Archive for the ‘Insurance’ Category

2008 Index of Economic Freedom

Thursday, January 31st, 2008

efindexcover.jpgThe 2008 Index of Economic Freedom published by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal covers 162 countries across 10 specific freedoms such as trade freedom, business freedom, investment freedom, and property rights. Unlike the Freedom House rankings, this is an index, meaning there is a first place winner (who should be rewarded with lots of investment and business creation) and a last place “winner” (who should be shamed into moving up the list for the same prizes)

The bottom ten countries:
148. Venezuela
149. Bangladesh
150. Belarus
151. Iran
152. Turkmenistan
153. Burma (Myanmar)
154. Libya
155. Zimbabwe
156. Cuba
157. North Korea  (unchanged)

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N.K. officials visit Wall Street over access to global financial system: sources

Monday, November 19th, 2007

Yonhap
11/18/2007

A North Korean delegation is visiting Wall Street to meet financiers and attend a seminar that could help the isolated communist country gain access to the international financial system, sources here said on Sunday.

The six-member delegation led by Ki Kwang-ho, a director at the North Korean Finance Ministry, arrived here on Thursday for the two-day-long session, which starts Monday. The U.S. side is to be represented by Deputy Assistant Treasury Secretary Daniel Glaser and other officials involved in ending Pyongyang’s suspected illicit activities.

The visit by the North’s delegation, the first of its kind, comes about one year after the release of some US$25 million in North Korean funds that were frozen at a Macau bank over their alleged connection to money laundering and other illegal activities.

Although the assets were released in a one-time transaction through the international financial system, the North has said it wants full access to the system without financial sanctions from the U.S., which has considerable influence over the global market.

The delegation’s visit also coincides with recent progress in the multilateral negotiations for North Korea’s nuclear disarmament, in which Washington is negotiating with Pyongyang on the removal of the North from its list of state sponsors of terrorism and the termination of the application of its Trading with the Enemy Act.

Washington, one of major shareholders in the International Monetary Fund and other lending institutions, is obliged by law to oppose any loans to countries on the list.

The North Korean financial officials met with financiers at the heart of global finance here Saturday to discuss international financing for the isolated communist state, informed sources said.

Donald Gregg, chairman of the New York-based Korea Society, quoted the North Koreans as saying Friday that they came to learn about ways to get access to the international financial system.

While attending a seminar sponsored by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, the North Koreans asked about know how to join the IMF and other international financial institutions, the former U.S. ambassador to South Korea said.

Another North Korea expert, however, predicted a long and bumpy road ahead for the North, saying the isolated, impoverished communist state needs a lot of manpower, experience and technologies before joining the international financial system.

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Kwon to Seek International Financing for N. Korean Projects

Friday, October 19th, 2007

Korea Times
Lee Hyo-sik
10/18/2007

Finance and Economy Minister Kwon O-kyu plans to call on the global financial community to increase support for North Korea’s economic projects when he attends the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in Washington D.C on Oct.20-22. The country’s top economic policymaker will also ask international financial institutions to allow the Stalinist state to become a member.

Kwon is planning to brief IMF meeting participants as well as U.S. administrative officials and lawmakers on the outcome of the inter-Korean summit between President Roh Moo-hyun and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il early this month.

He has said the government will attract funds from the World Bank and other international financial institutions, as well as from the private sector, for a range of large-scale inter-Korean economic cooperation projects, which is expected to cost billions of dollars over the years.

Hyundai Research Institute projected that the establishment of a special peace zone in the West Sea area and other economic cooperation projects between the two Koreas will cost $11.2 billion (10.3 trillion won). The state-run Korea Development Bank (KDB) and other institutions have put forth even larger spending estimates for the envisioned economic cooperation between the two Koreas _ as much as 60 trillion won over the next 10 years.

While in the U.S., Kwon is also scheduled to meet with the U.S. trade representative Susan Schwab to discuss the ratification of the Korea-U.S. free trade agreement (FTA). He plans to ask Schwab as well as other U.S. administrative and congressional officials to urge the Congress to quickly approve the bilateral trade accord.

He will also have a series of interviews with the U.S. media to promote the trade agreement and publicize the second inter-Korean summit. Seoul and Washington signed the deal in June, and Korea submitted the agreement to the National Assembly last month for ratification.

However, there has recently been growing opposition to ratification of the Korea-U.S. FTA in the U.S. Congress. Many lawmakers, including Democratic Party presidential contender Hillary Clinton, are openly opposing the agreement, claiming it will have negative effects on the U.S. manufacturing industry and job growth. They also said Korea should do more to open its markets to U.S. industrial and agricultural products.

