Archive for the ‘General markets (FMR: Farmers Market)’ Category

The Way to Survive for Farmers

Saturday, June 21st, 2008

Daily NK
Jung Kwon Ho
6/21/2008

The price of rice in the jangmadang has been on the decline since June. The rice price which had risen to 3,000 won at one point is now at 2,400 won per unit (1kg in North Korea), which was the standard in the beginning of April. With the upcoming potato harvest season and spreading the news that U.S.’ food aid will come, the forecast has also been proposed that the food crisis will be mitigated from a climax in mid-June. However, even though it is not at a life and death situation, the hunger of citizens still continues. The Daily NK, through the testimonies of three witnesses who came out of North Korea between May and June, got a glimpse into the lives of North Korean citizens.

Mr. B is a farmer in a county, Hwanghae Province. He met with a reporter while visiting relatives in China early last month, when the food shortage was severe in North Korea.

B said that food in Hwanghae Province, traditionally a granary area, is absolutely insufficient. Since the mid-90s, food has not been adequately distributed and a vicious cycle of food crisis and a lack of an effort by farmers have been occurring.

Regarding the cause of the reduction in the volume of food production, B noted, “You could possibly name several reasons, but the most important factor is the lack of earnestness by farmers. It is difficult to find people who work with consciousness. There is no reason to work, because even if people work hard, there is no food provision. In the 80s, before Kim Il Sung’s death, the estimated corn yield per unit of an area (approx. 2.45 acres) was even up to 10 tons. After his death, the yield has been about 3 tons per unit area.”

In June in Hwanghae Province, the reaping of wheat and flour begins. Accordingly, the food crisis can temporarily recover. If wheat and flour are produced, around 20 kilograms are distributed. However, these are excluded from the total distribution from the autumn harvest.

He stated that North Korean farmers have been finding a way to get by on their own for last 10 years after the March of Tribulation in late 1990s, due to the unstable food provisions. He cited three methods of survival for farmers in Hwanghae Province: “private farming, pilfering grains of farms, and doing business.”

Furrows are allocated to farmers for private farming

Because distributed food for individuals has not been enough, he said that land has been allocated according to the number of family members so that private farming could be carried out. This means, the authorities distribute no filed of the farm, but furrows and footpaths in the farm, so that farmers could plant peas or potatoes between crops.

“The state was supposed to provide 280kg of unpolished grain after a year of farming by the farmers, but only 120~130 kg are provided, which is not sufficient for the year. So all kinds of other crops are planted in the furrows and shared among the people. Furrows do not have to be registered with the state, so they can be operated independently. In Jaeryong County, Hwanghae Province, such methods have first been adopted. Half of the Province has started to employ this method.”

In actuality, the production volume of potatoes planted among corn furrows exceeds that of state potato farms. Mr. B said, “Farmers are zealous about planting potatoes in the furrows, because it has to do with private profits. They share over 50kg amongst each other. This helps get over the difficult month of June.”

Mr. B said that 150kg of food was produced from private field cultivated on an inclined plane of a mountain and in his home site. He said, “After discussions with the mountain surveillance directors, they have agreed to give a 30% of their production, even plant some trees, and engage in farming. If the deal is not kept, however, the steep land on mountains is not given to them for the subsequent year.”

B explained that besides private farming, another critical method of survival for the citizens in Hwanghae Province is pilfering grain under the control of the state. For several years, national provision has not been carried out properly, so coping methods by farmers have also become more aggressive.

He said, “Before harvesting officially the farm’s crops, farmers pilfer grains on fields every night. These stolen grains are actually their lifeline for the next year. Farmers are saving corn and rice for a year in this way.”

He said that the amount of food secured by farmers via such a method is different from person to person, but in the Jaeryong plain, people have been able to secure up to one ton of food. Through that rice, people are able to acquire daily necessities and send them to relatives in the cities.

