General markets (FMR: Farmers Market) « North Korean Economy Watch

Archive for the ‘General markets (FMR: Farmers Market)’ Category

Tax? What Tax? The North Korean Taxation Farce

Monday, April 5th, 2010

Daily NK
Yoo Gwan Hee
4/5/2010

In North Korea, April 1st is commemorated as “Tax Abolition Day.” Ever since the law, “On Completely Abolishing Taxes,” was ratified through the Supreme People’s Assembly on March 21, 1974, North Korea has claimed both within and without to be the only country in the world that does not collect taxes. However, their claim is only for propaganda purposes, for North Koreans labor under a list of state-imposed taxes and duties which grows longer day by day.

Take the example of electricity. Power distribution center members in every city and town visit households in their region alongside the chairperson of the local People’s Unit, whereupon they collect electricity payments according to the number of electric bulbs and electronic equipment therein. This process is done quarterly. In the late 1990s, the quarterly electricity bill per household in Pyongyang was about 20 won. To reduce costs, of course there were people who removed electric bulbs and hid electronic equipment such as irons whenever the power distribution center had workers in their neighborhood.

Since the 2002 economic management reforms were announced on July 1, however, electricity bills have increased greatly. For families living in luxurious apartments in the Jung-district of Pyongyang with televisions, refrigerators and electric fans, households pay as much as 800 or 900 won per quarter.

After the so-called July 1 Reform Measure, troubles between the power distribution center and the people increased. The North Korean people were understandably displeased with the power distribution center, for it was trying to collect money for a utility whose availability was and remains far from regular.

Next, let’s look at reserve food and organizational expenses. North Korea has nine levels of food distribution. From 100g to 900g is supposed to be distributed per day depending on the level, but for the purpose of stocking up reserves, up to 100g is collected from the people instead. Additionally, people are forced to submit approximately two percent of their salary for organizational expenses.

Next, to support for the construction of historical sites. North Korea emphasizes the “voluntary participation” of the North Korean people under the Party apparatus and workers’ organizations. Construction of historical sites for the idolization of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il is frequently organized. Also, officials often collect money from people in order to support those construction projects of which the cabinet is in charge.

Then there is free education. It is officially called “free education,” but school administration expenses are all covered by students and parents. Students have to collect waste paper, waste iron and waste rubber, or raise rabbits and submit the pelts to school. After 2000, there have even been students engaging in business around markets in order to provide supplies for submission to the school.

Onwards, then, to market stands rental fees. After the July 1 Reform Measure, the amount of tax collected at markets suddenly increased. Market stand rental fees already existed before the July 1 Reform Measure but, after 2002, market management centers started collecting market management tax as well, basing it on each product sold. Noodle sellers paid ten won per day, while soybean curd sellers paid three won.

Market stand rental fees became more systematic as well after general markets opened in late 2003. According to the product being sold and daily sales figures, market management centers charged rental fees. In present-day Nammun Market, Hoiryeong, the stand rental fee is said to have been fixed at 100 won per month.

Separate from the stand rental fee, monthly tax is charged on products for sale in the markets. For example, Nammun merchants pay additional taxes of 300 won for industrial goods, 180 won for pork, 150 for cigarettes, alcoholic drinks and fish, 120 won for food and 100 won for general merchandise.

So, while the North Korean media deliver their diet of propaganda promoting North Korea as the world’s only taxless country, be wise to the reality of the North Korean people suffering under an increasing tax burden.

Posted in Education, Electricity, Energy, Fiscal & monetary policy, Food, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Labor conditions/wages, Public Distribiution System (PDS) | Comments Closed

DPRK official reaffirms intention to close markets

Sunday, April 4th, 2010

Ugh…I really don’t know what to say at this point. Depressing.

According to the Associated Press (via Forbes):

“In the early days immediately after the currency change, market prices were not fixed, so markets were closed for some days,” Ri Ki Song, a professor at the Institute of Economy at North Korea’s Academy of Social Sciences, told APTN. “But now all markets are open, and people are buying daily necessities in the markets.”

Ri was provided by the North’s government in response to a request to talk to an official who could explain its economic situation. It is very rare for North Korean officials to discuss such policies with foreign media.

Impoverished yet nuclear-armed North Korea has in recent years allowed some free markets for food and consumer items, while others not sanctioned by the state have also sprung up as the public copes with declining living standards and food shortages.

“Outside Korea, many people have been talking loudly about problems that occurred during the change of currency in our country, but there wasn’t any of the social disorder that they have been talking about,” Ri said. “Now the situation is being stabilized overall, and the economy is functioning well, thanks to some of the measures that have been taken.”

