Economic reform « North Korean Economy Watch

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Kumgang Expansion

Wednesday, February 15th, 2006

According to the Korea Times, 02-10-2006, the Kumgang tourist zone is being expanded. Here are some stats:

The Extended tour zone will reach Wonsan (Where the Japanese Chongryun ships come in)
There are plans to finalize a “master plan” of development for the area (lakes, nursing homes, beaches).
Since opening in 1998, 1.2 million south Koreans have visited
Hyundai Asan hopes to channel 2.3 trillion won ($2.37 billion) into the project through domestic and foreign investors.
Besides the tour-related issues, the two sides also agreed on a payment of $400,000 to the three victims of a traffic accident that happened late last year. It wish I could track that $400,000. It will end up in interesting places for sure. The accident happened on Dec. 27 in the tourist area, and North Korea called at first for at least $1 million in compensation. In an earlier traffic accident that killed a North Korean soldier in June 2001, $6,000 in compensation was paid.

Posted in Chongryun, Foreign direct investment, Mt. Kumgang Tourist Special Zone | Comments Closed

Sinuiju SAR back on?

Monday, February 13th, 2006

According to the Daily NK (2006-2-13):

A high-level internal source in North Korea reported on the 12th that North Korea is in the process of restarting the development of Shinuiju Special Administrative Region.

According to the source, a mass number of residents were moved to rural areas, plans were set to move administrative offices and plans were carried out to build the road to Dandong, China is under expansion construction. They are also coming up with measures to better control the usage of cellular phones as well as other political measures.

Such recent development activities in Shinuiju mainly took place after Kim Jong Il’s visit to China, which seems to be part of North Korea’s reformation and liberalization plan.

Driving Out the Residents and Their Number

The source reported, “They are planning to move the Shinuiju residents of about 7,000 families (25,000 to 30,000 people) to close cities and rural areas. Their plan is to strictly sort out those from “bad families” and those who have committed political errors (wrongdoings) and move them to Chulsan-gun [Cholsan], Donglim-gun [Tongrim], Yomju-gun, and Taechun-gun[Thaechon] of North Pyongan province.”

In September of 2002, North Korea announced Shinuiju as the Special Administrative Region and nominated Yang Bin, president of Ouya Group at the time, who was the invited minister of the Shinuiju Special Administrative Region. He said, “We will move the current 200,000 Shinuiju residents to another place.”

At the time, the North Korean government started to build 3 m high fence around the designated region, which clearly showed its preparation to make Shinuiju an isolated Special Administrative Region.

Kim Eun Chul, president of Backdu-Halla Association, a young adults defectors organization and a former Shinuiju resident, said, “Chulsan-gun, Donglim-gun, Yomju-gun, and Taechun-gun are agricultural areas where there is no military or manufacturing production facilities, thus they are adequate places to move the residents.”

“There have been rumors about moving those people with unclear backgrounds out of the region every time they talked about making the Special Administrative Region.”

Provincial Administrative Offices to be Moved

The source reported, “The provincial offices located in Shinuiju city are rebuilt in South Shinuiju and roads to Dandong, China are under construction to be expanded.”

Shinuiju’s administrative offices refer to provincial offices of North Pyongan Province, including Provincial Party (office), People’s Committee, and Administrative Committee. Plans to move these offices to South Shinuiju had been announced when the government announced the plan for the Shinuiju Special Administrative Region in September 2002. South Shinuiju is located about 3 km away from downtown Shinuiju and when Shinuiju becomes a Special Administrative Region, administrative work will be divided and South Shuinuiju will take charge of provincial administrative work.

Yet another source said, “Among the Shinuiju residents, rumors are spreading that Kim Jong Il’s visit to China was for iron and oil trade.” Shinuiju relied on Chinese aid or trade for most of the industrial facilities and as an example, currently, Baekmawon Oil Factory in Shinuiju is receiving oil aid of 1,500,000 tons per year from China.

Additional posts on the Sinuiju SAR can be found here.

Read the full story here:
Shinuiju Special Administrative Region Plan Propelled Once Again
Daily NK
Kwon Jeong Hyun
2006-2-13

Posted in China, Economic reform, Sinuiju Special Administrative Region | Comments Closed

Smoke signals from BAT’s North Korea venture

Wednesday, February 8th, 2006

Asia Times
Lora Saalman
2/8/2006

On January 10, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il traveled in a luxury train to China’s Guangdong province to sample socialist-flavored capitalism. Just a few months earlier, the North Korean Workers Party introduced reform measures granting foreign investors tax cuts and allowing them to sell goods produced in North Korea without tariffs.

For an economy that ostensibly issued halting economic reforms in 1984, these new measures constitute a revolution, albeit one with Chinese characteristics. In accordance with its giant neighbor’s model, North Korean economic reform is predicated as an alternative to the instability of political liberalization. Unforeseen social and political shifts are to be cushioned by financial solvency to keep the regime intact. With China’s assistance and unofficial aid, sustainable growth may one day be achieved in North Korea. Yet a darker side to North Korea’s economic awakening remains.

