Archive for the ‘Fiscal & monetary policy’ Category

Biref history of US sanctions on DPRK

Monday, October 9th, 2006

From AFP:
10/9/2006

The US already has broad sanctions in place against North Korea, giving it little additional economic and trade leverage to bring to bear following Pyongyang’s defiant nuclear test explosion.

Washington imposed a near total economic embargo on North Korea at the start of the Korean War in June 1950, only beginning to ease the sanctions slightly from 1989 amid efforts to draw the reclusive Stalinist regime into the international community.

A series of measures aimed at encouraging North Korea to not develop nuclear arms culminated in a June 2000 Executive Order legalizing most transactions between US and North Korean nationals.

The order allowed many products to be sold to North Korea, though sanctions affecting trade in military, so-called dual-use and missile-related items remained in place.

But imports from the country remain under tight restrictions, managed by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, and North Korean assets frozen since 1950 remained frozen.

While restrictions on US investments in North Korea and on the travel of US citizens to North Korea were also eased under the 2000 measure, the two countries have no formal diplomatic relations and have never officially ended the Korean War.

Most forms of US economic assistance, other than purely humanitarian aid, remain prohibited and North Korea does not enjoy “Normal Trade Relations” with the United States, so allowable exports are hit by high tariffs.

The State Department acknowledges that “US economic interaction with North Korea remains minimal” and that Washington’s leverage over the reclusive regime is limited.

“There’s not a lot to grab hold of,” commented a senior State Department official about the hunt for ways to impact the North Korean economy bilaterally.

North Korea receives the bulk of its imports over the Chinese and Russian borders and relies on hefty aid from South Korea, giving those three governments far greater potential leverage in economic sanctions.

Washington did find one powerful pressure point last year when the Treasury Department slapped sanctions against a Macau-based bank, Banco Delta Asia, which US officials charged was the main conduit for bringing North Korean counterfeit dollar bills into the international system.

Washington and its allies have long contended North Korea uses counterfeiting, drug trafficking and sales of weapons to prop up its ailing economy.

The US decision to designate the Banco Delta Asia a “primary money-laundering concern” left the bank teetering and could foreshadow similar action targetting other financial transactions by the North.

Many analysts pointed to the banking sanction as possibly the main reason North Korea went ahead with its nuclear test shock at this time.

The North Koreans were “feeling under a great pressure from the United States and the sanctions that were being imposed, particularly the financial sanctions,” said David Albright, a former UN nuclear weapons inspector.

“I think this test is coming from that sense of being backed into a corner,” he said.

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Dollarization of NK Economy

Monday, September 25th, 2006

Korea Times:
Andrei Lankov
9/25/2006

For a Stalinist country, North Korea was unique in its permissive approach to hard currency transactions. Most Communist states followed the Soviet example and strictly forbade all private trading in currency. There were foreign currency shops in the Soviet Union, but only the lucky holders of foreign passports could go there.

Until the late 1980s, all Soviet citizens returning from overseas were required to submit their currency to the state-run banks within 72 hours of crossing the border. In exchange, they were given special coupons that could be used as money in special shops stuffed with quality goods. They couldn’t be used in “real” currency shops, which targeted foreigners and where the merchandise was even better. By keeping more than just a few one-dollar bills at home, a Soviet citizen committed a crime.

Professional foreign currency speculators existed, but their business was extremely risky.

According to Soviet law, they could face the death penalty for their activities, and some of them were actually shot in otherwise liberal 1960s. Thus, everybody who wanted to buy or sell currency had to be very careful.

But this was not the case in North Korea. From the late 1970s currency shops operated freely in Pyongyang and other major cities, open to any North Korean who had dollars or yen.

No questions were asked by the guards. Unlike their Soviet counterparts, the shops sold not only durables, but also daily necessities and food stuffs. Currency exchange outside the banks was illegal, but it was considered a relatively minor crime.

This approach, unusually permissive for a very repressive and restrictive regime, reflected one North Korean peculiarity.

The presence of some 95,000 ethnic Koreans who were lured into moving to the North from Japan during the 1990s. The government discovered that these people could attract remittances from Japan, so a network of the state-run currency shops emerged to suck the yen into the state’s coffers.

Prices in the shops were roughly twice the international average, with the difference going to the state.

But in the early 1990s another type of dollar-based economy emerged. From 1990 the value of the North Korean won was in steady decline. The public distribution system was falling apart, and many people turned to foreign currency as the major means of protecting their savings from both inflation and the ever present danger of a confiscatory money reform. Thus, in the early 1990s a dollar-based economy emerged.

The exchange rate began to climb. The official rate was 2.2 won per dollar. Like most other Communist states, North Korea grossly overvalued its currency to squeeze more money from foreign visitors. But nobody was trading the won at such grotesquely high rate. By the time the great famine struck the country in the late 1990s, the actual exchange rate was approximately 220 won, a hundred times the official average.

Market traders and emerging entrepreneurs of all kinds ceased to use the North Korean won for any large-scale transactions.

The dollar also became the major medium of saving. Due to the lack of data and peculiarities of the Communist economy, it is difficult to give precise figures, but the annual inflation rate over the last few years has exceeded 100 percent.

The major turning point was reached in 2002, when the government introduced economic reforms. Actually, they were formally known as “special measures.”

The word “reform” had to be avoided in the official parlance since it hinted that something in the North Korean perfect society needed adjustment, and that could not possibly be true.

The new official rate of exchange was 165 won per dollar.

This was already well below the true market rate but still constituted an overnight 7,500 percent depreciation of the national currency. This is probably not a world record, but it’s still an impressive figure.

Simultaneously, the government raised prices in state shops and won-denominated salaries. This was done in an uneven fashion. Some groups gained far more than others, with the military security personnel and academic staff being the most prominent winners.

This meant the release of huge amount of cash, which flooded the economy and sped up inflation. In 2005 the exchange rate soon approached the level of 2200 won to 2300 won per dollar.

It has been discussed whether such hyper-inflation was provoked deliberately, as a result of some calculations, or came about through planners’ mistakes. I am inclined to believe the second option.

North Korean officials are exceptionally naive when it comes to the basics of the market economy. I would not be surprised if we eventually learn that in 2002 they hoped that the prices would stand still once they had been increased to market levels.

All this is often described as the dollarization of North Korean economy. However, in late 2002 the North Koreans declared that they would switch to euros as the major currency unit in their dealings with the outside world. Since then, all North Korean shops exhibit prices in euros, not dollars.

However, this act did not change actual habits much. Transactions are still usually based on the good old greenback.

Those groups who had access to the currency tended to fare much better than others. Some of those groups were once underprivileged, and the great nationwide disaster of the 1990s actually improved their social standing.

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The Politics of Famine

Friday, September 22nd, 2006

A four-part series in the Asia Times

Part 1: Failure in the Fields
By John Feffer

Introduction
Access to food is a basic human right. For several decades, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK – North Korea) prided itself on meeting the food needs of its population, although it has little arable land. Like many socialist countries, North Korea emphasized this success – along with high literacy rates, an equitable health-care system, and guaranteed jobs for all – as proof that it upheld human rights, that its record in fact exceeded that of Western countries.

By the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, a deteriorating economy and a steep rise in the cost of energy, followed in mid-decade by a series of natural disasters, undercut North Korea’s capacity to feed its population. The public distribution system collapsed, and famine ensued. [1] Pyongyang appealed to its neighbors and then the world at large for help.

Through the United Nations, famine relief for North Korea became a global concern. The UN’s World Food Program (WFP), in the largest aid program in its history, fed more than one-third of North Korea’s population. For most countries, bilateral food aid became their only significant form of engagement with the DPRK. For many aid organizations, famine relief not only equaled engagement, it represented human-rights work.

“There is no hierarchy in human rights,” explained Erica Kang of the South Korean non-governmental organization (NGO) Good Friends. “But if you don’t have any food on the table and your child is undernourished, the first thing on your mind is food. The right to food is one of our first priorities.” [2] Food aid helped to meet the needs – and uphold the right to food – of millions of North Koreans.
The correlation between food and human rights in the DPRK has not been an altogether positive one, however. In the 1980s, human-rights organizations began to document the extent of North Korea’s violations in the civil and political spheres, including political labor camps, the lack of freedom of speech and assembly, and the collective punishment of families for the crimes of an individual.

In the 1990s, these accounts became more detailed and cross-checkable via interviews with an increasing number of North Koreans in China and South Korea. The same food crisis that prompted humanitarian relief also supplied the outside world with more details of the political and social reality within the DPRK.

At this time, too, allegations surfaced regarding the diversion of food aid, the distribution of food according to political classification, and the designation of parts of the country as lost causes. Complaining that Pyongyang restricted their humanitarian operations, such groups as Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) and CARE pulled out of North Korea and rejected further engagement with the DPRK.

Reports in 1999 from the US General Accounting Office and the US Institute of Peace echoed these criticisms. In its first term, the administration of President George W Bush responded to concerns about inadequate monitoring by reducing US contributions to the WFP.

What had previously been two relatively separate approaches to North Korea – food aid versus human-rights criticism – have thus converged. The right to food, which humanitarian organizations emphasized in their operations, has become yet another arena in which critics have castigated Pyongyang’s record. A former rationale for engagement has morphed into an argument for disengagement.

Although both the MSF and Action Contre la Faim published some materials in support of their decision to withdraw from North Korea in the late 1990s, the first major broadside in the language of food as a human-rights issue came from Jean Ziegler, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food.

In his February 2001 report, he penned the much-cited sentence that after 1995, “it gradually became clear that most of the international aid was being diverted by the army, the secret services, and the government”. [3]

After a short interval, human-rights organizations zeroed in on the issue. Amnesty International published “Starved of Rights” in early 2004, [4] and the South Korean NGO Good Friends issued its report “North Korean Human Rights and the Food Crisis” in March of the same year. [5]

Last September, Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland distilled these concerns into a report for the US Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. [6] Human Rights Watch followed up with “A Matter of Survival” this May. [7]

All of these reports leveled charges against the DPRK. Haggard and Noland put the charges in the strongest terms: Pyongyang was “culpably slow” in responding to the famine, did not use funds to import food during the worst of the crisis, diverted food aid away from the neediest recipients, and blocked assistance to the hardest-hit parts of the country.

North Korea is not the first place to experience the collision of human rights and humanitarianism. In international conflicts such as Kosovo and Rwanda and in other famine situations such as Biafra and Ethiopia, champions of human rights and humanitarian relief often butted heads.

Humanitarian organizations focused on delivering essential goods and services to satisfy basic human rights (to food and shelter). But they sometimes drew criticism for not addressing the situation of civil and political rights or systemic political abuses – in other words, the structures within which they had to operate.

This dilemma was both tactical (what problems should be tackled first?) and philosophical (is there a hierarchy of human rights, with food being the most important, or should all human rights, economic as well as political, be treated with equal emphasis?).

To understand this conflict between human rights and humanitarianism in North Korea, we will separate the problem into four questions:

1. Was the DPRK famine the result of unexpected external causes such as weather, unanticipated failures of state and local policy, or easily foreseeable system breakdown? This question will require analysis of North Korea’s agricultural system and the difficulties it encountered in the 1980s and 1990s.
2. How can we evaluate the factual basis of the subsequent charges that North Korean officials engaged in human-rights violations in the sphere of food policy during the famine era? This question will necessitate a closer semantic scrutiny of terms such as diversion and monitoring.
3. How have agricultural and market reforms more generally altered the food-policy calculations in North Korea, particularly as they pertain to meeting the needs of the most disadvantaged? This question will spark a discussion of the relationship between famine/food aid and market mechanisms.
4. What are the policy implications of this debate about food and human rights? This discussion will lead us to an evaluation of strategies of linkage, the relationship between food aid and political change, and the current controversy over bilateral versus multilateral assistance. [8]

In answering these questions, this essay will reflect a philosophy that integrates human-rights concerns with economic engagement. Humanitarian disasters in illiberal environments require such an integrative approach.

To understand North Korea’s particular dynamic, though, we must also tackle the question of power as it relates to sovereignty. Cognizant of trans-border issues such as environmental pollution, nuclear proliferation, and accelerated financial flows, most countries have relinquished a certain portion of their national sovereignty to craft global solutions to global problems. This trend has intensified since the Cold War.

The DPRK, though it belongs to several international organizations and is a party to numerous international agreements, remains locked in a Westphalian political model that stresses territorial integrity and national self-determination. Relations with other countries fall under the communist-era rubric of “peaceful co-existence”. This divergence on the issue of sovereignty isolates North Korea in an increasingly globalizing era.

But the conflict is not as simple as the DPRK versus the rest of the world. Nation-states practice in essence three types of sovereignty. Employing a sovereignty of the weak, countries like North Korea use Westphalian notions as a fragile shield against challenges from the outside. Wielding a hegemonic sovereignty of the strong, the United States and other superpowers place their national interests above those of other countries and justify intervention on the basis of an assumed consensus of values such as democracy and stability. Citing a sovereignty of international law, mid-level states attempt to contain the hegemonic impulses of the strong and acquire a level playing field for the rest. Countries might deploy different understandings of sovereignty depending on the situation.

The battles between North Korea and those providing it with food aid might appear to revolve around different definitions of human rights. Beneath this surface conflict, however, is a more fundamental disagreement over sovereignty, with Pyongyang perceiving superpower designs behind the sovereignty of international law. The conflict between human rights and humanitarianism cannot be resolved without clarifying this underlying dispute about sovereignty.

Although the controversy regarding food and human rights in North Korea largely stems from matters now a decade old, the issue is all too current. Heavy rains and flooding this July have once again plunged the DPRK into a precarious food situation. Pyongyang is ambivalent about receiving international food assistance, and charges of human-rights abuses in the food realm have once again surfaced. The conflicts between international human-rights norms and conceptions of state sovereignty continue to bedevil efforts to save lives in North Korea – and have considerable implications for how the world approaches similar humanitarian crises elsewhere in a changing world system.

