North Korean Economy Watch

Asia Times
Andrei Lankov
6/28/2005

This month, Hyundai Asan Corp stated that the number of tourists to have visited the Kumgang Mountain Tourist Project in North Korea since it began operations in 1998 had finally reached one million. This is seen as a reason for some major celebration – as any sufficiently round figure would.

However, in January 1999 Hyundai Asan leaders assured that by the end of 2004, there would have been an accumulative 4.9 million visits to the North. The actual figure was about 900,000. At the same time, Hyundai Asan managers predicted that in 2004 alone some 1.2 million tourists would visit the project. Yet the actual number of visits that year was 274,000.

Does this mean the Kumgang project is a failure? Not quite, since it remains in operation – unlike many other much-trumpeted intra-Korean projects. But it is kept afloat only due to persistent political and financial support from the South Korean government (or, in other words, due to the deepness of the pockets of South Korean taxpayers). Within its short history, the project has been on the verge of bankruptcy, and has even seen its chief executive officer driven to suicide.

The project was conceived in 1989, when Chung Ju-yung, the founder of Hyundai Group, spent a week in North Korea negotiating with the Pyongyang leaders, including president Kim Il-sung himself. The chairman of Korea’s largest industrial conglomerate was born in what is now North Korea, and in last years of his long and eventful life he demonstrated a sentimental attachment to his native land, being the most enthusiastic proponent of South Korean investment in the North.

One of the schemes briefly discussed during his 1989 visit was the idea of setting up a large tourist park in North Korea, to be used by South Korean tourists. The park was to be located in the Kumgang (“Diamond”) mountains, which for centuries have been seen in Korean culture as an embodiment of scenic beauty. The mountains conveniently lay near the Demilitarized Zone, or DMZ, the border between the two Korean states.

However, it took a decade and some major political changes to start the project moving. By the mid-1990s, Seoul realized that the collapse of North Korea was both unlikely and undesirable, since a German-style unification would be prohibitively costly. Hence, investment to the North and all kinds of direct and indirect aid came to be seen as a necessity by the new left-leaning administration of president Kim Dae-jung, who was elected in 1997.

That meant Chung Ju-yung’s plans received government support. He moved ahead with his characteristic energy, and in November 1998, the Kumgang project began to operate.

The idea was simple. The North Koreans agreed to create a sort of ghetto for South Korean visitors. A part of the Kumgang mountains was fenced off, with all the local population moved away. The South Korean tourists took a cruise ship to the area. The ship moored in a local harbor while the visitors ventured out for mountain walks and sight-seeing. Typically, a tour lasted for four days and three nights, and tourists lived onboard the cruise ship, which doubled as a floating hotel.

This clever scheme solved the problem of information flow, which was seen by Pyongyang as the major obstacle in its interactions with the South. North Korean commoners are supposed to believe that their South Korean brethren suffer under the cruel yoke of US imperialists. Understandably, their government does not want them to know that the per capita gross national project (GNP) in South Korea is 20 to 30 times higher than in the North. The sight of well-dressed South Korean crowds would be damaging for public morale and even political stability, but in the tourist scheme the rich southerners could be kept out of sight of average North Koreans, being accompanied only by a handful of carefully selected minders.

The South Korean visitors also had to behave themselves. They were warned that they could not criticize the North Korean system and its leaders, and that, in general, talking politics with North Korean personnel was not advisable. Transgressions could be punished.

In June 1999, Min Yong-mi, a 35-year-old housewife from Seoul, was engaged in talks with a North Korean minder. She told him a few words about South Korean prosperity and said something to the effect that North Korean defectors in the South were doing well. The reaction was swift: the talkative lady was arrested and spent one week in detention, accused of espionage. Of course she was not put into a real prison, but the ordeal was tough enough to undermine her health. There are good reasons to suspect that the entire affair was a deliberate provocation: the North Korean authorities were waited for something like this to happen to demonstrate that no quasi-political activities would be tolerated. They wanted to make an example of Min, and they generally succeeded: since then, tourists have become far more cautious.

Moneywise, the North Koreans were doing very well, too. The Hyundai Group built all the necessary infrastructure (presumably including the fences to keep the South Korean visitors under control), and also paid US$12 million every month as a fee for the use of the area. Some additional income was earned by North Korea through the sale of grossly overpriced local products and souvenirs.

