Archive for the ‘Fiscal & monetary policy’ Category

Two years after the DPRK’s currency revaluation

Tuesday, December 13th, 2011

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
2011-12-8

It has been two years since the implementation of North Korea’s currency revaluation and the South Korean government recently has presented an assessment of it, evaluating it as a complete failure, as exchange rates have skyrocketed and inflation set in.

It has been largely evaluated as having weakened the government control over the market and the people.

In the report released by South Korea’s Ministry of Unification (MOU), the prices of rice and exchange rates have returned previously to the level before the measure went into effect. The prices of rice per kg that cost between 20 to 40 KPW in December 2009 has jumped to 3,000 to 5,000 KPW as of November of this year, which is more than a 2,300 times increase.

The price of rice that went for 2,400 KPW early this October is believed to be close to 5,000 KWP currently.

The fluctuation of rice price is allegedly associated with preparation for next year’s celebration (i.e., of North Korea becoming a “strong and prosperous nation”). According to an anonymous North Korean government official, rice is being stockpiled to be released next year during the celebration period.

North Korea has self-proclaimed 2012, the centennial birthday of Kim Il Sung, as the first year of the “strong and prosperous nation.” While it may be ephemeral, it said it will normalize rice distribution for next year.

The exchange rate for KPW in December 2009 was 35 North Korean won to one USD; a year later, it soared to 2,000 won, and it is currently worth 3,800 won.

At the time of the currency revaluation, the usage of foreign currency was completely banned. This in return made the exchange rate spiral up. In February of this year, North Korea eventually abandoned this measure.

One Chinese yuan is also worth about 400 KPW, standing shoulder to shoulder with the value of the US dollar. About 300 markets that exist currently in North Korea are affected by the soaring exchange rate of the yuan, raising the prices of Chinese products on the market.

North Korea also has increased wages for the workers a hundred fold during the currency redenomination; but life for the people has become harder due to hyperinflation.

The average monthly salary of a North Korean worker is about 3,000 KPW; however, the monthly expenses for an average family of four hovers around 100,000 KPW.

The MOU has announced that the currency reform implemented by the North Korean government two years ago was intended to weaken the role of the markets, and regulate the new-rich, generate supplies of capital for the construction industry, and adjust the amount of domestic currency in circulation. In the end, the reevaluation ended up achieving the opposite.

At the time, the government prohibited sales of imported and industrial products on the market and promoted marketization of agricultural goods. But the people’s dependency on markets is as high as ever, leading to a relaxation of market regulation in February 2010.

The MOU also stated, “There is growing distrust of the government among North Koreans from the failed policy which in effect undermined the power of the government to control the market and the people.”

The Daily NK also reported some similar information:

The price of rice in North Hamkyung Province and other areas along the Sino-North Korean border has passed 5,000 won per kilo. This represents a rise of over 1,000 won in little over a fortnight, after similar reports came out two weeks ago asserting that the price had passed 4,000 won in late November.

Sources have independently reported that the 5,000 won mark has been passed in markets in the cities of Hoeryeong and Musan, both in North Hamkyung Province, and Hyesan in Yangkang Province. The exchange rate of the Chinese Yuan against the North Korean won has simultaneously jumped from the low 700s to 800 in Hyesan and over 1,000 in Musan and Hoeryeong.

Reporting the news, one Hoeryeong-based source told The Daily NK, “The price rises have left people living hand-to-mouth, and the endless government controls and crackdowns mean people have no idea what to do. The atmosphere in the jangmadang has gotten really ugly on rumors that prices are going to rise further.”

A source from Musan pointed out, “The Yuan seems to go up every day, and now that rice has passed 5,000 won a kilo people have no idea what they’re going to eat to survive.”

“We’ve already given up on the idea of eating rice cake for the Chinese New Year,” the trading source from Hyesan said, going on, “Chosun rice now costs 5,000 won a kilo while Chinese rice is 3,800 won. Wherever you go people are up in arms about it.”

Most locals blame the rapid rise in the cost of living on the strength of the Yuan against the North Korean won. In this way, the lack of confidence in the local currency promoted and enhanced by the 2009 currency redenomination seems to be having a direct effect on the price of rice.

“Everybody prefers to use Renminbi to Chosun money, so by the time you wake up in the morning the thing which has risen again is the price of the Yuan. Because the exchange rate is rising, it is inevitable that the price of rice goes up as well,” the source from Hyesan explained.”

