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North Korea announces new official prices: rice now 23 won per kilogram

Wednesday, December 16th, 2009

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No.09-12-16-1
12/16/2009

In accordance with the recent currency reform in North Korea, new state-controlled prices were officially announced on December 9. South Korean NGO ‘Good Friends’ announced on December 13th that rice is now selling for 23 won per Kg, corn at 8 won per Kg, flour at 22 won per Kg, pork at 45 won per Kg and ‘matnaegi’, a common flavor-enhancing food additive, is selling for 45 won per bag. Other prices were also listed per kilogram, including crushed maize at 12 won, corn noodles for 10 won, soybeans from 9-13 won, soybean oil for 50 won, radishes at 5 won, artificial meat for 15 won, and cowpeas for 10 won.

On December 4, the Choson Sinbo, a newspaper printed by the pro-North Korean General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Jochongryeon), reported that North Korean authorities were planning to lower prices to the same level as was seen when the July 1, 2002 Economic Management Reform Measure was enacted.

At the end of November, prior to the currency reform, rice was selling for 1,850 won in Hamheung, 2,000 won in Cheongjin, and 1,700 won in Pyongyang and Sariwon.

In the markets of these four major cities, corn averaged 737.5 won/Kg, flour was sold for 1,687 won/Kg, and pork was 5,450 won/Kg. Pork is the only item now being sold more cheaply, while the price of all other goods went up with the currency reform.

A source inside North Korea has reported that most market traders are not following government pricing guidelines, however, and that the majority of goods are being sold at even higher prices than Pyongyang has set. In the market in Cheongjin, North Hamgyeong Province, rice was being sold for 50 won/Kg, and corn went for 18 won/Kg, more than double government prices. These high prices appear to reflect supply shortages and hoarding.

After the currency reform was announced, North Korean miners received raises, from a basic monthly wage of 6,000 won to the equivalent of 8,000 (pre-reform) won. Miners in North Hamgyeong Province can now put enough food on the table without needing second jobs. On December 4, the Choson Sinbo also reported that the government has guaranteed that living expenses distributed by factories will be distributed in the new currency.

Posted in Food, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Good Friends, Labor conditions/wages, Mining/Minerals, Price liberalization | Comments Closed

Rising cost of narcotics in DPRK drives up home, market prices

Friday, November 20th, 2009

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No.09-11-20-1
11/20/2009

The recent hike in narcotics prices in North Korea appears to be due to rising prices on homes and in markets.

According to Daily NK, “Recent narcotics prices have grown considerably,” and, “If narcotics prices rise, market prices rise across the board.”

As North Korean officials crack down on narcotics production and distribution, the availability of Philopon and other narcotics has been sharply reduced. This reduction in supply is driving up prices.

Drug prices in North Korea first jumped sharply in February of last year, as officials began cracking down on production centers in Hamheung and Pyeongseong.

These raids were said to sharply reduce narcotics production, and in the same month the price of one kilogram of “Ice” shot up to 1,000 won (approx. 2,700 USD), and then again to as much as 2,000 won in April. As soon as narcotics prices rose, housing prices also increased and the price of all factory-produced goods in markets went up. It is as if inside North Korea, the rise in narcotics prices causes the price of everything to increase.

As late as fall 2007, a kilogram of Philopon ran for 5 million won, and could be easily found by those who were looking. By 2008, however, as officials cracked down harder on Philopon producers and dealers, the price had risen exponentially.

Another factor impacting drug prices in North Korea is the sharply growing number of users in China. Despite the efforts of Chinese police, they have been unable to curb the growing flow of narcotics across the border and into the border regions.

In October 2009, one kilogram of Philopon ran from between 50-70 million won, depending on the quality. When smuggled into China, the drugs bring between 150-200 thousand yen (80-100 thousand DPRK won), which when exchanged for ROK currency equals between 30-40 thousand won.

In North Korea, drugs determine housing prices, with the most expensive house in an average city going for the price of one kilogram of Ice. Rising housing costs drive up prices in markets, so that now a kilogram of rice sells for 2200 won.

The price of rice generally falls after the harvest season, but this year remained relatively unchanged. In April of last year, food prices shot up from 2000 to 3000 won for a kilogram of rice, and while this was also related to food shortages, the rising cost of narcotics played a large role.