Initially these conditions were accepted, not only because Chung Ju-yung was sentimental (and over-optimistic) about investment to North Korea, but also because a large tourist flow was expected. According to the above-cited sanguine estimates of 1999, by 2003 the numbers were supposed to reach the level of one million visitors per year – and then exceed them.

However, the plan did not work out as intended. Contrary to initial expectations, South Koreans were not too eager to spend their short vacations behind barbed wire. The early enthusiasm soon wore out, and from 2,000 the numbers of tourists began to decline. The trips were not cheap: the cost in 1998-99 was about 650,000 to 750,000 won (some $500-600 at the current rate). South Koreans soon discovered that for a similar amount of money they could visit China or even some parts of Southeast Asia, where apart from the scenery they would have some exposure to foreign cultures and would not feel under constant control and supervision.

The reformist drive of the Seoul government also contributed to the project’s mounting problems. Until early 2001, other subsidiaries of the mighty Hyundai Group were helping Hyundai Merchandise Marine, which initially operated the Kumgang Project. But as a result of government-initiated reforms of chaebol (conglomerates), the Hyundai Group was disbanded, after which independent companies of the former chaebol were not too eager to keep afloat a struggling project. In April 2001, Hyundai halved the number of trips to Kumgang and stated that the project would be discontinued due to the great loss of money.

Trouble in paradise
The government, however, could not allow this to happen; by that time the project had acquired huge symbolic importance. By 2001, the Kumgang project had become by far the largest intra-Korean economic operation, and the Kim Dae-jung administration, bent on keeping its “sunshine” engagement policy going, could not afford to lose the major symbol of such policy.

A rescue package saved the project from demise. The government-owned Korea National Tourist Organization was ordered to take part in the project and pay some of the overdue bills. The government also occasionally paid for generous discounts for many groups of people. For nine months in 2002, for example, the government paid 70% of the traveling expenses for elementary, middle and high school students, and 60% as well as all costs for students and teachers living in rural areas.

The North Koreans also demonstrated uncharacteristic flexibility when in 2001 they reluctantly agreed to accept payments depending on the number of tourists and the length of their stay, instead of the earlier fixed fee. Currently, these payments amount to $50 per tourist with a standard package of two nights, and $25 for a tourist who stays only one night.

Thus, the project survived the first crisis – only to be struck by a new one. This time, the reasons were political: the opposition uncovered evidence which showed that in order to secure Pyongyang’s agreement to participate in the North-South summit of June 2000, Seoul had secretly transferred $500 million to North Korea.

It was only logical that this clandestine money transfer was conducted with the involvement of Hyundai Asan. First, the survival of the corporation would be impossible without government involvement, and this meant its leaders could hardly say “no” when asked by the authorities to “help” in some delicate affair. Second, being the largest South Korean operation in North Korea, Hyundai Asan had both vested interests in intra-Korean detente and experience in dealing with money transfers of such kinds (there are some good reasons to suspect that the ill-fated “summit fees” were not the only clandestine money transfer to Pyongyang).

The discovery of the “summit bribe” led to a political scandal. An investigation ensued, and the then-head of Hyundai Asan, Chiung Mong-hun, the 55-year-old son of the conglomerate’s founder, found himself in the center of the scandal. He could not handle the stress. Amid mounting political pressures, he committed suicide by throwing himself out of his headquarters’ window on August 4, 2003.

Yet once again the Kumgang project survived the blow. In May of this year, Hyundai Asan stated it would probably make a profit in 2005. If that happens it will be the first time a profit has been recorded in the company’s history – of course, we are talking about ongoing costs and revenues, without considering the estimated $470 million that has been invested in the project so far. Nonetheless, it is clear that the situation has improved over the past few years, even if the actual performance would not be considered satisfactory in a less politically motivated project.

The improvement was brought about by the opening of a land route in 2003 that replaced the earlier cruises. Now, South Korean tourists board buses near the checkpoint and then travel to hotels operated by Hyundai Asan in the same Kumgang area. Currently, two hotels are operational, but the number will probably increase. The new tours can be shorter, with two nights being the norm. The new scheme also cuts down prices considerably, making the trip somewhat more attractive at 300,000 to 400,000 won (roughly, $350-$400) per person.