Interestingly, according to the border region sources there is no great difference in the physical volume of rice in the market. However, because the Yuan has become the main currency for both the supply and demand sides of the market, prices have risen in accordance with the change in the exchange rate. The use of the Yuan as the medium of exchange between locals was already becoming institutionalized even before the recent rises.

The rapid price rises are also encouraging traders to try and obtain more locally-grown rice.

The source from Hyesan said, “Train stations in North Hamgyung and Hwanghae Provinces are in complete chaos when there is a train because of all the traders trying to bring in local rice, as well as the agents regulating them,” while the source from Musan said, “Many people are stocking up on food while they can because of reports that food prices will keep rising until next spring.”

Marcus Noland also blogged about the price of food and US$ exchange rate in the DPRK last week.

Read the full Daily NK story here:
Rice Tops Key 5,000 Won Mark
Daily NK
Lee Seok Young
2011-12-13

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Recent stories on food prices and inflation

Thursday, December 1st, 2011

Story 1 (Daily NK): Ministry strikes out currency swap (2011-12-1):

The Ministry of Unification has concluded that the currency redenomination implemented by the North Korean government two years ago was, as is already widely accepted, an utter failure in most regards.

According to the ministry, which revealed its assessment today, North Korea intended to use the currency redenomination to weaken the role of the markets, generate supplies of capital for the construction industry and adjust the amount of domestic currency in circulation, but ended up achieving the opposite.

Instead, the overall economy slowed, while markets have now made a comeback, recovering to their state they were in before the event.

The process was simple. Straight after the currency redenomination, the flow of commodities rapidly froze up due to contracting supply and weakening purchasing power. According to the Ministry of Unification, factories and enterprises that relied heavily on materials and capital from the market were fatally undermined. This immediately added to extant difficulties securing daily necessities, and forced the authorities to tolerate the markets once again. Commodity flows are still in the process of recovering.

But worse, the value of the domestic currency fell and people’s preference for US Dollars and Chinese Yuan deepened further, setting exchange rates and prices in a continuously increasing inflationary spiral.

This can be seen in the case of rice, a good proxy for overall economic conditions. In 2009, rice cost between 20 and 40won, but within a year had increased abruptly to approximately 1,500won, and as of November, 2011 was more than 3,000won. Despite the 100:1 ratio of the redenomination, prices have returned to their level before the currency redenomination.

The North Korean authorities even attempted to ban the use of foreign currency in January, 2010, causing various problems which resulted in the withdrawal of the plan in the following month. In December, 2009, a US Dollar was worth 35 North Korean won, but by a year later had soared to 2,000 won, and is currently worth 3,800 won.

The North Korean authorities said the currency redenomination would improve the lives of the people, but in truth because of hyperinflation people’s lives have actually gotten more difficult.

At the time of the currency redenomination, they emphasized care for the common worker, giving them wage increases and cash payments; a one-off bonus (500won per person) to laborers and an additional payment to farmers (150,000won per person). However, nominal wages subsequently increased 100 times, and with a lack of food, necessities and soaring inflation, made the people’s lives worse.

The average worker’s salary is now 3,000won, but the living expenses of a family of four are approximately 100,000 won per month.

In conclusion, an official from the Ministry of Unification declared, “As long as there is deepening popular distrust of the North Korean authorities, it looks like the power to implement future policy will weaken. The decisions made by the authorities that decreased the quality of people’s lives deepened the distrust.”

“The seizure of property, which in the short term alleviated polarization, ended up causing more poverty among the general population and had a relatively minor effect on the people who hold a lot of foreign currency.”

“North Korea tried to restore their socialist economy via the currency redenomination, but in reviewing the comments and perspectives of various North Korea experts and defectors we can see that the currency redenomination was an overall failure.”

That being said, he noted, “There is a limit to the ability of collective discontent to turn into collective political organizing.”

Story 2 (Yonhap): Botched currency reform destabilizes N.K. rice prices, exchange rates (2011-12-1):

North Korea’s currency reform has failed to stabilize rice prices and its currency while the nation still endures lack of food and supplies, Seoul’s Unification Ministry said Thursday.

The North carried out a massive currency reform two years ago to try to rein in galloping inflation, squash free market activities and tighten state control over the economy. The measures failed to halt massive inflation and worsened food shortages and public backlash.