Ri insisted the government’s objective is to phase out markets completely and rely on a state-controlled network of outlets to supply its citizens.

Read the full article here.

There is no shortage of posts on the DPRK government’s growing antagonism towards markets in the last several years.

The Heritage Foundation reminds us all that the DPRK has languished at the bottom of the international Index of Economic Freedom for years and asks, “how low can you go?”

The Daily NK tells us that times are pretty tough for many in the DPRK right now:

A source from North Hamkyung Province confirmed as much yesterday in a telephone interview with The Daily NK, saying, “Lower class people, who live from hand to mouth through the markets, have been suffering from the most serious difficulties since the redenomination.”

This is because for around two months the markets were shut down completely, and even after the markets reopened market price ceilings were adopted, so small traders and those who lived by relying on the markets were among those hit hardest, according to the source.

“Those running street-stands, alley market traders, porters and others who live by clinging to the markets mostly lost their money in the redenomination. Although markets have started to get animated again, these people are still facing difficulties due to a lack of seed money.”

The source added, “The food situation is actually dire. Despite the authorities’ program of releasing relief rice to poor households, in reality real distribution for them is not that helpful.” This is because any such state relief program is temporary, and cannot address the poorer classes’ fundamental problems.

He emphasized, “Now, people have started worrying about spring poverty, which comes every year in around May or June. In Onsung, Hoiryeong and Musan in North Hamkyung Province, the rice price has dropped to around 400 won per kilogram, but there are still so many people who cannot even afford to eat corn.”

The source gave the example of one of his acquaintances, whom he called Mr. Lee. He used to live by trading secondhand products in Musan.

Pre-redenomination, Mr. Lee managed around 200,000~300,000 won (in old value) of assets, dealing parts and used bicycle tires with his wife. However, following the currency redenomination of November 30, 2009, he was left with 1,900 won of new currency.

To make matters worse, he had only 100 kilograms of corn, which he had obtained in October. His family has been eking out that corn over the last few months.

Since February, the Musan Market resumed operations, but since prices have been unstable, not many people have wanted to buy. Recently Mr. Lee was forced to sell his one-room house to realize some capital.

As the source concluded, “The most terrible victims of the currency redenomination, market closures and inflation are lower class people in the cities. Nowadays, city residents feel lucky when they have just coarse corn.”

“In May or June, when the spring poverty period begins, the situation of the urban poor class will become even more terrible.”

Here is a satellite image of the Musan Market.

Posted in 2002 Economic reforms, Food, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market) | 2 Comments »

Behind the ecenes in North Korea’s markets

Saturday, March 27th, 2010

According to the Daily NK:

In recent days there has been a sudden decrease in both food prices and the North Korean won-dollar exchange rate, so people are looking at the activities of middlemen wholesalers, the lynchpin of the North Korean market economy, in more detail.

These wholesalers, who had been watching the market situation and waiting for the new currency to stabilize, are now making their move. The markets reopened in February, and restrictions on foreign-currency use have been eased. Rice prices, which had skyrocketed to more than 1,300 won per kilogram in late February, have reportedly fallen back below 600 won as the food which these wholesalers were hoarding entered circulation.

Meanwhile, the North Korean authorities’ plan, to take back control of the economy, came to nothing as they faced a hyperinflationary spiral. Currently, the economy seems to have simply returned to the pre-redenomination period, with markets providing most of the needs of the people, and wholesalers providing products for the market.

Until the early 1990’s, commercial distribution in North Korea was managed by executive fiat. The Ministry of Commerce of the Cabinet commanded the supply chain across the whole country via the works of the National Planning Commission. There was a central wholesale center, a commercial management center and a district wholesale center in each province, and a commerce management center in each district. The state maintained a pyramid control system beneath which each district managed its own commercial spaces.

According to size, these were classified into stores and booths, and into “general” and “special” according to the items sold.

However, after the famine of the 1990’s, state distribution ceased and North Korea’s national commercial network lost its capacity to function. From then on, North Korean people started obtaining their food and basic necessities through private distribution networks, and the jangmadang was spontaneously born.

This private distribution network soon came to include a small quantity of consumer products, so called “August 3 products,” produced in small industrial enterprises and circulated in the jangmadang, and foreign, mostly Chinese, products imported with the profits of trade.

Then, after the July 1st Economic Management Reform Measure of 2002, provincial factories that produced consumer goods started bartering between themselves. During this process, the distribution system expanded and the number and scale of the wholesalers expanded with it.