The basics of the tour remain unchanged, however: South Koreans are placed in a sort of ghetto, behind high fences carefully guarded by sentries. The tourists can shop for North Korean souvenirs, which are sold at exorbitant prices. It seems ant liquor and snake wine (with a real dead snake floating inside the bottle) are especially popular among males – both are believed to be good for virility. An acrobatics show and a hot spring are additional pleasures available for visitors – if they are willing to pay. A visit to the hot spring, for example, costs some $30, or about half of the average annual salary in North Korea.

Outside their hotels, tourists are constantly supervised by their North Korean guides, mostly young girls who are obviously selected for their good looks and, presumably, political reliability. There are some males as well, who dress in plain clothes. All guides are equipped with their Kim Il-sung badges, and are ever ready to deliver a well-rehearsed eulogy to the Great Leader and his son and successor, Dear Leader Kim Jong-il, in suitably exalted tones.

Combined with large iconic pictures of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il on major crossroads and eulogies to their greatness carved in mountain rock, this creates a very bizarre picture of time travel: for one who wants to experience the feelings of visitors to Mao Zedong’s China in the early 1970s or Stalin’s Russia in the late 1930s, the place is worth a visit. Admittedly, not many foreigners rush to see the Stalinesque environment, long extinct elsewhere: even though formalities are kept at a bare minimum, only 0.5% of all visitors are foreign citizens.

Looking at the North Koreans present on the scene, one cannot help but wonder what is actually happening inside the heads of these highly privileged people, more often than not agents of the secret police or scions of well-connected families. The crowds of well-dressed, well-fed South Koreans contradict the official picture of the South as an impoverished domain of US imperialists and Japanese neo-colonialists. The selected few probably don’t ask questions, but they arrive at some conclusions no doubt.

However, this impact should not be overestimated. After all, the project was conceived in a way that allowed the impact of the South Korean visitors to be kept as low as possible. The number of North Koreans allowed to see these visitors is intentionally kept very low. Until recently, Pyongyang did not allow the Kumgang project to employ local personnel, and only recently have North Korean waitresses and cooks appeared at some restaurants and in one of the hotels. Their attitude vividly reminds this writer of the privileged Intourist hotel in Leningrad, which had the same air of unintended rudeness in dealing with its foreign guests, and great superiority in interacting with Soviet citizens. Nonetheless, at the Kumgang project, the presence of some 400 North Korean employees (excluding the guides and plain-clothed minders) is significant. However, most of the semi-skilled personnel are ethnic Koreans recruited from China – they agree to work for very low wages.

How will historians see the Kumgang project and the much-trumpeted “intra-Korean cooperation” in general? As a selfish attempt by affluent South Koreans to prolong the existence of a brutal dictatorship in order to save themselves from the troublesome necessity of paying for North Korea’s transformation? Or as an important contribution toward this transformation, a way to slightly open the closed doors of North Korean society and teach its inhabitants a thing or two about the modern economy and modern world? Perhaps they will see it as a way to support the expensive habits of the North Korean elite, or a way to ameliorate suffering of the commoners. We know not, but one thing is clear: business with North Korea is, first and foremost, a political affair, and this is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.

Korea Times
Na Jeong-ju
6/9/2005

South Korean companies setting up operations in the Kaesong industrial complex face difficulties due to a North Korean obligation that they must purchase insurance policies from a North Korean state-run firm.

North Korea demands that South Korean firms have insurance against accidents with a North Korean state-run firm, but they question whether it is financially stable enough to cover all possible accidents.

According to related regulations set up by North Korea last November, South Korean firms in the Kaesong industrial complex must buy insurance policies from North Korean firms. If South Korean companies didn’t follow the rule, they had to pay $10,000 in fines.

South Korean firms regard this rule as unfair.

“We have to buy insurance from a North Korean company despite its inability to cover possible accidents,’’ said an official of a company in the Kaesong complex.

“We have asked the South Korean government to correct this problem because we don’t trust North Korean companies.’’

According to sources, the Unification Ministry, the Financial Supervisory Commission and the Korea Non-Life Insurance Association (KNIA) will hold a meeting today to discuss the matter. The South Korean government has been aware of the problem faced by South Korean companies, but it has delayed notifying the issue to North Korea, the sources said.

“South Korea should have a consultation with North Korea to address insurance matters,’’ a source said. “North Korea may be active in correcting the problem, but it may demand something in return.’’

Currently, a total of 15 South Korean companies have signed contracts with Hyundai Asan, a North Korean business arm of Hyundai Group, to set up a factory in the Kaesong complex. Hyundai Asan has the exclusive rights to develop the Mt. Kumgang tourism complex and the Kaesong complex under agreements signed in 2000.