The North Korean won was traded at 35 won to one U.S. dollar in markets right after the currency reform in late 2009. But one dollar was traded at around 3,800 won in November, up from around 2,000 won in 2010, according to the ministry.

The ministry, which handles inter-Korean affairs, also said rice prices have risen to pre-currency reform levels in a sign of food shortages in North Korea.

A kilogram of rice cost up to 40 won in 2009 before skyrocketing to about 3,000 won in November, the ministry said in an assessment of the North’s currency reform.

The dire assessment comes as the North is struggling to achieve its goal of building a prosperous nation by next year, the centennial of the birth of the country’s late founder, Kim Il-sung, the father of current leader Kim Jong-il.

The rice prices started to soar in Pyongyang on rumors that Kim failed to secure much aid during his trip to Russia in August, Good Friends, a Seoul-based private relief agency, said in September.

Rice is a key staple food for both South and North Koreans.

The botched currency reform is “expected to further deepen public distrust of the authorities and undermine their control on the people,” the ministry said in an assessment report.

Still, North Koreans are unlikely to display any collective action, because there is no organized political force, the ministry said.

Kim has been ruling the country with an iron fist, and tolerates no dissent.

There have been reports of growing discontent in the communist country over chronic food shortages and political oppression, though no organized opposition has emerged to challenge the leader.

Story 3 (Daily NK): Rice and Yuan zooming up in Ryanggang (2011-11-28):

The price of North Korean rice and the Yuan exchange rate have both reached post-2009 record levels in Yangkang Province, with domestic rice surpassing 4,000 won/kg and 1 Chinese Yuan selling for 720 North Korean won on November 28th.

Although a geographically remote location when seen from within North Korea, Yangkang Province act as a barometer for the situation in other areas because it stands alongside the capital Pyongyang and the Shinuiju-Dandong area as one of the most marketized, active trading locations of all.

Speaking with Daily NK today, a source from the province commented, “In the daytime on the 27th, the Yuan price, which had risen to 780 won, fell back to 720 won; however, the discomfort of the people is continual,” before adding, “Because of the rising exchange rate, the rice price also went up to 4,000 won.”

According to the source, as the price of North Korean rice hit 4,000 won/kg, that of Chinese rice also reached 3,200 won and sticky rice 5,000 won.

This means that the price of rice in Hyesan, the provincial capital, has now risen 500 won in two weeks, while the value of the North Korean won has depreciated by 120 won over a similar period.

The cause of the problem stems from a number of sources, but at the top of the list is a lack of faith in the North Korean won and the continual desire on the part of people who hold currency not to do so in domestic money.

As a result, the source said that traders are not selling their products, preferring instead to watch for changes, and with customers less likely to buy at such inflated prices, the overall effect is that trading volumes in the market have fallen drastically.

He explained, “There is even one rumor out there suggesting that by year’s end the price of the Yuan will have reached 1,000 won and that before long rice will have gone over 5,000 won. Rice traders are not selling their stock, saying that ‘if it gets more expensive, I’ll sell’, and so those citizens who are unable to get food together are looking pretty uneasy.’

Meanwhile, the new price records present a sense of cruel irony for a country about to commemorate the 2nd anniversary of the November 30th, 2009 currency redenomination.

“This is all the fault of the government, which organized the currency redenomination and destroyed the value of Chosun money,” the source agreed, complaining, “The price of everything is soaring, so the time has come where we can’t even buy blocks of tofu to eat.”

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DPRK 1950 Economy Bond

Thursday, October 20th, 2011

Source here. Hat tip to a reader.

According to the source, the reverse side of the document reads:

The Government of the DPRK issues an Economic Development Bond for democratic people in the amount of 50, 100, and 500 won for a total amount of 1,500,000,000 won with the period of ten years, from October 1, 1950-October 1, 1960.

Reading further, however, it becomes obvious that this is not a bond at all (in the traditional sense)–it is more like a very complicated lottery ticket.  This method of issuing “bonds” was probably copied from the Soviets, and as of 2008, the DPRK still practiced this method of domestic “bond” financing.

By the way, if you have any North Korean bonds you would like to sell, I know someone who is interested!

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Hamhung traders taxed to fund Pyongyang construction projects

Tuesday, October 18th, 2011

According to the Daily NK:

The North Korean authorities in Hamheung are demanding 150,000 won from each trader in local markets to support construction projects in Pyongyang, according to a source from the city.

