Archive for the ‘2002 Economic reforms’ Category

Signals coming from the media in North Korea

Saturday, November 3rd, 2007

Joong Ang Daily
Brian Lee
11/1/2007

Newspapers indicate a desire for more outside interactions

North Korea is increasingly sending out signals through its state media indicating a desire to interact more with the outside world.

The North’s communist party newspaper Rodong Sinmun said in an editorial earlier this week that it is no longer a time for production and construction to be achieved through the workers’ bare hands alone.

“We are stressing self-sufficiency, but that does not mean we are disregarding international economic relations while striving to build our economy,” the newspaper said. “The republic has always maintained its position that it wants to have good relations, even with capitalist countries.”

The Chosun Sinbo, a pro-Pyongyang newspaper in Japan widely believed to be representing North Korea’s views, also said this week that progress in the six-party talks reflected Pyongyang’s political will to improve ties with neighboring countries.

“The nuclear test was Pyongyang’s tool to change the stalemate with Washington,” said Koh Yoo-hwan, a North Korean specialist at Dongguk University. “It got its attention and now both sides are talking. The diplomatic exchanges with other countries are a sign from the North that it can accept capitalist methods and that it is open to the outside. This is not coming just out of the blue. In the North everything is planned from the top and all these moves are done strategically. They want to connect to the outside.”

Yesterday, North Korea restored diplomatic ties with Burma after 24 years of severed ties over the North’s involvement in a bomb attack on South Korean cabinet members in 1983, The Associated Press reported.

North Korean Premier Kim Yong-il has also embarked on a rare sweep of the Asian region, visiting Vietnam last week with Malaysia, Cambodia and Laos also on his itinerary.

Washington has tried in its own way to lure the isolated North more into the open.

A visit by the New York Philharmonic to the North is being pondered while the JoongAng Sunday reported that the North’s women’s soccer team may visit the United States.

In a related development, Christopher Hill, Washington’s chief representative to the six-party talks, met with his North Korean counterpart Kim Gye-gwan in Beijing yesterday to discuss progress in the nuclear negotiations.

Hill is scheduled to arrive in Seoul today to brief officials here on the meeting, a government official said yesterday on condition of anonymity.

Foreign Minister Song Min-soon told reporters a U.S. team of nuclear experts is scheduled to enter the North today to take actual steps to disable the North’s key nuclear facilities. Pyongyang said earlier this week that such measures would start within this week.

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Economic doldrums, restrictions on hawking cost jobs in N. Korea: aid group

Friday, October 26th, 2007

Yonhap
10/26/2007

North Koreans have been suffering from chronic job shortages due to worsening economic conditions and a recent move by North Korean authorities to limit the number of hawkers for fear of capitalism spreading in the isolated, communist state, an aid group said Friday.

The North has recently forbidden women under the age of 40 from selling merchandise on their own, Good Friends said in its latest newsletter. The previous age limit was 30.

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The Story of a Honorary Soldier Selling Noodles in Pyongyang

Friday, October 26th, 2007

Daily NK
Lee Kwang Baek
10/26/2007

Mr. “Kim,” who lives in Pyongyang, lost a foot in an accident in the army. After his discharge, he became a 1st-class Honorary Soldier of merit living on provisions and bonuses supplied by the nation. The wounded soldiers are named as “Honorary Soldiers” in North Korea. Even before the great famine, Mr. Kim and his family could survive on provisions and bonuses alone. However, after the worsening of the economic situation, they fell into serious hardship.

Nowadays, Mr. Kim steps outside every morning, dragging his one foot, because he has to buy noodles at the “Sunkyokak (a noodles restaurant)” that sells honorary soldiers at a state-assigned price of 230 won. Mr. Kim, who is a first-class honorary soldier, can buy two bowls of noodles at one time.

There is no limit on the number of times one can buy a bowl of noodles. However, with the increase in honorary soldiers living on the profit from noodles bought and resold, the number of bowls Mr. Kim can buy from standing in line all day is only four. Even then, he can sell a bowl which he bought for 230 won for 1,000 and can go home with a slightly upward amount of 3,000 won after selling four bowls.

