Archive for the ‘General markets (FMR: Farmers Market)’ Category

Mt. Baekdu’s 3 Generals Worth a Mere $2.50?

Monday, June 11th, 2007

Daily NK
Han Young Jin
6/11/2007

Recently, portraits of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Sook (Kim Jong Il’s mother) wearing military clothing are being sold at North Korea’s black market, Jangmadang.

“Good Friends” a North Korea support organization, published a newsletter which informed that a portrait of the “3 Generals portrait” was being sold for 7,500 North Korean won (approx. US$2.50) at Jangmadang.

The sale of the “3 Generals portrait” is actually prohibited. Then, how did portraits of the “3 Generals” end up on the black market? Is this a sign that the value of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Sook has plummeted to rock bottom? No way.

In the past, this portrait of “Baekdu Mountains 3 Great Heroes” or otherwise known as the “3 Generals,” was distributed to North Korea’s elite class. However, as the power of money slowly took a stance in North Korea, the “3 Generals” somehow managed to appear in the markets.

People purchasing the portraits are not the elite class. If a person visits the home and sees this portrait hung, they may get the impression that the household was closely related to the elite class. In other words, the home looks as if it has value or is important, hence the demand at the markets.

The sale of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Sook portraits in North Korea is a political offense. If a person is caught selling any portraits, they may end up in a political concentration camp.

However, as people thrive off trade and the value of money spreads throughout the nation, life continues abundantly as long as you don’t get caught. The fact that this item has appeared at Jangmadang just goes to show how much trade as prospered in North Korea.

Further, the source and owners of the portraits are the elite and with a little investigation one can unveil the corruption that is occurring amongst the upper class. As a result, as long as you do not spread rumors about the National Safety Agency and affiliated persons, authorities let you go unnoticed.

The painting is a family portrait with Kim Il Sung dressed as a Chief general on the left, Kim Jong Il dressed in a general’s outfit in the middle and then on the right, Kim Jong Sook dressed in a guerilla uniform.

The “3 Generals’ portrait” first appeared in 1997 about the time of Kim Jong Il’s 55th birthday. At first, the painting was distributed to officers of power including elite officials, generals, courts and the national security and safety agency. The portrait was not presented to average households and hence the “3 Generals” gained its elite status. “We have the 3 Generals in our home” children would say bragging to others.

Nonetheless, this portrait began to be sold on the markets illegally from 1997. This was a time where people died of starvation and Kim Jong Il went around proclaiming “Military First Politics.” Distributing the “3 Generals’ portrait” was all a part of Kim Jong Il’s propaganda for “Military First Politics.”

In the beginning, administrative officers bribed authorities with alcohol and cigarettes in exchange for the portraits. Factory managers would even exchange the goods in the factories and hang the portraits in their own homes. It was not too difficult to obtain the painting if you were closely affiliated to persons with any sort of power including the authorities, military or the government.

Since then, it was common to see the portraits in the homes of the rich. This portrait worth 3,000won in `97 has now escalade to 7,500won following the July 1st economic measure in 2002.

Sale of the portraits began at the place of manufacture Mansudae Art Institution (the national art academy, which is mainly creating works related to Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il). The moment rations were suspended, workers at Mansudae Art Institution began to produce extra portraits and badges of Kim Il Sung, and as a means of survival traded these portraits in exchange for food. With ties to relatives in the country, manufacturers sold portraits of the 3 Generals through the back door.

In additional to this, it is common practice that badges of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il are sold on the black market. There are many badges which vary according to class from badges in the shape of a flag (used by overseas North Koreans) to badges made for authorities and a special badge that was manufactured after Kim Il Sung’s death.

One badge, sold for 1,000won

At first the badges were distributed to elite officials and upper class and then slowly, more and more average citizens tried to obtain one. For example, in the mid-90’s it was rare to see the ‘couple badge’ in the country that it sold for 1,000~1,500won (approx. US$0.3~0.5) each. Accordingly, the cost of the badges has also been affected by market prices.

Dealers who sell the badges appear at the black markets wearing a black jacket. The portraits are hidden beneath the jacket and buyers haggle with the dealer for a good price.

However, not everyone likes the “3 Generals portraits.” A defector who recently entered South Korea said, “Only people who can afford the pictures are interested in buying the “3 Generals portraits.” Otherwise, the average commoner doesn’t care.”