During falls in North Korea, it is a well-known fact that the farmers and the state frequently scramble for grain. As a result, the North Korean authorities, since three years ago, have dispatched nation widely the People’s Safety Agency Political College students and have engaged in food recovery operations.

“Hide the food in a pigsty.”

B said, “Even a few years ago, there were a lot of people whose food were confiscated by the students, but the situation is different now. However, even last year, food was not preserved in the homes, but was hidden under the floor of pigsties or buried underground and covered with garlic fields. During last year’s harvesting season, the citizens benefitted this way and have been able to get by until now.”

However, he said that people who are who is honest and forthright or the elderly inevitably have a difficult time in the battle for pilfering grain.

Mr. B added, “Going out to the fields at night and gathering enough food before the harvesting period is a life and death matter. Without stealing, one ends up starving, so who would just sit there?.”

He additionally introduced a different style of persons belonging to a farm besides farmers. He said “There are about five traders in agricultural districts per work unit which consists of 50 households.” According to him, the managers of work units call them “8.3.” The name stuck after Kim Il Sung’s decree on August 3rd that necessities of daily life were to be independently produced in factories or work units. These people are often deployed by farms to be in charge of civilian projects ordered by the state. When the state demands necessary commodities, money or food from farmers under the pretext of support for the army or national construction, these traders take charge of the management.

They are the ones who go around to secluded villages and purchase 2~3 tons of corn and pea from the villagers in exchange for rice, oil, seasonings and flour, which usually produces a profit of 50 to 100 won per kg. But they have to sell over 15kg per day in order to buy a kilogram of corn.

B said, “Most of the people get by from private farming, theft, or doing business, but a minority do not even have any know-how to do that, so are in adversity. They have to endure the spring shortage period, skip meals, or eke out an existence on porridge. As a last resort, they borrow food at a high rate of interest and get by. Such a pattern is repeated the next year, so their debt only increases and they end up in even more desperate situations.”

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North Korea’s continuing social change

Friday, June 20th, 2008

The Daily NK posted a fascinating interview with a local North Korean merchant.  He provides interesting anecdotes of everyday life:

Tongil Market (Featured in A State of Mind):

Nowadays, the way to survive is selling in the jangmadang (market). With the exception of the residents of the Joong-district and its vicinity, who are often mobilized to national events, seven out of 10 households do business in the jangmadang. In the Pyongyang Tongil (unification) Market alone, the number of people doing business is between 5,000~6,000 people. The size of a street-stand is approximately 50cm by 50cm large. There are also about 2,000 people selling outside of the market.”

“There are people also selling in the alleyways. The Tongil Market usually consists of people from the Tongil Street, so merchants from the other regions cannot do business there. In the Tongil Market alone, there are around 8,000 people [doing business]. Because the Market is so large, the cadres from the other regions frequently come to buy goods.”

Even in North Korea, capital enhances worker productivity: 

Mr. A said that in the markets, the sale of industrial goods (all kinds of products such as clothing brought from China) and cosmetics are supposed to be lucrative. The traders usually bring in about 5,000 won per day and 15,000 won per month. Such an amount of money can buy about 2kg of rice per day. The people who make a lot of money are the marine product merchants. They make around 7,000~8,000 won per day. Marine products are often purchased by officials who have money and rice.

The people in the lowest class do not have the capital to do business, so a majority of them sell noodles or food. They make about 1,500 won per day, which can purchase about a kilogram of corn. People who sell food sell rice, sidedishes, and snacks on site. To them, selling is a battle to survive.

Coping mechanisms:

Mr. A relayed that not-so-affluent households raise several domestic cattle, collect medicinal herbs or brew liquor to sell. The remnants of the liquor are used as livestock feed. Selling two bottles of liquor made of corn as raw material generates about 500 won in profit. However, the authorities have strictly been regulating brewing liquor in homes, resulting in difficult situations. If exposed for making liquor, both the person-in-charge and the People’s Party Unit chairman are banished to the countryside.

