DPRK Policies « North Korean Economy Watch

Archive for the ‘DPRK Policies’ Category

Land Leasing Law

Sunday, February 11th, 2007

The DPRK Law on the Leasing of Land was adopted by Resolution No. 40 of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly on October 27, 1993, and amended by Decree No. 484 of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly on February 26, 1999.

The law consists of 42 articles in 6 chapters.

Chapter 1. Fundamentals (Articles 1~8)

This chapter stipulates that the mission of the law is to contribute to establishing a proper system in the leasing of land needed for foreign investors and foreign-invested enterprises and for use of the leased land.

A foreign corporate body or individual may lease and use land in the DPR Korea and the lessee has the right to use the land leased. When land is leased, natural resources and deposits in the land leased are not covered by the right to use land. The term of lease is fixed by agreement between the contracting parties within the limit of 50 years.

Chapter 2. Ways of leasing land (Articles 9~14)

This chapter defines the ways of leasing land.

It stipulates that the leasing of land should be undertaken through consultation or by means of tender or auction. It also notes that the lessor should provide the lessee with the data like the location and area of the land and its topographical map, uses to which the land may be put, the building area, a plan for development of the land, the period during which construction must be completed and the minimum amount of investment required, the requirements for environmental protection, hygiene and anti-epidemics and fire prevention, the term of lease of the land and the state of development of the land.

The lessee must use land in accordance with the contract for use of land. A lessee who wishes to alter the use of land must conclude a supplementary contract with the lessor.

Chapter. 3 Transfer and mortgage of the right to use land (Articles 15-27)

This chapter stipulates that the lessee is permitted, with the approval of the lessor; to transfer (by means of selling, re-leasing, donation or inheritance) or mortgage to a third party the right to use a part or the whole of the land leased and defines in detail the problems arising in the transfer and mortgage of the right to use land.

It also prescribes the condition for transferring the right to use land, the limits of its transfer and the procedure for the sale of the right to use land.

The lessee is allowed to sell, re-lease, donate or mortgage the leased land only after paying the total amount of charge for transferring the right to use land stipulated in the contract for leasing the land and making the contracted investment. In case of the transfer of the right to use land, the rights and obligations relating to the use of the land, and the structures and other appurtenance on it, are also transferred.

When a lessee sells the right to use land, the lessor has the preferential right to buy it.

The chapter also notes that the lessee may re-lease the land leased observing due formalities and defines the procedures for mortgaging the right to use land.

A lessee may mortgage the right to use land with the purpose of obtaining a loan from a bank or other financial institutions. In this case the mortgagor and the mortgagee must conclude a contract for the mortgage in accordance with the terms of the contract for leasing the land. The two contracting parties must register the mortgaged right with the relevant lessor within 10 days.

If the right to use land is mortgaged, the structures and other appurtenance on the land are also mortgaged with the land. When concluding a contract for the mortgage, the mortgagee may request the mortgagor the contract for leasing the land, a copy of the transfer contract, a copy of the certificate for use of the land or other information relating to the current state of the land.

The chapter defines the right of mortgagee when the right to use land is mortgaged as well.

The mortgagee may dispose of the right to use the land mortgaged by contract, as well as the structures and other appurtenance of the land in accordance with the mortgage contract if the mortgagor fails to pay the amount due by the expiry of the mortgage, or if business has been dissolved or gone bankrupt during the period of the mortgage contract. One who has won the right to use land and the structures and other appurtenance on it disposed of by the mortgagee must receive attestation from a notary office, register the change with the registration office and use the land in accordance with the contract for leasing the land.

The mortgagor is not permitted to remortgage or transfer the right to use land during the period of contract without the approval of the mortgagee.

Chapter 4. Rent of land (Articles 28-33)

This chapter notes that the lessee must pay rent for the leased land to the lessor. When leasing developed land, the lessor will receive from the lessee the charge for transferring the right to use land plus the cost of land development. The lessee must pay the total amount of charge for transferring the right to use land within 90 days of signing the contract for leasing land. If the charge is not paid before the prescribed deadline, the lessor must demand additional payment equivalent to 0.1% of the overdue rent on a daily basis, starting from the first day of default.

