Archive for the ‘Black markets’ Category

The secret world of North Korea’s new rich

Tuesday, August 9th, 2011

Andrei Lankov provides some anecdotal evidence and a taxonomy of the DPRK’s growing entrepreneurial class (perhaps one of the most interesting and least reported aspects of the DPRK).  He also gives us a glimpse of how the North Korean version of the “infant industry” mindset can impede economic reform.

Here is a great blurb from the article in the Asia Times:

Who are they – the North Korean new rich? The upper crust of this social group consists of high-level officials. Some of them have gained their wealth through illegal means, but many have seen their business activities permitted and even actively encouraged by the government. Most of the money is made in foreign trade, with China being by the far the most significant partner.

Many North Korean companies, despite being technically owned by the state, are effectively private and are run by top officials and their relatives.

That said, these people are not that frequently seen on the streets of Pyongyang. They live in their own enclosed world, of which not much is known.

But if we go one or two steps down, we will encounter a very different type of North Korean entrepreneur – somebody who has made his or her (yes, surprising many of them are women) money more or less independent of the state.

Complete independence is not possible because every North Korean businessman has to pay officials just to make sure that they will not ask too many questions and turn a blind eye to activities that are still technically illegal. In many cases, North Korean entrepreneurs prefer to disguise their private operations under the cover of some state agency.

Take for example Pak. In his early 40s, he runs a truck company together with a few friends. The company has seven trucks and largely specializes in moving salt from salt ponds on the seacoast to major wholesale markets. The company employs a couple of dozen people, but officially it does not exist. On paper, all trucks are owned by state agencies and Pak’s employees are also officially registered as workers of state enterprises.

Pak bought used trucks in China, paying the Chinese owners with cash. He then took them to North Korea where he had the vehicles registered with various government agencies (army units are the best choice since military number plates give important advantages). Pak paid officials for their agreement to “adopt” the trucks. This is so common in the North that there is even an established rate of how much fake registration of a particular type of vehicle costs at which government agency.

Kim was a private owner of a gold mine. The gold mine was officially registered as a state enterprise. Technically, it was owned by a foreign trade company that in turn was managed by the financial department of the Party Central Committee. However, this was a legal fiction, pure and simple: Kim, once a mid-level police official, made some initial capital through bribes and smuggling, while his brother had made a minor fortune through selling counterfeit Western tobacco.

Then they used their money to grease the palms of bureaucrats, and they took over an old gold mine that had ceased operation in the 1980s. They restarted the small mine and hired workers, bought equipment and restarted operations. The gold dust was sold independently (and, strictly speaking, illegally) to Chinese traders.

The brothers agreed with the bureaucrats from the foreign trade company on how much money they should pay them roughly between 30-40% and the rest was used to run the business and enjoy life.

One step below we can see even humbler people like Ms Young, once an engineer at a state factory. In the mid-1990s, she began trading in second-hand Chinese dresses. By 2005 she was running a number of workshops that employed a few dozen women.

They made copies of Chinese garments using Chinese cloth, zippers and buttons. Some of the materials was smuggled across the border, while another part was purchased legally, mostly from a large market in the city of Raseon (a special economic zone which can be visited by Chinese merchants almost freely).

Interestingly, Ms Young technically remained an employee of a non-functioning state factory from which she was absent for months on end. She had to pay for the privilege of missing work and indoctrination sessions, deducting some $40 as her monthly “donation”. This is an impressive sum if compared with her official salary of merely US$2.

The North Korean new rich might occasionally feel insecure. They might be afraid of the state, because pretty much everything they do is in breach of some article of the North Korean criminal code. A serious breach indeed – technically any of the above described persons could be sent to face an execution squad at the moment the authorities change their mind.

And before we all get our hopes up that this emergent entrepreneurial class will eventually push the leadership to adopt economic reforms, Lankov reminds us how they could just as well serve to prolong the regime’s life:

Paradoxically, the long-term interests of the emerging North Korean business class might coincide with that of the Kim regime. Unlike normal people in the North, both groups – officials and entrepreneurs – have an interest in maintaining a separate North Korean state. Unification with the South is bound to spell disaster for both groups.