Part 2: Human rights violations
By John Feffer

When Medecins Sans Frontieres withdrew from North Korea in 1998, the first major humanitarian organization to do so, it raised many of the same concerns that continue to echo today in reports on food and human rights: the misuse of public funds for grand projects rather than food imports, the distribution of food according to political classification rather than need, the lack of monitoring, and the diversion of aid away from the neediest. [34]

These are serious charges. But they are not new charges. In part, the human rights versus humanitarian readings of the North Korean crisis derive from different understandings of the origins of famine. One school looks at natural causes – local weather patterns or climate trends such as El Nino. [35] Another school focuses on economic issues, such as the impersonal play of the market forces of supply and demand. A third school stresses politics.

As Lord Bauer sums up this last view, “The cause of famine, starvation, and acute hunger is not overpopulation, or bad weather, or debt, but government policies.” Lord Bauer was not concerned here with the negligent policies of powerful countries such as England (for instance, during the Irish famine) but those of Third World governments, which he considered inefficient, incompetent, or just plain venal. [36] Amartya Sen’s assertion that democratic countries don’t suffer famines is a more current and diplomatic restatement of this philosophy. [37]

According to the political school of analysis, North Korea, by rejecting economic orthodoxy, political liberalization, and the stewardship of more powerful countries, has not suffered the slings and arrows of external misfortune but rather has brought the crisis upon itself. If Pyongyang had responded to worsening circumstances with the right policies – importing more food, distributing aid equitably, changing its budget priorities, and instituting democratic reforms – famine would either have been averted or quickly remedied.

The application of this political school of analysis to the case of North Korea has entailed a shift from a policy frame to a rights frame. What had hitherto amounted to criticism on the grounds of political failures has now been recast as violations of human rights. We thus exit the realm of policy and enter the realm of ethics, moving from political ineptitude to moral culpability, from largely domestic problems to actionable offenses in the international arena.

Whether North Korea’s domestic behavior after 1995 constitutes human rights violations or is more prosaically the result of policy miscalculations depends a great deal on how one approaches a set of terms: political classification, diversion, monitoring, triage, and budget priorities.

Political classification
The information that North Korea divides its citizens into three major classes and 51 subdivisions within those classes appeared in English for the first time in the Human Rights Watch/Minnesota Lawyers International Human Rights Committee 1988 report on the DPRK. [38] According to the CIA and South Korean sources for this material, North Korean citizens are loyal, wavering, or hostile toward the government, with the subdivisions related largely to family history. These classifications affect employment, education, residence, and so forth.

Although this class system had its origins in the immediate aftermath of the North Korean revolution, it became official only in 1967. [39] This picture of a society rigidly stratified according to political affiliation remains a fixture in analysis of the DPRK. Haggard and Noland, for instance, argue that this political stratification has meant that “deserving households – including politically disfavored households – are not getting the food intended for them or are being denied relief altogether”. [40] Amnesty International (AI) draws a correlation between political stratification on the one hand and proximity to Pyongyang and political privilege on the other. [41]

There is no question that North Korea is a highly hierarchical society, combining the traditional categories of Confucianism with the new classes associated with communism. [42] But it is not clear whether the precise stratification identified above still applies in today’s North Korea or whether it has had any influence over food distribution. It is quite likely that this classification system has changed over time, particularly since the categories often related to collaboration with Japanese colonial authorities, an event now more than 60 years in the past.

“During the factionalist strife around the Korean War, the North Korean authorities needed a system under which they could punish their enemies,” economist Ruediger Frank explains, “but this system outlived its usefulness.” [43] Stratification, contends Erica Kang of Good Friends, still exists in the DPRK but is comparable to class categories in England: “There’s stigma attached to it, but it doesn’t buy you food.” [44] Analyst Michael Schloms quotes defectors who clarify that age and profession, not political loyalty, determined the size of rations. [45] “The significance of the songbun system,” writes Andrei Lankov, using the North Korean term for social hierarchy based on origin, “has greatly diminished over recent years.” [46]

By the 1980s, new systems of privilege were emerging in North Korea. Average citizens, and not just highly placed party members, began to have access to hard currency, to private agricultural plots, and to products available in private markets. During the famine years, relations with friends or family over the border in China became an important factor for survival. A classification system built solely on one’s grandparents’ collaboration under colonialism – or even on party membership – gave way to different, informal status categories.

Those who have profited under these new systems may well be those who parlayed their political status for economic gain, like the “red capitalists” of the East European and Soviet transitions. But those at the bottom of the hierarchy also engage in risky behavior because they have nothing to lose. Thus it was that ordinary women, generally a low-status group in North Korean society, acquired real power in the household and in the community at large.

Scrounging small amounts of capital, these women became involved in cross-border and domestic trade, peddled wild greens or homemade food, raised domesticated animals, and sold produce from kitchen gardens. [47] Other low-status groups such as Japanese-Koreans and citizens of Chinese ethnicity also profited under the new dispensation. [48] A useful comparison could be made to the reconfiguration of social status at the end of the Choson era, as the sons of concubines, among other secondary-status groups, advanced politically and economically under the new system of Japanese colonialism. [49]

Was food aid directed to the politically loyal? International aid agencies such as Caritas provided food aid to orphanages, where it is unlikely that political criteria played any part. The UN World Food Program distributed much of its provisions through food-for-work programs that may have been subject to unseen political screening, though this too is doubtful. Marcus Noland notes that the WFP also provided food to institutions, and political considerations may well have shaped decisions over how such provisions were distributed. [50] But such decisions would have taken place at a local level rather than by central directive, which blunts any charge of systematic human rights violations.

In both cases, however, the WFP’s country director for North Korea, Richard Ragan, insists there is no evidence of political considerations affecting distribution. [51] The fact that targeted populations showed declining rates of malnutrition, particularly between the nutrition surveys of 1998 and 2002, provides some evidence for Ragan’s assessment. [52]

Political considerations may even have inadvertently benefited those most in need. As Erica Kang explains, some portion of food aid, which North Koreans considered of the lowest quality, found its way to the political labor camps. If anything, then, the perceived lower quality of the multilateral food assistance (as distinct from bilateral rice aid from China or South Korea) ensured that it went to the intended population. In other words, to the extent that political classifications applied to multilateral food assistance, they may well have benefited the neediest people, at least after the initial worst period of the famine.

Diversion
Humanitarian relief organizations operate according to the principle of proportionality: the greatest aid to the greatest need. Haggard and Noland discuss the “diversion” of aid to “less deserving groups”. [53] This formulation raises two complex issues: the definition of diversion and the definition of deserving.

During the Victorian era, there was much discussion of the “deserving poor:” the virtuous poor who conform to majority values as compared to the poor deemed to be lazy and shiftless. Such Victorianism distorts the debate on humanitarian aid, for it encourages moral evaluations of who is and who is not properly deserving of food.

Ethicist Peter Singer argues instead for effectiveness as a primary criterion: preventing as many people as possible from starving to death. [54] “If the way to do this is to aid those who are actually starving, then we should do so,” Singer writes, “but if we can save more by employing other criteria as well, that is what we must do.” [55] Such a strategy might mean directing food to farmers so they can grow more or to industrial workers so they can produce goods that can be sold to import more food. Everyone is deserving of food – that is, after all, the meaning of the right to food. But in a situation of scarcity, governments and aid workers must come to agreement over strategic allocations.” Thus it is more useful to speak of “targeted” recipients rather than “neediest” recipients.

The word “diversion” suggests a concerted effort to channel food away from the targeted recipients. When the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Jean Ziegler, asserted in 2001 that “most of the international aid was being diverted”, he based his charge largely on Action Contre La Faim documents that do not speak of diversion but only point out that the most vulnerable populations were not within the public structures of food distribution. [56] Ziegler later qualified his statements after consulting with his UN colleagues in the World Food Program, who discussed their efforts to improve monitoring and access. [57] Ziegler might also profitably have consulted an almost-identical back-and-forth between the US General Accounting Office (GAO) and Representative Tony Hall over a 1999 GAO report that made similar charges of diversion. [58]

Subsequent claims of as high as a 50% diversion rate were stated in the Haggard/Noland report. [59] Good Friends, the source cited in the report, quoted a figure of 30% of international food aid going to the military, 10% allocated to workers in the munitions industry, and 10% to the staff of Kim Il-sung holiday houses. On the surface, this adds up to 50%. However, it turns out that Good Friends lumped all international assistance in this figure, including Chinese bilateral aid that had no strings attached and cannot therefore be considered diversion.

Furthermore, Good Friends was careful to note that its assessment was based on a single eyewitness account. [60] Marcus Noland defends the diversion figure in his report by attributing it not only to Good Friends but also to interviews with a range of humanitarian organizations, some of which spoke of diversion, others of loss, and others of certain “taxes” paid to officials. [61] Since these additional sources remain confidential, it is difficult to assess them. After noting that a 10% “spillage” rate is common in food aid deliveries around the world, the WFP’s Richard Ragan declares that, “We bring in non-preferred commodities like corn and wheat, we process food at the factories, and we did between 300 to 500 visits a month, so I’m pretty confident that our food, that is, the WFP’s food, largely went where it was targeted.” [62]

Some foreign aid has indeed turned up in unexpected places. Haggard and Noland cite a European NGO report of diversion of therapeutic milk. [63] Since the aid, intended for certain provincial hospitals, ended up in provincial baby homes, North Korean officials apparently interceded with their own ideas of the appropriate targeted population. Though unwise, given the training needed to dispense such milk, this example of redirecting aid is not comparable to, for instance, the can of foreign food found on a North Korean submarine that ran aground in South Korea. That was a clear example of diversion. Beyond these cases, there are rumors of diversion and allegations from defectors, but the meager evidence so far suggests that no significant or systematic diversion took place.

Still, it is plausible that Pyongyang might allow international aid to reach targeted populations so that it can then redirect to the military the domestic production that would otherwise have fed civilians. Given the DPRK’s “military-first” policy, this kind of sleight of hand would not be surprising. First of all, the government could argue that such a redirection is a national security priority. Second, since the military has been the most effective work force in the country, akin to the US Army Corp of Engineers, this practice might qualify as a strategic allocation according to Singer’s criterion of effectiveness. Less justifiable, of course, would be reallocation if domestic resources that had previously fed the general population were reallocated to party cadres who already enjoyed a better diet.

But how well did the military and party cadres fare during the food crisis? Even under the military-first policy, the North Korean military has suffered severe shortages of food. [64] In fact, as the 2004 report from Good Friends points out, hunger among the rank and file in the army presented a major social problem: the plunder of civilian stocks. [65] In the army divisions that obtain higher food rations, “The military supplies go into the society through several routes,” one defector has written. “Moreover, the military supplies disappear because the officers save them for their families, and people who are in the army try to save as much as they can while they are in the army.” [66]

Party cadres, too, suffered during the famine. One high-level DPRK official told former top North Korean government adviser Hwang Jong-yop before he defected, that 10% of those who died of famine-related causes in 1996 were cadre members, a figure that roughly matches the rate of party membership in North Korean society. [67] This anecdotal evidence of hunger and malnutrition among soldiers and cadre suggests a more egalitarian distribution of food than alleged in human rights reports.

Perfect information about the food needs of a population, particularly one in a crisis situation with a rather poor communications system, is impossible. “All international humanitarian action is subject to some irremediable constraints,” famine specialist Alex de Waal writes. [68] As Christopher Barrett and Daniel Maxwell note, measurable need is only ever one of several criteria for distribution, and food transfer is both difficult and time-consuming and therefore subject to considerable “targeting errors”. [69] They cite several studies in the Horn of Africa demonstrating “that food aid flows as frequently to the richest, most food-secure districts and households as it does to the poorest, most food-insecure ones”. [70]

Political considerations – social classifications, military-first designations, or in capitalist countries, economic class strats – do not warp a perfect humanitarian aid system. Each aid system has inherent structural limitations that produce the abovementioned spillage rates. Targeting is not a hard science. It must be negotiated within countries and between governments and aid agencies. [71] Targeting is, in other words, a matter of contested sovereignty – a power struggle over who makes the ultimate decisions regarding allocation of resources.

Monitoring
Without careful monitoring, it is very difficult to determine whether food reaches its intended population. Aid organizations and critics have complained that DPRK authorities have placed numerous obstacles in the path of monitors. Korean speakers have traditionally not been permitted on monitoring teams. Random, unannounced inspections are not allowed. Certain provinces are off-limits. These restrictions have given rise to the notion that North Korea has something to hide.

Monitoring is not an on-off proposition. Rather, there is a spectrum of coverage, and monitoring, like targeting, requires negotiation. Action Contre la Faim left North Korea in 1999, complaining that the country only accepted unconditioned aid. [72] But other organizations, including the UN World Food Program, gradually negotiated better terms during the course of their stay in the country, and managed to change the conditions under which their aid was dispersed.

The WFP was only able to target its aid geographically beginning in 2001, [73] but it eventually established five regional offices and considerably increased the number of monitoring visits it conducted (before renegotiating a lower level of aid and access in 2006). The South Korean NGO Good Friends developed a direct relationship with authorities in the North Korean province of Rajin-Sonbong and has reported an improvement in monitoring conditions. [74] Canadian Foodgrains Bank (CFB) insists that the quality of monitoring in the DPRK “exceed[ed] the average monitoring of CFB programs”. [75]

But monitoring has become more than simply an index of the effectiveness of aid distribution. For North Korean authorities, monitoring has represented a level of invasiveness permitted to a certain extent with agencies trusted to a certain degree, but the activity has always been unacceptable from a national security point of view. For donor countries, monitoring has come to be seen as an indicator of whether North Korea was willing to play by international rules of conduct. This politicization of aid – in which monitoring is perceived as more than an instrument of judging effectiveness – has transformed negotiations between international agencies and North Korean officials into a power struggle over, ultimately, sovereignty.

Food crisis situations elsewhere in the world haven’t received comparable scrutiny. As one aid worker who has worked extensively in North Korea quips, in referring to food aid delivered to Afghanistan after the toppling of the Taliban, “How is food aid monitored when it is thrown out of an airplane?” [76] In situations where sovereignty struggles are not germane – Afghan sovereignty had been all but abrogated – monitoring is a political non-issue, even though questions of targeting and effectiveness remain.