“South Korean companies have asked the government to check the financial status of the North Korean insurance firm, but they have received no answer,’’ a KNIA official said. “In case of accidents, insurance firms must conduct investigations and check the financial status of policyholders. In this sense, we believe North Korean insurance companies are not capable.’’

North Korea has only one insurance company run by the government, but South Korean companies have little information about it.

The BBC offers a summary of economic conditions in the DPRK:

The focus of the international community’s alarm over North Korea is the isolated nation’s nuclear arsenal, and its refusal to talk about it.

An aspect that is sometimes overlooked is the dire state of its economy, and yet this could be at the heart of the nuclear crisis.

The regime, with few allies in the world, cannot appeal to the sort of humanitarian emotions that African or South Asian nations have in the past.

To ensure the flow of food and oil, it must have a bargaining chip, and its nuclear arsenal is that chip.

Therefore Pyongyang’s diplomatic bluster is inextricably linked to its need to keep what remains of its economy propped up by donations.

North Korea has recently attempted limited reforms to its economy, but these have not been comprehensive or well-enough planned to work.

Pushed into reform

North Korea became an independent state in 1953, and has operated a rigid centrally planned, or “command” economy based on that developed by Stalin in the USSR.

Industry and agriculture are planned on a five-year basis, all farms are collectivised, volume is praised over value and most foods and goods are rationed.

This model initially allowed for rapid industrialisation and rebuilding, but it failed to deliver sustainable growth or raise living standards.

The economy began to collapse, and by the mid-1990s the country was in a state of famine. The industrial base and the agricultural sector have been in decline ever since. Beijing, North Korea’s only real ally, decided to act in October 2001 with an economics lesson for North Korean leader Kim Jong-il.

He was shown round a GM plant and a hi-tech factory in Shanghai, and received a lecture about the benefits of Chinese-style reform.

The Chinese were effectively telling Mr Kim that it was time for change – and that they were fed up with the growing number of refugees fleeing over the Chinese border, and increasing demands for aid.

Mr Kim realised he needed to keep China close, and in June 2002 announced a series of economic reforms.

Pyongyang partially ended rationing and reformed the wages and pricing system.

Retail prices shot up – rice by 55,000%, corn 5,000%, electricity 143% and public transport fares 2,000% – but average wages increased by just 1,818% – from 110 won to 2,000 won (US$22) per month.

It also allowed private farmers’ markets to expand – to provide more goods for the consumers this monetary liberalisation had created.

Another major plank of the reforms was the new investment zone in Sinuiju – and another one in Kaesong, agreed as part of Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy.

These investment zones used foreign investment to create new economic ventures.

But neither the wage and pricing reform, nor the investment zones, have worked.

Scarce resources

The government had hoped that inflation created by the reforms, if kept under control, would “kick-start” the economy.

But this theory assumed there was a mass of underutilised resources waiting to be kick-started. Twenty-five years of decline meant that these resources were now scarce.

More food found its way into the farmers’ markets, but at prices ordinary people could not afford.

This effective legitimisation of private farming and smuggling across the border from China only succeeded in increasing the availability of goods to the elite – those whose wages were protected or had access to foreign currency.

As for the economic zones, Sinuiju’s position, opposite China’s flourishing economic zone in Dandong, annoyed Beijing.

It consequently arrested the Chinese businessman hired to run Sinuiju, imprisoning him for 18 years for tax evasion and effectively ending the project.

Kaesong survives but all the ventures are foreign-owned, with little benefit, therefore, for North Korea.

By the end of 2002, economic growth was estimated at just 1.2% at best, with the average citizen’s purchasing power severely eroded.

For most ordinary North Koreans, the end result of the reforms was further impoverishment and the eroding of any savings they may have been able to build up.

So, in light of the reforms’ failure, North Korea’s alleged announcement in October 2002 that its country was pursuing an enriched uranium programme could be interpreted as a return to its old bargaining tactics.

The international community responded to the announcement by setting up six-party talks in August 2003.

But the diplomacy is failing because North Korea, with no allies but the increasingly exasperated Chinese, and little prospect of economic revitalisation, needs to ensure a continued drip feed of aid.

That means a hard bargaining process, and Mr Kim has one bargaining chip – his nuclear bombs.

