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Spread of Religion among North Korean Soldiers

Monday, September 10th, 2007

Daily NK
Kim Yong Hun
9/10/2007

It was reported that a religion criticizing Socialism has been on the spread in North Korea’s army, and various publications and CDs relaying information on South Korea has been transmitted in secrecy.

It is the first time ever to be reported that there has been a spread of religion within the North Korean army.

On the 6th of September, the Committee for Democratization of North Korea collected and revealed an educational-purpose document, which was issued by the Chosun People’s Army Publishing Department. This 18-page manuscript, issued in March, 2007, was used in the two months following to educate soldiers and commissioned officers about the increase in soldiers relying on religion and foreign publications. According to the document, there is a need to re-indoctrinate the North Korean People’s Army in order to suppress the inflow of capitalism.

It warned that, “We should not look, listen, read the documents, broadcastings and video or audio materials made by the enemy. The enemy is using Radio and TV to launch false propaganda through well-made, strategic news and intrigue.” and “While the enemy continues to attack us with their political indoctrination, our soldiers must not sway to their influence. We must block off all means of broadcasting through which the enemies can trespass.”

The document states that “the CDs, recordings and publications from the enemies all contain information about their development of and the prosperity of capitalism. Their corruptive culture and lifestyle is embellished ingeniously in such a strategic manner. The signalmen must comply with all rules when using their radiotelegraph and every soldier must work to confiscate small-sized semiconductor radios and pocket-sized TVs.”

The reason why the North Korean military is complying with educational-purpose philosophy indoctrination is because the wide-spread transmission among soldiers of South Korean dramas, CDs, and publications that contain information on capitalistic society is seen as a serious problem.

In particular, the report advises very strictly that the soldiers not be dazzled by religion, and to pursue socialism no matter what. It conveys that religion is not only taking over the regular citizens but is becoming an influence within the army of North Korea.

The document states that, “The enemy is sending bibles, audio and video materials related to religion and superstition through various routes. They are placing spies within international delegations entering our borders to spread their religions and superstitious beliefs and win our citizens over to their side.”

In addition, “Religion and superstition are like poison that corrupts socialism and paralyzes class consciousness. Our soldiers must, more than ever, instigate a revolutionary awakening to defy the enemies’ maneuvers.”

It continues on, cautioning that “soldiers must be wary of superstition, religion and the foreign lifestyle, and when they find evidence of such things, must immediately stop them from spreading further. We must not get involved in the enemy’s strategic propaganda. Getting involved in the psychological warfare of enemies is considered high treason; and therefore, we must fight against it, considering this issue an emergency.”

It is also emphasized that, “Alcohol, Sex and Money are poisons that ruin our ideology and belief. We must increase the ideological indoctrination, ideological struggle and legal struggle in order to fight the spread of these elements of capitalistic ideology.”

The Committee for Democratization of North Korea revealed that “According to North Korean defectors, there have been consecutive economic downfalls since the nuclear tests, causing much difficulty in the daily lives of North Korean citizens. It is known that the situation for soldiers has worsened as well.”

The educational-purpose document is a kind of propaganda tool explaining background, measures, and outlines of the domestic state. Different indoctrination documents are distributed to different groups of individuals: what is disseminated among politicians differs from that which is given to workers or military.

Posted in Civil society, Domestic publication, Korean People's Army, KPA Publishing Dept., Military, Religion | Comments Closed

Pyongyang Vice: Tale of Veteran-Students

Monday, September 10th, 2007

Daily NK
Park Choel Yong
9/10/2007

Army Veterans in North Korea can have bright futures once accepted into college. In North Korea, serving in the Armed Forces, party membership, and college diplomas are three main keys for success.

However, a Veteran matriculate is not necessarily awarded with a diploma after four years.

Veteran-students without money or parental auspice would have to suffer turbulent years leading up till graduation.

First of all, most of them acknowledge that they are too old to study ardently (since veterans have spent at least seven to eight years in the Armed Forces); therefore, Veteran-students do not hesitate to take shortcuts.

Every North Korean university/college is organized as if it were a military academy. In this semi-military college student environment, Veterans usually take an officer role and often take advantage of their position, taking bribes from other students.

