North Korean Economy Watch

The Wilson Center’s North Korea International Documentation Project (NKIDP) has published another manuscript in the Critical Oral History Conference Series: Crisis and Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula: 1968-1969

Download PDF here

The Donga Ilbo reported on this paper:

Armed North Korean spies caught while trying to storm South Korea’s presidential office to assassinate then President Park Chung-hee on Jan. 21, 1968, are known to have also planned to attack the U.S. Embassy.

When the North seized the American intelligence ship USS Pueblo in waters off the North Korean port of Wonsan two days later, the U.S. planned to immediately mobilize F-4 Phantom fighters to bomb the North. This plan was shelved, however, because the U.S. Air Force lacked devices for loading conventional weapons required for an air strike.

This information was derived from a compilation of declassified documents from 1968-69 titled, “Crisis on the Korean Peninsula and Standoff” obtained exclusively by The Dong-A Ilbo from the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington Monday.

The documents were compiled after the center held in September 2008 a closed forum with 15 experts and seven former U.S. officials who worked in both Koreas and China in the late 1960s.

Through the forum, the U.S. think tank comprehensively analyzed classified documents 1,285 pages in volume, including those from the former Soviet Union and the Eastern European bloc like the former East Germany and Romania.

Those who attended the forum included Horst Brie, former East German Ambassador to North Korea; Walter Cutler, former political adviser to the U.S. ambassador to South Korea; Thomas Hughes, former director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the U.S. State Department; James Leonard, former chief of the Korea Desk at the State Department; and David Reuter, analyst for Northeast Asia at the U.S. National Security Agency.

Also at the event were Kang In-duk, former South Korean unification minister, and Yoon Ha-jeong, former South Korean vice foreign minister.

Leonard said, “According to multiple documents considered classified at the time, North Korea’s seizure of the USS Pueblo constituted an emergency situation. After the incident was reported to the U.S. Air Force, F-4 Phantoms were to be mobilized within several minutes but did not take off because they only were equipped with devices for loading nuclear weapons but none for loading conventional weapons.”

“The USS Pueblo incident was apparently a disgrace to the U.S.,” he said, adding, “With security concerns heightened at the time and Seoul’s presidential office under attack, the U.S. Defense Department should have been prepared to protect the Pueblo by mobilizing the Air Force when necessary.”

Ultimately, Washington merely mobilized the nuclear aircraft carrier Enterprise and two Aegis destroyers from the U.S. Navy`s 7th Fleet.

Kang, who served as the first chief of the North Korea intelligence bureau at the (South) Korean Central Intelligence Agency, said, “Armed North Korean spies, including Kim Shin-jo, originally had five targets including the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, (South Korean) Army headquarters, Seoul Prison and Seobinggo North Korean Spy Detention Camp.”

“But judging that the targets were too scattered, the North reduced the group of armed spies to 31 from the originally planned 35, and only targeted the presidential office.”

Through interrogation of Kim, Seoul secured intelligence that the spies originally had the U.S. Embassy as a target but it did not inform Washington of this finding.

Cutler, who was stationed in Seoul at the time, said, “We had no prior intelligence that the embassy was a target and thus took no special security measures in this regard.”

According to Voice of America:

North Korea has revised the charter of its only political party, apparently to ensure a smooth transition of power from father to son in the reclusive communist state.

VOA correspondent Steve Herman has obtained a copy of the document, which has not been made public in or outside North Korea.

It is worth pointing out that although the Worker’s Party is the only one that matters, technically it is not the only political party in North Korea. There is also the Korean Social Democratic Party and the Chondoist Party.

Here is a PDF of the new charter.  I am afraid th my Korean is not that good and I do not have a copy of the former charter. If anyone can do or find a comparison, I would like to see it.

Evan Ramstad at the Wall Street Journal: Korea Real Time interviews Marcus Noland:

Only a handful of outside economists spend the enormous time required to delve into the mysteries of North Korea.

Marcus Noland is one of them. With his research and writing partner Stephen Haggard, Mr. Noland has written several books about the North, including a definitive study on the famine that gripped the country from the mid- to late-1990s and resulted in the death of at least 1 million people and perhaps upwards of 2 million.

