North Korean Economy Watch

North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity has reported that Kim Jong-un is carrying out a purge of local officials to cement his ascention to power.  According to the AFP:

North Korea’s young heir apparent has launched a purge of senior party and military officials in an apparent attempt to cement his grip on power, a North Korean defectors’ group said Wednesday.

Pyongyang this month began a crackdown on senior officials suspected of corruption, starting in Musan county in the northeastern province of North Hamkyong, said the Seoul-based North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity.

A spokesman said the information came from North Korean sources whom he described as senior party officials closely connected with the investigation.

“About 15 heavyweight officials, many of them military, are being investigated for turning a blind eye to people fleeing the country and being involved in smuggling activities,” the spokesman told AFP.

He said the investigation was being led by Kim Jong-Un, youngest son and chosen successor to leader Kim Jong-Il.

The crackdown, which would be expanded into a nationwide campaign, was a “politically-motivated purge” aimed at replacing longstanding military members with younger officials more loyal to Jong-Un, said the spokesman.

“This is a purge for generational change… senior officials are trembling with fear because they don’t know where heads are going to roll,” he said.

Seoul’s intelligence agency declined to comment on the report.

The Kim dynasty, which has ruled the communist country with an iron fist for more than six decades, has long used purges to maintain its grip on power.

Founding president Kim Il-Sung reportedly executed hundreds of dissidents during the early years of his leadership and often persecuted senior officials showing signs of rebelliousness.

Kim Jong-Il, after taking over from his father, is known to have executed several hundred soldiers for showing “suspicious movements”, Wednesday’s Chosun Ilbo newspaper reported.

Jong-Un, believed to be aged 27, was made a general and given powerful party posts at the country’s largest political gathering for 30 years in September.

Kim Jong-Il, 68, is believed to be accelerating preparations for another hereditary power transfer due to worsening health after he suffered a stroke in 2008.

Additional Information
1. The Korea Times also reported this story.

2. Previously the Daily NK reported a reorganization of the DPRK’s external patronage networks.

Read the full story here:
N.Korea heir apparent purges officials: defectors
AFP
11/17/2010

According to the Daily NK:

A number of criminals judged to have committed their crimes due to poverty were granted an amnesty in commemoration of the 65th anniversary of the Workers’ Party founding in September, in a move characterized as being a result of Kim Jong Eun’s boundless consideration for the North Korean people. However, this has led to serious adverse effects.

A Daily NK source reported on the 12th that, upon a decision of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly, the North Korean authorities reduced the prison terms of around 150,000 criminals across the country in the amnesty, entitled “On the reduction of prison terms for prisoners in commemoration of the 65th anniversary of the Party founding and the Party Delegates’ Conference.”

For example, around 1,500 out of 2,100 prisoners in No. 12 Reeducation Camp under the Reform Department of the People’s Safety Ministry in Pungsan-ri, formerly Jeongeo-ri, Hoiryeong, North Hamkyung Province had their sentences reduced.

According to the source, “Around 250 prisoners were released and three special contributors had their sentences reduced by four years, 20 model prisoners by three years, and around 1,500 other general prisoners by two years.”

He added, “Only violent offenders (robbers, murderers and rapists) sentenced under article 141 of the Penal Code and human trafficking offenders (defector-related offences) under article 117 of the Penal Code were excluded.”

After the head of the camp announced the list of prisoners who would benefit, he reportedly added, “Those who are being released and having their sentences reduced should feel deeply the consideration of the Youth Captain,” going on to say, “The consideration given by the Party is not a gift sent equally to everybody, but only to those who have done well, and gives more consideration to them.”

Generally, amnesties in North Korea are undertaken on every fifth birthday of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il and the founding day of the Party, ratified by Kim Jong Il after the Standing Committee of the SPA submits a proposal to him. The 12 reeducation camps under the PSM then decide the scale of the amnesty, depending on the size of the prison population.

However, the amnesties can have undesirable consequences, and this one is no different; the PSM has been reportedly devoting itself to filling up the empty camps, because each camp contains production units.

The source said, “The PSM was concentrating on criminal investigations even before the official announcement of the amnesty, because they had received indications of the decree. With the help of the Prosecutors’ Office, they caught a lot of people and kept them in detention centers, then after the announcement they started putting them in camps.”

“In 2002, commemorating the 60th birthday of the General (Kim Jong Il), although around 30 percent of the prisoners in each camp were released, the same amount of prisoners filled the former prisoners’ places.”

The 12 reeducation camps in North Korea each have unique production facilities. In the No. 12 Camp in Hoiryeong, for example, there is a wooden goods factory, copper mine, dressing plant, limestone mine and farms. Defectors suggest that the profits from these factories cover 80% of the management costs of the PSM.

The camps can be found all over the country including Pyongyang, Kaechoen and Sariwon in South Pyongan Province, Deokwon in Kangwon Province, Hamheung and Hoiryeong.