“Since the start of October, Hamheung Municipal People’s Committee has been taking money from market traders on the premise that ‘You have to give material support to Pyongyang construction workers,’” the source told the Daily NK today. “In the case of traders in the markets in Hoisang and Sapo, they are being asked for as much as 150,000 won each.”

Hamheung is the most famous industrial city in North Korea, and as such has larger markets than many other places. Thus, given that each of the two markets mentioned by the source has more than 500 traders, if the authorities were to reach their goal figure then they would be able to take 75,000,000 won from each one.

However, the Market Management Office for each market already receives 300-500 won per day from traders in the form of a ‘stall tax’, with sellers of home appliances and other high priced goods paying 500 won and those who sell food only paying 300 won. Thus, 150,000 won represents a huge cost, and many traders are apparently reacting to the demand with incredulity.

The source also noted that this does not appear to represent a central Party directive, with only traders in South Hamkyung and Yangkang Province having been hit by it to date.

“In Hyesan Market in Yangkang Province, it is 100,000 won per trader,” the source revealed, adding, “It seems like a case of the provincial Party preparing funds to support Pyongyang construction by taking money from traders.”

Elsewhere, although traders are now angry at the demand for funding, everything else is good, with official market controls being very lightly implemented at the moment, according to the source.

“The market is open from morning to night, and with the exception of the usual crackdowns on grasshopper traders there are no notable inspections,” he revealed.

But then, he added sarcastically, “They are taking money from the market as if it were some kind of state industry, so maybe that’s why they are leaving it alone.”

Read the full story here:
To Hamheung Traders: 150,000 Won for Pyongyang!
Daily NK
Lee Seok Young
2011-10-18

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Koryo Bank unveils new debit card

Wednesday, October 12th, 2011

Dr. Bernhard Seliger of the Hanns Seidel Foundation writes in to notify us about the DPRK’s new Koryo Bank (고려은행) debit card.

Click image above to see the front and back of the card.

There is an information flyer available in the DPRK:

According to the translator this is what it says:

Electronic Paying Card (Debit Card)

1. Introduction
* Electronic Paying Card is a cash card with which cardholders can make a payment when buying a merchandise or receiving a service instead of money. We provide the very best customer service, convenience and security.
* Cardholders (including foreign cardholders) can freely make a payment in foreign currency at electronic paying card affiliates.

2. Instruction
*Issuing a card and making a deposit: Card is issued at Koryo card issuing branches. Foreign currency is converted into equivalent North Korean won at a current exchange rate (purchasing price) when cardholders or to-be make a deposit. Issuing a new card is free of charge. Issuing a card, cardholders should register a private password to prevent use of a third party. Using the card cardholders should remember the password to verify identity.

*Procedure of the payment: Card holders are allowed to purchase goods and services within the available balance of the account. Card payment machine verifies identity by crosschecking with the password you enter. If the information is confirmed to be correct upon identification, merchants or acquirers proceed to make the payment. After purchasing, the balance is diminished by the payment.

*Cash Withdrawal: Cardholders who want to withdraw a part or the entire of the remaining balance can be served at Koryo Bank Card issuing branches. The exchange rate is the current selling price.

3. Notice: Cardholders observe the followings as regards to using the card.
*Due to its delicate electronic procedure while the card is to be used, it is recommended not to damage the electronic part of the front.
*Remembering and entering the password correctly is important, since the payment procedure is suspended after 3 times of password errors.
*If the card is destroyed or lost, cardholders should go to the Koryo bank where the card is issued and report the loss and the damage.
*With verifying identity and the balance of the card, a new card is issued.
*Cardholders shall remain liable for the loss incurred by their negligence.

4. Questions and hot line
*When there is a question, a loss, duplication or a lost electronic paying card, Call 462-6315.

Koryo Bank

This is not the only debit card available to foreigners in the DPRK. Dr. Seliger also wrote in earlier this year to inform us of the DPRK’s Narae (나래) debit card.

Here are previous posts on Koryo Bank.

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Lankov on measures of economic freedom in the DPRK

Friday, September 23rd, 2011

Pictured above: An annual index measure of economic freedom in the DPRK from 1995 to 2011, published by the Heritage Foundation’s and Wall Street Journal’s Index of Economic Freedom.

Andrei Lankov writes in the Asia Times:

[The] Heritage foundation and the Wall Street Journal recently published a new edition of their annual index of economic freedom, according to which North Korea has the world’s least-free economy. One can hardly argue about this – North Korea has for decades worked hard to take Stalinism to its logical extremes, and slightly beyond that.

