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N. Korean nuclear envoy says North is ready to implement 6-way pact

Thursday, February 15th, 2007

Yonhap
2/15/2007

North Korea’s top nuclear envoy on Thursday said his country is ready to carry out an agreement from the recent six-party talks over its nuclear ambition, which calls on the communist nation to shut down its nuclear-related facilities in two months.

“We are ready to implement the results of the meeting,” Kyodo News agency quoted Kim Kye-gwan as telling Russia’s top diplomat in the North and an official from the Chinese embassy there at Pyongyang’s airport.

The Russian and the Chinese diplomats were apparently at the airport to welcome the North’s vice foreign minister who returned from Beijing where he and nuclear negotiators from South Korea, the United States, Japan, Russia and China held talks since last Thursday.

Pyongyang puts some spin on 6-way talks agreement
State media say it will close nuclear facilities ‘temporarily’
Joong Ang Daily
Brian Lee

Pyongyang’s state-controlled media have given what may be a signal that Pyongyang is prepared to reinterpret Tuesday’s agreement at the six-party nuclear talks in Beijing even before the ink on it is dry.

The Korean Central News Agency, hours after the nuclear deal was reached, reported that participants had agreed to supply North Korea with 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil in return for a “temporary” suspension of operations at the North’s nuclear facilities.

It also reported that Washington and Pyongyang would begin discussions possibly leading to diplomatic relations, but did not describe the rest of the agreement, in which the closing of the North’s facilities was intended as a prelude to their “disablement.” The shipment of all but 50,000 tons of crude oil supplies was contingent on that complete shutdown, a declaration of all the North’s nuclear programs and international inspections of those facilities.

It was not clear, however, whether the reports were intended as a definitive statement of North Korea’s interpretation of the agreement or, as one South Korean official suggested yesterday, a bit of domestic propaganda to demonstrate to its populace that its nuclear programs had boosted the nation’s prestige.

Some private analysts in Korea concurred. Koh Yoo-hwan, a North Korean specialist at Dongguk University, contended that because of the North’s tight control of information, even the most senior military leaders in the North would not be able to see easily the entire text of the agreement. “So the announcement focused on what the North would get,” he concluded

But a diplomatic source in Seoul was not fully convinced, noting that sometimes agreements were struck only by deliberately vague diplomatic language. “Different interpretations lead to agreements,” he said. “Shaky ones.”

Even the Chosun Shinbo, a pro-Pyongyang news outlet in Japan, carried a report of the agreement along the lines of the Pyongyang news agency, even though the full text of the agreement is widely available in Japan. (The full text of the agreement can be found on the JoongAng Daily’s Web site, joongangdaily.joins.com.)

Many independent analysts were cautious in reacting to the agreement, although the political leadership in all six nations praised it. Michael Green, a Georgetown University professor and former State Department official who participated in earlier nuclear negotiations with Pyongyang, said the hard part of implementing the agreement would come in its second phase, the “dismantlement” of the North’s nuclear reactor and nuclear fuel reprocessing facility, which has no deadline attached.

The six-party talks are scheduled to resume in Beijing next month; if the commitments by both Pyongyang and its negotiating partners are met within the 60-day deadline, the foreign ministers of the six countries are also expected to meet to discuss next steps.

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Outside Pressures Broke Korean Deadlock

Wednesday, February 14th, 2007

NY Times
David E. Sanger

It is hard to imagine that either George W. Bush or Kim Jong-il would have agreed even a year ago to the kind of deal they have now approved. The pact, announced Tuesday, would stop, seal and ultimately disable North Korea’s nuclear facilities, as part of a grand bargain that the administration has previously shunned as overly generous to a repressive country — especially one that has not yet said when or if it will give up its nuclear arsenal.

But in the past few months, the world has changed for both Mr. Bush and Mr. Kim, two men who have made clear how deeply they detest each other. Both are beset by huge problems, and both needed some kind of breakthrough.

