Archive for the ‘International Organizaitons’ Category

Choson Exchange Update

Sunday, March 6th, 2011

From the Choson Exchange web page:

We are looking to build our knowledge pool in the areas of contract negotiations, microfinance and bond markets as there have been requests for knowledge assistance in these areas from Pyongyang. We are told that North Korean firms need to negotiate more effectively with their Chinese counterparts, and require legal training to do so. The fundamentals of micro-finance and bond markets are also of interest to some financial organizations.  We expect initial programs for these areas to take place in April to May this year.

The executive director of Choson Exchange, Geoffrey See, also wrote the following article in the East Asia Forum:

Choson Exchange recently prepared a program for North Korean students to learn business, finance and economics overseas through university courses and internships.

They consulted a range of North Koreans on how it should structure such a program and ‘the Australia National University’ often came back as the model to follow. Up until 2006, ANU hosted North Korean trainees studying economics under programs supported by international and Australian aid agencies. The Australian exchange program was clearly well-regarded by outward-looking North Koreans.

But what would Australia gain from such programs?

A resolution to the constant series of crises on the Korean peninsula is obviously in Australia’s interest. Conflict on the Korean peninsula can destabilize the region and in a worst-case scenario draw China and the United States into a military conflict involving Australian troops. This would cause incalculable harm to the Asia-Pacific economy because of its impact on all the major Northeast Asian economies, not to mention the human cost of conflict. Australia also has long and particular historical interests in commerce with North Korea.

There are some things that Australia can facilitate for North Korea which is in their mutual interest, but which neither the United States nor South Korea can provide anytime soon. The opportunity for North Korean students to study economics, business or law in Australia in long-term university programs is one such crucial shared interest. Yet such programs are currently impossible because of autonomous sanctions in place since 2006 that deny visas to visiting North Koreans. This policy is counter-productive. It trades off the ability to shape longer-term outcomes on the Korean peninsula for short-term public displays of opprobrium. The only countries whose sanctions can hurt North Korea are the countries that actually trade with it. This policy is also unusually harsh of Australia. The United States takes a more nuanced stance by allowing visits by North Koreans for some purposes while publicly preventing political delegations to express its political support for US allies, chiefly South Korea. Similarly, Australia can publicly express its disapproval of current North Korean activities alongside efforts to develop exchanges that shape a future that goes beyond the present stalemate.

These educational exchanges provide Australia with an effective way to shape longer-term dynamics on the Korean peninsula. One way the Korean crisis will end peacefully is when North Korean elites calculate that benefits of economic integration with the rest of the world are great enough to make the costs of confrontation unsustainable. Overseas education can shift this cost-benefit calculus because it equips a new generation of North Korean leaders with the knowledge and the networks to benefit from international trade and integration.

Choson Exchange recently placed a North Korean student in an internship with an international consulting firm. Without such networks, the opportunity would not have materialized. The student also needed coaching on how to explain why his prospective-employer might find value in taking him on. He assumed that a good score on an international English test was the qualification he needed even though most selective employers see fluency as a minimum threshold, rather than a core selling point. This experience helped us see things from the North Korean perspective: there are hardly any commercial benefits to speak of when one lacks knowledge and networks to realize those benefits.

Now is the time to help build this knowledge and network base. North Korea has been active over the past year setting up institutions to promote economic development. This includes the State General Bureau of Economic Development, the Daepung Group, and the State Development Bank. Choson Exchange has led finance workshops with the State Development Bank, and Bank managers agree that training is needed and appreciated. By helping to educate the next generation of North Korean businessmen, economists, financiers or lawyers who will eventually fill these institutions, Australia can play a role in shaping these emerging institutions in North Korea, institutions that could have important ramifications for how North Korea interacts with the rest of the world in the future.

Australia has the opportunity to redefine how such exchanges are conducted. To maximize impact in developing institutions in Pyongyang, we need to think in terms of a “talent pipeline.” We need interlinked programs targeted at different age-groups: training workshops targeting senior or middle management at these institutions, overseas scholarships targeted at university students or recent graduates, and a way to bring both groups together to help maximize opportunities for scholarship recipients to move into the emerging institutions.

Australia has the base from which to take initiatives with North Korea. The North Korean institutions that are looking outwards explicitly seek to build on what has been done with Australia, and specifically through the Australian National University program for training in economics. A comprehensive settlement of the Korean problem is much more likely if we begin again to put this infrastructure in place and help with institutional development in North Korea.