The reason narcotics prices have such an impact is due to the particular nature of drug sales in North Korea. Drug peddlers deal in cash with narcotics producers, but as cash can be hard to come by, these dealers put up houses as collateral before taking the drugs to China.

In addition, most Chinese renminbi and U.S. dollars circulating in North Korean markets are from the cross-border drug trade, and the fees charged by money-handlers in North Korean markets drive prices up considerably.

Posted in Black markets, Drug smuggling, Illicit activities, Price liberalization, Real estate | Comments Closed

North Korean food shortage to grow, crimes of necessity on the rise

Tuesday, November 3rd, 2009

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-11-02-1
11/2/2009

The North Korean agricultural ministry has announced that the countries food shortages are expected to be even greater next year. Edition 302 of the newsletter “North Korea Today,” distributed by the group Good Friends, reports that the Ministry of Agriculture announced harvest predictions for farms in North and South Hwanghae and Pyongan provinces, North Korea’s ‘ricebowl region’. It stated that if the country was to avoid a food crisis next year, everyone would need to strictly manage this year’s crops. It was also reported that the central party authorities in North Korea, after receiving the report, called for the opening of all customs houses in the border region and for trading companies to seek new avenues for trade. An order was passed down to “relentlessly trade with the outside in order to bring in much food.”

With food shortages this year and last, and now news that there will be food problems next year as well, it is rumored that there is a growing number of angry people in the normally mild-mannered Hwanghae Province. In addition, this is driving a growing number of people to turn to crime in order to put food on the table. On October 26, Free North Korea Radio quoted a source as stating, “As rumors spread across North Korea that large-scale famine, the likes of which were seen in the mid-1990s, will again sweep through country next year, anxiety is shooting up among the people and crimes of necessity are on the rise.”

According to the source, “Crimes of necessity, like pillaging granaries on farms, are spreading like never before as people act quickly to ensure food supplies,” and, “Fighting has grown fierce between people trying to maintain their standard of living.” Furthermore, “The number of people in the Dancheon region of South Hamgyeong Province just ‘sitting down and starving to death’ is exploding,” and, “Not long ago, there was even one incident of and armed soldier guarding a threshing floor of one farm being attacked by a gang of thieves.”

The source explained, “People are well aware that this year yielded poor harvests, but that they cannot rely on aid from the international community because of the Kim Jong Il regime’s indiscriminant pursuit of nuclear development.” The source also added, “These days, people are rationalizing illegal activities in the belief that ‘you can rely on no one but yourself.’”

It was also reported that in Hyesan, Hyeryeong, Onseong and Musan, most food prices are at higher levels than what are usually seen in the spring, despite the fact that it is now fall harvest season. According to Free North Korea Radio, October 23rd prices of rice, flour and corn in Hyesan, Hyeryeong, Onseong, and Musan were as follows: Hyesan, rice = 2,550-2,750 won/1 kg, flour = 2,400-2,600 won/1 kg, corn = 850-900 won/1 kg; Hyeryeong, rice = 2,500-2,800 won/ 1 kg, flour = 2,400-2,700 won/ 1 kg, corn = 800-1,000 won/1 kg; Onseong, rice = 2,450-2,600 won/ 1 kg, flour = 2,500-2,700 won/1 kg, corn = 700-900 won/1 kg; Musan, rice = 2,500-2,700 won/1 kg, flour = 2,400-2,600 won/1 kg, corn = 850-1,000 won/1 kg

Posted in Agriculture, Food, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), International trade, Ministry of Agriculture, Price liberalization | 2 Comments »

Black market film prices

Monday, November 2nd, 2009

From a recent article in Time:

In recent years, bootlegged South Korean dramas have been flooding into the northern neighbor — part of a recent explosion across Asia in the popularity of South Korean TV shows and music known as the Korean Wave. On the black market in North Korea, American DVDs go for about 35¢; South Korean ones go for $3.75, because of the higher risk of execution for smuggling them in, according to two recent defectors from Pyongyang. The nation’s films and dramas have become so widespread across North Korea that the regime launched a crackdown this fall on North Korean university students, the movies’ biggest audience, and smugglers at the Chinese border, charging some with promoting the ideology of the enemy state.

