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Evolution of the DPRK’s cigarette market

Tuesday, August 12th, 2008

North Korean Cigarette Production: Chinese Cigarettes Disappear
Daily NK
Moon Sung Hwee
8/12/2008

The market share of North Korean cigarette manufacturers has been increasing because North Korean cigarette factories have turned their gaze on domestic low-priced brands instead of counterfeit products.

A source from North Korea explained on the 8th that “There are lately dozens of cigarette brands which are being produced in North Korea, from low-priced ones to expensive ones made for high officials. Now, we rarely see people looking for foreign-made cigarettes in the markets.”

He added that “We can see 500 won per pack cigarettes and also cheap brands, like 300 won cigarettes which are made by individuals. When compared to rice prices, cigarette prices have sharply declined, as well as their quality having advanced when compared to the pack price.”

According to the statistics of the Korean International Trade Association, since 2000 imports of Chinese cigarettes have increased every year and in 2003, reached a maximum of 9.4 million dollars.

The source continued, “Competition to obtain Chinese cigarettes among Cigarette smugglers was keen, but now, consumers of North Korean cigarettes are increasing in number and the productivity of manufacturers is increasing as well. Therefore, individuals who produced cigarettes at home took a heavy blow to their business.”

North Korean cigarette makers converted from counterfeit to private development

Since the early 1990s, North Korea has felt keenly the necessity of earning foreign currency after suffering the aftereffects of the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe. Accordingly, North Korean authorities have had an interest in producing and trading drugs and counterfeit cigarettes that need a low initial investment and quickly convert into money. Since 1992, North Korea has mass produced imitations of Mild Seven, Crown, 555, Dunhill and other international brands.

When suffering the “March of Tribulation” in the late 1990s, middle managers started taking an interest in counterfeit cigarette markets, which had been occupied by the authorities. In Nampo, Pyongsung, Pyongyang and other big cities, with the appearance of counterfeit cigarettes made by individuals, competition between the national cigarette traders and private manufacturers in the jangmadang started. Workers of cigarette factories kept secretly packing papers of the counterfeit cigarettes and sold them to the private manufacturers.

The North Korean authorities eventually took measures to punish the private manufacturers, to confiscate their products and search the workers’ bodies one by one.

However, after printers were allowed to be used in some factories related to IT departments of universities in 2002, managers of printers being in collusion with private manufacturers started printing the packing papers of cigarettes.

Production of tobacco leaves privately, manufacturing of cigarettes by the factory

After the start of the 2000s, North Korean authorities turned their gaze on domestic demand for cigarettes. The biggest North Korean cigarette factory is Ryongsung Cigarette Factory, where most counterfeit cigarettes made by North Korea were produced. As sales increased since 1997, the No. 39 Department of the Workers’ Party, which operates, accumulates and manages Kim Jong Il’s slush funds, has been directly operating the factory. The top quality counterfeit cigarette in North Korea, CRAVEN “A,” so called “Cat cigarette” by North Koreans, are produced in the factory.

The past price of CRAVEN “A” was much more expensive than Chinese cigarettes, such as Hongmei, BAT, Zhangbaishan and Tianping, being equivalent to two kilograms of rice. However, among cadres and the wealthy they were excessively popular. At the time, Chinese brands of cigarette in North Korea were generally valued at around the price of one kilogram of rice.

With profits increasing since 2003, North Korean authorities have tried to increase production by re-opening ruined factories that had closed their doors for lack of resources during the March of Tribulation.

In 2002, “Rasun” and “Sunbong,” which were produced in cooperation with Chinese entrepreneurs, came out in the Rajin-Sunbong area at a lower price than Chinese cigarettes.

Competition between factories to produce high quality and tasty cigarette toughens

Meanwhile, some of private manufacturers who went under in the competition have disappeared from the cigarette market or been merged with big factories.

There is no reason for being poor if North Korea works like it produces cigarettes

The source said that “These days, affiliates with cigarette factories buy dried tobacco leaves from individuals.”

According to the source, on seeing the high quality of cigarettes, people currently say, “That’s the reason why we should open and reform our market and system. If we produce other goods like we produce cigarettes, we won’t have any reason for being poor anymore.”

The Ryongsung Cigarette Factory in Pyongyang produces “Pyongyang,” “Geunseol (construction),” “Hyunmoo (a kind of mythological animal),” “GGoolbeul (Honey Bee),” “MT. Daesung,” “Dongyang (the Orient),” “Saseum (Deer),” and “Galmaegi (Sea Gull)” and the Sungcheon Cigarette Factory produces “Haedangwha (Sweetbrier),” “Yonggwangro (Furnace),” “Deungdae (Lighthouse),” and “Manbyungcho (a name of a herb).”