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Eugene Bell foundation fighting tuberculosis in DPRK

Monday, February 21st, 2011

According to the Korea Times:

Dr. Stephen Linton, founder of the Eugene Bell Foundation, says his group’s program to combat multidrug resistant TB (MDRTB) has cured its first patients after four years of working to establish adequate care in the North.

“We’re making progress,” Linton, 60, said in a phone interview. “It has been a tremendous learning curve for the North Koreans on a very short time frame. It takes most nations decades to put together a good MDRTB program because the treatment is so intensive.”

A growing health concern worldwide, MDRTB emerges when regular TB is inadequately treated, creating bacteria resistant to first- and sometimes second-line drugs. Half of those who do not get treatment, which can take up to two years to complete, die.

The problem is compounded in poor countries not properly equipped to diagnose the disease and where malnutrition makes the body more susceptible to TB.

The organization’s hopeful outlook follows its most recent trip to the North in November last year, when it found a steadily-increasing rate of patients testing negative for the strain ― meaning they are no longer infective.

It also comes as the international community wrestles with how to help the impoverished country ― which has called in recent weeks for humanitarian assistance ― without supporting its provocative behavior.

In the case of treating MDRTB, the doctor says the breakthrough would be impossible without meaningful contributions on both sides of the tense border that divides the Koreas.

Powerful medicine

By 2007, Linton had been travelling to the North to treat TB for more than a decade, so he was braced for the news when caregivers complained that first-line drugs were not helping some patients.

“I knew it was going to be a real headache,” he said of the undertaking. “But the commitment of our donors and the desire to treat the people in most need ― that was a powerful incentive.”

Later that year, Linton and his team took sputum from 19 patients, brought the samples to a South Korean hospital for analysis, and returned six months later with medicine. On subsequent trips, the number of patients wanting the test grew.

By 2009, as an indication of the worsening health situation but also the growing trust in the program, Eugene Bell was overwhelmed by crowds of people at its testing centers.

The program now accommodates upwards of six hundred patients at six specialized centers across the country’s northwest.

Linton, who spent his childhood in South Korea, says the process requires significant “buy-in” from North Koreans, beginning with the health authorities.

In their biggest show of cooperation, the government agreed to Eugene Bell’s recommendation that treatment take place in centrally-located MDRTB centers, despite reluctance over the logistics.

It also needs the dedication of health care providers, who must vigilantly keep patients on their programs. If not, they can become resistant to MDRTB medications, opening the door for the emergence of XDRTB, which Linton calls “virtually incurable.”

But the biggest commitment comes from patients, who are prescribed with a harsh cocktail of drugs. Some need to learn to trust outside help, not always an easy task in the isolated country.

“This is a very rigorous and rough treatment program. It takes a lot of very strong, toxic medicines to treat MDRTB. Patients suffer a good bit,” said Linton, who counted nausea, vomiting, temporary deafness and psychosis as side effects.

If after eighteen months, a patient’s sputum tests negative for MDRTB, they are effectively cured. But if after a year they still test positive, the treatment is considered a failure.

“Most of those people know, because they are still coughing up phlegm,” the doctor said. “But failing people is terrible. This work can be very dramatic at times.”

You can read previous posts about the Eugene Bell Foundation here.

UPDATE: On February 24th the Korea Economic Institute held a conference with Dr. Sharon Perry, DPRK Tuberculosis Project, Stanford School of Medicine.  You can see the video of the conference here: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4. The paper is here (PDF).

Read the full sotry here:
Aid group engages N. Korea in fight against TB
Korea Times
Kim Joung-jin
2/21/2011

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Trade in Kaesong drastically increases to $ 1.4 billion in 2010

Friday, February 18th, 2011

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No.11-02-18
2/18/2011

Despite the severed inter-Korean relations, Kaesong Industrial Complex related trade reached USD 1,442,860,000, surpassing last year’s figure (USD 940 million) by 53.4 percent.

Trade at Kaesong continuously rose since 2004, almost reaching USD 1 billion by 2009. Then it sharply jumped over the one billion mark last year in 2010.

A closer look at the numbers is as follows: 2004 (USD 41.69 million); 2005 (USD 176.74 million); 2006 (USD 298.79 million); 2007 (USD 440.68 million); 2008 (USD 884.40 million); 2009 (USD 940.55 million); 2010 (USD 1.44 billion).