Kim Jong-il’s visit comes on the heels of accounts of North Korean money-laundering in Macau and the US decision last June and again in October to freeze the assets of various North Korean companies and financial institutions. While many of these firms are beyond the reach of US sanctions, implied misconduct has already led to runs on the North Korean-affiliated financial institution Banco Delta Asia in Macau.

As allegations swirl of money-laundering through counterfeit cigarettes and currency, a less-known story has emerged on British American Tobacco’s previously undisclosed four-year-old joint venture in North Korea. It presents the dilemma of doing business in a country in desperate need of revenue but with a poor track record of allocating resources to its people. This cautionary tale begs the question as to where exactly Pyongyang’s joint-venture profits are going.

For North Korea, which lacks many of the basic laws for financial transparency and good governance, capital investments are more than economically precarious. Shared contact information and dubious management practices among North Korean companies are ubiquitous.

Daesong-BAT is one of a handful of Western joint ventures in North Korea. The far-reaching tentacles of its North Korean partner illustrate the complexity of verifying the background and connections of any North Korean entity. Like many of its compatriots, North Korea’s Sogyong General Trading Corp (Sogyong) boasts circuitous and often indirect ties to entities engaged in proliferation, international trade, shipping, and money-laundering. These indicators point to larger concerns as to whether joint ventures, particularly Western ones, can be manipulated by North Korea for illicit financing of the regime or even to sustain its alleged WMD (weapons of mass destruction) programs.

Joint ventures and front companies
In establishing Daesong-BAT, British American Tobacco teamed up with Sogyong General Trading Corp, a Pyongyang-based state trader best known for its carpet exports. Sogyong, however, also exports such products as handicrafts, furniture and agricultural produce, while importing machinery, electronics, fishing tackle, chemicals and fertilizer. It is not uncommon for North Korean state-run enterprises to deal in everything from machinery to fishing tackle. Yet eclectic product lists make trade in illicit drugs and weapons all the more difficult to track. Cigarettes are just one more product in the Sogyong export-import pantheon.

North Korean company product lists also rarely convey their full range of trade. Seemingly innocuous industries are often manipulated as front companies. Last year, for example, Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) listed what appeared to be an innocuous North Korean food manufacturer, Sosong Food Factory, for its participation in nuclear, missile, chemical and biological-weapons proliferation. Cigarettes, like food, have been used at times to mask the real objects being transferred. In one case, Japan in 2002 seized a Chinese vessel and found that the declared store of cigarettes on board actually contained drugs thought to have come from North Korea.

While not as licentious as drug or human trafficking, even the black-market trade of cigarettes could have a tangible impact on North Korea’s financing, as seen in Eastern European illegal cigarette rings. These factors highlight the danger of taking a North Korean food or even carpet manufacturer at face value.

North Korea’s network
Among the elements of obfuscation, the company name Daesong-BAT merits attention. Rather than combining or modifying the titles of the two partner companies to form Sogyong-BAT, Daesong-BAT combines British American Tobacco’s acronym with a name that could either point to North Korea’s Daesong district or Daesong General Trading Corp (Daesong). If it turns out to be the latter, Japan and other governments have prominently featured Daesong for its ties to missile and nuclear proliferation.

Incidentally, Daesong maintains one of the most extensive and convoluted North Korean networks, with more than 10 subsidiaries. It also is suspected of falling under Bureau 39, which earns foreign currency for North Korea. A direct connection between Daesong-BAT and the sinewy Daesong franchise has yet to be established but, as illustrated below, nothing is clear cut in North Korean business relations.

Because of the lack of transparency and convoluted nature of North Korean companies, contact information often serves as the first stencil for tracing overlap between industries. In the case of Daesong, the US Central Intelligence Agency’s Open Source Center follows the use of the same fax number to establish potential business and branch linkages. If the same logic is applied to Sogyong, another pattern emerges. Sogyong shares common fax numbers with at least two companies, Korea Foodstuffs Trading Corp (Foodstuffs) and Korea Kwail Trading Corp (Kwail). These companies in turn share fax numbers with nearly 100 companies in North Korea.

Among North Korean firms sharing contact information with Sogyong-linked entities, Japan’s METI and official European export monitors have listed at least six as end-users associated with North Korean WMD programs. In October, the US government targeted one in particular, Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corp (Ryonha), freezing its assets under US jurisdiction and placing it on the US Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list. Ryonha is a prime example of the complex web of North Korean subsidiaries. Last June, the US Treasury Department also targeted the assets of its parent company Korea Ryonbong General Corp, formerly known as Lyongaksan, which heads five other US-designated entities.