A lessee who has been leased land through consultation or auction must pay to the lessor a guaranty equivalent to 10% of the charge for transferring the right to use land, within 15 days of the conclusion of the contract for leasing the land. The user of the land leased should pay annually land use charge. In this case, for those who invest in priority sectors and in the Rason economic and trade zone, land use charges may be reduced or exempted for up to 10 years.

Chapter 5. Return of the right to use land (Articles 34~38)

This chapter provides that the right to use land automatically returns to the lessor on the expiry of the term of the lease stipulated in the contract. The structures and other appurtenance on the land also return, without compensation being paid.

The chapter defines the procedure for canceling the registration of the right to use land, extension of the term of land lease, the expense for the withdrawal and clearance of the leased land and the cancellation of the right to use the leased land.

Chapter 6. Penalties and settlement of disputes (Articles 39-42)

This chapter specifies that if a lessee illegally uses land without the certificate for the use of land, or changes the use of land or transfers or mortgages the right to use land without approval, he must be fined, have the facilities on the land confiscated or be required to restore the land to its original state, and the contract for transfer or mortgage be declared null and void.

The chapter also stipulates the ways of depriving the lessee of the right to use land, appealing to or filing a suit on it and settling the disputes.

In case of a failure to invest 50% of the total sum of investment during the period prescribed in the contract for the leasing of land, or to develop the land as contracted, the lessee may be deprived of the right to use land.

If the lessee disagrees with the penalty imposed on him, he may appeal to an institution senior to the one that has imposed sanctions or file a suit with an appropriate court within 20 days of the receipt of the notice of penalty.

Disagreements arising in leasing land or transferring and mortgaging leased land to a third party must be settled through consultation.

In case of failure in consultation, they must be settled through arbitration or legal procedures provided by the DPRK, or may be taken to an arbitration body in a third country for settlement.

The DPRK Law on the Leasing of Land contributes to establishing a proper system and order in the leasing of land needed for foreign investors and foreign-invested enterprises in order to secure their investment and activities.

Posted in Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, Law on Land Leasing | Comments Closed

Efforts Redoubled to Build Economic Power

Thursday, February 8th, 2007

KCNA
2/8/2007

Redoubled efforts are being made to build a socialist economic power in the DPRK. The people are turning out in the grand march for perfecting the looks of a great, prosperous and powerful nation, full of confidence in sure victory and optimism.

The DPRK has consolidated the foundation for building an economic power over the last years.

The Workers’ Party of Korea has developed in depth President Kim Il Sung’s idea on economy as required by the developing revolution and thus provided unswerving guidelines for building an economic power.

While implementing the revolutionary economic policies of the WPK such as the line on economic construction in the Songun era with main emphasis on the development of the munitions industry and the policy of putting the national economy on a modern footing and IT, the Korean people have been firmly convinced that they will certainly build an economic power in this land when they work as indicated by the Party.

The army-people unity has developed as the oneness of army and people in terms of ideology and fighting spirit in the Songun era. It constitutes a powerful impetus to the construction of the economic power.

The Kanggye spirit, torchlight of Songgang and the Thaechon stamina have been created while the whole society following the revolutionary soldier spirit. The efforts have brought about a great change in the overall socialist construction.

Through the heroic endeavors, the people replete with faith in the future of prosperity have put industrial establishments, once stopped, on normalization of production and erected many monumental edifices including the Thaechon Youth Power Station No. 4.

An importance has been attached to science. A large army of intellectuals are paving the shortcut to the construction of an economic power with an extraordinary revolutionary enthusiasm.

A solid material and technical foundation for the construction of an economic power has been laid in the country.

All the sectors of the national economy have pushed ahead with the work of perfecting production structures, renovating technique and putting them on a modern footing, with the result that the number of such model factories in technical renovation and modernization as the Pyongyang 326 Electric Wire Factory is increasing as the days go by.

Production bases such as foodstuff factory, chicken farm, catfish farm, beer factory and cosmetic factory, which are directly contributing to the improvement of the people’s living standard, have mushroomed in different parts of the country.

The DPRK, with all the conditions for leaping higher and faster, will demonstrate the might of an economic power in the near future.

Posted in Cell phones, Computing/IT, Email, Internet, Songun, Worker's Party | Comments Closed

Food aid key to N Korea talks

Thursday, February 8th, 2007

BBC
2/7/2007

As six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear programme resume in Beijing, the BBC’s Penny Spiller considers whether food shortages in the secretive communist state may have an impact on progress.