This rise in trade brought the total trade figure up to USD 1.912 billion by 2010, an increase of 13.9 percent against last year’s total of USD 1.679 billion.

The number of total workers in North Korea reached 42,397 in March 2010, steadily increased to 44,958 in October, and reached 45,332 by November.

However, after the Cheonan incident, South Korea issued a suspension on inter-Korean trade, causing a drop in general trade and processing on commission.

General trade declined by 54 percent from 2009 to USD 117, 860, 000 while processing on commission was down by 22.5 percent to USD 317, 560, 000.

Consequently, the composition of the inter-Korean trade changed, contributing to the proportion of the trade in Kaesong to increase to 75.5 percent from 56 percent in 2009. General trade on the other hand, fell from 15.3 percent to 6.2 percent and processing on commission dropped from 24.4 percent to 16.6 percent from 2009.

In addition, commercial transactions — such as general trade and processing on commission — in Kaesong comprised 98.8 percent of total inter-Korean exchange while noncommercial activities like humanitarian assistance only reached 1.2 percent.

Also in 2010, a total of 13,119 South Koreans visited North Korea, which is an increase of 7.9 percent from the previous year (12,616 people). This is due to the rise in the number of people visiting the Kaesong Industrial Complex.

According to the Ministry of Unification, 94.5 percent (123,023) of the total visitors to the DPRK had involvement with the Kaesong Industrial Complex. This is an increase of 7.9 percent from 2009 (111,811 people).

In comparison, most of the noneconomic related visits to the DPRK declined since the Cheonan incident including socio-cultural exchanges and humanitarian assistance. With the implementation of the May 24 sanctions against North Korea, noneconomic related visitation to North Korea decreased 23 percent from 2,313 people to 1,773 from the previous year.

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North Korea diaspora in North East Asia

Thursday, February 17th, 2011

The Woodrow Wilson Center’s Asia Program and NKIDP hosted a panel on the North Korean diaspora in North East Asia.

Panelists include:
Apichai Shipper, Visiting Scholar, University of California, Los Angeles;
Hazel Smith,Professor, Cranfield University, U.K.;
Suzanne Scholte,President, Defense Forum Foundation

I have not seen the panel yet, but it is in the queue for this weekend.

Watch the entire event here.

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2010 DPRK grain production estimates inconsistent

Monday, February 7th, 2011

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 11-02-07
2/7/2011

Evaluations of North Korea’s grain output for 2010, and predictions for 2011, varied considerably between international organizations and South Korean agricultural experts. A recent report from the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) evaluating North Korea’s economy for 2010 and examining the outlook for 2011 revealed that the World Food Program (WFP) and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimated a 3.1 percent growth in North Korea’s 2010 grain production over the previous year, at 5.53 million tons. Based on this estimate, the two international organizations stated, “Because North Korea used more fertilizer than in the previous year, and an improved fuel situation [allowed] the use of more agricultural equipment, harvest conditions have improved.”

These international organizations believe that North Korea’s 24.43 million residents need an annual total of 5.35 million tons of grain, estimating that 4.25 tons (148kg per person) are needed for food while an additional 1.1 million tons are needed to seed future crops, for use in industrial manufacturing, and for livestock feed. Therefore, it was predicted that North Korea’s domestic production will fall 870,000 tons short in 2011. Since Pyongyang is expected to be able to import 330,000 tons of grain this year, it will be left with a 540,000 ton grain deficit.

On the other hand, the (South) Korea Rural Economic Institute and experts from other South Korean agricultural research institutions believe that unfavorable weather conditions in 2010, just like those seen in the South, as well as flooding in North Korea meant that grain production fell off last year, especially since the adverse weather and low temperatures struck during prime growing seasons. Therefore, South Korean agricultural experts estimate that North Korean grain production for 2010 was about 200,000 tons less than the year prior. Increased fertilizer distribution accounted for an additional 100,000 tons, but the damage from flooding cost the North the same in crops, and the shortage of assistance meant an additional 200,000 ton shortage.