Currently the debate over monitoring has shifted to whether the Republic of Korea (ROK) can require the same level of transparency for its bilateral aid that the WFP achieved in its multilateral assistance. Seoul argues that, like the WFP, it has improved its monitoring activities over the years as a function of building trust and relationships. [77] It is also interesting to note that NGOs initially criticized the WFP for setting a low monitoring standard. [78] Now it is the WFP that is held up as the benchmark by which all other monitoring should be judged. We’ll return to this question of South Korean assistance in the section on policy implications.

Triage
The largest number of North Korean food migrants and refugees in China come from the DPRK’s northeast provinces. Interviews with these refugees suggest that the famine hit this region hardest. Nutritional surveys also indicate that malnutrition varies significantly by province, with children in North and South Hamgyong and Ryanggang provinces worst affected. [79] That food monitors were not allowed into certain areas of North Korea prompted speculation that officials deliberately cordoned off certain parts of the country in order to save other ones. Andrew Natsios wrote in 1999 that Pyongyang had triaged the Northeast. According to Fiona Terry of Medicins Sans Frontieres, in a 2001 Guardian article, Kim Jong-il asserted in a 1996 speech that only 30% of the population needed to survive in order to rebuild North Korean society.

North Korea’s northeast provinces have traditionally been food-deficit regions that relied on transfers of food from the South. When the famine hit, the government began to apply the self-reliance doctrine of juche at the provincial level. Since the center no longer had surplus food to distribute, each province was on its own. Individual counties negotiated contracts directly with Chinese authorities across the border; entire factories, reduced to scrap, were traded for food.

The question from a human rights perspective is whether Pyongyang exacerbated this situation. The northeast provinces are home to economically important industries (mining) and have been political strongholds for the Workers Party. [80] On the face of it, then, it wouldn’t make sense for Pyongyang to deliberately starve a politically and economically important part of the country. The situation does not appear comparable to Moscow’s approach to the Ukraine in the 1930s or Addis Ababa’s posture toward Tigray province in the 1980s. Although the northeast provincial capital of Chongjin was the site of a possible military coup in 1995, there is no evidence that this city was a bastion of political opposition. [81]

Yet DPRK authorities resisted initial requests from international relief organizations to provide assistance to the Northeast. World Food Program aid reached the East Coast only in 1997 and 1998, and only one-fifth of the WFP’s total aid went to feed the third of North Korea’s population that lived in this area. [82] Though Pyongyang later agreed to an expansion of the WFP program in the Northeast, it is difficult to explain the two-year lag in response to conditions there. [83] Political scientist Wonhyuk Lim speculates that the central government was reluctant to show the worst of the crisis to foreigners. [84] He points out, though, that food aid did make it to the Northeast in 1995, when South Korea shipped provisions to Chongjin, a primary port in that area. [85]

Meanwhile, food monitors were barred from 45 of 303 DPRK counties in March 2005. Aid workers offer various explanations, including potential military sensitivity or the location of prison camps in those counties. Disputing the notion of any area being cordoned off, Good Friends staff person Erica Kang counters that even the labor camps, which have the highest concentration of the politically suspect, received foreign aid because this food was considered to be of the worst quality. [86]

Pyongyang’s greatest policy error at this time was its attempt to uphold laws restricting freedom of movement. Travel restrictions made it difficult for the population in the Northeast to move around legally to obtain food. [87] Ultimately, however, the formal travel pass system began to lose its hold, and even cross-border movement became more feasible, though not without hardships or grave dangers. Meanwhile, though, the application of juche on a county level may have been a sensible accommodation to reality, this provincial extension put the northeast in very difficult straits.

Beyond a doubt, the DPRK’s food crisis hit hardest in the northeast. Although there is no solid evidence that Pyongyang deliberately cut off this province, distribution of food was a significant problem. In retrospect, given what we know of the consequences of the famine in the northeast, Pyongyang should have directed more food aid there between 1995 and 1997, particularly in the period when South Korean aid dwindled and international aid had yet to begin. It would be a mistake, though, to argue that the central government was either unaware of the regional problem or did nothing to rectify it. Pyongyang’s major failing seems to relate more to the overall amount of available food than to its distribution. So now we must turn to the government’s budget priorities.

Budget priorities
During the famine period, North Korea continued to spend large amounts of money on its military and on projects extolling its past and current leadership. This approach to budget allocations might be considered a human rights violation, since it deliberately deprives the population of its right to food. Such political decisions have indeed been appalling. Unfortunately, North Korea is not alone in this regard.

Not only do many countries in the world spend money on the military when portions of their population are malnourished, but the global order itself tilts in favor of military purchases rather than food distribution to the poor. In most free trade agreements a national security exception exempts military budget decisions, such as direct subsidies of contractors, from trade liberalization – which suggests that the sovereign right to exclusive control over military spending remains strong even when global institutions and treaties have trumped sovereign control over other budgetary matters. [88]

Still, despite the generally poor track record on budgetary priorities around the globe, international agencies, NGOs, scholars, and activists have increasingly come to view development as a human right and to see political and civic freedoms as important to securing economic improvement. [89] The lack of opportunity for groups within North Korea to voice their dissatisfaction – about economic priorities or the distribution of economic goods – is a significant concern. That this problem exists to a greater or less extent in other societies, including democratic ones, does not let North Korea off the hook.

So, did Pyongyang’s budgetary decisions exacerbate the famine? Though North Korea did increase its commercial imports of food as its agricultural situation deteriorated in the late 1980s, the levels declined in the mid-1990s (along with all imports) and sagged again from 1998 on. Was this part of a plan to deliberately starve the population? Wonhyuk Lim rebuts any such claim. With more food aid finally entering the country in the late 1990s, the government decided that it did not need to import a surplus. “One may suggest that the planners should have allowed a bigger margin of error before reducing commercial imports to prepare for unexpected changes in domestic production or food aid,” he writes, “but it would be a stretch to argue that the planners reduced commercial imports with intent to leave the population vulnerable to starvation. Western donor countries have significantly reduced their food aid to North Korea since 2001, but scholars don’t assign such a sinister motive to these reductions.” [90]

The DPRK’s food crisis took place during a period of general economic collapse. The country’s leadership also perceived that it remained within a generally hostile international environment that required continued military expenditures. The loss of the country’s first and only leader in 1994 also generated what might be considered a legitimation crisis, and the ruling elite became more anxious about maintaining power. With budgetary resources declining, it had to make strategic allocations, and it invoked its sovereign right to do so.

The decision to rely on international food aid, although directly threatening to the governing ideology, begins to make sense in the context of an overall budgetary crisis. Since a hungry population and a malnourished military do not make for a stronger security policy or a heightened sense of government stability, the decision not to import more food in the mid-1990s would appear to be a miscalculation rather than a deliberate or callous attempt to starve the population.

North Korea’s decision in 2005 to phase out humanitarian food shipments has been highlighted as another example of government policy that deliberately puts the population at risk. [91] But Pyongyang, recognizing how ill-advised dependency on food aid is, has long called for a shift from aid to development. Rather than a function of inept agricultural policy or a criminal disregard for still-vulnerable populations, the government’s decision seems based on a longer-term assessment of the requirements of the economy.

Whether Pyongyang is in error depends in part on calculations of grain shortfall. According to conventional estimates, the DPRK needs approximately 6.5 million tons of food annually to feed its population. Its best harvest recently was in 2005, when it produced 4.8 million tons. Its shortfall, therefore, was approximately 1.7 million tons, which it has to make up in aid or trade. Ruediger Frank, however, calculates a lower overall requirement of less than 5 million tons. [92] If North Korea maintains its 2005 yields, the government faces virtually no shortfall at this lower figure. From his estimates, Frank believes that Pyongyang’s decision to phase out humanitarian aid shipments is rational rather than irrational.

If, however, reports of the 2005 harvest are considerably inflated – if, for instance, the production level was more like 3 to 3.5 million tons [93] – then aid from China and South Korea will not entirely fill the gap, and hunger will worsen in 2006. The DPRK has negotiated a two-year program of development assistance with the World Food Program that would provide aid for nearly 2 million children and women of childbearing age in the industrial East and mountainous North, but this too would be insufficient if overall grain calculations are unwarrantedly optimistic. [94]

The 2006 floods further complicate the situation. The extent of the damage remains unclear. The North Korean government claims “hundreds” dead, while the South Korean NGO Good Friends estimates over 50,000 dead or missing. [95] The loss of arable land, according to the World Food Program, suggests a decline of as much as 100,000 tons of food from the expected harvest. [96] The significance of this shortfall depends on the level of bilateral assistance.

Seoul has reversed its initial suspension of humanitarian aid after North Korea’s July missile launches, and South Korea’s Red Cross has offered 100,000 tons. [97] If Seoul resumed sending its annual contribution of 500,000 tons of rice, the shortfall would be covered. Much also depends on China, for this erstwhile ally has reduced its oil shipments in the aftermath of North Korea’s missile launches in July 2006. For its part, Pyongyang was initially reluctant to invite international assistance back into the country (over and above the negotiated World Food Program amounts) but has more recently shown greater receptivity.

Some critics have charged the WFP with subsidizing the DPRK’s military program by supplying assistance to populations that the government should responsibly use its budget to feed. [98] The truth is, however, that humanitarian organizations find themselves in this position virtually everywhere in the world – including rich countries such as the United States – because government budget priorities are set according to political considerations not humanitarian ones. The problem in North Korea is that those who suffer because of a humanitarian crisis have no political voice and have little hope of affecting official policy except indirectly in the government’s calculations of its overall stability.

Thus we have two separate but related divergences on the issue of sovereignty. In the first divergence, North Korea has asserted its right to determine policy within its territory and has been loath to accept the demands of other governments or NGOs concerning the production, distribution, and accountability of its food system. In the second divergence, North Korea adheres to a notion of state sovereignty in which power is invested in the institutions of government; many other countries believe to one degree or another in popular sovereignty, in which power is invested in the people. In other words, Pyongyang clings to an older, Westphalian model in an age of globalization and democracy. The question remains whether any of this will change as a result of ongoing reforms within North Korea.

Part 3: A question of reform
By John Feffer

The North Korean government is caught in a double bind on market reforms. Either it implements modifications that critics dismiss as lukewarm or it introduces sweeping changes that threaten the social safety net and plunge the already poor into more abject poverty. [99 ]

In the first case, Pyongyang is guilty of perpetuating injustice by not properly fixing a broken system; in the second, it shows callous disregard for those who can’t command market access in order to purchase food. Viewed another way, the current DPRK system appears to be experiencing the worst of both worlds: capitalism without proper regulation, and socialism without egalitarian distribution.

This dilemma poses a peculiar challenge for any transitional economy that hasn’t experienced political transformation: how to change enough to satisfy outsiders (investors, economists, international financial institutions) without undermining the source of domestic legitimacy (a more-or-less egalitarian social contract).

There is an analytical challenge as well. When a government is the sole guarantor of food security, any and all failures to uphold the right to food can be placed at its door. In the current, more complex situation in North Korea, the emerging market and Pyongyang’s ongoing reform project must both be taken into consideration when evaluating the relationship between food policy and human rights.

Governments can be accused of human rights violations. On the other hand, it is rarely considered a human rights violation for a market economy to disburse its rewards inequitably. According to the laissez-faire model, political leaders are not obligated to intervene in the economy for the purpose of redistribution; indeed, they are practically enjoined from doing so.

The UN’s Human Development Report 2000, however, suggests that each government has a responsibility to work with markets and other mechanisms to lift its citizens out of poverty and that citizens should hold their political leaders accountable to this task. [100] If a country is cautiously nurturing a market economy, can we evaluate its effort in terms of strengthening or weakening the right to food without falling into judgments about what governments should and should not do with respect to the economy?

Let’s first look at Pyongyang’s reform package in the agricultural sector. The government has engaged in a number of attempts to improve agricultural efficiency: double-cropping, introducing a wider variety of crops such as potatoes and broadening the range of livestock with chickens and goats, consolidating agricultural lands for greater efficiency, bringing underutilized land under cultivation, and exploring new seed varieties, nontraditional fertilizers, integrated pest management, and even organic production. [101]

Some of the changes introduced since the mid-1990s have been de facto responses to altered circumstances, such as a greater reliance on manual labor to substitute for a lack of mechanized tools. Other changes have related to the structure of production, such as reducing the size of work teams and allowing more flexibility over the dispensation of products from private plots. In the past five years, local farm managers have been given broader autonomy to determine what crops each farm should grow and where the surplus will be sold. [102]

This decentralization of control has taken place within the context of expanding private markets that have both stimulated and absorbed surplus production. During the 1990s, the market became a key source of food for the population, as even the North Korean government admitted in its 2004 nutrition survey. [103] It is estimated that 60-70% of the population now trades part-time or full-time on the market. [104] What had been liberalization on the margins has crept closer to the center, as market relations – and market prices – increasingly shape agricultural transactions in the DPRK. Pyongyang has not wholeheartedly supported these developments at all times, however. During the food crisis, for instance, much of the market expansion was technically illegal, and this resulted in considerable corruption and police shakedowns that continue today. [105]

Still, these top-down reforms and the encouragement (or at least the toleration) of bottom-up marketization suggest that the DPRK leaders are seriously casting about for ways to fix the systemic problems that accelerated the food crisis in the early 1990s. These various reforms have led to a moderate improvement in agricultural production as 2005 yields returned to the levels of the early 1990s. By expending considerable effort to revive the agricultural sector, Pyongyang has upheld development as a human right, though outsiders might disagree about the proper proportion that government and market should play in the reform process.

If the market is increasingly influential in North Korea, how can we understand charges that food aid has been diverted to the new private sector? Critics point to photos and video footage of bags of international aid on sale in private markets throughout the DPRK. Although others respond that sturdy bags – a rare commodity in the country – are reused and that the bags in the photos are usually open, there is considerable anecdotal evidence that aid indeed shows up in the market, as people barter their food for other needed items. [106] But the question remains: if food ends up in the marketplace, is it being diverted? And if it does qualify as diversion, should it be discouraged?