It seems plausible that South Korean films are more expensive than American films due to political risk, but this cannot be the only factor. DPRK politics aside, South Korean and American films are not perfect substitutes. I am willing to bet that some of the price difference can be explained by the language barrier. North Koreans can watch South Korean films and dramas without reading subtitles. Some of the stories, characters, and motivations probably make more sense as well.

We can make apriory assumptions all day, however. We need some data. There is a paper in here for an enterprising economics student living near Dandong.

Read the full story here:
Soap-Opera Diplomacy: North Koreans Crave Banned Videos
Geoffrey Cain
Time
10/29/2009

Posted in Black markets, Civil society, Film, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Price liberalization | Comments Closed

The urban dimension of the North Korean economy: A speculative analysis

Sunday, August 9th, 2009

Chapter 11 of North Korea in the World Economy
Bertrand Renauld

(NKeconWatch: the whole paper is worth reading in full. Below is the introduction. Here is a link to the chapter in Google Books.

Introduction:

This chapter explores the urban dimension of the North Korean economy. Few areas of economic management of centrally planned economies have met with such widespread dissatisfaction and broad popular support for reforms as housing and urban development. This dissatisfaction arises from the peculiar systemic features of the “socialist city.” Since the early 1990s we have been able to study the economics of this type of city based on data from cities of the former Soviet Union, Central Europe, and also China and Vietnam. Of course, no such access to information exists today in North Korea.

As a starting point, I ask only one question: based on the body of knowledge that we have gained from other centrally planned economies (CPE), what are the systemic features of the North Korean urban economy that we expect to find? By so doing, the chapter applies to North Korean cities the method of “rigorous speculation” used earlier by Noland et al. (2000a) on North Korean macroeconomic and trade performance. According to Noland and his colleagues, “rigorous speculation” is the incorporation of fragmentary information into a consistent analytical framework that can clarify alternative scenarios regarding current economic conditions in North Korea. The results can then suggest suitable reforms to stimulate the economy.

Using a medical analogy, the focus is how the “personal history and diagnosis” of the North Korean urban system should be conducted some day. The analysis should not be misconstrued or misused: it is not offered as an actual diagnosis of the North Korean urban system. Rather, using our body of knowledge of the anatomy and physiology of the “socialist city,” it speculates about what we should expect to find in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) urban system. This “pre-diagnosis” relies on the limited yet often revealing information available on the North Korean urban system and its patterns of investment. We also can narrow the range of uncertainty about the structure of the North Korean urban system by means of international comparisons. For instance, should we expect the North Korea system of cities to have more in common with the Soviet cities of Russia than with Chinese or Vietnamese cities, both in terms of time paths of development and of institutional arrangements?

The paper contains many interesting facts and data that help us understand just how different centrally planned/socialist cities are when compared with market-based cities. The paper also spells out some interesting implications for North Korea’s urban residents (the majority of the country’s population) once the transition from a socialist to a market-based infrastructure begins.

Posted in Construction, Economic reform, Price liberalization, Private property, Real estate, Urban Economics | 3 Comments »

DPRK government continues to prove price controls ineffective

Wednesday, May 13th, 2009

According to Radio Free Asia:

Government price controls are now being imposed on non-food items in the markets, with frequent spot checks by state security police to monitor sales of sought-after household goods such as spoons, toothbrushes, and candles.

Price tags for more than 35 items were posted at farmers’ markets in Hweryong , Onsung, and Moosan cities in northern Hamgyong province, where North Korea’s poorest people go to buy the hard-to-find necessities of life.

“Market administrators and security agents take turns asking repeatedly about the price of various items,” a North Korean who recently defected to the South said in an interview.

“According to the government-imposed price tags, a toothbrush costs 200 won, a spoon 150 won, and 10 candles 1,000 won.”

This compares with unregulated prices of 250 won for a toothbrush, 200 won for a spoon, and 1,300-1500 won for a bundle of 10 candles.

An average monthly salary for a worker in North Korea is about 2,500 won.

“If someone asks the price, the vendors will be sure to give you the price dictated by the authorities, but they will not actually sell anything for that price,” the defector said.

Another South Korean-based defector agreed.

