Archive for the ‘Black markets’ Category

DPRK trade officials crack down on corruption

Friday, September 28th, 2007

Institute for Far Eastern Studies
NK Brief No. 07-9-28-1
9/28/2007

Since early this year, North Korean authorities have been systematically implementing a double-entry accounting system to keep track of cross border trade with China, and as of late have been cracking down on private sales of goods imported under state requisitions.

It has become common practice for most traders to keep two sets of books, a private accounting record, and a set of records for government use. As these traders exported state goods to China, they would conspire with Chinese counterparts and make huge profits by recording lower prices than goods were actually being sold for. In many cases, bribes are taken to turn officially imported and exported goods (minerals, seafood, etc.) over to private sellers. These facts came to light through Chinese traders in business with North Korea.

Recently, however, investigations by the Kangsung Trade Company, operated under the supervision of the People’s Armed Forces Bureau, led to the conviction and execution of a foreign currency trader in Kangwon Province, Wonsan City and another from South Hamkyung Province, Hamheung City on charges of funneling company funds for private use. The crackdown appears to be because embezzlement and other forms of corruption are on the rise.

It was also disclosed that the foreign currency trader in Hamheung was accepting money from private business operators and using the company’s name to lend import and export quota chits. Inspectors raided the homes of the suspects and found large amounts of U.S. currency and gold, as well as no small amount of Japanese yen.

The human rights NGO ‘Good Friends’ reported in last month’s newsletter, “ After Oh Moon-hyuk, foreign currency director for the Chosun Fabric 88 Trade Company in Yunsa County, North Hamkyung Province, built a private villa on a plot with a good view, and purchased a Mercedes out of pocket, he drew the attention of General [Kim Jong Il] and was exposed. He was publicly executed in the middle of last July.” The NGO went on to report, “Every day young girls were called to the villa for his enjoyment, and security forces and police made it a point not to stop by the area near the villa often.”

Trade authorities in the area report that the crackdown on these violators has had no effect on DPRK-PRC trade. High ranking officials are aware of the abuse of authority to earn money, but had to some extent turned a blind eye to the issue. The crackdown is a result of the recent considerable growth in the problem.

Share

Oppressive regime’s ID cards pave path to liberty

Monday, September 24th, 2007

Joong Ang Daily
Jeon Jin-bae
9/22/2007

North Korean resident identification cards have become a hot item on the black market in China for ethnic Koreans who want to live in Europe.

Mr. Kim, an ethnic Korean man from China, moved to Paris last year and obtained a resident permit from the French government a few months ago allowing him to stay in the country for 10 years. He asked not to be identified by his full name, because he obtained his permit illegally.

His resident permit states that he is a North Korean refugee and identifies him as a North Korean citizen, not a Chinese national. Kim said he purchased a North Korean resident’s ID card and pretended to be a refugee from China when he sought asylum in France.

Kim said he is not alone. “At least 100 people have sought refugee status in the last year using the same means,” he said.

According to other ethnic Koreans in China, North Korean IDs were traded in cities near the China-North Korea border, such as Yanbian and Dandong. The prices range between 1,000 yuan and 1,500 yuan ($134 to $199), they said.

“As far as I know, there are many North Koreans who want to sell their IDs,” said an ethnic Korean who lives in China.

North Koreans who manage to escape to China are anxious to sell their IDs, because they are afraid of being captured, identified as North Korean and then send back to their homeland.

According to sources, ethnic Koreans who want to live in Europe prearrange their trips through middlemen who transport them through China’s Shenzhen Province to Hong Kong.

From there they fly to Thailand and meet with South Korean middlemen who provide fake South Korean passports.

Using these documents, the ethnic Koreans will often fly to Switzerland and then move to the country of their destination, often France or Italy, via overland routes.

Reaching Europe is seen as being more than half way to success, sources said, because the process of seeking refugee status is relatively simple.

In France, immigrants only have to submit an application along with a North Korean ID card to qualify. The French government then provides a temporary three-month residence permit, which is extended until a final decision is made.

Four months after applying for refugee status an interview will take place. A French official who speaks Korean will question the applicant, but most ethnic Koreans are well prepared to pass this simple screening, the sources said.

Europe is a popular destination because it only costs 10,000 euros for a Korean-Chinese to buy refugee status and various organizations often provide them with extra protection and assistance.

