North Korean Economy Watch

North Korean Cigarette Production: Chinese Cigarettes Disappear
Daily NK
Moon Sung Hwee
8/12/2008

The market share of North Korean cigarette manufacturers has been increasing because North Korean cigarette factories have turned their gaze on domestic low-priced brands instead of counterfeit products.

A source from North Korea explained on the 8th that “There are lately dozens of cigarette brands which are being produced in North Korea, from low-priced ones to expensive ones made for high officials. Now, we rarely see people looking for foreign-made cigarettes in the markets.”

He added that “We can see 500 won per pack cigarettes and also cheap brands, like 300 won cigarettes which are made by individuals. When compared to rice prices, cigarette prices have sharply declined, as well as their quality having advanced when compared to the pack price.”

According to the statistics of the Korean International Trade Association, since 2000 imports of Chinese cigarettes have increased every year and in 2003, reached a maximum of 9.4 million dollars.

The source continued, “Competition to obtain Chinese cigarettes among Cigarette smugglers was keen, but now, consumers of North Korean cigarettes are increasing in number and the productivity of manufacturers is increasing as well. Therefore, individuals who produced cigarettes at home took a heavy blow to their business.”

North Korean cigarette makers converted from counterfeit to private development

Since the early 1990s, North Korea has felt keenly the necessity of earning foreign currency after suffering the aftereffects of the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe. Accordingly, North Korean authorities have had an interest in producing and trading drugs and counterfeit cigarettes that need a low initial investment and quickly convert into money. Since 1992, North Korea has mass produced imitations of Mild Seven, Crown, 555, Dunhill and other international brands.

When suffering the “March of Tribulation” in the late 1990s, middle managers started taking an interest in counterfeit cigarette markets, which had been occupied by the authorities. In Nampo, Pyongsung, Pyongyang and other big cities, with the appearance of counterfeit cigarettes made by individuals, competition between the national cigarette traders and private manufacturers in the jangmadang started. Workers of cigarette factories kept secretly packing papers of the counterfeit cigarettes and sold them to the private manufacturers.

The North Korean authorities eventually took measures to punish the private manufacturers, to confiscate their products and search the workers’ bodies one by one.

However, after printers were allowed to be used in some factories related to IT departments of universities in 2002, managers of printers being in collusion with private manufacturers started printing the packing papers of cigarettes.

Production of tobacco leaves privately, manufacturing of cigarettes by the factory

After the start of the 2000s, North Korean authorities turned their gaze on domestic demand for cigarettes. The biggest North Korean cigarette factory is Ryongsung Cigarette Factory, where most counterfeit cigarettes made by North Korea were produced. As sales increased since 1997, the No. 39 Department of the Workers’ Party, which operates, accumulates and manages Kim Jong Il’s slush funds, has been directly operating the factory. The top quality counterfeit cigarette in North Korea, CRAVEN “A,” so called “Cat cigarette” by North Koreans, are produced in the factory.

The past price of CRAVEN “A” was much more expensive than Chinese cigarettes, such as Hongmei, BAT, Zhangbaishan and Tianping, being equivalent to two kilograms of rice. However, among cadres and the wealthy they were excessively popular. At the time, Chinese brands of cigarette in North Korea were generally valued at around the price of one kilogram of rice.

With profits increasing since 2003, North Korean authorities have tried to increase production by re-opening ruined factories that had closed their doors for lack of resources during the March of Tribulation.

In 2002, “Rasun” and “Sunbong,” which were produced in cooperation with Chinese entrepreneurs, came out in the Rajin-Sunbong area at a lower price than Chinese cigarettes.

Competition between factories to produce high quality and tasty cigarette toughens

Meanwhile, some of private manufacturers who went under in the competition have disappeared from the cigarette market or been merged with big factories.

There is no reason for being poor if North Korea works like it produces cigarettes

The source said that “These days, affiliates with cigarette factories buy dried tobacco leaves from individuals.”

According to the source, on seeing the high quality of cigarettes, people currently say, “That’s the reason why we should open and reform our market and system. If we produce other goods like we produce cigarettes, we won’t have any reason for being poor anymore.”

The Ryongsung Cigarette Factory in Pyongyang produces “Pyongyang,” “Geunseol (construction),” “Hyunmoo (a kind of mythological animal),” “GGoolbeul (Honey Bee),” “MT. Daesung,” “Dongyang (the Orient),” “Saseum (Deer),” and “Galmaegi (Sea Gull)” and the Sungcheon Cigarette Factory produces “Haedangwha (Sweetbrier),” “Yonggwangro (Furnace),” “Deungdae (Lighthouse),” and “Manbyungcho (a name of a herb).”

Koksan Factory in Hoiryeong produces cigarettes for soldiers; “Baeseung (ever-victorious),” “Ildangbaek (a match for a hundred),” “Chobyung (Sentry),” and “Poongnyon (a fruitful year).”