As another vice, some Veteran-students commit adultery while in college. An ex-serviceman studying in college and communist party members are the most eligible bachelors in North Korea. Many rich parents encourage their daughters to marry with collegiate Veterans.

Exploiting their popularity, some Veterans have wives to support in their hometowns, but engage with another woman in Pyongyang. Some even divorce their under-educated and less-privileged wives to marry their mistresses.

Often times, a divorced wife of a Veteran-student will come to the college in Pyongyang and seek help at the party office.

Some Veteran-students boast “There is a nice way to shut them (divorced wives) up!” The ‘way’ is demanding huge sums of money from the parents-in-law. The wife’s parents will be shocked, will tire of the petition, and eventually, the call for divorce will come from the other side.

A Veteran-student from my college never let his wife leave his hometown to visit him in Pyongyang because she was too rustic.

An additional area of concern is that Veteran-students frequently instigate fist fights.

The Veterans, who sweat and bled on the drill field, can not allow other students to regard themselves as being in the same class. So they bully other students into revering them, and often fight with those who refuse to do so.

At other times, these Veteran-students will provoke quarrels with police or traffic officers.

Their fighting ability ranks top, but academically, they are pitiful; yet they make no efforts to overcome the disadvantage.

Veteran-students learn how to exploit a situation. And as soon as they are appointed as party leaders after graduation from college, ex-servicemen tend to pursue power and money by preying on their subordinates.

North Korean people used to call American imperialists “wolves” (a very derogatory term). However, more people now have begun to redirect the term toward party officials, who were once Veteran-students themselves.

Posted in Civil society, Dating/Courting, Education, Korean People's Army, Military, Worker's Party | Comments Closed

Obsession With Nuclear Family

Sunday, September 9th, 2007

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
9/9/2007

On Aug. 24, 1962, the Soviet Ambassador to Pyongyang, Vasilii Moskovski, met the North Korean foreign minister, Pak Song-chol. The issue to be discussed was nuclear non-proliferation, one closely related to the nuclear test ban treaty, then in preparation. Moscow was an enthusiastic backer of the treaty, and wanted support from its allies. Relations with North Korea were deteriorating fast, but still some supportive gesture from the North was hoped for.

However, Comrade Pak was straightforward: a non-proliferation treaty was a bad idea. He explained the reasons for his skepticism. He asked a Soviet diplomat: “Who can impose such a treaty on countries that do not have nuclear weapons, but are perhaps successfully working in that direction?” Having said that, the North Korean foreign minister continued, “The Americans hold on to Taiwan, to South Korea, and South Vietnam, they blackmail the people with their nuclear weapons, and so rule over those lands and do not intend to leave. Their possession of nuclear weapons, and the lack thereof in our hands, objectively helps them, therefore, to eternalize their rule.”

Indeed, soon Ambassador Moskovski learned that the North Koreans were trying to acquire nuclear technology. As a matter of fact, recently de-classified Soviet papers confirm that in late 1963 Moskovski heard something to this effect more or less every month.

In August 1963 the East German ambassador informed Moskovski that “the [North] Koreans … are asking whether they could obtain any kind of information about nuclear weapons and the atomic industry from German universities and research institutes.”

In September 1963 Soviet geologists, then employed as technical consultants to the North Korean uranium mine, told Ambassador Moskovski that “the Korean side incessantly tries to obtain information about the deposits and quality of the uranium ore mined in the Soviet Union.” They also noticed that the amount of the uranium ore extracted in the North far exceeded the modest demands of its small-scale research program.

In October 1963, another Soviet scientist told the ambassador about a recent conversation on the same subject with a Korean engineer. The engineer asked whether Koreans were able to create an atomic bomb. The Soviet scientist said that the economy of the DPRK could not cope with such a task. But, according to an Embassy document, “the Korean said that it would cost much less in the DPRK than in other countries. If we tell our workers, he declared, that we are taking up such a task, they will agree to work free of charge for several years.”

This new evidence, recently obtained and published by Balazs Szalontaj and Sergei Radchenko, finally confirms what has been long suspected by many (and known to the few) _ from its inception, the North Korean nuclear program was military in its nature.