Read the full story here:
Kim Jong Eun’s “Magnanimous” Amnesty
Daily NK
Im Jeong Jin
11/13/2010

UPDATE: Using North Korean television footage, I mapped out Jo Myong-rok’s funeral procession route on Google Earth.

The procession began at the Central Worker’s Hall (home of the General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea) where the VMAR’s wake was held:

The procession then traveled west to the Potong Gate (near Sojang Hall where state funerals are normally held) and then north to the Patriotic Martyr’s Cemetary. 

Jo Myong-rok was bruied in the front row of the cemetary in one of the empty spots.

I wonder which two individuals will be buried next to him?  Judging from the satellite imagery, it appers this cemetary is being expanded for additional martyrs.  I wonder what the criteria are to be buried here.  

Here is the story in KCNA.

ORIGINAL POST: According to KCNA (11/6/2010):

Vice Marshal of the Korean People’s Army Jo Myong Rok, member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, first vice-chairman of the DPRK National Defence Commission and deputy to the Supreme People’s Assembly, died of an inveterate heart disease at 10:30 a.m. on Nov. 6, Juche 99 (2010) at the age of 82 to our sorrow.

Born into a poor peasant’s family in Yonsa County, North Hamgyong Province on July 12, Juche 17 (1928) Jo Myong Rok was a revolutionary comrade loyal to General Secretary Kim Jong Il and a prominent activist of the WPK, the state and the army of the DPRK who devoted his whole life to the sacred struggle for the freedom and independence of the country and the victory of the cause of socialism.

He grew up to be an able military and political official under the care of the party and the leader after the country’s liberation.

He worked for years at important posts of the party, the state and the army.

In the period of the hard-fought Fatherland Liberation War against the U.S. imperialists’ armed invasion he bravely fought as a pilot of the KPA for the victory in the war. He worked hard for the development of the air force, holding posts of squadron commander, group commander and divisional commander of an air unit and the chief of the staff and commander of the air force of the KPA in the post-war period.

Holding important posts as the director of the General Political Bureau of the KPA from October, Juche 84 (1995) and first vice- chairman of the DPRK National Defence Commission from September, Juche 87 (1998), he energetically worked to thoroughly implement the Juche-oriented military line of the WPK and firmly guarantee the building of a thriving nation and the victory of the revolutionary cause of Juche with matchless military power.

He was elected alternate member of the C.C., the WPK in November, Juche 64 (1975), member of the C.C., the WPK and member of the Central Military Commission of the WPK in October, Juche 69 (1980) and member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the C.C., the WPK in September, Juche 99 (2010) and worked as a deputy to the Supreme People’s Assembly from the sixth Supreme People’s Assembly held in November, Juche 66 (1977).

He was awarded Order of Kim Il Sung, the highest order of the DPRK, the titles of Hero of the DPRK and Labour Hero and many other orders and medals including Order of National Flag First Class and Order of Freedom and Independence First Class for the distinguished feats he performed for the party and the revolution, the country and its people.

He received the title of vice marshal of the KPA in October, Juche 84 (1995).

An obituary of Jo Myong Rok was jointly issued by the C.C., the WPK, the Central Military Commission of the WPK, the DPRK National Defence Commission and the Presidium of the DPRK Supreme People’s Assembly on Saturday.

The obituary said that his death is a great loss to the party, the army and people of the DPRK waging a dynamic struggle to win the victory of the cause of building a thriving socialist nation and bring earlier the independent reunification of the country. Though he passed away, the exploits he performed for the party and the revolution, the country and its people will shine long along with the victorious advance of the revolutionary cause of Juche, it stressed.

On the same day, the C.C., the WPK, the Central Military Commission of the WPK, the DPRK National Defence Commission and the Presidium of the DPRK Supreme People’s Assembly announced that the late Jo Myong Rok would be accorded a state funeral and formed a state funeral committee with Kim Jong Il as its chairman and Kim Jong Un and 169 others as its members.

The state funeral committee informed the public that the bier of the deceased would be placed in the Central Hall of Workers, it would receive mourners from 10:00 on Nov. 8 to 18:00 on Nov. 9 and the hearse would leave the hall at 9 a.m. on Nov. 10.

KCNA also reports (11/8/2010):

Leading officials of the state and armed forces organs Monday visited the bier of Vice Marshal of the Korean People’s Army Jo Myong Rok, member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, first vice-chairman of the National Defense Commission of the DPRK and deputy to the Supreme People’s Assembly, to express deep condolences over his death.

Seen standing before the bier of the late Jo Myong Rok was a wreath sent by Kim Jong Il, general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea, chairman of the DPRK National Defence Commission and supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army.

Also seen standing before the bier were wreaths sent by the C.C., the WPK, the Central Military Commission of the WPK, the NDC of the DPRK, the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK, the DPRK Cabinet and the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces.