In a new book published this week, called Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea, Messrs. Noland and Haggard produce the results of interviews they and their researchers conducted with more than 1,600 North Koreans who fled the country. The interviews took place from 2004 to 2008 and involved people who left North Korea as early as 1991.

The book documents the remarkable changes inside the North through the eyes of people who lived through them. Of course, it’s a group that holds negative views of North Korea. But the economists do their best to take that into account.

Mr. Noland, who is based at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, discussed the book with us. Here’s an excerpt of the interview:

WSJ: Most books and studies on North Korea by people outside the country are focused on the nuclear weapons issue and the geopolitics around that. Why have you focused on refugees and the economy?

Mr. Noland: An understudied aspect of the North Korea story, we believe, is the really quite dramatic internal changes that have been going on in North Korea over the last 10 to 20 years. North Korea poses an analytical challenge in that access is limited and the conventional ways that one could go studying a country aren’t available. In this context, the diaspora of refugees leaving the country is an important source of information.

The refugees themselves constitute a first-order crisis. Most of these people, in a clinical setting, would probably be diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder. Their mental health issues appear to be related not only to the difficult circumstances they faced in China but their experiences in North Korea.

WSJ: What is the cause of those stresses?

Mr. Noland: Specifically the loss of family members and family separations associated with the famine. The sense among many of them that they were abandoned in their moment of greatest need. The feeling that they were not given access to international humanitarian aid, which many of them believe was diverted to the military. And the experience of many of them of having been arrested and incarcerated in North Korea’s vast and sprawling penal system.

So the refugees themselves are an issue. They also provide us a window into North Korea.

WSJ: What did you learn from them?

Mr. Noland: Our book addresses three broad issues, which they illuminate.

The first is the underlying economic changes in the country. What we find is the economy has essentially marketized over the last 15 years or so, not as any kind of planned reform but rather as a function of state failure. What is extraordinary is the degree of marketization that the refugees portray when describing their daily lives. They describe a situation in which doing business or engaging in corrupt or illegal activities is increasingly seen as the way to get ahead in North Korea. And positions in the state or the party are still highly desired and seen as a way to get ahead, but not out of patriotism because these positions increasingly provide a platform for extortion of the general population.

Which brings us to the second big theme of the book and that is the criminalization of economic activity and the use of this vast penal system not only for its traditional use as a tool of political intimidation but for economic extortion. What we find is that changes in the North Korean legal code have criminalized vast areas of economic life, the sort of economic life that real people actually lead. In their daily lives, most if not all of North Korea’s non-elites run afoul of some of these statutes, which in effects makes everyone a criminal.

The fact that everyone is running afoul of some statute is combined with the fact that the police are given extraordinary discretion in who they arrest and who they incarcerate and for what period of time. We find that the North Korean penal system has four components. The worst and best known are the long-term political prisons, the North Korean gulag that was set up by Soviet advisors. There’s also a set of institutions that are effectively felony prisons, where you put the murderers and the rapists. Then there are a set of institutions that correspond to misdemeanor jails in other societies. What has developed since the famine period of the 1990s is a fourth set of institutions that have been codified. Those primarily house people who have made economic crimes, such as hiring labor for money or selling things in the market that you’re not supposed to be selling. We go through the enormous expansion of articles in the North Korean legal code to cover these crimes, such as illegally operating a restaurant.

This is a fantastic instrument for extortion. It means if you were engaging in entrepreneurial behavior, the police can come to you and say ‘You’re engaged in illegal activity. We can take you, take your spouse, take your kid and put them in this institution where you know horrible things happen.’ So the penal system not only serves its traditional function as a platform for political corruption but we find it is now a platform for economic predation as well.

We discovered something that we call the ‘market syndrome.’ It is a series of characteristics that seem to be linked with engaging in market activities. People who engage in market activities are 50% more likely to be arrested than their counterparts. They are more likely to harbor more negative appraisals of the regime than their counterparts. And in a society where people are afraid to express their opinions, these guys who are engaged in the market, who have been to jail and been released, are more likely to express their views to others. That is to say that the market is emerging as a kind of semi-autonomous zone of social communication and potentially political organizing. And in that sense, the regime is right to fear the market.