For Mr. Bush, bogged down in Iraq, his authority undercut by the November elections, any chance to show progress in peacefully disarming a country that detonated a nuclear test just four months ago could no longer be passed up. As one senior administration official said over the weekend, the prospect that Mr. Bush might leave Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and North Korea more dangerous places than he found them “can’t be very appealing.”

Still, the accord came under fast criticism from right and left that it was both too little and too late.

For years, Mr. Bush’s administration has been paralyzed by an ideological war, between those who wanted to bring down North Korea and those who thought it was worth one more try to lure the country out of isolation. In embracing this deal, Mr. Bush sided with those who have counseled engagement, notably his secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, and her chief negotiator, Christopher R. Hill. Mr. Bush took the leap in the hope that in a few months, he will be able to declare that North Korea can no longer produce fuel for new nuclear weapons, even if it has not yet turned over its old ones.

For Mr. Kim, the nuclear explosion — more of a fizzle — that he set off in the mountains not far from the Chinese border in October turned out to be a strategic mistake. The Chinese, who spent six decades protecting the Kim family dynasty, responded by cutting off his military aid, and helping Washington crack down on the banks that financed the Cognac-and-Mercedes lifestyle of the North Korean leadership.

“As a political statement, their test was a red flare for everyone,” said Robert Gallucci, who under President Clinton was the chief negotiator of the 1994 agreement with North Korea, which collapsed four years ago. “It gave President Bush and the Chinese some leverage.”

Mr. Gallucci and other nuclear experts agree that the hardest bargaining with world’s most reclusive, often paranoid, government remains ahead.

Over the next year, under the pact, the North must not only disable its nuclear reactors and reprocessing facilities, it must lead inspectors to its weapons and a suspected second nuclear weapons program. And to get to the next phase of the agreement, the one that gives “disarmament” meaning, North Korea will have to be persuaded to give away the country’s crown jewels: the weapons that make the world pay attention to it.

But before the administration faces off against Mr. Kim in Pyongyang, it will have to confront the many critics of the deal here at home. As the White House took credit on Tuesday for what it called a “first step,” it found itself pilloried by conservatives who attacked the administration for folding in negotiations with a charter member of what Mr. Bush called the “axis of evil,” and for replicating key elements of Mr. Clinton’s agreement with North Korea.

At the same time, Mr. Bush’s advisers were being confronted by barbs from veterans of the Clinton administration, who argued that the same deal struck Tuesday had been within reach several years and a half-dozen weapons ago, had only Mr. Bush chosen to negotiate with the North rather than fixate on upending its government.

In fact, elements of the new decision closely resemble the Clinton deal, called the Agreed Framework. As it did in that accord, the North agrees to “freeze” its operations at Yongbyon, its main nuclear facility, and to allow inspections there. And like that agreement, the new one envisions the North’s ultimately giving up all of its nuclear material.

In two respects, however, the new accord is different: North Korea does not receive the incentives the West has offered — in this case, about a year’s supply of heavy fuel oil and other aid — until it “disables” its equipment at Yongbyon and declares where it has hidden its bombs, nuclear fuel and other nuclear facilities. And the deal is not only with Washington, but with Beijing, Moscow, Seoul and Tokyo.

“We’re building a set of relationships,” Ms. Rice argued Tuesday, saying that the deal would not have been possible if she and President Bush had not been able to swing the Chinese over to their side. Mr. Bush has told colleagues that he believes the turning point came in his own blunt conversations with President Hu Jintao of China, in which, the American president has said, he explained in stark terms that a nuclear North Korea was more China’s problem than America’s.

But the administration was clearly taken aback on Tuesday by the harshness of the critique from the right, led by its recently departed United Nations ambassador, John R. Bolton, who charged that the deal “undercuts the sanctions resolution” against the North that he pushed through the Security Council four months ago.

Democrats, in contrast, were caught between enjoying watching Mr. Bush change course and declaring that the agreement amounted to disarmament-lite. “It gives the illusion of moving more rapidly to disarmament, but it doesn’t really require anything to happen in the second phase,” said Joel Wit, who was the coordinator of the 1994 agreement.