To promote Korea as a regional financial hub, minister Kwon plans to hold a meeting with heads of leading international investment banks and prominent financers to ask for more investment in Korea and increasing cooperation with Korean financial firms.

Additionally, a number of local bankers and heads of other financial institutions will converge in the U.S. capital for the meetings and hold talks with executives from global financial institutions.

Bankers include Kookmin Bank President Kang Chung-won, Woori Financial Group Chairman Bahk Byong-won, Shinhan Bank President Shin Sang-hoon, Hana Bank President Kim Jong-ryul and Export-Import Bank of Korea President Yang Cheon-sik.

Among others, Korean Federation of Banks Chairman Yoo Ji-chang, Korea Asset Management Corp. CEO Kim Woo-suk and Korea Investment & Securities CEO Yoo Sang-ho are flying to Washington.

Marcus Noland Response… 

N.K. needs technical help before joining int’l financial institutions: U.S. expert
Yonhap

10/19/2007

North Korea must first receive technical assistance from international financial institutions before it can join them and begin receiving monetary aid, a U.S. expert said Friday.

Pyongyang, viewed as one of the most secretive regimes in the world, has to provide certain economic data and follow standardized practices and procedures in order to be able to join financial institutions, Marcus Noland, a senior fellow at the Institute for International Economics, told Yonhap in an e-mail interview.

Noland proposed first inviting North Korea in as an observer “to begin the process of education and technical assistance to support their economic transition” into full membership.

North Korea had said it wanted to join such institutions in 1996, but lost all interest after finding out it would not immediately begin receiving money, according to Noland.

Since then, it has not indicated willingness to adopt the transparency and openness required for membership into the institutions, he said.

Outside aid to the North is heavily constrained by various sanctions, notably by the U.S., which brands Pyongyang as a state sponsor of terrorism. The designation requires Washington to vote against monetary loans and assistance programs to North Korea through international organizations, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

In an annual IMF meeting here next week, South Korean Finance Minister Kwon O-kyu is expected to call on the global community to increase support for North Korea’s economic development, and to allow Pyongyang to become a member of global financial institutions.

His recommendations follow an inter-Korean summit earlier this month that highlighted economic cooperation and progress in six-nation efforts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.

Noland questioned whether Pyongyang would be willing to be subjected to the scrutiny required for a membership into the international financial system.

“Frankly speaking, the most important thing that the international financial institutions could immediately provide to the North Koreans is technical assistance,” he said.

“But again, it is not at all clear that they are particularly interested in becoming members of these organizations or reforming their internal practices in ways that would allow them to make full use of membership.”

Such assistance could involve setting up processes, procedures and regulations to reform North Korea’s laws and practices, he said.

North Korea also has to provide the necessary data, a process which international institutions could assist by providing basic standards, such as data collection standards.

North Korea and financial institutions also need to come up with a strategic plan, said Noland. If, for example, Pyongyang wanted to set up a stock exchange, the institutions would assist in starting it and revising relevant laws in the North, he said.

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DPRK Emphasizes Training International Financial Experts

Monday, July 23rd, 2007

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 07-7-23-1
7/23/2007

North Korea is calling for training for financial specialists in order to protect against the pitfalls of credit transactions and currency exchanges. In a recently acquired copy of the latest issue of the North’s economic journal, “Economy Research”(2007, no.2), ‘bank risk’, the term applied to the hazard of potential losses, was explained in detail, stating, “In order to strengthen the improvements made in foreign currency trading, an important issue is that banks, such as the Trade Bank, dealing with overseas debts identify and thoroughly resolve potential threats.”

It is especially exceptional that the North Korean journal fully introduced the bank risk involved in financial transactions within a market-based economic system. This issue also reported on the events of May 20, when movement toward a resolution to the issue of frozen DPRK accounts in the Delta Banco Asia took place.

The journal divided ‘bank risk’ into three categories, ‘finance risk’, ‘credit risk’, and ‘management risk’. Finance risk was defined as, “the risk that a variety of changes within capitalist financial markets could carry with them adverse effects”. Further on, finance risk was divided into ‘foreign exchange risk’ caused by fluctuations in exchange rates, and ‘interest risk’ driven by changing interest rates.

In addition, “Economy Research” also carried pieces on rational management of the banking management system, subjective evaluation of bank risk, and establishing a strategy for preventing bank risk. “The outcome of [strategy for] prevention of bank risk rests entirely on the quality, skill, and roles of workers responsible for bank administration.”

