North Korean Economy Watch

Joong Ang Daily
Seo Ji-eun
3/24/2007

Automobile statistics from the Korea Customs Service show that South Korea imported 778 cars from North Korea from 2003-2006. Is it true that the North exports its cars to the South? Not entirely.

Under related regulations, when South Korean cars are shipped to the North for use in inter-Korean business, including commerce at Mount Kumgang and the Kaesong Industrial Complex, the cars are classified as “exports” to the North. For the same reason, when passenger cars, commercial vehicles, and trucks from South Korea break down or wear out in the North, they return to the South in the form of “imports.”

North Korea has a handful of car manufacturing factories, but there is only one still in operation, Pyeonghwa Motors. The plant is run by the 70-30 joint venture between South and North Koreas and started mass production in April 2002. It has churned out an annual average of 600 vehicles in all segments, except for trucks and large buses, for exclusive supply to North Korea. According to a Pyeonghwa Motors spokesman, the carmaker accounts for the majority of vehicle demand, with some used cars unofficially imported from Japan.

Special-purpose vehicles, including dump trucks, account for most of the vehicles sent back from North Korea to the South. Other vehicles crossing the border are multi-purpose cars, trucks and vans.

Korea Times
Lee Jin-woo
3/15/2007

South and North Korea on Thursday agreed to resume the reunions of families separated since the Korean War by the two sides’ heavily fortified border, this May, Seoul’s Red Cross said.

After ending a two-day working-level inter-Korean meeting in Kaesong, the Korean National Red Cross (KNRC) in Seoul announced each side will have 100 separated family members meet their long-lost relatives at Mt. Kumgang, a scenic resort, in North Korea between May 9 and 14.

The two sides confirmed the date and other details about the reunions over the telephone and through liaison officials at the truce village of Panmunjom, it said.

They will exchange the whereabouts of the people next month and will disclose the final list of participants on April 27, it said.

The agreement came about two weeks after the 20th inter-Korean ministerial talks in Pyongyang. During the four-day meeting, the two Koreas agreed to resume face-to-face family reunions in early May, but did not set a date.

Since the historic inter-Korean summit in June 2000, South and North Korea have held 14 rounds of face-to-face family reunions.

At the Kaesong meeting, both sides failed to narrow differences on a trial run of cross-border trains, said Yang Chang-seok, spokesman of the Ministry of Unification.

“There were differences on when to start the joint cooperation project with the light industry and natural underground resources. Both sides agreed to continue the dialogue in the near future,’’ he said.

During the Cabinet talks earlier this month, Seoul and Pyongyang also agreed to carry out the test-run in the first half of this year although no exact schedule was set.

Last May, Pyongyang unilaterally notified Seoul that it would postpone the test-run just a day before the scheduled date, May 25, under apparent pressure from its hard-line military.

The Stalinist state cited two reasons for canceling the run _ the lack of security guarantees on both sides and the “extremely confrontational” climate in the South.

The aborted test-runs also nullified an economic accord under which South Korea was supposed to provide raw materials in exchange for access to the North’s minerals deposits.

NY Times
Steven R. Weisman
3/14/2007

The Treasury Department is expected to move formally this week to bar American banks from engaging in transactions with a bank in Macao linked to North Korea, clearing the way for North Korea to regain possession of money at the bank frozen since 2005, a Bush administration official said Tuesday.

American officials see such a step by the Treasury, which has been expected for weeks, as a crucial part of the recent deal to disarm North Korea’s nuclear program. The deal, announced last month, requires North Korea to disarm its nuclear facilities in return for economic and energy benefits.

The Chinese government effectively froze about $25 million connected to North Korea a year and a half ago, when the Treasury Department listed Banco Delta Asia, a small family-owned bank in Macao, as a “primary money laundering concern.” As much as half of the money is expected to be returned to North Korea.

American officials charged in 2005 that the bank was helping North Korea conduct counterfeiting, narcotics trafficking and transactions related to its nuclear weapons program, a charge that North Korea and the bank denied.

The initial Treasury announcement put American banks on notice that after further investigation, the department would decide whether to bar United States banks formally from facilitating transactions with the bank.