Koksan Factory in Hoiryeong produces cigarettes for soldiers; “Baeseung (ever-victorious),” “Ildangbaek (a match for a hundred),” “Chobyung (Sentry),” and “Poongnyon (a fruitful year).”

Posted in Agriculture, Black markets, Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), International trade, Light Industry, Manufacturing, Tobacco | Comments Closed

(UPDATED) How Big is the North Korea Deal?

Monday, August 11th, 2008

UPDATE: (Reuters) Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told Japan that Washington would not remove North Korea from a US list of state sponsors of terrorism on the initial deadline of Monday, Japan’s foreign minister said.

ORGINAL POST: Marcus Noland comments in a Newsweek International op-ed how recent US policy changes towards North Korea (delisting the DPRK as a state sponsor of terror and exempting sanctions under the Trading with the Enemy Act) amount to very little:

Lifting the trade restrictions will have a minimal impact. North Korea will remain one of a few countries that does not have normal trade relations with the United States, meaning its exports will continue to be subjected to punitive tariffs of up to 90 percent.

Removing North Korea from the terrorism list means that Washington can now legally support it for membership in international financial organizations such as the World Bank. But the White House is under no obligation to actually do so. North Korea also remains excluded from US government programs that encourage trade and investment.

North Korea’s declaration will trigger a reconvening of the Six-Party Talks, which includes China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia. The inadequate nature of the declaration guarantees there will be yet another round of negotiations in which North Korea will reveal a bit more in return for further concessions. It is no accident that up to 50,000 metric tons of US food aid is expected to arrive in North Korea early this month.

Writing in 2004 (yet relevant today), Marcus Noland wrote about these issues in depth. Below are excerpts from his op-ed on US tariffs:

US importers of DPRK products are required to obtain prior approval from the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets, certifying that the products were not produced by North Korean entities designated as having engaged in missile proliferation. Subject to this condition, approval is routine. US government officials report that they receive only a handful of such requests each year. Their impression is that business conditions in the DPRK pose a greater impediment to bilateral trade than the regulatory regime.

…

So, at present, with the exception of military-related products, there are few specific legal restrictions on the ability of Americans to export to or invest in the DPRK. Imports are subject to a prior approval process, but this is based on a transparent and narrowly delineated certification requirement.

Yet there is little trade between the United States and the DPRK. North Korea is among the few countries that the United States does not grant normal trade relations (NTR) status to, and North Korean exports are subject to the so-called column 2 tariff rates established by the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. These tariffs tend to be the highest on labor-intensive products such as garments, in which North Korea is conceivably competitive. Though their incidence is an accident of history, and not an intentional slap, the column 2 tariffs represent a serious potential impediment to trade. Some countries, notably China, have successfully exported to the United States despite being subject to the higher column 2 tariffs (though even China eventually gained NTR status on a year-to-year basis). Most countries that have recently obtained permanent NTR, such as China, have done so through the World Trade Organization (WTO) accession process. The DPRK has shown no interest in joining the WTO.

This disinterest is unfortunate. The United States does not grant the DPRK quotas under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA), a worldwide network of bilateral trade quotas on textiles and apparel (due to expire in 2005), and WTO accession could aid the DPRK in this regard. In the case of the similarly diplomatically problematic Burmese government, the US government found it politically easier to accept an increase in Burmese exports to the United States than to negotiate publicly a textile agreement under WTO auspices with the repressive regime. WTO membership has its privileges. In any event, the DPRK is one of the rare countries that chronically do not fill their MFA quotas in Europe, where there are no sanctions, suggesting that the problem lies in DPRK’s inability to compete, not in trade barriers.

However, should the DPRK obtain NTR status, the United States would likely classify it as a nonmarket economy (NME) and subject it to onerous antidumping rules on the Chinese template. The point is that improved diplomatic relations is no panacea—the United States can be protectionist on purely economic grounds, regardless of politics.

Conversely, the United States trades with some low-income countries preferentially, unilaterally granting them limited tariff-free access through the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), subject to standards concerning workers’ rights, intellectual property protection, and drug trafficking. Given North Korea’s disregard for internationally accepted labor standards, it is inconceivable that the United States would grant North Korea GSP privileges under current practices, even if diplomatic relations were normalized. Yet China, which has never received GSP privileges, vividly demonstrates that it is quite possible to prosper without such advantages.