A cornucopia of items, from welding rods to belts, cotton yarn to copper wire, bearings and the nuts and bolts needed in factories and enterprises were traded through these wholesalers. A paper mill which needed 10kg of welding rods, for instance, could barter 20 notebooks for them. In order to exchange soap for 10kg of welding rods, 10 bars of soap were required. In the case of soju, a traditional liquor in both Koreas, two or three liters was needed.

Provincial factories also traded their production in order to earn the necessary funds to purchase needed materials and run the factories. This was done with the approval of the state through the five percent of booths in the markets allocated to factories after the July 1st Measure. Also, it was possible because the authorities permitted the by-products of regular production to be used for handicraft production, and factory workers to sell 30 percent of production in the market.

Under the changes, the wholesalers were classified into larger ones, called “vehicle traders,” smaller ones called “runners,” and retailers representing booth merchants. They shouldered the burden of providing North Koreans all over the country with their basic necessities.

These middle men wholesalers, known colloquially as “big hands,” get their stocks through trade with foreign currency-earning enterprises. They sell the products to “runners” or directly to stores. Big hands are mostly overseas Chinese, Korean Japanese and the families of those working in foreign currency-earning businesses.

Members of the Party administrative apparatus are another kind of middle wholesaler. It is impossible for them to officially run a business in the markets, so they earn money through middle wholesale after work. They make a huge amount of profit by buying products from factory enterprises at the state price and selling them at the market price. They also sell products accumulated through bribery.

“Runners” who obtain products from the wholesalers travel the different regions of North Korea and sell them to booth retailers. Making a profit through market price differences between regions, they sell those products to retailers at a price 30 percent to 40 percent higher than the price they paid.

One defector, who ran a “runner” business between Chongjin in North Hamkyung and Sinuiju in North Pyongan, bought fabric from traders in Chongjin and sold it in Pyongsung in South Pyongan. With the money earned in Pyongsung, he bought products and sold them in Sinuiju. He went along this same Sinuiju-Pyungsung-Chungjin route back and forth. He was like an 18th century Korean peddler.

Talking of his experiences, he said, “When travelling by train, I could usually make a 30 to 40 percent profit. But there wasn’t much left after paying the necessary bribes.”

When he bought fabric in Chongjin, he paid about 500 to 550 won (in old currency) per meter. When he sold that fabric to retailers in Pyongsung market, they paid him about 800 won per meter. He made about 300 won per meter, but he spent half the money on bribes paid to gatekeepers; for documents, to army troops in charge of trains, and to train inspectors during the process of issuing travel certificates or riding the train. He also had to pay for his board and lodgings, so the final profit he made was less than 100 won per meter, he explained.

Runners like that, going between North Pyongan and North Hamkyung, usually distribute things like fabric for shoes that traders bring across the border or in through Rasun. A runner usually carries between 150 and 200 kilograms of products. When travelling on the train, one person can only carry one or two backpacks-full, because anyone carrying too much baggage will be the target of inspection and have to pay bigger bribes.

Products transported by runners are sold to retailers in the markets. Retailers sell those products at a price 20 to 30 percent higher than the original price. Therefore, the fabric Kim conveyed was sold to the final consumers at approximately 1,000 won per meter.

It seems that the figures North Korean authorities wanted to eradicate via the redenomination were these middle wholesalers, the big hands. For primary producers, paying them with adequate rations and money alone could have wrestled back state control. Retailers, meanwhile, could be controlled by locking up the markets. However, the persistent viability and energy of the middle wholesalers was uncontrollable. This is primarily because low and middle-ranking authorities are working in total collusion with them.

Now, middle wholesalers who survived the carpet bombing of the North Korean authorities, such as the 100:1 currency exchange rate, the exchange limit of 100,000 won and the restriction on usage of foreign currency, are getting ready again. The second round between the North Korean authorities and middle wholesalers with the market as its stage is about to begin. It will be interesting to see how those middle wholesalers who have grown strong will react to the actions of the North Korean authorities.

Wholesalers at Forefront of Market Battle
Daily NK
Yoo Gwan Hee
3/27/2010

Posted in 2002 Economic reforms, Banking, Cabinet, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Ministry of Commerce, Public Distribiution System (PDS) | Comments Closed

Economy stabilizes before Supreme People’s Assembly meeting

Friday, March 26th, 2010

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 10-03-24-1
3/24/2010

It has been reported that food prices in North Korea have leveled out in the latter half of March. An informant from North Hamgyeong Province told Daily NK on March 21 that “nonglutinous rice is 950 Won (per kilogram), corn is 220 Won (per kilogram), and pork is 1,800 Won (per kilogram).” The same source stated that prices in the Onseong town market, Namyang Market, prices were similar. It appears that the prices have dropped because of the increase in overseas food assistance to the North and the fact that emergency rations are now being sold on markets.