A person who is now running a couple of small shops might eventually, if North Korean capitalism continues uninterrupted growth, become an owner of a supermarket chain. If unification comes, he or she would be lucky to survive the competition with the South Korean retail giants and keep the few corner shops they had.

The full story is well worth reading here:
The secret world of North Korea’s new rich
Asia Times
Andrei Lankov
2011-8-10

 

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Foreign clothing gaining popularity in DPRK

Thursday, July 21st, 2011

According to the Daily NK:

Young people in North Korea are emerging as proponents of Hallyu (the South Korean cultural wave) and as fashion leaders, showing themselves to be particularly keen on the South Korean music, movies, and fashion that are being smuggled into the country and traded.

On Wednesday, The Daily NK met with a Chinese merchant who conducts business in Pyongyang to find out about trends amongst young people in North Korea. He told us that, “Hooded sweatshirts are enjoying immense popularity with young people at the moment.” The reason, he explained, is that, “They want to emulate the fashion they see in South Korean dramas.”

He added, “At the jangmadang, hooded sweatshirts sell for about 200 Yuan (around US$31), so they’re not cheap, but so many people come looking for them that we almost run out of hooded sweatshirts to sell.”

The source explained that, in spite of this, South Korean brands and products with English lettering are prohibited from being sold.

“As the days get hotter, people are looking to get their hands on short-sleeve clothing. Light-colored clothing is most popular,” he noted, also mentioning that, “In general, new clothes sell for about 15,000 won and second-hand clothes for about 3,000 won.

One-piece dresses are in vogue with females as summer takes hold. These dresses tend to sell at the jangmadang for around 70,000 won. Additionally, the source said, “There are lots of young ladies looking for high-heel shoes, which go for about 25,000-30,000 won. Skinny jeans are as popular as ever, and you see lots of people walking around in three-quarter pants.”

He also mentioned that many people are taking advantage of the opportunity to wear shorts and sleeveless shirts to beat the humidity.

However, authorities have already cracked down on “inappropriate attire” for women, for example by banning skirts that do not go down past the knee. The sleeveless shirts, short skirts and pants that have become fashionable in recent times are difficult to wear out of the house because a person wearing them would become a target of the Union of Democratic Women’s community watch guards.

Regarding this, the source said, “People get punished for wearing shorts or skirts that don’t come down past the knee. The UDW’s community watch guards are in every lane and alleyway inspecting women (who break the law). Sleeveless clothes do sell, but nobody can wear them. So they just wear such items at home.”

Furthermore, he mentioned that, “Young ladies walk around wearing earrings and bracelets,” explaining that, “Bracelets, watches, rings and hairpins all tend to be popular itemsbecause people think they’re pretty.” North Korean authorities restricted the wearing of accessories in the past, but appear to have eased off on this policy in recent times.

He relayed that crackdowns on South Korean-made goods are as common as ever. According to him, those who get caught in the crackdowns have their goods confiscated on the spot. “The crackdowns on South Korean goods are still going strong,” he said. “At the outdoor market, the patrolling officers are checking practically every item tag now. That’s how serious it has got.”

“The intensity of crackdowns on South Korean movies and dramas on DVD that are coming into the country is always increasing,” he said, “but university students and young people in general are getting hold of South Korean and other foreign movies and selling them in secret.”

South Korean dramas and movies usually sell for 5,000 won (a normal DVD sells for 1,300 won), and at the moment IRIS, Assorted Gems, Slave Hunter, Queen of the Game and Smile, Mom are said to be the most popular.

Read the full story here:
Fashion Also Influenced by South Korean Culture
Daily NK
Choi Cheong Ho
2011-7-21

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Informal sellers on the rise in DPRK markets

Thursday, July 7th, 2011

Pictured above (Google Earth, October 2010): (left) informal street market in Hadang-dong, (right) official market in Hadang-dong

According to the Daily NK:

Sources have reported a large increase in the number of ‘grasshopper traders’ in the alleyways around many of North Korea’s markets.