Ryonha is not an aberration among companies converging with Sogyong. Among other Foodstuffs and Kwail-connected entities, Korean company databases list Korea Pyongyang Trading Corp as a distributor of methane gas derived from animal excrement. Apparently, effluent is not its only fetid source of income. The Japanese government has listed the very same company, along with subsidiaries of two other firms tracing back to Sogyong, namely Korea Ryonhap Trading Corp and Korea Jangsu Trading Corp, for nuclear, missile, chemical and biological weapons proliferation.

Proliferation networks may not be the only mechanisms at Sogyong’s fingertips. Contact information also links the two Sogyong-connected associates with at least four North Korean financial institutions. Among these, Koryo Bank and Korea Joint Bank have alleged ties to the now-infamous Banco Delta Asia in Macau. Banco Delta Asia’s own purported involvement in counterfeit-currency distribution and counterfeit-cigarette smuggling does not bode well for Daesong-BAT, no matter how convoluted their connections. Banco Delta Asia may have three degrees of separation between it and Sogyong, but in North Korea’s fishbowl of finance this does not preclude cooperation.

Banco Delta Asia is also reported to maintain a close business relationship with Macau-based Zokwang Trading, which its own vice general managing director claims is a part of North Korea’s Daesong General Trading Corp. Daesong, as mentioned earlier, has a pervasive proliferation record. It also has reported links to Changgwang Sinyong Corp (Changgwang), which has been repeatedly sanctioned by the United States for its missile-proliferation activities and sales to Iran and Pakistan. Zokwang in turn deals in missiles and nuclear-power-plant components, all the while maintaining a partnership with the notorious Changgwang. Combined with Sogyong’s branch in the joint \-venture hub Shenyang, China, even indirect ties to Macau suggest that Sogyong has the ability to tap into proliferation, industrial and financial networks in China and beyond.

Proliferation, industry and finance mean little without the means to transport goods and technology. Sogyong-associated entities Foodstuffs and Kwail share fax numbers with North Korea’s national airline Air Koryo, which has also been cited by official European monitors for proliferation. A 2003 Far Eastern Economic Review article even named Air Koryo as the transportation mechanism for Daesong’s suspected military assistance to Myanmar. Sogyong’s own shipping vessels Sogyong 1 and 2, which were detained in Japan on safety violations in December 2004 and January 2005, complete the final leg of the contact-linked proliferation, financing and shipment triangle. This network belies a much more intricate set of alliances than the domestic-consumption-based joint venture touted by British American Tobacco and Sogyong General Trading Corp.

Standards of business conduct
British American Tobacco’s website advocates transparency in international business and laudably eschews bribery, corruption, illicit trade, and money-laundering. In October, BAT executives further contended in The Guardian that the company’s North Korean cigarette joint venture fuels only domestic consumption, not exports to China or elsewhere. In spite of these reassurances, BAT is no stranger to the dangers of black-market cigarette production and transshipment. A February 2000 article in The Guardian even accuses BAT of complicity, by knowingly allowing illicit smuggling of its cigarettes to occur.

In the case of Daesong-BAT, British American Tobacco officials have admitted to knowing little of the company’s North Korean joint-venture operations. Ominously, BAT has stated that an unnamed Singapore division controls its North Korean joint venture. Lack of oversight combined with a dubious North Korean offshore mechanism for managing an ostensibly domestic industry raises significant warning signs. The incestuous relationship between state-run North Korean entities that share fax numbers of companies and banks listed for WMD procurement and money-laundering through counterfeit tobacco should also elicit concern. These are not simply dilemmas for British American Tobacco, but pose challenges to any companies forming joint ventures in North Korea.

Economic integration, as in China’s case, may bring North Korea more into step with international norms and standards. Ironically, engagement that is likely to lead to greater future transparency may also be manipulated for North Korea’s short-term illicit gains.

In 2003, the British government pressured BAT to close down its cigarette factory operations in the military dictatorship of Myanmar because of concerns over that country’s lack of human rights. Given the legion of obstacles impeding transparency in North Korea, BAT and other Western firms could be contributing to the worsening of more than human rights. They could be aiding and abetting illicit North Korean financing that is alleged to fuel Kim Jong-il’s slush fund and WMD programs.

Posted in Arms shipment, Banking, British American Tobacco (BAT), Bureau 39, Counterfeiting, Daesong-BAT JV Company, Drug smuggling, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, Foreign direct investment, Illicit activities, Ryonha Machine Tool Factory (JV Company), Sogyong General Trading Corp | Comments Closed

Kaesong Industrial Park Update and Expansion

Tuesday, February 7th, 2006

From the Korea Times:

Tuesday, February 7, 2006

By Hwang Si-young

KT Corp., the country’s No. 1 fixed-line telecom and broadband operator, will build a gigantic communications center at the Gaeseong Industrial Complex in North Korea by 2007, the company said yesterday.