Of course, there is no guarantee that the current prices will hold steady in the future, and there is no shortage of people voicing concerns that with the spring lean season approaching, rising food prices and instances of starvation could be unavoidable. On February 4, North Korean authorities dictated that rice could not be sold for more than 240 Won/Kg, and that corn must be sold for 130 Won/Kg or less. Along with the fall in the cost of rice, foreign currency exchange rates also appear to be falling. On March 21, the Yuan traded for 100 Won, and one dollar sold for 720 Won.

According to Daily NK, in the Nammun Market of Hyeryeong city, glutinous rice sold for 900 Won/Kg, while corn went for 500 Won/Kg. On the 13th of last month, (polished) rice cost 1,200 Won/Kg, while corn sold for 550 Won/Kg. The exchange rate was 1 Yuan:120 Won and 1 USD: 1,00Won.

On March 20, the Korean Central News Agency reported that the second session of the North’s 12th Supreme People’s Assembly would open in Pyongyang on April 9. While the agenda was not revealed, the assembly meets each spring, generally to settle the previous year’s budget and set the spending schedule of the current year. There is no reason to believe this year would be different.

At this assembly meeting, it is also likely that new members of the National Defense Commission, Cabinet, and other high-level administrators will be sworn in. In particular, with the aftermath of failed currency reforms and growing reports of starvation throughout the country, there will likely be new economic measures introduced along with the replacement of some officials.

Posted in Agriculture, Food, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market) | Comments Closed

Foreign exchange and smuggling again prevalnet in North Korea

Friday, March 26th, 2010

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 10-03-22-1
3/22/2010

Foreign currency swaps and illegal trade are again prevalent in North Korea, despite recent currency reforms and bans on money exchanges.

Following last November’s currency reform, there has been a significant crackdown on the use of foreign currency and cross-border trade by individuals. However, reports indicate that North Korean traders continue to conduct business with outside entities, despite new regulations requiring them to remit profits through the Korean ‘Kwangson’ Bank. There has been a crack-down on unauthorized transactions, but it appears to have been ineffective.

The Korean Central Bank and Chinese People’s Bank established the Kwangson Bank in 2004 in Dandung as part of the North’s efforts to earn foreign capital. Even today, North Korean authorities rely on the Kwangson Bank to handle trade accounts, but most North Korean traders despise using the bank, and conduct most of their transactions privately, avoiding authorities. This is because the bank has a reputation for seizing the profits of private traders. The official decision to funnel foreign funds through the Kwangson Bank was part of the effort to crack down on smuggling, and was in conjunction with other currency reform efforts.

Economic reform attempts included crackdowns on illegal activity for a short time, but black market currency trade and smuggling has again become commonplace. Reform efforts were aimed at reducing unregulated and illegal trade by requiring transactions to be carried out through a government bank, but the costs associated with such a transaction further encouraged black market activity.

It also appears that currency exchange, banned as part of last year’s currency reform, is now again being allowed in order to ease rising prices and other detrimental side effects of the measures.

In North Korea, not only traders, but also average citizens are earning foreign capital through smuggling and other means. The latest reversal of policy to again allow currency exchange is seen as an attempt by authorities to sooth rising discontent within the masses.

In November of last year, North Korea implemented currency reforms and issued new notes, devaluing the currency by 100:1 and banning private holdings of foreign currency. This led North Koreans to lose faith in the value of their currency and sparked a drive on foreign monies. Now, the government appears to be implementing measures to underscore the value of the Won and to stave off inflation. Foreign visitors are allowed to again spend foreign currency and it appears that other restrictions are slowly being lifted.

Posted in Banking, Black markets, Central Bank, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, Foreign Trade Bank, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Korea Kwangson Banking Corp. | Comments Closed

Reports of worsening conditions in DPRK

Tuesday, March 23rd, 2010

This week there have been several reports about conditions worsening following the DPRK’s currency reform. Here are links to some of those stories:

New Signs of Unrest in North Korea?
Peterson Institute
Conversation with Marcus Noland (audio)
March 22, 2010

Resistance against N. Korean regime taking root, survey suggests
Washington Post
Blaine Harden
March 24, 2010

Political Attitudes under Repression: Evidence from North Korean Refugees
Stephan Haggard, Marcus Noland
East West Center Working Paper
No. 21, March 2010

North Koreans fear another famine amid economic crisis
Los Angeles Times
Barbara Demick
3/23/2010

North Koreans fear the country is on the verge of a new famine
Times of London
Jane Macartney
3/20/2010

According to the AFP, the US is ready to provide food assistance but the North Koreans banned assistance a year ago:

The United States would consider resuming food aid to North Korea if Pyongyang moves to lift a year-old refusal of humanitarian assistance, the State Department said Tuesday.