‘Grasshopper traders’ are individuals who conduct their trade activities without an official permit beyond official market boundaries, meaning that when security forces arrive they have to jump, like grasshoppers, to a new location. Growth in this kind of phenomenon would tend to suggest that the class of capital-holding middle class traders is shrinking, while the number of those trading day-to-day in order to make ends meet is growing. It is also related to the fact that official efforts to eliminate grasshopper trading are not as strict as they have been.

One source living in the traditionally more affluent capital, Pyongyang, explained to The Daily NK today that even there, “The number of grasshopper traders has increased a lot of late. There are too many to count,” adding that in the case of Hadang Market, the normal 100-200 grasshopper traders has grown to between 300-400 over a very short period.

Another source from Yangkang Province agreed, saying, “There are grasshopper traders camped in every alleyway around Hyesan Market. People are coming in twice the numbers they normally do, so cracking down on them is not easy.” Other local sources have revealed that markets in the provinces of North Hamkyung and Pyongan are in much the same state.

As expected, with an increasing degree of grasshopper trading comes an increasing number of market watch guards. However, whereas in the past those caught engaging in grasshopper trading stood to lose their wares, nowadays grasshopper traders are just warned about their conduct.

The Pyongyang source explained, “The number of market watch guards has increased by around ten, but their crackdowns are much weaker than they used to be. I know that the authorities have ordered them not to confiscate traders’ wares by force, just to enforce public order.”

This appears to be because the authorities fear that some of their excesses are inflicting too much harm on public opinion.

The Pyongyang source explained, “In many cases people oppose the young market watch guards’ attempts to take the belongings of traders by force, saying ‘they are worse than the Japanese’, and the authorities seem to care about that.”

Officials and the security forces are also being careful about their conduct because of fear of investigation, and this may also be affecting the market environment. Rumors are circulating which suggest that some cadres are being punished for things such as taking bribes.

On this point, the Pyongyang source added, “The central Party is conducting an inspection of the public organs charged with controlling the markets. The word is that people working for these organs are being investigated for things like taking bribes, going to the homes of traders to demand things, or just taking what they want from market stalls.”

Read the full story here:
Grasshopper Numbers Rising Fast
Daily NK
Choi Cheong-ho
2011-7-4

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DPRK food prices rising

Tuesday, July 5th, 2011

According to Bloomberg:

North Korean rice prices have quadrupled this year amid concern the regime is facing further economic isolation, according to a South Korean research report.

Rice prices jumped to as much as 2,200 North Korean won per kilogram during the first six months of the year from about 500 won at the end of 2010, South Korea’s state-run Korea Development Institute said today in an e-mailed statement. The difference was mostly caused by a slump in the domestic currency, which is a factor the government considers in setting the price, the report said.

North Korea’s won is not freely traded though the U.S. dollar is the de facto currency used in many markets.

South Korea in May last year cut off most trade with North Korea, accusing Kim Jong Il’s regime of torpedoing one of its warships in March that killed 46 sailors. The U.S. is assessing whether to provide food assistance to North Korea, which is also under United Nations sanctions for its nuclear tests.

The North Korean currency has weakened “sharply” since the regime shelled South Korea’s Yeonpyeong island in November amid concerns worsening relations will lead to further shortages of goods, the report said. North Korea has also increased coal exports to China to make up for the shortfall in trade with South Korea, causing energy shortages, it said.

While the regime lifted its ban on street markets that was placed at the end of 2009, high prices and goods shortages are preventing them from helping meet North Koreans’ needs, the report said.

Read the full story here:
North Korean Rice Prices Quadruple
Bloomberg
Bomi Lim
2010-7-5

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Daily NK on anti-socialist activities

Thursday, June 23rd, 2011

Part 1: The Illogicality of Anti-Socialist Policy
Lee Seok Young
2011-6-22

In North Korea today, those actions which are subject to the harshest oversight and most excessive punishment are those deemed anti-socialist, an expression of the extent to which such actions are seen as a threat to the regime.

Yet these very actions have already taken deep root in people’s lifestyles, spreading rapidly as a result of chronic economic difficulties, food insecurity, endemic corruption and the inflow of information from abroad.

First of all, every North Korean and defector the Daily NK meets says much the same thing; that if people had not followed an ‘anti-socialist’ path during the mid-90s famine, they could not have survived. The power which maintains North Korean society through the hardest times is that derived from anti-socialist actions, and it is those actions which the authorities would like to put an end to.