The subsidies Mr. Kim receives as an honorary soldier every month is 3,000 won. That only comes out to 100 won per day, not even sufficient for a bowl of noodles from Sunkyokak. The cost of living for a family of four is usually 100,000 won (approx. USD30.0), so it is not enough to get by for a month. If one can earn one month’s worth of bonus in a day by selling noodles, there is nothing he can do, besides sell them, but to stand in line all day on crutches.

Until now, North Korea has poured a lot of energy to support for honorary soldiers. After the Korean War, it has guaranteed jobs for soldiers by erecting the Distinguished Soldier Fountain Pen Factory, the Sariwon Honorary Soldier Dressmaker Factory, the Hamheung Honorary Soldier Plastic Products Factory, etc. and to soldiers who have lost their ability to work, it has given provisions and bonuses. Further, it has advertised support for honorary soldiers as the “citizen’s responsibility” and has sought out civilian support.

However, recently, according to North Korean sources, among the guests who come to the Sunkyokak, approximately half are honorary soldiers who resell the noodles. The honorary soldiers demonstrate the fact that survival based on provisions and bonuses alone are impossible.

After the food shortage, an important transformation has taken place in North Korea. The number of people relying on national provisions decreased by around 30% and the rest were placed in situations where they could not survive on provisions, salaries, and bonuses provided by the state alone. At least 100,000 won is needed for monthly living costs, but the salary and bonus that the state can provide is only several thousand won. North Korea has become a society where honorary soldiers who had received the state’s special consideration and support now have to sell whatever they can to survive.

In order to buy four bowls of noodles, Mr. Kim, who has to stand on crutches all day, is the testament of North Korea’s economic system which has crumbled since the food shortage and the rapid deteriorate of whatever grip it does have.

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Privileged Pyongyang Citizens No Longer Enjoy Privileges in the Market.

Monday, October 22nd, 2007

Daily NK
Lee Sung Jin
10/22/2007
(Click on image for original size)

dprkmarketprices.jpgAccording to DailyNK’s research on prices in North Korea conducted in late September, the prices in Pyongyang are similar to the prices in other parts of the country. The finding shows that Jangmadang (markets) economy has been going through integration and similar distribution process across North Korea.

In the past, domestic commodities were sold cheap, and foreign products were sold expensive in Pyongyang.

DailyNK has been conducting quarterly research on prices in the central such as Pyongan Province and Hamkyung Province and northern areas.

This time the research result shows that the price of rice in a Jangmadang in Pyongyang is 1,350 won/kg, which is similar to the price of rice in Sinuiju, 1,400won/kg. In North Korea, the rice price serves as a gauge for price trends.

In Pyongyang, the exchange rate is about 330 thousands won to 100 dollars, which is the same as the exchange rate in other places. The most famous imported cigarettes, Cat (Craven A) is sold at the same cost of 1,500 won in Pyongyang and other areas.

Subsidiary food is more expensive in Pyongyang. The price of cabbage is 400 won/kg, 50 won/kg higher than cabbage price in Sinuiju. The price of pork ranges from 3,500 to 4,000/kg, 500~1,000 won/kg higher than the pork price in other areas.

The prices of seafood such as brown and green seaweed, and dried Pollack are cheaper in Pyongyang. Seafood caught in Kangwon Province and neighboring areas is transported to markets in Pyongyang in refrigerator car. Since the demand is high, seafood is sold in great quantities, and the price remains low in general.

Movie ticket prices range from 200 to 400 won. Telephone service is charged five won per minute. Overall, the price range for each commodity is high, and many different kinds of goods are available in Jangmadang.

Imported items from China such as socks, sports shoes, or underwear are expensive being sold at a cost of 1,000 won in Pyongyang. That is because there are extra shipping rates and labor costs imposed on Chinese goods transported to Pyongyang. On the contrary, in Sinuiju, imported goods from China are circulated on the market right away.

Often, retail prices are higher in Pyongyang because of high levels of consumption among Pyongyang citizens. However, cigarettes or liquor produced in Pyongyang, or clothes from South Korea circulated to other areas via Pyongyang are sold cheap in Pyongyang.

However, in these days the differences in regional price levels have almost disappeared.

A defector from Pyongyang, Ahn Chul Min (a pseudonym) who came to South Korea in 2006 said, “Prior to 2002, there were individuals who hung around from place to place and made money on price differences. But nowadays, the retail prices are almost uniform across the country because people just use a telephone and find out where to get items they want at what prices.