“There are profound needs for the North Korean population, and to the extent that North Korea wants to accept aid from the international community, including the United States, we will be willing to consider that,” department spokesman Philip Crowley said at a daily briefing.

In June 2008, Washington agreed to send 500,000 tonnes of food aid to North Korea, including 400,000 tonnes through the UN’s World Food Program and the remainder through other non-governmental agencies.

In March last year, however, the hermit nation began refusing US food aid, without offering a reason.

“If we (provide humanitarian assistance) in the future, just as we’ve done that in the past, our efforts will be to make sure that the aid actually goes to the North Korean people who need it most and is not diverted to other groups such as the military,” Crowley said.

Posted in Banking, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, Food, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Revolt | 2 Comments »

Kang Chol-hwan on Hamhung

Thursday, March 11th, 2010

From the Choson Ilbo:

I visited Hamhung many times before defecting to South Korea, and whenever I went I felt distinctly uncomfortable. Hooligans clustering at the railroad station glared at the goods carried by pedestrians and provoked quarrels if they thought you were looking at them. At construction sites in Pyongyang, the word was that Hamhung people were wild. Often there were gang fights at project sites where tens of thousands of youths from different regions had been mobilized, and Hamhung youngsters were always the most violent. The city was home to the greatest number of organized gangs, and even police officers couldn’t handle them. Hamhung also has more access to outside world as it is an intermediary place through which all things coming in through the northern border with China pass.

As long as 20 years ago, markets in Hamhung were so active that almost everything was available there. It was here, among other cities, that market traders rioted in the wake of a recent disastrous currency reform since they suffered greater damage due to the bigger size of the markets.

I also got the impression that many young people in Hamhung listened to South Korean broadcasts, and those who didn’t know South Korean pop songs were treated as country bumpkins. The people there struck me as more resilient than in any other city, and that may be a reason that the city often sees public executions.

Read the full story here:
Kim Jong-il’s Visit to Hamhung Is a Bad Sign
Choson Ilbo
Kang Chol-hwan
3/11/2010

Posted in Black markets, Civil society, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market) | Comments Closed

North Korea: It’s the Economy, Stupid

Thursday, March 4th, 2010

Nautilus Institute Policy Forum Online 10-015A
Aiden Foster-Carter
3/4/2010

Too many Kim Yong-ils

Korean names can set traps for the unwary. Amid a multitude of Kims, almost all unrelated, North Korea adds an extra twist. German speakers, and some others, tend to mispronounce the J in Kim Jong-il as a Y. Not only is this incorrect, but currently it can confuse; for North Korea’s Premier – head of the civilian Cabinet, as distinct from the Dear Leader who chairs the more powerful National Defence Commission (NDC) – is named Kim Yong-il.

To add to the confusion, another Kim Yong-il was until recently vice foreign minister (one of several), but in January became director of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK)’s international department: a post apparently vacant since 2007. As such, this Kim Yong-il met his Chinese counterpart Wang Jiarui, head of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s international liaison department, when Wang visited Pyongyang in early February. Since his promotion, Kim Yong-il 2 (as it may be best to call him) has been reported as frequently at Kim Jong-il’s side. This suggests he may see far more of the Dear Leader than does anyone else involved in DPRK foreign policy, including the man hitherto thought to be the eminence grise on that front: first vice foreign minister Kang Sok-ju, who negotiated the 1994 Agreed Framework with the US. It was Kang whom the current US special envoy on North Korea, Stephen Bosworth, demanded to meet when he visited Pyongyang in December, rather than the North’s main nuclear negotiator Kim Kye-gwan: a more junior deputy foreign minister.

Or is Washington behind the curve? That Kim Yong-il 2 is the DPRK’s new foreign affairs head honcho seemed confirmed on February 23, when he turned up in Beijing and went right to the top: going straight into talks with President Hu Jintao and separately with Wang Jiarui. This flurry of activity suggests two possibilities. Either Kim Jong-il will soon visit China, as he is overdue to do; or North Korea may return to the nuclear Six Party Talks (6PT), which have not met in over a year. Or perhaps both, if we are especially fortunate.

If both Kim Yong-ils are now leading players, perhaps one of them could change his name? That is not a frivolous suggestion. Some DPRK officials do this, for no clear reason. Often the change is small, so this is not a case of deception. Thus Paek Nam-sun, DPRK foreign minister – meaning chief meeter and greeter rather than top negotiator – from 1998 until his death in 2007, was originally Paek Nam-jun. Ri Jong-hyok, who as vice-chairman of the Asia-Pacific Peace Committee (APPC) now handles relations with the South, was Ri Dong-hyok in the 1980s when this writer knew him as head of North Korea’s mission in Paris.