Among the mourners were Choe Yong Rim, Jon Pyong Ho, Pyon Yong Rip, Kim Rak Hui, Kim Chang Sop, Ri Ha Il, anti-Japanese veteran fighters Ri Ul Sol and Kim Chol Man, and Kim Yong Dae, chairman of the C.C., the Korean Social Democratic Party, and Ryu Mi Yong, chairperson of the C.C., the Chondoist Chongu Party.

They observed a moment’s silence in memory of the late Jo Myong Rok and expressed deep condolences to the bereaved families of the deceased.

On the same day officials of armed forces organs including the NDC and the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces, servicepersons of KPA and the Korean People’s Internal Security Forces, officials of the party and power organs, working people’s organizations, ministries and national institutions, working people from all walks of life, the diplomatic corps and the military attaches corps here and overseas Koreans visited the Central Hall of Workers where the bier of the deceased was placed and expressed condolences over his death.

Additional Information:
1. Michael Madden has additional information on the VMAR here and here.

2. The media is highlighting that Kim Jong-un has been named after his father as a member of the state funeral committee.  See here and here.

3. To see a satellite image of the Central Worker’s Hall click here.  This will be the first funeral to be held in this facility since at least 1996.  As far as I can tell this is the first funeral to be held there.

4. Most other state funerals are conducted in Sojang Hall in Potonggang District (Satellite image here).  See a previous post I wrote about the geography of DPRK state funerals here.

According ot the Daily NK:

The rapid ascent of Kim Jong Eun and the building of a new ruling cast in Pyongyang is causing ripples to be felt in North Korea’s foreign currency earning apparatus. In Beijing, it is clear that anyone considered a supporter of Kim Jong Nam or Oh Keuk Ryul faces a rough ride.

One of the most prominent cases is that of Kang, a pro-Kim Jong Nam foreign currency earner who has distinguished himself in various ways, including by installing air conditioning in the Mansudae Assembly Hall. He is noteworthy among North Korea trade workers in China, and was mentioned in articles released by The Daily NK in June on the subject of emergency inspections over North Korean trade departments.

According to the testimony of Kang’s acquaintances, Kang was supposedly summoned to Pyongyang in early July, whereupon he was violently beaten by agents of the National Security Agency. The alleged reason behind the summons was that Kang was guilty of embezzling national assets and corruption; however, trade workers in China generally assume that it was a part of systematically “taking care” of Kim Jong Nam‘s closest associates.

In North Korean diplomatic circles in Beijing, the general interpretation is that Kim Jong Nam‘s outspoken negativity towards North Korea‘s third generation succession has helped to bring trouble upon his supporters.

One Chinese building contractor, Jwa, who sells construction materials to North Korean traders, commented, “Kang pledged allegiance to Kim Jong Nam and received a lot of favors as his affiliate. But a battle between Kim Jong Eun and Kim Jong Nam is taking place, and trade workers are suffering.”

However, the more surprising fact was the return of Kang to Beijing in October. It is highly unusual for someone from a privileged office to be so severely “investigated” by the National Security Agency but then return to their former seat in a foreign trade office.

According to one of Kang’s acquaintances, this was down to the fact that he is actually the person in charge of the North Korean Liaison Office in Beijing.

One Chinese trader who has done business directly with Kang told The Daily NK, “Kang, who is well known as a famous trade worker, was really in charge of North Korean maneuvers for more than ten years while maintaining the identity of a trade worker. This fact has been confirmed through several sources.”

However, South Korean intelligence has neither confirmed nor denied Kang’s true role.

The North Korean Liaison Office is an organization said to be responsible for maneuvers against South Korea, and is thought to have pulled the strings in the South Korean Chosun Workers‘ Party incident of 1992, in which the largest spy ring since the liberation was uncovered, that of Kim Dong Sik, an armed espionage agent arrested in 1995, Choi Jung Nam and Kang Yeon Jung, an agent couple who committed suicide in 1997, the assassination of Lee Han Young, Kim Jong Il’s nephew, in 1997, and the 2006 Ilsimheo spy ring incident.

Mr. Kang also owns a well-appointed villa, recent sedan and VIP membership of the fitness center at a five-star hotel.

Generally, North Korean employees abroad have to leave one of their children in Pyongyang as what can only be described as hostages to loyalty. However, the testimony of Kang’s acquaintances states that he is permitted to live in Beijing with his wife, daughter and son, who has studied in England. This is due to Kim Jong Nam’s full support, an extraordinary level of operational funding and the superior status of a person in charge of a covert operation.

He has avoided being outright purged, despite the fact that he is an affiliate of Kim Jong Nam, thanks to the fact that he is the person in charge of operations against the South. However, other trade workers in China who are also affiliated with Kim Jong Nam are desperate to forge new connections in Pyongyang to secure their positions, and, as such, many seem to have been absorbed by the Jang Sung Taek camp.