South Korea’s Rural Development Association estimates North Korea’s 2009/2010 crop yield at 4.11 million tons, and predicts the 2010/2011 yield will drop to 3.9 million tons. South Korean experts also predict that even with international aid and continuing private-sector grain exports to North Korea, Pyongyang will fall 1 million tons short of grain this year. Not only that, the chances that the North’s grain situation will grow even more severe are significant. Rising international grain prices will heavily burden Pyongyang, and while food prices in North Korea’s traditional markets appear stable following the fall harvest, they have risen steadily, and as the lean season approaches, there is a high likelihood that prices will skyrocket soon.

KINU predicts that if there isn’t any significant domestic political upheaval or any serious clashes with other countries in 2011, North Korea’s industrial sector may be able to boost production. As long as international sanctions continue to be enforced against North Korea, Pyongyang’s reliance on China will continue, but that the forced efforts at self-sufficiency and indigenous development are unsustainable.

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Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea

Monday, January 31st, 2011

I was in Washington today for the release of Haggard’s and Noland’s new book Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea. According to the Peterson Institute’s web page:

Despite its nuclear capability, in certain respects North Korea resembles a failed state sitting uneasily atop a shifting internal foundation. This instability is due in part to the devastating famine of the 1990s and the state’s inability to fulfill the economic obligations that it had assumed, forcing institutions, enterprises, and households to cope with the ensuing challenges of maintaining stability with limited cooperation between the Korean government and the international community. The ineffective response to the humanitarian crisis triggered by the famine resulted in the outflow of perhaps tens of thousands of refugees whose narratives are largely overlooked in evaluating the efficacy of the humanitarian aid program. Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea uses extensive surveys with refugees who now reside in China or South Korea to provide extraordinary insight into the changing pathways to power, wealth, and status within North Korea. These refugee testimonies provide an invaluable interpretation of the regime, its motivations, and its capabilities and assess the situation on the ground with the rise of inequality, corruption, and disaffection in the decade since the famine. Through the lens of these surveys, preeminent North Korean experts Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland carefully document the country’s transition from a centrally planned economy to a highly distorted market economy, characterized by endemic corruption and widening inequality. The authors chart refugees’ reactions to the current conditions and consider the disparity between the perceived and real benefit of the international humanitarian aid program experienced by this displaced population. Finally, the book examines these refugees’ future prospects for integration into a new society.

I have read the book and found it tremendously helpful for understanding the changing dynamics within the DPRK.

In conjunction with the release of the book, the two authors have launched a new blog.  You can see it here. They have already posted some fantastic data—and we can also see a sense of humor as well!

UPDATE:

1. Here is a link to the presentation given at the event.

2. Here is coverage in the Daily NK.

3. Here is coverage in the AFP.

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New NKIDP report: Crisis and Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula: 1968-1969

Tuesday, January 25th, 2011

The Wilson Center’s North Korea International Documentation Project (NKIDP) has published another manuscript in the Critical Oral History Conference Series: Crisis and Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula: 1968-1969

Download PDF here

The Donga Ilbo reported on this paper:

Armed North Korean spies caught while trying to storm South Korea’s presidential office to assassinate then President Park Chung-hee on Jan. 21, 1968, are known to have also planned to attack the U.S. Embassy.

When the North seized the American intelligence ship USS Pueblo in waters off the North Korean port of Wonsan two days later, the U.S. planned to immediately mobilize F-4 Phantom fighters to bomb the North. This plan was shelved, however, because the U.S. Air Force lacked devices for loading conventional weapons required for an air strike.

This information was derived from a compilation of declassified documents from 1968-69 titled, “Crisis on the Korean Peninsula and Standoff” obtained exclusively by The Dong-A Ilbo from the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington Monday.

The documents were compiled after the center held in September 2008 a closed forum with 15 experts and seven former U.S. officials who worked in both Koreas and China in the late 1960s.

Through the forum, the U.S. think tank comprehensively analyzed classified documents 1,285 pages in volume, including those from the former Soviet Union and the Eastern European bloc like the former East Germany and Romania.

Those who attended the forum included Horst Brie, former East German Ambassador to North Korea; Walter Cutler, former political adviser to the U.S. ambassador to South Korea; Thomas Hughes, former director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the U.S. State Department; James Leonard, former chief of the Korea Desk at the State Department; and David Reuter, analyst for Northeast Asia at the U.S. National Security Agency.

Also at the event were Kang In-duk, former South Korean unification minister, and Yoon Ha-jeong, former South Korean vice foreign minister.