Today, internal conditions and practices in North Korea, not legal restrictions, greatly impede bilateral trade. However, with sufficient reform and improvement in competitiveness, a broad range of policy issues would become increasingly relevant. In this regard, DPRK accession to the WTO would be advantageous. In the meantime, rather than complaining about US policy, North Korean officials would be better served by redoubling their reform efforts.

For more information, read the full articles below:
Partially True Confessions: How Big is the North Korea Deal?
Marcus Noland, Peterson Institute
Newsweek (Link via the Peterson Institute)
7/7/2008

The Legal Framework of US–North Korea Trade Relations
Op-ed in JoongAng Ilbo, via the Peterson Institute web site.
Marcus Noland
4/27/2004

Posted in Intellectual Property, International Aid, International trade, Labor conditions/wages, Military, Political economy, USA | 3 Comments »

China’s tax windfall on DPRK border

Thursday, August 7th, 2008

In the last several months the Daily NK has reported on North Korea’s anti-corruption campaigns, particularly in Sinuiju and Hyesan, major DPRK/China trade hubs. Additionally, we have seen stories of how the Chinese are making life harder for resident North Koreans in the run up to the Olympics.

These measures, both of which should have an adverse impact on trade volume between the two coutries—and thus on tax revenues—made this recent report in the Daily NK all the more surprising. China’s Yanji Customs House (along the North Korean border) has reportedly seen a 226% increase in tax revenue this year from trade with North Korea.

How can China and the DPRK make life difficult for traders/entrepreneurs and still see an increase in the value of traded goods and corresponding tax revenue? According to the article:

Jilin Newspaper in China reported on the 4th that “[…]For the first half of this year, tax revenues vis a vis North Korea totaled 34.22 million Yuan, up 226.2 percent from the year before.

The newspaper continued, “During this period, entrepreneurs in Yanji imported 64 thousand tons of iron ore from North Korea; that is a 2.3 percent increase from the same period a year ago. Accordingly, the tax amount of collected was 29.13 million Yuan, which is 66.1 percent of the total tax revenue derived from North Korea.”

The Yanji Custom House covers seven border gateways with North Korea, such as Juanhe-Wonjeongri, Shazi-Saebyul, Tumen-Namyang, Sanhe-Hoiryeong, Kaishantun-Sambong, Naping-Musan, and Guchengli-Samjangri.

According to the Yanji Custom House statistics, the Naping-Musan border gateway, where iron ore collected from the Musan mine enters China, is the first ranked for commercial traffic, and Guchengli-Samjangri, the gateway for North Korean timber, is second.

Tonghua Steel Group, Yanbian Tianchi Trade Incorporated Compay, and Zhonggang Group purchased 50-year mining rights for North Korea’s Musan mine in 2005. Since late 2007 they had been discussing a seven billion Yuan additional investment in it but that failed due to conflicting views on cooperative investment rate proportions, methods of withdrawing invested funds and other issues. As a consequence of the stalled investment, the Musan mine’s exports to China have not grown relative to last year’s figures.

So most of the trade that goes through Yanji is in raw natural resources, particularly iron ore and timber, and trade in these resources seems to be carried out by Chinese companies and is probably supported (protected) by senior policy makers on both sides of the border. Rather than looking at politics as an explanation, it might simply be another result of rising global commodities prices.

The tax windfall could come from one of two sources: A volume (unit) import tax (ex: $1 for each ton of iron) or an ad valorem import tax (ex: tax on the monetary value of the goods). It is not likely they impose much of an export tax to make a difference.

If China imposed a unit tax, the revenue gains would have to come from surging imports. In this case, it would be likely that the Chinese companies had fixed-price contracts with their North Korean suppliers, and that the increase in global commodity prices simply made DPRK iron ore comparatively very cheap. When (if?) global iron prices fell, we would expect to see China decrease imports from North Korea. But according to the article, iron imports are up only 2.3%—not enough to explain the surge in revenue.

It is more likely that China imposes an ad valorem tax on North Korean imports and the contracts between the Chinese companies and North Korean suppliers are set at (near) market prices. Simply put, taxing the monetary value of increasingly valuable imports has been beneficial for the Chinese government. Even though production at the Musan Mine has not increased much, revenues are probably way up.