And that brings us to the final theme, and that is the political attitudes of these people and nascent dissent. What we find is people have very negative appraisals of the regime. That’s not surprising. We’re sampling from a group of people that have voted with their feet and one would expect them to have negative views, though we go through fairly elaborate statistical exercises to try to control as best we can for the demographic characteristics of the people we’ve interviewed.

People have very negative views of the regime. They are increasingly disinclined to believe the regime’s meta-narrative, which rationalizes their misery as a function of being held captive by hostile foreign forces. Most of these people hold the government itself as responsible for their plight.

WSJ: You two previously wrote one of the seminal studies on the North Korean famine (Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid and Reform), what did the refugees tell you about living through that?

Mr. Noland: Both Steph and I were really struck by was just how the famine experience reverberates. The famine was more than 10 years ago. It ended in 1998. A significant share of the people, I think about a third, reported separation from, or death of, family members during that process. You had people out scavenging to find food. People going to China. Family separation and death of family members just continued to reverberate.

We asked them: ‘Were you aware of the international food aid program?’ The numbers differ in our surveys, but significant numbers of people were unaware of the food aid program. It was astonishing to us.

Then, among the ones who were aware, we asked `Do you believe you were a beneficiary?’ Only a small minority responded yes. And when we run all the regressions, this status of knowing of the existence of the program but believing you were not a beneficiary, this is a profoundly demoralizing experience. These people feel they were abandoned at this time of need, when they were seeing their families and neighbors dying. They believe it’s going to the army and the elites. That group of people, when we run the psychological tests and ask them their views of the regime, this is an embittered group. The effect of that experience is bigger than being in the prisons.

We wrote a book on the famine, so obviously we’re interested in it. But we were surprised and we wouldn’t have guessed that this experience continues to reverberate among the people who lived through it.

Read the full story here:
Marcus Noland on NK’s Refugees and Economy
Wall Street Journal: Korea Real Time
Evan Ramstad
1/12/2011

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 11-01-11
(1/11/2011)

On January 7, the Korean Workers’ Party newspaper Rodong Sinmun ran an article introducing the Huichon Ryonha Machine Complex, which manufactures Computer Numerical Control (CNC) systems. The article appeared just before Kim Jong Un’s birthday, and the CNC system appears to be attributed to the youngest son of Kim Jong Il.

The newspaper introduced the machine complex by calling for advancements in the coming year, stating that the CNC system manufacturer “saved our country” and that it was the envy of everyone, catching eyes around the world. The article also proclaimed that “the fatherland” was “growing younger and stronger” with the implementation of vanguard-technology CNC, and that equipment filling a space the size of seven soccer stadiums was set to further the push for industrialization. The reference to ‘growing younger and stronger’ is thought to refer to Kim Jong Un.

In particular, the article stated that North Korea “is not a country that only answers the hardline talk of aggressors with a more hardline response,” and that the North “is not a country that answers the nuclear cudgel of the aggressors as a satellite-launching country or a nuclear country by name alone.” Rather, “the citizens living on this land will answer with vanguard technological breakthroughs” in the face of the economic and technologically dominant aggressors.

North Korea’s satellite launch and nuclear programs were credited to Kim Jong Il in both domestic and international propaganda. The article emphasizing ‘vanguard technological breakthroughs’ is part of a campaign in which the succession system and Kim Jong Un’s reputation are being built on economic and technological development. Increasing propaganda touting CNC technology, in particular, is reflective of the realization of Kim Jong Un’s leadership role.

On one hand, there were no special ceremonies on January 8, the first birthday of Kim Jong Un’s to pass since his official emergence into DPRK politics. In fact, according to the Daily NK, Kim Jong Un’s birthday is not acknowledged in the official calendars issued by Pyongyang at the end of last year.

Last year, North Korea recognized Kim Jong Un’s birthday as a special holiday, with laborers and farm workers all having a day off. Within the Party, the day is known as “the people’s holiday,” and there were internal celebrations attended by Party members. A source within North Korea explained to Daily NK, “with no official promulgation of a successor, it doesn’t make sense to make the Young General’s birthday a holiday.”