Nevertheless, what would happen if Kim Jong Il found out that the portrait of the “3 Generals portraits” were being sold on the black market? Furthermore, what would happen if he found out that the portraits were being sold for a mere $2.50? He would most probably make an order to close Jangmadang.

If not for the living and trade of average commoners, it would be best for Kim Jong Il not to know this fact. It would be better for Kim Jong Il to be ignorant of this rather humiliating truth.

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Another Lie “We Will Give Rations”

Wednesday, May 30th, 2007

Daily NK
Han Young Jin
5/30/2007

The rice-planting season began at the beginning of May. Consequently, city and provincial safety agencies have adjusted market hours at Jangmadang (markets) affecting the lives of North Korean people greatly, a source informed on the 30th. Even street vendors have been completely prohibited from selling goods on the side alleys of Jangmadang.

Ever since the rice-planting season began, the markets open at 5 o’clock in the afternoon until sunset. Basically, sellers can only trade for 3 hours at the most.

Park(43) who lives in the border regions of North Hamkyung province said, “We live by selling at Jangmadang. I feel like cast a spiders’ web in my throat because the authority forced to close Jangmadang during the farm supporting activity. Leaders of the People’s Units force members to work on the farms and the Safety Agents scowl Jangmadang like an eagle scavenging for food.”

She should support her husband working at a factory which manufactures farming equipment and two sons. Surviving the march of suffering, she began to sell noodles at the markets.

Park said, “If I sell things, at the least, I can make a little money and buy some corn. If I cannot trade for a month, I will have lost all my goods to waste.”

Every year, North Korea endures the rice-planting season and closes Jangmadang partially. Although many people buy rice and corn in advance, it is nonetheless a tough month for the people and acquiring food is a big concern.

“They said they would redistribute rations from April. Lately, they haven’t said anything but to be patient” said Park and added, “Since we cannot afford to have rice, I only hope that the price of corn does not increase.”

Rice which sold at 850 won in early May has already risen more 50 won. Fortunately, corn has maintained its cost at 300 won.

In North Korea, spring poverty season from early March is called as “Yellow Spring,” because the sky is seen yellow for the malnutrition or hunger. The period between end-May to mid-June is the time of “farm hardship (‘barely hump’ in Korean)” Around June 15th, when barley begins to ripen, the “farm hardship” disappears.

Normally as March approaches, people begin to deplete their stored a year worth of food. By May, the 6 months worth of Kimchi that was made in last December has been consumed and people resort to herbs and plants to accompany their meals.

More recently, as trade became common, there have been less cases where people have died from starvation.

It is even uncommon for Park’s husband who works for an agricultural factory to acquire distributions from his work. He is offered lunch when he gets called to fix equipment on the farms but then again, this doesn’t happen every day.

Hyun who trades between Pyongan and Hwanghae said dissatisfied, “They (authorities) said they would distribute rations as of April 1st. The people are angry as they feel they have been deceived once again. It is common practice that rice is lacking during the springtime, but I don’t understand why they keep attracting the people’s discontent by telling lies.”

He said, “People living in Pyongan are in a worse position than people living in the border regions. Traffic control officers roam the district of Moonduk, South Pyongan and regulate merchants by forcing them to the farms.”

Hyun added, “In the past, even amidst starvation, people in Pyongan believed that they were living in such deity because the U.S. ruined the economy. When I went there this time, the atmosphere was certainly different. People are blatantly cursing that the ‘nation cannot even feed and save the people.'”

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The North Korean Economy: Between Crisis and Catastrophe

Thursday, May 3rd, 2007

American Enterprise Institute Book forum
4/17/2007

A couple of weeks ago, I had the opportunity to attend a book forum at the American Enterprise Institute on Nicholas Eberstadt’s new book, The North Korean Economy: Between Crisis and Catastrophe.  It was very informative to hear three different perspectives on the direction of North Korea’s economic reform.