Negotiators for the US, North Korea, China, Japan, South Korea and Russia are meeting in Beijing amid signs of a willingness to compromise.

While the last round of talks in December ended in deadlock, bilateral meetings since then have brought unusually positive responses from both North Korea and the US.

Such upbeat noises were unexpected, coming four months after North Korea shocked the world by testing a nuclear bomb.

The test brought international condemnation and UN sanctions, as well as a significant drop in crucial food aid.

South Korea suspended a shipment of 500,000 tonnes of food supplies, while China’s food exports last year were sharply down.

The World Food Programme has struggled to raise even 20% of the funds it requires to feed 1.9 million people it has identified as in immediate need of help.

Aid agencies warned at the time of a humanitarian disaster within months, as the North cannot produce enough food itself to supply its population. It also lost an estimated 100,000 tonnes-worth of crops because of floods in July.

‘Queues for rations’

Kathi Zellweger, of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation in Pyongyang, said the present food situation in the country was unclear.

No figures are yet available for last year’s harvest, and it was difficult to assess what impact the lack of food aid was having on supplies, she said.

However, the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation estimated the country was short of one million tonnes of food – a fifth of the annual requirement to feed its 23 million people.

South Korea-based Father Jerry Hammond said there were signs of shortages – not only in food but also in fuel – when he visited the North with the Catholic charity Caritas in December.

He described seeing long queues for rations, and ordinary people selling goods in the street for money to buy the basics.

“You do expect to see more shortages during the winter time,” the US-born priest, who has visited North Korea dozens of times in the past decade, said.

“But I did see a noticeable difference this time.”

High malnutrition rates

Paul Risley, of the World Food Programme, said people in North Korea may still be cushioned by the November harvest and the pinch will be felt in the coming months.

“We have great concerns,” he said, pointing out that North Korea was now in its second year of food shortages.

He says “stabilising food security” in the country will be very relevant to the talks in Beijing.

“It is certainly the hope of all who are observing the situation in [North Korea] that imports of food can be resumed and returned to prior levels,” he said.

“Malnutrition rates are still the highest in Asia, and we certainly don’t want to see those rates rise any further.”

Father Hammond thinks Pyongyang may be persuaded to consider compromises in Beijing, but is unlikely to do so as a result of any pressure from the people of North Korea.

“People are very cut off from the outside world, and there is constant propaganda about national survival. Even if they go hungry, it will be considered patriotic,” he said.

There have been signs of possible compromise from both sides in the run up to the talks.

Washington has reportedly hinted at flexibility over its offer of aid and security guarantees, as well as showing a willingness to sit down and discuss North Korea’s demands to lift financial sanctions.

Meanwhile, North Korea reportedly recently told visiting US officials it would take the first steps to disband its nuclear programme in return for 500,000 tonnes of fuel oil and other benefits.

And South Korea is keen to resume its shipments of rice and fertiliser aid – if Pyongyang agrees to freeze its nuclear programme, the Choson Ilbo newspaper has reported.

As the nuclear talks resume, all sides will be looking to translate such pressures into progress.

Posted in Agriculture, Agriculture statistics, Arduous March, China, Foreign aid statistics, International Aid, International trade, Japan, Russia, South Korea, Switzerland, UN, UN Food and Agriculture Organization, UN World Food Program | Comments Closed

N. Korean Food Program Needs Funds to Continue to 2009, UN Says

Friday, February 2nd, 2007

Bloomberg.com
Emma O’Brien
2/2/2007

The United Nations program to feed about a quarter of North Korea’s 24 million people needs funds to operate until 2009, after countries such as the U.S. ended or reduced their support, the head of the World Food Program said.

“We only have 16 percent of the funds needed to do our work in North Korea over the next two years,” James T. Morris said late yesterday in Wellington, New Zealand. “The U.S. used to be our largest donor in North Korea, but we haven’t received any money from them for the past 8 to 9 months.”

More than 1 million people died in North Korea during the 1990s as a result of famine caused by drought, floods and economic mismanagement. North Korea’s international isolation deepened last October when the United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions after the communist country tested its first nuclear bomb.