Economist Ruediger Frank is blunt: diversion of food to the market should be praised, not condemned, for it contributes to change in North Korea and is more effective than any planned attempts to reform the country. [107] Aid, he further contends, has a multiplier effect if it is monetized in its circulation through the economy. [108] Andrew Natsios holds a similar view: “International food aid has stimulated private markets, reduced the price of food in the markets 25-35%, and undermined central government propaganda concerning South Korea and the United States.” [109]

Moreover, the diversion does not apply simply to external aid. Pyongyang’s own reforms stimulated a form of diversion as farmers underreported their yields in order to hold back more food to sell on the market. [110] It is even common for humanitarian relief to support markets. [111] But in the DPRK, individual citizens, not humanitarian agencies, bought and sold aid on the market. Regarding this practice, Marcus Noland raises an important objection. If food aid trickles down through the economy and doesn’t reach those without purchasing power in the market, the result is “suboptimal”. [112] Absent policies to compensate the new class of market shutouts, this result reinforces the polarization of wealth inside a country.

The North Korean government has not fully embraced a laissez-faire philosophy, however. In September 2005, Pyongyang announced that it would no longer permit the sale of grains in the private markets, and it resuscitated the public distribution system (PDS) to replace the grain market. There are numerous explanations behind this revival of the PDS: a response to economic polarization, an attempt to combat rising inflation, or a method of reversing absenteeism (since many workers receive food at their workplaces).

But what if this resurrection of the PDS is, as Haggard and Noland maintain, “being used as a tool of control, with favored state employees provided with enhanced access to food in preference to the vulnerable populations targeted by the WFP?” [113] In a volatile and murky market economy, it can be difficult to distinguish between government interventions to correct market inequalities and those designed to reallocate resources for political reasons.

Two problems with subsidized food are the opportunity for arbitrage and the difficulty of ensuring that, as with food aid, the most vulnerable get what they need. There is no formal means of testing in the DPRK. However, given some of the most recent reports out of North Korea, the resumption of the PDS system has had various effects in different parts of the country, with some markets strictly controlled to prevent the sale of grain and others not controlled at all. [114]

The government attempt to revive the PDS has so far been unsuccessful. The World Food Program reported that as of November 2005, recipients were not getting the target ration of 500 grams. [115] PDS distributions in most areas, according to Good Friends, dwindled to nothing by the end of 2005 and had stopped in Pyongyang too by May 2006. [116] Moreover, rice is apparently sold from private homes and by way of middlemen known as doeguri.

Here again, political markers of status (ie, party affiliation) are gradually giving way to economic markers of status (possession of hard currency). Sometimes these markers overlap; often they do not. Those with little market power, however, are liable to slip through an already-flimsy social safety net. The new, smaller WFP development program can only target a portion of the individuals who lack market access.

Ultimately, though, whether the zig-zags of North Korea’s economic reforms reflect good or bad policy decisions, the point is that they are policy. In the main, Pyongyang’s changes do not appear to be designed to undercut the right to food. Most reforms have been intended to increase the amount of available food grown domestically, and the revival of the PDS attempted to address the problem of distribution.

Should North Korea direct state policy toward higher-value-added agricultural production coupled with increased imports of staples? Perhaps. That it hasn’t followed this oft-repeated advice, however, speaks more to its sovereign stubbornness – and its reluctance to jeopardize the one-third of its population living in the countryside – than to any deliberate abuse of human rights.

Part 4: A matter of policy
By John Feffer

Some have argued that Pyongyang’s broad-spectrum violation of human rights justifies a suspension of all efforts at engagement, including food aid, in favor of government isolation and destabilization.

Medecins Sans Frontieres researcher Fiona Terry wrote in The Guardian in 2001: “The purpose of humanitarian aid is to save lives. By channeling it through the regime responsible for the suffering, it has become part of the system of oppression.” [117] Others, including Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, advise the continuation of food aid but under altered conditions linked to “political change” in the country. [118] Those humanitarian organizations that still operate in North Korea – even as they shift to development as demanded recently by the North Korean government – have continued to favor some form of engagement and have avoided any discussion of sensitive topics related to internal political change.

The critical question is whether food policy – both within North Korea and toward it by outsiders – requires policy change or political change. The former position suggests that the current North Korean government should continue with some manner of economic reform, that the international community should not add contingencies to food assistance, and that the changes that occur in these spheres will be largely technocratic: a mechanism might be improved, a reform might be fine-tuned. This has generally been the approach taken by humanitarian organizations.

The latter position of advocating political change suggests that a more thoroughgoing transformation is required in North Korea to guarantee its citizens the right to food. Haggard and Noland argue that “only political change” can “guarantee a North Korea free from hunger”. [119] Moreover, they add, the lack of sufficient food is “directly” related to other human-rights violations, namely freedom of expression and freedom to organize. [120] If this latter position is taken, foreign governments might insist on attaching political conditions to economic assistance. North Korea, for instance, might not be able to secure substantial development assistance without first dismantling its prison-camp system.

Policy change might suggest internal linkages, such as tighter food-monitoring systems. Political change suggests external linkages, such as making economic assistance contingent on improvements in civil and political rights. Policy change involves negotiating civilly and respecting North Korean sovereignty; political change requires undermining that sovereignty.

The era of humanitarian aid to North Korea may well be over, given Pyongyang’s announcement late last year that it is now only soliciting development assistance and is asking all humanitarian organizations to leave the country. But the issue of policy change versus political change remains relevant. Many of the concerns around monitoring and transparency will inevitably carry over to the development era. Indeed, in this new phase, foreign donors will have much greater opportunities for influencing the course of reform, since contingencies can apply to more than simply monitoring or transparency. [121] Many of the criticisms regarding multilateral aid and NGO (non-governmental organization) assistance are already being applied to South Korean food aid, which, except for a brief period this year, continues to flow into the North. Calls for more thoroughgoing political change within North Korea have by no means disappeared; in some quarters they have intensified, particularly after the July missile launches.

External linkage has generally been successful in other contexts when foreign governments are working in conjunction with a domestic constituency pressing for political change from within. The classic case is the anti-apartheid movement’s coordination with the African National Congress to link economic trade to political change within South Africa. Other examples might include the US government’s destabilization of Chile in the early 1970s – undertaken with the support of the Chilean military and business class – or the current campaign against Myanmar’s military junta undertaken in collaboration with Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy.

However, external linkage in the absence of strong domestic support in the target country has not had much effect. This was the case with the Soviet Union in the 1970s and China in the 1990s. External linkage also faces the “cat-herding” problem. For example, Washington was unable to persuade US grain traders to submit to a coordinated policy toward the Soviet Union. Similarly, it will be difficult to persuade US corporations to accept limitations on trade with China in the case of the (yet to be introduced) Scoop Jackson National Security and Freedom Act of 2005, which would set limits on US trade with China, if Beijing doesn’t change its policy of returning refugees to North Korea. Moreover, it is very hard to support external linkages with respect to food assistance in light of humanitarian imperatives exemplified by the late US president Ronald Reagan’s dictum that a hungry child knows no politics.

This leaves internal linkages, such as improved development-project monitoring and fiscal transparency or training sessions for government officials and project managers. But has Chinese and South Korean bilateral aid weakened the case for such internal linkages? The amount of multilateral aid flowing to North Korea has declined significantly, from 900,000 tonnes in 2001 to 300,000 tonnes in 2005. [122] Bilateral assistance has grown as a proportion of overall aid during this period, but, tellingly, South Korean assistance has not increased in monetary value. “So how could South Korea’s stable bilateral and multilateral aid to North Korea since 2000-01 undermine the WFP’s negotiating leverage in 2005?” asks Brooking Institution scholar Wonhyuk Lim. [123] Meanwhile, Seoul has, like the United Nations’ World Food Program and NGOs before it, made an effort to ensure transparency and to engage in respectful negotiations with Pyongyang. As Dongguk University Professor Park Sun-song observes, South Korea has more influence on the Northern leadership, so the additional goodwill it accrues by providing bilateral assistance can theoretically be put to more efficient use. [124]

So should we conclude that linking food aid and human rights through some form of conditionality is counterproductive, even if food availability is to some degree reflective of the overall level of individual and collective freedoms in North Korean society? Social Science Research Council program director Alex de Waal entreats us to reconsider: “When famine prevention is recognized as a human right, and fought for using the sorts of political structures that exist when human rights are respected, then famine can be conquered. This is not to abandon humanitarianism, which can again be a force for ethical progress. But a humanitarianism that sets itself against or above politics is futile. Rather we should seek a form of politics that transforms humanitarianism.” [125] De Waal’s answer is not substantively different from the recommendation in the UN Human Development Report 2000: that the people enmeshed in a food crisis must mobilize and establish their own priorities in the policy sphere. This is an important point and must serve as an organizing principle in both humanitarian and human rights work, for it is an unfortunate failing of both approaches to treat target populations as victims and not actors in their own right. Both de Waal and the UN report agree that humanitarianism and a rights-based approach should not be set against one another.

At an official level, North Korea has numerous laws that respect the human rights of its citizens. However, at an operational level, it maintained laws, even during a food crisis, that substantially violated the rights of its citizens, whether related to freedom of movement or the freedom to engage in economic activities. At a functional level, though, citizens were able to overwhelm these laws by traveling in large numbers without passes and engaging in gray market activities. North Koreans, although they did not create independent political parties or independent media, carved out new and expanded civil realities under extremely adverse conditions. This third level, wherein North Koreans proved they could act as subjects and not simply objects, is frequently ignored in analyses of “real, existing” human rights in North Korea.

Sovereignty
Humanitarian workers are agents of change both internally and externally. They serve as informants about what is going on within North Korea as they debrief in both formal and informal settings when they return to their countries, potentially contributing to external policy change. When they introduce innovative ideas into North Korea, exposing officials and scientists and farm managers to new techniques and ways of organizing their tasks, aid workers contribute to changing the very environment in which they work.

To what degree these humanitarians cross the line and become instruments of their home country’s government is difficult to determine. But, as Dr Ruediger Frank argues, North Korea has certainly perceived many of these aid workers as suspect. [126] In other words, allowing humanitarian workers into the country doesn’t only challenge the country’s philosophy of juche or self-reliance; more important, it undermines Pyongyang’s sovereign power to introduce change at its own pace, since government loses its monopoly over the control of information.

North Korea’s perceptions concerning the politicization of humanitarianism have not been mere paranoia. US food aid, for instance, has always been integrated into political-change strategies that challenge the sovereign decision-making of other countries. Washington extended its first food aid to Venezuela after a natural disaster in 1823 to boost support for a US-friendly political party. Food aid to Europe after World War II – which spread to the Third World during the subsequent development era – was part of a larger strategy of consolidating an anti-communist front. The late US vice president Hubert Humphrey declared in an unguarded moment: “We have to look upon America’s food abundance not as a liability, but as a real asset … Wise statesmanship and leadership can convert these surpluses into a great asset for checking communist aggression.” [127] The Food for Peace program, meanwhile, was designed quite explicitly to create demand for US agricultural surpluses, stimulating a taste for dairy products or wheat or corn in countries that had never included such items in their diet.

Any notion that the short-term political considerations that once governed US food aid policy no longer apply today is a myth, according to scrutiny of Washington’s food aid policies toward Afghanistan, Iraq, and North Korea by analysts Christopher Barrett and Daniel Maxwell. [128] US government officials claim that aid to North Korea is purely humanitarian. But even as fierce a critic of North Korea as Action Contre la Faim has acknowledged that “US support seeks to make the North Korean regime heavily dependent on US aid while allowing the United States to increase its leverage with North Korea”. [129]

North Korea wants to eradicate precisely this type of leverage. The pursuit of its juche goal influences Pyongyang’s approach to energy sources (nuclear power reduces reliance on Chinese capacity and potential South Korean electricity). It also influences its approach to food aid. To rely on one single source – China, the World Food Program, the US Congress or South Korea – gives that sole source unacceptable leverage. For North Korea to be dependent on other countries for largesse – instead of what it views as a short-term infusion of capital to jump-start the rebuilding of its economy – is anathema.

North Korea’s move away from dependency on humanitarian aid is also pragmatic, given donor fatigue and pressing food crises elsewhere in the world. North Korea’s pragmatism and national-security concerns, however, are compromised by its weakness. This weakness has forced the country to fall back on a rather old-fashioned conception of state sovereignty, which it has asserted against both popular sovereignty and the forces of economic globalization and human-rights interventionism. On food matters, Pyongyang is forced into a position of choosing who will call the shots (the WFP, South Korea or China) rather than calling the shots itself. The few levers at its disposal – the resurrection of the Public Distribution System, the continuation of market reforms, or the rejection of external linkages – are relatively weak. To import food and go into further external debt only increases the weakness of the government.

This paucity of choices amounts to a sovereignty of the weak. Some countries are powerful enough systematically to disregard the decisions, democratic or autocratic, of other nation-states (eg, US policy toward Chile in 1973 and toward Serbia in the late 1990s). In this hegemonic “sovereignty of the strong”, powerful states assert the primacy of their sovereign powers not only within their own territories but even overseas (eg, the US opposition to the application of International Criminal Court jurisdiction over US troops in other countries). Meanwhile, mid-level powers often attempt to solicit the support of both the dominant and the weak to construct a sovereignty of international law to level the playing field with consistent rules and regulations. North Korea remains suspicious of the latter, perceiving, for instance, a hidden regime-change agenda lurking within international laws concerning human-rights standards. The dissembling behavior of overbearing nations and the weak and inconsistent application of standards by institutions of international law – which contribute to Stephen Krasner’s notion of sovereignty as “organized hypocrisy” [130] – help us understand North Korea’s decision to cling to the outdated Westphalian model.