“Many local companies are expected to set up plants in Gaeseong in a few years. To meet a growing demand for fixed-line telephone and internet services, we decided to build a large communications center, approximately 9,900 square meters in size,” said KT’s Gaeseong District Office director Joung Youn-kwang.

There are currently 11 companies based in Gaeseong Complex. They are permitted and approved by the Ministry of Unification and Korea Land Corporation to do their businesses in Gaeseong.

The size of the industrial complex currently stands at 92,400 square meters, but according to KT, it will be expanded more to around 3,300,000 square meters by 2007, housing 300 or more companies.

As of now, KT operates a small communications center using a two-story temporary building in Gaeseong.

The company is likely to build a center after the overall industrial complex expansion is completed, Joung said.

KT will soon begin negotiating with its North Korean counterpart to secure land and bring additional telecommunications equipment, the company said.

Posted in Communications, Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) | Comments Closed

DPRK conterfitting cigarettes?

Monday, February 6th, 2006

According to Time Magazine:

A confidential report compiled by investigators working for a coalition of major U.S., European and Japanese tobacco companies indicates that North Korea has developed a highly lucrative source of hard currency: counterfeit cigarettes. The report dated June 29, 2005, offers a unique glimpse of the scale and sophistication of North Korea’s illicit-cigarette industry, which has allegedly counterfeited a vast array of brands—from Marlboro to Davidoff. The report estimates that production from 10 to 12 North Korean factories in the counterfeiting business may total 41 billion cigarettes a year, generating annual revenues of $520 million to $720 million. It’s not clear how much of this money flows to the regime of dictator Kim Jong Il, whether in duties or payments “for protection,” but the report speculates that its share of the profits may amount to $80 million to $160 million a year. That would be quite a windfall at a time when the North’s economy is reeling and the U.S. is trying to pressure Kim to abandon his nuclear-weapons program by cracking down on his regime’s income from business exploits as diverse as trafficking drugs and counterfeiting $100 bills.

Pyongyang has consistently dismissed U.S. allegations that it’s engaged in such illegal activities. But according to the report, some of these cigarette factories are directly owned by North Korea’s military and the internal-security service, giving the state “total control” over these operations. In other cases, says the report, the North’s contribution is primarily to provide a “safe haven” to factories run by overseas counterfeiting syndicates. Three of the factories that are said to be located in the Rajin area on the northeast coast of North Korea are allegedly run or financed by crime syndicates from Taiwan. One of these factories, equipped with second-hand equipment from China, has allegedly counterfeited such brands as Mild Seven, Dunhill and Benson & Hedges. According to the report, another factory in Rajin employed 120 people and was run by Chinese supervisors and technicians; North Korean officials were allegedly paid a “tax” on the factory’s cigarettes, which were then exported in fishing vessels owned by a Taiwan crime syndicate. Indeed, the report claims that a chief attraction of running such a business in North Korea is that the “regime’s willingness to allow dedicated, deep-sea smuggling vessels to use its ports provides the gangs with a secure delivery channel.”

Posted in Counterfeiting, Illicit activities, International trade, Rason Economic and Trade Zone (Rajin-Sonbong), Tobacco | Comments Closed

North Korean Grain production up 5.3% in 2005

Wednesday, January 25th, 2006

According to Financial Express:

North Korea’s grain production rose 5.3 per cent to 4.54 million tonnes in 2005, helped by better harvests and fertilizer shipments from South Korea, South Korean data showed today.

The 2005 harvest was still far short of the impoverished country’s annual demand, estimated at six million tonnes, South Korea’s unification ministry said in a report. North Korea received 500,000 tonnes of rice from South Korea last year, together with humanitarian food aid from the World Food Programme (WFP) and other international agencies.

UN’s food aid to North Korea, however, ended on December 31 after Pyongyang said it no longer needed emergency shipments from international agencies. Instead, Pyongyang called for long-term development assistance to end its chronic food shortages. But some experts regard the shift to development-oriented assistance as a tactic to dodge the WFP’s request for transparency in food distribution.

Posted in Agriculture, Foreign direct investment, Public Distribiution System (PDS), UN World Food Program | Comments Closed

Private business in Hamheung province

Tuesday, January 24th, 2006

According to the Daily NK:

Recent testimonies came out stating that 90% of the families in Hamheung City of South Hamkyung province maintain their living by running private businesses and due to the given reality, distribution of phones has been rapidly on the rise. It is a well known fact that the North Korean factories in work are still below 20% and it is the women who are the main breadwinners of the North Korean homes. This is the first time the testimony came out saying that 90% of women in Hamheung City run businesses. Lee said that although she does not sell at a stall in a jangmadang, she does have a business of providing necessary items to a number of regulars. She started this medication business in 1995, when her relatives(Korean-Chinese) living in China helped her by providing 500,000 Won ($250).