The North Korea government said in 2005 it no longer needed the UN program that aimed to feed about 6.5 million people because it succeeded in harvesting enough grain. Floods last year reduced grain production by an estimated 90,000 metric tons, almost one-fifth of the minimum harvest needed to feed the population, the WFP said at the time.

“I am very concerned about the situation in North Korea,” Morris said, as the country’s crop deficit is forecast to be 1 million tons this year. “We are not able to do our job unless there is additional support to provide food.”

Morris, who will leave the directorship of the WFP early this year after 5 years at the helm, was in Wellington for talks with New Zealand’s aid agency, NZAID, on food aid to East Timor. His speech to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs was his last on an international visit.

The WFP and its sister agencies, the UN Development Program and the UN children’s fund Unicef, are the only major non- governmental organizations still active in North Korea.

Government Restrictions

North Korea is the only country in the world where the UN program has to work through the government. The administration chooses all their local workers and all food has to be distributed via government-selected contractors.

“It’s the only place in the world where we don’t have universal access,” Morris said. “The government makes life very difficult for our work.”

The program used to distribute to 183 counties in North Korea. The government now restricts them to 29. Constraints placed on the program by the government are “abhorrent and unacceptable,” he said.

The average 7-year-old North Korean boy is 8 inches shorter and 20 pounds lighter than his South Korean counterpart, Morris said, and 40 percent of North Korean women are anemic.

Russia, China

Russia is now the largest contributor to North Korean aid, Morris said. The U.S. provided about 47 percent of all contributions, in both commodities and funds, over the past 10 years. The WFP, the UN’s largest division, had an operating budget of more than $2.8 billion last year, he said.

China and South Korea, which send food directly to North Korea, are also scaling down their aid.

“They intend to reduce their bilateral food and fertilizer assistance,” Morris said, adding China’s toughened stance toward North Korea since the missile test may be behind the move.

China, North Korea’s closest ally, supported the UN sanctions imposed after the nuclear test that ban sales of military equipment and luxury goods to the country. The U.S. imposed financial restrictions on North Korean bank accounts in October 2005 over allegations of money laundering and counterfeiting.

The issue stalled talks between North Korea, the U.S., China, Japan, South Korea and Russia on dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program. The forum resumed in December after a 13-month break with North Korea refused to enter discussions within the six-nation forum until the U.S. lifts the sanctions.

The six nations will hold another round of talks in Beijing beginning Feb. 8.

Posted in 1990s Famine, Agriculture, Agriculture statistics, Arduous March, DPRK Policies, International Aid, Russia, Statistics, UN, UN World Food Program, UNICEF | Comments Closed

Can Economic Theory Demystify North Korea?

Wednesday, January 31st, 2007

Japan Focus (Hat Tip Gregor)
Ruediger Frank
1/31/2007

Abstract
The starting point of this paper is the assumption that North Korea is de facto a well-defined nation-state, home to a national economy and inhabited by individuals that bear the same basic economic and social characteristics as individuals elsewhere. Despite the obvious specifics of the economic system and institutional structure of the country, standard economic theory should be applicable to the question of North Korean economic development. The article seeks to prove this as broadly as possible, showing that economic theory as diverse as classical and neoclassical, Marxist, Keynesian, institutional, developmentalist, neo-liberal or structuralist, dependency analysis-based and many others, including regionally centered approaches, can be utilized to explain the North Korean case with useful results, although the latter will inevitably vary depending on the chosen framework. Without arguing against or in favor of any of the available theoretical methods, this article advocates further research on North Korea as another case of development in East Asia, rather than as a mystical exception to the rule. This is particularly important in light of the tendency to describe North Korea as unpredictable, bizarre, and incomprehensible. This is clearly not the case.

Full paper below the fold

(more…)

Posted in 2002 Economic reforms, DPRK Policies, Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, International Aid, Political economy | Comments Closed

Ideological Center of North

Tuesday, January 30th, 2007

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
1/30/2007

The North Korean press insists that the “great and immortal” juche idea was designed by the “Great Leader,” Kim Il-sung, in the mid-1920s and has remained the guiding principle of the Korean revolution ever since. But do not expect to find references to juche in Korean publications of the 1950s or even early 1960s.