Other overseas officials are also on the back foot. Not only are affiliates of Kim Jong Nam being called into Pyongyang, but affiliates of Oh Keuk Ryul, a Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission who is also actively involved in bringing foreign capital into North Korea in de facto competition with Jang Sung Taek, are also being summoned. Oh Keuk Ryul was shut out of the recent process of realigning the Chosun Workers’ Party and has lost a lot of his former influence as a result.

North Korean foreign trade departments are a target of veneration within North Korea. However, trade workers must strive to preserve their status with bribes like supplies which are hard to find within North Korea or large amounts of money. Now the dynamic is changing, so it is proving difficult to preserve their desirable positions.

Read the full story here:
Traders Living in Fear of Pyongyang Summons
Daily NK
Shin Joo-hyun
11/8/2010

Andre Lankov writes in the Korea Times:

Recently one cannot help but notice an important change in the mood of Pyongyang watchers ― well, some of them. Over last year one began to hear again talk which has not been heard for 15 years or so ― serious people, many of whom are potential or actual decision makers, once again are discussing the probability of North Korea’s collapse.

Back in the early 1990 such a collapse was widely ― almost universally ― expected. Indeed, the communist bloc was falling apart, so it seemed only logical that North Korea, arguably the least efficient of all communist states, would go the same way as East Germany or Rumania. To a large extent, in the early 1990s the U.S. policy towards North Korea was based on assumption that its days were numbered. However, the much anticipated collapse did not happen, and since then the idea of it was discredited, so among the experts talks of collapse came to be seen as a sign of non-professionalism. Only in recent years has this talk begun anew.

The reason seems to be clear: the botched 2009 currency reform produced a serious crisis. The irritated North Koreans began to express their dissatisfaction even when talking to foreigners ― an unprecedented development. For a while in February it seemed that the situation was getting out of control ― so, even the habitually cautious Chinese for a while privately expressed their concerns about North Korea’s future.

On one hand, this revival of collapse theory is good news. It seems that in the long run a regime collapse is indeed highly probable, almost unavoidable, and it is good that decisions makers at least discuss such a probability, since it will prompt them to do some useful contingency planning. However, the present author is afraid that these recent talks are, above all, another example of wishful thinking. An immediate collapse is not impossible, no doubt, but it does not look very likely.

There are seem to be two reasons which might trigger the regime’s sudden disintegration ― a popular uprising and an open power clash within the elite, and neither appears likely right now.

The North Korean elite understand perfectly well that unity is the major condition for their survival (“if we do not hang together, gentlemen, we would be hanged separately” seems to be their most favorite dictum). In the peculiar case of a divided Korea, a clash within the elite is likely to trigger the disintegration of the state. Of course, there must be powerful internal rivalries and feuds within the elite, but their shared fear of instability helps to keep these disagreements under control. It is possible that Kim Jong-il’s death will create a new situation, and some of the old feuds will surface, but as long as the “Dear Leader” remains in control, this is not likely.

An outbreak of a popular revolution is highly improbable, too. The North Koreans are poor, but people do not start revolutions simply because they are poor. Revolutions happen when people believe that there are better ways of living. Nowadays, thanks to the spread of information about the outside world, many North Koreans are beginning to suspect that life indeed might be better. However, the sheer dissatisfaction about the current system alone is not sufficient for a revolution. Two other conditions must be present in most cases: people should have some organization, even rudimentary, and they should believe that their efforts are not futile, that the resistance has at least some chance to succeed. Neither condition is met in North Korea so far.

To start with, the North Korean authorities are very good in breaking all horizontal connections between their subjects. Unlike other communist regimes, North Korea does not tolerate even the obviously non-political activities if such activities are not directly supervised by the authorities. So, people are isolated and very distrustful of one another.

The fear is great, too. People do not start rebellions if they are certain that their rebellion has no chance to succeed. But North Koreans still tend to believe that any resistance is futile, since the regime would crush it in no time. There are closet dissenters in North Korea, to be sure, but they have to keep their mouths shut, since any challenge to the regime means certain death.

Things are changing, no doubt. Kim Jong-il’s North Korea is more liberal and permissive than it was when Kim Il-sung ruled the place. The officials prefer to take bribes and are ready to overlook minor irregularities. The booming private markets create an environment where some interaction is possible and people began talking between themselves. However, it might take a long time before these changes will produce conditions suitable for a revolution. Talks of a coming collapse are not a complete fantasy but might be seriously premature.

Read the full story here:
Revival of ‘collapse’ theory
Korea Times
11/7/2010

According to the Daily NK:

The North Korean state media has stepped up the level of its Kim Jong Eun propaganda in an attempt to stamp his identity in the minds of the North Korean people.