Lee said that instead of going to the workplace, she pays 10,000 won ($5). Because she is not working, they do not give her food tickets, but they stamp her attendance card. If she neither works nor pays, she has to go to a labor detention facility (Nodong Danryeondae).

“Although state enterprises say they will give 10,000 won ($5) to the workers, after taking out fees for the People’s Army, savings, and other fees to the state, the money you end up with is only about 2,000 Won ($1). With this, you cannot live. This is why I started my own business,” said Lee.

Kim Jin Chul (male, age 26) from Shinuiju testified, “Most of the families I know of in my town, Dongsang-dong, Shiuiju, have their own businesses. They mostly sell manufactured goods such as shoes, hats, glasses, gloves and food such as candies, ramyun, and liquor.”

“More than 90% of the Dongsang-dong residents live by running their own businesses. They buy goods by making profits by exchanging foreign currency to the trade companies in China, and they sell them in jangmadang,” said Kim.

Posted in China, Economic reform, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), International trade, Price liberalization, Private property | Comments Closed

Kim Jong il taking in Chinese economy

Friday, January 20th, 2006

Speculation was rampant this week on the whereabouts of Kim jong il. No one knew for sure really…First he was Beijing via his special train, then he was in Russia, others claimed it was Shanghai by air. It turns out he was in southern China (by train). As usual, the “unofficial” trip, from January 10-18, and itinerary were made public just as Kim was to return home.(source)

According to the Washintgon Post:
Hundreds of uniformed and plainclothes police swarmed in and around the opulent White Swan Hotel in Guangzhou, capital of Guangdong province, putting up roadblocks leading to the hotel. In the early evening, two of the city’s most luxurious sightseeing ferries — “The Pearl of the Flower City” and “The Information Times,” named after a local paper — cruised slowly down the Pearl River, with Kim rumored to be aboard. Police cars lined roads on both sides of the river.

Where did he visit?
A Guangzhou branch of Sun Yat Sen Univeristy (source)
Yantian container port (source) (Guangzhou)
Wuhan and Yichang, Hubei province (source)
Beijing (source)
Three Gorges Dam (source)
High-tech factories and agricultural research institute (source)
Yantian Port (source)

What was the purpose?
The visit has prompted speculation that China is advocating market reforms for Pyongyang and could also urge it to rejoin stalled nuclear negotiations.

Mr Kim’s visit to the cradle of the Chinese boom could be a careful hint to the outside world that he is following Beijing’s lead, says the BBC’s Louisa Lim in Beijing. (source)

“There is a debate in North Korea as there was in China at one time about how far and how fast they should go,” said Chung Jae Ho, an international relations expert at Seoul National University. “But I think this is a signal that this is the right time for a new opening.”(source)

He said one possibility widely discussed among experts was that North Korea would try to create a capitalist-oriented trading zone on its western coast, near China, modeled at least loosely on Shenzhen, which borders Hong Kong.(source)

Kim also held meetings with President Hu Jintao and all other eight members of the governing Politburo Standing Committee as well as tours of two Chinese provinces.

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher R. Hill, made an unscheduled trip to Beijing and met with his North Korean counterpart, Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan, in a session hosted by the Chinese, diplomats said. (source)

Kim Quote:
“The progress made in the southern part of China, which has undergone a rapid change, and the stirring reality of China deeply impressed us”

Posted in China, Economic reform | Comments Closed

what is stopping DPRK reform?

Wednesday, January 18th, 2006

According to Han Young Jin, Reporter, Defector from Pyongyang
in the Daily NK:

Interview 1:
Kang Min Jun (pseudonym, age 65), a former executive of “Keumgang Jewelry Processing Co.”, a North Korea-China state cooperative factory asserted that Kim Jong Il’s visit to China is a mere gesture.

“I participated in the National Economic Sector Officials Seminar held in Pyongyang, and it was before the 2002 7.1 Economic Measure was announced. The central party officials who came to educate us said, “Reformation and liberalization does not fit into our revolution reality so do not expect it to happen.” Unless the North Korean regimes changes, reformation and liberalization will remain as a dream,” Kang said.

“After his 2001 visit to China, Kim Jong Il praised China’s changes calling it, “heaven and earth reversed” and called on three hundred professors and experts from Pyongyang People’s Economy University and Wonsan Economics University and made them visit China and study economics. They came back and during their discussion for reformation, their study was abandoned due to the four principles the Party insisted never to be violated.”

The four principles Kang presented are as the following.
1. Planned economy must never be abandoned.
2. Private ownership by the people cannot be permitted.
3. Liberalization of individual economy must not be allowed.
4. The Public Distribution System (food distribution system) must not be abandoned.