(For completeness, yet another Kim Yong-il was Kim Jong-il’s late half-brother. He died of liver cirrhosis in 2000 aged only 45 in Berlin, where he had a diplomatic posting tantamount to exile – as his elder brother Kim Pyong-il, the DPRK ambassador to Poland, still does.)

Jong and Yong both say sorry

The past month saw both Chairman and Premier Kim doing something almost unheard of in Pyongyang. Apparently they both said sorry, although some reports got the two muddled up.

On February 1 Rodong Sinmun, daily paper of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), reported Kim Jong-il as lamenting his failure to fulfil his late father Kim Il-sung’s pledge, to which he had also alluded shortly before on January 9, that all North Koreans would eat rice and meat soup (everyday fare for even the poorest South Korean, be it noted). This time Kim said: “What I should do now is feed the world’s greatest people with rice and let them eat their fill of bread and noodles. Let us all honour the oath we made before the Leader and help our people feed themselves without having to know broken rice [an inferior version]”.

Given Kim Jong-il’s own notoriety as gourmet and gourmand, his professed “compassion” for his less fortunate subjects’ deprivation may induce queasiness. Yet even this not-quite-apology glosses over the truth. Broken rice? They should be so lucky. As readers of Barbara Demick’s excellent and heartbreaking new book Nothing to Envy will know, rice of any kind – whole or broken – is a rare luxury for most North Koreans. In the late 1990s a million or so starved to death; even today most remain malnourished. One refugee who fled to China saw her first rice in years in the first house she came to – in a dog’s bowl. That is the true reality.

Worse, all this was and is avoidable: the result of stupid and vicious policies, not the natural disasters that the regime blames. The real cause was the government’s failure to adapt in the 1990s after Moscow abruptly pulled the plug on aid. This hurt other ex-Soviet client states too. Cuba went for tourism; Vietnam tried cautious reform; Mongolia sold minerals. North Korea, bizarrely, did nothing – except watch its old system break down and growth plunge.

In a speech at Kim Il-sung University in December 1996, when famine was seriously biting, Kim Jong-il lashed out at the WPK and uttered this petulant but very revealing whinge:

In this complex situation, I cannot solve all the problems while I have the duty of being in charge of practical economic projects as well as the overall economy, since I have to control important sectors such as the military and the party as well. If I concentrated only on the economy there would be irrecoverable damage to the revolution. The great leader told me when he was alive never to be involved in economic projects, just concentrate on the military and the party and leave economics to party functionaries. If I do delve into economics then I cannot run the party and the military effectively.

Evidently Bill Clinton’s famously apt watchword, which helped him win the presidency in 1992, had not breached North Korea’s thick walls and heads. It’s the economy, stupid! The paternal advice was dead wrong. (The full speech can be read on the much-missed Kimsoft website. Unsurprisingly it is not part of the DPRK’s official canon of the dear leader’s works, but the scholarly consensus is that it is genuine. A slightly different version appears here.)

Redenomination disaster

Mass starvation, you might hope, would prompt some soul-searching and fresh thinking. From mid-2002 North Korea did essay cautious market reforms, but recently it has tried to squash Pandora back in her box. The latest such crass effort, a currency redenomination that deliberately wiped out most people’s meagre savings, was discussed in December’s Update.

By all accounts this has backfired badly, sparking runaway inflation (which it was supposed to stanch) and even riots. Forced on the defensive, the regime has issued an unprecedented apology. This being North Korea, it has not done so publicly; there are limits. Nor, in 2010 as in 1996, is Kim Jong-il about to take the rap, despite some newswires confusing J with Y.

But reliable intelligence claims that on February 5 Premier Kim Yong-il called all leaders of neigbourhood groups (inminban) to Pyongyang. The lowest unit in the DPRK’s still tight system of socio-political control, each comprises 20-40 households. This suggests that over 10,000 people heard the premier say what no leader had ever said to them before: sorry. In his words: “I offer a sincere apology about the currency reform, as we pushed ahead with it without sufficient preparation and it caused a great pain to the people… We will do our best to stabilize people’s lives.” The audience’s reaction is not recorded.

The situation on the ground remains confused, but markets appear to be functioning again unhindered. Good Friends, a seemingly well-informed South Korean Buddhist NGO, said on February 18 that after examining a report on food shortages and conditions nationwide by the Office of Economic Policy Review, the WPK Central Committee issued an ‘Order for Absolutely No Regulation Regarding Foodstuffs’. All markets are to reopen as they were before recent government crackdowns, and under no circumstances must local authorities try to regulate food sales – “until central distribution is running smoothly.” There may be a sting in that tail, but for now this is a complete, humiliating government U-turn and climbdown.