Actually, North Korea was to some extent involved in nuclear politics as early as the 1940s. It has large deposits of a particular monazite, a mineral that was seen as potentially useful for the Soviet nuclear program. The Soviets demanded payments in monazite for their sales to the North. Eventually, the engineers were disappointed with the properties of the mineral, and abandoned their plans to use it as a source of nuclear material. Russia still does not know what to do with the large stockpiles of monazite it still has from the 1940s.

The North Koreans were mining for uranium as well. There were two major quarries operated with Soviet technical support. The quality of the uranium remained low, but its production was still seen as necessary for the sake of the future.

In 1959 the DPRK signed an agreement on nuclear research with the USSR (soon afterwards, a very similar agreement was signed with China as well). The Soviet Union was becoming very strict about non-proliferation, and the agreement was probably seen as a potential safeguard, to make sure that North Korean ambitions would not result in a military nuclear program.

Needless to say, such a program was indeed what they wanted, and the North Koreans had many ways to outsmart the Soviet supervisors _ not least, by skillfully exploiting the deepening rivalry between Moscow and Beijing, and so it was that Soviet assistance helped Pyongyang launch its first research reactor in 1965.

It seems that the nuclear weapons were not much feared _ generally, in line with Mao’s mad dictum about the `paper tiger.’ In 1962, for example, the East German ambassador had a remarkable talk with Yi Chu-yon, then a Politburo member and one of North Korea’s top leaders.

Yi Chu-yon suggested that it was a good time to start a Third World War. He said that “now, when the USSR has such powerful means of waging war, with missiles that can strike all ranges, perhaps it would be better not to wait, but to strike the imperialists.” Yi Chu-yon received some support, since, according to the East German diplomat, “other Korean comrades who accompanied us also insistently advocated a military resolution of all contradictions between capitalism and socialism.”

Hence, North Korean nuclear ambitions have remained a constant for nearly half a century. However, it took a couple of decades to get things moving. The North was, indeed, too poor for such an undertaking, and no amount of drum-beating nationalism could compensate for lack of resources and technology. At the same time, none of the great power allies was enthusiastic about helping Pyongyang arm itself with nukes.

Nonetheless, work continued, and by the early 1980s the first rumors of the North Korean nuclear weapons project began to spread along the people in the know.

Posted in Military, Nuclear, Political economy, Russia | Comments Closed

N. Korea Agrees to Nuclear Deadline

Monday, September 3rd, 2007

Washington Post
John Ward Anderson
9/3/2007; Page A10

Deal Would Disable Programs, U.S. Says

North Korea agreed to disclose all of its nuclear activities and disable its nuclear programs by the end of the year, a senior U.S. official said Sunday after negotiations this weekend in Geneva.

Assistant Secretary of State Christopher R. Hill said details of North Korea’s agreement would be worked out later this month in meetings sponsored by China and involving Russia, Japan and South Korea, in addition to the United States and North Korea.

“One thing that we agreed on is that the DPRK will provide a full declaration of all their nuclear programs and will disable their nuclear programs by the end of this year, 2007,” Hill said, using the initials for North Korea’s formal name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Hill said it was the first time North Korea had agreed to a timeline to end its nuclear programs.

In separate remarks, the head of the North Korean delegation, Kim Gye Gwan, said his country had agreed to declare and dismantle its nuclear facilities, but he did not mention a deadline.

“We made it clear, we showed clear willingness to declare and dismantle all nuclear facilities,” Kim said, the Associated Press reported. “We are happy with the way the peace talks went.”

Hill, who described the talks as “very good and very substantive,” said the agreement included disclosing and dismantling any uranium enrichment programs, which the United States fears could be used to make nuclear weapons but North Korea previously had not acknowledged having.

The discussions this weekend also focused on North Korean demands to normalize relations with the United States, Hill said. In particular, North Korea wants to be removed from the U.S. list of states that sponsor terrorism, a listing that imposes a ban on arms-related sales to the country and restricts economic aid.