According to a report carried by Chosun Central News Agency, Rodong Shinmun was expanded to ten pages on November 4th to include a full-page spread about Kim Jong Il and Jong Eun’s onsite inspection of Heecheon Power Plant in South Pyongan Province.

Rodong Shinmun normally covers six pages, although important events regularly lead to it being expanded.

On the first and second pages of the Heechon Power Plant edition there were photos and commentary about the inspection; the remaining pages contained nothing but photos.

Chosun Central TV also reported the news of the onsite inspection at around 5:10P.M. on the same day, and, in a highly unusual move, simultaneously released 145 pages of related images.

Of them, 86 were of Kim Jong Il and/or Kim Jong Eun, and 59 were of power plant facilities; 13 of 45 showed father and son together; and 8 showed only Kim Jong Eun, who appeared in the same style and color of overcoat as his father.

This is the second time this year that Rodong Shinmun has been expanded to report one of Kim’s onsite inspections while completely excluding other news; his onsite inspection at Ryongseong Food Factory and Pyongyang Flour Factory was released over 12 pages on January 24th.

The newspaper has also been expanded to more than ten pages in order to report Kim Jong Il’s public activities in detail alongside other news on a number of further occasions during 2010: an onsite inspection at Kim Il Sung University electronic library on April 13 covered eight of ten pages; another at Ryongseong Machinery Factory in Hamheung on May 22 took up nine of ten; Goksan Factory in Pyongyang on August 26 required six of ten; and the Party Delegates’ Conference on September 29 took up eight of ten.

Heecheon Power Plant, which is designed to generate 300,000kW of power, is under construction in the upper reaches of the Cheongcheon River. It is scheduled to be completed in 2012 alongside other “Strong and Prosperous State” construction projects including that of 100,000 houses in Pyongyang.

In addition, the Daily NK reports that the DPRK media is using honorific words to describe KJU.

North Korea’s state media has begun to apply the highest form of honorific speech to Kim Jong Eun’s name and descriptions of his movements, according to a Radio Press report released yesterday.

According to Radio Press, while broadcasting the movements of Kim Jong Il on October 27th, a Chosun Central Television announcer explained that a Chinese delegation had “given a gift to Chosun Workers’ Party Central Military Commission Vice Chairman, Comrade Kim Jong Eun”, using both the highest form of “to” and “give” available in the Korean language.

In addition, on the 29th of last month both Chosun Central Television and Pyongyang Broadcast announced the fact that the international media had reported the presence of Kim Jong Eun and Kim Jong Il at a mass rally with the highest form of “to” and by amending the verb “to attend” to reflect the esteem with which the successor is officially held..

Hitherto, only three people in North Korea have been spoken of in this way; national founder Kim Il Sung, son Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Il’s mother, Kim Jong Suk.

This method of referring to Kim Jong Eun appears to represent an important part of ongoing attempts by the authorities to idolize and elevate the successor’s status, while seeming also to reflect the speed with which the succession process is being undertaken.

Read the full stories here:
Cover-to-Cover Kim in Rodong Shinmun
Daily NK
11/5/2010

North Korean Media Speaking of Kim Jong Eun in Honorifics
Daily NK
Kim Tae Hong
11/4/2010

According to the Daily NK:

It has been confirmed by The Daily NK that North Korea failed in a recent attempt to import beef from New Zealand for the purpose of providing special gifts to cadres on Kim Jong Eun’s birthday, January 8, after the plan ran afoul of the New Zealand government, which froze the funds.

According to a source from North Korea today, “$170,000 remitted by ‘Myohyang Bureau’ to a New Zealand bank in October to import parts for Japanese tourist buses and beef has been frozen by the New Zealand authorities.”

The source added, “The New Zealand authorities are investigating whether or not the money is related to (North Korea’s) drug dealing.”

The source explained, “The beef is for special distribution to cadres on the Youth Captain (Kim Jong Eun)’s birthday, while the parts of Japanese buses are to repair buses operated by the Tour Bureau,” adding, “Myohyang Bureau is alarmed that there might be a snag in Comrade Youth Captain’s birthday special distribution.”

In North Korea, workplaces have already started to prepare presents for Kim Jong Eun’s birthday. There are two types of presents: the first is from cadres to Kim Jong Eun; and the latter is special distribution to cadres in Kim Jong Eun’s name. However, even though the special distribution is like a gift handed out by a monarch, factories and Party organs have to prepare it. According to the source, the Myohyang Bureau’s duty this time is to supply beef.

The Myohyang Bureau is directly in charge of tour events including Arirang performance-related tours and Mt. Baekdu and Geumgang tours. It sends the profits from these businesses involving foreign tourists to the No. 39 Department of the Central Committee of the Party.

The source explained further, “Due to Japanese sanctions against North Korea, the Tour Bureau has not been able to obtain parts for Japanese buses, so the Myohyang Bureau asked a New Zealand business partner to obtain them for them. In doing that, they also asked for beef.”