However, the practical effect was to make all United States banks voluntarily cease transactions with Banco Delta Asia.

Without the ability to acquire dollars, Banco Delta Asia collapsed. Macao froze all its funds related to North Korea, and most of its other customers withdrew their money in a run on the bank. The bank was then taken over by the authorities in Macao, a semiautonomous province of China.

Subsequently, American and Chinese authorities pored over more than 300,000 documents describing the transactions with North Korea. These included accounts of 20 North Korean banks, 11 North Korean trading companies, 9 North Korean citizens and 8 Macao-based companies that did business with North Korea, according to bank records filed with the Treasury Department.

The Treasury announcement expected this week would formalize what is already in place. It would probably mean that the bank could do only a modest amount of business, without the benefit of dollar transactions.

But it would mean that the Chinese government would be in a position to return some of the funds to North Korea that are not linked to counterfeiting, drugs, nuclear arms or other illicit activities.

For example, some of the funds belong to a North Korean unit of British American Tobacco, American officials say, and those funds are expected to be returned to the company, which is owned by British interests.

When the North Korea nuclear deal was announced last month, no mention was made of returning funds to North Korea from the bank, but American officials now say that the return of those funds was a major incentive for North Korea to reach an accord.

The disarmament agreement was negotiated with the United States, China, South Korea, Japan and Russia as part of what were called six-party talks.

Christopher R. Hill, the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs and the central envoy in the talks, said this month that North Korea was “concerned about the fact that we were able to go after an important node of their financing” but that the United States would continue to monitor its illicit activities.

The Chosun Development & Investment Fund is a privately structured Limited Partnership Fund incorporated in the United Kingdom and based in London.

Specifically designed for investment in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“DPRK”) or (“North Korea”). Chosun Fund is now beginning to seek subscriptions from qualifying investors. This follows the authorisation of Chosun Fund’s Fund Manager, Anglo-Sino Capital Partners Limited on 19th May 2006 by the UK Financial Services Authority.

Chosun Fund will concentrate entirely on the DPRK and will channel external investment into the economic development of that country.

The exclusive Investment Advisor to Chosun Fund Fund manager is Hong Kong based Koryo Asia Limited (“Koryo Asia”) whose team of principals has over 25 years experience of commercial & financial dealings with the DPRK and in Asia generally.

The principals working with Chosun Fund will initially be concentrating on those areas of the DPRK economy with which they are familiar and which they believe can be developed quickly and efficiently to generate foreign exchange cash flow for the DPRK.

As a completely private initiative it is intended that Chosun Fund is a fully transparent financial vehicle that will assist the DPRK develop its legitimate economic activities along internationally accepted lines and also provide an attractive return to investors.

This first-to-market fund has the capability to deliver a significant return on investment in the near term and considerably enhanced returns after the expected resolution of the current nuclear issue and other problems. This should result in a substantial expansion in the economy of North-East Asia’s last emerging economy.

About the Fund

The idea of an investment fund specifically for The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) began at a conference in July 2000 held by the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, and entitled “Engagement and Development in the DPRK” , to which Colin McAskill (McAskill), the originator of this project, was invited because of his experience in dealing with the DPRK.   The conference was also attended by Mr. James Kelly, prior to him joining the US State Department as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs in the first George W. Bush administration.   Following the conference McAskill was called to the US State Department by a special adviser in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (in the administration of President Clinton), who wished to talk to him about realistic prospects for business in the DPRK – an issue of concern at the time since the “Perry process” held out foreign investment and business as one of the benefits of the DPRK’s engagement with the outside world.

McAskill said that he had come to the conclusion that a private initiative to set up an investment fund, which could initiate or participate in repeated dealings in the DPRK, and thus be seen by the ruling hierarchy as too important to alienate through non-performance, could avoid many of the pitfalls of investing in, or dealing with, the DPRK.   The State Department Official agreed with his analysis and encouraged McAskill to set up such a fund.

Partners were gathered and engaged to set up such a fund. Aware that although this was completely a private business initiative it engendered a certain political sensitivity, McAskill met with US Assistant Secretary Kelly in September of 2001 to brief him on progress.   Kelly had no objection to such a fund as long as it kept within the parameters of US law and asked to be kept informed. By the autumn of 2002 a fund based in the US was ready to be launched but, with the serious deterioration in political relations between the US and the DPRK in October 2002, several partners in the US asked if they could postpone their active participation.