“Since there is no big difference in retail prices, retailers are not doing well in business,” Ahn added, “Instead, individuals driving a truck and selling goods wholesale are making good money.”

Ahn said, “Not everyone who lives in Pyongyang is well-to-do. Despite of their locations whether in Pyongyang or Chongjin, all markets have goods from South Korea and China. The poor people even if they live in Pyongyang should buy cheap and low quality of products from China. In contrast, those who live in Chongjin and have money can buy goods from South Korea anytime.”


Market Prices Consistent Throughout DPRK
Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 07-10-25-1

10/25/2007

The results of a survey conducted by Daily NK on the price of goods in Pyongyang at the end of September show that prices in the capital were similar to those in rural areas. This is an indication that markets throughout the country are integrated, and evidence that goods can be circulated from region to region.

In the past, the price of domestic goods in Pyongyang was relatively cheep, while imported goods were sold at high prices. During that time, Daily NK carried out local price surveys in central regions such as Pyongan and Hamkyung provinces, as well as in northern areas. According to this latest survey in Pyongyang, the cost of one Kg of rice, the standard measure of the cost of goods in North Korea, was 1,350 won, similar to the 1,400 won price in Sinuiju, and the 1,250 won cost in Hyeryung. An exchange rate of 3,300 won per USD is also in line with rural exchange rates, as is the 1,500 won price tag on a pack of Craven A cigarettes, the most favored imported cigarette in North Korea.

Non-essential food goods are more expensive in Pyongyang than in outlying areas, with one Kg of lettuce selling for 400 won, 50 won more than in Sinuiju. Also, pork in the capital runs between 3,500 and 4,000 won per Kg, which is 500 to 1,000 won more than it would cost elsewhere in the country.

On the other hand, seaweed, dried Pollack, and other marine products are cheaper in Pyongyang than elsewhere. Ocean harvests from Kangwon and neighboring provinces are brought to Pyongyang markets by way of refrigerated trucks. Because of high demand, a variety of goods get delivered, yet overall, prices are held fairly low.

Overall, the price range on a particular ware was very wide, indicating that there was a variety of products available in the markets. The survey found that goods such as undergarments, socks, sneakers imported from China were selling for the high cost of 1,000 won each. In Sinuiju and other northern areas, goods from China are brought directly to markets, but by the time these same goods reach Pyongyang, additional labor and transportation costs force prices up. Pyongyang residents typically have more money to spend than those in rural areas, also leading vendors to raise prices on some goods, however cigarettes and alcohol produced in Pyongyang and distributed to rural areas, as well as South Korean goods which reach DPRK markets by way of Pyongyang, are slightly less expensive in the capital.

Recently, regional price differences have nearly disappeared. Prior to 2002, some traders earned their living traveling from region to region exploiting price differences. However, now with one simple phone call, North Koreans can find out where and for what price goods are being sold, leading the majority of retail prices to be similar throughout the country.

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North Korea Farming Region Destroyed, So the Cost of Rice Increases

Wednesday, October 17th, 2007

Daily NK
Han Young Jin
10/17/2007

Due to the flood damage which heavily affected the central region of North Korea last August, the next year’s price of rice has been putting an increasing burden among civilians.

Min Nam Su (pseudonym), a North Korean trader who has come to Dandong, China, said on the 15th, “In Hwanghae and South Pyongan Province this year, farming has been affected for the flood damage, so the price of rice has been showing signs of an increase. Currently in the Jangmadang (markets) in Shinuiju, 15kg of rice costs 25,000 North Korean won (KRW8,000, USD8.7).

“The farmlands in Hwanghae and South Pyongan have been completely submerged, so we were only able to look to farming in North Pyongan Province. It is obvious that they will be taken up for provisions for the People’s Army, so people who have money are already busy buying and hoarding rice.”

A majority of urban civilians are directly purchasing rice from the jangmadang, with the exception of Hwanghae and Pyongyang, after the breakdown of the provision system in North Korea. If the price of rice skyrockets, the livelihood of North Korean citizens will be directly affected.

It is possible that the rice aid from South Korea or international society, which will be distributed from the end of this month, may stabilize the price of rice.