Interview 2:
“Whenever he is in trouble, Kim Jong Il makes an event. Right now, Kim Jong Il is in a deep trouble. Nuclear issue, counterfeit issue, Banco Delta Asia fund freeze, human rights issue, food issue and all the problems are now come together. The only way to solve these problems is siding with China. If North Korea is determined to reform, it could be have just made foreign investment attraction policy instead of making a trip all the way to China.”

Posted in Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, Private property, Public Distribiution System (PDS), UN World Food Program | Comments Closed

Price information

Saturday, December 31st, 2005

Here is more commodity price information courtesy of Open Radio for North Korea:

Agricultural and houselhold commodities:
1) Rice
-Shin Eui Joo: The price rose from 850 won/kg (18th) to 900won/kg (31st)/ whole sale price: 620won/kg
-Bak Chun Gun: October: 1000won/kg, November 800won/kg (trading rice was banned in October with resumption of food distribution system, which caused the rising price.)
-Pyeongyang: Honammi 800won/kg Annammi 680won/kg

2) Corn
-Shin Eui Joo: 400won/kg (December)
-Bak Chun Gun: 350won/kg (November)

3) Pork
-Shin Eui Joo: 3,300won/kg (December)
-Bak Chun Gun: 3,500won/kg (November)

4) Beef: 7,000won/kg (Beef is seldom sold at markets, but was temporarily out in the black market for new year’s holiday season.)

5) Cooking Oil
-Shin Eui Joo: 2,300 won/kg (November)/Yellow Oil
-Bak Chun Gun: 2,500won/kg (November)/Yellow Oil

6) Seasoning
-Same in the region of Shin Eui Joo, Sah Ree Won, Bak Chun Gun: 2000won/bag(200g)

7) Underwear
-Bak Chun Gun: Brassiere: 4,000~6,000won, Children’s underwear: 5,000~6,000won
-Shin Eui Joo : Underclothes: 10,000~15,000won/piece, 20,000~30,000won/set

8) Socks
-Bak Chun Gun: 500~2,000won/pair (socks for winter)

9) Shoes
– Bak Chun Gun: high quality: 15,000won, poor quality: 3,000~4,000won/ Handmade: 2,500won

10) T.V
-Shin Eui Joo: the same as November

11) Price of house and rent
-Shin Eui Joo: One storied house (1 Room, 1 Kitchen): $600, Apartment (2 Rooms, 1 Kitchen): $1,500, Well-located apartment (3 Rooms, 1 Kitchen): $10,000~15,000(able to bargain), 100 Sq.m- apartment: $12,500 (90,000~100,000 Chinese Yuan)
-Sa Ree Won: 100 Sq.m apartment $8,750 (70,000 Chinese Yuan)
-Bak Chun Gun: One storied house (2 Rooms, 1 Kitchen): around $100, Three storied apartment: around $150~200

Footnotes:
1. A middleman receives 10% of the purchase as compensation. If one moves to a purchased house, one needs to receive a certificate which records that you are allowed to live in the house from a police officer in charge of registration in the neighborhood, usually the payment is one mal(10du/15kg) of rice.
2. Expense for making Kimchi(Bak Chun Gun): Chinese cabbage 200won/head, Red pepper powder 2500won/kg, garlic 3,000won/100heads, ginger 300won/kg, salt 350won/kg, sugar 1,000won/kg, salted anchovies 1,500won/kg, scallion is raised at home. Approximately 40,000~45,000won is expended for making 150 heads of Kimchi (usually consumed with rice, and is made with pepper, scallion and salted anchovies), for family of four.

Local Fees and Markets:
1) Electricity- Bak Chun Gun: 10won/lightbulb, 70won for black and white TV (per quarter)

2) Water- Bak Chun Gun: flat rate of 200won per house (per quarter)

3) Tax on land – Bak Chun Gun: 200won/2.5 Sq.m (per month)

4) Payment for spot at markets (Bak Chun Gun)

5) Exchange rate for Renminbi and US dollar
Shin Eui Joo: 2,900won/$ (November 1: 2,715)/ Rinminbi 360won/yuan (November 1:320)/ 3600won/Euro

Footnotes:
1. No payment at markets, but general tax is imposed. 20won/day for agricultural products, and tax for industrial products vary according to the goods.
2. Spots in Markets are rarely traded. For people starting their business at the market, relationship with the manager is important. When business with the manager was successful, managers make a spot for them by making others’ spots smaller.

Health Care and clothing:
1) Medicine for cold and antibiotics (Bak Chun Gun)
-Medicine for cold: Chung Yeong Poong 10won/pill (Adults consume 2 pills)/ Antibiotics: Penicillin 100won per ampoule/ Distilled water: 30won
-Antibiotics: when one receives an injection of 1 ampoule of Penicillin mixed with distilled water, the doctor is paid 100won aside from the price of medicine.