The Bush administration is counting on the lure of future benefits to the North — fuel oil, the peace treaty ending the Korean War it has long craved, an end to other sanctions — to force Mr. Kim to disclose where his nuclear weapons and fuel are stored.

Mr. Bush’s big worry now is that Mr. Kim is playing the administration for time. Many experts think he is betting that by the time the first big deliveries of oil and aid are depleted, America will be distracted by a presidential election.

But Mr. Bush could also end up with a diplomatic triumph, one he needs desperately. To get there, he appears to have changed course. Asked in 2004 about North Korea, he said, “I don’t think you give timelines to dictators and tyrants.”

Now he appears to have concluded that sometimes the United States has to negotiate with dictators and odious rulers, because the other options — military force, sanctions or watching an unpredictable nation gain a nuclear arsenal — seem even worse.

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Posted in Energy, Nuclear, Oil, Political economy, USA | Comments Closed

Kim Jong-il’s Son Sells Weapons Abroad: Report

Tuesday, February 13th, 2007

Korea Times
1/13/2007

Kim Jong-nam, believed to be the eldest son of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, has taken charge of the overseas sales of North Korean military weapons.

The junior Kim, 35, went back to Pyongyang via a Koryo Air flight from Beijing on Tuesday after getting a lot of media attention during his three-day stay in the Chinese capital.

According to the Segye Times, a vernacular daily, Jong-nam has made profits for his country by selling military weapons such as Scud medium-range missiles and SA-16 surface-to-air missiles overseas.

He invested money in real estate and overseas banks offering high interest rates in several countries including Britain, Switzerland, Hong Kong, Macau and Singapore, said the report based on comments from an expert on North Korean affairs in Japan.

On Sunday Kim was spotted by Japanese television crews at Beijing International Airport. His appearance in Beijing sparked interest among North Korea watchers, as the six-party talks over the North’s nuclear weapons programs were being held there.

Reports said Kim was on a three-day layover on his way back home to attend his father’s 65th birthday party, which falls on Friday.

Wearing a Reebok baseball cap and blue jeans as well as a gold necklace, Kim showed off his foreign language skills in brief interviews with the news media including Japan’s Fuji television.

Asked whether he speaks Japanese, he answered in Japanese that he didn’t understand the language. He also said he speaks a little bit of English and French as he studied in Europe for several years.

Kim said he meets with his father “sometimes” but did not elaborate on their relationship.

According to reports Kim stayed at his favorite hotel, the Kempinski Hotel located adjacent to the South Korean embassy in Beijing during his short visit.

The Toronto Globe and Mail reported earlier this month that the North Korean leader’s son has been spending most of his time for the past three years at casinos, saunas and luxury hotels in Macau, the former Portuguese enclave near Hong Kong.

Kim was photographed in the city by a newspaper as he left his favorite hotel, the Mandarin Oriental.

According to the South China Morning Post, he has frequently visited Macau’s casinos and often goes out drinking late at night.

There have been rumors that fell out of favor with his father in 2001 when he embarrassed the regime in a bizarre incident in Japan.

Kim was briefly detained at Tokyo’s airport where he tried to enter Japan on a fake Dominican Republic passport. He was on his way to visit Tokyo Disneyland, reports said.

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Posted in Arms shipment, Banking, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, Illicit activities, International trade, Political economy | Comments Closed

Kim Jong-il Wins Kim il Sung Peace Prize (update)

Monday, February 12th, 2007

 The wise decision has been re-celebrated in the DPRK:

 Int’l Kim Il Sung Prize Council’s Decision Hailed
   Pyongyang, February 12 (KCNA) — Meetings were held in South Africa and Mongolia on Feb. 5 and 6 in support of the decision of the International Kim Il Sung Prize Council on awarding the “International Kim Il Sung Prize” to Kim Jong Il. 