This is an astonishing episode, which history may record as pivotal. If the leadership learns its lesson and finally accepts that the market economy is as ineluctable as gravity, then the DPRK might conceivably survive on a reconstituted economic base and social contract, like today’s China or Vietnam. But if Kim Jong-il (or whoever) keeps trying to square the circle, under the delusion that correct politics is a substitute for sound economics, there is no hope.

Sea shells

Relations with South Korea remain an odd blend of sabre-rattling and dialogue. Four times in the past month, starting on January 25 and most recently on February 19, the North has declared a series of no-sail zones for varied time periods. Some of these adjoin two ROK-held islands close to the Northern coast, Baengnyong and Daechong. For three days (January 27-29) the Korean People’s Army (KPA) fired volleys of artillery shells near the Northern Limit Line (NLL): the de facto western sea border since 1953, which the North rejects.

Though no shells actually crossed the NLL, on the first day the South called this provocative and fired back – but again only within its own waters south of the line. By late February, a Southern defence spokesman called the latest shelling “a routine situation that is part of the North’s winter military exercise”, adding that this may go on till the end of March. Routine or not, a report submitted to the ROK National Assembly’s Defence Committee on February 19 said Pyongyang has reinforced its military along the west coast of the peninsula and has strengthened military drills.

Kaesong and Kumgang remain unsettled

The shelling did not stop the Koreas talking about their two joint venture zones just north of the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ). But they got nowhere, beiing far apart on the agenda, format and venue for talks. On the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) – see last month’s Update for more details – the North suggested that the South’s issues – it wants smoother cross-border passage – were best left to military-level talks, which in the past have handled issues relating to the border and security. The South agreed, proposing February 23 at the border village of Panmunjom: the venue for all military meetings hitherto. The North then counter-proposed March 2, at Kaesong; but on February 22 the South said it will insist on Panmunjom, rather than set the precedent of holding a military meeting inside North Korea. With both venue and agenda still in dispute, the chances of progress on the substantive issues looks remote.

Mount Kumgang tours remain suspended

Separately, South Korea with some misgivings accepted the North’s request for talks on resuming tours to the Mount Kumgang resort, suspended since a Southern tourist was shot dead there in July 2008. At the talks held in Kaesong on February 8, North Korea asked for tours to restart from April 1. It breezily declared that the South’s three conditions – a probe into the shooting, efforts to ensure no repetition, and a cast-iron safety guarantee – had been met. But as the North well knows, the South’s key demand is to send in its own investigating team – which the North resolutely refuses. The Northern side proposed continuing the talks on February 12, but the South declined unless the North accepts their three conditions first.

More arms are interdicted

UN sanctions imposed last June after North Korea’s second nuclear test seem to be biting. In February South Africa told the Security Council that in November it inspected a ship headed for the Congo Republic (Congo-Brazzaville). The French owners reported suspicions about cargo they took on in Malaysia from a Chinese vessel. Seizing the containers, South Africa found that what the manifest called “spare parts of bulldozer” were in fact tank components. The shipping agent, and likely origin, is North Korean. China said it will investigate its own vessel’s role in the affair. UN resolution 1874 bans almost all DPRK weapons exports.

More ambiguously, on February 11 Thailand dropped charges against the crew of a plane seized in December and found to contain 35 tonnes of weapons from North Korea, including five crates of Manpads (man-portable air defence systems) which terrorists can use to shoot down aircraft. Next day all five were put on a flight to Almaty. Four are Kazakhs, and their government had asked that they be sent home to be tried. It will be dismaying if they are not.

Posted in 2002 Economic reforms, Arms shipment, Cabinet, Fiscal & monetary policy, Food, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Illicit activities, International Department (KWP), Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), Military, Mt. Kumgang Tourist Special Zone, Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013), Worker's Party | Comments Closed

Money in Socialist Economies: The Case of North Korea

Sunday, February 28th, 2010

Ruediger Frank, “Money in Socialist Economies: The Case of North Korea,” The Asia Pacific Journal, 8-2-10, February 22, 2010.

Introduction
Dated January 29, 2010, the Foreign Trade Bank of the DPRK (North Korea) issued document No. DC033 10-004 to diplomatic missions and international organizations present in North Korea. They were informed that the use of foreign currency was to be stopped, payments were to be made in the form of non-cash cheques, and that the official exchange rate of the Euro to the North Korean Won was changed from 188.2 KPW to 140 KPW, effective January 2, 2010.