Share

Unintended Separation of Young Married Couples

Monday, September 24th, 2007

Daily NK
Yang Jung A
9/24/2007

Choi (25) from Hamheung, South Hamkyung Province, married with his fiancé last Spring. Wedding ceremony was accompanied by his neighbors, friends and relatives. Happy life afterwards seemed awaiting the newly wed couple.

All of sudden, serious problem emerged. As in South Korea, North Korean married man provides housing while married woman brings furniture and other basic goods. Rarely a newly wed couple lives with their parents.

However in these days, due to rising house prices, couples have hard time finding new homes. Even if they are fortunate enough to find one, sometimes police or local government officials intervene and confiscate houses for private sales of property, which is, in principle, still illegal in communist North Korea.

Confiscated houses are distributed to Army officers or discharged veterans. Choi’s house was forfeited, too. He went to the police office and protested, but police guards bluntly replied; “Then you can live with your parents.”

The Chois are now in debt to buy another house. And for a while, since there is no house to live together, the newly weds are residing in their parents’ houses separately.

Faulty construction in Yongcheon

Kim (female, 55) live with fear. Her little apartment in Yongcheon, North Pyongan Province, is so weak that it might crumble to ground someday.

She and her family lost home in 2004 Ryongchun station exploision. They had lived in tents for several months until local government finally told them a plan to build new houses for refugees. Delight soon turned to disappointment, however. The apartment was well built outside but faultily done so inside.

Rumors spread that new houses built after Ryongchun incident was so hastily constructed that vulnerable to sudden collapse. Materials were poor and construction phase was too quick. Some houses were not even equipped with proper electricity. Cracks emerged soon.

A neighbor of Kim told her that some party officials embezzled money and materials provided upon Ryongchun residents after the explosion.

For Kim who is living in anxiety, state and the Dear Leader are no more venerable.

Photo market in NK

Hwang (male, 20) from Chongjin, North Hamkyong Province, has father who is involved in Sino-Korean trade. Thanks to his rich dad, Hwang seldom goes to work and instead hangs out with friends. He owns a lot of foreign stuff, which attracts many friends.

His most precious is a Japanese digital camera. While walking down the street with the camera on his hand, every girl looks upon him with envies.

Even in Chongjin, there are an increasing number of people who bring digital cameras. Using digital camera grew fast since three to four years ago. And some people take and sell pictures of customers, 2000 NK won (less than a US dollar) per pic.

According to a friend in Hwoiryeong, it is sold five hundred won per picture taken from digital camera, taking five days.

Share

North Korean Citizens Are Differentiated into Six-Levels

Friday, September 21st, 2007

Daily NK
Lee Kwang Baek
9/21/2007

The expansion of Jangmadang’s private economy

Several years ago, I met a defector from North Korea and is currently residing in Japan. He frequently meets people coming and going from North Korea.

The change he relayed regarding North Korea was interesting and vivid. Although hundreds of people are not dying from starvation as in the past, transformation brought about by the expansion of the private economy, such as the Jangmadang (markets).

I asked him what the most significant change in North Korea was after the mass starvation of the mid-90s.

It was the reorganization of North Korean society’s class system. According to him, there are currently six levels of classes forming in North Korea.

First is the top privileged class based on Kim Jong Il. It is the class that feeds and lives on Kim Jong Il’s administrative funds, all kinds of support coming in from South Korea, and extractions from civilians.

The second is the power class engaging in the area of foreign currency earning activity. A portion of money gained from the foreign currency earning business is offered to the Kim Jong Il regime and the rest are accumulated as their own wealth.

The third is the “moneybag” class who has earned money from exchanges with the products from Jangmadang and China. They use “violence” and “money,” like the Russian mafia, to secure the commercial rights of each region via the Jangmadang.

The fourth is the class whose sustenance depends on provisions. It can be deduced that people in the middle-class take up approximately 20~30% of the civilian population.

The fifth is the common class who depend on Jangmadang and individual patches. Approximately 60% of the total population falls into this class. They live day to day on their labor power.

The lowest class is the elderly, the handicapped, Kotjebi (begging children), city migrants, and diseased patients.

The most outstanding class is the 5th class. They are a class who has started living independently without depending on the Kim Jong Il regime and counts as 60% of the population.