Beekeeping is seasonally supposed to be lucrative. In May when the acacia flowers start to bloom, the number of people who collect honey in the mountains increases. In the surrounding areas of Pyongyang, there are at least trees on the mountains, so beekeeping has been feasible. One person can collect about 100kg of honey per month by keeping around 15 beehives. The honey is usually consumed by people who want to use it in medicine or by officials.

Work overseas:

“The utmost goal of workers in Pyongyang is to go to another country to earn money. Recently, they have even gone to the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Once they leave, they do not return for three years. They can go back or stay in Pyongyang. Workers who have gone to Russia or to Congo for farming come back with 10,000~20,000 dollars in three years.”

“With that money, they can buy a house and prepare a significant amount of capital for business. Those who have gone abroad not only do the work ordered by organizations, but also engage in private farming, do business and save as much money as they can. There have been a quite a few people around me who have gone abroad recently to make money this way. Out of 100 male workers, there is at least one or two. In order to go overseas, one has to pay 300~400 dollars in bribes.”

Read the full article here:
Doing Business Is a Battle
Daily NK 
Jung Kwon Ho
6/18/2008

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Border guards and North Korea’s food shortage

Monday, June 16th, 2008

Last autumn, Chinese rice sold for 900 won/kg in northern North Korea.  The Chinese Yuan’s appreciaiton, combined with food export restrictions, caused North Korean rice prices to increase to about 2,000 won/kg this year.

Where does this money go, and what can these prices tell us?

According to an article in the Daily NK, this is how the retail rice price breaks down: 

37,600  won = purchase price for 25kg sack of Chinese rice
10,000 won = DPRK border guard bribe
+ 3,750 won = Chinese smuggler commission (150 won/kg x 25kg)
51,350 won = Korean smuggler purchase price (2,054 won/kg x 25kg)
+ 3,750 won = Korean smuggler markup (150 won/kg)
55,100 won = Retail vendor purchase price (2,204 won/kg x 25kg)

If the above numbers are true, combined middlemen commissions (Chinese and Korean smugglers) comprise just 13% of the retail price, bringing them just over $1USD per 25kg bag (appx 3,000 won=$1USD).  This indicates the field is fairly competitive.   In fact, border guards make more than both the Chinese and North Korean smugglers combined, for much less effort.  In all fairness to the border guards, they have families to feed as well and each probably paid a hefty amount for his job.  Besides, if they were not so corruptible, North Korean food prices would be higher.  Since North Korea can’t get rid of their border guards, the next best thing we can hope for is lots of corrupt ones.  If the market is competitive, North Korean consumers could see rice prices fall up to 18%.

Read the Daily NK article here:
What Is the Truth of the Food Crisis in North Korea?
Daily NK
Moon Sung Hwee
6/6/2008

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Haggard, Weeks op-eds on DPRK food crisis

Friday, May 23rd, 2008

Newsletter from Marcus Noland
5/23/2008

Linked below are three op-eds written with Steph Haggard and Erik Weeks addressing the looming humanitarian crisis in North Korea which have appeared recently in Newsweek International, the Korean Herald, and OpenDemocracy, respectively:

“Asia’s Other Crisis” – Newsweek International
 
“Famine in North Korea? The Evidence” – Korean Herald
 
“North Korea: The Next Famine” – OpenDemocracy

 A longer policy brief addressing North Korea’s hunger issues can be accessed at:
 
“North Korea on the Precipice of Famine”
 
Finally, from the Shameless Commerce Division, Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid and Reform will soon be released in paperback.  In anticipation, Columbia University Press is trying to reduce its inventory of the hardcover edition, and through 31 May has put the book on sale for the extraordinarily low price of $7 (the discount appears once you add the book to your shopping cart).  Act quickly while supplies last!:
 
“Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform” – Columbia University Press

(NKeconWatch:  With an honest sales pitch like that, you should probably buy two copies)

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Food shortage coping strategies

Saturday, May 10th, 2008

With the likelihood that food is coming into short supply in North Korea, the authorities and individuals alike have implemented strategies to minimize the adverse effects.