Leonard said, “According to multiple documents considered classified at the time, North Korea’s seizure of the USS Pueblo constituted an emergency situation. After the incident was reported to the U.S. Air Force, F-4 Phantoms were to be mobilized within several minutes but did not take off because they only were equipped with devices for loading nuclear weapons but none for loading conventional weapons.”

“The USS Pueblo incident was apparently a disgrace to the U.S.,” he said, adding, “With security concerns heightened at the time and Seoul’s presidential office under attack, the U.S. Defense Department should have been prepared to protect the Pueblo by mobilizing the Air Force when necessary.”

Ultimately, Washington merely mobilized the nuclear aircraft carrier Enterprise and two Aegis destroyers from the U.S. Navy`s 7th Fleet.

Kang, who served as the first chief of the North Korea intelligence bureau at the (South) Korean Central Intelligence Agency, said, “Armed North Korean spies, including Kim Shin-jo, originally had five targets including the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, (South Korean) Army headquarters, Seoul Prison and Seobinggo North Korean Spy Detention Camp.”

“But judging that the targets were too scattered, the North reduced the group of armed spies to 31 from the originally planned 35, and only targeted the presidential office.”

Through interrogation of Kim, Seoul secured intelligence that the spies originally had the U.S. Embassy as a target but it did not inform Washington of this finding.

Cutler, who was stationed in Seoul at the time, said, “We had no prior intelligence that the embassy was a target and thus took no special security measures in this regard.”

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KJI and JST meet with Orascom president

Sunday, January 23rd, 2011

Pictured above (L – R): Jang Song-thaek, Naguib Sawiris, and Kim Jong-il

According to Martyn Williams:

The CEO of Egypt’s Orascom Telecom has been given a rare honor during his current trip to Pyongyang: an audience with Kim Jong-il and dinner hosted by the reclusive leader for the businessman whose firm owns a majority of North Korea’s only 3G cellular network.

Naguib Sawiris arrived in the North Korean capital on Friday and was received on Sunday by Kim Jong-il, the Korea Central News Agency reported on Monday.

Kim Jong-il, “warmly welcomed his DPRK visit taking place at a time when Orascom′s investment is making successful progress in different fields of the DPRK, including telecommunications,” the report said.

Orascom holds a 75 percent stake in Cheo Technology, which operates North Korea’s only 3G cellular network.

The network, the remaining stake in which is held by the government, uses the Koryolink service name. It has seen fast growth in subscribers and currently claims more than 300,000 accounts in just the two years since its launch.

After starting first in Pyongyang, the network has been expanded to cover provincial capitals and smaller cities and a 3G signal is now within reach of 75 percent of the population, the company said in November last year.

The Orascom group has made several other investments in the country. In 2007 it invested in a cement factory and in late 2008, at around the same time it launched the 3G network, it opened a local bank. The company has also been tied to renewed construction work at Pyongyang’s pyramid-shaped Ryugyong Hotel. The iconic building was halted in 1992 and has remained vacant ever since.

According to the AFP:

North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il has met the head of an Egyptian company that provides a mobile phone service in the impoverished communist nation, state media reported Monday.

Naguib Sawiris, chairman and CEO of Orascom Telecom Holding, has been visiting the North since Friday. His company has provided a mobile phone service in the North jointly with a local firm since late 2008.

Kim “warmly welcomed his DPRK (North Korea) visit taking place at a time when Orascom’s investment is making successful progress in different fields of the DPRK, including telecommunications,” the North’s state news agency KCNA said.

Kim had “a cordial talk” with Sawiris and hosted a dinner for him, it added.

Orascom said last year that mobile phone subscriptions in North Korea had more than quadrupled in the space of a year — to 301,199 by the end of September 2010 from 69,261 a year earlier.

However, it said overall “mobile penetration” remains at one percent in the country, which has an estimated per-capita GDP of 1,700 dollars and a population of 24 million.

North Korea strictly controls access to outside information and fixes the tuning controls of radios and televisions to official stations.

It began a mobile phone service in November 2002 but shut it down without explanation 18 months later and began recalling handsets.

But in December 2008 the country introduced a 3G mobile phone network in a joint venture with the Egyptian firm.

The Egyptian group in 2007 sealed a 115 million dollar deal to invest in a North Korean cement plant. It is also reportedly involved in completing construction of the 105-storey Ryugyong Hotel in the capital.