The journal also stressed that even though quality information resources and materials on financial data are available, “if the quality and skill of workers in the banking sector cannot be raised,” then bank risk cannot be understood, analyzed, or evaluated, and an appropriate strategy cannot be implemented. “When workers constantly improve their quality and turn their attention to preventing bank risk…then an appropriate strategy can be set up.”

In one article, training in international financial transactions was called for, with the journal printing, “Even though today’s workers know how to use modern information resources and include financial experts with foreign language skills, they need to be well versed in the changing modern banking sector and international financial transactions.” From the 2002 “Foreign Investor Banking Law’ to last year’s ‘Commercial Banking Law’, established to stimulate private-sector financial transactions, North Korea continues to tweak its financial system. 

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Will Economic Sanctions Have Impact on N. Korea?

Tuesday, January 23rd, 2007

Korea Times
Chang Se-moon
1/23/2007

Obviously, it is important to know the correct answer to this question. Sanctions that have no impact on North Korea’s economy will not change the behavior of North Korean leaders. If sanctions do have a significant impact, the possibility that North Korean leaders may be tempted to resolve the pending security issues through negotiations exists.
In answering the question, however, we need to keep in mind what the British economist John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946) said: “The theory of economics does not furnish a body of settled conclusions immediately applicable to policy. It is a method rather than a doctrine, an apparatus of the mind, a technique of thinking which helps its possessor draw correct conclusions.’’ In plain English, Keynes stressed an unbiased economic way of thinking that could help us draw correct conclusions. In other words, until we review all the facts with an open mind we should not make up our minds.

This is exactly what we will do by assessing the impacts of economic sanctions on North Korea.

The first question that comes to mind is which sanctions are we talking about. If we review U.S. sanctions on North Korea since the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, there would be too many sanctions imposed on North Korea to be practical. There are three important sanctions that are still in effect, however. One is the U.S. denial of a Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status on North Korea’s exports.

This sanction was imposed on North Korea’s exports to the United States on September 1, 1951, following the outbreak of the Korean War. MFN tariffs are the lowest tariffs that are levied on imports to the U.S. Over 99 percent of imports to the United States qualify for the MFN tariffs. Without MFN status, tariffs on North Korean exports to the United States are so high that North Korea simply cannot even imagine exporting anything to the United States.

The second of the three important sanctions stemmed from the bombing of Korean Air 858 by North Korean agents on November 29, 1987. The explosion killed 115 innocent passengers and crew members. On January 20, 1988, North Korea was placed on the list of countries that supported international terrorism according to the U.S. Export Administration Act of 1979.

The importance of this sanction is that placement on the list has made it impossible for North Korea to borrow money from international financial institutions including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Like the denial of MFN status, the placement of North Korea on the list of countries supporting international terrorism continues to this date.

The third of these three key sanctions relates to tightening of North Korea’s illegal financial transactions, which culminated in Banco Delta Asia’s termination of business dealings with North Korea as of February 16, 2006. You may know that Banco Delta Asia had long been suspected of handling North Korea’s illicit activities overseas such as laundering of counterfeit U.S. dollars and sales of illegal drugs

Banco Delta Asia is located in Macao, which is a Special Administrative District of China. Tightening of North Korean financial transactions was extended to North Korean trade during 2006. This added pressure on North Korea originated from U.N. Resolution 1540 following North Korea’s test-launching of long-range missiles on July 5, 2006, as well as from U.N. Resolution 1718 which followed North Korea’s nuclear test on October 9, 2006.

Are these sanctions having an impact on North Korea’s economy? Perhaps, a more accurate question is whether these sanctions are placing enough pressure on North Korean leaders to reconsider the possibility of returning to the negotiation table?

One aspect is the status of North Korea’s trade deficit. As you probably know, North Korea buys from other countries much more than it sells to other countries. When the amount of imports exceeds the amount of exports it’s called a trade deficit. North Korea’s annual trade deficit averaged about $800 million from 2003 to 2005. This figure does not include North Korea’s trade deficit against South Korea, since South Korea appears to consider any financial support to the North as a long-term investment rather than a trade deficit.

How has North Korea been paying for the trade deficit? The ways have been unique. Almost the entire deficit appears to have been financed by weapons sales, illicit activities, and funds flowing from South Korea through joint projects.