However, one gets perplexed when looking at the grades of unfreedom that are given by the Heritage Foundation to the North through the 1995-2011 period. According to the index, the level of economic unfreedom in North Korea was essentially the same throughout the entire 1996-2005 period. Then, in 2005 it deteriorated considerably and has continued a slow downward slide until now.

This depiction is bound to raise the eyebrows of anyone who is familiar with actual economic trends in North Korea. The graph is correct when it says that the economy became more restrictive in 2005, when the government tried to re-introduce the rationing and reconfirmed the ban on the private sale of grain (such a ban had existed since 1957, but ceased to be enforced around 1990).

However, the 2005 measures were, essentially, a backlash, an attempt to reverse the half-baked reforms of 2002 – and those reforms can be described only as liberalizing.

On balance, the 2002 reforms should not be overestimated. Nonetheless, the 2002 reforms legalized a significant part of the black economy, and also granted managers of state-owned industrial enterprises a measure of managerial freedom they had not had for many decades.

If this was not an increase in economic freedom, what was it? But the Heritage Foundation graph does not give any hint of this change: the line that purports to depict the level of economic freedom remains on the same low level in 2002.

This is more interesting because 1997-2002 was when actual economic freedom increased dramatically. The old hyper-Stalinist laws remained technically effective, but nobody bothered to enforce these restrictions. It is estimated that in the early 2000s, the average North Korean family drew some 80% of its income from various market activities.

This was technically illegal, but the authorities were ready to turn a blind eye to the re-emergence of some form of a market economy, and in 2002 they even grudgingly and partially legalized the already flourishing market economy.

However, these improvements – both de-facto and, in 2002-2005 de-jure – find no expression in the flat line of the Heritage graph which, however, does not fail to notice that after 2005 the situation again began to deteriorate due to a government backlash against the private economy. The backlash was not particularly successful, but it lasted until 2009, and this is correctly reflected by the downward line at the graph.

However, then the graph begins seriously misleading again – and again, seemingly due the same implicit assumption that in North Korea things can go only from bad to worse. The graph depicts 2009 as a year when the level of freedom went even lower – and this is a correct assumption, since in 2009 the authorities undertook currency reform.

The reform’s main, if not sole, purpose was to annihilate the private economy that had survived the 2005-2009 backlashes surprisingly well. There is little doubt that North Korean decision-makers really want, above all, to revive the hyper-Stalinist economy that alone guarantees the regime’s long-term political stability (or so they – and the present author – believe).

However, the 2009 bold attempt to go back to the Stalinist ways ended in complete and pathetic failure – and the government, fearful of the chaos its inept reform created, backpedaled immediately.

The failure of the 2009 currency reform was followed by another wave of economic liberalization. In May 2010, the government lifted all restrictions and bans on private retail trade that were introduced in the 2005-09 backlash. In fact, the North Korean economy nowadays is roughly as free (or rather unfree) as it used to be immediately after the 2002 reforms. But there is no hint of this roller coaster changes in the slowly descending line of the Heritage Foundation Index.

The same is applicable to the economic situation. Every year, we get reports about a looming famine in North Korea – and this year is no exception. A quick look through headlines of major newspapers can clarify that such reports surface with predictable regularity every year.

In March 2008, the International Herald Tribune ran a headline “Food shortage looms in North Korea”. In March 2009, the Washington Post headline said “At the Heart of North Korea’s Troubles, an Intractable Hunger Crisis”. One year later, in March 2010, the Times of London warned: “Catastrophe in North Korea; China must pressure Pyongyang to allow food aid to millions threatened by famine.” In March 2011, The New York Times wrote: “North Korea: 6 Million Are Hungry.” The predictions of gloom come every year, but famine does not.

Actually, from around 2002-2003, we have seen a steady but clear improvement in North Korea’s economic situation. North Koreans are still malnourished, and likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, they are not starving any more – at least not in significant numbers.

However, opponents of the regime cannot admit that people are not starving or report about (however marginal) improvement of the food situation, since, as I have said, from their viewpoint nothing can possibly improve in North Korea. At the same time, supporters of the regime will not admit that the North Korean people are still malnourished, and the regime itself is active in presenting exaggerated evidence of a looming famine (or perhaps, even fabricating such evidence when necessary) – as this will help it get more free food from the outside, and this is what Pyongyang needs.