Interview Blog, Germany
(click here for all their North Korea-related interviews)

“Phoenix Commercial Ventures Ltd is a venture capital company that offers investors business and investment opportunities in the DPRK” – Interview with Ken Frost (CFO of Phoenix)

Klaus-Martin Meyer: Mr. Frost, you are member of the Board of Phoenix Commercial Ventures Ltd, a company that offers investors business and investment opportunities in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) otherwise known as North Korea. Would you mind introducing yourself and your company as well to our readers?

Ken Frost: Phoenix Commercial Ventures Ltd is a venture capital company that offers investors business and investment opportunities in the DPRK, enabling them to take advantage of the economic reforms that are taking place there.

Phoenix is owned and run by four experienced professionals, who are based in London, Paris and the DPRK. The Board has between them many years of international business experience, and an invaluable network of well placed contacts. Phoenix offers a unique service, by being able to offer direct access to the DPRK.

Phoenix Commercial Ventures Ltd specialises in project finance in the DPRK. As is well known, the business environment is difficult, and the company targets very specific investment projects; these are small enough to manage and have the capacity to generate foreign currency, either through export or import substitution.

Phoenix Commercial Ventures Ltd maintains an office in Pyongyang, almost the only European company to do so, and operates with the following specific aims:

• Identify commercially viable investment projects in the DPRK, on a case by case basis
• Identify reliable local partners for all forms of business in the DPRK, either trade or investment
• Seek overseas investment sources for such projects
• Minimise the risk in such projects, by taking responsibility for supervision of the local set-up procedures and management of the projects

The Board of Phoenix Commercial Ventures Ltd consists of nationals of the UK, France and the DPRK. The European flavour is enhanced by the fact that most of the counterparties and suppliers in the various projects are also European, and the DPRK government views Phoenix Commercial Ventures as a prime conduit for European business and investment in the DPRK.

One of the directors of Phoenix Commercial Ventures is also General Manager and CEO of the Daedong Credit Bank, the only western-invested foreign bank in the DPRK. Based in Pyongyang, this is a 70-30 joint venture between a UK financial management company based in Hong Kong and the Korea Daesong Bank, one of the main DPRK banks.

Phoenix Commercial Ventures is unique in having this connection with a reliable, locally based financial institution. The synergy benefits include a wider exposure to local business contacts in differing fields; as well as an additional degree of control, made possible by the fact that the various joint venture projects have to maintain their accounts with the bank.

We have a number of projects within DPRK, including two 50/50 joint ventures:

– Hana Electronics JVC, a consumer electronics company now ranked as one of the top three best performing joint ventures in DPRK, as assessed by the Ministry of Finance.

– Sinji JVC, whose main areas of operations are retail, software and bonded processing.

Full details about our company can be found on our website www.pcvltd.com

I am the CFO of Phoenix and am a chartered accountant with over twenty years international experience of FMCG industries, consumer electronics, rough diamond distribution and the Internet. I have worked in KPMG, Philips Electronics, De Beers and run my own Internet company. I am also a Scholar on Gerson Lehrman Group Councils.

In November 2007 I reached the finals of Accountant of the Year held by the Association of International Accountants at the President’s Awards Dinner 2007. This award is designed to recognise organisations’ accountancy stars.

In January 2007 I was awarded, based on recommendations from fellow members of the ICAEW, a New Year’s Honour by AccountingWeb. The award was for my services to the accountancy profession in opposing the merger of the ICAEW with other accountancy bodies.

In November 2006 I was awarded an honorary fellowship of the Institute of Professional Financial Managers (IPFM), for my services to the accountancy profession.

In January 2006 Accountancy Age placed me on their Financial Power List for 2006. I was 11th on their list of the top 50 of “The Ones To Watch”. The list identified the “most influential names to look out for” in the world of finance for 2006.

Klaus-Martin Meyer: We read on your website “offers investors business and investment opportunities in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), enabling them to take advantage of the economic reforms that are taking place there.” Can you tell us what kind of opportunities this could be?

Ken Frost:There are three main areas of investment opportunities open to investors, which we can facilitate within the DPRK:

1 Small scale investments ($500K or less) yielding good levels of return (20% or more).

These investment opportunities are in local production (consumer goods, bonded processing, software etc) for domestic market consumption and export. These utilise the advantages that DPRK has over all the other countries in the region namely:

– 99% literacy
– skilled/disciplined/hard working workforce
– well educated workforce, many speak a good level of English
– lowest wage rates in the region

Phoenix has a number of opportunities that it can offer investors in this area; eg bonded processing, consumer manufacturing, clothing manufacturing and software development.

2 Natural resources

DPRK has proven abundant natural resources worth several trillion dollars; eg coal, gold, copper, titanium, lead, zinc, nephelite, nickel, magnesia, graphite etc.

The investment required would be of a higher order than the small scale investments above, $1M plus. The money would be used to bring existing mines back to production, by pumping out flood water and renewing worn out capital equipment.

Phoenix has, via its working relationship with CPEEC, a number or opportunities in the natural resource sector that it can offer genuine investors.

3 Infrastructure development

Clearly investment in infrastructure is the costliest form of investment. However, given the dilapidated state of the roads, railways, ports, electricity grid etc it is necessary if the economy is to be revived.