Good Friends, beginning early this month, relayed through its newsletter, “Only when the rice aid comes in quickly will the overall price of rice decrease, no matter whose hands it falls into. It is difficult to buy a kg of rice for 1,700~1,900 won.”

Rice aid to North Korea flows in through Pyongyang, Nampo, or through Chongjin Harbor. The rice, after it goes to the People’s Army or large-city political employees, travels down a path of smuggling into the jangmadang. NGOs for North Korea estimate that the actual amount of rice allocated to civilians is around 30% of all the aided rice.

The North Korean authorities recently gave an instruction to factories and offices to guarantee six-months worth of food provisions to laborers, but the factories are reportedly in a difficult situation due to the rice shortage.

Mr. Min said, “From now on, 15kg of rice is supposed to hike up to 50,000 North Korean won (approx. USD17.4). In places like Yongcheon plain and Jungju plain, some farming has been well done, so the armies are mobilized and will do harvest. This year in particular, there will probably be a lot of thieves in farmlands.”

He said further, “The price of rice is supposed to have risen even more in Kaecheon, Suncheon, and Pyongsung in South Pyongan Province than in Shinuiju. There have been news that people are even coming from the Hwanghae region, which is a famous farming province, to North Pyongan to buy rice.”

Mr. Min said, “In early August, when the initial flood damage occurred, a kilogram of rice rose to 1,960 (approx. USD0.7) in the Shinuiju and in the second week of August, remained stable at 1,500 won (approx. USD0.52). It seems like the price of rice will continue to rise. But, the situation would change when the support is distributed to the civilians, but who expects that?”

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Great Review of ‘Famine in North Korea’

Sunday, August 26th, 2007

noland-haggard.jpgFor several months I have been meaning to post a review of Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland’s book, Famine in North Korea, but for thousands of reasons it was always pushed back.

Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland wrote the definitive book on the DPRK’s Arduous March, and it is required reading for any serious North Korea watcher.

Now…Joshua at One Free Korea has written the definitive review of the book, so I will just put links to his posts: Part One, Part Two, Part Three.

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Price of Rice and Inflation

Sunday, August 19th, 2007

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
8/19/2007

Sometimes even Stalinist propaganda tells the truth. When the North Korean newspapers occasionally told grossly exaggerated horror stories about South Korean inflation, they stressed that nothing like that could possibly happen in North Korea. This was the case indeed. For nearly half a century, from the late 1950s to the late 1980s retail prices in North Korea remained essentially unchanged. One kilogram of rice cost 0.08 won in 1960. It was still the same price in 1990.

This was possible because almost nothing was actually “sold’’ in North Korea. Communist states often rationed goods distributed through retail trade, but in most cases it was only a handful of most prestigious goods that were subjected to rationing _ like, say, cars. North Korea went much further: by the early 1970s, retail trade in the North ceased to exist, being completely replaced by an elaborate public distribution system. Rations depended on a type of work performed, but also on one’s position within a complicated hierarchy of social groups, as well as one’s place of residence (inhabitants of major cities, and Pyongyang in particular, enjoyed much better rations than those in the countryside).

There were some markets, of course, barely tolerated by the government. But until the late 1980s markets were small, with their trade volume being almost negligible. It seems that most people were reasonably satisfied with what they could get from the state distribution system _ of course, it helped that they knew next to nothing about the situation in other countries, so they could not compare.

The situation began to change around 1990 when the old distribution system collapsed under the pressure of an economic crisis. From 1993-94 there were increasing problems with rations, and from around 1996 rations pretty much stopped altogether. Some food was still distributed in major urban centers, but even there the distributed amount was so meager that nobody could survive on rations alone. A large-scale famine ensued, with at least half to one million dead (the oft-cited figure of three million victims seems to be an exaggeration).

People turned to trade and handicrafts, and with this arrival of a market economy inflation became a North Korean phenomenon as well. Even in the 1980s market prices exceeded the official prices in the state shops. By the mid-1990s, the difference was much greater. In theory, rice still cost 0.08 a kilo, but by 2000 its price on the market reached 45-50 won. Official wages remained unchanged, however, so around 2001 the average salary was approximately 20 times less than the income necessary for physical survival. People had no choice but to augment their income.