As a result of this, the planning of the fund was reconstituted with the emphasis deliberately shifted to North East Asia, with new partners in Hong Kong and China as well as with experienced fund managers in London.

McAskill has kept the US government informed of the Fund’s progress. Similar to the close contact kept with the US State Department, McAskill has also kept both the UK Foreign Office and the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) government fully informed, the latter through contact with the South Korean Ambassador in London as well as the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Ministry of Unification in Seoul. McAskill’s partners in China have similarly informed the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China).

While the organisers and participants in the Fund fully understand the decision to keep relevant governments informed as a matter of courtesy, and to comply with any laws or regulations by those governments that affect the Fund, it should be emphasised that the Fund is a purely private business initiative. Its establishment in London, and the authorisation and regulation of its Fund Manager by the UK Financial Services Authority will ensure complete transparency.

McAskill has been involved in business dealings with the DPRK since 1978 (his first visit to the DPRK was in 1979/1980), primarily in coordinating the emergence of parts of the DPRK’s business community into western markets. This included the certification and sale of DPRK bullion and other minerals in the London market, and also in assisting other significant DPRK state entities in their dealings with western institutions, especially European banks, over their defaulted debts. Dealings with the DPRK became somewhat moribund in the 1990s due to internal political developments there, coupled with the natural disasters that overran the country causing widespread damage and a general contraction of the DPRK economy. During this period McAskill continued to maintain contact with senior associates in both business and banking institutions in Pyongyang.

The DPRK leadership has officially declared that it will pursue a controlled opening to commerce and is seeking foreign capital. In 2002 it introduced internal reforms that allowed the economy to become more market orientated. The reforms are now entrenched and gradually expanding to a point where most outside experts on the DPRK believe they have become irreversible.

The management, partners, and directors of the Fund understand the risk inherent in dealing with the DPRK, but also believe that the Fund can achieve returns commensurate with that risk. The Fund will seek initially to deal with and invest in key areas of the DPRK economy that have been known to operate successfully in the past, concentrating on transactions in sectors that were proven hard currency exporters into Western markets, mainly minerals, but have been subject to recent performance constraints.  Later dealings will take advantage of a wide variety of opportunities that are expected to become available as the DPRK economy opens and develops.

The DPRK government is aware of these developments, at first via senior DPRK officials engaged in the six-party talks in Beijing whom McAskill met with in July 2005. This was followed by meetings in Beijing in December 2005 and again in Asia in April 2006 with a special envoy sent from Pyongyang to establish direct contact. And, as a result of the earlier meeting, McAskill’s partner and management team member in China was invited to meet the DPRK Ambassador in Beijing on 15th August 2005.

The creation of the Chosun Fund and the authorisation & regulation by the UK Financial Services Authority of Chosun Fund’s Fund Manager has now formally been announced to the DPRK government.

Update: the money went missing.

South Korea criticizes North Korea for failing to disclose how aid was used
Herald Tribune
2/11/2008 

South will give money directly to North Korea
Joong Ang Daily
Lee Young-jong and Ser Myo-ja
3/12/2007

Although South Korea does not allow cash to be given directly to North Korea, it made a deal of its own.

The two countries announced Saturday that Seoul would give Pyongyang cash to buy video conference equipment. A South Korean official said yesterday the amount will be $400,000.

North Korea will use the money to set up video conference calls between families separated during the Korean War, according to a joint statement issued Saturday by the two countries.

The South Korean government has strictly banned humanitarian groups ― as well as all residents ― from giving cash to the North due to concerns the money could be spent for other purposes.

“We decided to assist the North to smoothly resolve the separated family issue,” the official said, adding that the government will thoroughly monitor the spending of the money and the use of the equipment.

The cash payment agreement was first made at a Red Cross meeting in June 2006, but never publicly announced. The money was not exchanged because North Korea conducted a missile test the next month, temporarily freezing inter-Korean relations.