DPRK also has a keen interest in infrastructure development focussed on green/renewable energy areas.

Phoenix has on it books a profitable renewable energy project that would suit a serious, well financed and experienced green energy investor.

The DPRK is the final economic frontier and is a “green field” site. Its primary advantages are:

– Location (physical position between Russia, South Korea, China and in AP)
– Location (historical, all the major players now want to move forward)
– Location (resources, it has abundant rich resources both mineral and human capital – high literacy, well educated etc)

Klaus-Martin Meyer: What are the main differences between your company and a conventional venture capital company that is investing for example in internet our biotech companies?

Ken Frost: Companies such as those you mention are industry-specific, whereas ours is location-specific. Our company is relevant to people who might want to invest in the DPRK.  We work in the DPRK and have a physical presence in the DPRK, other “conventional” venture capital companies do not.

Klaus-Martin Meyer: Are there any differences to other investment companies?

Ken Frost: We apply the same principles to potential investments as any other professional investment company, we look at:

– the risk
– the returns
– the quality of the local management
– the quality of the business plan
– the size of investment
– the share offered for that investment etc

We also pay very close attention to corporate governance issues such as; financial reporting, management structure and ethics etc. We have a code of conduct which can be seen on our website.

Phoenix Commercial Ventures Ltd is committed to being a responsible corporate citizen and to the pursuit of a sustainable future, both economic and social.

Phoenix Commercial Ventures Ltd adheres to three fundamental ethical principles:

– Integrity
– Competence
– Courtesy

To this end Phoenix Commercial Ventures Ltd has developed a Code of Conduct, which sets out to ensure that these principles are followed in its operations. The Code of Conduct governs Phoenix’s business decisions and actions. The Code applies equally to corporate actions, and to the behaviour of individual employees when conducting business on behalf of Phoenix.

We work very hard with our local management teams and business partners to ensure that international standards re reporting, corporate governance and ethics are understood and followed.

Klaus-Martin Meyer: What are your plans for the company’s future? How do you see Phoenix Commercial Ventures in five years time?

We see the coming period for Phoenix as that of being continued growth.

In our view there will be a major upswing in economic relations between the DPRK and other countries over the coming months/years. Phoenix Commercial Ventures is uniquely placed to take advantage of, and to respond to, that upswing.

We are one of the very few organisations to have made successful joint ventures in the DPRK. We are also one of the very few organisations to have people with many years’ experience, and cultural sensitivity, actually on the ground in Pyongyang. You cannot run a business by email!

Brendan Carr over at Korea Law Blog dug up some information on law firms operating in the DPRK.  All the information he posts is worth reading, but here are some highlights:

[T]he prospect of working as a foreign lawyer in Pyongyang has been on my list since I’ve been a lawyer.

Michael Hay, a foreign legal consultant in Seoul since 1990, actually did this—striking out from “Big Four” firm Bae, Kim, & Lee in 2001 [domain lapsed] to focus on being a full-time North Korea consultant. He established KoreaStrategic Inc. as a consultancy (its domain lapsed in June 2006, though), then with a splash announced the formation of Hay, Kalb & Associates as the first foreign/North Korean joint venture law firm in Pyongyang. The Hay, Kalb website, too, disappeared sometime in 2005, and I lost touch with Mike Hay around the same time. I remain curious to know about his adventure up North; I’m sure it’s been fascinating. However, he was always extremely tight-lipped about what he was doing there. Other than that he was focusing on North Korea “full-time, all the time” it was hard to get any specifics out of him.

There are two other law firms advertising their services and office presence in North Korea: Italy’s Birindelli e Associati (now Chiomenti after being acquired) and Singapore’s Kelvin Chia Partnership. 

But today I found that the International Financial Law Review’s IFLR Legalwire, to which I hadn’t previously subscribed, recently (May 2008) reported on Birindelli partner Sara Marchetta’s experiences in Pyongyang. It’s fascinating stuff, published in two parts—go read Part 1 and Part 2. The article gave the impression that Hay, Kalb was still trading, which is promising, but Marchetta says that Birindelli kept no expatriate lawyer there year-round, because there were only four or five clients a year needing legal services, mostly in resource-extraction and processing ventures.

From Marchetta’s interview, I thought the following observations were worth noting:

Obtaining copies of laws: 

The first issue is looking for legal resources  – the law- as it is extremely complicated to get them.  Even if you are a law firm and have people who are well-connected, its still a very long process to get a copy of a law.  Even if the law has already been enacted and should be public, you still need special permission.  If the law has not yet officially been translated into English, then you need to obtain special permission to get it and translate it.

The second thing is that the intended implementation of the law in a western sense does not exist.  Especially when you go out of Pyongyang and Kaesong [North Korea’s special economic zone], everything is pretty much left up to political decision: whether you can stay here or there, what you do and cannot do…

Just to give you an example: in terms of a corporate tax, you go to a place, make an investment and you pay a corporate tax even if you don’t profit.  It’s sort of a tax for being there.  Corporate tax ends up being interpreted as a presence tax , which is paid independently of whether you make profits or not.  In a few cases, we did find this type of interpretation, which is obviously extremely bizarre.    So it is really a matter of general legal culture – which is totally lacking – and education of the administrative middle to low levels.