  A branch chairman of the Pretoria City Committee of the African National Congress of South Africa said in a speech at the meeting that the decision reflected the unanimous desire of the world progressives highly praising the exploits of Kim Jong Il who is leading socialism and the human cause of independence to victory with his distinguished political ability and outstanding leadership ability. 

    The secretary general of the Centre for the Study of the Juche Idea of Mongolian Chinggis Khan College said at the meeting that Kim Jong Il is wisely leading the building of a great prosperous powerful nation and the cause of Korea’s reunification with his Songun politics. 

The decision was also hailed by Bonakele Majuba, secretary of the Mfumalanga Provincial Committee of the South African Communist Party and chairman of the South African Association for Friendship and Solidarity with the Korean People, and Youssef Amin Wali, vice-chairman of the National Democratic Party of Egypt, in their statements on Feb. 5. The Egypt-Korea Friendship Association expressed its support in a statement on Feb. 6 celebrating the February holiday.

Original Post: (Hat Tip Letters From China)

New Delhi, February 2, 2007 (KCNA) –The International Kim Il Sung Prize Council announced in New Delhi on February 1 its decision on awarding the “International Kim Il Sung Prize” to Kim Jong Il on the occasion of his birthday. According to it, the council decided to confer the prize on General Secretary Kim Jong Il on the occasion of his birthday in high recognition of his immortal contribution to the noble cause for global peace and security and the independent development of humankind.

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Corrupt Transactions

Sunday, February 4th, 2007

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
2/4/2007

Corruption is elusive. A vast majority of corrupt transactions are done in secret and remain secret forever. No scholar has ever been able to measure the corruption level even though everybody agrees that it varies markedly, depending on place and time.

Nonetheless, there is no way to make an informed judgment on whether or not, say, the Britain of the 1670s was more corrupt than China of the 1820s. Even the oft-cited Global Corruption Reports of Transparency International is based, essentially, on the personal impressions of the people in the know (largely, businesspeople), not on direct measurements.

North Korea is not considered in the Global Corruption Report. However, everyone with first-hand experience of North Korea agree that corruption and bribery are very common there.

It has not always been the case. Indeed, back in the 1950s one of the features that attracted many Koreans to the North was the relative austerity of its ruling elite. The North Korean administration might have been wasteful, indifferent to human suffering, and irrational, but it was clean _ in marked contrast to Syngman Rhee’s regime in the South.

This did not mean that everybody had his or her fair chance.

On the contrary, people with a “bad social origin” were nonstarters by definition, and they formed a significant minority of the population. One’s connections were important, too. In 1957, Yu Sung-hun, the then president of Kim Il-sung University, complained to a Soviet diplomat that every year “queues of cars” waited near his office on the eve of the entrance exams (a car was a sign of extremely privileged social position).

The president, an honest educator and intellectual, felt guilty and upset because he had to accept the scions of top bureaucrats at the expense of gifted people without the right connections. But, one assumes, this was achieved by the application of political pressure alone, with no money involved.

The situation began to deteriorate in the late 1970s. Perhaps, this reflected the slow decline in idealism: Earlier generations sincerely believed that they were constructing a paradise on earth, but people who became adults in the 1970s and 1980s had fewer illusions. They lived in a society that was run by a hereditary elite, where one’s family background comprehensively determined one’s lifestyle, and where the official slogans were increasingly seen as irrelevant or hypocritical. Thus, bribes began to spread.

What did the North Koreans pay bribes for? Generally, for chances of social advancement, or to access to goods and services one would not normally be eligible for. Thus, sale clerks in the shops, despite their meager official salary, became one of the most affluent groups in society.

They used their access to goods to sell better quality stuff outside the official rationing system and at huge premiums.

In the 1980s corruption became ubiquitous at the colleges where one’s chances of being admitted were greatly improved by an envelope given to an influential professor or bureaucrat. There are stories that the right to join the ruling Korean Workers’ Party was sometimes also purchased through a bribe (this right is important since it makes a person eligible for white-collar positions). Finally, it was becoming quite common to pay a superior to ensure a good position.