Given the status of the Musan Mine as the DPRK’s largest, it is likely that funds raised from this mine are firmly under control. It would be interesting to know the customs receipts in Dandong, Laioning Province, across the river from North Korea’s Sinuiju. Sinuiju seems to have suffered the brunt of the DPRK’s anti-corruption drive, and it is the main railway and trade artery between North Korea China. Most of the companies targeted for inspection were in Sinuiju. Have Chinese tax collections/trade rebounded there?

Read the full story here:
226% Rise in Tax Revenues at Yanji Custom House
Daily NK
Lee Sung Jin
8/6/2008

Posted in China, Forestry, International trade, Iron Ore, Lumber, Manufacturing, Mining/Minerals, Trade Statistics | 1 Comment »

Kim Jong il asserts control of border regions

Thursday, July 31st, 2008

As reported earlier this year by the Daily NK, Kim Jong il’s brother in law, Jang Song Taek, was leading an anti-corruption campaign in North Korea’s northern provinces along the Chinese border. Aside from controlling financial leakages, these efforts could be interpreted as attempts by Kim to gain control over military-owned trade companies.

According to a past report:

The inspection group withdrew all trade certificates with exception of those certificates belonging to the families of anti-Japanese guerrilla fighters, and those certificates issued by the Ministry of Finance or the Shinuiju Municipal Administrative Committee. Therefore, presently at Shinuiju Customs, all import items without trade certificates issued by the above mentioned three groups have to be sent back to China.

Jang’s efforts, though seemingly effective at reasserting financial control of the region, had apparently taken their toll on local commerce:

In Hyesan, Yangkang Province, markets have been significantly reduced in size and scope recently, due to the anti-socialist group’s inspections[.]

[T]he merchants were at unease when under inspection by the National Security Agency (NSA) and other governmental organizations which govern the jangmadang [markets].

For example, transportation of goods by traders has withered away since last year, as the authority of the People’s Safety Agency (PSA) [controlled by Jang] rose and [it] launched [] a strict crackdown on traders’ belongings.

The source explained the situation in Hyesan, that “Hyesan had become the city where Chinese goods were traded for the cheapest value because Chinese goods [enter the country] at Hyesan[.] [During] the (PSA) inspection period [goods] could not be transported inland due to the inspection of trains and cars. Lives of the common people became even tougher than before, since goods could not be circulated through the jangmadang in spite of their low prices.”

“The more stringent the regulation became, the more bribes cadres received and worsened were the lives of people,” the source added.

(NKeconWatch: I have “cleaned up” some of the grammar here to make it more readable. If you want to see the original version, click here.)

And in Sinuiju:

The intensive inspection of Shinuiju, in which over 70% of Chinese-North Korean commercial traffic occurs, caused several aftereffects inside North Korea: commercial traffic passing through Shinuiju and Dandong decreased by half compared to the past, and the aftermath of the inspections in Shinuiju added fuel to the fire of price rises in jangmadang goods across the country.

For instance, sugar, which is a raw material for doughnuts or candies that are consumed the most by average civilians in the jangmadang, carried a price of around 1,500 won per kilogram before the inspections, but in mid-May, it rose to 2,100 won and vegetable oil hiked from 5,500 to 7,500 won per kilogram. Such an increase in prices also caused a significant threat to the survival of citizens who made a living off the jangmadang trade.

But the final result of the evaluation of the Shinuiju inspection, which caused quite a stir externally, has purportedly been negligible.

The source said, “The volume of trade has decreased over several months and the number of visitors to China has also been reduced by half. The results of the inspection have not produced too much difference, except for the execution of 14 corrupt officials.”

The source further noted, “The only change which has been visible to the eye is the rise in the cost of bribes offered to North Korean customs from 40 to 80 dollars per hundred kilograms of goods. There was a rumor that the loading volume carried into the North would be fixed at 120kg, from 360kg, but this has not been done yet.”(Daily NK)

The Daily NK now reports that in the wake of these developments, Kim Jong il’s National Defense Commission (NDC) has moved in and directly taken over the inspections—and economic conditions have improved:

[Markets] have become lively again in the past few days as inspections by the National Defense Commission (NDC) have gotten underway.

A source in North Korea reported to Daily NK on Friday that “Merchants in Hyesan these days are fish in water. They say that they would not mind at all going through such inspections for an entire the year!”

Part of the reason for the turn around has been a change in focus. Whereas Jang’s work hit many “ordinary” North Koreans (particularly those working for the wrong trading companies), NDC inspections are focused on controlling the mid- to upper-level cadres. It is entirely speculatory to ask whether Kim’s strategy was to unleash Jang to get control of the region and afterwards assert direct control himself, or whether complaints from locals forced the NDC to end Jang’s campaign.