Closer ties with the United States will be built “step by step, with the understanding that we’re not going to have a normalized relationship until we have a denuclearized North Korea,” Hill said Sunday before the talks ended. “To the extent that we can move quickly to denuclearization, we can move quickly to normalization.”

Japan also has refused to forge warmer relations with North Korea until it provides an accounting of what happened to Japanese citizens who were kidnapped by North Korean security services in the 1970s and ’80s.

Negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear programs and normalizing relations with the xenophobic, communist country have been fitful for years.

Last October, while talks were stalled, North Korea announced it had conducted its first underground nuclear test. In February, the United States and North Korea agreed to a sweeping deal to restore diplomatic and economic relations and end the country’s nuclear programs. In July, North Korea closed its main plutonium reactor at Yongbyon after receiving 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil from South Korea — the first installment of 1 million tons pledged as part of the February agreement.

Posted in Energy, Military, Nuclear, Political economy | Comments Closed

North Korea Uncovered v.4 on Google Earth

Wednesday, August 29th, 2007

The most authoritative, publicly available map of North Korea
Version 4: August 29, 2007

Download it here

This map covers North Korea’s agriculture, aviation, cultural locations, manufacturing facilities, railroad, energy infrastructure, politics, sports venues, military establishments, religious facilities, leisure destinations, and national parks. It is continually expanding and undergoing revisions. This is the fourth version.

Additions to the latest version of “North Korea Uncovered” include the city of Manpo along the Chinese border, KEDO, Kumgang Resort expansion, Kaesong Industrial Zone, as well as a few more parks, antiaircraft sites, dams, mines, canals, etc. I have also added more links in the menu which will tell the viewer a bit about the locations themselves. I have also changed the color scheme to make the collage easier to view.

Disclaimer: I cannot vouch for the authenticity of many locations since I have not seen or been to them, but great efforts have been made to check for authenticity. These efforts include pouring over books, maps, conducting interviews, and keeping up with other peoples’ discoveries. In many cases, I have posted sources, though not for all. This is a thorough compilation of lots of material, but I will leave it up to the reader to make up their own minds as to what they see. I cannot catch everything and I welcome contributions.

I hope this map will increase interest in North Korea. There is still plenty more to learn, and I look forward to receiving your additions to this project.

Posted in Agriculture, Architecture, Automobiles, Aviation, Biotech, Dams/hydro, Education, Electricity, Energy, Environmental protection, Fiscal & monetary policy, Forestry, Gasoline, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Google Earth, Health care, Hoteling, Hwanggumphyong and Wihwado Economic Zones (Sinuiju), International trade, Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), Labor conditions/wages, Leisure, Library, Light Industry, Lumber, Manufacturing, Military, Mining/Minerals, Mt. Kumgang Tourist Special Zone, Political economy, Pyongyang International Trade Fair, Pyongyang Metro, Railways, Rason Economic and Trade Zone (Rajin-Sonbong), Real estate, Sea shipping, Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013), Tourism, Transportation, Water, Wind | 1 Comment »

Weekly Report on North Korea (July 30, 2007 – August 5, 2007)

Monday, August 13th, 2007

South Korean Ministry of Unification
Serial No.851 (July 30 to August 05, 2007)

Internal Affairs

According to the report by the Central Broadcasting Station on July 30, North Korea held the Election of Deputies to the Provincial (Municipality Directly under Central Authority), City (District) and County People’s Assemblies of the DPRK on July 29 and announced the result through the report by the Central Election Guidance Committee.
According to the reports by the Central Broadcasting Station from August 1 to 4, Chairman Kim Jongil inspected a sub-unit of KPA Unit 4318, the Unit 136, and the Unit 273.
The Central Broadcasting Station reported on August 2 that cooperative farms in Dahungdan-gun, Yanggang-do, are focusing on potato farming.

Inter-Korean Affairs

According to the reports by the Central Broadcasting Station and Pyongyang Broadcasting Services on August 3, the spokesperson of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland announced a statement on August 2 to criticize the U.S.-ROK joint military exercise Ulchi Focus Lens from August 20 to 31.
The Rodong Daily reported on August 4 that on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of Kim Jong-il’s work “Let Us Carry out the Great Leader Comrade Kim IL Sung’s Instructions for National Reunification,” North Korea held a Pyongyang city report session on August 3 and published a commemorative editorial on August 4 on the Rodong Daily.