The bribes were not necessarily paid in money. Quality liquor or imported cigarettes were even better, and good old greenbacks the best of all.

But it was only in the 1990s that bribery truly became ubiquitous.

The breakdown of old systems of control meant that there was less to be afraid of.

There were also fewer rewards available for the “good citizens of the socialist motherland.”

Finally, the collapse of the economy produced a multitude of opportunities for corruption.

Apart from the sales clerks who have always been engaged in small bribery, the drivers, train conductors and the like began to accept money for letting traders travel with their merchandise, as well as looking the other way when people could not produce valid travel permits (in the latter case policemen have also pocketed their share).

But what about the top crust of society? We do not know much about this, but it appears that they have not been touched by these trends yet.

After all, they already have enormous privileges, and in North Korea there is no private business to tempt them with good pay-offs. Probably, this is going to change soon.

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Posted in Black markets, Civil society, Education, Political economy | Comments Closed

Dear Leader’s Exiled Son Surfaces in Macau

Thursday, February 1st, 2007

Chosun ilbo
2/1/2007

A man presumed to be North Korean leader Kim Jong-il’s eldest son Kim Jong-nam appeared in Macau on Tuesday, the Yomiuri Shimbun reported. A South Korean government official confirmed the report on Wednesday. It seems Kim Jong-nam has not been allowed to return to North Korea and been wandering the globe for six years.

Once heir apparent of the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-nam first grabbed international headlines when he was caught trying to enter Japan on a fake passport with his wife and son in May 2001. The reasons for his departure from North Korea are unclear. According to former high-ranking North Korean officials who defected, Kim junior was branded a traitor to the revolution by his father after he talked about a Chinese-style reform and opening policy at a private gathering in 2000. They say he was forced to leave the country over a power struggle with his stepmother Ko Young-hee, the mother of his younger half-brothers Jong-chul and Jung-woon.

Since then, he has reportedly been staying in China. He was spotted at expensive restaurants in Beijing several times in January last year. Kim contacted an ethnic Chinese trader who was arrested on charges of espionage in South Korea in April 2006, a government official said. He gets along with members of the so-called Taizidang or princes’ club comprising children of prominent Chinese leaders like former president Jiang Zemin.

Kim is said to have made money from a trade business, which he set up with the Taizidang group. He has shown interest in the IT sector since his Pyongyang days and now is in touch with IT experts he met when he visited Hong Kong and Macau to gather information. Despite being a stateless refugee, Kim does not appear restrained either socially or financially.

Analysts say China does not treat him as an unwelcome guest. Kim Jong-nam tried to return to Pyongyang after his stepmother died in June 2004, but to no avail. Security strategy specialist Lee Ki-dong says anti-Kim Jong-nam forces remain strong in North Korea, adding the fact that Kim junior has not returned proves that the North’s succession structure remains unstable.

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Kim Jong-il’s eldest son lives in Macau: Hong Kong paper

Thursday, February 1st, 2007

Yonhap
2/1/2007

The eldest son of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, has been living with his family in Macau for the past three years, a Hong Kong-based newspaper reported Thursday.

The South China Morning Post quoted one diplomat as saying that Kim Jong-nam, 35, has been using the city as his base, putting Macau’s government in a difficult position. He flew back into the city this week after one of many overseas trips, the paper reported.

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Can Economic Theory Demystify North Korea?

Wednesday, January 31st, 2007

Japan Focus (Hat Tip Gregor)
Ruediger Frank
1/31/2007

Abstract
The starting point of this paper is the assumption that North Korea is de facto a well-defined nation-state, home to a national economy and inhabited by individuals that bear the same basic economic and social characteristics as individuals elsewhere. Despite the obvious specifics of the economic system and institutional structure of the country, standard economic theory should be applicable to the question of North Korean economic development. The article seeks to prove this as broadly as possible, showing that economic theory as diverse as classical and neoclassical, Marxist, Keynesian, institutional, developmentalist, neo-liberal or structuralist, dependency analysis-based and many others, including regionally centered approaches, can be utilized to explain the North Korean case with useful results, although the latter will inevitably vary depending on the chosen framework. Without arguing against or in favor of any of the available theoretical methods, this article advocates further research on North Korea as another case of development in East Asia, rather than as a mystical exception to the rule. This is particularly important in light of the tendency to describe North Korea as unpredictable, bizarre, and incomprehensible. This is clearly not the case.