Even if Kim Il-sung first used the term in his speech in December 1955, it took at least five years before the term became widely known in the country _ and five more years for it to become the name of North Korea’s official ideology.

Only in April 1965, while delivering a lengthy lecture in Indonesia, did Kim Il-sung make it clear that from that point on juche would be considered the basic principle of North Korean ideological policy.

The North Korean leadership badly needed a new ideology in 1965. Why? This was the year when the dispute between the Soviet Union and China reached new heights. The two communist powers had been quarrelling for some time, but from 1965 to 1970 the two countries, which had recently vowed “eternal friendship,” were on the brink of war.

North Korea wisely decided to maintain neutrality, allowing it to milk both sponsors. But in the heavily ideological world of oldstyle communism one needed a theoretical justification for one’s position, even if this position was taken exclusively on account of pragmatic considerations (sounds like academia, doesn’t it?).

Nothing could be as handy as a new ideology, especially since the North had been drifting away from Soviet-style Leninism for some time. A locally designed juche was a good solution to the ideological conundrum.

It was easy to say that North Korea had discovered a new truth that was, needless to say, superior to the truth of Sovietstyle Leninism or Chinese-style Leninism-plus-Maoism. Hence, being bearers of the supreme truth, Koreans could not be ordered around.

But what exactly were the relations between juche and Marxism? For our readers this might appear a rather scholastic question, but the world of communism was based on ideology, and ideological disputes mattered. Of course, communist leaders had long learned how to bend their ideology and how to adjust its postulates to any given current political purpose.

In this regard, they were no different from leaders of supposedly religious states, whose actual policy was not too constrained by their loudly professed faith.

Nonetheless, some explanations had to be invented.

Until the late 1960s, juche was presented as a specific form of Marxism-Leninism, which suited the Korean realities and demands of the Korean communist revolution. It was not separated from Marxism. This explanation found its way into the North Korean constitution of 1972. Article 4 described juche as “a creative application of Marxism-Leninism to the conditions of our country.”

The next step in juche’s development took place around 1974 and was perhaps related to the gradual rise of Kim Jong-il. It has been often stated that Kim Jongil introduced new interpretations of juche because he wanted to flatter his father, the founder of juche, and thus demonstrate his loyalty to Kim Il-sung’s cause.

Whatever the reasons, in 1974 some documents signed by Kim Jong-il but actually written by the administration’s chief theoretician, Hwang Jang-yop (currently in Seoul), began to use the term “kimilsungism” as a synonym for juche. In February 1974, Kim Jong-il explained that the works of Marx and Lenin had become outdated.

They described the world as it was 100 or 50 years ago, while juche was suited for the modern world, they argued. Thus, in 1980 the Korean Workers’ Party proclaimed juche the party’s guiding ideology, without mentioning its relationship to Marxism.

That statement doubtless resonated well with the nationalism of Korean cadres because it essentially placed North Korea at the ideological center of the world. Since then, the nationalist element of juche has been increasingly emphasized.

That position was also an open challenge to orthodoxy as understood in Moscow and Beijing. It was as if a local Catholic bishop proclaimed that he had a better grasp of the Holy Scriptures than the pope (or, to take the analogy a bit further, two quarrelling popes) and was able to devise something like a Newest Testament.

These statements made juche-worshipping North Koreans into open heretics within the communist camp, but other “fraternal countries” had to swallow this: Whatever they said, strategic considerations took precedence over ideology. Nobody wanted to alienate Pyongyang, which had been long seen as a strangebehaving sibling of the communist “family.”

However, this family unity did not last. In 1992, the newly amended North Korean constitution completely omitted references to Marxism-Leninism and replaced it with juche as the sole official ideology. Nobody was outraged.

By that time Leninism was patently dead, and even the few countries that still maintained a commitment to that ideology hardly took their own declarations seriously.

However, after the death of Kim Il-sung there were some signs that the significance of the juche idea began to wane.

Posted in China, DPRK Policies, Juche, Political economy, Russia, Songun | Comments Closed

Analysis of North Korea’s ‘Market Economy’ 2

Friday, January 26th, 2007

Daily NK
Kim Min Se
1/26/2007

The “first-runners” are first-tier wholesalers who connect Chinese manufacturers and North Korean market owners in large cities such as Sinuiju, Hyesan, Hamheung or Chongjin. The goods transported by the first-runners to metropolitan markets in NK are met by second-runners in smaller cities.