“When the inspectors come by, they see the official price on the tag, but when buyers come by, the vendors never sell for that price, but for a higher one,” the defector said.

“If buyers ask the vendor to sell for the government-imposed price, the vendors simply tell them to try to purchase for that price from somebody else.”

To avoid the watchful eye of the authorities, some vendors simply avoid going to farmers’ markets, and instead set up small bazaars elsewhere to sell manufactured goods.

The North Korean government has attempted to regulate the markets in numerous ways in the last few years (More history and commentary here). So far the implementation of new rules has proven haphazard, unpredictable, and largely ineffective since the black market is well developed and the levels of bureaucracy involved in the operations are numerous and subject to local manipulation.

The non-uniformity of these market regulations can be seen in the following IFES report:

North Koreans subject to harsher market controls
Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-5-6-1
2009-05-06

Good Friends, a non-profit organization working for human rights in North Korea, reported recently that North Korean residents are becoming increasingly discontent due to the government’s strengthening of restrictions on markets.

The group’s online newsletter, “North Korea Today,” reported in its most recent issue (no. 275) that a new list of banned items, presented as the “February 17th policy”, was issued by authorities to women selling goods in the market in Chungjin, North Hamgyong Province on April 10th.

According to a Good Friends source, Party propaganda officials were dispatched to markets in broadcasting trucks in order to announce the new measure, blaring that the selling of goods on the list of banned items would be considered “anti-socialist” activity, and would be punished accordingly.

Other sources report that the ban has resulted in an increase of door-to-door sales, and that those in the market are still willing to take individual orders for goods on the banned list, and then meet outside of the market to complete the deal.

In Hyeryong, North Hamgyong Province and Hyesan, Ryanggang Province, the “February 17 policy” was posted around markets, but the details of the policy were not explained. In the city of Hamheung, market hours were also restricted, with sellers only allowed to operate from 1~6 pm.

The goods restricted were mostly imported wares, with as much as 90 percent of foreign goods banned, and absolutely all South Korean products blocked. Those caught selling restricted items can expect to have their goods confiscated, with additional punishment not unheard of.

So the good news is that these rules make little difference to the actual distribution of goods and services in the DPRK. Of course the bad news is that the North Korean government keeps trying.

The whole story can be obtained here:
Radio Free Asia
Jung Young
5/6/2009

Posted in Economic reform, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Price liberalization | Comments Closed

DPRK price data

Friday, May 8th, 2009

Chris Green of the Daily NK offers the following price data (click on image to see full size):

Source:
The Good, the Bad and the Optimistic
Daily NK
Chris Green
5/8/2009

Posted in Agriculture, Economic reform, Food, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Price liberalization | Comments Closed

DPRK food prices stable

Monday, March 23rd, 2009

The Daily NK offers some recent food price data from the DPRK:

A defector named Kim, who keeps in touch with his family in the North, reported Monday in a telephone conversation with Daily NK, “The current food prices remain stable, according to sources from Hoiryeong and Pyongyang.”

Mr. Kim explained, “Rice sells in the Hoiryeong jangmadang at between 1,600 and 1,800won, around 200 won lower than before. Other grains and foods have fallen too. Pork sells for 2,800 to 3,000 won per kilogram and corn for 600 won per kilogram. An egg sells for 350 to 500.”

He added that, “Pork sold for about 5,000 won around lunar New Year’s Day and now it sells at half the price. Egg prices have risen a bit; they used to sell for 250 to 350 won. In Pyongyang, the price of rice, which was 2,200 won per kilogram in mid-January, is 1,700 won now. Corn per kilogram fell from 900 won to 750 won.”

He accounted for the lower food prices: In January, to greet the 60th anniversary of the friendship between North Korea and China, Chinese rice came in through Nampo port, so rice prices fell and provision of food increased. Since last year, the authorities have been able to deliver provisions to workers in a few major cities like Shinuiju.

He also relayed news that, “In February, a month’s provisions, 14 kilograms, were delivered to workers and their dependents; corn was provided through food distribution offices.”

Mr. Kim predicted that the situation will be at its worst in May and June of this year, although the food situation is comparatively much better than last year. No matter how good the last harvest was, though, it is not so significant for those who have to buy their food in the jangmadang.”

