectrical production and heavy oil tied to 6-Party Talks, and the provision of parts and materials for power plants, which considerably increased power production, at least in the first half of the year. This played an important role in the increase in industrial operations, as well. As electrical supply is the biggest obstacle to raising the operating rate of production facilities, more power resulted in overall production increases.

The construction sector has focused efforts on Pyongyang, and in particular on efforts to improve the lifestyles of its residents. Housing (averaging 20,000 family dwellings per year), restaurants, waterworks, roads, and other construction and repair projects have been aggressively undertaken.

North Korean authorities emphasized the science and technology sector in 2008, although it appears that the actual impact of this campaign topped out at the supply of some practical technology and the at production facilities, power plants, and other factories, and the promotion of modernization and normalization of industrial production.

At the mid-point of 2008, inter-Korean trade had grown by 1.2 percent compared to the same period the year prior, reaching 1.82 billion USD. The freeze on the annual supply of 400 thousand tons of rice and between 300~350 thousand tons of fertilizer from the South had a negative impact on the North’s food situation. On the other hand, DPRK-PRC trade from January-November 2008 jumped by 29.3 percent over the same period in 2007, considerably more than the 14.9 percent recorded in 2005, the 14.9 percent seen in 2006 and the 16.1 percent rise last year.

The increase natural resource development and improvements in core industries, the possibility of expansion of markets, and the advantage of low-cost labor give China, Russia, and other adjacent countries positive perceptions regarding investment in the North, and as Pyongyang continued to expand economic cooperation with these countries last year, it also improved economic relations with Europe as well as Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries.

PROSPECTS FOR THE NORTH KOREAN ECONOMY IN 2009

If one looks at North Korea’s domestic economic policies, one will see that basically, in the 2009 New Year’s Joint Editorial, North Korea’s domestic and international economic policies have not undergone any significant changes. However, in order to accomplish the goal of establishing a Strong and Prosperous Country by 2012, it is expected that all efforts will be poured into reviving the economy. Based on the Joint Editorial, this year, the North’s economic policy is not one of reform due to transformation of the outside environment, but rather a revival of pas, conservatively grounded economic policy. Regarding international economic relations, the 2008 Joint Editorial specifically stressed the building of an economically strong nation based on the principle of the development of external economic relations, but there was no particular reference to this in 2009.

In 2009, resolution of agricultural problems was again prioritized as the task most necessary for the realization of a Strong and Prosperous Nation by 2012. Along with this, the North’s economic policy for 2009 will prioritize the modernization and normalization of the economy’s ‘vanguard sector’, and it is expected to continue to strengthen efforts to revive the economy. As it continues to work toward creating an environment in which it can concentrate efforts on the building of an ‘Economically Strong Nation’, North Korean authorities are expected to issue new measures to strengthen the economic management system, including the planned industrial system, the distribution and circulation framework, and an effective market management system. The North is also expected to further emphasize efforts to modernize the People’s Economy, as it considers modern vanguard science and technology to be the answer to recovery from its current economic crisis.

There is a possibility North Korea’s foreign trade, including that with China, will shrink in the future, as its external economic activity is hit by the current international economic situation and the rising value of the U.S. dollar and Chinese Yuan. Just as was seen in 2008, with the shrinking growth of the Chinese economy, DPRK-PRC trade will be hit negatively. Progress on the rail link being promoted between Rajin and Hasan, as well as the redevelopment of the Rajin Harbor is also expected to face difficulties. This is likely to lead to further efforts by the North to expand economic cooperation with the EU and Middle Eastern countries.

Despite North Korea’s removal from the U.S. list of terrorism-sponsoring states, because sanctions against North Korea still remain, the North will need to make progress in non-proliferation, human rights improvement, and marketization in order to see real economic benefits from improved relations with the Obama administration. However, because of a lack of confidence regarding market reform, differing stances between the U.S. and DPRK on denuclearization, and deeply rooted mistrust, there is a more than a small chance that progress on the nuclear issue will be stretched out over the long term.

Looking at prospects for the main domestic economic sectors of North Korea, firstly, the amount of development in the energy and mining sectors could take a favorable turn if there is movement on the nuclear issue, and this would have an overall positive effect on the entire industrial sector. The drop-off of demand due to the international financial crisis could have a considerable impact on the North’s mining sector, making it difficult to see much growth past the levels seen in 2008.