Does [this environment] hinder getting things done?  Yes and no. Yes in the sense that getting a deal done takes more time because you do not have all of the information available at the beginning.  No in the sense that once there is the intention of getting the deal done, there is a lot of facilitation from the bureaucratic and governmental point of view.  If they say yes, its basically yes and it will happen.

How big is your office in Pyongyang:

It is currently staffed with two people.  We have no expatriates.  It is a joint venture as we are there in cooperation with a DPRK government entity called the Korean Justice Committee [KJC].  It is equivalent to the Chinese Ministry of Justice.

Are your lawyers at the office North Koreans?

Yes, they are North Korean lawyers. One of them is a pure lawyer, the other one is more someone who is well-connected in the government and has also PR and English capabilities.  One side has the legal knowledge, and on the other side, fluent in English that they use to work with foreigners.

Does your JV status with the KJC give you an advantage over foreign firms?

As a matter of fact, from an operational point of view: yes.  From the client’s point of view, I don’t know.  I have no idea.  I don’t think this is something that is hindering the expansion of our client base in Pyongyang, but I am not sure if it enhancing it.

What types of clients do you serve?

We serve companies looking at setting up a presence in the DPRK.  These are large companies that deal with natural resources, like mining or consumer goods, and most of them have already a presence in China.

What are teh key sectors of Work?

Well we deal with mining projects.  This means that yo go there, you test the product and if it’s okay then you give the technology to be extracted in a proper way.  You do part of the processing of the mineral and export it.  This is one deal.  On the other side, before advising on an investment we advise our clients on precessing contracts.  Obviously this can be done not just for mining, but for shoes, clothes, and any other product that can be exported.  The deal structure is basically these two.

Looking forward, is there enough going on to fairly classify the DPRK as an “emerging market”?

Not in terms of a domestic market.  I don’t think that the domestic market is going to develop very much, but the DPRK is a good place for processing contracts.  I mean, you send raw materials and they send back the finished product.  There is also a strong market for natural resources and low-to-medium technology projects.  There, you can produce basic chemicals, basic pharmaceutical products and some consumer goods.  The Chinese are doing clothing here, doing shoes, and a lot of other things.

Do you predict enough work growth to expand?

Not for the time being for a number of reasons.  One, we do not see an increase in DPRK-related work.  We have two, three, four, maximum five clients a year and that’s basically it.  So this is the main reason.  Then you have always the political issue.  It’s always there.  The political wind is really swinging a lot and it changes by the season and is very much affected by the situation of the six-party talks.  So for the time being, we are looking at what is happening and we are doing what we can do, but we do not have plans to enlarge our presence in the DPRK for the time being.

From Dr. Leonid Petrov in the Asia Times:

Russia cooperation with North Korea
Since the early 2000s, overall relations between Russia and the DPRK have been improving. The DPRK’s importation of refined oil from Russia saw its first increase in 2002-2003 (from $20 million to $96 million) and was caused by the beginning of the US-DPRK nuclear confrontation and the subsequent demise of the international Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization project that was to construct a light water reactor nuclear power plant in North Korea.

During 2004-2005, petroleum trade between Russia and North Korea grew from $105 million to $172.3 million. Until the six-party talks produced their first results, in the list of Russia’s exports to the DPRK, oil products dominated at 63%. Rampant corruption in both countries also let a trickle of Russian oil to be smuggled to North Korea unaccounted for.

In 2006, Russia was the DPRK’s third-largest trading partner after China and South Korea and absorbed 9% of the total $3.18 billion spent by the North on imports (approximately $286 million). The Kremlin’s approval of international sanctions against the former communist ally was accompanied by the curtailment of trade with the North. At the time of North Korea’s nuclear test in October 2006, Russia’s trade statistics showed that exports of petroleum had dropped 91.1% compared to the same period of the previous year.

The pragmatic mood in bilateral relations prevails, and these days Russia delivers oil and food to North Korea only in accordance with its obligations associated with progress at the six-party talks. This year, Russia has already delivered 100,000 tonnes of fuel oil to the DPRK in two batches and, according to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei Borodavkin, a top Russian envoy to the six-party talks, will deliver another 100,000 tonnes by October 2008. In June, the Russian government announced it would provide 2,860 tonnes of flour to the DPRK. According to an official KCNA news agency report, this food aid arrived at the border city of Sinuiju in the DPRK’s northern Pyongan province in early July.

Recently, for the first time in the post-Soviet era, North Korea saw a major Russian investment. In the city of Pyeongseong, the Russian auto plant KamAZ opened its first assembly line, specializing in the production of medium-size trucks named “Taebaeksan-96”. Although less than 50 trucks were assembled in 2007, this cooperation became an important milestone in the development of bilateral relations. While the project doesn’t violate United Nations sanctions on North Korea, it shows Moscow’s drive to expand its influence in the country. Ironically, the more trucks assembled the heavier North Korea’s dependence on imported fuel, engine oils and other petrochemical products.