South Korean administration believes that there is a need to seek a North Korean policy while considering the size and characteristics of the lower class.

That is, direct support or loans to the North Korean government should be reduced and a direct commercial transaction with North Korean citizens should be increased. Gradually, Kim Jong Il regime’s political position should be weakened and the status of self-sufficient lower-class citizens have to be elevated. This can become an important foundation for North Korean society’s move towards a market economy.

The second eye-catching element is the most venerable people in the lower class. Approximately 10% of people who fall under this class are humanitarian aid recipients of our government and international society. The latter two have steadily continued their support to them.

Despite this, according to a recent North Korean source, a significant amount of people are suffering from malnutrition among those who have been admitted to hospitals, long term reeducation camps, and concentration camps for beggar children. Why are such events occurring?

The defector said that when the rice that the South Korean government sends arrives at the North Korean harbor, North Korean authorities or organizations immediately sell them for money.

Similar testimonies have come forth from North Korean civilians. Rice which is sold at the harbor can only be bought with foreign currency. People who can purchase rice by paying foreign currency are “moneybags” for a portion of bureaucrats who have accumulated wealth. Moneybags and corrupt officials hand over this rice to the Jangmadang and collect the enormous balance.

The humanitarian aid provided by the outside, before they are even relayed to the lowest class who should be receiving support, are flowing into the hands of moneybags and corrupt bureaucrats. If such defectors’ testimonies are true, the South Korean government’s humanitarian rice support has lost its original function.

The solution regarding this is two-fold. First is directly relaying medical products and rice to North Korea’s lowest class. Through civilian and organizational efforts, a humanitarian support team jointly based on South Korean civilians and government should be formed and they should initiate humanitarian aid activity by directly going into North Korea.

Further, a large-sized South Korean humanitarian support activity inspection team should observe the activities of the North Korean Red Cross and raise the transparency of distribution. If this is difficult, there is a need to simplify the window through the support of international society whose monitoring is much ahead of our government’s monitoring of formality.

The government should urgently restore the original capacity of humanitarian support in order to avoid falling into a policy of failure geared only towards a dictatorship regime.

Share

What Are N. Koreans Up to?

Friday, September 21st, 2007

Korea Times
Marcus Noland, Stephan Haggard
9/21/2007

Last summer North Korea conducted provocative missile and nuclear tests. Yet only four months later, Pyongyang signed on to a roadmap that included a return of international inspectors, a full declaration of contested nuclear activities, closing down existing facilities and ultimately disabling them.

American negotiator Christopher Hill predicted this last step could take place as early as the end of the year.

What are the North Koreans up to?

The cynical, some would say realistic, view in the United States _ advanced by departed Bush administration hawks such as John Bolton _ is that Kim Jong-il is raising false hopes.

The appearance of cooperation has several tactical advantages. Sanctions and ongoing uncertainty have had substantial economic costs. The February agreement was preceded by secret meetings in Berlin to resolve the Banco Delta Asia issue.

In return, the North Koreans closed their nuclear facilities, but they have not firmly committed to the difficult aspects of the agreement _ providing a full accounting of their programs, disabling their programs, and giving up actual stores of fissile material and weapons.

Cooperation also drives wedges between the U.S., South Korea and China. If North Korea appears to be making concessions, it is easier for South Korea and China to continue diplomatic and financial support.

Next month, President Roh Moo-hyun will travel to Pyongyang for a summit with Kim Jong-il. Expect him to come bearing gifts to cement his legacy as a peacemaker.

Other politicians in the presidential race have also offered extraordinarily ambitious and generous programs of support for the North as well.

Recent studies we have done on North Korea’s changing external economic relations are consistent with some of this cynical picture, but also suggest a sliver of hope for more substantial change.

To understand why, requires a brief tour of the miserable history of North Korea over the last two decades. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the North Korean economy went into a steep decline ending in full-blown famine.

By our estimates, as many as one million people _ five percent of the entire population _ perished in the mid-1990s. Out of the human ashes of this tragedy, however, the North Korean economy began to undergo a profound transformation.

As households and work units scrambled for food, they engaged in barter, trade and new economic activities.

The desperation of the famine also saw an upturn in illicit activities, from missile sales to drugs and the counterfeiting of U.S. currency. But trade and investment also started to flow across the Chinese border.