Full paper below the fold

(more…)

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Posted in 2002 Economic reforms, DPRK Policies, Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, International Aid, Political economy | Comments Closed

Ideological Center of North

Tuesday, January 30th, 2007

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
1/30/2007

The North Korean press insists that the “great and immortal” juche idea was designed by the “Great Leader,” Kim Il-sung, in the mid-1920s and has remained the guiding principle of the Korean revolution ever since. But do not expect to find references to juche in Korean publications of the 1950s or even early 1960s.

Even if Kim Il-sung first used the term in his speech in December 1955, it took at least five years before the term became widely known in the country _ and five more years for it to become the name of North Korea’s official ideology.

Only in April 1965, while delivering a lengthy lecture in Indonesia, did Kim Il-sung make it clear that from that point on juche would be considered the basic principle of North Korean ideological policy.

The North Korean leadership badly needed a new ideology in 1965. Why? This was the year when the dispute between the Soviet Union and China reached new heights. The two communist powers had been quarrelling for some time, but from 1965 to 1970 the two countries, which had recently vowed “eternal friendship,” were on the brink of war.

North Korea wisely decided to maintain neutrality, allowing it to milk both sponsors. But in the heavily ideological world of oldstyle communism one needed a theoretical justification for one’s position, even if this position was taken exclusively on account of pragmatic considerations (sounds like academia, doesn’t it?).

Nothing could be as handy as a new ideology, especially since the North had been drifting away from Soviet-style Leninism for some time. A locally designed juche was a good solution to the ideological conundrum.

It was easy to say that North Korea had discovered a new truth that was, needless to say, superior to the truth of Sovietstyle Leninism or Chinese-style Leninism-plus-Maoism. Hence, being bearers of the supreme truth, Koreans could not be ordered around.

But what exactly were the relations between juche and Marxism? For our readers this might appear a rather scholastic question, but the world of communism was based on ideology, and ideological disputes mattered. Of course, communist leaders had long learned how to bend their ideology and how to adjust its postulates to any given current political purpose.

In this regard, they were no different from leaders of supposedly religious states, whose actual policy was not too constrained by their loudly professed faith.

Nonetheless, some explanations had to be invented.

Until the late 1960s, juche was presented as a specific form of Marxism-Leninism, which suited the Korean realities and demands of the Korean communist revolution. It was not separated from Marxism. This explanation found its way into the North Korean constitution of 1972. Article 4 described juche as “a creative application of Marxism-Leninism to the conditions of our country.”

The next step in juche’s development took place around 1974 and was perhaps related to the gradual rise of Kim Jong-il. It has been often stated that Kim Jongil introduced new interpretations of juche because he wanted to flatter his father, the founder of juche, and thus demonstrate his loyalty to Kim Il-sung’s cause.

Whatever the reasons, in 1974 some documents signed by Kim Jong-il but actually written by the administration’s chief theoretician, Hwang Jang-yop (currently in Seoul), began to use the term “kimilsungism” as a synonym for juche. In February 1974, Kim Jong-il explained that the works of Marx and Lenin had become outdated.

They described the world as it was 100 or 50 years ago, while juche was suited for the modern world, they argued. Thus, in 1980 the Korean Workers’ Party proclaimed juche the party’s guiding ideology, without mentioning its relationship to Marxism.

That statement doubtless resonated well with the nationalism of Korean cadres because it essentially placed North Korea at the ideological center of the world. Since then, the nationalist element of juche has been increasingly emphasized.