One can see the same trends everywhere. For example, human-rights non-governmental organizations keep telling us about a further deterioration in the human-rights situation in the North. However, the evidence tells a different story. Human rights are still by far the world’s worst, but they are better than 20 or 30 years ago.

Just one example of this under-reported improvement will probably suffice. Until the mid-1990s, the entire family of a political criminal – that is, all people who were registered at the same address as he or she, were by default shipped to a concentration camp. Some 10 or 15 years ago, this approach ceased to be universal, so families of many political criminals – including some prominent activists based in Seoul – remained free.

There is little doubt that families are harassed, and even distant relatives of dissenters are denied good jobs and/or the right to reside in Pyongyang and major cities. Nonetheless, there is a great difference between inability to live in a major city and incarceration in what might indeed be the world’s worst prison camp system.

However, this change is seldom reported. Human-rights advocacy groups obviously cannot bring themselves admit that something can get better under the Kim family regime. Probably, they think that such admission would make the situation look less urgent and thus would help the Kim family regime in some indirect way. These worries might be even well-founded – but the result is the tendency to ignore a particular type of “politically incorrect” news.

Paradoxically, regime sympathizers – whose presence is especially noticeable among the South Korean left – are equally reluctant to attract any attention to these minor improvements. It is understandable, since we are talking about changes from the awful to the very bad, and Pyongyang champions cannot bring themselves to admit how brutal and inefficient the regime actually is.

For example, if pro-Pyongyang media outlets report that the “family responsibility” principle does not apply in many cases, they would have to admit that in the supposed “paradise” of national purity and/or anti-globalist determination in North Korea, not only dissenters, but their families as well were shipped to concentration camps until quite recently. No member of South Korea’s radical nationalist left could bring him or herself to admit this fact.

One cannot imagine a pro-North Korean leftist blogger in Seoul triumphantly writing something like this: “In the past, if somebody watched a South Korean melodrama, he would be arrested, beaten unconscious and then sent to prison for life together with his entire family. Nowadays, things are so better: only his teeth – not ribs! – are likely to be broken during an investigation, and then he or she will spend in prison merely a couple years, and his family are now allowed to keep their freedom. What an improvement!”

The sad irony is that this change is actually an improvement, but neither side of the political debate is going to report it. This is confirmation to the old truism: political passions make people oblivious to the obvious. However, propaganda is a poor substitute for honest and objective analysis – even when such propaganda is produced by people who believe it themselves.

Read the full story here:
It’s not all doom and gloom in Pyongyang
Andrei Lankov
Asia Times
2011-9-23

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Rajin-Sonbong Minimum Wage Set at 80 Dollars

Friday, September 23rd, 2011

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
2011-9-21

The minimum monthly wage at the Rajin-Sonbong (Rason) Economic and Trade Zone has been set at 80 USD.

The Rason Economic and Trade Zone is a joint development project between China and the DPRK. Recently, a booklet on the “Tax Policy in the Rason Economic and Trade Zone” was published by Rason city’s tax bureau to introduce the zone’s tax policy to foreign investors. The booklet designates the monthly minimum wage for local employees at 80 USD.

The Rason Economic and Trade Zone Law was revised in January 2010, handing to local Rason authorities the jurisdiction to decide on the minimum wage for the North Korean workers working for foreign companies in the region.

With wages in China rising, Chinese firms are tending to look at Vietnam and Indonesia to build factories. The Rason Economic Zone is also becoming an attractive alternative, especially for those investors from companies situated in China’s northeastern provinces.

The monthly minimum wage at Rason will be 25.3 percent higher than the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), which is set at 63.814 USD. However, the minimum wage at Rason still remains below half of the minimum wage of workers in China. According to the (South) Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA), the monthly minimum wage in China is 167 USD.

The booklet also provides detailed descriptions of tax related information in the Rason area.

For buildings obtained with one’s own funds, property tax will be exempted for five years. It will also be possible to make inheritance tax payments in installments, if it exceeds 20,000 Euros.

The corporate income tax rates range from 10 to 14 percent. Those companies that invest over 30 million Euros will be exempt from income tax for four years from the year they record a profit. Afterward for the next three years they will receive a 50 percent tax reduction. Other taxes such as sales and transaction taxes are set at 0.6 to 5 and 0.3 to 2.5 percent.

In addition, tax payments are permitted at banks and the tax bureau directly.