The importance of the DPRK’s Rajin-Seonbong special economic zone to Russia’s national interests continues to grow. The state-run monopoly OAO Russian Railways is currently upgrading its railway connections with North Korea in Khasan-Tumangang, investing at least 1.75 billion roubles (US$72 million) into this project, and plans to participate in an ambitious plan to rebuild a trans-Korean railway. By connecting Rajin (and the rest of northern Korea) to its Trans-Siberian railroad, Russia hopes to benefit form the transit of South Korean and Japanese cargo which could be sent via its territory to Central Asian and European markets. Pyongyang seems to endorse these plans and other Russian initiatives, but does not commit any financial resources.

Eighty percent of overall bilateral economic trade between Russia and North Korea consists of cooperation, barter and investment-in-kind between the regional areas. The most active Russian regions trading with the DPRK are Eastern Siberia and the Far East. Maritime province (Primorsky Krai) itself exports to North Korea more than $4 million worth of refined oil per year. There are no oil fields in Maritime province and oil has to be borrowed through a chain of federal bureaucratic structures from the oil-rich areas of Eastern Siberia. Instead of money, the local governments agree to receive the labor of North Korean workers.

North Korean laborers in Siberia and the Far East were common under the Soviet system and they are still visibly present. In 2004, the Russian Federal Immigration Service issued 14,000 visas for foreign laborers, of whom North Koreans numbered 3,320 in 2005 and 5,000 in 2006. Since the DPRK has no other way to pay in goods or services, its government started paying for oil imported from Russia by dispatching thousands of laborers at zero cost. Following strong demand from local companies, just in 2006 regional authorities of Primorsky Krai agreed to issue an extra 5,000 working visas to North Koreans. This openness is contrary to local government policy that normally restricts the entry of labor from China.

DPRK citizens are sent to Russia to work as woodcutters and builders but some have also managed to find work in the agricultural and marine industry. Through the presence of these laborers, Russia has enjoyed a partial repayment of the DPRK’s post-Soviet debt through North Korean workers being contracted to work in mines and lumber mills in Russia’s Far East.

The wages they are able to make in Russia are far greater than what they would make at home. However, the foreign worker quota is set not by provincial governments but by Moscow, which often tries to put a stop to these programs due to the complexity of the matter. Part of this opposition stems from the fact that the North Korean workers in Russia still fall under DPRK laws and, therefore, are subject to intrusive supervision.

Among the most difficult but negotiable issues in the way of Russia-North Korea cooperation remains the problem of external debt. During the Soviet era, the DPRK incurred a debt of approximately $8 billion, which Pyongyang still owes to Moscow but cannot repay. This debt remains a stumbling block in most negotiations on new aid and development programs. However, this debt can potentially make trilateral Russian-Korean relations closer and stronger.

In January 1991, soon after the opening of diplomatic relations with South Korea, Moscow received $3 billion from Seoul in the form of a three-year loan. The collapse of the Soviet Union left this loan largely unpaid. The new Russian government in the 1990s provided South Korea with armaments worth $150 million to be counted as payment in kind for the remaining debt. In 2003, after bilateral negotiations on this issue were completed, part of this Russian debt was canceled and the remainder was rescheduled to be paid over the next 23 years.

Taking into account its own debts to the South, Russia could easily write off a significant portion of North Korean debt. To resolve this question, a certain agreement between all three parties is needed. To engage in a mutual and reciprocal round of debt cancelation, Russia might choose to see the North and the South as one country. Such an agreement would have unblocked the road for broader cooperation between Russia and the two Koreas, and simplified Russia’s energy cooperation with China and Japan.

The full article is worth reading here:
Russia is key to North Korea’s plight
Asia Times
Leonid Petrov
7/24/2008

UPDATE 2: According to the Associated Press:

[A South Korean] NIS official, who asked not be named, citing an internal policy, told The Associated Press that China had no plans to close all bridge links with North Korea “out of concerns of diplomatic friction with North Korea.”

The official also said China would not ask all North Koreans in China to leave, saying that Beijing plans to crackdown on North Koreans who illegally stay in China and Beijing plans to restrict renewing visas for North Koreans. 

UPDATE 1:  According to the Associated Press, China plans to close all the bridges to the DPRK during the Olympics, starting next month.  This will have a devastating impact on trade with Sinuiju, Manpo, Hyesan, Hoeryong, and many other trading hubs along the Chinese border.

ORIGINAL POST: According to an interesting article in Bloomberg (thanks to reader) China is acting to reduce the chances that North Korea issues will interfere with coverage of the Olympic games in Beijing this summer.

According to the article:

China asked some North Korean work units to leave the country or move their business operations during the Olympic Games, according to documentation from the North Korean embassy obtained by Bloomberg News.

Citing security issues, China asked North Koreans, except trade representatives and government-dispatched personnel, to leave by July 31 and not return until the end of September, the Korean-language statement said. The embassy in Beijing gave the order to North Koreans in a July 11 directive, according to a copy of the document obtained by Bloomberg News.