In fact, a study by the Korean Institute for Defense Analysis indicates that full implementation of U.N. Resolution 1718 would cause North Korea to lose just about the same amount ($700 million to $1 billion) by stopping exports of weapons and illegal drugs and counterfeit money.

The Economist Intelligence Unit is quoted to have estimated in 2003 that “North Korea earned as much as $100 million a year from counterfeit money, while in 2005, a U.S. task force estimated that “$45 million to $60 million in Pyongyang’s counterfeit currency (primarily in U.S. $100 bills) is in circulation,’’ reportedly, including some in Seoul’s Namdaemun Market.

Assuming that recently added sanctions will cause North Korea to lose about $800 million that it has been earning overseas each year, the next interesting question is how North Korea will pay for the annual trade deficit of $800 million in the future? If North Korea does not pay for its imports, other countries will refuse to sell products to North Korea and the North Korean economy will suffer.

North Korea cannot borrow from world financial institutions because of the 1988 U.S. sanctions that branded North Korea as one of countries supporting international terrorism. They cannot use the money from foreign direct investment because China and Korea are the only two countries that have been willing to invest in North Korea, but the combined amount is not even close to paying for the annual trade deficit.

Think of it this way. If you borrow money every year, and lenders believe that your ability to pay off the debt is rapidly declining, will lenders continue to lend you money? Not likely. With sanctions adversely affecting North Korea’s ability to pay for imports, North Korea will find it increasingly difficult to buy what it needs. The breaking point may not be imminent, but the future is predictable.

This is what I think will happen. North Korea will ask China to increase its foreign direct investment in North Korea by giving China more incentives for such investment. These incentives may include low taxes and free land. North Korea will ask South Korea to send more money.

For instance, as of July 1, 2004, Hyundai Asan and North Korea set the entrance fee to Mt. Kumkang at $10 for a day trip, $25 for a two-day trip and $50 for a three-day trip. On May 1, 2005, these fees were raised to $15, $35, and $70. On July 1, 2006, these fees were raised again to $30, $48, and $80. This is just one way.

North Korea may also ask South Korea to lend it a large sum of money with an empty promise of paying it back. This explains in part why it is so important for North Korea to have leaders of the South Korean government who are friendly to North Korea.

These desperate acts are likely to be very short of paying for the majority of the annual trade deficit. If sanctions continue to be effective, the likelihood of North Korea returning to the negotiation table increases. Economics is rarely boring, especially when it deals with real problems.

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DPRK scores last place in economic freedom (again)

Tuesday, January 16th, 2007

Heritage 2007 Index of Economic Freedom

North Korea’s economy is 3% free, according to our 2007 assessment, which makes it the world’s least free economy, or 157th out of 157 countries. North Korea is ranked 30th out of 30 countries in the Asia–Pacific region, and its overall score is the lowest in the world.

North Korea does not score well in a single area of economic freedom, although it does score 10 percent in investment freedom and property rights. The opening of the Kaesong industrial venture in cooperation with South Korea has been a start in foreign investment.

Business freedom, investment freedom, trade freedom, financial freedom, freedom from corruption, and labor freedom are nonexistent. All aspects of business operations are totally controlled and dominated by the government. Normal foreign trade is almost zero. No courts are independent of political interference, and private property (particularly land) is strictly regulated by the state. Corruption is virtually immeasurable and, in the case of North Korea, hard to distinguish from necessity. Much of North Korea’s economy cannot be measured, and world bodies like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank are not permitted to gather information. Our policy is to give countries low marks for specific freedoms when it is country policy to restrict measurement of those freedoms.

Background:
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has maintained its Communist system since its founding in 1948. A serious economic decline began in the early 1990s with the end of economic support from the Soviet Union and other Communist-bloc countries, including China. Floods and droughts all but destroyed the agricultural infrastructure and led to severe famine and dislocation of the population during the 1990s. South Korean and Chinese investments in the economy have alleviated dire conditions. The government continues to rely on counterfeiting foreign currency and sales of missiles for money. That and the nuclear ambitions and isolationism of Kim Jong Il reinforce North Korea’s status as the hermit kingdom.

Business Freedom – 0.0%
The state regulates the economy heavily through central planning. The economic reforms implemented in 2002 allegedly brought some changes at the enterprise and industrial level, but government regulations make the creation of any entrepreneurial activities virtually impossible. The overall freedom to start, operate, and close a business is extremely restricted by the national regulatory environment.