Kim Jong Il made a visit to Rason in 2009 where he announced to focus on three main sectors to revive the North Korean economy: manufacturing, transportation, and tourism.

According to a North Korean authority, “Investing in labor intensive industries will be profitable in many ways. Many Chinese and even Taiwanese textile companies are expressing interest in building factories in the Rason area.”

In addition, Rason authorities expressed future plans to attract businesses in the tools, shipbuilding, automobile, and high-tech industries, and are making great efforts to attract foreign investments to the area by promoting the zone’s geographical proximity to China and Russia, cheap labor, and tax benefits.

Additional Information:
1. Read more about the Rason tax and wage policies here.

2. Read previous posts on the Rason Zone here.

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DPRK rice price up

Friday, September 23rd, 2011

According to Yonhap:

The price of rice in North Korea has risen constantly over the past six months, reaching as much as 2,400 North Korean won (US$17.18) per kilogram early this month, South Korea’s Unification Ministry said Friday.

After falling to as low as 1,400 won per kilogram, rice prices started to increase in April and reached between 2,200 and 2,400 won by early this month, according to the ministry, which handles inter-Korean affairs.

Here is a compendium of stories about thie DPRK’s alleged food shortage and food aid this year.

Read the full story here:
Price of rice in N. Korea rises over past 6 months: ministry
Yonhap
2011-9-23

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North Korea Encourages Investment in Rajin-Sonbong (Rason) Economic and Trade Zone

Friday, September 16th, 2011

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
2011-9-14

At the seventh China Jilin and Northeast Asia Investment and Trade Expo (NEASIAEXPO), the North Korean delegation actively promoted the Rajin-Sonbong (Rajin) Economic and Trade Zone to attract investment.

During the expo, the DPRK’s Ministry of Trade and China’s Ministry of Commerce and People’s Government of Jilin Province co-sponsored the “(North) Korean Business Day and China-DPRK Trade and Investment Session” at the Changchun International Conference and Exhibition Center on September 7. Hwang Chol-nam, the vice mayor of Rason City, briefed the attendees on the current situation, advantages, and special benefits of his city.

According to Hwang, “The spacious 470 square-kilometer Rason Economic and Trade Zone is one of the largest economic trade zones,” and advertised the geographic and economic advantages of Rason as the “transportation hub of Northeast Asia that connects China and Russia via Tumen River and with Japan across the East Sea.”

He also introduced the three ports in the region. “Rajin Port is equipped with the annual loading capacity of 3 million ton and Sonbong Harbor is able to transport 2 to 3 million ton of oil while Ungsang Harbor is able to handle up to 600,000 cubic-meter of lumber annually.” He also boasted the ports to be deep enough where it does not freeze during the winter.

Rason was also introduced to have received the “special city” designation in 2010 and will grow to have a population of one million. The recently amended “Law on the Rason Economic and Trade Zone” was revised and supplement with over 50 articles.

Hwang also elaborated on the eight preferential policies providing special tax benefits to foreign investors. He asserted, “The government of North Korea will guarantee the investment of the foreign investors by not nationalizing or demanding requisitions. For inevitable cases where such demands occur, proper compensation will be provided.”

The income tax is also at 14 percent, which is 11 percent lower than other areas in North Korea. For companies with business plans over ten years, foreign capital companies will receive three years of tax-free benefit starting from the profit earning year and two years thereon after will receive 50 percent tax-free benefits. According to Hwang, over 100 foreign companies and offices are operating businesses currently in the special economic zone.

He also announced that the current highway construction project connecting Rajin with Wonjung is expected to be completed in October, and that the Tumen-Rajin port railway system is to be upgraded to a broad gauge railway next month.

Specifically, Russian Railways reached an agreement with North Korea to repair the Hasan-Rajin Railway and improve the Rajin port facilities, especially focusing on Pier 3. The plans include upgrading Rajin as a container harbor to be capable of transporting twenty-foot equivalent units annually. Russia and the DPRK have already conducted measurement and geological surveys and reached the process design phase.

However, Seo Gil-bok, the DPRK’s vice minister of commerce, stated in a speech that North Korea would “actively work hard to make the Rason region a successful collaboration between the DPRK and China,” saying further that they would “pull out all the stops to realize the goals agreed by the best leaders from both nations.”

Many foreign media and correspondents were present at the event to cover the “Korean Business Day.” At the event, North Korea actively promoted the Rason Economic and Trade Zone by also presenting a promotional video of the zone.