The South Korean approach to engagement acknowledges the importance that North Korea accords to issues of sovereignty. Seoul’s decision formally to eschew the absorption path under Kim Dae-jung has necessarily led to a slow-motion reunification imagined to stretch over several decades. In this context, bilateral South Korean food aid is designed to help support the “progress of North-South relations”. [131] Given that anti-communism or boosting exports previously served as legitimate reasons for promoting food aid, South Koreans wonder why the promotion of unification can’t be an equally legitimate consideration. Seoul perceives concrete benefits from offering food aid, both short-term (progress in ongoing economic and political negotiations) and long-term (investing a smaller amount now to avoid much larger infusions to resuscitate a failed state later on). The issue is not whether food aid comes attached with strings, but rather which country gets to attach the strings and enjoy the political advantages that ensue. In other words, “who gets the take that accompanies the give” is the subject of important but largely unstated power struggles.

South Korea faces a paradox. As a long-term goal, its conception of North-South engagement would substantially reduce North Korean state sovereignty through a confederal or federal arrangement. In the interim, however, Seoul’s approach is reinforcing that same state sovereignty by strengthening the North Korean system. Pyongyang can enter the reunification process on a more or less equal footing only when the North-South gap in capabilities is narrowed. Yet from Seoul’s perspective, the narrowing of the gap requires strengthening North Korea’s central government, not simply maintaining it (and certainly not toppling it). Such strengthening translates, again in the short term, into a reassertion of Pyongyang’s sovereign control over its food system, from production to distribution, from import levels to technical reforms. South Korea’s strategy vis-a-vis popular sovereignty, a necessarily sensitive issue, is not altogether clear. Greater people-to-people contact might well encourage the seeds of civil society in the North. But Seoul continues to recognize and interact with Pyongyang as the primary interlocutor and locus of power.

South Korea’s approach to North Korean sovereignty also runs counter to a brand of humanitarianism currently in vogue. When neutrality was a universally recognized value for international NGOs, the Red Cross won the Nobel Peace Prize (in 1944 and 1963). But as Michael Schloms points out, Medecins Sans Frontieres won the award in 1999 for quite the opposite reason. “The main characteristic of this new generation of humanitarianism,” Schloms writes, “is the disrespect of sovereignty.” [132]

This divergence within the humanitarian movement mirrors the two main geopolitical approaches to resolving the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula: negotiating with Pyongyang (acknowledging its sovereignty) versus seeking regime change (undermining the state’s sovereignty in favor of an imagined popular sovereignty). South Korea’s policy on supplying food (or food-related development assistance) necessarily navigates between the shoals of humanitarianism and geopolitics, between supportive and dismissive positions on state sovereignty.

Conclusion
We are left with two difficult questions. Does the human-rights framework help us understand the origins of and domestic responses to North Korea’s famine? And how can the international community best assist North Koreans to improve their overall access to food?

Regarding the first question, the human-rights framework did little to help us understand the sources of the famine, for it introduced the notion of deliberate malice in what can be understood as a combination of policy errors and natural disasters. Few would argue that the US government’s response to the Hurricane Katrina disaster was a human-rights violation rather than a set of bad policies. The structural racism of US society that ensured that the hurricane would have disproportionate effects on whites and blacks in New Orleans, Louisiana, can be compared to the structural inequalities in North Korean society (based on inherited privilege or on differential access to the emerging market). Government policies should be designed to mitigate those structural inequalities. Government policies that don’t are bad policies but not human-rights violations. So, too, does the human-rights framework prove inadequate when understanding the relationship between market reforms and the right to food, at least as it relates specifically to the North Korean context (unless one advocates the broader argument that free markets systematically deprive people worldwide of human rights).

In explaining Pyongyang’s response to the famine, the human-rights framework proves useful in some respects and not in others. While diversion and triage have proved to be largely non-issues – at least in terms of human-rights violations – the human-rights framework is useful for understanding the relationship between, for instance, the right of movement and the worsening of famine conditions. Such a framework is also helpful in highlighting the empowerment of the North Korean people as the rightful center of humanitarian policy. As such, food aid is not an apolitical enterprise. It can and should strengthen more than simply the right to food. But should it strengthen the larger bundle of human rights explicitly or implicitly?

This leads us to the second question. External linkages, which challenge North Korea’s sovereign right to design and implement policy within its borders, are not likely to improve its citizens’ access to food substantially. The North Korean leadership will resist externally induced change, less food will enter the country as a result, and the policy of external linkage will backfire.

It might be argued that the tide of history has turned against Pyongyang’s interpretation of sovereignty, so countries frustrated with this outmoded approach should intensify their pressure until North Korea ultimately buckles. By this logic, instead of providing a Band-Aid of food relief, the international community should pressure Pyongyang to change its system to conform to the recommendations of economists and the political observations of Amartya Sen. However, external pressures have not led to a change in North Korea’s regime, despite many expectations to the contrary. Indeed, as the case of Cuba suggests, external policies that too explicitly challenge state sovereignty help to reinforce government stability by allowing the leadership to employ nationalism to rally popular support (or at least to deflect public dissatisfaction). Even if external linkages were to lead to regime collapse, a great many people might slip backward into famine for an unknown period of time. In other words, even if external linkage successfully attains its interim objective (regime change), it may fail miserably at meeting its overall goal (feeding the hungry).

Internal linkages that acknowledge North Korean sovereignty, whether proposed by international actors or countries in the region, stand a better chance of not only increasing access to food but also incrementally expanding the social space that North Koreans have courageously carved out for themselves. Such internal linkages – better monitoring and targeting, training sessions for North Korean officials – have a track record of improving access to food in the country; the impact of external linkages remains hypothetical. Such internal linkages, to be successful, ideally occur in an atmosphere of political rapprochement. Only then will the larger human-rights framework – political/civil as well as economic/social rights – be on the negotiating agenda with Pyongyang.

Paradoxically perhaps, recognizing state sovereignty may also create more opportunities for popular sovereignty to take root. When the North Korean state can incrementally relax its grip on the population – because engagement policies have allayed the leadership’s anxieties over the country’s weakened sovereignty – social and economic liberalization can proceed. It is at this intriguing juncture that engagement policies and human-rights advocacy intersect in many interesting and still-uncharted ways.

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Australia, Japan roll out curbs on Pyongyang

Tuesday, September 19th, 2006

Joong Ang Daily
Ser Myo-ja, Lee Sang-il
9/20/2006

Japan and Australia yesterday announced new sanctions against North Korea in another sign of increased financial pressure on the communist state, which has declared it possesses nuclear arms.

The announced purpose of the sanctions was to push Pyongyang back to six-party talks in Beijing to disarm the country in return for diplomatic recognition and financial aid.

In Washington, U.S. officials also signaled that additional sanctions against the North may be in store.

In Tokyo, the cabinet approved a partial freeze on North Korean assets in Japan, imposing restrictions on 15 North Korean agencies or companies and one individual.

“This shows the resolve of the international community and Japan,” said Shinzo Abe, the chief cabinet secretary and heir-apparent to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi.

The restrictions on financial transactions were directed, Tokyo said, at figures related to North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs.

After North Korea test-launched a barrage of missiles in early July, Tokyo barred the entry of a North Korean ship to its ports for six months and forbade the entry of North Korean government officials into Japan.

Australia, one of the few Western countries that had diplomatic relations with North Korea, acted the same day, imposing similar bans on financial transactions by people and companies it said were involved in North Korean arms programs.

Foreign Minister Alexander Downer told the press, “This supports and complements similar action taken by Japan today and previous actions taken by the United States, and sends a strong message to North Korea.”

In Washington, a State Department official told Korean journalists in a background briefing that the United States might reimpose sanctions lifted after an accord in 1994, which temporarily reduced tensions over the North’s nuclear programs. He said a proposal to restore the sanctions existing before 1994 was being studied. The relaxation was modest; U.S. companies were allowed to offer telephone service to North Korea and import some raw materials.

In Seoul, Song Min-soon, the Blue House senior security advisor, reacted cautiously to the announcements, saying it would be “inappropriate” to comment on sanctions imposed by other governments. He said the matter was one for capitals to decide, based on a United Nations Security Council resolution critical of North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs and those nations’ own laws.

Separately, Beijing rebuffed a U.S. invitation to a meeting Thursday of financial ministers in New York to discuss North Korea.

From the BBC:
New sanctions target North Korea

Japan and Australia have announced new financial sanctions against North Korea, stepping up pressure on the secretive state over missile tests.

The sanctions will freeze the transfer of money to North Korea by groups suspected of having links to its nuclear or missile programmes.

The move, which follows similar action by the US, comes after Pyongyang launched several missiles in July.

South Korea has urged other countries not to push the North into a corner.

The South is worried that the North may retaliate by carrying out a nuclear test, which would destroy any remaining hope of a diplomatic solution to the stand-off.

Japanese government spokesman Shinzo Abe said the new sanctions were in line with a United Nations resolution which denounced the missile tests.

The Japanese measures affect 15 groups and one individual, and will come into effect later on Tuesday, according to Japanese media.

The Australian measures applied to 12 companies and one person, according to Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, who said the sanctions were “consistent with our strong international stand against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”

Media reports said the two lists were almost identical.

Tough stance

North Korea’s decision to test-fire seven missiles in July – including a long-range Taepodong-2 which is believed to be capable of reaching Alaska – angered the international community.

A UN resolution demanded that North Korea suspend its ballistic missile programme, and barred all UN member states from supplying North Korea with material related to missiles or weapons of mass destruction.

In the immediate aftermath, Japan imposed limited sanctions, including a decision to ban a North Korean trade ferry from Japanese ports and a moratorium on charter flights from Pyongyang.

The new measures also called for closer scrutiny of those wanting to send money or transfer financial assets to North Korea.

“By taking these measures, we have demonstrated the resolve of the international community and Japan,” said Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe.

“I do not know how North Korea will respond, but I hope North Korea will accept the UN Security Council resolution in a sincere manner.”

The BBC correspondent in Tokyo, Chris Hogg, says there is still some doubt about how effective these sanctions will be.

Although Japan looks to be clamping down on North Korea, other countries that exert a strong influence on the country – notably China and South Korea – are reluctant to impose similar measures.

Following the Japanese announcement, China restated its opposition to sanctions and called for further dialogue.

Nuclear fears

In addition to fears over North Korea’s missile programmes, the international community is also worried about its nuclear intentions.

The United States, China, Japan, Russia and South Korea have repeatedly tried to persuade the North to abandon its nuclear programme.

But the so-called six-party talks have been on hold since November 2005, because North Korea refuses to attend until Washington lifted economic restrictions against it.

Exactly a year ago, North Korea agreed in principle to give up its nuclear weapons programme in return for economic help and security guarantees.

The move was greeted by surprise and relief, but a joint statement issued at the time failed to bridge the wide gulf between North Korea and the US. One year on, the North remains as isolated as ever.

The region remains on alert in case Pyongyang decides to follow up on the July ballistic missile tests with a nuclear test.

Analysts say the North has enough plutonium for several bombs, but has yet to prove it can build a reliable weapon.

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DPRK moves accounts to Russia

Sunday, September 3rd, 2006

From AFX News on Yahoo:
9/3/2006
NKorea opens bank accounts in Russia to dodge US sanctions – report

TOKYO (XFN-ASIA) – North Korea has opened about 10 bank accounts at Russian financial institutions in an effort to secure fund flows now blocked by US financial sanctions, the Sankei Shimbun here reported at the weekend.

The newspaper, quoting sources who it described as being close to North Korean affairs, said senior North Korean officials were transferring their funds through the accounts.

Thi is part of Pyongyang’s efforts to escape pressure from the US, which has moved to freeze North Korean funds it claims are the profits of drug trafficking, money laundering and other illegal activities.

Washington is aware of North Korea’s money flows through the Russian banks and it may step up pressure on the Russian authorities to abandon such support for North Korea, the newspaper said.

North Korea has warned the United States it will take ‘all necessary counter-measures’ against Washington for increasing the the pressure on North Korea through financial sanctions.

In November, Pyongyang walked out of six-way talks on its nuclear ambitions after Washington accused a Macau-based bank of helping Pyongyang launder earnings from fake US currency, and told US financial institutions to stop dealing with the bank.

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Koryo Asia to Buy U.S.-Sanctioned North Korean Bank (Update2)

Friday, September 1st, 2006

Bloomberg
Bradley K. Martin

Koryo Asia Ltd., a London-based financial adviser, said it will buy North Korea’s Daedong Credit Bank for an undisclosed amount and lobby the U.S. to lift sanctions on the foreign-run bank.

Daedong Credit is among North Korean banks whose accounts in Macau’s Banco Delta Asia SARL have been frozen since September 2005 after the U.S. Treasury Department alleged Banco Delta laundered money from North Korea and worked with front companies trafficking drugs for the communist state. The Macau government has taken control of the bank.

The value of Daedong Credit “would be enhanced if we can resolve the sanctions issue with the U.S.,” Koryo Asia chairman Colin McAskill said in an e-mail interview. Koryo Asia is adviser to London-based Chosun Development & Investment Fund LP, which aims to raise $50 million for investments in North Korea.

North Korea has demanded removal of the financial sanctions before it will return to six-nation talks to prevent the country from developing nuclear weapons. The U.S. and China urged North Korea to resume the talks that include South Korea, Russia and Japan, after the country in July tested a missile that may have the capability to reach the U.S.

Daedong Credit’s general manager Nigel Cowie confirmed the sale and that he would stay on. He declined further comment. Cowie said in an interview last year that the bank’s assets –including those frozen in Macau — totaled around $10 million.

A former HSBC Holding Plc banker, Cowie was hired in the mid- 1990s by Peregrine Investment Holdings Ltd. to start the bank. Following Peregrine’s 1998 collapse, Cowie and three other investors bought the 70 percent foreign stake from the liquidator in 2000.

Transparent

Koryo Asia signed an agreement to buy the majority share in Daedong through a wholly owned subsidiary that McAskill, 65, did not name. The majority shareholders had approached Koryo Asia to propose the sale, he said.

McAskill said he won’t take a direct management role in the bank, instead serving as a consultant to persuade U.S. officials to release as much as $7 million of Daedong’s and its customers’ assets in Macau. The total of frozen North Korean bank assets in Macau is about $24 million.