The blocking of these so-called ‘anti-socialist trends’ nominally began with Kim Jong Il’s 1992 work, ‘Socialism Is a Science’, issued following the fall of the Eastern Bloc. A time of great fear for the regime, ‘Socialism Is a Science’ expressed a determination to block out anti-socialist phenomena.

However, a famine exploded nationwide shortly after the publication of the thesis, placing these very anti-socialist modes of behavior at the core of the lives of almost everybody in the nation.

Having completely replaced Kim Jong Il and the Chosun Workers’ Party as the alpha provider of sustenance, money is now uppermost in the minds of the people. If they can, they are moving away from the collective farms, factories and enterprises to become more active in the market.

“At a time when the state didn’t provide rations and workers were not even receiving their monthly wages, the ones who started trading early on were all best able to avoid this predicament,” said one defector, “Others followed after their example and, rather than trying to find work, went straight into the market.”

Money, then, is the fundamental toxin that now threatens to shake the very basis of the Kim regime, completely undermining the ‘let’s work the same, have the same and live well’ lifestyle that the regime has long been demanding from the people.The authorities, as part of a losing battle to halt this slide, ‘educates’ the people with the mantra, “Don’t become a slave to money,” but it makes no difference.

People are growing more and more money-oriented. What simply began as a desperate rearguard action to survive extreme poverty has become a preoccupation with accumulating wealth. The many who don’t have the capital to start a business are keen to work with those who do.

One interviewee, a woman hailing from North Hamkyung Province, told The Daily NK, “They have to keep trying, but they can’t eliminate it. How could they, when the state itself is actually encouraging its spread? Everywhere you go, they demand bribes, and people with money never get punished even when clearly guilty, because everyone is desperate to earn money.”

Given that the central authorities demand Party funds from regional bodies, and regional Party and military cadres in turn work with smugglers, and the cadres charged with inspection turn a blind eye to criminal acts in exchange for bribes, the whole system is, as the interviewee said, rotten from the top down.

One defector who left his position as a cadre in a Yangkang Province enterprise agreed, recalling, “The Party periodically collected money from our factory, but since all the machinery had long since stopped running, they made us work in the market and give 30% of the profits to the authorities. It was the state that promoted anti-socialism in consequence.”

Another defector originally from North Hamkyung Province said in a similar vein, “The National Security and People’s Safety agents stationed on provincial borders stop people without the right permit to travel, but let them pass in exchange for a few packs of cigarettes. Some even ask for your wrist watch. It’s not just the people; the whole nation is busy being anti-socialist.”

Increasing exposure to foreign materials is also influencing the situation somewhat. Such things are especially popular with students and women working in the markets, two groups which are more up-to-date than most.

South Korean and Western culture is being transmitted quickly via DVD, and materials that are brought into the state from China by traders and smugglers are also pushing forward new trends such as the ‘Korean Wave.’

To the North Korean people, who once lived in near complete isolation from the rest of the world, the introduction of foreign materials has intensified their yearnings for a new life style. The stricter the regulations become, the thirstier for something else the people become.

Part 2: Crackdowns Enhancing Anti-Socialist Cycle
Mok Yong Jae
2011-06-23

‘Anti-socialism’ in North Korea is a destabilizing force disturbing the foundations of the system. For that reason, the authorities place a great emphasis on rooting it out. Inspections are frequent and their targets varied. But the fact is that this has done little to stop the growth of such activities; in fact, quite the opposite; some believe that targeted inspections actually increase instances of smuggling, for example.

These focused inspections are handed down in the name of the ‘Party Center’ in other words Kim Jong Il. The latest inspections over anti-socialist trends in border areas have been being carried out by Kim Jong Eun’s direct instruction. First people are educated about and warned against ‘anti-socialist behavior’, then provincial Party and military cadres launch an inspection.

If a concerted inspection is to be unleashed on a given area, an inspection unit is set up, and it does the work. In the case of recent inspections targeting drugs and defection, the inspection units have even been sent from the Central Committee of the Party. The makeup of the unit can differ slightly depending on the target of the inspection, but usually includes agents from the National Security Agency (NSA), People’s Safety Ministry and Prosecutors Office. Precise search sites are usually selected at random and the searches conducted without warning, while ‘criminals’ are flushed out in part by getting citizens to report on one another.