The order took effect from July 13 and those who delay departure would be fined or not allowed to reenter China, according to the document. Workers scheduled for dispatch to China from July 1 should delay their departure until Sept. 25, it said.

and…

It isn’t clear how authoritative the directive is. Five North Korean businessmen contacted by Bloomberg news provided different departure dates, or said they were not affected by the directive. The people refused to be identified in print, citing possible recriminations.

A press attaché at the Chinese embassy in Tokyo who declined to give his name said he wasn’t aware of the directive and that there would be no way to confirm its existence.

Read the articles here:
China asks some North Koreans to leave ahead of Olympics
Bloomberg
Hideko Takayama
7/15/2008

Report: China to shut down all bridges linked to NKorea during Olympics
Associated Press
7/21/2008

China to step up inspections at border with North Korea during Olympics to stop migrants
Associated Press
Kwang-Tae Kim
7/22/2008

Some enterprising Swedes are attempting to manufacture and export jeans from North Korea.  As far as western countries go, Sweden has been one of the leaders in commercial interaction with the DPRK.  Although, according to Erik Cornell, they were frequently burned. 

The project, Noko Jeans, would be the first jeans manufacturer in North Korea.  Here is some info from their website:

Noko Jeans – jeans from North Korea

Noko Jeans began with an e-mail sent to North Korea, fueled by the enthusiasim of being able to contact the country directly. We thought Noko Jeans would end there, before it even began. It didn’t. Instead, and despite our lack of experience in international trading, it swiftly grew to a much more serious level.

Initiated and managed by three Swedes with a background in advertising and PR, Noko Jeans is our attempt to approach and get closer to North Korea, and it is our attempt to answer the question: is it possible to do what no one has ever done before? Is it possible to design, produce and import jeans from North Korea?

Greetings from North Korea!

After months of research, loads of headache and, lastly, several meetings with North Korean government representatives, we are finally allowed into the country. As official visitors, and by invitation of the state. Take off: 27th of July.

We are just now beginning to sense that this experiment actually might come true. Please stay with us as we tell you the unique process – and story – that is Noko Jeans.

According to Yonhap (citing a Ministry of Unification report), trade volume between the two Koreas increased 23% to US$880 million (up from $718.2 million) in the first half of 2008.  This is due to an increase in commercial trade (not official exchanges), which were up 47% to $823.6 million from $558.7 million.  Commercial trade comprises 94% of trade volume, up from 78% last year. The number of firms conducting inter-Korean trade reached 526, up from 324, and and they manufactured 736 items (up from 686).

Goods traded in larger volume than a year ago: plate glass, clams, brackens and textiles from the Kaesong complex.

(UPDATE) Much of this is due to brisk activity in the Kaesong Industrial Zone, which employs 30,084 North Koreans (as of July 4, 2008), up from 225 in 2004.  The zone comprises 72 South Korean firms. 

Total production at the complex has been on a steady rise from US$15 million at the end of 2005 to $373.8 million as of the end of May, up 147 percent from last year, the Kaesong Industrial District Management Committee said.

“Such a rise in production is notable in that 33 of the 72 firms in the complex are start-ups operating there for less than one year,” said Kim Min-kyong, a public relations official of the committee.

To learn more, read the full articles below:
Number of N.K. workers at Kaesong complex tops 30,000
Yonhap
Shim Sun-ah
7/8/2008

 Inter-Korean trade rises sharply in first half despite political chill
Yonhap
Shim Sun-ah
7/7/2008

Institute for far East Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 08-7-4-1
7/4/2008

It appears that the number of people involved in handmade goods manufacturing, trading, and other small-scale, individual businesses is steadily increasing among North Korean citizens.

According to a source inside North Korea on June 30, ever since North Korean authorities announced the ‘Market Stimulation Measure’ in March 2003, the number of small-scale private businesses employing between 1~8 people has continued to grow as citizens in the North have taken to markets aggressively in order to earn money,

As the North’s economic woes continue to stretch over time and the government is unable to provide basic living necessities, the people are looking for other ways to support themselves.

In March of 2003, North Korea expanded farmers’ markets into general markets, allowing not only the sale of agricultural goods, but of manufactured goods as well. At the same time, the state introduced ‘market use fees’ for vendors wishing to rent space to hock their wares, thus bringing about a tax-like ‘state payment’.

Small-scale commercial and industrial businesses took on the form of family manufacturing or collaboration between factories, enterprises and engineers working together, but ‘Chinese-model’ small enterprises hiring just one or two workers also appeared.

In-home food preparation or handmade goods manufacturing, restaurants, bus services, repair work and other service-related industries grew. There also appeared examples of those leasing import rights from organizations or enterprises and making a living through trade.

Authorities have given these businesses tacit permission to operate, recognizing their role in increasing public revenue and supplying the people with daily necessities, but at the same time, they have laid down some restrictions, criticizing those “bitten by the capitalist bug, working only to make money for themselves.”

Small-scale private commerce and industry has the positive benefit of expanding the provision of daily necessities and absorbing unemployed labor in the North, but on the other hand, anti-socialist side effects such as the increasing gap between the rich and the poor and mammonism are also on the rise.