Trade Freedom – 0.0%
The government controls all imports and exports, and formal trade is minimal. Data on North Korean trade are limited and compiled from trading partners’ statistics. Most North Korean trade is de facto aid, mainly from North Korea’s two main trading partners, China and South Korea. Non-tariff barriers are significant. Inter-Korean trade remains constrained in scope by North Korea’s difficulties with implementing needed reform. Given the lack of necessary tariff data, a score of zero is assigned.

Fiscal Freedom – 0.0%
No data on income or corporate tax rates are available. Given the absence of published official macroeconomic data, such figures as are available with respect to North Korea’s government expenditures are highly suspect and outdated.

Freedom from Government – 0.0%
The government owns all property and sets production levels for most products, and state-owned industries account for nearly all GDP. The state directs all significant economic activity. The government implemented limited economic reforms, such as changes in foreign investment codes and restructuring in industry and management, in 2002.

Monetary Freedom – 0.0%
In July 2002, North Korea introduced price and wage reforms that consisted of reducing government subsidies and telling producers to charge prices that more closely reflect costs. However, without matching supply-side measures to boost output, the result of these measures has been rampant inflation for many staple goods. With the ongoing crisis in agriculture, the government has banned sales of grain at markets and returned to a rationing system. Given the lack of necessary inflation data, a score of zero is assigned.

Investment Freedom – 10.0%
North Korea does not welcome foreign investment. One attempt to open the economy to foreigners was its first special economic zone, located at Rajin-Sonbong in the northeast. However, Rajin-Sonbong is remote and still lacks basic infrastructure. Wage rates in the special zone are unrealistically high, as the state controls the labor supply and insists on taking its share. More recent special zones at Mt. Kumgang and Kaesong are more enticing. Aside from these few economic zones where investment is approved on a case-by-case basis, foreign investment is prohibited.

Financial Freedom – 0.0%
North Korea is a Communist command economy and lacks a private financial sector. The central bank also serves as a commercial bank with a network of local branches. The government provides most funding for industries and takes a percentage from enterprises. There is an increasing preference for foreign currency. Foreign aid agencies have set up microcredit schemes to lend to farmers and small businesses. A rumored overhaul of the financial system to permit firms to borrow from banks has not materialized. Because of debts dating back to the 1970s, most foreign banks will not consider entering North Korea. A South Korean bank has opened a branch in the Kaesong zone. The state holds a monopoly on insurance, and there are no equity markets.

Property Rights – 10.0%
Property rights are not guaranteed in North Korea. Almost all property belongs to the state, and the judiciary is not independent.

Freedom from Corruption – 10.0%
North Korea’s informal market is immense, especially in agricultural goods, as a result of famines and oppressive government policies. There is also an active informal market in currency and in trade with China.

Labor Freedom – 0.0%
The government controls and determines all wages. Since the 2002 economic reforms, factory managers have had more autonomy to set wages and offer incentives, but the labor market still operates under highly restrictive employment regulations that seriously hinder employment and productivity growth.

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N. Korea Faces Suspicion of Reinsurance Fraud

Tuesday, December 5th, 2006

The Fox News and the Korea Times (both stories below) are reporting that a growing number of insurers and reinsurers are growing suspicious of claims made by the North Korean government.  The story of North Korean insurance claims first emerged in September 2006 when the US started closing down DPRK bank accounts across Asia.  Insurers in these cases, though, were allowed to travel to the DPRK to examine the damage, even to sensitive areas. 

The stories below…

Fox News
North Korea Suspected of Collecting Millions in Reinsurance Fraud
Monday , December 04, 2006
By George Russell

[edited] A growing number of major underwriters around the world strongly suspect that communist dictator Kim Jong-Il’s regime is running an elaborate major insurance and reinsurance scam on them, to the tune of tens of millions of dollars or more.

The alleged fraud involves a wide variety of North Korean industrial and personal calamities where insurers have been presented with perfect government-controlled documentation of accidents, including deaths, along with carefully gathered photographic evidence, all compiled in a startlingly brief time.

That paperwork is coupled with a resistance to letting foreign insurance adjusters examine some of the most crucial physical evidence, except after long delays and under a watchful eye, if at all.

The growing concern in the reinsurance industry is that the property damage being claimed is vastly overstated, and the circumstances of some alleged accidents may have been altered, or that deaths for which insurance payment is claimed may have had nothing to do with the accidents.

The number of apparently ordinary people in the dictatorship who have suddenly been found to have foreign-backed life insurance is raising insurers’ eyebrows.  The chief concern is that only the Kim Jong-Il regime controls the information required to trigger the payments.