However, the effectiveness of this system has a limit. This is primarily due to an overwhelming degree of official corruption at nearly all levels.

The Spread of Bureaucracy and the Limits of Inspections

The primary agents conducting the inspections, agents from the NSA and PSM, collude with smugglers for their own benefit. Anti-socialist activities are not a new means of survival, and the more commonplace the inspections become, the more focused the agents doing it become on their own self-interest; i.e. rent seeking rather than uncovering instances of wrongdoing.

For example, agents seek out big smugglers only in order to offer them an opportunity for their actions to be ignored, something they will do for a price. A source from Yangkang Province explained to The Daily NK, “Hoping not to lose their goods, also so as to avoid prison, in many cases smugglers try to win over agents. They talk to the official for a while, and if they think ‘this guy can be won over’ then some even gently encourage them to find a way to forego any punishment.”

Then, when the inspecting agents begin dropping heavy hints about expensive merchandise, electronics or a piano, for example, the smugglers say, “I’d be delighted to buy that for you,” and for that receive their freedom.

Thus, it is rare for money to change hands directly; goods are bought in China and handed over when the inspection period has come to a close. The smuggler also obtains a permit to import a certain amount of other goods without penalty in the future. By winning over agents in this way, assistance in future times of trouble can also be secured.

In addition, as Lee Jae Won, the former chairman of the Korean Bar Association Committee on Human Rights in North Korea and someone who has interviewed a great number of defectors as author of the 2010 White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea, concludes, “Anti-socialist activities are extremely common for North Korean cadres in public positions such as prosecutors and judges.” The bribing of prosecutors and judges in exchange for leniency or to escape conviction is a daily occurrence, as much as bribing the security forces and cadres.

What Anti-socialist Counteroffensive? Officials are the source of Antisocialism

Now much more so than in the past, cadres and agents are directly involved in the antisocialist activities.

A Chinese-Korean trader who often goes between Dandong and Shinuiju told The Daily NK, “There are so many drugs in North Korea that even the officers supposed to be policing it are taking drugs themselves. Some of them even asked me to take opium to China and sell it. I go back to North Korea every year to visit relatives, and I’ve seen officers there doing bingdu (methamphetamines) with my own eyes.

It is also said that the families of cadres are the main source of South Korean movies and dramas on DVD. Party cadres are, in effect, the very source of the Korean Wave that their bosses in Pyongyang ban on the premise of defending the state from the ‘ideological and cultural invasion of the South Chosun reactionaries’.

A source from Pyongan Province confirmed the story, telling The Daily NK, “These DVDs and VCDs come from the houses of cadres who travel overseas a lot. The children of cadres love watching them. The families of traders have a lot of them, too, but it’s the cadres they’re spreading from.”

Thus, while the central Party single-mindedly attacks anti-socialist behaviour, the cadres and agents who are meant to be carrying out the orders are deeply involved in the ‘anti-socialism’ themselves. The more crackdowns that occur, the more contact there is between the elite and security forces on the one hand and smugglers and traders on the other, offering more opportunities for symbiosis. It is for this reason that some claim the inspections are actually catalyzing the anti-socialism.

Meanwhile, An Chan Il of the World North Korea Study Center pointed out to The Daily NK that the whole thing is completely inevitable, saying, “These inspection teams are not receiving proper rations from the state, so of course they take bribes instead when sent out into the field. Administrative irregularities and corruption are at the very heart of these anti-socialist inspections. The only way for the families of inspecting agents to survive is for the father to be a part of this anti-socialist behavior.”

Choi Yong Hwan from the Gyeonggi Research Institute agreed, adding, “These inspections are intensifying social inequality. The fundamental cause of this is the collapse of the state rationing system due to economic difficulties. It’s a situation where even the agents are hungry, so there is a permanent pattern of them attempting to guarantee their own survival via corruption. There is a vicious cycle repeating here, whereby those who are able to ingratiate themselves with the inspecting agents and cadres survive, and those who do not or cannot get punished.”