In 2009, the supply-demand situation regarding North Korean grains is expected to improve over last year. North Korea requires 5.2 million tons of grain, and is expected to harvest 4.9~5 million tons, falling only 200~300 thousand tons short. This is an improvement over the 790 thousand ton shortfall the North suffered in 2008. However, the actual amount of grains distributed to the people may not increase, because some of the 2008 shortage was relieved through the release of emergency rice reserves, and so some portion of the 2009 harvest will need to be set aside to restock that emergency reserve.

In the manufacturing sector, the increase in electrical production and increase in large-scale equipment operations in metalworks, chemicals, construction materials, and other heavy industries, the supply of materials for light industries as well as fertilizer will be extended, but the reduction of inter-Korean economic cooperation and foreign capital will mean a reduction in the ability to import equipment and materials, making it difficult to meet 2008-level growth in industrial production numbers.

In the construction sector, housing construction in Pyongyang and other areas will not fall off suddenly, but with the anniversary of the founding of the Party Museum upcoming and the impact of the furious construction activity that has been underway, it is likely to slow down in 2009. With North Korean authorities restricting private-sector economic activity, controlling the size of markets, and other measures controlling commerce in the North are expected to strengthen, which will considerably restrict anti-socialist commercial activity. To what extent official commerce networks will absorb this activity will be pivotal.

Trade between North Korea and China is expected to shrink as the global economic crisis drives down the price of raw materials that the North exports to the PRC. Following the North Korean authorities’ enforcement of a measure reducing inter-Korean economic cooperation on December 1, 2008, without improvement in the North Korean nuclear issue, and in U.S.-DPRK relations cooperation between Seoul and Pyongyang will gradually shrivel. Trade with other countries is also expected to fall as a result of the current global economic situation. Therefore, reduction of inter-Korean economic cooperation, North Korea’s principle provider of foreign capital, and sluggish trade between Beijing and Pyongyang will weaken the North’s foreign reserves supply-and-demand situation.

As for the investment sector, if North Korea is to succeed in its push to build a Strong and Prosperous Nation by 2012, it must attract foreign investment through aggressive policies of opening its economy. In order to improve the investment environment, Pyongyang must work more aggressively to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, but despite the demands of the surrounding countries, it is likely North Korea will insist on recognition as a nuclear power, making it difficult to expect progress on this front. Therefore, foreign investors’ interest in North Korean markets, and North Korea’s assention into international financial institutions through improved relations with the United States, appears to be a long way off.

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Sinuiju SAR: Take 4

Friday, January 23rd, 2009

sinuiju2.JPGOn September 20, 2002, the DPRK’s Supreme People’s Assembly announced the creation of the Sinuiju Special Administrative Region (SAR) (KCNA announcement here).

The project was to be headed by a Chinese-born, naturalized Dutch citizen, Yang Bin…who was arrested by Chinese authorities shortly after the Sinuiju SAR was announced.  Western analysts interpreted this move as a signal that China was not supportive of either the project or the selection of Mr. Bin as its chief executive.  Needless to say the future of the project lay in doubt.

However, according to a Yonhap report (here), as of March 2007 the North Koreans still seemed interested in launching some kind of SAR/SEZ in Sinuiju, though the location had been moved from the city proper to two islands in the Yalu River, Bidan and Wihwa.

In August 2007, IFES and the Choson Ilbo reported that preparations were already underway in Sinuiju to convert the city center into a SAR/SEZ.  However, after this initial media hit, most of the news coming out of Sinuiju was related to Jang Song Taek’s 2008 anti-corruption campaign which brought most of the trading companies along the Chinese border back under the control of the Ministry of Finance.

This week, Japan’s Yomuri reports from Shenyang, China, that the Sinuiju SAR is still on and will be located on Wihwa Island:

“The zone will only cover Wi Hwa Island, which will be much easier to control, and only Chinese will be allowed to freely visit,” one of the sources said. “The plan solely aims at expanding trade with China. North Korea isn’t planning any measures that would involve a dramatic opening up.”

According to Chinese statistics, the total value of trade between China and North Korea from January to October last year was 2.12 billion dollars, up 31.7 percent from a year earlier.

Meanwhile, a diplomatic source said, “The move to beef up border trade with China is also aimed at putting pressure on South Korea.”