Already twice, as far as we know, Beijing has managed by persuasion, and perhaps a little economic pressure, to get Pyongyang back to the table after talks have stalled.

Now Beijing is trying again. Perhaps what Pyongyang wants most is a serious package of economic aid from China.

China may provide it to get the talking started again.

But the price Beijing will need to demand is that Pyongyang restarts economic reform in earnest, and moves away from the continual brink of collapse that forces it to make desperate diplomatic gambles such as the current crisis.

As for the economy today, it has to all intents and purposes collapsed.

The reforms were limited, and benefited just the elite of the country rather than ordinary people.

The basic structure remains in place and continues to erode the economy.

However, as long as the regime can keep the country isolated, it can survive on this drip-feed indefinitely.

The endgame is simple – regime survival. It is a long-term strategy using diplomatic belligerence and military threat to secure enough aid to maintain power and isolation.

The regime may survive, and may under pressure begin another round of tentative reform, but it seems unlikely that life will improve for ordinary North Koreans any time soon.

Read the full story here:
Economy root to N Korea crisis
BBC
Paul French
2005-4-12

Korea Economic Institute
Oh-Seung Yeul

February 2005

Download in PDF: Oh.pdf

Trade, reform, inter-Korean cooperation, China, IT, aid.

Check it out.

From Chongryun:

On December 11, 2004, the DPRK finalized management, entry and residency regulations, and customs regulations for the Kaesong Industrial Zone.

Set up under a de facto constitution, the “Kaesong Industrial Zone Management Institution” consist of 21 articles.

The Management Institution is a corporation in charge of administrating the region.  People who have experience in these kinds of managemnt fields can work for the Institution, but employees of firm that operate in the zone are no allowed to serve.

The Institution will make annual plans for the development of the zone on its own and carry out the plans and will discuss with the central leading organ of the zone in case an important problem arises in the course of its work.

Entry and residence articles: 30

The regulations apply to South Koreans, overseas Koreans and foreigners who come to the zone from the South or do so by transportation means using the same route. According to the regulations, persons can enter the zone by showing their passports or certificates issued by the management institution.

They can stay in the zone for a long or short term. A short term stay is within 90 days and a long term stay is over 91 days. The extension of their stay is permitted if they applied for it at the immigration office of the industrial zone. Excluded from extended stay are those who are expected to leave the zone within 7 days from their arrival, as well as members of international organizations and foreign missions in South Korea, tourists and those who are not required to register themselves for their stay.

The regulations also clarify the issue of certificates related to entry into the zone, procedures for issuing the certificates of stay and residence registration cards and the extension of their term of validity, orders of deportation from zone, etc.

Customs

According to the regulations, goods, postal matter and persons engaged in transport service who stay in the zone for a certain length of time, can pass through the customs clearance house.

The goods that are sent by organizations and enterprises in the DPRK to the zone are exempt from customs procedures. But customs should be imposed on the goods from other countries which are to be sold in the DPRK as they are, without being processed.

Also clarified in the regulations are the rules of customs registration, the rules of customs exemption and payment, presentation of applications for permits to carry goods into and out from the zone, declaration of postal matter and personal belongings, customs inspection and supervisory institutions, the inspection method of goods to be carried into or carried out from the zone, standard customs rates and calculation methods, etc.

The goods prohibited to be carried into the zone include weapons, bullets, explosives and other materials for military use, narcotics, radioactive material, toxic chemical agents, printed matter that may adversely affect public order and good manners and customs of the nation and listed goods coming from contagious disease-afflicted areas.

Those goods banned to be taken out from the zone include weapons, bullets, explosives, materials for military use, lethal weapons, wireless apparatuses and their accessories, poisonous substances, powerful medicines, narcotics, radioactive material, toxic chemical agents, historical relics, secret documents, printed matter (copies included) and their manuscripts, films, photos, cassettes and video tapes, records, compact disks and other goods which are banned from being carried out under related agreement.

From KCNA:

Regulations of Insurance in Kaesong Industrial Zone Adopted

Pyongyang, October 11 (KCNA) — Decision No. 35 of the Presidium of the DPRK Supreme People’s Assembly “On the Adoption of the Regulations of Insurance in the Kaesong Industrial Zone” dated September 21, Juche 93 (2004) has been published. The decision says the regulations were adopted and the Cabinet and organs concerned of the DPRK are to take working measures for their implementation. 