Of course this is all unverified information from inside North Korea, so who knows how much of it is correct!

Posted in International trade, Military, Ministry of Administration, Ministry of People’s Security (Criminal Police), Ministry of State Inspection, Ministry of State Security (MPSS, NSA, SSD), Political economy, Worker's Party | 1 Comment »

Beijing Olympics make life harder for North Korean merchants

Tuesday, July 29th, 2008

According to previous reports, Beijing’s border control policies have stiffened up in preparation for the 2008 Olympics. The Daily NK reports these policies are adversely affecting North Koreans visiting family and conducting business in Jilin.

The Daily NK claims that North Koreans pay appx. US$400-500 in bribes and processing fees to obtain a passport, exit visa, and Chinese entrance visa. (The article does not explain how these prices break down, although it would be interesting to know how much Beijing charges North Koreans for various visas.) China typically issues North Koreans family visit visas which are valid for three months, but if a North Korean visitor can secure a residence and employment, this can be easily extended for up to a year. As a result, many North Koreans stay with family for the full year and try to earn some money to take home.

Because of the Olympics, Beijing is now apparently rejecting all family visit visa extensions and stepping up patrols for illegal “visitors.” This means the North Koreans who paid hefty sums to be in China have to go underground if they wish to stay in the PRC. They will also face additional hardship in recovering “travel costs.” Additionally, many North Koreans who are married to Chinese face greater chances of being deported.

Interestingly, this policy was not ordered by local organizations but by the Jilin Provincial Communist Party.

Read the full article here:
China Rounds Up Defectors in Preparation for the Olympics
Daily NK
Lee Sung Jin
7/26/2008

Posted in China, Civil society, International trade, Labor conditions/wages | 2 Comments »

Working as a Lawyer in Pyongyang

Sunday, July 27th, 2008

Brendan Carr over at Korea Law Blog dug up some information on law firms operating in the DPRK. All the information he posts is worth reading, but here are some highlights:

[T]he prospect of working as a foreign lawyer in Pyongyang has been on my list since I’ve been a lawyer.

Michael Hay, a foreign legal consultant in Seoul since 1990, actually did this—striking out from “Big Four” firm Bae, Kim, & Lee in 2001 [domain lapsed] to focus on being a full-time North Korea consultant. He established KoreaStrategic Inc. as a consultancy (its domain lapsed in June 2006, though), then with a splash announced the formation of Hay, Kalb & Associates as the first foreign/North Korean joint venture law firm in Pyongyang. The Hay, Kalb website, too, disappeared sometime in 2005, and I lost touch with Mike Hay around the same time. I remain curious to know about his adventure up North; I’m sure it’s been fascinating. However, he was always extremely tight-lipped about what he was doing there. Other than that he was focusing on North Korea “full-time, all the time” it was hard to get any specifics out of him.

There are two other law firms advertising their services and office presence in North Korea: Italy’s Birindelli e Associati (now Chiomenti after being acquired) and Singapore’s Kelvin Chia Partnership.

But today I found that the International Financial Law Review’s IFLR Legalwire, to which I hadn’t previously subscribed, recently (May 2008) reported on Birindelli partner Sara Marchetta’s experiences in Pyongyang. It’s fascinating stuff, published in two parts—go read Part 1 and Part 2. The article gave the impression that Hay, Kalb was still trading, which is promising, but Marchetta says that Birindelli kept no expatriate lawyer there year-round, because there were only four or five clients a year needing legal services, mostly in resource-extraction and processing ventures.

From Marchetta’s interview, I thought the following observations were worth noting:

Obtaining copies of laws:

The first issue is looking for legal resources – the law- as it is extremely complicated to get them. Even if you are a law firm and have people who are well-connected, its still a very long process to get a copy of a law. Even if the law has already been enacted and should be public, you still need special permission. If the law has not yet officially been translated into English, then you need to obtain special permission to get it and translate it.

The second thing is that the intended implementation of the law in a western sense does not exist. Especially when you go out of Pyongyang and Kaesong [North Korea’s special economic zone], everything is pretty much left up to political decision: whether you can stay here or there, what you do and cannot do…

Just to give you an example: in terms of a corporate tax, you go to a place, make an investment and you pay a corporate tax even if you don’t profit. It’s sort of a tax for being there. Corporate tax ends up being interpreted as a presence tax , which is paid independently of whether you make profits or not. In a few cases, we did find this type of interpretation, which is obviously extremely bizarre. So it is really a matter of general legal culture – which is totally lacking – and education of the administrative middle to low levels.