Chinese companies, small-scale traders and North Korean firms pursued business opportunities, from large-scale mining operations to the import of South Korean videos.

The regime was always hesitant about the emergence of the market. In July 2002, the government initiated economic policy changes that decriminalized some private activities. But reforms have taken a zig-zag path, always subject to reversal.

Sanctions and closer scrutiny have limited the country’s arms sales and illicit activities.
With these sources of revenue increasingly foreclosed, North Korea has two alternatives _ open the economy and increase normal commercial activities or cooperate primarily to obtain aid. In terms of internal change, these two options may actually push North Korea in opposite directions.

Consider the aid tack. Given the regime’s concerns about internal stability, aid could provide a lifeline, allowing the regime to sustain a modicum of current consumption while forgoing deeper reforms. Under this option, North Korea trades away its nuclear program for assistance precisely to maintain the political and economic status quo.

Alternatively, North Korea could use the resolution of diplomatic tensions to deepen the economic reform process.

The military has been engaged in commercial activities and could potentially benefit from such a course. But real reform will reshuffle power and influence within North Korea in ways that are unpredictable and risky.

So what can we expect from Pyongyang? The nuclear program is the regime’s one major asset and we should not expect them to bargain it away easily.

Rather we should expect prolonged and difficult negotiations as they try to extract tribute for their “Dear Leader.”

In the end, we may eliminate North Korea’s capacity for making additional nuclear weapons, but this will not necessarily be accompanied by economic or political reforms.

An important lesson learned elsewhere in the developing world is that aid is not a substitute for reform.

Ambitious schemes for infrastructure and other investment in North Korea will only generate large economic pay-offs if they are accompanied by genuine opening and a more aggressive embrace of the market.

The key issue, therefore, is how tightly South Korea will link its offer of aid to progress in the resolution of the nuclear issue. Properly conditioned, South Korean aid could be a powerful carrot in the nuclear negotiations, whether it ultimately encourages internal reforms or not.

But if the South Korean offers at the summit are large, unconditional and open-ended, they could permit the regime in Pyongyang to stall the nuclear negotiations while actually discouraging deeper reform.

Share

Class Divergence on the Rise as Market Economics Spred in DPRK

Friday, September 21st, 2007

Institute for Far East Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 07-9-21-1
9/21/2007

The recent growth in the private-sector economy in DPRK markets and other areas of society has brought with it some significant social changes worth noting. According to most defectors from the North, following the massive famine suffered in the mid 1990s, the biggest change to emerge in the DPRK was the reshuffling of the social class structure. In North Korean society, there are reportedly five identifiable social classes.

The first of these classes is the ruling class, made up of those elite surrounding Kim Jong Il. This class survives off of Kim Jong Il’s government funds, aid sent from South Korea, and from exploitation of the general public.

The second class is made up of business traders with access to foreign capital. A portion of money earned through foreign currency exchange businesses is turned over to the Kim Jong Il regime, while the rest can amassed in order to lead a relatively comfortable life.

The third class is made up of organized thugs who make their money through public trading and markets. These people control regional markets and local trading by using money and violence to employ extortion tactics much like the Russian mafia

The fourth class scrapes by on government rations. This mercantile class comprises an estimated 20~30 percent of the North’s overall population.

The fifth distinct class in North Korea is made up of commoners who support their way of life through farming private plots and selling goods in markets. An overwhelming majority of the population falls into this class; more than 60 percent of the people in North Korea live hand-to-mouth each day on the fruits of their own labor.

The remainder of the population falls beneath even these classes, because they either lack labor skills or are feeble elderly, handicapped, hospitalized, homeless, or wandering from city to city.

Share

South Korean News on Broadcast in Pyongyang

Wednesday, September 19th, 2007

Daily NK
Kim Min Se
9/19/2007

It was reported that the North Korean high officials and Chinese emigrants have been using the satellite antennas in Pyongyang and major cities in North Korea to get access to South Korean TV.

Previously it has been reported that the high quality antenna (Yagi Antenna) smuggled from China was used to intercept the South Korean ground waves, which allowed them to listen and watch South Korean news and drama through Japanese televisions in secrecy in Kaesung and Pyongyang.

The “Yagi Antenna” is a VHF receiver which is intercepted for television. This type of antenna is utilized as a receiver for waves from South Korean soil which has high risk of being detected by outside and enforces its usage around nighttime.