McAskill’s argument that Daedong Credit Bank serves only foreign, not North Korean, customers and that its transactions are legal and transparent may not win an audience at the U.S. Treasury Department.

“Given the regime’s counterfeiting of U.S. currency, narcotics trafficking and use of accounts worldwide to conduct proliferation-related transactions, the line between illicit and licit North Korean money is nearly invisible,” Stuart Levey, Treasury’s undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, said last month.

Asked if the purchase of Daedong Credit Bank is a big gamble, McAskill said, “Not a gamble — a gambit.”

He said his strategy is to demonstrate that Levey’s blanket condemnation of all North Korea-related finance is counter to U.S. interests.

Exempting Daedong on its merits from the sanctions would bring a potentially big payoff, he said, “an atmosphere in which Kim Jong-il can consider a return to the six-party talks.”

Anselmo Teng, chairman of the Macau Monetary Authority, didn’t immediately return a phone call and e-mail to his office seeking comment on the sale and any impact the ownership change may have on the status of Daedong’s Banco Delta Asia accounts.

Korean Investment

McAskill said the Chosun Development & Investment Fund LP aims to raise funds for “transaction-based” investments, such as procuring mining equipment and receiving mine output in return.

“We believe we will fully subscribe the fund from investors in Europe, Asia, the People’s Republic of China and possibly South Korea,” he said. “Global investor interest in this potential emerging market was not affected by the missile launches in July,” he said, without giving details.

Taking over the bank “gives us a legitimate foothold and provides a conduit for investment in the country, whether through Chosun Fund or other sources,” McAskill said. “In the long term, the goal is to facilitate the resuscitation of the legitimate economy.”

Chosun Fund, managed by London-based Anglo-Sino Capital Partners Limited, is denominated in U.S. dollars. If the sanctions issue cannot be resolved, the fund has the option to switch to denomination in euros or pounds sterling, McAskill said.

“There’s no point in taking in U.S. funds if the United States is going to try and block them,” he said.

Room 39

The minority owner of Daedong Credit is Korea Daesong Bank, a unit of North Korea’s Daesong Group.

A 1995 U.S. government study cited close ties between Daesong and Room 39, an office of the ruling North Korean Workers’ Party said to handle foreign exchange-gathering projects for the country’s leader.

McAskill said the minority owner does not run the bank. Daedong is “not only majority foreign-owned and foreign- controlled but also foreign-managed,” he said, adding he was given access to all of Daedong’s activities and concluded it’s a legitimate business.

Only North Korean-owned banks can do business with state enterprises and North Korean individuals, Cowie said last year, so Daedong’s customers are all foreign — mostly Chinese, Japanese and Western individuals and institutions.

As of Aug. 17, that had not convinced Levey at the U.S. Treasury.

“The U.S. continues to encourage financial institutions to carefully assess the risk of holding any North Korea-related accounts,” he said.

The undersecretary traveled in Asia in July to push that line, which resulted in the closure of some North Korean banks’ accounts in Vietnam.

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DPRK inflation on the increase

Tuesday, August 1st, 2006

from the Daily NK:

Recently, concerns mounted that a counterfeit $100 “supernote” was being used as “official currency” between North Korean traders.

For a while, the supernote was used in areas of China in common trade and drug smuggling. The counterfeit money began circulating in Jangmadang and then North Korean markets, as “unofficial forms of trade”.

As of early this year, the supernote circulated amongst North Korean common traders was valued at $70, and by June, had spread throughout the whole nation. It appears that the counterfeit money is being accepted as “income currency”.

This information was obtained by North Korean and Chinese tradesmen residing both in and outside of North Korea.

On July 26th, Park Chul Woong (pseudonym, 34), a Korean-Chinese merchant in Dandong, China said “It has been a while since counterfeit money has been used as a form of transaction in North Korea. Now, tradesmen use the supernote amongst themselves to do business”.

Park said “Even if you make a small deal of $1,000, this still equates to 600 sheets of North Korean 5,000 won notes. (The largest North Korean bill) As people do not want to carry this amount of money with them, merchants use the counterfeit money instead”.

Also, Park said “Merchants do not deal with North Korean currency as they do not trust it. When inflation rises rapidly as in 2002, merchants sit around and discuss how the money has no value. However, there is nothing you cannot do with the dollar. As the dollar is scarce, merchants have resorted to using fakes.”

The traders complain that the North Korean currency has lost its value so much, that if they were to use the money for trade at markets they would have to carry numerous bags of it. They also said “Every day the market price fluctuates dramatically. The more you trade with North Korean money, the greater the loss.”

No control of counterfeit money
 
Last May, Kim Young Man (pseudonym, 38), a Korean-Chinese who went to Shinuiju for an Investment Conference, said “North Korea is unhestitantly using the counterfeit $100 note as real $70. It is of concern as to how far they will take this.”

He said “Even business employees of the National Security Office or the Department of the People’s Armed Forces General Logistics Bureau use counterfeit when paying Chinese tradesman for products such as seafood and hand-made goods. If North Korean authorities discover that counterfeit money is circulating in North Korea on such a large scale, chaos could ensue.”

Also, he said “Merchants generally carry dollars. Rich merchants store their real currency in safekeeping and use counterfeit money for “exchange”. He continued, “Although the whole world has eradicated counterfeit money, North Korea is still far behind”.

At Dandong’s economic development zone, a Chinese tradesman said “The U.S. alleges that it will eradicate the counterfeit money, but there has been little change. The value of the counterfeit money at $70 is not depreciating”.

On the one hand, tradesmen say “Apart from the supernotes manufactured by North Korean authorities, computer-made supernotes have been discovered and rejected as a means of business.”

At present, it is difficult to estimate how much counterfeit money is circulating around North Korea. However, if the counterfeit money is accepted amongst common traders at Jangmadang, this means that the counterfeit currency has reached a large scale and is spreading further.

This substantiates the failure of the North Korean authority’s implementation of foreign transaction of the Euro in December, 2002.

Last July, at the Interpol Conference on counterfeit money in Riom, France, North Korea was marked as “a hotbed of counterfeit money”. It is expected that the U.S. will take drastic measures to control the counterfeit dollars circulating throughout North Korea as official currency.

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China freezes DPRK bank accounts I

Monday, July 24th, 2006

This is big news.  The Bank of China has frozen DPRK-owned bank accoounts for one of two reasons:

1.  The Bank of China plans to list on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), as a result, it has to comply with western regulations and concerns…making its role as the new faciltator of DPRK monetary transactions more difficult to accept.  

2.  The Chinese now suspect the DPRK of counterfeiting the Chinese Yuan.

I am not sure of the real reason just yet.  Anyway, here is the coverage in the South Korean press: 

From the Joong Ang Daily:

Bank of China freezes North’s money accounts
Lawmaker, citing U.S. official, blames counterfeiting concerns
by Brian Lee 

The state-run Bank of China has frozen its North Korean bank accounts due to concerns over counterfeit money, a Grand National Party lawmaker claimed yesterday.

Lawmaker Park Jin said his information came from a former senior U.S. government official of the Bush administration, who served at the White House.

Nevertheless, an official with the Foreign Ministry said yesterday that there was no information in regard to Mr. Park’s claim while the Chinese Embassy to Seoul said it was not in a position to comment.

Mr. Park visited in Washington recently with ruling and opposition lawmakers.

The lawmaker said that after Washington initiated an operation called “Smoking Dragon” in September of last year, which was designed to target North Korean counterfeit activities, a Macao-based bank was put under financial sanctions and North Korea moved its bank accounts to China in response.

Mr. Park said the former official told him that continuing probes by Washington led to the measure taken by the Chinese bank.

Mr. Park said yesterday that the Chinese bank was opting to list its stock at the New York Stock Exchange and was told it had little choice but to freeze the accounts.

The lawmaker said he didn’t know the exact timing of when the Chinese bank had frozen the North Korean accounts but speculated that a recent rift between Beijing and Pyongyang was due in part to that incident.

China agreed to a UN resolution passed earlier this month that was drafted in response to North Korea’s missile launch, which occurred despite Beijing’s efforts to stop it.

Mr. Park asserted that Pyongyang is also forging Chinese yuan currency. However, Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok who was asked about it yesterday at a briefing to the National Assembly’s Unification, Foreign Affairs and Trade Committee, said Seoul had no information one way or the other about the forging.

From the Korea Times:

China freezes N.K. accounts: lawmaker
By Lee Joo-hee

A South Korean lawmaker yesterday claimed that the Bank of China froze its North Korean accounts in relation to the alleged counterfeiting activities of the communist regime.

Citing former and incumbent Washington officials, Grand National Party lawmaker Park Jin said the latest move by China was connected with the United States’ financial measures against North Korea’s counterfeiting and laundering of money.

“This is a virtual ban against dealing with North Korea by China, leaving North Korea all the more devastated,” Park said. Park was in Washington to attend a seminar that started on July 15.

Last September, the U.S. Treasury Department cautioned American banks from dealing with Banco-Delta Asia, a Macau-based bank, which allegedly helped circulate North Korea’s counterfeit U.S. dollars.

The measure eventually forced the Macau bank to freeze the North Korean accounts, which amounted to $24 million.

North Korea immediately protested the move and has since boycotted the six-party talks.

“According to U.S. officials, although the $24 million may not appear to be a large sum, North Korea is sensitive to this issue because most of the funds are used for bribery and purchases of weapon components,” Park said.

Park said that following the freeze of BDA, the U.S. Treasury Department trained their radars onto other banks in Macau. North Korea has moved its accounts into banks in China since, he said.

Washington is currently evaluating the data from BDA for proof that North Korea counterfeited U.S. dollars.

North Korea is apparently concerned that the BDA measure could also affect some $200 million to $300 million accounts that are scattered in Singapore, Austria, Switzerland and Russia.

In yesterday’s parliamentary session, Park questioned Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok over North Korea’s counterfeit currency.

Park contended that North Korea was also counterfeiting Chinese yuan, but Lee responded that he did not have any specific information about it.

Reports in Tokyo yesterday said Japan was contemplating revising foreign exchange and trade laws, as part of its additional sanctions on North Korea over its missile launches.

The revisions are likely to require about 300 Japanese-based companies with business ties with North Korea to suspend exports of about 40 materials to destinations that are believed to be linked to the North’s missile program, the Yomiuiri newspaper reported.

It will require the companies to report to the Trade Ministry the details of their exports of targeted materials, including large trucks, titanium alloys and carbon fiber, the Yomiuri said.

Japan is also considering banning cash remittances and freezing North Korean assets in the country.

From Yonhap:

Chinese bank said to freeze N.K. accounts for currency counterfeiting

North Korea is suspected of having printed fake Chinese currency, which prompted the Bank of China (BOC) to freeze all of its North Korean accounts in an apparent retaliation, a South Korean legislator asserted on Monday.

Quoting a number of unidentified U.S. officials, Rep. Park Jin of the main opposition Grand National Party (GNP) said the freezing of North Korean accounts at the BOC is tantamount to virtual imposition of sanctions by Beijing on the North.

“I understand the North is even more frustrated because this means China is in fact imposing sanctions on North Korea,” the opposition lawmaker told Yonhap News Agency in a telephone interview.

Park has just returned to the country after a three-day trip to Washington along with 12 other ruling and opposition party legislators.

The GNP lawmaker claimed Washington may have been aware of the Chinese bank’s move as early as late last year when its Treasury Department imposed sanctions on a Macau bank suspected of circulating counterfeit U.S. dollars printed in the North.

“I suspect (the United States) did not announce the part related to China considering the sensitivity of the issue,” Park said.

He later claimed Beijing may be working with Washington to crack down on Pyongyang’s alleged counterfeiting of Chinese yuan.

“Following U.S. dollars, North Korea is also counterfeiting China’s currency, the yuan,” Park said during a meeting of the National Assembly Unification, Foreign Affairs and Trade Committee.

The claim, if found true, is expected to further complicate the stalled negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program as the United States has been looking to China to convince the North to return to the multilateral talks.

Pyongyang has been staying away from the talks since November, shortly after Washington imposed sanctions on the Macau bank, Banco Delta Asia.

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DPRK super notes are of super quality

Saturday, July 22nd, 2006

From the New York Times (via NK Zone):

The counterfeits were nearly flawless. They featured the same high-tech color-shifting ink as genuine American bills and were printed on paper with the same precise composition of fibers. The engraved images were, if anything, finer than those produced by the United States Bureau of Engraving and Printing. Only when subjected to sophisticated forensic analysis could the bills be confirmed as imitations.

Counterfeits of this superior sort — known as supernotes — had been detected by law-enforcement officials before, elsewhere in the world, but the Newark shipment marked their first known appearance in the United States, at least in such large quantities. Federal agents soon seized more shipments. Three million dollars’ worth arrived on another ship in Newark two months later; and supernotes began showing up on the West Coast too, starting with a shipment of $700,000 that arrived by boat in Long Beach, Calif., in May 2005, sealed in plastic packages and wrapped mummy-style in bolts of cloth.

In the weeks and months that followed, federal investigators rounded up a handful of counterfeiting suspects in a series of operations code-named Royal Charm and Smoking Dragon. This past August, in the wake of the arrests, Justice Department officials unsealed indictments in New Jersey and California that revealed that the counterfeits were purchased and then seized as part of an operation that ensnared several individuals accused of being smugglers and arms traffickers, some of whom were suspected of having connections to international crime rings based in Southeast Asia.

The arrests also prompted a more momentous accusation. After the indictments were released, U.S. government and law-enforcement officials began to say in public something that they had long said in private: the counterfeits were being manufactured not by small-time crooks or even sophisticated criminal cartels but by the government of North Korea. “The North Koreans have denied that they are engaged in the distribution and manufacture of counterfeits, but the evidence is overwhelming that they are,” Daniel Glaser, deputy assistant secretary for terrorist financing and financial crimes in the Treasury Department, told me recently. “There’s no question of North Korea’s involvement.”