Does [this environment] hinder getting things done? Yes and no. Yes in the sense that getting a deal done takes more time because you do not have all of the information available at the beginning. No in the sense that once there is the intention of getting the deal done, there is a lot of facilitation from the bureaucratic and governmental point of view. If they say yes, its basically yes and it will happen.

How big is your office in Pyongyang:

It is currently staffed with two people. We have no expatriates. It is a joint venture as we are there in cooperation with a DPRK government entity called the Korean Justice Committee [KJC]. It is equivalent to the Chinese Ministry of Justice.

Are your lawyers at the office North Koreans?

Yes, they are North Korean lawyers. One of them is a pure lawyer, the other one is more someone who is well-connected in the government and has also PR and English capabilities. One side has the legal knowledge, and on the other side, fluent in English that they use to work with foreigners.

Does your JV status with the KJC give you an advantage over foreign firms?

As a matter of fact, from an operational point of view: yes. From the client’s point of view, I don’t know. I have no idea. I don’t think this is something that is hindering the expansion of our client base in Pyongyang, but I am not sure if it enhancing it.

What types of clients do you serve?

We serve companies looking at setting up a presence in the DPRK. These are large companies that deal with natural resources, like mining or consumer goods, and most of them have already a presence in China.

What are teh key sectors of Work?

Well we deal with mining projects. This means that yo go there, you test the product and if it’s okay then you give the technology to be extracted in a proper way. You do part of the processing of the mineral and export it. This is one deal. On the other side, before advising on an investment we advise our clients on precessing contracts. Obviously this can be done not just for mining, but for shoes, clothes, and any other product that can be exported. The deal structure is basically these two.

Looking forward, is there enough going on to fairly classify the DPRK as an “emerging market”?

Not in terms of a domestic market. I don’t think that the domestic market is going to develop very much, but the DPRK is a good place for processing contracts. I mean, you send raw materials and they send back the finished product. There is also a strong market for natural resources and low-to-medium technology projects. There, you can produce basic chemicals, basic pharmaceutical products and some consumer goods. The Chinese are doing clothing here, doing shoes, and a lot of other things.

Do you predict enough work growth to expand?

Not for the time being for a number of reasons. One, we do not see an increase in DPRK-related work. We have two, three, four, maximum five clients a year and that’s basically it. So this is the main reason. Then you have always the political issue. It’s always there. The political wind is really swinging a lot and it changes by the season and is very much affected by the situation of the six-party talks. So for the time being, we are looking at what is happening and we are doing what we can do, but we do not have plans to enlarge our presence in the DPRK for the time being.

Posted in 2002 Economic reforms, Chiomenti, DPRK Policies, Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, International trade, Joint Ventures, Kelvin Chia Partnership, Korean Justice Committee, Light Industry, Manufacturing, Mining/Minerals, Statutes | Comments Closed

Russia-DPRK economic relations

Thursday, July 24th, 2008

From Dr. Leonid Petrov in the Asia Times:

Russia cooperation with North Korea
Since the early 2000s, overall relations between Russia and the DPRK have been improving. The DPRK’s importation of refined oil from Russia saw its first increase in 2002-2003 (from $20 million to $96 million) and was caused by the beginning of the US-DPRK nuclear confrontation and the subsequent demise of the international Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization project that was to construct a light water reactor nuclear power plant in North Korea.

During 2004-2005, petroleum trade between Russia and North Korea grew from $105 million to $172.3 million. Until the six-party talks produced their first results, in the list of Russia’s exports to the DPRK, oil products dominated at 63%. Rampant corruption in both countries also let a trickle of Russian oil to be smuggled to North Korea unaccounted for.

In 2006, Russia was the DPRK’s third-largest trading partner after China and South Korea and absorbed 9% of the total $3.18 billion spent by the North on imports (approximately $286 million). The Kremlin’s approval of international sanctions against the former communist ally was accompanied by the curtailment of trade with the North. At the time of North Korea’s nuclear test in October 2006, Russia’s trade statistics showed that exports of petroleum had dropped 91.1% compared to the same period of the previous year.

The pragmatic mood in bilateral relations prevails, and these days Russia delivers oil and food to North Korea only in accordance with its obligations associated with progress at the six-party talks. This year, Russia has already delivered 100,000 tonnes of fuel oil to the DPRK in two batches and, according to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei Borodavkin, a top Russian envoy to the six-party talks, will deliver another 100,000 tonnes by October 2008. In June, the Russian government announced it would provide 2,860 tonnes of flour to the DPRK. According to an official KCNA news agency report, this food aid arrived at the border city of Sinuiju in the DPRK’s northern Pyongan province in early July.