I am keeping a running list of official and civil responses here as they appear in the media.

1. The DPRK supposedly ended rations for mid-level cadres (party and state employees), though food can still be purchased in markets. Unless the government is hoarding its grain supplies, this probably has the effect of improving food distribution (transferring food stocks outside Pyongyang), though not to the satisfaction of those who were used to receiving it for “free.”

2. The DPRK asked China for food aid. (Requested 150,000: tons of corn. Received: 50,000 tons on their first ask)

3. Propaganda extolling people not to waste food has been distributed to workers.

4. The DPRK has started cracking down on liquor production/sale.

5. Lets grow potatoes!

6. Distributing food stocks to military families from military warehouses.  This will hopefully take some of the pressure off the price of grains in the markets.

7. Solicit food aid from the US.

8. Officials begin to demand more bribes!

9.  The KPA halts military exercises to assist in farming.

10.  Propaganda campaign to educate the population about alternative foods (Good Friends via OneFreeKorea)

11. China increases food export quota

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North Korea on the Precipice of Famine

Tuesday, May 6th, 2008

Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper
May 2008
Stephan Haggard, University of California, San Diego
Marcus Noland, Peterson Institute for International Economics
Erik Weeks, Peterson Institute for International Economics

Download the paper here: haggard_noland_weeks_pb.pdf

Abstract:

North Korea is on the brink of famine. As detailed [in this policy brief], the margin of error between required grain and available supply has virtually disappeared. Local food prices are skyrocketing even faster than world prices. Aid relationships have been soured and the regime’s control-oriented policy responses are exacerbating distress.  Hunger-related deaths are nearly inevitable and a dynamic is being put in place that will carry the crisis into 2009, even if as expected, the US announces that it is sending 500,000MT in return for a signed nuclear declaration.
 
The US can provide aid in ways that maximize its humanitarian impact while limiting the degree to which aid simply serves to bolster the regime.  We know that aid is diverted.  Yet given the fragmented nature of markets in North Korea, diverted aid often finds its way into markets in the catchment area where it is delivered.  Geographically targeting aid to the most adversely affected regions and providing it in forms such as barley and millet that are not preferred by the elite can increase the ameliorative impact of assistance.  The Bush Administration has taken up the first part of this equation–requiring that most of its contribution to the World Food Program be targeted at the worst affected regions–but it could do more on the second part: providing aid in forms less preferred for elite consumption. It can also encourage others such as South Korea to follow suit.
 
The US should also exercise quiet leadership with respect to the refugee question as well. The Chinese government’s practice of returning North Korean refugees may reflect a natural self-protective response against the threat of a flood of migrants and even the breakdown of the North Korean regime; it was, after all, the notorious “hole in the fence” that helped precipitate the collapse of the Eastern European regimes. But the policy of returning refugees does not conform with China’s obligations under the refugee treaty and does not in the end serve the country’s underlying political objectives either; it simply serves to cutoff another escape valve, however small, that has contributed to taking pressure off of a rapidly deteriorating situation.

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Peterson Institute event featuring Marcus Noland

Friday, May 2nd, 2008

On Wednesday I attended a panel discussion featuring Marcus Noland, co-author (with Stephan Haggard) of Famine in North Korea, and three North Korean defectors.  Here is the video of the event.  Below is the information on the event from the Peterson Institute website:

Press release (slightly updated w/ comments from the talk)
North Korea is once again headed toward widespread food shortage, hunger, and risk of outright famine. According to Peterson Institute Senior Fellow Marcus Noland, “The country is in its most precarious situation since the end of the famine a decade ago.”