Last September, the Treasury Department took action to signal its displeasure. The department announced that it was designating Banco Delta Asia, a bank in Macao with close ties to North Korea, a “primary money-laundering concern,” a declaration that ultimately led to the shutting down of the bank and the freezing of several key overseas accounts belonging to members of North Korea’s ruling elite. In a public statement, Treasury officials accused Banco Delta Asia of facilitating North Korea’s illicit activities by, among other things, accepting “large deposits of cash” from North Korea, “including counterfeit U.S. currency, and agreeing to place that currency into circulation.”

The counterfeiting of American currency by North Korea might seem, to some, to be a minor provocation by that country’s standards. North Korea, after all, has exported missile technology in blatant disregard of international norms; engaged in a decades-long campaign of kidnapping citizens of other countries; abandoned pledges not to pursue nuclear weapons; and most recently, on July 4, launched ballistic missiles in defiance of warnings from several countries, including the United States.

But several current and former Bush administration officials whom I spoke with several months ago maintain that the counterfeiting is in important ways a comparable outrage. Michael Green, a former point man for Asia on the National Security Council, told me that in the past, counterfeiting has been seen as an “act of war.” A current senior administration official, who was granted anonymity because of the sensitivity of relations between the United States and North Korea, agreed that the counterfeiting could be construed by some as a hostile act against another nation under international law and added that the counterfeits, by creating mistrust in the American currency, posed a “threat to the American people.”

Whether counterfeiting constitutes an economic threat, the issue of North Korean counterfeiting is aggravating diplomatic relations between the two countries. According to some analysts, the freezing of North Korea’s bank accounts helps explain the regime’s decision to launch its missiles on July 4. Bill Richardson, the governor of New Mexico and a former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, visited North Korea last fall, not long after the Treasury Department’s crackdown. When I spoke with him in mid-July, he said that the missile launch was in part a protest of the department’s actions. “When I was in Pyongyang in October,” he said, “my interlocutor raised the counterfeiting issue and the freezing of the assets as a major irritant for the government.” He continued, “The counterfeiting issue, and the crackdown on Banco Delta Asia, is a major factor which is contributing to Kim Jong Il’s posturing.”

How much of a concern should the counterfeiting be? Is it worth adding the issue to an already volatile diplomatic situation? The current South Korean government, which has made détente with North Korea a centerpiece of its foreign policy, has shied away from an open confrontation with the regime over the issue. Even many American law-enforcement officials who are upset that North Korea is counterfeiting nonetheless question the view that the counterfeiting poses an urgent threat. In Congressional testimony delivered in April, Michael Merritt, deputy assistant director of investigations for the Secret Service, which is responsible for protecting the nation’s currency from counterfeiters, said that the supernote was “unlikely to adversely impact the U.S. economy based on the comparatively low volume of notes passed.”

The Bush administration, though, is taking a hard line. In response to a question after a speech in Philadelphia in December, President Bush himself suggested that counterfeiting is among the regime’s gravest affronts. “North Korea’s a country that has declared boldly they’ve got nuclear weapons,” he said. “They counterfeit our money. And they’re starving their people to death.”

Funny Money

In December 1989, while counting a stack of $100 bills, an experienced money handler in the Central Bank of the Philippines became suspicious about one bill in particular. It passed the usual tests for authenticity but still felt a bit odd. The bill eventually found its way to the offices of the United States Secret Service. All counterfeits sent to the Secret Service headquarters, in Washington, are examined under a microscope, scrutinized in ultraviolet light and otherwise dissected to reveal their flaws and shortcomings, as well as the printing techniques used in their manufacture. This information is then cross-checked with a database of all known counterfeits.

As the mystery note underwent the usual scrutiny, it became apparent that this was no ordinary counterfeit. For starters, it was printed on paper made with the appropriate mix of three-quarters cotton and one-quarter linen of real U.S. currency. Making secure paper with this mix requires a special paper-making machine rarely seen outside the United States.

In addition, the note was manufactured using an intaglio press, the most advanced form of currency-printing technology available. These intaglio presses are far more expensive than ordinary offset, typographic or lithograhic presses, which yield inferior counterfeits. An intaglio press coats the printing plates with ink, and then wipes the surface clean, leaving behind ink in the recesses of the engraving. The press then brings paper and plate together under pressure, so that the ink is forced out of the recessed lines and deposited on the paper in relief. While counterfeits made using the intaglio process had been seen on rare occasions before, this note surpassed all of them in the quality of the engraving.

As with other new species of counterfeits arriving in the offices of the Secret Service, the bill was given its own flat-file drawer and christened with a sequential number: C-14342. In time, its remarkable quality earned it its more informal honorific: the supernote. But as soon became clear, the supernote was merely one member of a family of counterfeit notes. Technicians at the Secret Service soon linked it to another intaglio note detected around the same time, C-14403. This counterfeit had a few defects that the note from the Philippines did not, suggesting it was manufactured before C-14342. Nonetheless, C-14342 was soon known by the name Parent Note 14342, or PN-14342.

The Secret Service has drawn up what looks like a genealogical chart of these and related bills, which agents showed me during a visit to their Washington offices this spring. The chart displays the many members of the supernote clan: C-21555, for example, the first “big head” $100 (so-called because of the design of the most recent U.S. bills), which was initially identified in London; and C-22500, a more recent arrival that appeared in Macao. The family, which now has 19 members and remains unparalleled even in the world of high-quality counterfeits, also includes two $50 notes: C-20000, a small-head supernote that appeared in Athens, in June 1995; and C-22160, a big-head version, first sighted in Sofia, Bulgaria.

Thanks to sophisticated tools, including mass spectroscopy and near-infra-red analysis, along with old-fashioned visual inspection, the labs of the Secret Service have established genetic links between the family members. These links are not a matter of resemblance so much as they are an indication of a common ancestry: the notes in the PN-14342 family have been created by an individual or an organization using the same equipment and the same materials, and most likely operating from a single location.

As the number of supernotes multiplied, the question arose: who created them? In theory, only governments can buy intaglio printing presses used for making money, and only a handful of companies sell them. Those facts alone pointed toward government involvement, but for some time there was no consensus as to which nation was behind the counterfeiting. Many of the supernotes surfaced in the Middle East, notably in the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon and in Tehran. In 1992, Bill McCollum, a Florida congressman and chairman of the House Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, issued a report accusing Iran of printing the supernotes. The report estimated that the value of supernotes in circulation might eventually approach “billions.”

The Secret Service, however, distanced itself from this accusation. In a letter written in 1995 in response to a Government Accounting Office report on counterfeiting overseas, the Secret Service called the task force’s allegations “unsubstantiated” and characterized its conclusions as being based on “rumor and innuendo.” In reality, evidence was pointing elsewhere.

A Picture Emerges

With a country as closed and secretive as North Korea, information about government activities is hard to come by. But in the late 1990’s, a new source of information arrived in the form of defectors. Starvation, corruption and desperation had prompted thousands of North Koreans, many of them government officials, to flee the country. In 1997, two high-ranking bureaucrats — Hwang Jang Yop, a former secretary of the North Korean Workers’ Party, and Kim Duk Hong, head of a government trading company — sought political asylum at the South Korean Embassy in Beijing. They were the most prominent officials to defect, but they were hardly alone: thousands of North Koreans have fled to South Korea. Many thousands more have escaped to China.

In the international intelligence community, vetting accounts from defectors about activities in North Korea soon became a specialty — as well as a necessity, for the accounts were not always reliable. Raphael Perl, an analyst at the Congressional Research Service who has written extensively on North Korea’s counterfeiting operations, told me that “a lot of defectors or refugees give us information, but they tell us anything we want to know. You have to question the reliability of what they say.”

Nonetheless, the most trustworthy of these accounts, when combined with more traditional intelligence sources, permitted a best guess of what might be happening in North Korea. And as far as counterfeiting was concerned, the picture that emerged suggested that moneymaking had long been a passion for the country’s dictatorial ruler, Kim Jong Il, dating back to the 1970’s, years before he took over the reins of power from his father, the country’s founder and first president, Kim Il Sung.

Today, on Changgwang Street in Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, there is a barricaded compound of government buildings. Judging from satellite photos, these are unremarkable, rectangular structures that suggest no special purpose. Yet according to a North Korean specialist based in Seoul whom I spoke with recently, and who has interviewed many high-ranking North Korean defectors, including Hwang Jang Yop and Kim Duk Hong, these buildings are the home of Office 39, a government bureau devoted to raising hard currency for Kim Jong Il. (The specialist was granted anonymity because of the sensitivity of relations between North and South Korea.)

While the operatives of Office 39 may well direct legitimate enterprises, including the export of exotic mushrooms, ginseng and seaweed, a substantial portion of the office’s revenue comes from its involvement in illicit activities: drug manufacturing and trafficking, sales of missile technology, counterfeit cigarettes and counterfeit $50 and $100 bills. According to Ken Gause, director of the Foreign Leadership Studies Program at the CNA Corporation, a policy group in Virginia that consults on national-security issues, the activities of Office 39 overlap with those of two other offices that occupy buildings in the same complex. The first, Office 38, manages the money acquired by Office 39, he said, while the second, Office 35, handles kidnappings, assassinations and other such activities.

All three divisions employ the same narrow coterie of elites, and all answer directly to Kim Jong Il, who lives in a villa less than a mile away. The history of the operations of Offices 39, 38 and 35, Gause told me, closely follows Kim Jong Il’s own rise to power through the party apparatus. In the early 70’s, after helping his father purge the ranks of the Korean Workers’ Party of competing factions, Kim Jong Il assumed control of North Korea’s covert operations, mostly involving South Korean targets.

In the mid-70’s, according to defector accounts related to me by the North Korean specialist, Kim Jong Il issued a directive to members of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party instructing that expenses for covert operations against South Korea be paid for by producing and using counterfeit dollars. Officials in charge of the operation supposedly brought back $1 bills from abroad, bleached the ink and then used the blank paper to print fairly sophisticated counterfeit $100 bills — though nothing close in quality to a supernote. Many of these notes were later used by North Korean agents implicated in attacks on South Korean targets, like the operatives arrested for the bombings of a South Korean government delegation in Rangoon in 1983 and a Korean Airlines jet in 1987.

According to the same defector accounts, Kim Jong Il endorsed counterfeiting not only as a way of paying for covert operations but also as a means of waging economic warfare against the United States, “a way to fight America, and screw up the American economic system,” as the North Korean specialist paraphrased it to me.

In a similar vein, according to Sheena Chestnut, a specialist on North Korea’s illicit activities who has also interviewed several key defectors, counterfeiting was seen as an expression of the guiding idea of the regime: the concept of juche. Often loosely translated as “self-reliance” or “sovereignty,” the idea of juche entails an aggressive repudiation of other nations’ sovereignty — a reaction to the many centuries in which Korea capitulated to its larger, more powerful neighbors. “It appears that counterfeiting actually contributed to the domestic legitimacy of the North Korean regime,” Chestnut told me. “It could be justified under the juche ideology and allowed the regime to advertise its anticapitalist, anti-American credentials.”

By 1984, as North Korea’s planned economy began to fall apart, Kim Jong Il, who by that time was effectively running much of the government, issued another directive, according to the North Korean specialist, who told me he has obtained a copy of the document. It explained that “producing and using counterfeit U.S. dollars” was a means, in part, for “overcoming economic crisis.” The economic crisis was twofold: not only the worsening conditions among the general population but also a growing financial discontent among the regime’s elite, who had come to expect certain perquisites of power. Counterfeiting offered the promise of raising hard currency to buy the elite the luxury items that they had come to expect: foreign-made cars, trips for their children, fine wine and cognac.

Laundering, Wholesaling and Redesigning

Earlier this year, I visited David Asher, a former senior adviser for East Asian and Pacific affairs in the State Department and an outspoken critic of the North Korean regime. In late 2001, he explained to me, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly asked him to study why the North Korean regime had not collapsed, given that the country’s economy had declined even further over the previous decade, with industrial output alone falling by as much as three-quarters. Former Communist countries had ended their subsidies, Kim Il Sung had died, the country was stricken by floods and famine and the food-distribution system had collapsed. (Party slogans betrayed more than a hint of desperation: “Let’s Eat Two Meals a Day” was one of the era’s more uplifting exhortations.) Yet Kim Jong Il, defying all expectations, managed to cling to power.

“How this was happening was perplexing, given the huge trade gap, even with adjustments for aid flowing into the country,” Asher recalled. “Something just didn’t add up. It didn’t account for why Kim was driving around in brand new Mercedes-Benzes or handing out Rolexes at parties and purchasing truly large quantities of cognac.”

As Asher and his colleagues began amassing intelligence, evidence of an array of illicit activities began surfacing — everything from ivory smuggling to the production of high-grade methamphetamine. And counterfeiting was at the core. “The more we found out about this counterfeiting of dollars, the more we thought it was outrageous,” Asher told me. These activities provided what Asher calls “an alternative framework for existence” and “the palace economy of Kim Jong Il.”

In the spring of 2003, the State Department established the Illicit Activities Initiative, an interagency effort designed to investigate and counter North Korea’s criminal activities, and appointed Asher coordinator. The department began to systematically collect a variety of forensic and other evidence gathered by its own investigators, the Secret Service and elements of the intelligence community linking North Korea to the supernotes. (Asher declined to comment on the nature of the evidence, most of which remains classified.)

In addition, the department put together circumstantial evidence of North Korean counterfeiting that had been accumulating for more than a decade. In 1994, for example, authorities in Hong Kong and Macao apprehended five North Korean diplomats and trade-mission members carrying about $430,000 in bills that turned out to be counterfeits of the supernote variety. Additional North Korean diplomats, including an aide close to Kim Jong Il who was attached to Office 39, were caught trying to launder millions of dollars worth of supernotes over several years, prompting an increased scrutiny of North Korea’s diplomatic and trading missions.