The government understood that there was no way to restore the old system: a decade of economic crisis had undermined the basic machinery of distribution and obviously the system was beyond repair. Thus, in 2002 the much trumpeted “July 1 Reforms” were introduced.

It’s difficult to describe these measures as “reforms”–the government simply gave official recognition to the situation which had existed for quite a few years.

The distribution system (long defunct) was curtailed. There was a dramatic increase in the retail prices of basic goods and services _ obviously in an attempt to approximate the prices of the market. Thus, that one-kilo of rice which cost 0.08 won since July cost 44 won.

Wages increased as well. Obviously, the wage increase was not even, and some groups have gained _ or lost _ more than others. It was estimated that the average increase in wages has been approximately 2500 percent (that is, 25 times). At the same time, prices have increased 3000-4000 percent (that is, 30-40 times). This necessitated the issue of 1000 won bills _ the largest denomination in North Korean financial history since the 1959 currency reform. Later, 5000 won bills were issued as well.

But the measures had another effect. The increase in salaries meant that the market was instantly flooded with cash. Needless to say, the only outcome could be inflation. Some people speculated that this was the intention of the Pyongyang leaders who hoped to kick-start the economy in such a way. Perhaps. But I would not be surprised if in 15 or 20 years down the track we learn from interviews and talks with the planners of this reform that they did not really expect inflation. Pyongyang economic managers have not had much exposure to market theory, and are sometimes very naive in their understanding of these questions.

Indeed, by October 2002 the market price of rice had increased to 120 won per kilo. In 2003, the price doubled to 250-300 won, and now it is about 1000 won. Inflation has become a part of North Korean life.

What will happen next? Will the North Korean leaders manage to stabilize the situation, or will a new wave of economic crisis wipe out the entire North Korean system? We do not know yet. But it is clear that there is no return to old days when a kilo of rice could be had for 0.08 won _ that is, if you were lucky enough to live in an area where they distributed grain rations in rice, not in maize.

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A Mass-Scale Trade Deficit Results after the July 1 Economic Measure

Thursday, July 26th, 2007

Daily NK
Park Hyun Min
7/26/2007
 
In North Korea, despite the additional reform measures on the table after the implementation of the 2002 July 1 Economic Management Reform Measure (July 1 Economic Measure), it appears that a mass-scale trade deficit has resulted.

Choi Soo Young, a Senior Researcher of Korea Institute for National Unification, said through a recently published report called “Five years after the July 1 economic measure, North Korea’s Economy and Process of Transformation” in the July issue of the Reunification Affairs Analysis, “The size of the deficit in North Korea’s revenues and expenditures (with the exception of North and South Korea trade) has increased from 790 million dollars in 2002 to 11 hundred million dollars in 2006.”

Researcher Choi said, “After the July 1 economic measure, North Korea, through regionalization of trade activities, which used to revolve around the Central Planning Administration, by allowing provincial-level offices such as the city and district offices, attempted trade revitalization.” However, to control inflation resulting from structural unemployment and shortage of supply, the North Korean government ignored revenues outside of national planning, which was the cause of the deficit.

After he also pointed out that, “When the North Korean economy’s dependence on China became chronic, the situation has become exacerbated,” he said, “North Korea’s export to China in 2006, compared to 2002, rose 72.7%, but on the other hand, import from China increased 163.8%.”

Between 2002-2004, North Korea’s size of trade deficit with China was only around 2 hundred million dollars, but in 2005 and 2006 each, it expanded to 5.8 hundred million dollars and 7.6 hundred million dollars. Further, North Korea’s reliance on trade with China, augmented from 48.5% in 2004, to 52.6% in 2005, and 56.7% in 2006.

Accordingly, North Korea has to depend on China in order to get equipment, energy, and raw materials for industrial production.

Simultaneously, Choi, from the perspective of macroeconomics on the basis of North Korea’s economic growth rate, North Korea’s economy has recovered from the worst situation and is maintaining a low-growth condition.

He analyzed, “From 1990 to 1998, a continuous 9-year negative economic growth has been recorded, but from 1999 to 2004, a positive growth has been achieved. After the July 1 economic measure, the North Korean economy’s low-growth originated from its verbal effort of increasing productions of agricultural and a portion of its light industry goods and the support of the outside world.”