South Pyongan province’s Pyongsong, Sunchon and Nampo are the hub for those second-runners, who move imported commodities to further deep into countryside of North and South Pyongan provinces and Hwanghae province.

Moon, a 38-year old shopkeeper in a market in Sunchon, South Pyongan, said “As soon as we hear the news that first-runners brought goods, we go to them with money right away. Since they run a huge amount of money, ordinary buyers can’t even meet them.”

Moon said that for second-runners including herself it took about half million NK wons (180 US dollars) to buy goods for one time. She buys merchandise from first-runners and sells it back to local storeowners.

For second-runners, it is crucial to procure enough high-quality goods with low price. If one buys bad products, he or she loses money. Same rule applies to first-runners.

Second-runners also hand over raw materials to manufacturers. The diminutive North Korean industry relies partly on them.

Chinese sugar and flour turn to bread and candy, and imported clothing materials are manufactured in home factories. Most of the manufacturers who buy raw materials from second-runners are individual handicraftsmen.

Lee, a clothing producer in Hamheung, sells her homemade clothes in market. Lee has had good relationship a number of second-runners, who trade Chinese fabric, so she can even buy stuff on credit.

Throughout the March of Tribulation in late 90s, North Korean people had depended on home industry for their basic necessities. And now it is estimated that significant amount of industrial products in North Korean markets are home-produced.

Those with little capital or without a stand in local market go to the most remote regions in high mountains or countryside and sell their handicrafts via train. Although it is not North Korean business slang, such activity can be classified as “third-running.”

The so-called “third-runners” trade their home-manufactured goods with country people’s corn, bean or rice, since it is rare to own a lot of cash in rural area.

In sum, once persecuted North Korean private markets are now reflecting every aspect of capitalist economy.

Posted in 1990s Famine, Agriculture, Banking, Black markets, Economic reform, Finance, Foreign direct investment, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Price liberalization, Private property | Comments Closed

Analysis of North Korea’s “Market Economy” I.

Thursday, January 25th, 2007

Daily NK
Kim Min Se
1/25/2007

Since 2002’s 7.1. economic reform measures, North Korea’s markets have become most vital part of peoples life. North Korean market system operates from ‘general market’ with huge process chain to small local ‘yard market’ in the remote countryside. And, in between, there are always some brokers.

An importer buys goods from China and transports them through cargo trains or trucks to large cities in North Korea, such as Hamheung, Chongjin, Pyongsung or Nampo. Wholesale traders take those products and resell to local businesspeople. In North Korean jargon, such process is called “running.”

Usually imported goods from China or North Korean domestic ones take three steps of circulation; one or two laps of ‘run’ is added in case of mountain area.

Wholesale is mostly carried out by cars. Since oil and vehicles are not enough, sometimes wholesalers rent cars by themselves.

A forty one-year old trader working in Dandong, China, Kim, said that he purchases goods from Chinese factories firsthand. If the amount of import is huge, Kim uses freight. If not, a few trucks are fine for him. At maximum, Kim bought 60 tons of texture from China at once and resold it to North Korean wholesaler in one month.

In Hyesan, Yangkang province, 38-year old Choi, a broker of mainly Chinese cloths and shoes, sells his stuff to nearby Chongjin. Choi told the Daily NK “There are two types of so-called running; first run and second run. “Running” requires a lot of capital like money for vehicles. So the person must be patient and cautious when buying and selling something.”

According to the interview with Kim, using vehicle in wholesale business takes from 3.5 million NK wons (roughly 1,000 US dollars) to 35 million wons. The money includes not only car rental but also “transportation permit” application fee. Transportation permit is required when vehicle and personnel move inter-province, and costs relatively large amount of cash.

Kim keeps about twenty percent of total sales as his profit. The other 80% is comprised of original price of goods, car tax, gasoline and multifarious types of ‘extra expenses,’ or bribe.

The “first run” business is apportioned to a few with privilege in North Korea. Those who can earn cooperation from Security Agency and police are able to do the first run. Without bribery, it is impossible to obtain various permits that are essential for any businessperson.