Panelists included:

Nicholas Eberstadt, AEI
Andrei Lankov, Kookmin University
Deok-Ryong Yoon, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy

In summary, Mr. Eberstadt and Mr. Lankov are pessimistic about the North Korean leadership’s desire to enact reforms–knowing that information leakages will undermine their political authority.  As Mr. Lankov pointed out, the North Korean nomenklatura are all children and grandchildren of the founders of the country who are highly vested in the current system.  They have no way out politically, and as such, cannot reform.

They argue that the economic reforms enacted in 2002 were primarily efforts to reassert control over the de facto institutions that had emerged in the collapse of the state-run Public Distribition System, not primarily intended to revive the economy.  Lankov does admit, however, that North Korea is more open and market-oriented than it has ever been, and  Mr. Yoon was by far the most optomistic on the prospects of North Korean reform.

Personally, I think it makes sense to think about North Korean politics as one would in any other country–as composed of political factions that each seek their own goals.  Although the range of policy options is limited by current political realities, there are North Koreans who are interested in reform and opening up–even if only to earn more money.  In this light, even if the new market institutions recognized in the 2002 reforms were acknowledged only grudgingly, they were still acknowledged, and their legal-social-economic positions in society are now de jure, not just de facto.  The North Korean leadership might be opposed to wholesale reform, but that is economically and strategically different than a controlled opening up on an ad hoc basis–which is what I believe we are currently seeing. Anyway, dont take my word for it, check out the full commentary posted below the fold:

(more…)

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Hoiryeong Market Price of Rice Wanes from 1000 to 800 North Korean Won

Tuesday, April 10th, 2007

Daily NK
Kwon Jeong Hyun
4/10/2007

riceprices.jpgAt the end of March, the price of North Korean rice in Hoiryeong City’s jangmadang (market) fell to 820 won per 1kg, around 200 won lower than early January of this year. At a 100 won less value, the price of rice is in a falling state.

The result of Daily NK’s survey of three cities – Shineju, Hoiryeong, Kwaksan – in North Korea’s southern and northern regions at the end of March revealed that the declining price of rice will remain a reality through all regions of North Korea. In Shineju, North Korean rice costs 800 won per kg, 850 won for South-Korean rice, and 700 won for Chinese rice. The price of rice in Shineju is not much different than in January.

The price of corn, which is the staple among North Korea’s low-income, fluctuated narrowly from 340 won at the beginning of the year to 370 won at the end of March. Compared to the decline in the price of rice, the price of corn remaining at the current level can be said to reflect the demand for corn which has been transferred from the demand for rice on a small-scale.

As a whole, the stability of North Korea jangmadang’s price of rice indicates that food supply for North Korean citizens is relatively stable, compared to before. Since the North Korean authorities have not fulfilled the nationwide rations, a large majority of the citizens are purchasing their food at the jang.

In spite of North Korea entering the spring shortage season where the difficulty of obtaining food becomes more severe, the stability of the current price of rice is significant contrary evidence from the position upheld by world’s food organizations or domestic aid organizations of “100,000 tons of food deficit” in North Korea.

The value of the North Korean currency has been in a recession since March. In the Northern region, the currency declined from 3200 won per dollar early this year to 3050 won by the end of March. The Chinese yuan has also declined from 418 won to 360 won. North Korea’s inflation is falling back daily.

The price of North Korean pork at 2500 won per kg does not differ much from early this year. The price of flour, which is rare in North Korea, is 1000 won per kg; it always exceeds the price of rice. The price of North Korean sea foods is still astronomical. The bidding price for one frozen Pollack is 4000 won. That is enough to buy 5kg of rice.

A local source who conducted the price investigation of markets inside North Korea said, “The results of this investigation revealed that the price difference among the North Korean regions is very significant” and “besides medicinal or daily products, the price level in Hamkyungdo is higher than the price level in Pyongando.”

 

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Rice bought, sought at markets in N. Korea: source

Tuesday, April 10th, 2007

Yonhap
4/10/2007

North Korean authorities have scaled back their country’s food rationing system and allowed rice to be bought and sold at open markets in major cities, sources here said Tuesday.

In July 2002, the communist country reduced food rationing and introduced an economic reform program under which wages were raised and farmers’ markets were expanded so that people could buy food. But the policy has zigzagged on the purchase and sale of cereals and rice. 

“Since last year, rumors have spread about the sale at state-run stores as the food rationing system did not function well. Currently, not only corn but also rice is being traded at the markets,” a government source said, asking to remain anonymous because of the sensitivity of the issue.