Via Interview Blog:

UPDATE: Here is an interview with Jürgen Bein about the Kaesong Industrial Zone (In German)

Klaus-Martin Meyer: Mr. Eloesser, you recently became the President of Nosotek Joint Venture Company in Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea. In which the field of business is Nosotek operating?

Volker Eloesser: We do general IT outsourcing. This includes data base applications, 3D technology development as well a games production. Nosotek’s customers come from all over the world and some of our products are even used in the US.

Klaus-Martin Meyer: According to your CV, before you were heading to North Korea, you’ve been the general manager of Elocom, a subsidiary of a German Joint Venture between News Corporation (NWS.A) and Verisign (VRSN). It’s quite unusual for a high-ranking manager of a US based public company to move to North Korea.

Volker Eloesser: That’s true. But I don’t see my job as a political mission. At Elocom, I was managing a company producing mobile phone software technology. Neither my old job nor my new one is a political one.

Klaus-Martin Meyer: What’s your opinion about the demolition of the nuclear cooling tower in Yongbyon and the announcement of the US President George W. Bush to remove the country from the terrorism blacklist?

Volker Eloesser: This was great news. I think that both parties, the Korean and US government, took wise decisions which hopefully help giving peace a chance through diplomacy. For our business, lifting the sanctions will have a very positive impact, as well as for the People in the DPRK. North Korean Companies, domestic and foreign-invested, were suffering a lot under the sanctions. Foreign trade was very difficult and many potential customers feared to get trouble when making business with the DPRK.

Klaus-Martin Meyer: When did you first get interested into the DPRK? Did you already do active business with North Koreans before?

Volker Eloesser: Of course I did. In the beginning of 2005, I held lectures at the Pyongyang Business School. The Korean participants of my lectures were great people really interested into international business.

Klaus-Martin Meyer: Who are the shareholders of Nosotek? Is it a state-run company?

Volker Eloesser: Nosotek is a joint-venture between a European owned private holding company and the General Federation of Science and Technology of DPRK, a non-government organization.

Klaus-Martin Meyer: Along being the president of Nosotek, you are Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Next Generation Entertainment N.V. (NGE), a Dutch public company. Are there any links between NGE and North Korea?

Volker Eloesser: NGE’s management is highly interested in investing into the DPRK software industry. The CEO Dr. Stefan Heinemann believes that the DPRK will become a very important sourcing market in the near future, which has many advantages over China and India. Having this in mind, it makes a lot of sense for NGE to have a board member with experience in dealing with North Koreans.

Klaus-Martin Meyer: How would you describe the difference of outsourcing software in the DPRK compared to China or India?

Volker Eloesser: The DPRK’s software industry is already very well developed, but only for the demands of the domestic market. Although the skill level of the engineers is as high as the skill level in China or India, most DPRK software companies never made successful international business in large scale. The Korean engineers usually have no experience with western culture, habits and taste. But of course you’ll experience the same, when working with some small Indian or Chinese companies. One major advantage of the Korean engineers is that they don’t move to a new job frequently, like the Chinese. In this matter, you can compare the Koreans with Japanese staff, who usually never leave the company to move to another job. The result is obvious: the experience and knowledge stays within the company and there is no risk of IP leak.

Klaus-Martin Meyer: Are you personally living in North Korea or can you do your job remotely?

Volker Eloesser: It’s definitely required to have western management in a company dealing with western customers. Every attempt of people trying to do this remotely has failed. I’m planning to live in Pyongyang most of the year. I have a nice apartment in the city centre.

Klaus-Martin Meyer: Living in Pyongyang sounds hard. How are the living conditions for foreigners in Pyongyang? What about your family?

Volker Eloesser: Well, it’s not as hard as western readers may think. Of course the hardest thing is to live separated from my wife, but she promised to visit me frequently. Generally, the living conditions for westerners in Pyongyang are good: The air is totally clean, there is no risk of becoming a crime victim, there is a lot of green in the city and the Korean people are generally very friendly .

Klaus-Martin Meyer: Usually, western media has almost no idea about the real working and living conditions of the people in North Korea. Can you tell us something about the working conditions of your local staff?

Volker Eloesser: One of my goals is to achieve working conditions according to German standard. The staff is equipped with the latest computer hardware and enjoys a lot of incentives from the company to make their live comfortable. For example, the company is providing free lunch for the whole staff, which is delicious and nutritious. I myself have lunch together with my engineers every day, and I like it very much. Additionally to the large number of public holidays, the company even sponsors a one-week holiday trip. This is the way we appreciate the performance on the job.

Klaus-Martin Meyer: What are the most difficult obstacles, western managers are facing in the DPRK? Do you stuffer from political pressure?

Volker Eloesser: I’ve not yet experienced any political pressure, but of course you need to get used to the local security regulations and bureaucracy. When you behave politely, don’t do derogative statements about politics and respect the Korean culture, you won’t face any serious problems. The most difficult obstacle is the absence of international experience of the software engineers, combined with the cultural differences typical to Asian countries.

Klaus-Martin Meyer: How many European businesspeople like you have discovered the DPRK as tomorrow’s sourcing market?