After progress in the recent six-party talks designed to make North Korea nuclear-free, South Korean Red Cross officials pledged again on Saturday at a meeting at a Mount Kumgang resort to give Pyongyang the money, the official said on condition of anonymity.

According to the joint statement, the two Koreas agreed that video conference call reunions will be expanded. The two Koreas also agreed a video conference call reunion center will be built in Pyongyang, separately from the reunion center under construction at Mount Kumgang, and that Seoul will provide construction material and equipment. The material and money will be released at the end of March, the agreement said.

Neither the joint statement nor the press release specified the amount of money, but the Seoul official said it will be $400,000. The construction material to be provided to the North is worth another $3.5 million, he said.

The South Korean government was unable to give the video conference call equipment, such as liquid crystal display monitors and computers, directly to the North because of United States regulations banning the export of dual-use goods to North Korea. Under the United States export administration regulations, strategic goods that include more than 10 percent of United States-made components or technology, are banned for export to state sponsors of terrorism, which include North Korea.

According to the official, South Korea advised the North to purchase the items from China with the cash. Washington could make an exception to the export ban, presumably at Seoul’s request, but it would take time to do so.

In addition to the cash, the $3.5 million worth of goods, such as trucks, construction materials, air conditioners, heaters and cables, will be provided to build a video conference call center in Pyongyang.

At the Red Cross talks, the North also agreed to resume the construction of the reunion center on Mount Kumgang on March 21. The two Koreas began the construction in August 2005, but the work stalled last July. The buildings are about 30 percent complete.

Last week’s Red Cross meeting was scheduled for only one day, for about two hours. Due to the North’s persistent demands for cash and materials, the talks went on for a second day, the government official said.

Donga Ilbo
3/10/2007

820 2nd Avenue, New York City. This is the address of the permanent mission of North Korea in the United Nations, the only North Korean diplomatic arena in the U.S. It is a four-minute walk from the UN headquarters and a two-minute walk from the permanent mission of South Korea to the U.N. It is located on the 13th floor of the “Diplomatic Center.”

About 10 North Korean diplomats including North Korean Ambassador to the U.N. Pak Gil Yon are working in this place. When you look at the list of member states of the U.N., you’ll find names like ‘Mrs. Pak’ and ’Mrs. Kim’ right below the list of North Korean diplomats. These are diplomats’ wives who help their husbands at the office by answering phones.

They live in an apartment on Roosevelt Island located on the opposite side of the U.N. headquarters. Many diplomats from poor countries such as North Korea and African nations live there because the rents are relatively inexpensive compared to those of Manhattan.

The diplomats except for Ambassador Park go to work together via minivan. Deputy Ambassador Kim Chang Guk is in charge of U.N.-related affairs and Minister of Political Affairs Kim Myong Gil handles U.S.-related issues. North Korean diplomats have a good command of English. Minister Kim’s English is fluent enough to communicate with reporters in English. Some young diplomats speak French as well.

However, during North Korea-U.S. talks, Choi Son Hee, a fellow researcher of North Korean Foreign Ministry, interpreted for the North Korean delegation headed by Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan. She is not only an interpreter but also a diplomat. Choi, who visited the U.S. for the third time, drew attention as an excellent interpreter.

North Korean diplomats are required to get permission from the State Department when they travel beyond the 30-mile limit from the Columbus Circle in Manhattan. When Ambassador Park has to go to Washington, he has to get permission.

Recently, Harvard University was going to invite Mr. Park to hold a forum but failed because the State Department did not issue permission. So the host tried to change the location to Columbia University, which is located within the 30-mile limit. .

South Korean diplomats contacting North Korean diplomats directly or indirectly say they are not financially abundant. It is said that ethnic Koreans who are friendly to North Korea help the North Korean representatives in one way or another. The North Koreans sometimes visit a Korean restaurant on the 32nd Street but not often. Some people say they saw them eat at a delicatessen.

North Koreans often use a Chinese restaurant just beside the North Korean mission when they have an official meeting. A lunch set menu costs about 40 dollars per person and the restaurant offers delicious food so that many South Korean diplomats visit the place. North Korea invited the U.S. delegation to the restaurant for lunch as a return courtesy.