The regulations consist of 28 articles.

The mission of the regulations is to strictly establish the system and order in the work of insurance in the Kaesong industrial zone so as to help toward stabilizing the business activities and life of those who reside and stay there.

The regulations are applied to the enterprises, branches and offices established in the Kaesong industrial zone.

They are applied also to the south Koreans, overseas Koreans and foreigners who stay and reside in the industrial zone.

From Asia Times:

North Korea has mass-produced computers with Pentium IV processors since 2002, a Russian journalist says in a new book. The confirmation came at a time when the United States and North Korea are in a war of nerves over US and international export control regulations that would ban 15 South Korean firms selected to operate in an industrial complex in the North’s city of Kaesong from bringing in “strategic materials,” including computers.

The South Korean companies said they must be permitted to bring computers with at least Pentium IV chips, which are essential for normal office work, citing earlier unconfirmed reports that the North already began to produce those kinds of computers.

“North Korea has produced computers with Pentium IV processors since 2002, which I saw during my visit to an electric appliance factory in Pyongyang,” Olga PMaltseva, a Vladivostok-based journalist, said in her new book about the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il.

The Korean translation of the book, titled “A Waltz with Kim Jong Il” was published here on Monday.

“Seven hundred workers and technicians made 14,000 Pentium IV computers in 2002,” she said.

“The factory has produced tens of thousands of computers since 1986 and half of them were exported to Germany.”

There was a similar report by the Choson Sinbo, organ of the pro-Pyongyang General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, in May last year.

The newspaper reported at the time that a North Korean electronic appliance developer has been selling computers with Pentium IV processors in a joint venture with China’s Nanjing Panda Electronics Co since September 2002.

South Korea’s Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) confirmed the report in August last year, citing data from its North Korean counterpart, the International Trade Promotion Committee.

The KOTRA said the North’s electronics firm “Achim (Morning)” and China’s Nanjing Panda have produced three types of Pentium IV computers.

The Russian author is believed to have visited the joint venture factory.

North Korea is classified as a “dangerous country” under the Wassenaar Arrangement, which replaced the Cold War era’s Coordinating Committee for Export Control to Communist Areas in 1996, and thus signatory countries cannot export items classified as “strategic materials” to the communist state.

The items include computers, various metal machinery, laser equipment, high-tech materials and electronic appliances with US-produced parts.

South Korea is among the 33 signatory nations.

An earlier report said the South Korean government is studying ways for the 15 domestic companies to use production equipment, materials and office supplies in Kaesong without conflicts with the U.S.

The Kaesong industrial complex, being built by the Korea Land Corp and Hyundai Asan Corp, a South Korea firm, is one of the most prominent symbols of inter-Korean reconciliation set in motion by the first-ever summit of the leaders of the two countries in 2000.

The developers are scheduled to open Kaesong’s main complex to hundreds of South Korean manufacturers in the first half of next year.

KIEP has published the North Korea Development Report 2003/04 (follow the link to download all several hundred pages!)

Summary: As a result of North Korea’s isolation from the outside world, international
communities know little about the status of the North Korean economy and its
management mechanisms. Although a few recent changes in North Korea’s economic system have attracted international interests, much confusion remains as to the characteristics of North Korea’s recent policy changes and its future direction
due to the lack of information. Therefore, in order to increase the understanding of readers in South Korea and abroad, KIEP is releasing The North Korea Development Report in both Korean and English. The motivation behind this report stemmed from the need for a comprehensive and systematic investigation into North Korea’s socio-economic conditions, while presenting the current status of its industrial sectors and inter-Korean economic cooperation. The publishing of this second volume is important because it not only supplements the findings of the first edition, but also updates the recent changes in the North Korean economy. The topics in this report include macroeconomics and finance, industry and infrastructure, foreign economic relations and inter-Korean economic cooperation, social welfare and science & technology.