The source added that North Korean authorities permitted the sale of imported rice at state-run stores. “The authorities hope to clamp down on high rice prices at black markets by diversifying the sources of rice distribution,” the source said. On the North’s black market, the product costs about 20 times more than rice at state-run stores. 

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Foreign Policy Memo

Tuesday, April 3rd, 2007

Urgent: How to Topple Kim Jong Il
Foreign Policy Magazine
March/April 2007, P.70-74
Andrei Lankov

From: Andrei Lankov
To: Condoleezza Rice
RE: Bringing Freedom to North Korea

When North Korea tested a nuclear weapon late last year, one thing became clear: The United States’ strategy for dealing with North Korea is failing. Your current policy is based on the assumption that pressuring the small and isolated state will force itto change course. That has not happened—and perhaps never will.

North Korea’s Kim Jong Il and his senior leaders understand that political or economic reforms will probably lead to the collapse of their regime. They face a challenge that their peers in China and Vietnam never did—a prosperous and free “other half” of the same nation. North Korea’s rulers believe that if they introduce reforms, their people will do what the East Germans did more than 15 years ago. So, from the perspective of North Korea’s elite, there are compelling reasons to resist all outside pressure. if anything, foreign pressure (particularly from Americans) fits very well into what Pyongyang wants to propagate— the image of a brave nation standing up to a hostile world dominated by the United States.

Yet, sadly, the burden of encouraging change in North Korea remains the United States’ alone. China and Russia, though not happy about a nuclear North Korea, are primarily concerned with reducing U.S. influence in East Asia. China is sending considerable aid to Pyongyang. You already know that South Korea, supposedly a U.S. ally, is even less willing to join your efforts. Seoul’s major worry is not a North Korean nuclear arsenal but the possibility of sudden regime collapse. A democratic revolution in the North, followed by a German-style unification, would deal a heavy blow to the South Korean economy. That’s why Seoul works to ensure that the regime in Pyongyang remains stable, while it enjoys newfound affluence and North Koreans quietly suffer.

Do not allow this status quo to persist. Lead the fight for change in North Korea. Here are some ideas to make it happen:

Realize a Quiet Revolution Is Already Under Way: For decades, the Hermit Kingdom was as close to an Orwellian nightmare as the world has ever come. But that’s simply not the case anymore. A dramatic transformation has taken place in North Korea in recent years that is chronically underestimated, particularly in Washington. This transformation has made Kim Jong Ii increasingly vulnerable to internal pressures. Yes, North Korea is still a brutal dictatorship. But compared to the 1970s or 1980s, its government has far less control over the daily lives of its people.

With the state-run economy in shambles, the government no longer has the resources to reward “correct” behavior or pay the hordes of lackeys who enforce the will of the Stalinist regime. Corruption runs rampant, and officials are always on the lookout for a bribe. Old regulations still remain on the books, but they are seldom enforced. North Koreans nowadays can travel outside their county of residence without getting permission from the authorities. Private markets, once prohibited, are flourishing. People can easily skip an indoctrination session or two, and minor ideological deviations often go unpunished. It’s a far cry from a free society, but these changes do constitute a considerable relaxation from the old days.

Deliver Information Inside: North Korea has maintained a self-imposed information blockade that is without parallel. Owning radios with free tuning is still technically illegal— a prohibition without precedent anywhere. This news blackout is supposed to keep North Koreans believing that their country is an earthly paradise. But, today, it is crumbling.

North Korea’s 880-mile border with China is notoriously porous. Smuggling and human trafficking across this remote landscape is rampant. Today, 50,000 to 100,000 North Koreans reside illegally inside China, working for a couple of dollars a day (a fortune, by North Korean standards). In the past 10 years, the number of North Koreans who have been to China and then returned home may be as large as 500,000. These people bring with them news about the outside world. They also bring back short-wave radios, which, though illegal, are easy to conceal. It is also becoming common to modify state-produced radios that have fixed tuning to the state’s propaganda channels. With a little rejiggering, North Koreans can listen to foreign news broadcasts.