The Korea Society sponsored a large sum of money for the 7-day stay of the North Korean delegation consisting of 7 members, and Stanford University`s North Korea expert group paid for the money needed for the stay in San Francisco. The National Committee on American Foreign Policy also chipped in. Non-profit organizations in the U.S. sponsored the delegation from hotels, restaurants and musicals, as well as round-trip flights from Beijing to San Francisco and New York.

The Korea Society, an organization founded by Korea experts dedicated to the promotion of greater awareness, understanding and cooperation between the people of the United States and Korea, says funding for its programs is derived from contributions, endowments, membership dues and program fees on its website. Many U.S. branch chiefs of Korean conglomerates such as Hyosung and Posco work in the board of directors, and many U.S. companies trading with South Korea sponsor the organization. The South Korean government is supporting it indirectly through the Korea Foundation. A 2004 document shows that the foundation gave 1.1 million dollars to the Korea Society.

Yonhap
3/8/2007

Red cross officials from South and North Korea are to meet this week on resuming the construction of a family reunion center on the North’s scenic mountain bordering the South along the east coast, South Korean officials said.

The one-day meeting, slated to be held at the North’s Mount Geumgang resort on Friday, will also address the next family reunions via video link to be held on March 27-29.

Last week, the two Koreas agreed to resume reunion events for families separated by the border since the end of the Korean War. The next face-to-face family reunions will be resumed in early May.

Shortly after the North conducted its missile tests in July, the South suspended food and fertilizer aid. In retaliation, the communist nation immediately suspended inter-Korean talks, family reunions and the construction of the family reunion center.

“The construction has been put on hold for about eight months, so we will have to resume construction after checking whether there are technical problems. The construction will likely be completed next year, far later than the originally scheduled April of this year,” a South Korean Red Cross official said on condition of anonymity.

High on the agenda will be discussions on when to resume construction, how to check the facilities needed for construction, and how to provide supplies and dispatch engineers, the official said. The South Korean delegation will be headed by Hwang Jeong-ju, while Pak Yong-il will lead the North Korean team.

The two sides started the construction at a village near the scenic mountain resort in August 2005. The envisioned 12-story building will house two reunion halls and serve as the venue for family reunion events.

The two Koreas have held 14 rounds of family reunions. More than 90,000 people from South Korea alone have remained separated from their loved ones since the end of the 1950-53 Korean War.

International Herald Tribune
Donald Greenlees
3/8/2007

Last August, Colin McAskill, a British businessman, agreed to buy a small bank in North Korea. On the face of it, Daedong Credit Bank was not a brilliant investment.

The agreement that McAskill signed with the management of Daedong Credit at a hotel in Seoul came as the bank was caught in the grip of financial sanctions that had virtually cut off North Korea from the global financial system.

Financial institutions around the world were shunning any links to North Korean banks, making it almost impossible to transact business.

Daedong Credit was using couriers to carry cash in and out of the country in amounts as high as $2.6 million because it could not make electronic transfers to other banks.

Since September 2005, Daedong Credit had also been fighting to recover $7 million that had been frozen in a Macao bank as part of efforts by the United States to put a financial squeeze on North Korea over alleged illicit financial transactions. This was a big sum for Daedong Credit. When McAskill had examined the bank’s books, its total assets were just $10 million.

None of this has deterred him. He said during an interview in Hong Kong that he planned to execute the sale agreement within the next two weeks and take full control of the only foreign-managed bank in North Korea. The Hong Kong- based Koryo Asia, chaired by McAskill, will take control of the banking license and a 70 percent stake owned by British investors through a Virgin Islands company. The remaining 30 percent is held by the state-owned Daesong Bank. “I think it’s a magnificent deal,” McAskill said, although he would not disclose the purchase price. “The bank has been running for 12 years. It is trusted and it has been profitable since day one.”

Despite McAskill’s optimism, the future of Daedong Credit has been under a cloud since the imposition of the U.S.- orchestrated banking embargo on North Korea 18 months ago and the viability of the business remains precarious.

Even amid signs of a thaw in relations between Pyongyang and Washington, the start of a bilateral dialogue that began in New York on Monday and an agreement in six-nation talks in Beijing on Feb. 13 to start to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, analysts say banks in North Korea will struggle to restore contacts with the global financial system.