Foreign Affairs

The standing committee chairman of the Supreme People’s Assembly Kim Young-nam made a formal visit to Algeria, Egypt, and Ethiopia from July 24 to 31.
North Korean delegates led by Minister of Foreign Affairs Pak Ui-chun visited the Philippines to attend the ASEAN Regional Forum from July 28 to August 2.
With the U.S. House’s adoption of the resolution on comfort women, North Korea is continuously criticizing Japan, maintaining Japan’s raising the abduction issue is causing trouble in the six party talks.
North Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Pak Ui-chun met South Korean counterpart Song Min-soon during the ASEAN Regional Forum and reaffirmed that the abolition of the U.S. hostile policy against North Korea should be the precondition of the implementation of the second step of February 13 Agreement.

Posted in Agriculture, ASEAN, Central Broadcasting Station, Military, Ministry of foreign Affairs, Political economy, RoK Ministry of Unification, Supreme Peoples Assembly | Comments Closed

Kim Jong Il’s Yacht, UNESCO, Golf, and the Taean Glass Factory

Tuesday, July 31st, 2007

Now available on Google Earth!
(click above to download to your own Google Earth)

North Korea Uncovered v.3

Google Earth added a high-resolution overlay of the area between Pyongyang and Nampo. In it, most of the Koguryo tombs listed with UNESCO are now distinguishable. In addition, viewers can see the latest Kim Jong Il palace (including a yacht), the DPRK’s premier golf course, and the Chinese-built Taean Glass factory. I have also made some progress in mapping out the DPRK electricity grid.

This is the most authoritative map of North Korea that exists publicly today. Agriculture, aviation, cultural institutions, manufacturing, railroad, energy, politics, sports, military, religion, leisure, national parks…they are all here, and will captivate anyone interested in North Korea for hours.

Naturally, I cannot vouch for the authenticity of many locations since I have not seen or been to them, but great efforts have been made to check for authenticity. In many cases, I have posted sources, though not for all. This is a thorough compilation of lots of material, but I will leave it up to the reader to make up their own minds on the more “controversial” locations. In time, I hope to expand this further by adding canal and road networks.

I hope this post will launch a new interest in North Korea. There is still plenty more to learn, and I look forward to hearing about improvements that can be made.

Posted in Architecture, Automobiles, Aviation, Banking, Coal, Communications, Computing/IT, Dams/hydro, Education, Electricity, Energy, Football (soccer), Forestry, Gambling, Gasoline, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Golf, Google Earth, Health care, Hoteling, Hwanggumphyong and Wihwado Economic Zones (Sinuiju), Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), Leisure, Library, Light Industry, Manufacturing, Mass games, Military, Mining/Minerals, Mt. Kumgang Tourist Special Zone, Railways, Rason Economic and Trade Zone (Rajin-Sonbong), Real estate, Religion, Restaurants, Sea shipping, Sports, Tourism, Transportation | 1 Comment »

Drivers Employ Guards to Prevent Theft

Thursday, July 26th, 2007

Daily NK
Han Young Jin
7/25/2007

More and more North Korean delivery drivers have been employing guards in preparation for theft by soldiers.

On the 24th, Kim Kyung Min (pseudonym) a defector who entered Korea in February said, “Lately, there have been many incidents where the military get into brawls with young kids employed by delivery drivers and chauffeurs” and added, “This was something unthinkable in the past, but delivery drivers who transport wholesale goods are now hiring guards in order to protect their goods.”

As Jangmadang (markets) revitalized and more drivers began to load cargo onto their trucks to deliver goods to rural districts via road, protective measures such as guards have been employed as the number of theft by the military becomes more common.

Kim said, “In the past, drivers used government cars and so they were always attacked. However, things have changed now. Drivers bring their cars registering them at factories and businesses, and as a result, 2~3 guards are hired as a proactive way to protect themselves.”