But there are few broadcasts that North Koreans can hope to intercept. It was once assumed that South Korea would do the best job broadcasting news to its northern neighbor. And that was true until the late 1990s, when, as part of its “sunshine policy,” South Korea deliberately made these broadcasts “non-provocative.” There are only three other stations that target North Korea. But their airtime is short, largely due to a shortage of funds. Radio Free Asia and Voice of America each broadcast for roughly four hours per day, and Free North Korea (FNK), a small, South Korea-based station staffed by North Korean defectors, broadcasts for just one hour per day.

Being a former Soviet citizen, I know that shortwave radios could be the most important tool for loosening Pyongyang’s grip. That was the case in the Soviet Union. In the mid-1980s, some 25 percent of Russia’s adult population listened to foreign radio broadcasts at least once a week because they were one of the only reliable sources of news about the world and, more importantly, our own society A dramatic increase in funding for broadcasts by Voice Of America is necessary.  It is also important to support the defectors’ groups that do similar broadcasting themselves. These groups are regularly silenced by South Korean authorities, and they have to do everything on a shoestring. A journalist at the FNK gets paid the equivalent of a janitor’s salary in Seoul.  Even a small amount of money- less than U.S. military forces in Seoul spend on coffee-could expand their airtime greatly. With an annual budget of just $1 million, a refugee-staffed station could be on air for four hours a day, 365 days a year.

Leverage the Refugee Community in the South: There are some 10,000 North Korean defectors living in the South, and their numbers are growing fast. Unlike in earlier times, these defectors stay in touch with their families back home using smugglers’ networks and mobile phones. However, the defectors are not a prominent lobby in South Korea. In communist-dominated Eastern Europe, large and vibrant exile communities played a major role in promoting changes back home and, after the collapse of communism, helped ensure the transformation to democracy and a market economy. That is why the United States must help increase the influence of this community by making sure that a cadre of educated and gifted defectors emerges from their ranks.

Today, younger North Korean defectors are being admitted to South Korean colleges through simplified examinations (they have no chance of passing the standard tests), but a bachelor’s degree means little in modern South Korea. Defectors cannot afford the tuition for a postgraduate degree, which is the only path to a professional career. Thus, postgraduate scholarships and internship programs will be critical to their success. Without outside help, it is unlikely that a vocal and influential group of defectors will emerge. Seoul won’t fund these programs, so it will be up to foreign governments and non-governmental organizations to do so. Fortunately, these kinds of initiatives are cheap, easy to enact, and perfectly compatible with the views of almost every U.S. politician, from right to left.

Fund, Plan, and Carry out Cultural Exchanges: The Cold War was won not by mindless pressure alone, but by a combination of pressure and engagement. The same will be true with North Korea The United States must support, both officially and unofficially, all policies that promote North Korea’s Contacts with the outside world. These policies are likely to be relatively expensive, compared to the measures above, but cheap in comparison to a military showdown with a nuclear power.

It makes sense for the U.S. government to bring North Korean students to study overseas (paid for with U.S. tax dollars), to bring their dancers or singers to perform in the West, and to invite their officials to take “study tours.” Without question, North Korean officials are wary of these kinds of exchanges with the United States. However, they will be less unwilling to allow exchanges with countries seen as neutral, such as Australia and New Zealand. In the past, Pyongyang would never have allowed such exchanges to happen. But nowadays, because most of these programs will benefit elite, well- connected North Korean families, the temptation will be too great to resist. in-other words, a official in Pyongyang might understand perfectly well that sending his son to study market economics at the Australian National University is bad for the communist system, but as long as his son will benefit, he will probably support the project.

Convince Fellow Republicans That Subtle Measures Can Work: Some Republicans, particularly in the U.S. Congress, might object to any cultural exchanges that will benefit already-privileged North Koreans. And, for many, funding Voice of America isn’t as attractive as pounding a fist in Kim’s face. But these criticisms are probably shortsighted. As a student of Soviet history, you know that mild exposure to the world outside the Soviet Union had a great impact on many Soviet party officials. And information almost always filters downstream. A similar effect can be expected in North Korea. During the Cold War, official exchange programs nurtured three trends that eventually brought down the Soviet system: disappointment among the masses, discontent among the intellectuals, and a longing for reforms among bureaucrats. Money invested in subtle measures is not another way to feed the North Korean elite indirectly; it is an investment in the gradual disintegration of a dangerous and brutal regime.