However, he pointed out that it is not off-target to evaluate that the North has a foundation of undergrowth due to its sustained level of low-growth, that its shortage of food, energy, and raw material goods is continuing, and on the industrial front, productions increase has not shown any movement.

On one hand, researcher Choi said that going beyond the financial deficit, in order to realize a form of annual income and annual expenditures, an establishment of the power of taxation for an increase in tax revenues and restraining of unnecessary financial expenses are needed. Also, he ordered the acquirement of an objective tax system for the assurance of an effective financial plan and a fair tax.

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North Korean Won dropping in value

Monday, May 21st, 2007

Institute for Far Eastern Studies
5/21/2007

Recently, the cost of living for North Koreans has become increasingly burdensome, as the value of the North Korean won (KPW) has steadily fallen. This phenomenon has been observed since the introduction of the July 1st measures in 2002, but the toll on poorer citizens is growing as money is concentrated in the hands of the elite.

A decent jumper jacket from China sells for 30,000 to 50,000 won, a kilogram of meat for 3,000 won, and a bottle of cooking oil for 2,700 won. North Koreans tell of taking 100,000 won to the market and, having only made a few purchases, leaving with an empty wallet.

Every month, a family of four requires 50 kilograms of rice (50,000 KPW or 1,000 won per kg) and 20 kg of corn (7,000 KPW or roughly 350 won per kg). On top of this, the expense of buying supplementary food items such as cooking oil, red pepper flakes, vinegar, garlic, and scallions is almost equivalent to the price of rice.

One North Korean woman (hereafter referred to as Ms. Kim) who sells noodles at the Hweryung Nammun market estimates her living expenses at 60,000 won per month. Ms. Kim, a housewife responsible for a family of three, earns about 2,000 to 3,000 won a day selling noodles. This amounts to roughly 60,000 won a month, which only covers food expenses. She cannot even dream of buying rice, let alone saving up to raise seed money for a business, as her income goes toward supplementary items like corn (23,000 KPW for 70 kg), cooking oil (2,700 KPW), and beans (950 KPW for 1 kg).

Ms. Kim’s husband, who works at the Hweryung machine factory, receives a monthly salary of 4,000 won. This money is only enough to buy four kilograms of rice. Ms. Kim started selling noodles ten years ago, when it became clear that relying on her husband’s income would end in starvation for her family. She said that she has not put meat on the table for her child in a long time, as it is difficult to afford even one kilogram a month. With the exception of merchants who trade with overseas Chinese, workers who earn foreign currency, and those with relatives in China, the majority of Hweryung’s residents live day to day.

With the recent order from the Ministry of Public Security to “cease selling, as rations will be provided starting in April,” local markets have come under stricter regulation. This regulation has had the effect of raising the price of goods manufactured in China. Before the restriction, transactions took place at stalls and impromptu shops, but now buyers must hunt down merchants, which has led to a rise in prices.

On a related note, the dollar’s weak performance in the international market has been reflected in the North Korean black market. The exchange rate remains pegged at one dollar to eight Chinese yuan, but the rate of the North Korean won to the dollar and to the yuan changes daily. North Korea does not have a fixed exchange rate, because individuals who offer money exchange services occasionally receive information on currency rates from China. Due to the dollar’s recent weakness, the rate of the North Korean won to the dollar as well as to the yuan has been falling for several months.

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Rice bought, sought at markets in N. Korea: source

Tuesday, April 10th, 2007

Yonhap
4/10/2007

North Korean authorities have scaled back their country’s food rationing system and allowed rice to be bought and sold at open markets in major cities, sources here said Tuesday.

In July 2002, the communist country reduced food rationing and introduced an economic reform program under which wages were raised and farmers’ markets were expanded so that people could buy food. But the policy has zigzagged on the purchase and sale of cereals and rice. 

“Since last year, rumors have spread about the sale at state-run stores as the food rationing system did not function well. Currently, not only corn but also rice is being traded at the markets,” a government source said, asking to remain anonymous because of the sensitivity of the issue.

The source added that North Korean authorities permitted the sale of imported rice at state-run stores. “The authorities hope to clamp down on high rice prices at black markets by diversifying the sources of rice distribution,” the source said. On the North’s black market, the product costs about 20 times more than rice at state-run stores. 

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