The trigger for the financial embargo of North Korea was a declaration by the U.S. Treasury Department under section 311 of the Patriot Act that the Banco Delta Asia, based in Macao, was a “primary money laundering concern” because of its links to a number of North Korean banks, individuals and companies alleged to have engaged in product and currency counterfeiting, drug trafficking and weapons proliferation.

The U.S. and Macanese authorities began separate investigations into Banco Delta Asia and the bank was placed under Macao government supervision.

Along with about 50 North Korean banks, trading companies and individuals, Daedong Credit had its account frozen. The total amount put into “suspense accounts,” according to Banco Delta Asia, was about $25 million, with Daedong Credit accounting for the largest share. Since then, almost all foreign banks that had correspondent relations with Daedong Credit have severed contact for fear of being excluded from the U.S. financial system.

Jack Pritchard, president of the Korea Economic Institute in Washington, said it was unlikely that the United States would send an explicit signal to the financial community to resume trading with North Korea, regardless of whether Pyongyang starts to address concerns about its foreign financial transactions.

He said that although a portion of the frozen money was likely to be released soon, there would not be a “100 percent reversal” of the American stance on financial transactions with North Korea.

Daedong Credit is likely to be one of the first North Korean account holders in Banco Delta Asia to get its money back from the Macao Monetary Authority where it has been earning no interest.

In recent months, McAskill has circled the globe from his home in London acting under a mandate from Daedong Credit to persuade officials in Washington and Macao to release the account. At 66, McAskill has spent 28 years doing business with North Korea, including as a consultant to North Korean banks on debt negotiations and helping to operate North Korean foreign gold sales. He said that at no stage in his meetings with officials from either the U.S. or Macao governments had he seen any specific reason for freezing the Daedong Credit money or been told of any specific allegation about its origins.

McAskill has produced what he calls a “dossier of proof” to establish the identity of all the customers whose money is frozen and the sources of the money. Since it was founded by the failed Hong Kong finance group Peregrine in 1995, Daedong Credit has filled a valuable niche serving the foreign community in Pyongyang. It has about 200 customers among foreign-invested joint ventures, foreign relief organizations and foreign individuals, according to McAskill. The biggest single amount frozen in Macao is $2.6 million belonging to British American Tobacco, which owns a cigarette plant in North Korea.

“We irrefutably established that the money was legal,” McAskill said. “The U.S. Treasury have been going around the world saying to banks ‘close this account, close that account’ but not offering any proof of wrongdoing.” He said his due diligence of Daedong Credit had convinced him that it was a “fully legal, legitimate operation” that did not manage state accounts or had ever been connected to illicit practices.

One of the Treasury’s main allegations against Banco Delta Asia is that it facilitated the spread of counterfeit $100 bills. But McAskill said Daedong Credit had put $49 million into Banco Delta Asia in 2005 and all that money had been forwarded to HSBC for verification.

Only three of the $100 notes belonging to Daedong Credit were confiscated because they were “suspect,” he said.

McAskill has charged the Treasury with harassment after two correspondent banks — one in Vietnam and the other in Mongolia — informed Daedong Credit late last year that they would immediately close accounts because of pressure from the United States.

But it is likely to prove difficult to persuade banks, nervous about the effect on Banco Delta Asia of the long- running Treasury investigation, to take the risk of dealing with a North Korean counterpart, regardless of the pedigree of its shareholders and board.

Last week, at a meeting in Macao, McAskill was finally told by the head of a government-appointed committee supervising Banco Delta Asia, Herculano de Sousa, that it was likely that the money in Daedong Credit would be returned by the end of March.

In the meeting, McAskill told de Sousa that once the funds were freed, Daedong Credit intended to leave the money in Banco Delta Asia and resume operating its old account.

But Banco Delta Asia has informed the U.S. Treasury that as part of its cleanup both the administrative committee and the shareholders were adamant that they no longer would do business with any North Korea entities. In doing so, the bank hopes to avoid the United States making good on a threat to ban Banco Delta Asia from having any correspondent relationships with U.S. banks.