North Korea has changed, and its changes should be boldly exploited. The communist countries of the 20th century were not conquered. Their collapse came from within, as their citizens finally realized the failures of the system that had been foisted on them. The simple steps outlined here will help many North Koreans arrive at the same conclusion. It may be the only realistic way to solve the North Korean problem, while also paving the way for the eventual transformation of the country into a free society. This fight will take time, but there is no reason to wait any longer.

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19 Dollars a Month Means Three Corn Meals a Day

Monday, April 2nd, 2007

Daily NK
Han Young Jin
4/2/2007

“100,000 won (approx. US$32.2) doesn’t cut it.” This is a sigh-ridden comment of a North Korean citizen, who states that even if he has 100,000 won, it is not much to spend.

The recent currency depreciation of the North Korean won has been exacerbating the North Korean citizens’ burdens of their costs of living.

Such a situation has been ongoing since the July 1st Economic Measure in 2002, but with the concentration of money in the privileged class, the grim realities of life of vulnerable persons have been becoming more difficult.

Hoiryeong citizen Park Hyun Sik (pseudonym), in a phone conversation with Daily NK on the 30th, stated that “a decent Chinese jumper costs 30,000 ~50,000 (approx. US$ 9.7~16) won for one, 3,000 won for 1kg of meat, and 2,700 won per a bottle of oil. After eagerly awaiting a month, I go to the market with 100,000 won (approx. US$ 32.2), but end up with nothing even though I did not buy much.”

Mr. Park, who conducts the wholesale business of relaying goods received from overseas Chinese emigrants to the provinces, receives a monthly income of 300,000 won. This puts him in a good class in North Korea. Mr. Park’s family, which consists of his wife and son, plans to secure food with this money.

Evidently, a family of four needs 50kg (50,000 won) of rice, which costs 1,000 won per kg, and 20 kg (7,000 won) of corn, which costs 350 won per kg, to survive. Additionally, the cost of buying a bottle of bean oil at 2,700 won as well as pepper powder, vinegar, garlic, onions and other vegetables is almost equal in value to the cost of buying rice.

On top of this, the family says they eat pork meat about once a month, which costs 3,000 won per kg. The rest of the money goes to the three family members’ clothing and cigarettes and drinks for Mr. Park, all of which cost about 300,000 won. Even then, Mr. Park tends to be on the well-fed side.

Working Citizens Cannot Eat Meat Even Once A Month

Kim Jung Ok (Alias), who sustains her living through a noodle business in the Hyeryung South Gate jang (market), has a monthly living expense of approximately 60,000 won. Ms. Kim is a housewife, who has taken on the responsibility of her three-member family.

Even if she sells noodles all day, she only makes 2,000~3,000 won. She merely earns around 60,000 won per month, all of which goes to food. Making a profit from her business is a mere dream, she expresses. She cannot even think about rice; after buying 70 kg of corn (23,000 won), bean oil, beans (950 won per kg) and other vegetables, she has nothing left.

The monthly income of her husband, who works at a machine shop in Hoiryeong, is 4,000 won. That is enough to buy 4kg of rice. Fearing starvation if she solely depended on her husband, she opened her noodle shop 10 years ago. “Even if we are both working like this, it is barely enough for corn meals. It is difficult to buy a kg of meat in a month. It has been a long time since I fed meat to my child,” she confessed.

Currently, with the exception of storekeepers who trade with Chinese emigrants, foreign currency traders, and those who have relatives in China, a majority of residents in Hoiryeong live daily as Mr. Park.

Recently, the Ministry of People’s Safety Agency issued the order that “Rations will be distributed in April. So, stop engaging in illegal trade.” Due to this decree, the control of the jangmadang (market) has been tightened. Discontent among residents who sell Chinese industrial products has climaxed, “How can we live if they feign ignorance while not providing the rations?”

The regulation of jangmadang (market) by ministry officials has only raised the price of Chinese industrial products. Before that, there would be joint bargains, but now, purchasers are visiting the merchants and so the costs of products are going up.