While it’s clear that Kim Jong Un will move up through the ranks to take his father’s leadership position, he has to first be officially established within the Party before his birthday can be celebrated on a national level. Furthermore, since the currency reform measures at the end of November, 2009, prices skyrocketed and the lives of the people grew more difficult. With the current atmosphere within North Korea, it would not benefit Kim Jong Un to be cast into the spotlight by politicizing his birthday.

In addition, North Korean authorities have been emphasizing the ‘battle’ for light industrial development and the improvement of the lives of the people through the New Year’s Joint Resolution and other articles in state-run newspapers and media, while the people of North Korea have been gathering in groups to have the joint resolution explained and the key points emphasized. In this situation, it appears authorities decided that public celebration of Kim Jong Un’s birthday would be distracting.

According to the Choson Ilbo:

The North Korean regime appears to have started a new reign of terror to consolidate the succession of leader Kim Jong-il’s son Jong-un.

The South Korean government and a North Korean source on Wednesday said public executions more than tripled last year. And increasing numbers of North Koreans have been killed trying to cross the Apnok (or Yalu) or Duman (or Tumen) River after the regime gave a shoot-to-kill order. The party and military, meanwhile, are engulfed in a whirlwind of purges, observers believe.

Public Executions

A diplomatic source familiar with North Korean affairs Wednesday said there were 60 confirmed public executions in the North last year, more than triple the number of 2009. “Since last year, the regime has put a notice on bulletin boards warning that those who use Chinese-made mobile phones or illegally circulate dollars face public execution, the source said.

Another source familiar with North Korean affairs said, “It’s rumored that Kim Jong-un has called for ‘gunshots across the country.’ Kim Jong-il did exactly the same thing when he took power.”

Jang Se-yul of the North Korean People’s Liberation Front, a group of former North Korean soldiers and officers who defected to South Korea, said, “In Chongjin, North Hamgyong Province alone last year, at least six people were executed publicly on charges of human trafficking and robbery. People are executed publicly for crimes that would have sent them to prison for just a few years in the past.”

“The number of public executions had gradually dwindled in the North since the famine of the late 1990s,” said International security ambassador Nam Joo-hong. “But since last year, the regime has apparently relied increasingly on public executions to tighten control in the aftermath of the botched currency reform and complaints about the hereditary succession.”

‘Shoot-to-Kill’ Order Against Defectors

Observers believe the regime has issued a shoot-to-kill order against defectors. According to a high-level source in the Changbai region in the Chinese province of Jilin, five North Koreans were shot dead and two others wounded by North Korean border guards on the Chinese side of the border after they crossed the Apnok River on Dec. 14.

And the military is being purged of unreliable elements. Quoting an internal North Korean source last Saturday, Free North Korea Radio, a shortwave broadcaster in the South, said the number of inmates has soared at a labor camp under the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces in North Hamgyong Province. It said many of the inmates are former army generals who have been purged by Kim Jong-un.

The regime’s determination to tighten control is also reflected in the Workers Party’s new regulations, the first for 30 years. The regime recently added a new clause calling for all party members to abide by a new regulation requiring them “to oppose and fight against anti-socialist trends.”

A South Korean intelligence official said the phrase refers to elements of capitalism that have flowed in from South Korea. “The regime has paved the way to publicly execute even people who watch South Korean soap operas or dress in South Korean style, branding them as anti-party elements,” he said.

The Daily NK also reports some personnel changes:

North Korea has been replacing local Party officials with a younger generation since the Chosun Workers’ Party Delegates’ Conference on September 28th, in preparation for Kim Jong Eun’s ascent to power.

In particular, North Korea replaced a great many officials in November and December of last year, a source from Chongjin has revealed, bringing in new provincial, municipal, and district institution officials and industrial complex Party committee members to replace those over 60 with people in their 30s and 40s.