In addition, to trade with overseas Chinese merchants, one must possess enough wealth and credit. Credit enables North Korean businessmen to buy goods in China with comparatively low price. Those first runners are, in most cases, wealthy North Koreans with ten thousand US dollars cash on their hand at any moment.

Posted in 2002 Economic reforms, Automobiles, Black markets, China, Economic reform, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), International trade, Price liberalization, Private property, Railways, Transportation | Comments Closed

Female Ratio in KPA Now More Than 10%

Tuesday, January 23rd, 2007

Daily NK
Kim Min Se
1/23/2007

What is the gender ratio in Korean People’s Army?

A 28-year old recent defector Kim and a 38-year old former KPA Air Force engineer Choi said that female members of KPA could take up to ten percent of the total armed forces from administrative positions to front battalions.

Kim testified “Most of small-caliber anti-aircraft guns are operated by women and there are even all-female independent brigades and regiments.”

“North Korean authorities encourage women to be enlisted in coastal artillery by advertising ‘recruiting songs.’”

Kim also said that virtually all of the North Korean train tunnels and bridges were guarded by women forces armed with 14.5mm machine gunnery.

Korean People’s Army, according to the South Korean Ministry of Defense’s White Paper, boasts 1.17 million soldiers, and the government in North Korea has increasingly enlisted women since the population shrank in mid-90s.

Kim is a former female member of the KPA 4-25 Training Camp (equivalent to a corps) 331st Brigade 6th Mechanized Battalion. She had served since 1997, the peak of starvation period. At that time many North Korean parents sent their daughters to the army for them to avoid hunger.

Female officers have been mass-recruited since 1995 among women NCOs of proven party loyalty and good family background. They were trained for two years and then stationed in each unit.

For the enlisted, both men and women are conscripted at their age of 17 while the female soldiers receive trainings specialized in anti-aircraft guns.

However, some others, as their male compatriots, are more fortunate, due to their superb ancestral or family background, to be stationed in army hospitals or other more comfortable places than coastal artillery.

“In more recent days,” another defector Choi said, “even aircraft pilots of Soviet-built IL-28 Bombers are filled with women.”

North Korean enlisted women usually serve six to seven years, in contrast with ten to thirteen years of men’s service.

Female veterans automatically become KWP member as they are discharged and enjoy higher chance to be selected as junior party official, but not as preferable marriage partner.

Posted in 1990s Famine, Automobiles, Civil society, Military, Railways | Comments Closed

N. Korea to focus on inter-Korean economic projects in 2007: think tank

Monday, January 22nd, 2007

Yonhap
1/22/2007

North Korea will put strong emphasis on inter-Korean economic projects this year as the communist state insinuated that it is suffering from economic difficulties, a state-run think tank said Monday.

In its new year commentary, Pyongyang partially admitted that its economy is in bad shape and said its highest priority for 2007 is boosting the sagging economy, the Korea Development Institute (KDI) said in a report.

“Unlike in previous years, when the North placed political ideology, the military and the economic sector, in that order, as its three key areas of importance, North Korea set the economic sector ahead of those two other sectors in the commentary this year,” the KDI said.

“The North also skipped over commenting on a series of economic achievements, except for saying that it has secured a foothold for a new leap. … In addition, it said that it has gone through the ‘worst adverse situation’ in the past 10 years, showing that the economy was still suffering from difficulty in 2006.”

To boost the economy, the North may actively push for inter-Korean economic projects and depend on the South for increased economic support as its economic cooperation with other nations such as the United States and Japan has come to a near halt, the institute said.

In the commentary, the North also used a slogan, “put an importance on the Korean people,” a comment indicating increased inter-Korean cooperation, the KDI said.

Every Jan. 1, the communist nation releases its new year commentary on three state dailies, including the Rodong Sinmun, one of the only sources of information on the country’s economic policy plans.

Under the title, “Create a prosperous era of the Songun (military-first) Choseon,” the North urged its people to make concerted efforts to solve the economic problems in 2007 and make the country an economic power as a socialist nation.

According to many analysts, the North’s annual economic growth may have fallen below 1 percent last year, down from an estimated 1 percent growth in 2005 and 2.2 percent in 2004. A variety of global economic sanctions against Pyongyang could have contributed to the slower growth in 2006, the institute said.

Posted in Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, Songun, South Korea, Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013) | Comments Closed

North Korean Economy Watch