“Since the Myohyang Bureau sent the money via a secret bank account held with a bank in Latvia to a bank in New Zealand, it incurred the suspicion of the New Zealand government. Money is still money, but the bigger problem is to expose the Latvian account.”

This is the first time that a Latvian account has been linked to North Korea, adding to known secret accounts in Switzerland, China, Macau and the Caribbean.

The source said, “The Myohyang Bureau opened the account in the name, ‘RUSKOR International Company Ltd’ in a bank of Latvia,” adding, “The account name is the connecting of the words Russia and Korea.”

“Gift rations” have been in the news a lot lately.  Links to previous posts about the DPRK’s “gift rations” can be found here.

Read the full story here:
North Korean Funds for Beef Frozen by New Zealand
Daily NK
Park In Ho
11/5/2010

According to the Daily NK:

Although it is just 10 kilometers from Hyesan, the capital of Ryanggang Province, no electricity has been supplied to Nojoong-ri since construction began on the Samsu Power Plant in 2004. In fact, there are no longer any transmission cables connected to the village at all.

The North Korean authorities, in preparation for the construction of the power plant in 2002, put in place relocation plans for the residents of the Unchong River Basin in areas they designated as “probable watersheds” for the lake which would form behind the proposed dam. District Four of Nojoong-ri was one of those areas, and as a result had all of its power cables removed.

However, in a follow-up plan completed right before groundbreaking on the project in 2004, the water storage capacity of the Samsu Power Plant was reduced on account of analysis that cautioned against over-filling the reservoir. This resulted in District Four of Nojoong-ri being re-designated as outside the flood zone, but none of the services were resumed, including the provision of electricity

After a year of living without power, the residents, who were still waiting to be assigned new homes, eventually pleaded their case to have the village’s power lines restored to the “Standing Committee on Flooding”, a special organ of government in charge of the relocation of flood-area residents. However, the response was that they were ineligible for aid because their village was not in a flood zone. The villagers then filed petitions with the Party at Hyesan City and provincial level, but to no avail. They were only to hear the same repeated response, “We were not the ones who removed the power lines.”

If electricity were to be provided to the area, quite a few power lines would need to be installed. But the only place where electricity for the village could be obtained is “Military Supplies Factory No. 95”, located four kilometers from the village on the other side of a hill. The 50-megawatt Samsu Power Plant stands adjacent to the village, but the electricity generated there is supplied exclusively to “Kim Jong Il Birthplace Heritage”, otherwise known as the “Baekdu Hideout”, in Samjiyeon. At one point there was talk of the residents putting their money together to provide for their own power cables, but the plan was prohibitively expensive.

Thus, the residents of this part of Nojoong-ri have been living without electricity for nearly seven years. They depend entirely on candlelight and firewood as they scrape a living off potato farming and alluvial mining.

“It is hard to say that it is even a place where people should live. People from as far away as South Pyongan and North Hamkyung come here to mine alluvial gold, but are shocked to find the state that the village is in,” according to an anonymous Yangkang Province source.

Of course, with the original designation came many more changes, including work and schooling. The one-way commute that the village’s men take every morning is seven to eight kilometers, while the women cannot easily reach the market to sell their produce. Children are also suffering the consequences; having to walk 15 kilometers a day to attend Nojoong-ri Middle School has led to a rising number of student dropouts.

Here are previous posts about the Samsu Dam: here, here, here and here.

Read the full story here:
Seven Years of Blackness
Daily NK
Kang Mi Jin
11/4/2010

Aidan Foster-Carter wrties about the recent increase in China-DPRK “friendship” activities in the Asia Times: 

Over a month ago, in an article in these columns, I suggested a number of reasons why North Korea may well become a quasi-satellite of China.

Well, it’s happening even faster than I expected. In all the excitement about Kim Jong-eun’s coming-out for a second time, at the 65th birthday of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) on October 10, we risk missing another key aspect of that big Pyongyang parade.

The “reptile press” – one of my favorite North Korean phrases; yup, I’m a lizard and proud – all oohed and aahed at their first glimpse of the “young general”. Most paid less attention to a middle-aged chap also standing on the podium, not far from the clearly ailing Kim Jong-il. The one without a badge – meaning he isn’t North Korean. A rare privilege for a foreigner.

How now, Zhou
Meet Zhou Yongkang. Hardly a household name, yet ranked ninth in China’s politburo. A former minister of public security (2002-2007), he still has responsibilities in that key area.

Now Zhou has a new role too: he is China’s point man on North Korea. This seems to have been his first trip there, but it won’t be his last. Barely a week later, back in Beijing, he was on the job again, this time hosting a large visiting North Korean delegation (of which more below).