The source commented, “After each Party committee’s annual evaluation meeting, the replacement of officials took place,” continuing, “For the stated purpose of raising the quality of the Party to make it a ‘young, vigorous, and ambitious party’, they are replacing aged officials with younger ones. Thus, recently some officials that people wouldn’t know if they tripped over them have been appearing.”

The policy apparently stems from Kim Jong Il, who is pushing the succession process forward relatively swiftly for reasons said to include his own health and North Korea’s external political environment. Of course, it is also a strategic move on the part of Kim Jong Il, to strengthen unity around Kim Jong Eun by bringing in new blood which will henceforth owe a debt of gratitude to him.

According to the source, Party committees organized a one-month short course for such young officials in October of last year, during which instructors dispatched from Pyongyang or the provincial Party center promoted the idea that youth, vigor and ambition, alongside iron loyalty to the dictator, would be necessary tenets of future party operations.

According to the source, officials emphasized during the lecture course, “Obeying Youth Captain Kim Jong Eun and working well are the kind of faithful actions which repay the trust we receive from the General,” and, “Officials need to strengthen the Party, following on from their predecessors.”

Adding detail to the Party reshuffling; the source said that graduates of Communist Colleges older than 60 are being relieved of their positions, and graduates of Kim Il Sung Senior Party College are filling the ranks in behind.

Those who have at least two-year career as secretary of a Party cell can enter a Communist College, a provincial entity managed by the provincial committee of the Party; after graduation they can work on a provincial committee of the Party.

However, Kim Il Sung Senior Party College, the so-called Central Party College, is a more elite institution in Pyongyang charged with fostering the Party’s core workers; it admits officials with a good family background who have been working for more than two years on a provincial committee.

According to North Korean defectors, once one graduates from Central Party College, one is on the road to a comfortable life. For example, in the words of one defector with experience of the system, any North Korean official with access to a vehicle is almost certain to have graduated from Central Party College.

Accordingly, using North Hamkyung Province as an example, people in ‘powerful’ departments like factory guidance units, the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Guidance Department of North Hamkyung Province Party Committee, the Ministry of Administration, factory and industrial complex Party committees (Guidance Department, Officials Department, Propaganda and Agitation Department, Party Member Registration Department and General Affairs Department) have been or are being replaced with graduates from the Central Party School.

Those who are being eased out are either destined for less powerful departments, the source said, citing the Party Inspections Committee or Labor Organization Department, or are being completely removed.

Quoting a common phrase relating to the holding of power, the source said that those about to be replaced are full of regret, saying, “If I had known this would happen, I would have done more to prepare for my future when I had glue on my hands.”

A similar process of replacing officials was conducted in the 1980s, prior to Kim Jong Il’s coming to power. In addition to which, this fits in with the overall propaganda rhetoric, which is justifying Kim Jong Eun’s succession by emphasizing youth and his regime’s concomitant ability to apply technology (CNC etc.) to solve North Korea’s chronic economic shortcomings.

The usual caveats apply.

Read the full story here:
N.Korean Regime Intensifies ‘Reign of Terror’
Choson Ilbo
1/13/2010

Youth, Vigor, Ambition, and Loyalty
Daily NK
Im Jeong Jin
1-12-2011

According to the Korea Times:

The late North Korean leader Kim Il-sung proposed secret negotiations with Washington ahead of the assassination of then South Korean first lady Yuk Young-soo in 1974, according to a classified document dated June 6, 1974 from the U.S. Embassy in Senegal.

The revelation came after An Chi-yong, a former journalist based in the United States, posted the confidential dossier, classified as “secret,” on his website “Secrets of Korea,” Tuesday.

It reveals that the North’s founder, father of current leader Kim Jong-il, asked the late Senegalese President Leopold Senghor to deliver a secret message to the U.S. in 1974.

“President Senghor informed me on June 5 that during his recent visit to Pyongyang, Kim Il-sung charged him with a message for the United States government,” according to the dossier.

“Kim Il-sung said the DPRK (North Korea) would welcome secret negotiations with the USG (U.S. government) on the future of Korea.”

The suggestion was made two months before the assassination of the first lady on Aug. 15, 1974.

Yuk was shot by a Japan-born Korean believed to be a communist sympathizer and having acted upon orders from a pro-Pyongyang organization there.