2) Bribe paid for medical examination and basic treatment (Bak Chun Gun)
-5000won for releasing a medical certificate, 350won for 1 injection (ex, glucose 500g), 100won for Penicillin

3) Stationaries (Bak Chun Gun)
-Won Joo Pil( Ball Pen): 250won, Notebook (paper made of straw): 5won/20pieces, Hand-made bag in North Korea, 2,000~3,000won, Uniforms used to be purchased at a flat rate set by the government with a coupon, but uniform is seldom sold at a shop these days. People usually purchase fabrics of appropriate color and size, and hand made the uniforms. (official state rate for elementary school uniform used to be 1,500won)

Monthly tuition and expense (Bak Chun Gun) :
-No monthly tuition is officially required, but some parents give some money to the teachers privately and school requires the students to prepare various materials.
– Club activity: the students need to pay 5,000won every month. (If one participates in cell activity, he/she is exempted from external labor or social labor ).
– Monthly payment is 10 bundles of firewood/Iron 3kg/Vinyl 1kg/Rubber 1kg
– -Students who fail to bring the materials are returned home without being allowed into the class.

Electricity:
-Shin Eui Joo: same as November
-Bak Chun Gun: Electricity was provided throughtout all day despite frequent blackouts occurred in the summer. / Since the beginning of the winter, electricity was provided only between 10:30pm~ 4am due to poor supply. (Mostly, candles are used at night. Candles are 40won each).
– Pyeongyang: electricity is provided for 24 hours, but blackouts occur often. Sometimes, 3~4 hours of blackout occur.

Water Supply:
-In case of Bak Chun Gun downtown, water pipes freeze in the winter. People dig wells for water.
-In case of Pyongyang, peripheral area is provided with water only once or twice a week. (The time when water is supplied is not announced beforehand. People have to watch the faucet on all the time).

Railway system and transportation fee:
-The fare for train from Bak Chun~ Won San with a transfer at Gaema Highland (Where Pyong Buk Sun and Gang Won Sun meets) is 35won, but most of the officials at the station hide the tickets and sell them for 1,000won.
-In order to buy train tickets, one needs to make a reservation a day ahead and stand in line to buy the ticket on the day. However, honored soldiers, soldiers on service and school teachers have priority, and it is hard for common people to buy tickets.
-What is interesting is that a lot of people take the train without paying the fare when moving from Bak Chun Gun to Ahn Joo Gun by Shin Eui Joo-Gae Sung train. It is because no body checks the tickets in this block.

Cars, buses and car fare between major cities:
-Pyongyang: same fare of 5won for subway, train without track
-Bus between Bak Chun ~ Shin Eui Joo runs once a day, and the fare is 2,500~2,800won. Additional 1,000won needs to be paid for one luggage.
-Shin Eui Joo~Nampo/ Roundtrip, once a day, 10,000won
-Shin Eui Joo~Won San/ Roundtrip, once a day/ 12,000won (10,000won possible after bargaining)
-Shin Eui Joo~Sa Ree Won/ Roundtrip, once a day/ 12,000won (10,000won possible after bargaining)
Footnote: No departure time is designated. The train leaves when the train is full.

Lodging:
-Shin Eui Joo: Same as before. Some of the private inns are as well organized as hotel. Chinese Koreans usually use them, and it costs 5,000won per night.
-Bak Chun Gun: State owned inns lacked heating system and was filled with lice, which is why they rarely exist now. Individuals run lodging facilities now (similar to lodging at a private residence)/ they come out to the station in order to invite guests, and it costs 100won per night.

Expense for obtaining travel document:
-Travel document: it costs 10,000won to travel from Bak Chun to Pyeongyang (ten box of cigarettes branded “Cat”)/ if using other ways, 6,000won~8,000won (Jagangdo 7,000won/Chungjin 8,000won/Pyeongsung 6,000won)/ 500won from Bakchun to Shin Eui Joo (Within a province)
-Travel document is not supposed to cost any money, but Municipal adminisrative committee, county administrative committee and officials in charge of the process publicly asks for money/ Only expense for travel documents to Pyongyang is flat rate of 10,000won, and expense for other provinces differ by person.
-Travel document to cross the river: Valid for one month, and cannot be extended/ costs around $100~200, which is not much more than passport or visa. (more money paid, the document is more quickly issued)/ Fee for travel document to cross the river is set for 20,000won by the government.
-When Chinese citizen visited North Korea with the document, extension is only available with a cost of $100 a day. (When one has good relationship with people of National Security Agency or any other relevant organizations, he/she can pay $50 a day) Because of the fee, they rarely extend the document.
-Passport and visa: DPRK passport is valid for 2 months and Chinese visa is valid for 90 days (In North Korea, expiration date on DPRK passport is more important than that on Chinese visa)/ Extension can be made twice, but extension is rarely requested by anyone (Specific reason for extension needs to be provided, which is a lot of work)/ Also, certificate of health is only valid for 4 months, which means that the passport cannot be extended twice/ fee for issuance of passport is set by the government for 40,000won (Some people say 150,000won). But actual expense is $100~500, and the expense varies depending on the region, person (interpersonal skills, ability, relationship with others) and the waiting time to get the passport (1 month~1year)/ Passport is issued in 1~2 months with a payment of $500 for Pyongyang, and 2~3months with a payment of $300 for other regions. / DPRK passport is valid for 2 months, but it is actually issued 1 month after the issue date.
-When visiting China to visit relatives, applicants for passport and travel document to cross the river are classified separately. In case of crossing Yalu River, if the applicant intends to stay in Dandong Province (Dandong, Bongsung, Donggang, Gwanjun) they need to apply for travel document, and if they intends to go farther than Dandong Province and for example, visit relatives in Shenyang and Fushun, they need to apply for passport.
-A case of procedure to obtain travel documents to cross the river and visa (with purpose of visiting the relatives)
-Application and procedure -> Mid March, Fill out the application (Hand $200 to officials at the office of foreign works: Confirmation of the relatives at the office of foreign works, military security office, and military police office, confirmation by a chair of women’s committee, Approval from Provincial Police Office and National Security Agency) -> Issuance of travel documents to cross the river in the beginning of November -> Two-day education in the beginning of November (First day: Exhibition on battle against espionage/ Second day: special education by the deputy of military security offic / Lastly, write out the oath) -> entered China on 23 November