Zhou has been parachuted in above Wang Jiarui, the head of the Chinese Communist Party’s international liaison department, who in recent years had been China’s most frequent flyer to Pyongyang. Wang is still on the case: he was part of the October 10 delegation too, but clearly ranked below Zhou.

This seems less a demotion for Wang than a broadening of Beijing’s agenda. Wang’s main task, a thankless one, was and is to try to chivvy the Kims into line on the nuclear issue. That remains a key goal, but now in a wider context. China wants to deepen its overall relations with North Korea. To that end, bringing in a new more senior figure to take charge flatters the Kims, while Zhou’s background in public security is doubtless meant to reassure them.

China means business
Who else did Zhou bring along? Not the usual cross-section of the great and the good, but the neighbors: meaning senior figures from the three Chinese provinces – Jilin, Liaoning and Heilongjiang – which border or are close to North Korea. This trio had a special dinner with a quartet who are their North Korean equivalents: the party secretaries – provincial governors in all but name – from North Pyongan, Jagang, Ryanggang and North Hamgyong, the four provinces which adjoin China across the Yalu (Amnok in Korean) and Tumen rivers.

Not only dinner, but a deal. On the eve of Pyongyang’s parade, the two sides signed a trade agreement. No details were given, but again each side’s border bigwigs were in evidence.

Nor did it end there. A week later, one of North Korea’s rising stars led a big delegation to China, with provinces again prominent. Aged only 53, much younger than most of North Korea’s gerontocratic elite, Mun Kyong-dok is a new alternate politburo member. He also holds the key job of party secretary for Pyongyang. As such, on September 30 he gave a keynote speech in front of 150,000 people, congratulating Kim Jong-il on his re-election as leader.

October 16 saw Mun on the road, shepherding all 11 of North Korea’s provincial or big city party secretaries to – where else? – Beijing. Welcoming them, Zhou Yongkang – who else? – noted that this was “the first time that the secretaries from all the WPK provincial and municipal committees have visited China”, adding, “I wish that you will expand exchange with various Chinese regions you’re visiting and achieve success from your tours.” Mun replied that “We will study and learn the successful experiences from China.”

Maybe this time?
We’ve heard that before, even from Kim Jong-il – who forgets all about it as soon as he gets back home. But as Sally Bowles sings in Cabaret: “Maybe this time.” Sending such a large team – a full house, indeed – on the road in this way, including several younger and newly appointed provincial party bosses, looks like a real effort to take things forward. China won’t be impressed if its mendicant neighbor merely rattles the begging bowl again.

Mun’s team went on to – where else? – the northeast, visiting factories in Heilongjiang and Jilin. These provinces have in the past had bones to pick with their unneighborly neighbor, which too often fails to pay for coal or other goods – and sometimes doesn’t even return the railway wagons used to deliver them. That sort of tiresome trickery will have to stop. Time will tell whether North Korea has really turned over a new leaf in its business dealings.

Blood brothers
On another front, by a convenient coincidence October 19 was the 60th anniversary of China’s entry into the Korean War. The massed ranks of Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) – old British army joke: “I want three volunteers: You, you and you!” – turned the tide, saved Kim Il-sung’s bacon and stopped General Douglas MacArthur wiping the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) off the map.

Cue yet more love-ins. The state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) ran a stirring headline: “Friendship Forged in Blood in Anti-US War.” Special events included a photo exhibition, a Chinese film week and performances by a visiting art troupe from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). A delegation from the Korean People’s Army visited China, led by vice minister of the People’s Armed Forces Pyon Il-son: a hitherto obscure general, but evidently another name to watch.

China reciprocated by sending a better-known bigwig. (Speaking of which, he wears one – or so says Wigipedia.) Unlike Zhou Yongkang, who is new to this patch, General Guo Boxiong – vice chairman of China’s Central Military Commission – has had North Korean links for at least a decade; he visited in 2001 with then-president Jiang Zemin.

Usually the CPV anniversary is marked by a low-key wreath-laying and a few press articles. But 60 is a big one, and this time Pyongyang pulled out all the stops. There was a mass rally – “held with splendor”, gushed KCNA – with Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-eun in attendance and much stirring rhetoric. The dear leader also hosted a dinner, again with his son present.

Even Arirang has got in on the act. North Korea’s striking yet introverted mass games have finally admitted (pace juche) that the Kims didn’t go it alone; they got by with a little help from their friends. KCNA on October 22 described a newly added scene, “Friendship Arirang”. This highlights the role of the CPV, portrayed with “drums of different sizes, ribbons, red flags and other hand props … several-dozen-meter-long dragons, pandas and lions.”

We helped you first
One wonders what Chinese visitors who are the mainstay of North Korea’s thin tourist trade make of such cliches – or the fact that, the way Pyongyang tells it, that is only half the story. For Arirang also, and first, depicts “the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army and Chinese armed units fighting together against the Japanese imperialists”. The implication is that this was somehow reciprocal: Korea helped China out, and then China repaid the compliment. Note also the disrespect: Korea had an army, China merely “armed units”. What, no PLA?