figure-1.JPG

Click for larger view

Calculations by Noland and Stephan Haggard, University of California, San Diego, indicate that the country’s margin of error has virtually disappeared. For technical reasons, estimates produced by the United Nations’ World Food Program and Food and Agriculture Organization (total demand) probably overstate demand implying recurrent shortages year after year (figure 1 above). Noland and Haggard argue that in recent years available supply has exceeded more appropriately calculated grain requirements (adjusted total demand) but that this gap has virtually disappeared. “This is a yellow light about to turn red,” says Noland.

 figure2.JPG
Click for larger view

Food prices have almost tripled in the last year, skyrocketing at a rate faster than either the overall rate of inflation or global food prices (figure 2 above). Anecdotal reports describe a breakdown in institutions and increasingly repressive internal behavior. Noland and Haggard forecast that the North Korean regime will ultimately weather this challenge politically by ratcheting up repression and scrambling, albeit belatedly, for foreign assistance.

The North Korean food crisis, now well into its second decade, presents a difficult set of ethical choices. North Korea is critically dependent on food aid, but the government has recklessly soured its relations with the donor community. Yet in the absence of vigorous international action, the victims of this disaster will not be the culpable but the innocent. As of this writing, it already may be too late to avoid at least some deaths from hunger, and shortages of crucial agricultural inputs such as fertilizer are setting the stage for continuing food problems well into 2009.

Paper presentation
Noland discussed two recent papers, written with Haggard and Yoonok Chang, Hansei University, which are based on a pathbreaking survey of more than 1,300 North Korean refugees in China (11 different cities).  The survey provides rare and extraordinary insight into both life in North Korea and the experiences of the refugees in China.

Paper 1: Exit Polls: Refugee Assessments of North Korea’s Transition 
Results from a survey of more than 1,300 North Korean refugees in China provide insight into changing economic conditions in North Korea. There is modest evidence of slightly more positive assessments among those who exited the country following the initiation of reforms in 2002. Education breeds skepticism; higher levels of education were associated with more negative perceptions of economic conditions and reform efforts. Other demographic markers such as gender or provincial origin are not robustly correlated with attitudes. Instead, personal experiences appear to be central: A significant number of the respondents were unaware of the humanitarian aid program (40%) and the ones who knew of it almost universally did not believe that they were beneficiaries (96%). This group’s evaluation of the regime, its intentions, and accomplishments is overwhelmingly negative—even more so than those of respondents who report having had experienced incarceration in political detention facilities—and attests to the powerful role that the famine experience continues to play in the political economy of the country.

Paper 2: Migration Experiences of North Korean Refugees: Survey Evidence from China 
Chronic food shortages, political repression, and poverty have driven tens of thousands of North Koreans into China. This paper reports results from a large-scale survey of this refugee population. The survey provides insight not only into the material circumstances of the refugees but also into their psychological state and aspirations. One key finding is that many North Korean refugees suffer severe psychological stress akin to post-traumatic stress disorder. This distress is caused in part by their vulnerability in China, but it is also a result of the long shadow cast by the North Korean famine and abuses suffered at the hands of the North Korean political regime: first and foremost, perceptions of unfairness with respect to the distribution of food aid, death of family members during the famine, and incarceration in the North Korean gulag, where the respondents reported witnessing forced starvation, deaths due to torture, and even infanticide and forced abortions. These traumas, in turn, affect the ability of the refugees to hold jobs in China and accumulate resources for on-migration to third countries. Most of the refugees want to permanently resettle in South Korea, though younger, better-educated refugees prefer the United States as a final destination.