Volker Eloesser: Actually, not many so far. The European community in Pyongyang is very small. After a few weeks, you know every foreigner. Most Europeans who do business in the DPRK are organized in the European Business Association. But I feel that the community is growing since business managers are more and more recognising that doing business in and with the DPRK is of course working with a frontier framework but also with a great potential of highly-skilled people with an impressive work ethic and an attractive cost-performance ratio – and also an emerging domestic market.

Klaus-Martin Meyer: What drives you personally to go there and build up an internationally operating company?

Volker Eloesser: Leading a foreign invested company in North Korea is a great challenge for me. During my lectures at the Pyongyang Business School, I realized that the skilled North Korean IT engineers have a huge potential for successful software development. This potential is almost unrecognized in the world and therefore unused. I like to be the pioneer who builds up this new outsourcing destination. I believe that economic progress will lead to a general improvement of the people’s living conditions and IT business is a key to economic progress. If you ask me, I would tell you that my work will have a greater impact on improving the North Korean living conditions then just sending bags of rice.

Klaus-Martin Meyer: Do you experience economic progress or political changes in North Korea?

Volker Eloesser: The question about political changes should better be answered by the politicians. But indeed you can see economic progress: Compared to my first visit in 2005, there are now much more cars in the street and the number of foreign investment seem to have significantly grown. A group from Hong Kong is building a large shopping and business area along the Taedonggang river and Orascom from Egypt is continuing the Ryugyong Hotel construction as well as investing into a modern mobile phone network. And recently the German-based Prettl Group (Automotive industry) announced that it will be the first foreign non-Korean company to build a factory in Kaesong.

Klaus-Martin Meyer: Nosotek is located in Pyongyang. Do you think things could be easier for companies operating out of the Kaesong free trade zone?

Volker Eloesser: I’ve never been in Kaesong myself. From what I’ve heard, the free trade zone, which has been build with ROK investment, is a modern factory area, mostly targeted to low-cost production of shoes or textile. I don’t know of any software development in Kaesong. Pyongyang, being the economic and cultural centre of the DPRK with large universities, offers a huge number of qualified engineers.

Klaus-Martin Meyer: What are your plans for Nosotek’s future? How do you see your company in five years? What is your strategy?

Volker Eloesser: My plan for Nosotek is a constant growth. First of course, everybody in Nosotek has to understand the demands of our customers; not only the technical demands but also the usual communication style and habits of the western world. At the moment, we’re only fifty people and I’m starting to build up a powerful middle management, who knows their customer’s expectations. After this has been done, we can begin scaling the business volume.

Klaus-Martin Meyer: Are there other western IT companies having operations in the DPRK?

Volker Eloesser: Nosotek still is the only one. But according to Paul Tjia of GPI Consultancy who organizes business missions to the DPRK, the number of people interested into software development in the DPRK is constantly growing. I hope that Paul will bring more people here to operate software companies. With other Foreigners here, working in the same or similar field of business we together can help strengthening the DPRK to become a better known source for software development. Bangalore is still far, but I’m sure the quality delivered by the Korean IT engineers will be convincing, not only to grow Nosotek, but also to grow the country itself as an outsourcing destination.

Klaus-Martin Meyer: Mr. Eloesser, thank you for the interview.

North Korea does not publish economic data.  The size of North Korea’s economy is estimated by South Korea’s Central Bank (Bank of Korea), the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and other think tanks such as the Sejong Institute (Lee Jong Seok). 

According to a recent report by the Bank of Korea, North Korea sufferd its second full year of economic contraction (as defined by GDP), 1.1% in 2006 and 2.3% in 2007.  The bank estimates North Korea’s 2007 gross national income (GNI/GNP) at $26.7 billion, per capita GNP at $1,152 (assuming population of 23 million).  If you are interested in knowing the difference between GNP and GDP, click here.

Here are some highlights from the report:

Agriculture, forestry & fisheries marked a 9.4% decrease following a 2.6% decrease in 2006

Mining increased 0.4% in 2007, down from 1.9% increase in 2006

Manufacturing increased 0.8%, higher than 0.4% 2006 increase. -1.7% growth in light industry, due to the decrease in food products and beverages. +2.3% growth in heavy industries led by expansion of metal and machinery products.

Electricity, gas & water production increased 4.8%, (+2.7% in 2006), from hydroelectric and steam power generation.

Construction production -1.5%, (-11.5% in 2006), from reduced non-housing construction and civil engineering.

Services +1.7%, (+1.1% in 2006). Hotel, restaurant, transport, post & telecom industry expanded.

Trade volume (goods) fell 1.8% to $2.941 billion, 1/248 South Korea’s. Exports fell 3.0%, imports fell 1.3%.

These estimates are based on trade figures obtained from the Korea International Trade Association, Korea Trade and Investment Promotion Agency, fuel and food aid figures from aid groups such as the International Red Cross and the World Food Program, as well as information provided by frequent visitors.

More information here:
Full report by Bank of Korea  and data (recomended)

North Korea’s Economy Shrank in 2007, Second Annual Contraction
Bloomberg
Heejin Koo
6/17/2008