The dossier also offers a glimpse of Kim Il-sung’s attitude toward Washington and Tokyo and his thoughts on the unification of the two Koreas.

“The North Korean leader told Senghor he felt the DPRK’s enemy in the Pacific is Japan, not us,” the document stated.

“What North Korea seeks is a confederation, not suppression of South Korea, and within that confederation, there would be a place for U.S. influence in the South.”

Another U.S. government document that cites a New York Times article by Richard Halloran reveals that Kim Il-sung may have sought a similar favor from the late Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Miki before the 1974 assassination.

“Halloran (NYT 8/10) says Kim Il-sung informed President Ford through Prime Minister Miki he wants to open direct talks with us to settle outstanding issues of Korea,” according to the dossier dated Aug. 11, 1975. “Wants us to send envoy to prepare agenda for talks with HAK (Henry A. Kissinger) on U.S. troop withdrawal, peace treaty to replace 1953 truce.”

The two Koreas remain technically at war as the 1950-53 Korean War ended in an armistice, not a peace treaty

It remains uncertain whether the communist North succeeded in holding bilateral talks with Washington.

A declassified U.S. document shows that Pyongyang continued its efforts to have dialogue with the U.S. even after the tragic assassination took place.

It says on Aug. 27 1974 an aide to then Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu met with then U.S. President Ford at the White House to deliver a message from Kim Il-sung.

“The North Korean leadership wants to have confidential contact with the United States for discussions,” according to the declassified memorandum from President Gerald Ford’s files.

Yet, Ford’s response to the repeated proposal for talks was lukewarm.

“Certain things must precede such contacts. We don’t want to go in without a firm understanding,” the U.S. President was quoted as saying in the declassified documents.

Here is a link to the actual document.

Here is a link to “Secret[s] of Korea“.

Read the full story here:
NK proposed talks with US before 1974 assassination’
The Korea Times
Lee Tae-hoon
2011-1-11

UPDATE  (1/11/2011): The DPRK accuses the ROK of hacking its web pages.  According to the AP (Via Washington Post):

North Korea is accusing South Korean Internet users of hacking into one of its websites, calling the behavior a provocation aimed at undermining its national dignity.

The North’s government-run Uriminzokkiri website said Tuesday that South Korean Internet users recently deleted articles on the site and posted messages slandering the North’s dignity.

It accuses the South Korean government of being behind the cyber attacks and urges it to apologize.

Anti-North Korea articles and pictures were reportedly posted on the site over the weekend, with one image showing leader Kim Jong Il and his son and heir-apparent Kim Jong Un kneeling down before what appears to be a Chinese emperor. [See image here]

UPDATE (1/11/2011): I am not sure how I missed it, but it appears that the battle between North and South Korean hackers  we saw on the weekend of Jan 8 has been going on for a few weeks.  According to the AFP, last weekend’s hacks on the North Korean web pages was actually the second round of such efforts:

The South’s hackers last month sabotaged the official website [Uriminzokkiri] with a 12-line acrostic poem — purportedly in praise of the Kims but with the first letter of each line spelling out derogatory words about them.

Apparently North Korean hackers responded to this with a DDOS attack last week, and that was followed by the South Korean hacker attacks over the weekend on the Uriminzokkiri YouTube and Twitter accounts.

UPDATE (1/11/2011): A Chinese-language blog focused on the DPRK printed a small screen shot of the hack job on the Uriminzokkiri page itself which features Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un kneeling before a Chinese emperor:

Click image for larger version

UPDATE (1/9/2010): The Uriminzokkiri web page is back up, and the North Koreans have gotten control of their YouTube account and deleted the pirate video.  I have posted it to my own YouTube account for archival purposes.  You can see it here.  As of today, the North Koreans still have not deleted the pirate tweets:

우리 인민의 철천치 원쑤 김정일 력도와 아들 김정은을 몰아내여 새 세상을 만들자!