Other speakers: Several North Korean defectors also spoke as part of North Korean Freedom Week here in Washington DC.  Comments and biographies below:

Kim Seung Min: Founder and Director of Free North Korea Radio, the broadcasting program providing news and information to North and South Korea and China. Kim attended both elementary and high school in Pyongyang before serving in the North Korean Army. He escaped from North Korea to China in 1996 but was arrested and repatriated. While traveling from Onseong to Pyongyang to face punishment for leaving the country without government permission, he jumped from a moving train to escape to China again and eventually made his way to South Korea. He worked as a laborer at a coal factory in Yenji, China, until his uncle in South Korea helped him to escape to South Korea. He attended Yonsei University and Graduate School at Joong Ang University, where he received a Master of Arts degree. After serving in leadership roles in the North Korean defector groups, he founded Free North Korea Radio, which was available on the internet beginning April 2004 and began broadcasting on shortwave in December 2005 with regular daily broadcasting beginning in April 2006. (Born 5/6/62 in Jangang Do, North Korea)

*Mr. Kim was a captain in the KPA for 16 years.  He talked about how soldiers were no better off in terms of access to food than ordinary North Koreans.  Starting in 1986, the DPRK state limited food supplies to the military to only rice, leaving the generals up to their own devices for feeding the army.  This led to a break-down in discipline and now people resent the personal behavior of many soldiers who are looking for food.

Kang Su Jin:Founder and Representative of the Coalition for North Korean Women’s Rights, the only organization focused specifically on increasing awareness of the horrors facing North Korean women in China, the role of women in democratizing North Korea, empowering and encouraging North Korean women who have resettled in South Korea, and building cooperation with other organizations. Kang was a member of the elites from Pyongyang and was the Manager of Supply from 1991 to 1998 of the Bonghwasan Hotel in Pyongyang, the biggest hotel in Pyongyang, which catered to high-ranking party and army officials and was used for special events. When food distribution stopped in Pyongyang in 1996, the regime announced that all hotels had to operate on their own, and conditions became very difficult for the workers. Kang visited China and saw how much better off the people were and decided to defect to South Korea. (Born 10/23/66 in Pyongyang, North Korea)

Kim Young-il:President and Founder of People for Successful Korean Reunification (P-SCORE), an organization founded in the fall of 2006, specifically to ensure the successful reunification of the Koreas would not adversely affect the South Korean economy. To that end, PSCORE, chiefly composed of young people, studies other reunification models, informs about the human rights conditions in North Korea, and prepares and educates young North Koreans to be ready to help lead a reunified Korea. Because Kim was not born into an elite family in North Korea, he was not allowed to attend university and was destined to become a coal miner after serving his mandatory military service. While in the military he witnessed many people including soldiers dying of starvation. His own uncle died of starvation and his cousins were left to wander the streets. His family made the decision to defect to China in August of 1996 instead of starving to death in North Korea. They survived there for five years bribing the police not to turn them in until they safely defected to South Korea in January 2001. Lim received a BA in Chinese from Hankook University of Foreign Studies in August 2006. (Born 4/10/78 in Hamheung, North Korea)

*Mr. Kim still communicates with people in the DPRK on a regular basis.  He said that the price of rice inside the DPRK is sensitive to external supply shocks (or even the rumors of external supply shocks).  This means that reports of aid cut offs could result in temporary domestic price spikes even if aid is delivered.

UPDATE: Photo and coverage in the Daily NK.

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Food situation in Ryanggang Province

Saturday, April 26th, 2008

According to the Daily NK, many mid-level civil servants who used to receive enough rations to live on have now resorted to trading in the markets with the civilians.

“Since April, the government has only been giving out provisions to the head of each department of the People’s Safety Agency in Hyesan, Yangkang Province. As for the remaining staff, only 15-days worth of one-serving provisions have been supplied. The discontent among the agents of the People’s Safety Agency over the discrimination is quite significant.”

“With conditions worstening, those who have not been engaging in sales until now—the Provincial People’s Committee or the Municipal Committee leaders and average schoolteachers, doctors and their families—have been coming out to the alleyway markets. They do not even have a street-stand in a jangmadang, so they sit illegally in the alleyways, but the People’s Safety agents in charge of regulating the jangmadang have been reluctant to take action against them because they know who these people are.”