“Since 1995, food prices have always soared in May and June, the spring shortage season. After the spring this year they will soar again.”

In March or April, food in stock runs out and potatoes, barley, and other vegetables are not harvested until June. Therefore, rising food prices are a chronic spring phenomenon.

Pyongyang must feel reasonably confident, or they want us to think they feel reasonably confident, about current and anticipated food stocks. As reported last week, the DPRK has requested that all foreign NGOs and aid agencies responsible for distributing food aid to cease operations and head home.

Mr. Kim does offer some good news from North Korea’s markets (Jangmadang).

For some time we have heard news that the North Korean government is attempting to turn the clock back on local markets by regulating who may work in them (older women), when they may open, what they may sell, and at what price. All of these restrictions are supposedly part of a plan to break them down and reorient the population towards receiving goods from state-owned shops and the Public Distribution System. These measures could be part of the “2012 Kangsong Taeguk” plans, or they might simply be part of a longer-term political strategy.

It is rumored that these kinds of regulations have lead to violent backlashes because the socialist economy is not capable of supporting the population, and (paradoxically) markets are considered the social “safety net”. As a result, these market regulations are often ignored or “bypassed” by local officials and then quietly rescinded. Mr. Kim offers anecdotal evidence that regulation of the markets has still proven unsuccessful:

“Decrees to close the jangmadang were posted at the entrances but in January they were all removed and the jangmadang operated as usual.”

Let’s hope that this is the fate of more recent regulations as well.

Read more below:
Previous posts on food.

Previous posts on North Korea’s markets.

Food Prices in North Korean Markets Stabilize
Daily NK
Yoo Gwan Hee
3/23/2009

Posted in 2012 Strong and Prosperous Nation (Kangsong Taeguk), Agriculture, Food, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Price liberalization | Comments Closed

Rice prices plummet in North Korea

Wednesday, February 18th, 2009

Institute for Far Esatern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-2-18-1
2/18/2009

The online newsletter Open News for North Korea has recently reported that the cost of rice in the DPRK has fallen drastically. The report stated, “The price of rice in a number of cities, including Pyongyang, Nampo, Sinuiju, Hyesan, and Chungjin, has fallen an average of 300-400 won since the middle of last month,” but noted, “however, this is the nominal price, and considering that North Korea’s exchange rate has risen 10-20 percent compared to the Chinese Yuan, the actual fall in price is even greater.”

The price of one kilogram of rice in Pyongyang at the end of last month was 1700-1800 won (earlier prices were from 2000-2100 won); In Pyongsong and Soonchun, 1700won (2100 won), in Sinuiju, 1660 won (2000 won), in Hyesan, 1800 won (2500 won at the end of November), and Chungjin, 1800-1900 won (2000-2500 won at the beginning of January).

The newsletter attributed the drop in prices to the fact that rations from last year’s harvest were distributed to farmers on collective farms in January, and those farmers are now selling those rations in markets. The article explained that prices drop in January and February every year for the same reason.

In addition, North Korea reported that last year’s harvest was the largest in recent years, and that the North had imported large quantities of foodstuffs from China over the past several months. The newsletter stated that this, along with U.S. food aid shipped to Nampo, further added to the drop in prices.

“The North Korean Cabinet handed down an internal order to exchange foreign currency gained through exports until the end of December last year to import as much food as possible,” and the North imported 500 tons of Chinese rice through Sinuiju by January 9. Authorities insisted that after this first import, “[the North] will continue to exchange foreign currency for rice.”

These rice imports are being handled by mining and trade offices, including coal mining companies, the Central Party Underground Special Offices (Reungra Office 88, etc.), Kangsung Trade Office No. 54, which is controlled by the North’s military, Ryongaksan Trade Office, Eunpasan Trade Office.

North Korea is setting aside some imported rice as emergency stores, explaining that they are “in case South-North tensions escalate.”

Posted in Agriculture, Food, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Price liberalization, Public Distribiution System (PDS) | Comments Closed

North Korea’s transformation: A legal perspective

Thursday, February 12th, 2009

The Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES) published an interesting paper (with the above title) on legal reform in the DPRK. Below are some highlights. Links to the entire paper at the bottom.