Price of a business spot at the market (Bak Chun Gun)
-In case of the market at Bak Chung Eup, they don’t have the price of business spots.

Food Distribution System
-Bak Chun Gun: Distribution was carried out twice in the beginning and the end of October/ Distribution was halted in November/ The amount distributed was 15kg and did not meet the assigned amount of 57kg/ Official amount: 700g for workers, 300g for housewives, 500g for 15 year old child, 400g for 13 year old child/ rice/other crops ratio is 3:7
-Pyongyang: Food distribution was not halted except for the three months period of April~June 2005./ The amount distributed is 485g(official: 700g) for workers, 300g for housewives, 200g for students (official amount 300~500g)/ ratio of rice and other crops was 5:5. The ratio was sometimes 7:3 when things are better than the usual/ The price was 36won for Annammi, 54won for Honam rice (received from South Korea)/ Price at Yangjungso(Place where rice is gathered) was 20won less than market price/ Everyone is supposed to purchase rice from Yangjungso, but because of poor quality of rice, some well-off people buy rice at market.
-Shin Eui Joo and Sa Ree Won is similar to Bak Chun Gun.

Events, accidents, things to pay attention to

1) Penalty for listening to foreign broadcasting or watching illegal recordings
Case1> There was a public trial and punishment in July~August 2004 for 5 people for watching illegal recordings at a conference room of Gun Management Committee of Bak Chun Gun, located in downtown. / The penalty was expulsion of the family of the involved party to the mountains.
Case 2> A person who sold and showed VCD in Pyongyang in November 2005 was arrested. During investigation, the person committed suicide using a string on his bag while the investigator was absent. Reason for the suicide was not to harm the rest of his/her family/In Pyongyang as well, when one gets caught while watching illegal recordings, the penalty is usually an expulsion.

2) Wire telephone and charge for phone calls
– Installation of wire telephone: $200 at Sa Ree Won and Bak Chun Eup, $300 at Shin Eui Joo for obtaining a phone number as well/ customer needs to purchase the wire separately
-User of private wire telephone: There are relatively a lot of users of private wire telephone at Bak Chun Eup because there are a lot of Returnees from Japan and traders. Among 120 households, there are 11 households with telephone./ When somebody want to use wire telephone in a neighborhood, around 500won is paid.
-Common people use telegram for communication. 10won is charged for one page, and .5won is charged for each additional word.

3) Others
-Bak Chun Gun: There was a rumor that private cultivation would be allowed starting from this year, but instead of private cultivation, a group farming was adopted. Each group pay the assigned amount to the government, and the rest was left for the individuals to take care of. However, the groups needed to take care of fertilizer and pesticides which caused decline of the yield/ Phrase including “Communism” is gradually decreasing (example, “Communist Ethics” was replaced with “Socialist Ethics” in textbooks for elementary, middle and high school. “Rice is Communism” was replaced with “Rice is Socialism” as well/General atmosphere is that people do not believe what government and the party says.

-Pyongyang: Broadcasting criticized the resolution on situation of human rights in DPRK at the UN, but it is heard that the criticism has caused side effects/ Many of the people think that the resolution must have been adopted because there is a problem of human rights in DPRK/People in Pyongyang are known to be unhappy with Kim’s regime but have no way to change it. So they try to be patient and endure.

Posted in Agriculture, China, Communications, Emigration, Energy, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Hoteling, Price liberalization, Public Distribiution System (PDS), Transportation, UN World Food Program | Comments Closed

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