That position was also an open challenge to orthodoxy as understood in Moscow and Beijing. It was as if a local Catholic bishop proclaimed that he had a better grasp of the Holy Scriptures than the pope (or, to take the analogy a bit further, two quarrelling popes) and was able to devise something like a Newest Testament.

These statements made juche-worshipping North Koreans into open heretics within the communist camp, but other “fraternal countries” had to swallow this: Whatever they said, strategic considerations took precedence over ideology. Nobody wanted to alienate Pyongyang, which had been long seen as a strangebehaving sibling of the communist “family.”

However, this family unity did not last. In 1992, the newly amended North Korean constitution completely omitted references to Marxism-Leninism and replaced it with juche as the sole official ideology. Nobody was outraged.

By that time Leninism was patently dead, and even the few countries that still maintained a commitment to that ideology hardly took their own declarations seriously.

However, after the death of Kim Il-sung there were some signs that the significance of the juche idea began to wane.

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Posted in China, DPRK Policies, Juche, Political economy, Russia, Songun | Comments Closed

Disappearance of North’s Propaganda Chief

Saturday, January 27th, 2007

Donga
1/27/2007

Recently, rumors have been spreading in North Korea that Jeong Ha Cheol (74-year-old), the propaganda secretary of the Workers’ Party, has defected from North Korea, stirring public sentiment.

Party officials have been going door-to-door to remove traces of Jeong from publications without giving any reason. Officials are painting over Jeong’s face with black ink on any pictures that show Jeong accompanying North Korean leader Kim Jong Il or its former leader Kim Il Sung. They are also censuring his name with black ink if there are any passages that include his name and sealing the book. Moreover, writings by Jeong have been torn to pieces. All households which have a few dozens of those books now are required to get rid of them since most North Korea publications are propaganda books.

Jeong Ha Cheol, who studied philosophy at the Kim Il Sung University, was one of the most successful propaganda officials. He served as the editorial chief of the state-run newspaper Rodong Sinmun and the chairman of the Central Broadcasting Station before becoming the propaganda secretary of the Workers’ Party. It is a key post that oversees all the propaganda activities in North Korea, and Kim Jong Il also served in this post before being named as Kim Il Sung’s successor in the mid 1970s.

Jeong, who was considered as one of the closest aides of Kim Il Sung, accompanied Kim every time he paid a state visit to China and even received the Kim Il Sung Decoration, the most highly recognized medal in North Korea at that time.

In fact, rumors about Jeong erupted in December 2005. Some media outlets reported that Jeong has stopped appearing in public since October 2005. There were no news reports on his exile.

Some sources said that he was imprisoned at a concentration camp in North Pyongan Province because his faults were revealed during an intensive investigation into the staff of Central Broadcasting who was caught drinking during the daytime.

According to the sources, Jeong was sentenced as “a traitor against the party and revolution,” and was ordered to be erased from all the records, including publications. In short, he is unlikely to regain his power since he has been completely shunned by North Korean society.

All these people were involved in the so-called, “August Clan Incident.” The names of the children of Kim Sung Ae, Kim Il Sung’s third wife, who fell from political power and Seo Gwan-hee, former agricultural secretary of the Workers’ Party, who was shot to death on charges of espionage, were also removed from publications. You can see black marks quite often on North Korean political books. In North Korea, it is a principle that if one is accused of a serious crime, his or her family members and relatives (father’s side: up to second cousins, mother’s side: up to first cousins) are also sent to concentration camps or deep in the mountains, as it happened in the feudal age.

The most common cause that North Korean committee officials consider as a serious crime is a drinking bout. Criticizing Kim Jong Il or the communist regime after having some drinks can not be tolerated in the North, and that is likely the case with Jeong. It is a felony to shake the regime. Recently, Joo Dong Il, a high ranking official in charge of electricity, was dismissed for suggesting to Kim Jong Il on a private occasion, “How about we use the electricity used for unattended guest houses all across the country for the economic sector?”

However, some analysts speculate possibilities of Jeong’s involvement in serious corruption considering that North Korea lavishly spend money to purchase equipment from overseas for propaganda purposes every year.