According to Kim, these “bodyguards” employed by drivers were once militants who served in the army. Hence, they are trained in martial arts and fighting skills so that it is possible for a person to combat 2~3 people on his own.

Kim said, “Last year, soldiers put their baggage in the middle of the road on Pyongyang-Hyangsan Highway and wanted for a delivery truck. Thinking that the goods had fallen from a passing truck, the driver stopped his vehicle when three to four soldiers came and threatened him to hand over the goods. At that moment, the kids hired by the driver who were in hiding came and took care of the situation. Businessmen and drivers felt refreshed on hearing this story.”

Secretary general Lee Hae Young of the Association of North Korean Defectors said, “Since the past, soldiers would frequently steal household goods and corn from the country” and explained, “It seems that people have become conscious of protecting their assets.”

This kind of response by the people is a reflection of the real decline in power by the People’s Army.

Following the food crisis in North Korea, corruption amidst governmental officials worsened and soldiers increasingly stole goods from homes. People are widely recognizing the People’s Army as a violent group which steals goods.

Last year August, one Japanese broadcast captured and exposed a footage where a driver and security agent got into a fight in the vicinity of Sariwon, North Hwanghae, after the security agent had smashed a car window. This is what the majority of defectors mean when they respond, “This was something unthinkable in the past.”

These incidents may be a result of increasing individualism and property awareness as the distribution system collapsed. North Korean people analyze that different to the past, people are now increasingly asserting their own authority and not following the ways of the government or military.

Posted in Automobiles, Civil society, Military, Transportation | Comments Closed

Fair Game?

Sunday, June 3rd, 2007

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
6/3/2007

Kim Il Sung’s North Korea has always been a tough customer, and nobody knows who was more irritated by its constant antics: its foes or its friends. It has been a tough ally, ready to cheat and manipulate its sponsors. Since the 1950s most of its patrons have had to put up with its style _ largely because of their grand strategy, of course.

In the long run, it was probably the Soviets who were subject to Pyongyang’s diplomatic frolics most frequently, but China has the dubious honor of being the first country to enjoy such an experience in the early 1950s. Somewhat surprisingly, this happened during the Korean War when only a massive Chinese intervention saved Kim Il Sung’s regime from a sorry end.

Recent document-based research by Chinese scholars, especially by the formidable Shen Zhihua, has provided us with new insights into the early history of relations between the two supposedly “fraternal” countries. Now it is clear that the picture was anything but rosy.

When the North Korean troops invaded the South, it was implied that the Chinese forces would step in if the situation took a dangerous turn. Nonetheless, until late September, Pyongyang ignored Chinese advice and kept Beijing in the dark about the frontline situation. This drove the Chinese military attache and ambassador mad, but they could not do much about it.

The situation changed in October when Kim Il Sung had lost the war: by late October 1950, there was hardly one battle-ready battalion in the North Korean armed forces. The Chinese rushed in a large expeditionary force, but soon a question arose: who was to be in charge of the united armed forces?

Kim Il Sung clearly assumed that he would stay in command, and would have operational control over the Chinese units. This was unacceptable to the Chinese. To an extent, this was a clash of two nationalisms (and nationalisms of East Asia are notorious for being particularly virulent). However, there were real considerations involved as well.

First of all, the Chinese force far outnumbered the North Korean army. Second, the Chinese generals did not have much trust in the military competence of their North Korean colleagues. Peng Dehuai, whose task was to save the North, did not hide his outrage about Pyongyang’s style of operations. He was especially angry about the meaningless defense of a doomed Seoul, where about 30,000 North Korean soldiers were killed in late September. In late 1950, he sent a telegram to Beijing in which he labeled the North Korean style “childish”.

However, Kim Il Sung and other North Korean leaders avoided the issue, so the two armies (or, to be more precise, the Chinese army and the remains of the North Korean army) for a while acted independently–often, with sorry results. On November 4, for instance, the lack of coordination even led to a battle in which the North Korean tanks mistakenly attacked Chinese infantry, and thus unwittingly helped a semi-circled American unit escape.

At the same time, the Chinese attempts to incorporate the North Korean units into their own forces were met with resistance on the part of Kim Il Sung. He needed an army of his own, and was not ready for concessions.