(FYI: Use of the phrase “beef up” is a pretty good sign that the diplomatic source was an American.)

I know the story of “The Boy Who Cried Wolf.”  I will remain skeptical about the new SEZ until I see evidence of construction myself.

You can read the full Yomuri article here:
N. Korea plans free trade zone on island
Daily Yomuri
Toru Makinoda
1/23/2009

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Russia to complete fuel supplies to DPRK this month

Monday, January 19th, 2009

According to RIA Novosti:

Russia is to supply a total of 200,000 metric tons of fuel to North Korea as part of a denuclearization deal. Moscow hopes that in exchange for heating oil deliveries Pyongyang will complete the phasing out of its Yongbyon nuclear complex.

The full article can be found here:
Russia to complete fuel supplies to N.Korea in Jan.
RIA Novosti
1/16/2009

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DPRK won exchange rate continues to climb

Thursday, January 15th, 2009

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-1-15-1
2009-01-15   

The exchange rate for the North Korean won shot up approximately 13-15 percent at the end of last year, and has maintained this high rate into January, according to an article in the on-line newsletter, “Open News for North Korea,” on January 12.

According to the inaugural edition of the newsletter, the exchange rate last year was around 3,200 won per USD, or 460 won per Yuan, with only slight fluctuations, but shot up to 3,630 won per USD and 530 won per Yuan in December. In the first weeks of the new year, it has fallen only slightly, to 3,540 won per USD, and 530 won per Yuan.

According to traders who import and export between North Korea and China, “The sudden rise in the exchange rate appears to be related to trade regulations on goods imported from the North,” and they stressed, “After North Korea protested to China about inferior Chinese goods leading to accidents around the country, China decided to set an example, and unilaterally imposed [trade] restrictions.”

Because business with China makes up almost 50 percent of North Korea’s trade, if DPRK-PRC trade, and in particular, North Korea’s exports to China, are restricted, this would cause a large shock to the foreign currency market,” and, “China’s regulatory measures were eased as January come around,” but, “this year, North Korea is strengthening crackdowns on domestic markets, making it difficult to expect the exchange rate to return” to last year’s lower numbers. According to the article, “There is a foreign currency crisis in North Korea, as well, the scale of which is so great it can’t even be compared to what is happening in the South.”

The black market price for U.S. dollars has shot up from a low of 200 won, in July 2002, to 3,200 won in July of last year, and has continued to rise, peaking at 3.500 won currently. This is a sixteen-fold increase in just over six years. The newsletter put this in perspective by explaining, “North Korea has experienced a foreign currency crisis like that seen in South Korea in 1998 every year since 2002.”

North Korea’s haphazard currency distribution and chronic trade deficit has led to a reduction in the country’s foreign currency reserves, while the failure of the authorities’ currency stabilization policies combined with the growing demand for U.S. dollars by North Korean residents seeking imported goods have led to the sharp growth in the exchange rate.

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DPRK agriculture update

Thursday, January 15th, 2009

On May 12, 2008, The DPRK formally asked the UN World Food Program for emergency food assistance.  In June 2008, the UN WFP/FAO launched the “Rapid Food Security Assessment”.  They confirmed…

…a significant deterioration in food security in most parts of the country.3 Close to three quarters of respondents have reduced their food intake, over half are reportedly eating only two meals per day (down from three) and dietary diversity is extremely poor among two thirds of the surveyed population. Most families have daily consumption consisting of only of maize, vegetables and wild foods, a diet lacking protein, fats and micronutrients.

and

FAO forecasts that the October/November 2008 harvest will be 70-75 percent of an average year’s output due to inadequate fertilizer supplies, meaning the current food shortages will extend into the next agricultural year. The risk that the country will again suffer summer flooding remains, which could lead to further crop destruction and/or require general food distributions of emergency food aid. In such an event, WFP will have contingency stocks available in the country to rapidly respond. (UN Operations Report)

The UN launched a coordinated response lasting from September 2008-November 2009 which targets over 6 million people with 600,000 metric tons of food assistance.

But according to the Daily NK (Jan 13, 2009):

According to North Korean authorities, the total agricultural yield including rice, corn, potatoes and others reached its highest point since the food shortages of the 1990s this year, at 4.7 million tons.