Choi Yong Hae, the chairman of the League of Socialist Working Youth and who prepared the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students, was also found guilty of grave corruption. Although Choi was dismissed, his name was not censured with black ink. Chang Sung Taek, a senior official of the Workers’ Party, was also blamed of serious corruption, but he was recently pardoned. Corruption charges are far more lenient compared to criticizing the regime or Kim Jong Il.

Jeong’s case is a good example that illustrates how insecure the power that top North Korean officials have once they lose the trust of Kim Jong Il. If North Korean officials are not cautious all the time, like walking on thin ice each day, they can be out of Kim Jong Il’s favor.

NK Secretary Jung Ha Chol Politically Banished
Daily NK
Han Young Jin
1/29/2007

A rumor has spread alleging that a former secretary for the Propaganda Department of the Chosun Worker’s Party Jung Ha Chol (74) has escaped North Korea, reported the Donga Ilbo on the 27th.

A source told Donga Ilbo “Though the reason has not yet been revealed, North Korean elite officials have recently been erasing remnants of Secretary Jung in published materials” and informed “Secretary Jung’s face has been deleted from all photos taken with Kim Il Sung or Kim Jong Il.” In addition, Secretary Jung’s name is being erased from all written materials and sealed with tape, and materials directly written by Secretary Jung are being deleted altogether.

With Kim Il Sung’s May 25th teaching in 1967, “North Korea’s revolutionary culture” arose and excluding statements and instructions of Kim Il Sung, any foreign editions and all publications displaying anti-authority or conflict with Kim Il Sung were either burned or erased.

Hence, we can surmise that secretary Jung has already been purged from North Korea’s political arena based on the evidence that his photo and name is being obliterated from published materials.

Secretary Jung graduated from the Kim IL Sung University majoring in Philosophy and worked as an editor for the Rodong Newspaper and Head of the Central Broadcast Agency. In 2001, he became the director and secretary for the propaganda department which following the secretary for the Chosun Workers Party is the next best position. Secretary Jung was even selected as Kim Jong Il’s entourage on his visit to China and was even awarded the Kim Il Sung honorary medal.

However, in December 2005 inspectors discovered one of Secretary Jung’s private parties held at a rural village during an agricultural supporting activity. In addition, there had been rumors that the First Minister for the Chosun Workers Party Lee Jae Kang and Secretary Jung had been in conflict. Whatever the unknown reason, whether it was Secretary Jung conducting parties, occurrences or comments made at the party or personal feuds, Secretary Jung was ultimately imprisoned at a concentration camp in South Pyongan, Buk Chang province.

The Donga Ilbo informed “Secretary Jung has been condemned as an anti-revolutionist and is being banished from North Korean society. His existence being deleted from all records indicates that his power will not be reinstated to him.”

“One the main reasons elite officials are ostracized in North Korea is for reproaching Kim Jong Il or the system at parties” and “It is likely Secretary Jung fell into this category” prospected the newspaper.

Another speculation suggested that Secretary Jung had been corrupted. As North Korea carelessly spends vast amounts of foreign currency on propaganda every year, it is possible Secretary Jung made a foolish decision.

However, even Choi Young Hae, former director for Socialist Youth League who swindled vast amounts of foreign currency while preparing for the 13th International Youth and Students Festival in 1989 did not get “deleted” from all publication but just simply demoted. This was the same for Jang Sung Taek who was once overthrown but his position eventually reinstituted. To criticize or compare Kim Jong Il or the regime is an enormous criminal offense. Hence, for Secretary Jung’s existence to be deleted from all published materials denotes that he could never return to the political areana.

Though there is no real evidence to prove that Secretary Jung Ha Chol has defected overseas, he has undeniably been obliterated from politics.

At present, Jung Ha Chol’s position as secretary of the Chosun Worker’s Party has been reassigned to Kim Ki Nam.

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Posted in Central Broadcasting Station, League of Socialist Working Youth, Political economy | Comments Closed

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