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Rajin market on display to foreigners

Tuesday, September 13th, 2011

Pictured above: (L) satellite image of the Rajin Market, (R) a ground-level photo taken in 1999

Among the the flurry of activities that comprised the DPRK’s recent public relations campaign in Rason (Rajin-Sonbong), the Rajin Market appeared on the itineraries of a few visiting delegates. Alexa Olsen writes about the market for the Associated Press:

Chinese travel agents, potential investors and foreign journalists recently traveled into the North to get a look at the special economic zone Pyongyang is promoting in Rason. It lies in the far northeastern tip of North Korea, 600 miles (1,000 kilometers) from Pyongyang, but will be about an hour’s drive from China once the road is completed.

Rumbling Chinese cargo trucks already ply the route, churning up plumes of choking dust and ferrying containers of Chinese-made shoes, plastic toys, computer speakers, T-shirts and DVDs to the Rason Free Trade Market.

The market, a 13-year-old experiment in small-scale capitalism, has been so successful that the Chinese managing company, the Tianyu Group, is planning to expand the jam-packed 54,000-square-foot (5,000-square-meter) market to 320,000 square feet (30,000 square meters), Tianyu vice director Zheng Zhexi said.

“As I see it, this is the way of economic development, and it’s something that the people want,” Zheng said. “I think it’s reached a point where it cannot be reversed.”

North Korea declared the area a special economic zone 20 years ago. But after a brief flurry of activity and funding from the U.N. Development Program, the project languished without backing from Pyongyang’s leadership.

Rason has benefited from the shift in Pyongyang’s priorities. When Zheng arrived in 1997 to set up the market, people were hesitant to get involved. Now Tianyu doesn’t have the space to approve even a fraction of the applications from prospective vendors, he said.

“Ordinary people’s sense and the awareness of the market, and their views on the economy — all these have changed a lot,” Zheng said.

Foreign journalists, who typically are barred from local markets, were taken on a strictly controlled, 15-minute tour. No photos, no notes, the guide instructed: “Just use your eyes.”

Vendors, mostly women, stood behind stands loaded with freshly skinned rabbit and live chickens, as well as goods mostly imported from China: blouses, speakers, refrigerators, sofas, shampoo, playing cards, binoculars.

High heels went for 25 yuan (US$4), a Kim Jong Il-style beige suit for 85 yuan ($13) and a container of sea salt for 3 yuan ($0.47).

North Korean tour guide Mun Ho Yong, 25, said his family shops at the market several times a week to supplement state rations of rice, oil and fish.

Everything Mun wore — striped dress shirt, belt, polyester trousers and black dress shoes — was bought at the market except his pin of late President Kim Il Sung attached to his shirt, over his heart.

One major challenge will be to successfully leap from the market’s small-scale commerce to full-fledged manufacturing and trade.

(UPDATE) In an article published later in the New York Times (2011-10-12):

A Chinese company critical to Rason’s development, the Yanbian Tianyu International Trade Company, got involved here 13 years ago. It began by erecting the bazaar, then built the casino, a hospital, a bread factory and a telecommunications building. It is now working on a cement factory, and operates two iron mines.

“The policy environment has been improving continuously,” said Zheng Zhexi, 58, the company’s vice president. “It’s moving towards a market economy.”

He pointed to the official tolerance for the bazaar, where merchants rent stalls from the government to sell goods that they buy from Chinese traders. Prices fluctuate and shoppers haggle. The bazaar has proved so successful that it is expanding to six times the current size.

These kinds of markets have sprung up all over the country to supplement the government’s weak food distribution system. Still, the government is sensitive to their capitalist nature, and some top officials have tried to set limits on them. Foreign journalists were permitted a 15-minute tour of the Rason market on the condition that they not photograph it or take notes.

The market, open just a few hours each day, was bustling, with goods like skinned rabbits, sofas, Sony headphones and Dell computer mice. A soldier with a Kalashnikov slung over his back walked among the aisles, looking to buy, and women running stalls wore red vests, the uniform of officially registered merchants.

In one corner was an office with the English words “Foreign Exchange” above the door. In Rason, currency is exchanged at the market rate — one Chinese renminbi to 350 North Korea won — rather than at the official rate, which values one renminbi at 15 won.

Additional Information:

1. Previous posts on Rason can be found here.

2. Additional information can be found here.

3. Source:
Tending a Small Patch of Capitalism
New York Times
Edward Wong
2011-10-12

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