Recently, for the first time in the post-Soviet era, North Korea saw a major Russian investment. In the city of Pyeongseong, the Russian auto plant KamAZ opened its first assembly line, specializing in the production of medium-size trucks named “Taebaeksan-96”. Although less than 50 trucks were assembled in 2007, this cooperation became an important milestone in the development of bilateral relations. While the project doesn’t violate United Nations sanctions on North Korea, it shows Moscow’s drive to expand its influence in the country. Ironically, the more trucks assembled the heavier North Korea’s dependence on imported fuel, engine oils and other petrochemical products.

The importance of the DPRK’s Rajin-Seonbong special economic zone to Russia’s national interests continues to grow. The state-run monopoly OAO Russian Railways is currently upgrading its railway connections with North Korea in Khasan-Tumangang, investing at least 1.75 billion roubles (US$72 million) into this project, and plans to participate in an ambitious plan to rebuild a trans-Korean railway. By connecting Rajin (and the rest of northern Korea) to its Trans-Siberian railroad, Russia hopes to benefit form the transit of South Korean and Japanese cargo which could be sent via its territory to Central Asian and European markets. Pyongyang seems to endorse these plans and other Russian initiatives, but does not commit any financial resources.

Eighty percent of overall bilateral economic trade between Russia and North Korea consists of cooperation, barter and investment-in-kind between the regional areas. The most active Russian regions trading with the DPRK are Eastern Siberia and the Far East. Maritime province (Primorsky Krai) itself exports to North Korea more than $4 million worth of refined oil per year. There are no oil fields in Maritime province and oil has to be borrowed through a chain of federal bureaucratic structures from the oil-rich areas of Eastern Siberia. Instead of money, the local governments agree to receive the labor of North Korean workers.

North Korean laborers in Siberia and the Far East were common under the Soviet system and they are still visibly present. In 2004, the Russian Federal Immigration Service issued 14,000 visas for foreign laborers, of whom North Koreans numbered 3,320 in 2005 and 5,000 in 2006. Since the DPRK has no other way to pay in goods or services, its government started paying for oil imported from Russia by dispatching thousands of laborers at zero cost. Following strong demand from local companies, just in 2006 regional authorities of Primorsky Krai agreed to issue an extra 5,000 working visas to North Koreans. This openness is contrary to local government policy that normally restricts the entry of labor from China.

DPRK citizens are sent to Russia to work as woodcutters and builders but some have also managed to find work in the agricultural and marine industry. Through the presence of these laborers, Russia has enjoyed a partial repayment of the DPRK’s post-Soviet debt through North Korean workers being contracted to work in mines and lumber mills in Russia’s Far East.

The wages they are able to make in Russia are far greater than what they would make at home. However, the foreign worker quota is set not by provincial governments but by Moscow, which often tries to put a stop to these programs due to the complexity of the matter. Part of this opposition stems from the fact that the North Korean workers in Russia still fall under DPRK laws and, therefore, are subject to intrusive supervision.

Among the most difficult but negotiable issues in the way of Russia-North Korea cooperation remains the problem of external debt. During the Soviet era, the DPRK incurred a debt of approximately $8 billion, which Pyongyang still owes to Moscow but cannot repay. This debt remains a stumbling block in most negotiations on new aid and development programs. However, this debt can potentially make trilateral Russian-Korean relations closer and stronger.

In January 1991, soon after the opening of diplomatic relations with South Korea, Moscow received $3 billion from Seoul in the form of a three-year loan. The collapse of the Soviet Union left this loan largely unpaid. The new Russian government in the 1990s provided South Korea with armaments worth $150 million to be counted as payment in kind for the remaining debt. In 2003, after bilateral negotiations on this issue were completed, part of this Russian debt was canceled and the remainder was rescheduled to be paid over the next 23 years.

Taking into account its own debts to the South, Russia could easily write off a significant portion of North Korean debt. To resolve this question, a certain agreement between all three parties is needed. To engage in a mutual and reciprocal round of debt cancelation, Russia might choose to see the North and the South as one country. Such an agreement would have unblocked the road for broader cooperation between Russia and the two Koreas, and simplified Russia’s energy cooperation with China and Japan.