On one hand, the influence of the dollar’s recent bearish turn in the international market is fully reflected in the North Korean black market. The exchange rate of 800 won to a dollar between the Chinese Yuan and the dollar remains unchanging, but the North Korean currency following suit to the dollar and the Yuan changes day to day. Ultimately, North Korea is not “a region with a fixed exchange rate” due to the fact that exchange merchants occasionally apply the exchange information received from China.

Due to the dollar’s slump, the ratio of the North Korean won to the dollar and to the Yuan has been on the decline for several months. Mr. Park said, “In January, the North Korean currency went up to 42,000 won per 100 won RMB, but has drastically gone down to 36,500 won per 100 won.”

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Stop Illegal Trade! Rations Will Begin April

Thursday, March 29th, 2007

Daily NK
Han Young Jin
3/29/2007

North Korean inside source informed that authorities had been asserting control over illegal selling and use of mobile phones at the markets near the border regions. National Security Agents have also been conducting in-depth investigations on illegal acts such as drug smuggling and slave trade.

In a telephone conversation with a reporter on the 28th, Park Jong Run (pseudonym) of Musan, North Hamkyung said, “Authorities came to the People’s Units and said furtively, ‘Rations will be distributed in April. In future, you will live a good life. So, stop engaging in illegal trade.’ Why would we listen to them when they tell us to stop selling especially since they aren’t going to give us distributions anyway?”

Park relayed, “They said, don’t sell our confidential information about our country through the mobile phone. People already in possession of mobile phones will be forgiven if they self-confess at the National Security Agency.” Since last year, North Korean authorities have been keeping a close watch on mobile phone use particularly in the border regions.

He said, “They threaten us with a declaration, so that we will report cases of illegality or corruption such as slave trade and drug trade.” For example, large amounts of drugs were found in the home of a Chairwoman for the Women’s Union of Hoiryeong City, late February.

According to Park, authorities will directly carry out the procedures at Jangmadang (markets) themselves, with assistance from Hoiryeong Security Agency and various police departments. Some goods found to be linked to illegal trade are in part taken away by the sudden wave of control. In particular, these authorities have a keen eye for goods made overseas such as Chinese items.

National Security Agents and the police confiscate the items arguing that, “now we have a gap between the rich and poor, as well as the richer getting richer and vice versa, because you, tradesmen have tasted some money. Now, socialism has been infected by capitalism.” However, even the security agents are acting tactful by removing only some of the goods as a mere example of punishment.

Goods confiscated are locked up at the security agency and kept in provision. The endless lines in the waiting rooms of the security agency make up the people ready to pay a fine and recollect their items, says Park. Nonetheless, security agents are reluctant to return the goods back to the traders and so bribes must be ready at hand also.

“I barely got my goods back after bribing them with 10 packets of cigarettes, but there was only half the goods left remaining in the bundle” Park criticized and said that the security agents sarcastically remarked, ‘Hey, let us eat and live a little.”

Following the nuclear experiment, authorities have been trying to gather regime support and elevate the nation’s pride arguing the nation had become a strong militaristic country. They proclaim, “The world is cooperating with us and is throwing their goods at us. In future, you will live well.” It will be difficult for North Korean authorities to prohibit trade, especially with the people’s strong will power to make money.

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North Korea Lacking a Million Ton of Food…Inflated Figures?

Wednesday, March 28th, 2007

Daily NK
Yang Jung A
3/28/2007

The World Food Programme (WFP) revealed that North Korea had for the first time admitted that they were lacking a million ton of food.

Recently, Tony Banbury, WFP Asia Director spent 3 days on location with officials from the North Korean Agriculture Ministry and Foreign Ministry where the food situation was discussed.

On the 26th, Banbury told Reuters, “This is a very significant development that they themselves are confirming they have a gap of 1mn tones.”

Director Banbury informed that the WFP and other sources had provided for North Korea’s food variance which equated to about 20% of the nations needs, however that these sources had already been wasted.

Disputably, these figures made by Mr. Banbury do not correspond to the figures on North Korea’s crop yields. Some even criticize that it was inappropriate of the WFP to directly quote comments made by North Korean officials.

According to a source by the DailyNK, the cost of rice has remained at 800~900 won(US$0.25~0.29). Especially with the forthcoming cyclic hardships of spring harvest, these figures suggest that market costs are actually stabilizing.