It took more than a month to solve the question of joint command. Perhaps, the problems would have last longer, had Stalin not sent a cable demanding an immediate rectification of the situation. Stalin’s advice had to be taken seriously, and his intervention put an end to delays. The Joint Command was headed by Peng Dehuai, with two Chinese-speaking Korean generals acting as his deputies (incidentally, both generals were purged by Kim Il Sung a few years after the war).

However, new tensions arose in December 1950 when the railways came to be discussed. The Chinese forces could be supplied only by rail, and those lines were subjected to intense bombing. The railways had to be managed carefully, but the Chinese commanders discovered that Korean administration gave preference to cargo related to the economic needs of Korean reconstruction, rather than to military supplies. As a result, the Chinese and Koreans ran two different railway administrations, operating on the same railway network. It’s easy to imagine how this influenced the efficiency of the transportation system.

After a few months of discussion the North Koreans agreed to have a joint railroad command, but on the conditions that they would exercise overall control. By that time, most of the rolling stock had been provided by China, and the Chinese soldiers were also doing most of the maintenance work, hence the Chinese generals assumed that they should have the upper hand. But the Koreans did not agree. For them, this was an issue of their territorial rights, sovereignty, and other important symbols. For the Chinese, this was a question of their soldiers’ lives.

Once again, direct Soviet involvement was necessary to put an end to the squabbling. Stalin had no patience for the petty ambitions of his not very efficient satellite, and he was still in position to control the North. Hence, Stalin himself cabled Pyongyang demanding they agree to the Chinese conditions. In May 1951, after his august intervention, Pyongyang gave in.

These early squabbles were a sign of things to come. Over the years, North Korea has developed a peculiar diplomatic style, harsh and unbending but remarkably successful. It used to be applied to Moscow and Beijing. Nowadays the same tricks work wonders in dealing with the current sponsors of the regime, Beijing and Seoul as well as with Washington. But that is another story…

Posted in China, Military, Political economy, Russia | Comments Closed

N. Korean leader makes reshuffle of top military officials

Monday, May 21st, 2007

Yonhap
5/21/2007

North Korean leader Kim Jong-il recently made a reshuffle of his top military officials that may solidify his already firm grip on the country’s military, intelligence officials said Monday.

Ri Myong-su, former operations director of the North’s Korean People’s Army (KPA), has been named a resident member of the National Defense Commission (NDC), the highest decision-making body under the communist nation’s constitution that was revised in 1997 to reflect its military first, or “songun,” policy, an official said while speaking anonymously.

Ri was replaced by Kim Myong-guk, who had served in the post from 1994-1997, while Jong Thae-gun, an Army lieutenant general, has been named the propaganda director of the KPA’s General Political Bureau, according to the sources.

The reshuffle first appeared to be a routine rearrangement of personnel, but the sources said it may have been aimed at expanding the role and power of the already powerful NDC.

“The NDC seems to have become, at least externally, the North’s highest decision-making body as a number of top military officials have recently been appointed to (new) permanent posts of the defense commission,” a source said.

“We believe the NDC may become an actual organization in the near future with hundreds of resident staff like the other top decision-making bodies” such as the Workers’ Party, the official added.

Headed by the North’s reclusive leader, the defense commission has been the most powerful organization in the country where the military comes before everything.

But it has mostly been regarded as a faction of a group, namely the KPA, as most of its members concurrently served in other posts of the army, according to the sources.

Kim Yong-chun, the former Chief of General Staff of the KPA, was named the first deputy chairman of the NDC in April.

The sources said it is too early to determine why the commission’s permanent staff has been increased, but they said it may be linked to Pyongyang’s ruling system after Kim Jong-il.

The 65-year-old Kim has yet to name his successor, raising questions worldwide whether the reclusive leader is considering a collective ruling system after his death.

Kim was named as successor to his father, the founder of North Korea Kim Il-sung, at the age of 32 in 1974.

He has three sons from two marriages, but his oldest son, Jong-nam, 35, has apparently fallen out of favor following a 2001 incident in which the junior Kim was thrown out of Japan after trying to enter the country with a forged passport.