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DPRK law enforcement guidebook insights

Thursday, June 23rd, 2011

A DPRK law enforcement manual was “released” by a South Korean missionary group named Caleb Mission.  The document seemingly offers a glimpse of the typical workload of a North Korean police officer.  The document, to the best of my knowledge has not been posted on line yet, so caveat emptor.  The Korea Herald offers some details below:

The classified guidebook for law enforcement authorities published by the North’s police agency in June 2009 lists 721 actual cases related to criminal law, civil law and the code of criminal procedure and offers advice on how to punish offenders.

One of the cases in the 791-page reference book is about a hog-raiser who sold pork injected with growth hormones and made a lot of money by selling more meat.

In this case, the North Korean law enforcement authorities cannot do anything about the hog-raiser because the man made money by selling pork at a legally permitted price in the market through his own efforts, explains the guidebook.

The book also explains that the act of getting paid for transporting another person’s luggage from the train station using a bicycle cannot be seen as a crime because the law does not stipulate that selling an individual’s efforts is a crime.

A food salesperson can be punished for “violating the order of product sales,” however, if he sprayed water on his seaweed to make it look fresher.

Much of the guidebook is about crimes where individuals caused damage to the state by stealing from the government or neglecting their duties, an indication of the seriousness of economic difficulties many North Koreans are going through.

Attempts to evade mandatory military service and euthanasia have become social headaches in the North as well.

A doctor who took $800 from five people in exchange for forging their medical records was charged with bribery and violating the law on military duty.

If a person avoided conscription by lying about his eyesight and later was found to have normal eyesight, he could be questioned by the authorities on charges of violating the law on military service.

The guidebook also stresses that euthanasia is illegal, mentioning a case where a son drugged his father to death to relieve him of the pain from illness under the consent of his mother.

Both the mother and the son should be seen as accomplices in a murder because “although they did not have a foul motive in killing him, the victim did not ask for it,” the book reads.

Bribery and treats in exchange for influence-peddling was also prevalent in North Korea.

People accused of trading South Korean or American films were punished for illegally bringing in and distributing “decadent culture” under North Korean criminal law.

Read the whole story here:
Official guidebook offers glimpse of N.K. society
Korea Herald
Kim So-hyun
2011-06-22

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Meth as medicine

Tuesday, June 21st, 2011

From a recent Newsweek article about meth use in the DPRK:

First synthesized in 1893, meth is now one of the world’s most widely abused drugs, imbuing the user with intense feelings of euphoria, concentration, and grandiosity. Smoked, injected or snorted, the drug also suppresses the need for food and sleep for an extended period of time; coming down can bring fatigue, anxiety, and occasionally suicidal ideation.

Inside North Korea, observers say, many use meth in place of expensive and hard-to-obtain medicine. “People with chronic disease take it until they’re addicted,” says one worker for a South Korea-based NGO, who requested anonymity in order to avoid jeopardizing his work with defectors. “They take it for things like cancer. This drug is their sole form of medication,” says the NGO worker, who has interviewed hundreds of defectors in the past three years. A former bicycle smuggler who defected in 2009 told NEWSWEEK of seeing a doctor administering meth to a friend’s sick father. “He took it and could speak well and move his hand again five minutes later. Because of this kind of effect, elderly people really took to this medicine.”

Jiro Ishimaru, founder and editor of Rimjin-gang, a magazine about North Korea and reported by people inside the country but published in Japan, says he has seen several North Koreans take meth to relieve stress and fatigue, including his former North Korean business partner. “He didn’t start taking it as a drug but as a medicine,” Ishimaru says.

The drug also offers an escape that might not otherwise be possible. As Shin puts it: “There’s so little hope in North Korea—that’s why ice is becoming popular. People have given up.”

Read the full story here:
North Korea’s Meth Export
Newsweek
Isaac Stone Fish
2011-6-19

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Comparison of NK and USSR

Sunday, June 19th, 2011

Andrei Lankov writes in the Korea Times:

The present author was born in the former Soviet Union and is frequently asked which period of Soviet history the current North Korea is reminiscent of?