This report also covers the ‘July 1 Economic Reform’ launched two years ago and
subsequent changes in the economic management system. The North Korea
Development Report helps to improve the understanding of the contemporary North
Korean economy.
Table of Contents  
 
Part I Macroeconomic Status and Finance
Chapter 1 Current Status of the North Korean Economy and Its Prospects
Chapter 2 National Financial Revenue and Expenditure
Chapter 3 Banking and Price Management

Part II Industrial Management and Problems
Chapter 4 The Industrial Sector
Chapter 5 The Agricultural Sector
Chapter 6 Social Overhead Capital
Chapter 7 Commerce and Distribution Sector
Chapter 8 The Defense Industry

Part III International Economic Activities
Chapter 9 Foreign Economic Relations
Chapter 10 Special Economic Zones
Chapter 11 Inter-Korean Economic Relations

Part IV Social Security and Technology Development
Chapter 12 Social Security and Social Services
Chapter 13 Science and Technology Sector

Part V The Recent Economic Policy Changes
Chapter 14 The Contents and Background for the Recent Policy Changes
Chapter 15 The Features and Problems of the Recent Economic Policy Changes
Chapter 16 Prospects and Future Tasks of the July 1 Economic Reform  

From the Asia Times:

Global player wins N Korea’s only JV bank
By Tom Tobback (founder of Pyongyang Square)

“Dr. Johnny” Sei-hoe Hon, formerly of Hong Kong and now chairman of the UK-based Global Group of Companies, agreed to take over North Korea’s only joint-venture bank, Hon told Asia Times Online on Tuesday in a telephone interview.

Hon, 32, identified by the KCNA as “chairman of the British Global Group”, is a British citizen with roots in Hong Kong who received a PhD in psychiatry from Cambridge University, but his psychiatric expertise was apparently not the reason he visited Pyongyang. He was officially received by Choe Thae-bok, chairman of the North Korean parliament, or the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA). Hon presented Choe with a gift for the leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Kim Jong-il.

As usual, KCNA reported nothing more than that the two parties had “a friendly talk”, but it is clear that the visit was related to Pyongyang’s efforts at economic reform, initiated in July 2002, and possibly to new plans for its problematic special administrative region (SAR) of Sinuiju, which Pyongyang announced in September 2002.

The Global Group, of which Johnny Hon is founder, chairman, and chief executive officer (as described on his website), defines itself as “an evolving organization with diverse business ventures spanning the globe. Every new undertaking illustrates our skill in choosing the right opening in the right market – and most importantly, at the right time.”  The group specializes in financial consultancy, wealth management, high-growth companies, and online betting.

Hon revealed to Asia Times Online that his Global Group is taking over the majority stake in the Daedong Credit Bank (DCB), the only foreign joint-venture bank in North Korea, from a British company based in Hong Kong. The Daedong Credit Bank, run in Pyongyang by Nigel Cowie, has been serving the expatriate community and the few foreign business ventures in North Korea for many years.

“Our stake in the DCB will facilitate further investment projects; the Supreme People’s Assembly [SPA] has offered us business proposals which we will consider in due time,” Hon said. Currently he is awaiting the due-diligence report by Deloitte & Touche for his Daedong Credit Bank deal.

It remains to be seen what advice the Global Group can offer to revive the North Korean economy, but probably professional help from international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) would be a safer bet than venture-capital companies such as Hon’s Global Group.

Accoding to the Washington Post:

By Anthony Faiola
Washington Post Foreign Service
Tuesday, December 2, 2003; C01

MOUNT KUMGANG

In the surreal world of North Korean tourism, you can feast on local delicacies served by glamorous lady comrades, watch an acrobatics show infused with Stalinist humor and climb a storied mountain covered with plaques and monuments celebrating the totalitarian Kim clan.

But be back indoors by the midnight curfew — or face fines, questioning by authorities or, well, worse.

This is Mount Kumgang, the fortified tourist compound where the Hermit Kingdom meets the Magic Kingdom, right down to Disneyesque guys in fuzzy bear suits greeting visitors. A window into hermetically sealed North Korea since foreign visitors were granted limited access five years ago, it lies an hour’s drive north of the minefields and missile batteries lining the most heavily militarized border in the world.

Here, tension is part of the attraction.

“Look, quick! North Korean soldiers!” one excited South Korean yelled to other tourists on a bus after spotting an armed squad marching by. They tripped over each other trying to get a better view.

The over-the-rainbow quality of the place offers a rare, if hyper-controlled, glimpse at life on the Cold War’s last frontier.

“You are supposed to relax and have a good time,” said Jang Whan Bin, senior vice president of investor relations at Hyundai Asan Corp., the South Korean company that financed and operates most of the resort. “But this is still North Korea. Things are quite different here.”