Thwarted, the regime seems to have changed tactics, harnessing new distribution networks and wholesaling the counterfeits to third parties who would funnel them to criminal gangs. In the late 1990’s, for instance, British detectives began tracking Sean Garland, the leader of the Official Irish Republican Army, a Marxist splinter group of the I.R.A. According to an unsealed federal indictment in Washington, Garland began working with North Korean agents earlier in the decade, purchasing supernotes at wholesale prices before distributing them through an elaborate criminal network with outposts in Belarus and Russia, as well as Ireland. (Garland denies the charges and is currently fighting extradiction to the United States from Ireland.)

Details of the actual manufacture of counterfeit notes also began filtering into the State Department, much of the information derived from defector accounts. According to similar accounts compiled by Sheena Chestnut and the North Korean specialist in Seoul whom I spoke with, the regime obtained Swiss-made intaglio printing presses and installed them in a building called Printing House 62, part of the national-mint complex in Pyongsong, a city outside Pyongyang, where a separate team of workers manufactures the supernotes.

In 1996, frustrated by the high-quality imitations of its currency in worldwide circulation, the United States government redesigned the money for the first time since 1928. Out went the old-fashioned symmetrical designs, replaced by the big-head notes. Almost everything about the new design was aimed at frustrating potential counterfeiters, including a security thread embedded in the paper, a watermark featuring a shadow portrait of the figure on the bill and new “microprinting,” tiny lettering that is hard to imitate. The most significant addition was the use of optically variable ink, better known as O.V.I. Look at the bills in circulation today: all 10’s, 20’s, 50’s and 100’s now feature this counterfeiting deterrent in the denomination number on the lower-right-hand corner. Turn the bill one way, and it looks bronze-green; turn it the other way, and it looks black. O.V.I. is very expensive, costing many times more than conventional bank-note ink.

A Swiss company named SICPA is the major manufacturer of O.V.I., and the United States purchased the exclusive rights to green-to-black color-shifting ink in 1996. Other countries followed, purchasing color-shifting inks of different colors for their own currency. One of the first countries to do so, interestingly enough, was North Korea, whose currency, the won, counterfeiters ignore. North Korea purchased O.V.I. from SICPA that shifts from green to magenta. For the purposes of counterfeiting American currency, it would be a smart choice: magenta is the closest color on the spectrum to black. “The green-to-magenta ink can be manipulated to look very close to green-to-black ink,” Daniel Glaser of the Treasury Department told me. “They took this stuff the same year we went to O.V.I.” According to Glaser, the North Koreans managed to fiddle with the new ink, obtaining an approximation of the O.V.I. on the bills.

Though there is some dispute on the timing, the first counterfeit big-head supernotes might have arrived on the market as early as 1998. Like the earlier generation of supernotes, the big-head imitations show an ever-growing attention to detail. “They would certainly fool me,” said Glaser, who points out that the “defects” of the supernote are arguably improvements. He recalled looking at the back of a $100 supernote under a magnifying glass and noticing that the hands on the clock tower of Independence Hall were sharper on the counterfeit than on the genuine.

From all accounts, superb quality is a feature of much North Korean contraband: methamphetamine of extraordinarily high purity; counterfeit Viagra rumored to exceed the bona fide product in its potency; supernotes. It’s an impressive product line for a regime that can barely feed its people. When I discussed this with Asher, he let out a sigh. “I always say that if North Korea only produced conventional goods for export to the degree of quality and precision that they produce counterfeit United States currency, they would be a powerhouse like South Korea, not an industrial basket case.”

The Threat

How many supernotes are in circulation, and what sort of provocation do they represent?

Most government officials interviewed for this story declined to give an estimate, but several, including Michael Merritt of the Secret Service, noted that his agency has removed $50 million worth of supernotes from circulation. That is a far cry from the “billions” predicted by Representative Bill McCollum’s task force in the early 1990’s, and while it may still sound like a lot, it is insignificant relative to the $12 trillion dollar American G.D.P.

When supernotes are discovered in a smaller foreign economy that makes use of American currency, they can cause a local crisis of confidence in the dollar (this has happened in Taiwan and Ireland, for instance). But in the United States, the economic threat is minimal. For this reason, many analysts, particularly those outside the administration, like Raphael Perl of Congressional Research Service, express concern about making the issue into a diplomatic crisis. Perl, who agrees that the North Koreans are behind the counterfeiting, told me that because American government officials often view the violation of the currency as “a matter of national honor,” there is “an emotional factor that could get blown out of proportion.” In the process, he argued, counterfeiting can become conflated with other, more pressing problems posed by the North Korean regime, like its nuclear threat.

This conflation may also be deliberate. According to Kenneth Quinones, who was the North Korea country director in the State Department in the 1990’s, hawks in the current administration may be trying to use the counterfeiting issue to impede negotiations with the regime over its nuclear program. Critics of this approach note that the freezing of the North Korean bank accounts took place in the same month that participants in the six-party talks, the multination negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear program, hammered out an agreement that the regime would abandon its nuclear-weapons program. North Korea soon reneged on its promise to abandon its nuclear program and has since refused to rejoin the talks until the United States lifts the designation on Banco Delta Asia. The hawks, Quinones told me, “are attempting to use these sanctions” to help “bring down the regime.”

The senior administration official interviewed for this article dismissed that claim. “The notion that there was a grand conspiracy by hard-liners is just wrong,” he told me. “It’s not accurate. This was done as a law-enforcement action by appropriate U.S. government agencies based on the facts of the case.”

Even if the counterfeiting is not worthy of being a diplomatic issue unto itself, the fact that North Korea is counterfeiting may still serve as a grim reminder of the difficulty of good-faith negotiations with North Korea. Just consider that the supernotes that were seized by law-enforcement officials in New Jersey and California arrived in the United States while the six-party talks were going on. Asher, for one, was stunned by the audacity of the regime. “If they’re going to counterfeit our currency the entire time they’re engaged in diplomatic negotiations, what does that say about their sincerity?” he asked me. “How can they want normalization with a country whose currency they’re counterfeiting? How can they expect it?”

However the diplomatic standoff is resolved, Asher said that he believes North Korea won’t continue to counterfeit much longer. Next year, the Bureau of Engraving and Printing is issuing an updated version of the $100 bills. The notes will be expensive to manufacture, requiring the purchase of a new set of presses at a cost that Asher estimated in the “hundreds of millions” of dollars. The Treasury Department characterizes the next generation of notes as part of a routine redesign that it will undertake on a regular schedule every decade. But Asher has no illusions as to the timing. “It might be a routine update,” he said, “but it’s a routine update that’s being instigated by one country: North Korea.”

Stephen Mihm teaches history at the University of Georgia. He is at work on two books about the history of counterfeiting in the United States, one to be published by Harvard University Press and the other by HarperCollins.

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ROK mitigates calls for additional sanctions-Japan in no hurry

Saturday, July 22nd, 2006

From the Korea Herald:

Lee opposes additional sanctions on N. Korea

South Korean Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok has taken another shot at the United States, saying that additional sanctions against North Korea were undesirable.

“The solution to the missile problem is for South Korea and the United States to collaborate and for China, Russia and other countries to cooperate […] We must think about whether what the United States does immediately equals to what the international community wants to do.”

Lee’s comments are in line with the South Korean government’s policy to expand sanctions against the communist regime and avoid creating further tension on the peninsula, government officials later explained.

Lee underscored the “South Korean government, as a valid member of the international community must make our own voice known as well.”

The Seoul government has been visibly cautious against slapping sanctions on North Korea, which test-fired a barrage of ballistic missiles July 5 despite international warnings.

“There must not be any more comments or actions that will heighten military tension on the Korean Peninsula,” Lee said.

He urged that it was most important to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table and not give it more time to further develop any weapons.

But inter-Korean relations continue to take on a sour note. Upon North Korea’s demand to halt the ongoing construction of a family reunion center in Mount Geumgang, most of the 150 South Korean workers were set to return home yesterday afternoon.

The United States, in the meantime, reportedly refused a visa application for Ri Gun, North Korea’s director-general of the North American Division at the Foreign Ministry.

Ri was set to attend a seminar hosted by Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Stanford University later this month.

The United States is stepping up pressure on the North through investigating its alleged money counterfeiting and by highlighting its human rights abuses.

Japan has also made moves to fortify its defense lineup against the possible threat from North Korea.

“To solve this, any form of dialogue must be accomplished (with the North),” Lee said. Seoul officials said bilateral talks between the United States and North Korea should be considered as a possibility.

Here is what the US has been up to: 6/22/2006 From the Joong Ang Daily:

U.S. and Japan press on with plans for sanctions

The recent visit to Seoul by a U.S. Treasury Department official and his stops in other regional capitals is a sign that Washington intends to tighten the financial noose around Pyongyang. After telling Korean officials that Washington might reinstate trade sanctions on North Korea that were lifted during the Clinton administration, Stuart Levey, the under secretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, moved on to Vietnam, Singapore and Japan. Sources in Seoul said yesterday that the main purpose of his trip was to search for bank accounts linked to illicit activities in which North Korea is engaged.

On Tuesday, the under secretary reportedly met with Vietnamese government and financial officials. A diplomat in Seoul said, “A bank account that is used by Hyundai Asan and North Korea has been under investigation there.”

Last autumn, Washington warned Banco Delta Asia in Macao of financial sanctions if it did not tighten its controls against money laundering; about 40 North Korean accounts there have reportedly been frozen. Hyundai Asan once sent its payments to North Korea to that bank; Pyongyang has directed the payments to other bank accounts in Austria and Vietnam since then.

After arriving in Tokyo on Thursday Mr. Levey reportedly gave officials there a list of persons and companies suspected of being linked to North Korea’s missile programs. The U.S. official also discussed with his hosts possible measures to block the flow of cash from ethnic Koreans in Japan to their homeland, a move Tokyo has said publicly it was considering.

In Singapore, at least one bank account has been linked to money sent by the Hyundai Group to North Korea before the 2000 inter-Korean summit between Kim Dae-jung of South Korea and Kim Jong-il. Ironically, Don Kirk, a reporter for the International Herald Tribune in Seoul, mentioned that account in an article he wrote shortly after the summit; Seoul reacted with fury and the matter lay dormant for some time. Prosecutors eventually announced in 2003 that $450 million had been sent to North Korea to induce Kim Jong-il to host the summit meeting.

As other nations study ways to step up pressure on North Korea, the Roh administration remains defiant in pursuing reconciliation. But even more important to North Korea than the South is China. Efforts to coordinate sanctions have centered on the North’s major ally and provider of food and energy; Beijing is seen internationally as having enough leverage to bring Pyongyang back to the six-nation nuclear negotiations.

But a senior Chinese general said Thursday there was little his government could do. Guo Boxiong, the vice chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, flatly told an audience at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., that “China cannot possibly force the DPRK to do anything or not to do anything.”

Separately in Washington, the Bush administration is planning to implement the recent United Nations Security Council resolution on North Korean missiles and nuclear programs by enacting new legislation. Senator Sam Brownback, a Kansas Republican, told a news conference that a bill called the “North Korea Nonproliferation Act” is in the works. It would bar companies or individuals involved in North Korea’s mass weapons programs from doing any business with U.S. companies. The act is similar to legislation already in force, aimed at Iran in 2000 and then expanded to include Syria.

Defenses against missiles are also being given more attention. Washington and Tokyo are expected to sign an agreement on the operation of missile defense systems that includes commitments to more sharing of intelligence on North Korea. The Mainichi Shimbun, a Tokyo daily, added in an article yesterday that the agreement will allow Japan to receive U.S. satellite photos and data more quickly.

by Lee Chul-hee, Brian Lee

From the Associated Press (Via Korea Liberator)

Japan Won’t Rush Sanctions on North Korea
7/19/2006
Hiroko Tabuchi

Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi said Wednesday Japan will not rush to impose more sanctions on North Korea, amid reports Tokyo may call for five-party talks on the sidelines of a regional security forum on the North’s nuclear ambitions.

Japan, meanwhile, plans to launch two spy satellites to monitor North Korean activity by the end of the year, a news report said.

Koizumi told reporters Wednesday Japan will wait for a further response from North Korea to a U.N. Security Council resolution and a Group of Eight summit statement condemning its missile test-launches.

“North Korea should take the resolution and the (G-8) chairman’s statement seriously. I think it’s better for us to wait and see,” Koizumi said.

He also urged Pyongyang to return to six-nation talks on its nuclear weapons program, which have stalled over the North’s anger at U.S. sanctions for alleged counterfeiting and money laundering activities.

Koizumi’s remarks seemed at odds with recent hardline remarks by Japan’s top government spokesman, as well as a report carried earlier Wednesday by Japan’s largest daily newspaper, the Yomiuri Shimbun.

Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe suggested Tuesday that Tokyo had begun preparations to impose further economic sanctions on North Korea.

The Yomiuri said Wednesday Japan was considering banning cash remittances and freezing North Korean assets in Japan early next month. The newspaper did not say where it got the information.

Tokyo has so far imposed only limited sanctions — such as barring a North Korean trade ferry from Japanese ports — against North Korea in response to its missile tests.

A separate news report said Wednesday Japan has called for five-party talks, excluding Pyongyang, on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum next week to explore ways to resume stalled multilateral negotiations on the North’s nuclear ambitions.

It remained unclear whether the talks — potentially involving Japan, South Korea, Russia, China and the United States — would materialize, because Beijing hasn’t said whether it is willing to participate, Kyodo News agency reported. Kyodo did not say where it obtained the information.

Chun Young Woo, South Korea’s deputy foreign minister and chief South Korean delegate to the six-party talks, was slated to visit Japan for talks Thursday with Japanese counterpart Kenichiro Sasae.

Also Wednesday, Japan’s space agency, JAXA, said it would launch two more spy satellites using H-2A rockets, according to Kyodo. JAXA launched two spy satellites in March 2003 to monitor North Korea. JAXA officials couldn’t be reached for comment late Wednesday.

North Korea drew international condemnation this month after test firing seven missiles, including a long-range Taepodong-2 believed capable of reaching parts of the U.S.

On Saturday, the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution criticizing the missile tests and banning all U.N. member states from trading with Pyongyang in missile-related technology. The North has since rejected the resolution, warning of further repercussions.

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