I usually say that this question has no straightforward answer. The problem is that depending on what area you look, the associations are remarkably different. The developments in North Korea are not that different from those of the USSR, but in different areas the time seems to flow with a different speed.

North Korea’s official ideology and propaganda continues to be uncannily similar to late Stalinist Soviet culture, to the period of the late 1940s. The North Koreans are still served the same fare of ossified Leninism and strong nationalism, heavily spliced with eulogies to the leaders’ wisdom and benevolence.

It appears as if North Korean propaganda, as well as its official ideology, has been frozen in time since the late 1960s. One can take an article from Rodong Shinmun of, say, 1972 and then compare it with an article published yesterday only to find no major differences in language, style and reasoning.

At the same time, the general mood among educated urban North Koreans is quite similar to the mood which prevailed among the same social milieu in Moscow and Leningrad of the 1960s. People are still afraid to talk politics and most of them do not entertain serious doubts about the fundamentals of the system. They tend to believe that their economic problems have been created by a combination of natural disasters, collapse of the ‘socialist markets’ and, of course, an economic blockade maintained by the greedy U.S. imperialists and their shameless lackeys.

However, very few educated North Koreans nowadays buy the official propaganda message wholesale. They know that the official media lies, and sometimes lies quite shamelessly. While being more or less loyal subjects of their state, they entertain significant (and growing) skepticism about its institutions and the official pronouncements of its leaders.

It seems that social fear, once powerful and omnipresent, is diminishing. The North Korean state remains highly repressive, but the level of repressiveness is in steady decline. Nowadays North Koreans can do many things which would almost definitely have landed them in prison some 20 years ago ― in some cases, even mildly critical statements about the system are now tolerated.

Of course, open dissent is still unthinkable, but genuine enthusiasm is almost impossible to find. This is a picture, clearly reminiscent of the USSR of, say, year 1965 (albeit the North Korean state remains far more repressive than the Soviet Union used to be during Brezhnev’s rule).

The economic situation is different again. In economic terms, present day North Korea is similar to Russia in the early 1990s, the turbulent days that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. At that time a large number of the Soviet people discovered that their official salaries would not suffice if they wanted to stay alive, so they began to look for additional sources of income. Ex-Soviet officials busily stole state property, whilst less lucky commoners relied on an assorted variety of small businesses, household workshops and subsistence farming.

This is very similar to present-day North Korea, even though the collapse of the socialist economy in North Korea led to far more damaging consequences than was the case in Russia –after all North Korea experienced a disastrous famine, while few if any Russians starved to death in the early post-Soviet period.

In North Korea, the collapse of the state-run economy and rationing system plunged a majority of the population into the world of the grass-roots market economy. No reliable statistics are available, but researchers tend to agree that roughly three-quarters of average household income in North Korea is now derived from private economic activities of different kinds.

Like their early post-Soviet peers, North Korean officials are always on the lookout for a nice bribe. They also don’t mind quietly transforming state property into their own personal property– many North Korean enterprises ostensibly still owned by the government are actually private nowadays. Meanwhile other North Koreans sell, buy, smuggle, farm unofficial plots, run individual workshops or find employment with such workshops.

So, we have a curious picture. Ideology still pretends that almost nothing has changed in the last 50 years (it’s telling that the official media has never mentioned the market economy, as if it doesn’t exist). The political consciousness is less dominated by the state, but still remains under its control.

However, the North Korean state has almost completely lost control of the economic life of its people. This picture has no parallels in the history of the Soviet Union or, for that matter, in the histories of other ex-communist countries, even though all its elements (if taken separately) would appear familiar to the people with Soviet-era experience.

Read the full story here:
Comparison of NK and USSR
Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
2011-6-19

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Foreign used clothing popular in DPRK

Sunday, June 12th, 2011

According to the Daily NK:

The North Korean authorities are reportedly reacting more strictly than normal to overt sales of products from South Korea in the country’s domestic markets.

One Korean-Chinese man engaged in business in Pyongan and Hwanghae Provinces told The Daily NK on June 11th, “They’re cracking down hard on products from the Kaesong Industrial Complex in the jangmadang, and are reacting more strongly than before to South Korean products, too. There are no South Korean goods on sale openly.”