Since the breakdown of the distribution system, many North Koreans have resorted to purchasing rice at the markets. In North Korea, the cost of rice is a good representation of market conditions, and considering that rice prices are showing constancy is evidence that there have not been drastic setbacks as a result of the rice distributions.

In comparison to last year where flooding made the food crisis chronic in various districts throughout North Korea, the situation hasn’t really deteriorated. Rather, the continuous inflow of food and hence trade from China has helped maintain market prices, North Korea-China tradesmen say.

Earlier this year, the Rural Development Administration in South Korea estimated North Korea’s food production to be 4.3mn tons. Evidence from a defector who once worked at North Korea’s food distribution ministry and past analysis on crop production suggests that North Korea would not have incurred a food crisis in the case it had produced more than 4mn tons of output.

Simply put, 4.3mn tons of production is at the least enough to maintain the lives of North Korean citizens. Undoubtedly, in a society like North Korea, this figure could initiate a food crisis and starvation in the lower class. However, inflating the shortage of food may only cause exhaustion of essential aid.

In addition, some argue that international organizations are actually provoking this vicious cycle in North Korea by decreasing the real amount of food produce.

Recently, North Korean analyst Marcus Noland published a report, ‘Famine in North Korea’ where he argued that about 50% of international food aid was being consumed by the military and, or the elite class.

In the report, he said, “The North Korean government consistently sought to frustrate transparent, effective humanitarian relief” and that, “Diversion is almost certainly occurring on a large scale, enough food to feed between 3 to 10 percent or more of the North Korean populace. Some of this aid is almost surely consumed by politically connected groups, including the military.”

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Jangmadang, Market Competition Unlike the Past

Friday, March 23rd, 2007

Daily NK
Kim Young Jin
3/23/2007

Many North Koreans are saying that making money is different to the past. With the sudden wave of North Korea’s Jangmadang (integrated markets) spreading throughout the nation and with the whole population diving in trade, competition is soaring high. Individualism has intensified so much that the average person openly remarks that family and friends mean nothing when it comes to money.

In mid-March, Kim Jae Chun (pseudonym, 42) of Musan, North Hamkyung province, went to visit his relatives in Yanji, China. He said, “Nowadays, you cannot make a profit by operating small-trade… Selling goods has become tough as there are so many vendors now, even around the areas of Jangmadang, though their stores may not be legitimate.”

Kim’s wife sells rice nearby the Jangmadang in Musan. Up to a year ago, she would easily sell 10kg of rice. These days, she is lucky to sell even half. Normally, 100won (10% of the rice) remains as profit after selling 1kg of rice (1,000won). Simply put, Kim’s wife income has reduced from 1,000won to 500won.

Kim said, “People who own large-scale businesses sell expensive products targeting the rich or elite officials. Though these goods are different, nowadays, it has become hard to make money with rice, noodles or by selling a couple of clothing items.”

Nonetheless, Kim did agree that some business was better than no business. At the least, trade meant that you would not die of starvation.

He explained, “If you want to earn big cash at Jangmadang, you need to possess goods with greater value. If you want to earn even more money, people say, go to the integrated markets.”

“Lately, as people become experienced in trade, the more they are becoming obnoxious. Maybe it’s because they only think about money, it seems like a battlefield. There are even cases where friends and family become distant or ignored altogether. Why should we help each other out they argue since everyone has it touch,” he said.

When inquired whether or not relatives neglecting each other was an incident which had started during the food crisis, Kim responded, “Back then, it was because people really didn’t have anything. The problem is that today, people are not willing to help, even if they have something to share. People neglecting one another during the times where distributions were terminated is different to people who now only think about money.”

Lim Gil Man (pseudonym, 44) who had traveled with Kim from Chongjin agreed with Kim. He said, “In the past, people acted the way they did because they were starving to death. Today, people either stick by others with power or engage in corruption, with more and more people focused on making money.”

“Despite this, selling itself is not so bad. Compared to the times where we were all poor, at least now since there are some rich people, we can sell goods, and we have come to live more independently.”

As competition increases between North Koreans, it is expected that profits will continue to decline. The general populace of merchants trading in the North Korea-China region suspect that unless North Korean authorities propose reform measures to control the spread of markets, this wave of marketing will produce negative effects, with the possibility of rising antagonism amongst the people.

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