According to Michael Payton, a lawyer who represents several of the major insurers, the full extent of the reinsurance claims may involve more than $150 million. U.K. insurers facing these claims have only just begun to talk to each other about the potential scale of their North Korean losses.

North Korean insurance risk is also handled in a wide variety of other Western European markets, and as far away as Russia, India and Indonesia.

So far, there is little attempt to begin discussing the fraud possibilities across those national boundaries.

“I’ve never seen anything like it before,” said Payton, senior partner in the London-based international law firm of Clyde & Co., which specializes in insurance law. “The apparent involvement of the state in every detail of these claims, coupled with the impossibility of obtaining the usual corroborative facts independent of the state, makes these claims unique, in my experience.”

The suspected scam involves the huge international market for reinsurance, in which insurers reduce their risk on every kind of accident, from environmental catastrophes and crop failure to airline and auto crashes, by reselling much of their policy exposure to other syndicates of insurers outside their own countries. Huge sums are routinely covered in reinsurance; globally, the reinsurance market last year was valued at some $1.5 trillion.

One of the world’s most important reinsurance markets is Lloyd’s of London, some of whose syndicates are represented by Clyde & Co. But a number of major players in the global reinsurance market have exposure to North Korean claims.

The reinsurance industry has been badly staggered in recent years by huge claims from storms like Hurricane Katrina and terrorist disasters like the Sept. 11 attacks. In such a huge pool of often-complicated risk deals, North Korean reinsurance claims still represent only a drop in the bucket.

Nonetheless, it is a deeply troubling drop, because even though statistics are difficult if not impossible to come by, reinsurance industry sources believe there has been a recent sharp increase in claims coming out of North Korea.

The central focus of concern is the absolute control of ownership and information in North Korea by Kim Jong-Il and his regime. All North Korean insurance is controlled by one state-owned firm, the Korea National Insurance Corporation (KNIC), formerly known as the Korea Foreign Insurance Company, which in turn purchases reinsurance coverage abroad for risks that it has assumed in its domestic market.

Normally, most domestic insurers will use one, or at most two firms of brokers to obtain reinsurance. KNIC may use many, according to industry sources, and the brokers may well have no idea what business their colleagues are doing, or in what reinsurance markets.

“The North Koreans are extremely clever at spotting the gaps in the market,” an industry source says. “There is no transparency.”

Suspicions in London began to gel in July 2005, when North Korea reported that a medical rescue helicopter had crashed into a government-owned warehouse that authorities said was crammed with disaster relief supplies.

The entire contents of the warehouse, which ran to hundreds of thousands of items, were destroyed, KNIC said, submitting within 10 days a list compiled by the relief center of every single commodity that it said had been lost.

Along with the lengthy list came a reinsurance claim for more than 40 million euros, or almost $50 million at then-current rates, for 95 percent of the damages. The reinsurance was placed through London, but the risk was spread among reinsurers worldwide.

“They provided details including tens of thousands of children’s gloves, handkerchiefs, leather gloves, toilet soap and washing soap, within 10 days,” Payton said. “In the chaos which follows an accident of this kind, that is unheard of.

“A similar loss report in Britain might take months to compile.”

The North Koreans also supplied photos of the devastation, which insurers turned over to leading experts at photographic estimates of fire damage. The experts concluded that the volume of debris remaining within the warehouse, as assessed from the photographs, did not support the high volumes of relief supplies that were claimed to be there before the fire.

“The North Korean claims are supported by meticulous paperwork, something at which the North Koreans excel,” Payton said.

“For example, where death certificates and hospital reports are required, the regime’s attitude is ‘tell us what you want, we’ll give it to you.'”

In the case of a ferry accident that allegedly took place last April, near the coastal city of Wonsan, North Korean authorities declared that 129 people had died aboard the vessel after it struck a rock about 1,000 yards off the Korean coast, and only about 100 yards from an island. All of them, the Koreans claim, had been automatically covered with life insurance when they bought their ferry ticket, and that insurance risk had been passed on to the London market through a common reinsurance product known as “excess loss personal accident reinsurance.” Here the claims from reinsurers totaled about 5 million euros, or roughly $6 million.

The North Koreans claimed that most of the victims had died of hypothermia in the freezing water. Industry sources say that when insurance investigators discovered that weather conditions were warmer than claimed at that time, the North Koreans responded that severe winds were blowing from Siberia in the spring, making the water unusually frigid.

When insurers asked for permission to send an independent diver to inspect the ferry wreck, they were refused.