On this mountain, about which the famous Chinese Sang Dynasty poet Sudongpo wrote, “I would have no regrets in my lifetime were I to see Mount Kumgang just once,” the jagged cliffs and glistening waterfalls now take a back seat to homages erected to the Kims, the only father-and-son act in Stalinist history.

More than half a century ago, Kim Il Sung founded the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea — i.e., North Korea. His son, Kim Jong Il, took the helm following the elder Kim’s death in 1994. The son is said to have entered this world on a mountaintop, his birth heralded by lightning bolts and a double rainbow. Recently named “Guardian of Our Planet” by the North Koreans, Kim Jong Il rules through a cult of personality that is alive and well in Mount Kumgang.

No act of the Kims is too small to be noted on these ancient rocks, now coated with more than 4,000 monuments, etchings and other commemorative inscriptions to the clan. A spot where Kim Il Sung is said to have especially appreciated the view is dutifully marked with a six-foot-tall stone tablet. Elsewhere a young guard stood by an etching commemorating the exact location where Kim Jong Sook, mother of the younger Kim, once rested her weary bones.

This is an important landmark, insisted the female guard, who watches over foreign visitors and keeps out unauthorized North Koreans. Her eyes went wide when asked about the need for a monument in a place of such natural beauty.

“She was the beloved wife of the Great Leader!” fumed the guard in her fashionable red jacket with a matching propaganda pin bearing Kim Il Sung’s face. “Don’t you have a father? Isn’t he the absolute ruler of your family? Mustn’t he be obeyed? You must understand, Kim Il Sung is the father of our nation and we are his children. Everything related to him must be celebrated.”

“Including his wife?” she is asked.

“Do not just call her his wife! Use her title!” she demanded.

What title?

“Her title! How can you not know her title?” Exasperated, the guard explained that Kim’s wife must be referred to as “Great Revolutionary General Kim Jong Sook.”

Most of this sprawling tourist complex, including hotel, hot springs and duty-free shops including Prada and Gucci, is run by Hyundai Asan, which each month brings in about 15,000 people, mostly South Koreans. The North Koreans feared so many foreigners would contaminate the minds of the locals, so the vast majority of employees here are ethnic Koreans shipped in from China.

But two restaurants do employ local staff, and it’s there that foreigners have their best chance to interact with unarmed North Koreans. Waitresses wear ’50s-style heavy makeup and modest attire. One nervous server fled from a table of foreigners every time she was asked a question. In another restaurant, a waitress looked stunned after a foreign guest asked her where one could buy a Kim Il Sung lapel pin like the one she wore.

She tilted her powdered face skyward, raising one arm to gently cup the pin with her hand.

“This,” she proclaimed, “is not fashion. It cannot be bought in a store.”

She went on: “This is a symbol of my love for the great founder of my nation.”

Among the top attractions here is an acrobatics troupe shipped in from Pyongyang.

In one act, a disco version of the North Korean folk favorite “Nice to Meet You” plays as 10 men in stylized sailor suits, heavy rouge and blue eye shadow soar in front of a projected backdrop of sacred Mount Paektu, where Kim Jong Il is said to have entered the world with the blessing of Heaven. In a comedy act, a strongman wearing communist red gets the better of a weakling decked out in blue.

Lest the mountains, lakes and tourist attractions lull you into a false sense of security, officials constantly remind guests that they are surrounded by a military installation that includes a naval base across the port from where a small cruise ship docks each week. Visitors are instructed not to talk to the locals about politics or economics. Two years ago, one South Korean woman merely suggested that her nation, which is 13 times as wealthy as the communist North, had a higher standard of living. She was arrested and held for seven days until Hyundai negotiated her release. Photos here are limited to shots of the tourist installations and specified views of Mount Kumgang itself.

There are no exceptions.

One Dutch visitor captivated by the serenity of the scene snapped a digital photo of the mountain setting with a happy sign in the background declaring “Welcome to Mount Kumgang.” But she inadvertently clicked just as two North Korean soldiers with sidearms were walking by.

“Hey, you!” they barked in Korean. “Come here!”

“The soldiers were not amused,” said Eunmi Postma, a Dutch journalist based in Seoul.

They demanded the tourist’s camera and asked to see her passport.

“But, I mean, all I did was try to take a picture of the welcome sign,” she said. “The soldiers were so far away you couldn’t even make them out in the photo. I finally deleted the picture so they wouldn’t take my camera.

“I know it’s North Korea, but still, this is supposed to be a tourism resort. . . . What a weird place.”