조선인민군대여! 인민군들을 먹일 돈으로 핵과 미싸일 개발에 14억 딸라를 랑비한 김정일 력도에게 총부리를 겨누자

로망난 김정일과 폭악한 새끼 돼지 김정은을 한 칼에 처단하여 우리도 남녘의 인민들처럼 이밥에 고깃국을 먹으면서 행복하게 살아보자

300만 인민들이 굶어죽고 얼어죽었는데 초호화별장에서 처녀들과 난잡한 술파티를 벌이고 있는 김정일을 처단하자

Mary has offered translations of these tweets in the comments.

Multiple users at http://dcinside.com are taking credit for the job.

ORIGINAL POST: In honor of Kim Jong-un’s (alleged) birthday, some hackers posted derogatory content to the DPRK’s Uriminzokkiri Twitter and YouTube accounts.  As of now, the content is still up, meaning that the hackers might have changed the passwords making it difficult to gain access to the accounts and remove the content.

Here is the most recent Uriminzokkiri Tweet:

According to the Washington Post, this roughly translates to “Let’s create a new world by rooting out our people’s sworn enemy Kim Jong Il and his son Kim Jong Eun!” (Please correct me if I am wrong)

According to Al Jazeera:

The four most recent messages posted on Saturday morning accuse the ruling family of exploiting the North Korean people to enjoy luxurious lives and develop nuclear arms and missiles.

One message called for an uprising to kill the Kims “with a sword”.

…

The apparent hacking of the site on Saturday, also Kim Jong-un’s birthday, is not the first such attack against the government’s online public relations efforts. Last month, the government’s official website, Uriminzokkiri, was reportedly duped into carrying a message that called the ruling family by harsh names.

Here is a link to the Youtube video:

The Noland/Haggard blog provides a translation:

“The truth behind the Kim Jong Un Train Incident [the reference is to reports of a derailed train SH/MN]”

Kim Jong Il: Ahh…Today is Kim Jong Un’s birthday. I wonder what he’d like for his presents? A Mercedez Benz? A Yacht? Money? Eh, whatever; I’ll just get him everything. Hahahaha.

Kim Jong Un: Get out of my way, you &@#@$@! [Runs over starving people; the corpses pile up on the railway.]

Hahahaha, these people are worthless!!

(Phone rings)

Hello?

Kim Jong Il: It’s me, your dad.

Kim Jong Un: Daddy, it’s my birthday; don’t you have any presents for me?

Kim Jong Il: Don’t worry, I just sent you your presents by train. I’m sure you’ll like them since they’re all crazy expensive. Haha.

Kim Jong Un: Oh, Okay Dad.

Train driver: Huh? What are those?

(The train runs into the corpses left on the railway by Kim Jong Un, and the presents hit Kim Jong Un one by one.)

Kim Jong Un: Dammit, who is it! Who left the &@#@$@! corpses on the railway! Damn it, if you get caught, you’re dead! Which bastard is it!

(Closing) They say Kim Jong Un is still looking for the culprit.

The irony is that KJU’s birthday seems to have garnered more attention outside the DPRK than from within.  Two articles this week point out that KJU’s ascension may still be debatable.  Read more in the New York Times and the Washington Post.

More information related to the hacking below:
1. Washington Post

2. Joshua Stanton, One Free Korea

3. Martyn Willams, North Korea Tech

4. Yonhap

5. Previous posts about the DPRK’s YouTube and Twitter accounts: here and here

6. Martyn Williams’ list of North Korea and North Korea-related web pages.

Back in the autumn of 2008 the North-Korea-watching-world was abuzz with speculation about Kim Jong-il’s health since he had vanished from public view in August (see more here). Fueling the speculation, Kim Jong-il missed the country’s 60th anniversary celebrations in September–which everyone expected him to attend (read more here). KJI marked his return to “public life” on October 4th of that year when he attended a student football match (read more here).  According to KCNA:

Pyongyang, October 4 (KCNA) — General Secretary Kim Jong Il enjoyed a student football match on the occasion of the 62nd anniversary of Kim Il Sung University, the highest institution of Juche-based education and science.

There was the football match between teams of Kim Il Sung University and Pyongyang University of Railways that day, at which the former beat the latter 4-1.