However, recently the high officials in North Korea use satellite antennas in secrecy to watch South Korean news and drama. Due to the restriction, the number of people utilizing this satellite service is restricted.

Song Myung Hak (pseudonym), a Chinese trader who went to Pyongyang last month said, “I was surprised to get a request from a friend of mine who worked as a North Korean diplomat on his request to obtain the CD of ‘Ways to Meet a Perfect Neighbor’ (South Korean drama series broadcasted on SBS). He said that he is watching it via satellite but he wanted to recap the episodes he missed.”

Song stated that, “The former diplomat had the satellite dish in his veranda and his entire family was watching South Korean TV. With the expansion of the culture of viewing South Korean TV, Kim Jong Il issued a ban, which is making everyone a bit nervous.”

He said, “If they get caught watching South Korean TV, the family could suffer.” He also added, “Because he was a former diplomat, who was used to living overseas and the life abroad, it was difficult for him to resist the temptation of watching South Korean TV and foreign news. I’m sure it’s the same way for all people.”

Song stated that, “The satellite dish is imported through China to North Korea. The most recently produced satellite dish is quite small in size and China takes care of the maintenance so all they have to do in North Korea is connect it to the TV.”

Kang Myung Gil (pseudonym), a South Korean businessman selling regular satellite antenna and satellite broadcasting Skylife on commission in Dandong, China, explained over the phone that, “The normal satellite antenna (antenna and receiver) costs 600 Yuan (approx. USD86) in total, including the installation costs. We are also receiving the service of Koreasat Mugunghwa 2 which can be received from North Korea as well.”

Kang said that, “There is no technical difficulty in receiving South Korean TV if they are on an elevated apartment with spacious veranda heading the Southern direction. All of the 7-8 channels including KBS1, KBS2, SBS, MBC, EBS, China HAO TV and others can be directly received.”

Jin Hee Myung (pseudonym), an Chinese emigrant originally from Shinuiju, also installed satellite broadcasting service in her apartment. He said that even though overseas Chinese are also under surveillance, they do not receive as harsh of treatment by the North Korean authorities.

He added, “My wife loves to watch South Korean drama so much that I had to risk the consequences and install it. The satellite dish is so small that unless our house is searched thoroughly, there is no worry of being caught.”

In North Korea, if one is caught watching South Korean TV for a long time, they may be put into jail or receive harsh punishments. However, it is the experts’ general analysis that with the expansion of foreign cultures, it will be more difficult for North Korea to control this trend.

Share

What about Supporting North Korean Schools and Students?

Tuesday, September 18th, 2007

Daily NK
Lee Kwang Baek
9/18/2007

According to the newsletter of “Good Friends” published recently, the students living in the dormitories of technical colleges have not been able to eat anything due to the shortage of food for more than 10 days.

If this were to be true, there is a sentiment of utter despair and helplessness since there is both the South Korea and the international society’s food support going into North Korea at the moment. There has been a food supply of 400,000 ton being exerted to North Korea since July, and there is continually a grand supply of food to assist the flood victims. How is it possible that in spite of all these efforts, there are still starving North Korean youth?

According to the newsletter, the situation has worsened to the point where the teachers and principles in schools and kindergartens have to go out on a limb to retain some food supply. In Wonsan, children of the school age are unable to attend school. They are spending their time at the market selling ice cream, vegetables or carrying goods to earn money for living. There have been schools in Hamkyung province reported to have stopped running due to this reason.

It is difficult to determine whether this phenomenon is spread out nationwide, or simply applicable to some students or specific region. However, in spite of the difficulty in determining the extent of these effects, considering the non-transparent state of the distribution of food provision, it is highly likely that these effects are spread out nationwide.

The newsletter states that students are not only responsible for their own stationeries and backpacks, but they are also for the necessary cleaning tools, desks and chairs, and even the chalks used by the teachers.

North Korean government enforced the students to pay for the operation of schools since the mid 1990s. The government collects fees for school operation, oil, and even the fee for designing tank constructions. It is said that students face hard times in even attending schools if they don’t pay these fees.

The children who should be spending their youth running around and being free are spending their study time in the market earning money. The level of begging has expanded to group theft on the streets. According to the villagers in Donglim, North Pyongan, 1 out of the 3 children is unable to attend school due to the lack of money. This is sufficient evidence of “School Breakdown” phenomenon.