Foreign institutions and organizations now have to obtain non-cash cheques from the Foreign Trade Bank, denominated in KPW, in order to pay for accommodations, meals and service fees in hotels, fares for transport services like railways and airlines, communication charges, inspection fees, registration fees and commissions paid to institutions and enterprises in the DPRK, fuel, office materials, spare parts for vehicles, electricity, water, heating charges and rent. Bank transfers are now mandatory for any transfers between international organizations and all money paid to institutions and organizations of the DPRK (including the salary of DPRK citizens working in embassies or international organizations).

A recent visitor to Pyongyang confirmed in a talk with the author that individuals are subject to a cumbersome process if they wish to purchase anything. Rather than using a standard hard currency or exchanging it into the new Won, they now have to obtain a receipt stating the price of the good they want to buy, then present this at a desk where they exchange their money into exactly the needed amount of North Korean money, and finally return to the shop assistant, hand over the exact amount, and receive the product.

In the preceding weeks, North Korea had made international headlines related to what seems to be a concerted economic policy initiative. The domestic currency was reformed in a way that obviously aimed at reducing the amount of money in circulation (link). A few weeks later news emerged that the use of foreign currencies was banned (link).

This is no doubt a dramatic move with far-reaching consequences. Money matters for personal lives and for society, so when a country initiates a currency reform, it has significant repercussions.

But what are these consequences for the specific case of North Korea in early 2010? Are people in various sectors of society better off now, or worse? Will the economy benefit or suffer? Do the reforms promote or impede foreign trade and investment? Will the domestic political situation become more stable, or will it deteriorate? Are the economic reforms of 2002 reversed, or were they intended to be a temporary measure from the outset? Should we even interpret the currency reforms as part of the process of power succession?

(more…)

Posted in 2002 Economic reforms, Banking, Economic reform, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market) | 1 Comment »

DPRK reopens markets, authorizes food sales

Thursday, February 25th, 2010

Institute for Far Eastern Studies
NK Brief No. 10-2-24-1
2/24/00

Suffering from severe food shortages, North Korean authorities ordered that markets be opened unconditionally, and that there be absolutely no crack-down on the sale of foodstuffs within the markets. This is according to a report issued on February 18 by the North Korean human rights organization ‘Good Friends’.

Good Friends’ newsletter revealed, “After examining a report on food shortages and the conditions of residents in each region throughout the country by the Office of Economic Policy Review, the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party issued an ‘Order for Absolutely No Regulation Regarding Foodstuffs’ to each law enforcement office.” The order stated that until central distribution is running smoothly, all markets are to be reopened as they were prior to recent government crack-downs, and that under no circumstances were authorities to try to regulate food sales.

Furthermore, it reported that “the People’s Security Bureau also received the Central Committee’s order, and passed on a special instruction to each regional security office ordering agents not to crack down on markets for anything other than illegal goods, and not to regulate food sales, in particular.” Local authorities were also ordered not to engage in altercations with market traders and not to intervene or interfere in fights between traders working within the markets.

According to Good Friends, “Central Party authorities set the price of one kilogram of rice at 24~25 Won, corn at 9 Won/Kg, and corn noodles at 10 Won in an attempt to stabilize the daily lives of people, but the lack of central distribution made the attempt meaningless.”

A North Korean public health official relayed to Good Friends that a report released by central authorities on January 22 stated that there were more than 47 thousand cases of tuberculosis in the North, but that more than half were unable to receive treatment in a hospital, and that “the rise in the number of deaths due to starvation among the most indigent was due to TB patients being unable to eat and subsequently dying after catching a cold or the flu.”

In mid-January, Kim Jong Il called a meeting of Party administrative director (and brother-in-law) Jang Sung-taek and other high-level authorities in order to ease the side-effects of last year’s currency reform. A North Korean source relayed to Daily NK on February 17 that at the meeting, it had been decided that authorities would issue emergency rations to residents facing the threat of starvation.

According to this order, the Office of Food Procurement has been tasked with distribution of the emergency food; neighborhood units receive 5 kg of food daily, while offices receive between 5~15 kg, depending on the number of employees. Neighborhood unit directors or factory supervisors are responsible for assessing the food needs of their neighbors or employees, and prioritize food distribution to those households at risk of starvation.

Until the end of January, currency reform measures that banned the sale of food and drove prices up drove a significant number of households to starvation. However, since the emergency rations measure began to be enforced on February 1, there have been no reports of large-scale famine.

Posted in Agriculture, Food, Forestry, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Good Friends | Comments Closed

North Korean Economy Watch