His two other sons, Jong-chul and Jong-un, both in their early 20s, have not held any official posts.

N. Korea enhances Kim’s defense commission
Korea Herald
Jin Dae-woong
5/21/2007

North Korea is beefing up the National Defense Commission, a top military decision-making body directly controlled by Kim Jong-il, Seoul intelligence sources said.

Pyongyang recently conducted a major reshuffle of its top military leadership, including the repositioning of Kim’s closest confidants to the committee, they said on condition of anonymity.

Chaired by Kim, the committee is an organization independent of the Cabinet and the ruling Korean Workers’ Party. It is next only to the communist country’s president, a post permanently held by the late founder and Kim’s father Kim Il-sung since his death in 1994.

The sources said that Gen. Ri Myong-su, former operation director of the Korean People’s Army, has been appointed as a standing member of the NDC. Gen. Kim Myong-kuk has been named to replace Ri as the top operations commander.

The reshuffle followed the appointment of Vice-Marshal Kim Yong-chun, former chief of the general staff of the Korean People’s Army, as vice chairman of the NDC during last month’s general session of the Supreme People’s Assembly, the nation’s parliament.

The personnel reconfiguration, which also affected key posts in the North Korean armed forces, is seen as part of Pyongyang’s move to further enhance the NDC, a powerful state body, under North Korea’s military-first policy.

The generals have been regarded as the most influential figures in the military as they frequently accompany Kim during his field unit inspections.

The commission has the power to direct all activities of the armed forces and national defense projects, establish and disband central defense institutions, appoint and dismiss senior military officers, confer military titles and grant titles for top commanders. It also can declare a state of war and issue mobilization orders in an emergency.

The National Defense Commission, presently chaired by Kim Jong-il, consists of the first deputy chairman, two deputy chairmen and six commission members. All members are selected for a five-year term.

The reshuffles are the latest known change to the commission. Gen. Hyon Chol-hae, former vice director of the KPA General Political Bureau, moved to the post of NDC vice director in 2003.

Experts noted that the figures are taking full-time posts in the NDC and relinquishing their posts in the People’s Army.

Other current members concurrently hold posts at both organizations, sources said.

Vice Marshal Jo Myong-rok, the first vice-chairman of the NDC, also assumes the position of director of the KPA General Political Bureau. Vice Marshal Kim Il-chol concurrently serves as a member of the NDC and minister of the People’s Armed Forces.

“As high-ranking military officers have moved to the NDC as full-time members, the NDC may be preparing to take follow up measures to expand its role and function in the future,” the sources said.

The NDC has been known as a consultative body of top military leaders without extensive subordinate organizations comparable to the ruling party and the Cabinet.

The intelligence sources said the NDC may have more manpower and organization under its wing.

“The NDC began equipping itself with organizational apparatuses with the 2003 transfer of Hyon Chol-hae from the KPA position to the post of NDC,” another source said.

In addition, the NDC has continued recruiting personnel such as Kim Yang-gon, councilor of the NDC, from other government departments, to strengthen the NDC’s policy functions, sources said.

“It is in line with North Korea’s long-term move to concentrate the country’s decision-making power on Kim Jong-il and his close subordinates,” said Nam Sung-wook, North Korean studies professor at Korea University. “It is mainly aimed at preventing possible regime dissolution amid rising international pressures over its nuclear weapons program. Kim is also seen directly intervening in a resolution of the nuclear issue.”

Kim Yong-hyun, a professor at Dongguk Univsersity, also agreed that the enhancement of the NDC will lead to the centralization of power in North Korea, reducing the role of the Korea Workers’ Party.

“Through the organizational reform, the North’s regime seeks to further streamline decision-making procedures to more effectively tackle an array of issues,” Kim said.

The North Korean studies expert said it is an answer of North Korean leadership to continuing economic hardship. The leadership has given over a comparatively extensive amount of power to the Cabinet for dealing with economic stagnation.

Kim also said it could be interpreted as preparation for the post-Kim Jong-il system.

“After his death, a collective leadership led by core subordinates of Kim Jong-il is expected to emerge, so, the move could be one related to future changes,” he said.

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