The full article is worth reading here:
Russia is key to North Korea’s plight
Asia Times
Leonid Petrov
7/24/2008

Posted in Electricity, Energy, Foreign aid statistics, International trade, Labor conditions/wages, Light Industry, Manufacturing, Natural Gas, Oil, Political economy, Railways, Rason Economic and Trade Zone (Rajin-Sonbong), Russia, Trade Statistics | Comments Closed

DPRK Cabinet adopts ‘Border region management provision’

Tuesday, July 22nd, 2008

Institute for Far East Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 08-7-22-1
7/22/2008

On July 18, the North Korean Cabinet publication, “Democratic Choson’, revealed that the cabinet had recently adopted the ‘Border Bridge Trade Complex Management Activities Provision’.

According to the newspaper, the provision spells out to whom the rules and regulations must be applied regarding the orders and management activities of the border bridge trade complex. In addition, “by being adopted, the provision firmly creates regulations on foreign economic activities that cross over border bridges and has prepared the legal support for unceasing improvements of the border bridge trade complex’s management activities.”

North Korea relies on border trade with Chinese areas such as the city of Dandong, in Liaoning Province, and the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, as cross-border trade shot up to over 200 million USD last year.

Posted in Cabinet, Domestic publication, Institute for Far Eastern Studies, International trade, Trade Statistics | Comments Closed

Mongolia to hire North Korean workers

Tuesday, July 22nd, 2008

From Daily Business News Mongolia:

At the submission of the Government of Mongolia, the Parliament ratified Mongolia-North Korea Inter-governmental Agreement on exchanging work forces on the 20^th of July, 2007. According to the Agreement, Ministry of Social Welfare and Labor of Mongolia is to negotiate in the near future with Foreign Trade Ministry on realizing the agreement and exchange of work force, especially number and need of work force, the minimum wage /by USD/, labor conditions /normal and abnormal/, social welfare /social insurance/ and therefore those interested in employing North Korean wok force in 2009 should formulate their TORs accurately as well as submit them to the MSWL within 23 July. Currently orders should be submitted on the basis of position vacancy since number of workers is not specified yet.

(UPDATE) China asks some North Koreans to leave ahead of Olympics

Monday, July 21st, 2008

UPDATE 2: According to the Associated Press:

[A South Korean] NIS official, who asked not be named, citing an internal policy, told The Associated Press that China had no plans to close all bridge links with North Korea “out of concerns of diplomatic friction with North Korea.”

The official also said China would not ask all North Koreans in China to leave, saying that Beijing plans to crackdown on North Koreans who illegally stay in China and Beijing plans to restrict renewing visas for North Koreans.

UPDATE 1: According to the Associated Press, China plans to close all the bridges to the DPRK during the Olympics, starting next month. This will have a devastating impact on trade with Sinuiju, Manpo, Hyesan, Hoeryong, and many other trading hubs along the Chinese border.

ORIGINAL POST: According to an interesting article in Bloomberg (thanks to reader) China is acting to reduce the chances that North Korea issues will interfere with coverage of the Olympic games in Beijing this summer.

According to the article:

China asked some North Korean work units to leave the country or move their business operations during the Olympic Games, according to documentation from the North Korean embassy obtained by Bloomberg News.

Citing security issues, China asked North Koreans, except trade representatives and government-dispatched personnel, to leave by July 31 and not return until the end of September, the Korean-language statement said. The embassy in Beijing gave the order to North Koreans in a July 11 directive, according to a copy of the document obtained by Bloomberg News.

The order took effect from July 13 and those who delay departure would be fined or not allowed to reenter China, according to the document. Workers scheduled for dispatch to China from July 1 should delay their departure until Sept. 25, it said.

and…

It isn’t clear how authoritative the directive is. Five North Korean businessmen contacted by Bloomberg news provided different departure dates, or said they were not affected by the directive. The people refused to be identified in print, citing possible recriminations.

A press attaché at the Chinese embassy in Tokyo who declined to give his name said he wasn’t aware of the directive and that there would be no way to confirm its existence.

Read the articles here:
China asks some North Koreans to leave ahead of Olympics
Bloomberg
Hideko Takayama
7/15/2008

Report: China to shut down all bridges linked to NKorea during Olympics
Associated Press
7/21/2008

China to step up inspections at border with North Korea during Olympics to stop migrants
Associated Press
Kwang-Tae Kim
7/22/2008

Posted in China, Civil society, International trade, Labor conditions/wages, Light Industry, Manufacturing, Political economy | 2 Comments »

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