Sources say that in many cases this means that traders are being told to remove tags indicating South Korean origin.

The same trader explained, “Community watch guards come to the jangmadang and tell us to remove tags written in Chosun then sell them. They are thoroughly cracking down on things saying ‘Made in Korea’. Even though the clothes are of good quality, and therefore clearly South Korean, if there is no tag, then they are not prohibited.”

Currently, used clothes are said to be selling better than new ones, however. This is partly because people have little cash and are gravitating towards the cheaper prices, and partly because they don’t trust new products.

The trader explained, “The image of South Korean clothes is good as far as used clothes selling better than new ones goes. People think that new clothes are of poor quality and really expensive.”

He explained the reason for the low quality, saying, “Currently, producers are buying fabric in China to bring back and manufacture clothes in Chosun, and then they put ‘Made in China’ tags on them.”

A woman’s short-sleeve t-shirt is now worth 5,000 won for a new one but just 1,500 won for a used one. Since the price difference is huge and new ones are of questionable quality, decent used ones sell better.

Another source from Changbai in China corroborated the story, explaining, “Everybody from North Korea asks us to send them used stuff to sell. We go to Guangzhou to buy used clothes smuggled in from South Korea, and send them to North Korea. The demand from North Korea for South Korean used clothes is pretty high.”

Meanwhile, due to mobilization for seasonal agricultural work, the North Korean markets are currently operating from 5 PM to 7PM. They normally open at 2 PM.

However, the Korean-Chinese trader explained that despite the afternoon market closures, farms are facing an uphill battle, saying, “Since anyone who wants to survive has to trade, the number of traders has doubled. And since almost everyone is trading and their focus is on that, there is no way the farming work can go well.”

Read the full story here:
“Remove Tags, then Sell Them”
Daily NK
Park Jun Hyeong
2011-6-13

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DPRK stepping up investigations of border patrol

Friday, June 3rd, 2011

According ot the DailyNK:

The North Korean authorities are conducting an extensive investigation into the actions of soldiers attached to border guard units, based on the presumption that such guards are frequently guilty of aiding and abetting defection. Those found to have done so are being arrested and severely punished.

A source from Yangkang Province explained the news yesterday, “For the third time they are conducting an investigation along the border in Kim Jong Eun’s name, but this time it is focused on the soldiers.”

“The decree says to arrest and severely punish soldiers who have aided and abetted in defection, to pull out the roots; so the investigation has been harsh from the very beginning.”

The two previous investigations into defection from the border region, both said to have been launched in the name of the successor, happened in February and April this year, as reported by The Daily NK. However, this is the first time that attention has turned away from defectors themselves and towards those soldiers who help facilitate a lot of the escapes.

“There are two members of an investigation team from Defense Security Command going to every guard post, and they are questioning the soldiers one by one,” the source said.

It is well known both within and without North Korea that border guards are commonly bribed to turn a blind eye to defection. Through very serious questioning and the threat of severe punishment, the authorities are presumably hoping to kill two birds with one stone; both hindering further defections and re-instilling military discipline.

However, the new investigation has already inspired at least two guards from one post to desert instead of face censure, according to the source.

“Two men from a guard post in the Hyesin-dong area of Hyesan took their weapons and deserted, so now they are in the middle of a house-to-house investigation,” the source explained, adding, however, “People are saying, ‘They’ve already fled to China, why the hell would they still be in the country?’”

Although nobody knows why the two men chose to desert, the source said he had heard that they were indeed involved in defections, and feared punishment.

Across the Tumen River in Changbai, China, meanwhile, there is also an unusually intense investigation going on, according to sources there. It is suspected that the two events are related.

A source explained, “Public security officers and soldiers are stopping and investigating cars one by one. I heard that soldiers from North Korea deserted with their guns, so maybe it is because of that.”

Of course, the investigation is hurting small traders, too.

“Big-time smugglers are not having problems,” the Yangkang Province source explained. “But day-to-day small scale smugglers are complaining about the investigation. Border guards are telling them to put up with it just a little more.”

Read the full story here:
Border Investigators Turned on Soldiers
Daily NK
Lee Seok-young
2011-6-3

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