KCNA released several pictures of the match, but I post the most important below along with a satellite image of the location from Google Earth:

In both Google Earth images I have marked off the respective image locations using red arrows.  The top images are the most convincing: The fence, the covering, the field, and hilltop in the background are all spot-on matches .  There is a viewing stand as well (shown in the bottom pictures).  The other official photos, which I did not post, match the satellite imagery as well. You can see them all in the original KCTV broadcast on YouTube.

Just to be safe, I checked out the football fields at Kim Il-sung University and the Pyonyang University of Railroads and neither come close to matching the photographs:

I also checked the hundreds of football fields that I have tagged on my Google Earth file.  None of those match either.

So I think it is fair to say that Kim Jong-il watched the football match from his home in the Kangdong compound (39.200045°, 126.020564°) and this is where he recovered from his surgery, or stroke, or whatever befell him, in the fall of 2008.  Or maybe this is just what they want us to think and he was actually in Wonsan or Hamhung?  It is also worth noting that this compound received a new helipad sometime between March 6, 2004 and December 17, 2006 (39.204600°, 126.014662°).

According to Yonhap:

North Korean leader Kim Jong-il conducted the largest number of public activities last year since he inherited the communist country from his father in 1994, according to figures aggregated by the South Korean government.

The 68-year-old appeared in North Korea’s official media a total of 161 times, the Unification Ministry said Tuesday in a release that suggested Kim was trying to tamp down outside speculation over his health. About one fifth of his activities last year were joined by his third son and heir-apparent Kim Jong-un, the ministry said.

Kim Jong-il reportedly suffered a stroke in 2008, a year during which he showed up only 97 times. Kim appeared in official media 159 times in 2009, increasing his visits to factories and other economy-related facilities. Last year, he made 63 visits to economic sites and 38 to military ones, the ministry said.

“He seems to be trying to unite the regime by showing both internally and externally that he remains healthy and that he is focused on enhancing the living standards of people,” a ministry official said, asking not to be named.

North Korea is trying to revive its economy ahead of 2012, which marks the centennial of the birth of Kim Il-sung, who founded the country and later passed his power to Kim Jong-il upon his death.

Outside analysts say the heavy focus on the economy is aimed at creating a setting favorable for another hereditary power succession, this time, to Kim Jong-un, believed to be about 28.

North Korea’s media have yet to report on Kim Jong-il’s first public activity this year.

Read the full story here:
N. Korean leader most active last year despite health woes
Yonhap
Sam Kim
1/4/2011

According to the Daily NK:

In advance of the new year, 2011, the North Korean authorities have released lecture materials to emphasize “Kim Jong Eun’s leadership.” It implies that they are going to make 2011 the year of Kim Jong Eun, though without the label of “successor.”

A source from Yangkang Province reported on Monday on “a lecture entitled, ‘In the New Year under comrade Kim Jong Eun’s leadership the whole people should be united impregnably around the Party and open the gate of 2012 as a strong and prosperous state.’ It has been spread to each organ and enterprise.”

The source added, “The secretary of the party cell reported that this material was handed down and said the party is going to hold a lecture around the 30th. He stressed that we definitely must attend the lecture.”

Since the North’s authorities announced publicly the Kim Jong Eun succession through the Delegates’ Conference of the Chosun Workers’ Party and on the founding day of the Party, they have been speeding up the process of the succession through releasing Kim Jong Eun’s public activities such as military or security related on-site inspections with his father through the state publications and orders handed down from Kim Jong Eun.

The source reported the mood there, saying that, “Even though the authorities have been clamoring for decades to ‘Protect the Suryeong (Absolute Leader) to the Death,’ there are still many citizens who don’t attend lectures. When they do go to the lectures, they think it is a time napping.”

He went on, “Nowadays as food prices and other prices are soaring, people say that it’s hard to live or they aren’t sure about the propaganda.”

The source construed the attempt to hold lectures about Kim Jong Eun’s leadership likely to be a countermeasure to eliminate people’s discontent with Kim Jong Eun.

Read the full story here:
Lecture Scheduled on Kim Jong Eun’s Leadership
Daily NK
Kang Mi Jin
12/27/2010