To get North Korea’s side of the story, FOX News approached the regime’s official insurance representative in London, Song Ryon Ko, at his home. Song refused to discuss the issue and hastily closed his door.

Britain’s Foreign Office says the lack of firm proof of fraud is why it hasn’t taken action on the reinsurance issue, although British diplomats say they are aware of it. But as the British government is trying to put limits on Kim Jong-Il’s nuclear weapons program, the lack of an official British reaction could also be an attempt not to rock the boat, as well as to protect its diplomatic presence in Pyongyang.

Other experts on North Korea who are unaffiliated with the British or U.S. governments are much more willing to take the reinsurance industry’s concerns at face value.

“Anything that might be called white-collar financial crime might be an easy target for the regime,” said Alexander Neill, head of the Asia-Pacific security program at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies in London.

“If you look at the Kim family regime or the North Korean regime much more as a criminal organization, but on a state level, I think that’s a better way to look at it. There’s a whole dark underworld of operations which can be undertaken with criminals who are apolitical.”

David Asher, a former senior adviser on East Asian affairs at the U.S. State Department, and coordinator of the Bush administration’s North Korea Working Group, agrees.

While unfamiliar with the current fraud allegations, Asher said he is aware of previous North Korean forgery of insurance policies for its shipping, including fake Lloyd’s of London coverage. “The country will do anything to raise funds,” he said. “They’re not a nation-state, they’re a criminal state.”

Kim Jong-Il’s regime depends on hard currency to maintain its privileged lifestyle and its internal solidarity. Criminal activity is “deep rooted, at every level of government,” Asher said.

Korea Times
12/5/2006
By Jung Sung-ki

The Kim Jong-il regime is suspected of collecting huge amounts of dollars through an international reinsurance fraud, believed to be a new illicit source of hard foreign currency for the impoverished state, a U.S. broadcaster reported Tuesday.

Fox News said a growing number of major underwriters around the world strongly suspect that the regime is running an elaborate major insurance and reinsurance scam on them, to the tune of tens of millions of dollars or more.

The report said the alleged fraud involves a wide variety of North Korean industrial and personal accidents where insurers have been presented with perfect government-compiled documentation of events, including deaths, along with carefully gathered photographic evidence all in a startlingly brief time.

That paperwork is coupled with a resistance to letting foreign insurance adjusters examine some of the most crucial physical evidence, except after long delays and under the state’s watchful eye, if at all, it said.

The report said growing concern in the reinsurance industry is that the property damage being claimed is vastly overstated, and the circumstances of some alleged accidents may have been altered, or that deaths for which insurance payment is claimed may have had nothing to do with the accidents.

The chief concern is that only the Stalinist regime, well-known to be brutal, unscrupulous and desperately short of foreign currency, controls the information required for the payments, it said.

“I’ve never seen anything like it before,” Michael Payton, a lawyer who represents several of the major insurers in the United Kingdom, was quoted as saying by the report. “The apparent involvement of the state in every detail of these claims, coupled with the impossibility of obtaining the usual corroborative facts independent of the state, makes these claims unique, in my experience.”

Payton estimated that the full extent of the reinsurance claims may be up to $150 million, and U.K. insurers facing these claims have only begun to talk to each other about the potential scale of their North Korean losses.

The cash-strapped regime has a worldwide reputation for its criminal dealings in weapons sales, drugs and near-perfect counterfeit U.S. $100 bills.

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North Korea Makes First Insurance Payout to South

Sunday, November 26th, 2006

Korea Times
11/26/2006

A North Korean insurance company compensated a South Korean firm for a car crash at the joint inter-Korean industrial complex in Kaesong, North Korea, for the first time, reports said yesterday.

A bus belonging to the Kaesong Industrial District Management Committee, which legally belongs to the Stalinist North, and a vehicle of the Korea Land Corp., a state-run company of South Korea, collided at the complex on July 12, according to reports.

The South Korean company had its car repaired in the south, but asked a North Korean insurance company to cover the bill, which was estimated to be around 1.1 million won ($1,160).

After consulting both companies, the North’s insurance company decided the bus driver was responsible for 80 percent of the incident, paying some 840,000 won, which was actually paid in U.S. dollars, to the South Korean company on Sept. 21.

Some 21 South Korean firms operate factories, using cheap but skilled North Korean labor in the complex, which opened in June 2004. The number of North Koreans at the complex exceeded 10,000 last week, according to the Ministry of Unification.

