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Organizational Loyalty on Display

Friday, October 31st, 2008

Daily NK
Jeong Jae Sung
10/31/2008

North Korean youth and women’s organizations have been holding meetings to elicit a vow of loyalty to Kim Jong Il since mid-August, when he disappeared from public view.

Meanwhile, North Korean media report that Kim Jong Il mails letters and gifts frequently in order to prevent a potentially unstable social situation caused by rumors of his serious illness. These loyalty vow meetings are also a tool by which to emphasize solidarity with the current political system.

Chosun (North Korea) Central News Agency reported on Friday that the Primary Organization Chairmen’s meeting of the Union of Democratic Women was held on the 30th in the People’s Palace of Culture, Pyongyang, at which Party Secretary Kim Jung Rin was present and a further “oath statement” to Kim Jong Il was selected.

The News Agency described the meeting thus, “Chairwoman of the Union of Democratic Women Roh Sung Sil reported their activities, after which they evaluated sub-organizational achievements as led by the leadership of the Party and discussed the duties of the primary organizations’ chairwomen and ways to raise their results.”

The Union of Democratic Women consists of around 200,000 women between 31 and 55 years old who do not have jobs. Women who meet these registration conditions have to affiliate with the Union.

On the 28th, a North Korean representative youth organization, the Kim Il Sung Socialist Youth League, held its 38th Assembly in order to discuss a way to enact Kim Jong Il’s instruction, “The youths should take the role of vanguard and storm troopers in the hardest fields, to establish a great and strong country,” according to the News Agency.

The Kim Il Sung Socialist Youth League was founded on January 17, 1946 and today consists of around five million students, workers and soldiers between 14 and 30. Its role is to act as a rearguard for the Party.

Vice Chairman of the General Federation of Korean Trade Unions, the largest workers’ organization, Kim Sung Cheol said in late September through the Chosun Central News Agency (KCNA) that “The core of the spirit of the thousands of soldiers and people is to firmly support the Leader, so we should put pressure on members to strengthen their spirits.”

Posted in Democratic Women's Union, Federation of Trade Unions, League of Socialist Working Youth | Comments Closed

The Relationship between the Party and the Army under the Military-First Policy

Tuesday, October 21st, 2008

Daily NK
Choi Choel Hee
10/21/2008

With Kim Jong Il’s condition an issue, there has been a lot of talk about North Korea’s government system in the post-Kim Jong Il era.

Due to the strengthened military influence caused by the military-first policy, one prediction is that a military-based collective leadership system may take power after Kim Jong Il.

However, a defector who used to be a high-ranking official in North Korea pointed out that this prediction comes from an incorrect understanding about the relationship between the Party and the military.

Hwang Jang Yop, who is a former Secretary of International Affairs of the Workers’ Party, has said that not military authorities but the Party would likely grasp power after Kim Jong Il’s death.

I. Chosun (North Korea) People’s Army Is the Army of the Party

According to the Regulations of the Workers’ Party, the Chosun People’s Army is defined as “the revolutionary military power of the Workers’ Party.” Separate from the regular chain of command in the Army, Party members are assigned to each unit to command them. That is, there are two command structures: a military chain of command and the Party’s organizational system.

The People’s Army is controlled by the Party Committee of the Chosun People’s Army under the Military Committee of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party. The chief secretary of the Party Committee of the Chosun People’s Army is Cho Myung Rok, who also holds the position of Director of the General Political Bureau of the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces. His roles are to inform the Army of the Party’s instructions and regulations and to monitor and supervise the Army to make sure it adheres to the Party’s will and regulations.

At the same time, the highest political apparatus in the military, the General Political Bureau, is under surveillance of the Guidance Department of the Central Committee of the Party. Therefore, a Vice-Director of the Guidance Department of the Central Committee presides over the military while the military command system is always subordinate to the Party command system.

Regarding this relationship between the Party and the military, Hwang Jang Yop, the former Secretary of International Affairs of the Party, gave as an example “the Sixth Corps’ Coup d’état case,” and said that, “The suspected leaders of the coup were shot at once in a hall. The figure who ordered and carried out the massacre of the conspirators was Kim Young Choon, the Vice-Director of the National Defense Commission, but the political manager behind everything was Jang Sung Tae, Director of the Ministry of Administration, one of the departments under the Central Committee of the Party. This implies that there are different management systems overseeing the military — those of the military itself and those of the Party.”

II. The Right of Personnel Management and of Inspection Over the Military

The reason why the Director of the Guidance Department holds such a powerful influence is that the Director has the right to manage personnel and inspect the military.

Even the right to implement personnel management within the Army goes to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Party. The members of the Secretariat are the Director of the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces, the Army Chief of Staff, the Director of the General Political Department, the Director of the Operations Department, and, in some cases, the commander of the Defense Security Command of the Army is included.

The Guidance Department of the Party maintains the right to inspect the Army. The scariest inspections for the military are the ones by the Guidance Department. On a rumor that the Guidance Department is coming, a few military officials are usually purged.

The fact is well known that Kim Jong Il himself also holds power over the military through controlling the Guidance Department.