Still, McAskill insisted that Daedong Credit has not broken any law in Macao or elsewhere and that there were no grounds for it to be forced to close its account.

“I am not going to take my money back and cut and run,” he said.

Joong Ang Daily
3/8/2007

North Korea yesterday asked for 300,000 tons of fertilizer in aid, the Unification Ministry said, days after the two Koreas agreed to resume humanitarian projects.

“Chang Chae-on, president of the North’s Red Cross, sent a fax message to his South Korean counterpart Han Wan-sang, requesting 300,000 tons of fertilizer and wanting to know how much and what type,” said Yang Chang-seok, a ministry spokesman.

Mr. Yang said the shipment will be sent to the North in late March or early April, after the details have been worked out.

Mr. Yang estimated the aid will cost 100 billion won. “The government earmarked 108 billion won for that purpose this year.”

The North has also asked for rice and Red Cross officials will discuss the resumption of rice aid during a new round of economic talks to be held in Pyongyang on April 18 to 21.

Korea Times
Park Hyong-ki
3/7/2007

The outlook for inter-Korean trade this year seems bright, as North Korea agreed to dismantle its nuclear weapons programs at the six-party talks in Beijing last month.

According to a survey conducted by the Korea International Trade Association (KITA), about 45 percent of South Korean companies doing business with North Korea were optimistic that the volume of inter-Korean trade will grow this year. The survey was conducted on 150 firms in February.

Some 35 percent believe that the bilateral trade will remain the same as last year’s, while only 15 percent showed negative responses toward this year’s trade, saying that the volume will “drastically” decrease.

Only two companies said they will pull out of North Korea this year, while five companies were undecided.

Last year, inter-Korean trade amounted to about $1.3 billion, up 28 percent from 2005. Key trading commodities were agricultural, chemical and textile products.

Despite North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests as well as chilly inter-Korean relations last year, South Korean companies operating in the Kaesong Industrial Complex saw their sales grow 69 percent to $298 million.

The Kaesong site is one of the major cross-border projects symbolizing economic ties between the two Koreas, which utilize North Korea’s cheap labor and South Korea’s technological skills.

The Ministry of Unification is hoping to attract about 2,000 manufacturers to Kaesong by 2012. Currently, there are 55 South Korean firms operating in the joint economic zone, which account for 22 percent of overall South-North business, according to the trade association.

The other joint business _ the Mt. Kumgang tour managed by Hyundai Asan _ suffered from the aftermath of North Korea’s nuclear weapon test. The tourism project recorded only $57 million in sales, down 35 percent from the year before.

Specifically, a total of 477 South Korean companies participated in inter-Korean trade last year, down from 523 firms in 2005, due to heightened risks following Pyongyang’s nuclear test.

About 44 percent of those surveyed said that the test had negatively affected their business with the North. The report showed that only 39 percent reaped a “little” profit last year while doing business with North Korea.

Half of firms upbeat for North trade
Joong Ang Daily
3/8/2007

Almost half of South Korean companies doing business with North Korea said they have a bright outlook for inter-Korean trade this year due to expectations for better ties with the North, a poll said yesterday.

According to a survey of 67 companies conducted by the Korea International Trade Association, 45 percent of the respondents said inter-Korean trade will likely increase this year. Thirty-five percent expected trade to remain at the same level as last year while 15 percent said it will likely decline.

The poll also said 75 percent of local companies operating in the industrial park in the North’s border city of Kaesong had an optimistic outlook for trade. The industrial complex, mainly for smaller South Korean firms, is considered a model for reconciliation and cooperation between the two Koreas. Currently, 21 garment and other labor-intensive South Korean plants are operating there, employing about 11,000 low-paid North Korean workers.

The survey said among the firms that forecast inter-Korean trade to rise, 17 percent said their continued trust in North Korean firms was the reason for their upbeat outlook, while 16 percent and 14 percent said it was a rise in new orders and expectations for inter-Korean reconciliation. The survey was conducted before a deal on dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program was reached, reflecting that local firms have maintained a positive view toward inter-Korean trade. The agreement calls for Pyongyang to shut down and disable its main nuclear reactor and dismantle its atomic weapons program.