Pull the other one, comrades. True, a small but gallant band of Korean communists under Mu Chong, a veteran of the Long March, were with Mao Zedong in Yanan. Separately, the young Kim Il-sung was one of a few guerillas – under Chinese command – who skirmished with the Japanese in Manchuria before being chased across the border into the Soviet Union. Kim came back in Soviet uniform and set about purging rivals – including Mu Chong, who had to flee to China. All quite a can of worms, which it seems unwise of North Korea to risk opening.

CPV casualty figures tell their own story. This year Beijing quantified these. A staggering three million Chinese troops fought in what China still calls the “War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea”. Over 180,000 never came back. PLA statistics show 114,084 killed in action or accidents, with another 25,621 missing. A further 70,000 died from wounds, illness or other causes. There are 183,108 registered war martyrs. Others put China’s losses as even higher. With all respect to Mu Chong, a few Koreans’ sacrifices for China don’t begin to compare.

Nuclear hopes and fears
China’s many and mixed motives vis-a-vis North Korea now include never to get dragged into war like that again. To that end, Beijing still professes faith in the six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear program which it hosts, even though these achieved little tangible – despite many hopes, and much talking-up – over five long years. (They began in 2003 and have been stalled since 2008.)

Here too there is fresh activity. Hardly had the cheers echoing in Kim Il-sung Square died away than the North’s long-time nuclear negotiator Kim Kye-gwan, newly promoted to first vice minister, led a delegation to Beijing on October 12. There followed four days of what KCNA called “an exhaustive and candid discussion on DPRK-China relations, resumption of the six-party talks and the regional situation, etc.” It added: “The DPRK is ready for the resumption of the above-said talks but decided not to go hasty [sic] but to make ceaseless patient efforts now that the US and some other participating countries are not ready…”

True. South Korea and Japan, like the United States, see no point in dusting off the six-party circus without clear signals from Pyongyang on two fronts: a serious will to give up nuclear weapons, as against playing games; and an admission that it sank the South Korean corvette Cheonan in March.

That is a hard gap for Beijing to bridge – especially if there is any basis to recent rumors that North Korea, so far from disarming, may be planning a third nuclear test. Somehow I doubt this. China’s fresh embrace of its tiresome neighbor is not unconditional. I would expect its price for propping up the Kims to be twofold: Market reforms – and no more nuclear tests.

Another bang would sorely tax China’s patience with this tiresome thorn in its northeastern flesh. Beijing is still sheltering number one son Kim Jong-nam, who on October 12 rained (or an earthier verb springs to mind) on little brother’s parade by declaring that he personally was against a third-generation succession. Might anyone try to change his mind? Jong-nam may look ghastly, but he is pro-reform. If Jong-eun proves a pest or a dud, China has alternatives.

Read the full story here:
North Korea: Embracing the dragon
Asia Times
Aidan Foster-Carter
10/28/2010

According to the Choson Ilbo:

North Koreans were given the most extra supplies on Oct. 10, the 65th founding day of the Workers Party, since nation founder Kim Il-sung’s death in 1994, Radio Free Asia in the U.S. claimed last Friday.

The so-called “holiday supplies” are various daily necessities sold at state prices or about 1/100 of market prices on major holidays such as Kim Il-sung’s and current leader Kim Jong-il’s birthdays.

On the day, two days’ supply of food and daily necessities were supplied at state prices, a senior party official in Daehongdan-gun in Yanggang Province was quoted by RFA as saying.

Each of about 9,500 homes in the county received two bottles of liquor, 1 kg of potato noodles, 1 kg of potato starch syrup, a bottle of vinegar, a bottle of soybean oil, 1 kg of pork, a cake of soap, a pair of shoes, toothbrushes and toothpaste, the official said.

Another North Korean source said the sudden bounty led to drunken accidents and an inebriated gang fight between youngsters, several of whom were taken to hospital. The source said a tractor carrying potatoes keeled over, killing four people.

Holiday rations/gifts are a time honored tradition in the DPRK, though their significance to the North Korean people has declined since the “arduous march” and the rise of markets.

Paradoxically, their importance to foreign observers of the DPRK has in fact grown since the “arduous march”.  This is because the composition of the gifts, or lack thereof, is important data for estimating the strength of the Public Distribution System and by extension the state’s finances.  By giving the most generous gifts since Kim Il-sung’s death, the DPRK government wants us, and the North Korean people, to believe its fiscal position is improving.

Here, here, here, here, and here are previous posts about holiday rations.

Here is a story in the Daily NK featuring pictures of holiday rations.

Read the full story here:
N.Korean Regime in Rare Show of Generosity
Choson Ilbo
10/25/2010