There is a proverb that even God cannot salvage poverty. However, perhaps North Korea may be an exception to this proverb. The fault of school breakdown and poverty lies not in the civilians, but solely in Kim Jong Il. All of these phenomenons after one another are tragic ramifications of the ignorance and inhumane dictatorial leadership of Kim Jong Il. It is difficult to hide our distress and sorrow on the issue.

However, in retrospect, this phenomenon of school breakdown can also be perceived as the breakdown of North Korean free education system. What is the “free education system” that Kim Jong Il has so much bragged about? The nature of North Korean education is nothing but a systematic tool to make children as bullets and bombs to protect Kim Jong Il.

Was it not a tool to crush the creativity of young, intelligent minds to force them into becoming the slaves of the system? It wouldn’t be an exaggeration if we were to say that it was this education system that has created the North Korean society of today.

School breakdown phenomenon can also be interpreted as the destruction of idolization education revolved around Kim Jong Il glorification. The ideology inculcation system that bound all children and students in North Korea is finally coming to collapse.
The reason for the collapse is simple. Kim Jong Il regime is losing the strength to control it. We must carefully analyze this trend. While we must strive to stop the phenomenon of children starving and/or dropping out of schools, we must actively be supportive of the current situation that the North Korean government is losing its reign of its people.

We must focus our attention to the independent economic activities taken by the North Koreans, rather than them being dependent on the government sponsored rations. We must put our focus on restoring the practical right to live for the North Korean civilians and allow them to feel more connected to the international society, rather than Kim Jong Il ‘s regime.

The international community must come up with discerning measures to support the students and the parents to experience their independent economic activities and understand the vanity of the glorification-based education system of North Korea. It is time to carefully discern the possible remedies for individual schools and students, rather than continuing the sponsorship through Kim Jong Il regime and South Korean government.

Share

Trading Places

Sunday, September 16th, 2007

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
9/16/2007

The late 1990s will go down in North Korean history as years of frantic trade activity. As a witty North Korean once put it: “There are two types of people in North Korea now: those who trade and those who are dead.”

I’ve met a number of former North Korean merchants, and today I would like to tell the story of one such woman. The story is typical in many respects, and I suspect that countless thousands of her peers would narrate something similar.

When the Dear Leader died in 1994 and things began to fall apart, Ms. Yoo was in her early 20s, doing semi-skilled work at one of the offices in the North Korean capital.

By autumn 1996, even in privileged Pyongyang, food rations were coming less and less frequently. Ms. Yoo’s office, like many other offices across the country, decided to shrink its workforce.

Every month all workers were given one week free, on the assumption they would somehow fend for themselves. They were not paid that week’s wages, and did not receive rations either.

Essentially, it was Ms. Yoo’s mother who was the brains and energy behind the entire enterprise. A kindergarten teacher, she was a typical Korean “ajumma” at her entrepreneurial best: charismatic, charming when necessary, clever andquick-witted.

Actually, Ms. Yoo did not know much about her mother’s contacts and plans.

Now, a decade later, she still remains ignorant. However, one thing was clear: the mother had good connections among the personnel of the hard currency shops.

How did she manage to acquire such connections? After all, the hard currency shops are staffed with privileged people, while a kindergarten teacher is not very high in the North Korean pecking order.

We know not. At any rate, these connections existed and this fact sealed the fate of Ms. Yoo. It was not what people would talk about so much, but Ms. Yoo believes that many of her colleagues started private trade in those years, when it began to flourish. She was no exception, but her situation was better since her mother would take care of business planning.

Ms. Yoo’s mother chose cigarettes as their major merchandise. The smuggled Chinese cigarettes sold extremely well, the packs were light and so could be easily moved by the girl in her early 20s, and profits were very high.

In late 1996 a pack of ten would cost 280 won in the borderland areas, but could be sold in Pyongyang for 400 won wholesale. Later, Ms. Yoo found ways to buy the cigarettes even cheaper, at 240 won a pack, purchasing the merchandise directly from the smugglers instead of the local go-betweens.

Mother sold the cigarettes to the hard currency shop. It is not clear what happened to the merchandise eventually. It seems that the shop managers simply pocketed the money they received from the sales of the cigarettes.