Martyn has more at North Korea Tech.

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Daedong Credit Bank press release

Sunday, January 16th, 2011

The Daedong Credit Bank (Based in the Potonggang Hotel in Pyongyang) has issued a press release.

I have made a PDF of it available here.

Here is their web page.

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Chinese to boost investment in Rason

Friday, January 7th, 2011

UPDATE  1 (2011-1-19): According to the Wall Street Journal:

A Chinese firm has signed a letter of intent to invest $2 billion in a North Korean industrial zone, representing one of the largest potential investments in Kim Jong Il’s authoritarian state and a challenge to U.S. policy in the region.

The agreement was signed with little fanfare in Pyongyang on Dec. 20—a day otherwise marked by pitched tension on the Korean peninsula following the North’s shelling of a South Korean island—according to documents viewed by the Wall Street Journal. Confirmation of the deal comes as Chinese President Hu Jintao visits Washington this week in a bid to forge closer security and economic ties with the U.S.

U.S. officials said the administration is aware of the possible Chinese investment, but noted that previous projects haven’t gone anywhere. “No investment project will enable North Korea to meet the needs of its people as long as its government continues its destabilizing behavior,” said a senior administration official.

The letter of intent involves China’s Shangdi Guanqun Investment Co. and North Korea’s Investment and Development Group. An assistant to the managing director of Shangdi Guanqun, who identified himself only by his surname, Han, said his company’s planned investment is focused on the Rason special economic zone, situated near North Korea’s border with Russia.

The zone was called Rajin-Sonbong when it was established in 1991, but failed to attract sufficient investment. It was revived, and re-named Rason, following a visit there in 2009 by Mr. Kim.

Mr. Han said the plan is to develop infrastructure, including docks, a power plant and roads over the next two to three years, followed by various industrial projects, including an oil refinery, over the next five to 10 years. He said the company was waiting for a response from the North Korean government before applying for approval from China’s Ministry of Commerce.

“It’s all pending at this stage, and it’s really up to the Korean side to make the decision,” Mr. Han said. He added that the $2 billion figure was what the North Korean side had hoped for, not necessarily what his company could deliver.

The company’s Web site says the company was “under the administration” of a state-owned enterprise, Shangdi Purchase-Estate Corporation. Mr. Han, however, said his company was “100 percent private.”

For the Obama administration, securing China’s cooperation in restraining North Korea’s military and nuclear-proliferation activities is a cornerstone of a warmer bilateral relationship. But the potential investment is a reminder of possible limits of Chinese cooperation.

The U.S. wants to step up sanctions to force Kim Jong Il to give up his nuclear-weapons arsenal and military activities. China, meanwhile, is increasingly promoting business projects and direct investment to influence the North, say Chinese and American analysts, arguing financial pressure hasn’t worked.

China is North Korea’s biggest trading partner and aid donor, but the scale of this deal raises concerns in Seoul that Beijing is running its own version of the “Sunshine” policy under which the South boosted investment in the North from 1998 to 2008.

This policy disconnect is expected to be one of the issues Chinese and U.S. officials discuss this week. “These types of deals pursued by China generally present a real challenge to the sanctions” being effective, said Victor Cha, a North Korea expert who helped oversee Asia policy in George W. Bush’s National Security Council. “The net effect is that it does make it more difficult for these sanctions to have the desired effect.”

Such deals have emerged in the past and have come to nothing, analysts said, and it is possible this one, too, could peter out. A number of similar North Korean economic zones have failed to live up to their billing because of poor infrastructure and corruption, and a lack of economic reform. News of the deal was first reported in the Korean-language press, including the Voice of America’s Korean service.

It is unclear how long the agreement has been in the works. But its Dec. 20 signing came on the day South Korea conducted a closely watched artillery test from Yeonpyeong Island near North Korea.

The test marked a high point in tensions after North Korea’s surprise late November shelling of Yeonpyeong, which killed four South Koreans. Pyongyang had threatened a swift military response should Seoul carry out an announced artillery test on Dec. 20. But the day’s drill came and went amid high security in the South, with the North saying in a statement it “did not feel any need to retaliate.”

Top administration officials have recently both praised and chided the Chinese over the North. On a trip to China last week, Defense Secretary Robert Gates commended the Chinese for their “constructive” role in reducing tensions on the peninsula after Pyongyang’s recent shelling of a South Korean island. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in a Friday speech pressed China to be more aggressive in helping tamp down the North’s nuclear program.