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Ministry: Workers’ wages at Kaesong go to supplies

Wednesday, November 8th, 2006

Joong Ang Daily
11/8/2006

Amid continued concern that money spent on the Kaesong inter-Korean industrial complex fuels Pyongyang’s military, the Unification Ministry said yesterday that most of the wages paid by South Korean companies buy daily supplies and food for North Korean workers.

Song Yong-deung, 66, a Korean-Australian who operates a Kaesong-based food and supply company jointly owned by North Korea, told the ministry that his company regularly provides goods to North Korean workers, according to a press release from Goh Gyeong-bin, an official in charge of the complex. Song’s company gets money from North Korean authorities, who in turn accept the wage payments from the South Korean companies operating the complex. The North Korean workers do not directly receive their salaries.

According to data provided by Mr. Song and the ministry, South Korean firms pay an average of $600,000 per month in wages, of which about 45 percent is deducted for fees such as insurance and taxes. In March, after the deductions, a total of $295,000 was paid to the North, of which $219,000 went to Mr. Song’s company to purchase goods, such as rice, for the workers.

Unification Ministry officials said yesterday the bulk of the information provided by Mr. Song matched Seoul’s own assessment on how the money sent to the North is being used. Asked why the ministry has not tried in the past two years since the complex opened to verify how the money sent for wages was being used, Yang Chang-seok, a ministry spokesman, said Seoul has repeatedly asked the North to provide a detailed account of the cash flow, but other than stating the workers bought supplies, little information has been provided.

“Given the nature of the North’s closed society, confirmation itself is problematic,” the spokesman said.

The efforts by Seoul to cast a light on the flow of the money being paid to the North comes at a time when Washington is pushing Seoul to curb inter-Korean projects, citing transparency issues over money sent to the North. Over the weekend, President Roh Moo-hyun vowed to continue with inter-Korean projects in a policy speech addressed to the National Assembly. Currently, there are 15 companies operating at the complex employing 9,632 North Koreans.

The announcement came as U.S. delegation visited Seoul this week to discuss how to implement the United Nations sanctions resolution against the North.

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North finds reinsurance a source of hard cash

Tuesday, September 19th, 2006

Joong Ang Daily
Lee Young-jong, Shin Eun-jin, Sohn Hae-yong
9/20/2006

North Korea has filed claims with British and Russian reinsurance companies after four disasters in the North, and seeks millions of dollars in compensation, a source in Seoul said yesterday. His comments were confirmed by government officials.

The sources said the claims were filed by Minjok Insurance General Company, and asked for payments related to two rail crashes and two other incidents.

Reinsurers help policy-issuing insurance companies spread the risk involved in their policies to other insurance companies around the world. Companies buy “packages” composed of parts of many policies, and share in both the policy payments and claims made under those policies.

The reinsurers reportedly received permission from Pyongyang to conduct investigations at the accident sites before paying the claims; those visits have already taken place, these sources said, adding that the visits were made to places normally off-limits to foreigners.

One of the incidents was the sinking of a passenger ship traveling between Wonsan and Heungnam, both east-coast ports. Half of the ship’s 200 passengers lost their lives, Minjok reportedly told its reinsurers. Industry officials here estimated that the insurance payment would be in the millions of dollars. Another incident was a train accident in South Hamkyong province in April, which resulted in the deaths of 270 soldiers and 400 civilians. Rumors had circulated in Seoul about the latter accident, but those rumors were dismissed at the time by South Korean government officials.

Another train crash occurred near Nampo, a west-coast port, in April. Dozens were reportedly killed in that crash. Little is known about a helicopter crash near Pyongyang in May, these sources said.

“North Korea has been in a bad plight since September 2005, after its assets in Banco Delta Asia in Macau were frozen and the United States announced financial sanctions,” a Seoul official said. “It is my understanding that the North is also trying to press claims linked to flood damage this summer.”

One observer said the North’s rare disclosure of disasters indicates how serious Pyongyang’s cash crunch is. “It means that Pyongyang is more interested in gaining tangible benefits despite the risk of airing its dirty linen in public,” said Yang Moo-jin, a North Korea-watcher at the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul.

Others said Pyongyang may be learning to tweak global financial systems. “North Korean entities have been involved in competition to earn foreign currency, and now one of them is focusing on loss recovery through insurance,” said Lee Yeong-hun, a North Korea economic specialist at the Bank of Korea.

Experts said reinsurance payments to the North are outside the scope of any financial sanctions. “The North is operating all of its legitimate dollar-earning channels at full capacity,” a Seoul official said.

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