A single trip would garner a net profit of some 20,000 won, and she could go once a month (sometimes more frequently). Now consider that Ms.Yoo’s official salary was 80 won a month, and her father, a junior college teacher, received something like 150 won a month, so the black market money from the cigarettes ostensibly appears an outrageously large amount of money.

However, in the world of the Pyongyang black market, which began to emerge around that time, this was not seen as a fortune. Still, Ms. Yoo spent no more than 1,000 won a month on herself buying whatever was her fancy.

One of her more extravagant splurges was on a South Korean cosmetics set which cost 800 won, or roughly her official annual salary. At the time she did not quite realize where the goods were produced, since being a good, politically correct girl, she still believed that South Korea was populated by beggars living in constant terror of the sadistic Yankees!

But what about travel permits? After all, for decades no North Korean was allowed to leave the county without a permit issued by the police. Well, by the mid-1990s the travel permit system was in disarray with a single exception: entrance to Pyongyang remained strictly controlled.

However, in most cases money talked, and permits could be issued for a moderate bribe. However, Ms. Yoo and her mother discovered an even easier way. They did not bribe officials but bribed railway policemen, those who were on duty on the North Korean passenger trains.

For 500-1,000 won, plus free booze and some presents, a policeman would make sure that Ms. Yoo would reach her destination and come back with sacks of cigarettes, and he also would take care of her personal security.

Better still, the 500-1,000 won bribe was sufficient for few round-trip commercial expeditions. The trips were hard. The carriages were unbelievably crowded, with people packed everywhere, sitting on roofs and ladders. As Ms.

Yoo describes, “even on the roof one could not see a square centimeter of paint, people there were sitting that tight.” Another problem was the frequent delays, so the journey of some 400-500 kilometers would normally take 2-3 days. Still, the money was good, and Ms. Yoo enjoyed the adventure, and even now, ten years later, she seems to be proud of her ability strike deals, calculate profits and losses, and find suppliers.

However, Ms. Yoo’s business activity did not last for long. Somewhat against her will, she found herself lured (or kidnapped) to China and soon fate turned in a way which made a return home impossible.

Share

Strict Regulation of Underage Prostitution

Sunday, September 16th, 2007

Daily NK
Yang Jung A
9/16/2007

The “Good Friends” reported on the 12th that there has been an arrest of North Korean women who had jumped into the act of prostitution to support their family.

According to the newsletter published by Good Friends, “There was a nation-wide inspection, while there were regular evaluation meetings in the early September. This is when a large sum of the women in the prostitution business were arrested.”

According to the Good Friends, “Most of these women received a sentence of 3 years were sent to Jeungsang, South Pyongan to the labor-detention facility. Most of these women were from poor families who were talked into prostituting themselves by their mothers to supporting their family.”

The arrested women argued that, “If there were more jobs, salary or even rationing, who in their right mind would do such things for a living?”

The newsletter revealed that, “With the worsening shortage of food the number of underage prostitution has been on the rise. In Wonsan, Kangwon province, restaurants were found with rooms on the underground level in which a large group of underage children were forced into be in the activity of prostitution.”

“The seven restaurant owners and managers were sentenced to execution by a firing squad and the 40 underage children that were involved in the prostitution are currently in jail receiving indoctrination.”

The newsletter revealed that, “With the strict inspections being processed per district, the North Korean government is putting a stricter surveillance on prostitution, infiltration and drug smuggling. Last week at Hwoireong, one drug smuggler was executed in public.”

In addition, the newsletter also revealed that there is a shortage of necessities in North Korea nationwide due to the huge flood this summer.

In North Hamkyung province, the civilians are lacking three crucial necessities: rice, water and electricity.

“Due to the paralysis of transportation methods in North Hamkyung, they are not even able to receive the minimum supply for flood victims. Other regions are able to receive the partial amount of the supply for flood victims given by the South, but North Hamkyung is suffering the most out of all provinces.”

There has been a continuance of water shortage in Shinuiju since July.

The newsletter stated that, “There has not been a single drop of water in the entire city of Shinuiju. Only after September 9 were the civilians able to receive some tap water, but the tap water supply only runs from 3:00 a.m. to 4:00 a.m. for one hour.”

“The people in Shinuiju are not able to go to sleep because they are waiting to receive the water. The electricity is provided for five hours each day, but due to the low electric pressure, they are not even able to use the water pump.”

Share