The proposed investment is among the strongest evidence yet of China’s strategy of using direct investment rather political pressure to push for change in North Korea. Chinese experts say that after North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006, China tried to make improved bilateral relations dependent on Pyongyang dismantling its nuclear program. But after a second test in 2009, China changed tack.

Beijing now believes, according to Chinese experts, that the North Korean regime won’t respond to political pressure and could collapse completely if China cuts off aid and investment, triggering a flood of refugees into northeastern China, and bringing U.S. troops right up to the Chinese border.

The investment strategy was cemented when China’s Premier Wen Jiabao visited North Korea in October 2009 and signed a slew of economic and trade agreements. One of those agreements was for China to fund construction of a $250 million bridge across the Yalu River that separates the two countries.

Construction of the bridge, which would link China with another North Korean special economic zone, had been slated to start in August. Local officials said in November it appeared to have been put on hold indefinitely. Now they say a ground-breaking ceremony was held Dec. 31.

U.S. officials are particularly concerned about how China’s financial links to North Korea may be facilitating Pyongyang’s weapons programs. In November, Pyongyang showed a visiting American scientist 2,000 centrifuges stationed at a cover site, drastically raising fears about the North’s ability to expand its nuclear-weapons arsenal.

“China’s increased economic support undercuts the rest of the region’s efforts to convince Pyongyang that there will be consequences for further belligerence, nuclear weapons development or transfer of nuclear capabilities,” said Michael Green, who also served as a senior official on Asia during the Bush administration.

Read the full story here:
Chinese Firm to Invest in North Korea
Wall Street Journal
Jay Soloman and Jeremy Page
2011-1-19

ORIGINAL POST (2011-1-7): According to the Joong Ang Ilbo:

A Chinese state-run company recently agreed to invest $2 billion in North Korea’s Rason free trade zone, the JoongAng Ilbo learned yesterday from documents related to the deal.

Shangdi Guanqun Investment Co., Ltd. signed a 10-point memorandum of understanding with Pyongyang’s Investment and Development Group on Dec. 20 in Beijing, the documents showed.

The signing ceremony was attended by Mi Chang, president of Shangdi Guanqun Investment, and Kim Chol-jin, president of the Investment and Development Group.

The goal of the investment, stated in the documents, is to build Rason, a northeastern North Korean city on the East Sea that borders both China and Russia, into the “biggest industrial zone in Northeast Asia” in around 10 years.

The project calls for coal-fired power plants, roads, piers and oil refineries in the North Hamgyong Province city, the documents said.

According to the documents, the deal is “a strategic joint project based on trust between high-level figures” in China and North Korea, which suggests it may have been negotiated by North Korean leader Kim Jong-il during two visits to China last year, on which he met Chinese President Hu Jintao.

The North’s economy has suffered under international sanctions on trade and financial services overseas, imposed after its nuclear weapon tests, and is desperately seeking foreign investment.

China is investing in Rason as an export base to serve markets in Japan, southern China and Southeast Asia.

Rason is a merger of two towns, Rajin and Sonbong, and was designated the first free trade zone in the North in 1991. It was promoted to a “special city,” which means it has fewer restrictions on businesses.

“We have a deep interest in North Korea’s ample natural resources,” an official of Shangdi Guanqun Investment Co., Ltd. told the JoongAng Ilbo. “To facilitate the export of natural resources [from the region], we will invest $300 million first and construct a coal-fire power plant at the coal mine and build a railway, roads, and harbors and piers [near it].”

The Chinese firm’s official said the company opened an office in Pyongyang at the end of last month.

Shangdi Guanqun Investment, established in 1995 by the Chinese government, is a trading firm specializing in oil processing, natural resources and international financial services. It is one of the key companies in China’s 12th five-year economic development plan that starts this year.

North Korea’s Investment and Development Group is in charge of developing the country’s four free trade zones. The other economic special zones are in Kaesong, Mount Kumgang and Sinuiju.

The Shangdi Guanqun Investment official said the company will build an oil refinery in Rason, where it plans to refine crude imported from the Middle East and Russia and sell the output to China or other countries.

I believe this Chinese story also relates to the same project.

Read the full story here:
China backs North’s Rason project
Joong Ang Daily
Ko Soo-suk
2011-1-7

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