According to the Joongang Ilbo, a South Korean newspaper, a Chinese official involved in the agricultural business who had just gotten back from North Korea quoted a North Korean official as saying that they “had presumed the failure of last year’s harvest due to low temperatures in the Spring and Fall, but in fact recorded the highest level in recent years, 4.7 million tons.”

Regarding this, a researcher from the Korea Rural Economic Institute, Kwon Tae Jin said in a telephone conversation with the Daily NK that, “When I visited Pyongyang in December of last year, Ri Il Sok, Director of the Foreign Cooperation Team in the North Korean Ministry of Agriculture said to me that grain output last year was 4.67 million tons, up by 17 percent over a year ago.” (Daily NK)

Andrei Lankov, writing in tomorrow’s Asia Times (Jan 16), confirms the Daily NK story:

These worries seemed well-founded and the journalists who penned them were often among the most knowledgeable on North Korean issues. Furthermore, most of these stories were based on reports produced by reputable international organizations. By early September, North Korean watchers agreed almost unanimously that a great disaster was set to strike North Korea this coming winter.

Now it has become clear, however, that these were false alarms. The predicted famine has not materialized and does not appear likely to do so in the near future. North Korea has had its best harvest in years, and until next summer no North Korean is likely to starve to death – although some may remain severely malnourished.

This is good news. However, the contrast between the reality and recent predictions is remarkably stark. In recent years, we have come to believe that there are at least a few things about secretive North Korea which are known for sure. Yet the recent turnaround of events has again shed light on the severe limits of outside information about the Hermit Kingdom.

Lankov offers a couple of scenarios that could explain how this happened:

For example, why did reputable international organizations make such a serious mistake in estimating the North’s food shortage? It cannot be ruled out that international observers were deliberately misled by their North Korean minders. Perhaps foreign observers were shown the worst fields because the North wanted more food aid then would otherwise be available?

It also seems that some basic assumptions about North Korean agriculture are wrong. Unless the 2008 harvest was the result of incredible luck, it seems to indicate that fertilizer is far less important than previously believed. It is possible that North Korean farmers have devised strategies to deal with fertilizer shortages.

The false alarms of a disastrous famine in North Korea are a sober reminder that when dealing with the world’s most secretive society, predictions should be treated with the greatest caution.

To learn more, read the following documents/stories:
Emergency Operation Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
Title: 10757.0 – Emergency Assistance to Population Groups Affected by Floods and Rising Food and Fuel Prices
UN World Food Program

2008 Agricultural Yield of North Korea
Daily NK
Kim So Yeol
1/13/2009

North Korea reaps a rich harvest
Asia Times
Andrei Lankov
1/16/2009

North Korean Economy Watch topic archives:
Food, AgricultureForeign Aid Statistics

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Australia grants aid to DPRK

Tuesday, January 13th, 2009

According to the AAP via The Age (Australia):

Australia has granted $3.75 million in humanitarian aid to North Korea.

Foreign Affairs Minister Stephen Smith said the funds comprised $2 million for the World Food Program for emergency food for North Korea, $1 million for Unicef for emergency water and water sanitation supplies and $750,000 for the Red Cross.

Read the full story here:
Australia grants $3.75m aid to N Korea
The Age
1/13/2009

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DPRK opens consulate in Dandong

Monday, January 12th, 2009

According to the Korea Times:

North Korea has opened a consulate branch office in Dandong, a major Chinese city bordering North Korea, displaying its intention to reinforce bilateral trade relations with China, Yonhap News reported quoting a source Sunday.

“The North Korean consulate-general in Shenyang recently established its branch office in Dandong and dispatched personnel there,” said the source.

“The move signals the North’s intention to increase its product procurement from China through brisker border trade and strengthen its consular affairs amid a growing North Korean population in the Chinese border city.”

Dandong, a city in the Chinese province of Liaoning, is situated right across the Yalu River from Sinuiju in the northwestern part of North Korea. Approximately 70 percent of trade between North Korea and China is conducted through the Dandong-Sinuiju route.

According to the source, the North Korean consulate branch office is the first foreign diplomatic mission to open in Dandong, which has a population of about 650,000.

Bilateral trade and cooperation via Dandong are expected to further grow as China and North Korea are to celebrate the 60th anniversary of their diplomatic relations in 2009 and launch a joint “Year of Friendship.” Two-way trade is estimated to have topped $2 billion last year.

Read the full article here:
N. Korea Opens Mission in Chinese Border City
Korea Times
1/11/2009

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