Is anyone starving?  Thankfully, it seems not yet..

In response to the question as to whether people have begun to starve to death as a result of the food shortage, the sources confirmed, “We have not reached that point yet.”

Our contact in Yangkang Province said, “During the ‘March of Starvation’, we did not even have brewers’ grains to eat, but now, people feed that to the pigs. It is true that living conditions have become a bit more difficult with the rise in food prices, but it has not reached the point of starvation.”

The Hoiryeong source also said, “With the significant rise in food price, the quality and the amount of rice have fallen quite a bit, but people have not been starving for days at a time. People who previously consumed only rice are now mixing rice and corn 50/50, and those in more dire situations eat 30/70 or 20/80.”  

The food situation in Ryanggang is probably better then most of the country on average due to its proximity to the Chinese border.

The full story can be read here:
The Price of Rice Has Risen, But Not to the Point of Starvation
Daily NK
4/22/2008
Lee Sung Jin

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Pyongyang’s newest market…

Friday, April 25th, 2008

As North Korean Economy Watch readers are aware, this site hosts the most authoritative mapping of North Korea on Google Earth (click here to download).  Google Earth recently updated its North Korea imagery requiring me to update a colossal amount of information.  This update (version 10) will be released by the end of May.

Growing influence of entrepreneurs
While updating information on Google Earth, one has a chance to compare how things have changed over the course of a few years.  One of the interesting changes in Pyongyang is the emergence of a new market about 5 blocks east of the Tower of the Juche Idea (pictured below).  It seems to have replaced an older market formerly located on the city’s outskirts at the end of the trolley line.  In the past, street markets (or “jangmadang”) like this have been held on the outskirts of the city.  This new, more convenient location (near peoples’ homes) is a testament to the growing importance of these markets, and their budding entrepreneurs, in meeting the needs of the North Korean people.  

pyongyang-market.JPG

Click on the image to view full size.

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Market activity flourishes in the DPRK

Thursday, April 24th, 2008

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 08-4-21-1
4/21/2008

The March issue of “Rimjingang”, a magazine publishing stories on life inside North Korea as reported by defectors and those still inside the DPRK, contains an eye-opening report on activities in North Korea’s markets.

Since 2003, North Korean authorities have legalized DPRK markets throughout the country. The previously existing farmers’ markets were remodeled into ‘combined’ general markets and all traders were permitted to sell their wares. After the legislation was passed, even in Pyongyang general markets emerged in each neighborhood.

According to the magazine, more than 60 markets have been set up, with each market housing around 50 traders. The use of mannequins at clothing stores and attractive price tags used to catch the eye of the shopper are in force. These days, it is not even surprising to hear cassette players extolling the virtues of a particular vendor’s goods. Sellers here do not speak abruptly to customers as they might in a State-run store. In markets, one can hear respectful language used even to children. These are not ideas taught by the labor bureau, but rather independent ideas put to use by the sellers.

Stalls selling a variety of seafood can also be found in a number of markets. Mackerel, squid and flatfish from the East Sea are among the surprisingly fresh products on display. This seafood is not on display courtesy of the North Korean government, but rather is delivered by private entrepreneurs running refrigerated trucks from the coast to Pyongyang. According to the magazine, a number of delivery services are in operation, providing goods to the highest level of North Korean society.

Around Pyongyang, a number of flower sellers have also popped up in the capitalist markets. It is custom to give flowers whenever there is an event in honor of Kim Il-sung or Kim Jong-il; but these days it is also popular for couples to give each other flowers as gifts. Even before the emergence of these markets, there was nothing that couldn’t be found in Pyongyang as long as someone had the money to purchase it.

Currently, women under the age of 39 are prohibited from working in markets, and efforts to extend this restriction to women under 49 have raised tension with many women trading in the markets. ‘Good Friends’, an organization aiding North Korea, has reported that recently thousands of women have organized in protest against security forces in the farmers’ market in Chungjin.

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