As citizens have been left without state provisions for subsistence since the state did not have the material resources to supply the people through its central rationing system, the vast majority of individuals and organizations had to support themselves. Legitimizing commercial and market activity and expanding the scope of private ownership were a part of this effort. One of the most important laws reflecting this transformation is the Damage Compensation Law (sonhae bosang-beop), which is the North Korean version of a general torts law. This law holds an individual or any legal entity liable for its tort when damage is inflicted. Monetary compensation is the rule, while restoration is allowed when possible.

Under the socialist system, where the state is responsible for the provision of a citizen’s livelihood, tort law was of little use. Even in the case of death, one’s family would not suffer economically since the state provided sustenance rations. However, with the collapse of the public distribution system, the North Korean authorities could no longer maintain their socialist system. Since an individual now has to rely on his or her own devices, the loss of the employment, for example, directly inflicts a financial burden on the individual or family. Therefore, damage to property or person should be compensated for by the responsible party. Therefore, the new damage compensation law acts as a new mechanism for the protection of private property, and strengthens individual responsibility for negligent acts that inflict damage on others.

and…

Relaxation of law and order, along with the laxity of organizational control due to economic difficulties, changed individual attitudes toward government authorities and organizations in which these individuals were members. Individuals became more independent from the state and its organizations, since both the state and more directly engaged organizations lost important means of control over individuals in society due to the lack of resources and the inability to provide basic necessities to the people.

Under these circumstances, individual victims had no appropriate method to seek compensation for damage through an official dispute resolution process. This has led to an environment in which self-remedy has become the rule, rather than the exception. Although new criminal law punishes those who have used force in asserting their rights, there is no effective means of dispute resolution outside of taking advantage of officials willing to look the other way in exchange for favors, or hiring thugs to more directly resolve disagreements. Citizens can buy justice through bribes, and law enforcement officials are especially helpful in these endeavors when their palms are greased. This is much more economical as well as effective than bringing a case to the relevant official agency, which is generally incapable of resolving problems and instead further exploits the situation.

On courts and lawyers…

For example, the most prominent role of the court in North Korea, where other types of lawsuit are very unusual, was to handle divorce settlements, since divorce through simple agreement of the two parties was not allowed. Ordinary citizens went so far as to perceive settlement of divorce to be the most important role of the court. Criminal cases were also unusual. Political crime is handled through a non-judicial process, while many deviances are resolved through unofficial processes within more local organizations. The role of the court in resolving disputes was negligible, aside from divorce. Since the role of law enforcement agencies is to protect the state and secure the socialist system, the most important qualification for them is not legal expertise, but rather, loyalty and devotion to the North Korean ideology and system.

On the other hand, the Lawyer’s Act of 1993 prescribes the required qualifications of a lawyer. Those who are eligible to work as lawyers are those who are certified legal professionals, those who have working experience of no less than 5 years in legal affairs, or those who have a professional license in a certain area and have passed the bar examination after a short-term course in legal education. This qualification for working as a lawyer signifies that the state wants to equip the judicial system with legal professionals. Although there is no explicit professional qualification for a judge or prosecutor, we may assume that legal professionals have been elected or recruited in practice. This trend is likely to be reinforced as these social changes continue to unfold.

New provisions were also introduced to reinforce the judicial system. For example, interference with a law enforcement official’s performance of duties is now a punishable offence ; Threatening a witness or exacting revenge has been criminalized ; Non-execution of judgment will now be punished. Although the introduction of these provisions was an expression of the government’s effort to bring in a more effective judicial system, it would not be an easy task under the vague status of transformation. The state is very cautious and reluctant to undertake bold or fundamental changes due to concerns about political instability. Therefore, it takes time for various coherent mechanisms to fully support a market system.

You can download the entire paper in PDF format here.

You can read it on the IFES web page here.

Posted in 2002 Economic reforms, Automobiles, Aviation, Black markets, Damage Compensation Law, DPRK Policies, Economic reform, Finance, Foreign direct investment, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Insurance, International trade, Joint Ventures, Lawyers Act, Light Industry, Manufacturing, Price liberalization, Private property, Railways, Rason Economic and Trade Zone (Rajin-Sonbong), Real estate, Sea shipping, Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013), Transportation | 2 Comments »