The posts in charge of the military within the Guidance Department are the No. 13 Life Guidance Department and the No. 4 Cadre Department. Department #13 directly controls and instructs the operations of the Army Committee of the Central Committee of the Party and General Political Department of the Party.

III. Department #13 and Department #4 of the Guidance Department

The roles of these two departments are to monitor how well the Army follows the ideology and the leadership of Kim Jong Il, and whether or not party organizations and political organizations within the Army are operated well by the Party leadership. The Army Committee of the Party and the General Political Bureau doesn’t have the authority to make decisions, so it has to consult with Department #13 before taking action.

The Vice-Director of the Guidance Department is in charge of Department #13. The offices of Department #13 are located in the building of the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces due to its association with the General Political Department of the People’s Army.

It also oversees the Army Committee of the Central Committee, the General Political Department, and the Army Committee. Department #13 participates in the major military meetings including the ideological struggle meeting. It hosts an annual fifteen-day-long Guidance Department lecture of the Party for military officials.

The No. 4 cadre department has the final say over personnel matters regarding high military officials. Officials whose rank is higher than brigadier general must be approved by the Guidance Department. After the Guidance Department signs off, posts and military title can be granted by the order of the supreme commander of the People’s Army. Therefore, the Guidance Department of the Party holds absolute control over the Army through exercising its right of personnel management of the officials.

Posted in Central Miltary Committee, Committee of the Korean People’s Army, Korean People's Army, KPA General Political Bureau, Military, Ministry of Administration, Ministry of People’s Armed Forces, Organization and Guidance Department, Secretariat, Uncategorized, Worker's Party | Comments Closed

Kim Jong Il’s Ten Principles: Restricting the People

Monday, October 13th, 2008

Daily NK
Namgung Min
10/13/2008

The Chosun (North Korean) Workers’ Party controls and restricts all types of people: from party members to non-members, from the upper-class to the proletariat.

As the Party rules over the state, it coerces people to follow not the socialist constitution of the DPRK, but the party’s Ten Principles for the Establishment of the One-Ideology System (hereafter referred to as the Ten Principles).

The Ten Principles that the Party uses to restrict the people are something that everyone born in North Korea has to memorize and follow at home, work and school for their whole life.

The framework for the Ten Principles was laid by Kim Jong Il in his role as Party Secretary. Later he declared the principles throughout North Korea in February, 1974.

With the Ten Principles Kim Jong Il set standards for North Koreans’ daily lives and their daily activities.

Supervision and Restriction through Regular Party Evaluation Meetings

The Party’s regular evaluation meetings are the tools most typically utilized to monitor all affairs related to the work and personal lives of Party members.

According to Article 8, Section 5 of the Ten Principles, party members are required to “actively attend the Party’s regular evaluation meetings that are held every other day or every week in order to train oneself to become a revolutionary and to continuously rebuild oneself through criticism using the standards of the Leader’s teaching and the Party’s policies as a guide.”

During the regular evaluation meetings, first members within a certain period of time are to confess flaws and mistakes they or others made in their work or personal lives; what they said and did; and, one’s ways of thinking. Then they criticize themselves and one another.

These evaluation meetings are held weekly. There also are monthly and quarterly evaluation meetings, which vary in subject and scope.

If one tries to hide or minimize one’s mistakes during these evaluation meetings, then the level of criticism gets stronger.

“You can pass an evaluation meeting safely only when you seem to be repentant by showing tears and exaggerating even when the flaws are not that serious,” explained Mr. Kim, who defected in 2006.

The quarterly meetings sometimes last a half a day or a day.

Especially after reciprocal criticisms during the evaluation meetings, upper-level cadres of the Party submit the results to Kim Jong Il or the Guidance Department of the Central Committee of the Party for review. Later, the results of the evaluation are announced to the people involved.

The evaluations (similar to a South Korean court decision) can result in comparatively light sentences such as a warning, a severe warning or suspension of one’s qualifications. However, at times, severe punishments are given out such as mining work, farm labor without pay, suspension of one’s titles, banishment to remote regions, or referral to the National Security Agency. If charged and prosecuted, one may be sentenced to intensive labor or re-education camps.

Supervision through Various Forms of Guidance and Education

The Workers’ Party supervises and restricts the people by brainwashing them using various forms of instruction and lectures.

According to Article 4, Section 5 of the Ten Principles, everyone must “attend meetings, lectures and lessons without missing any to learn the Great Father Kim Il Sung’s revolutionary ideology and actively study the rules for more than two hours everyday.”

The mandatory Saturday meetings in particular are known to be the basic brainwashing tool; they are thoroughly prepared by the Propaganda and Agitation Department and involve lectures and documentary film lessons.

The brainwashing process that North Koreans have the hardest time with is the catechetical lessons.

The catechetical lessons take the form of a competition and include preliminary, semi-final and final rounds. During these lessons, all cadres, party members and residents have to memorize more than 100 pages of “catechetical lesson material” that have been prepared by the Propaganda and Agitation Department without getting one word wrong.

The catechetical lesson material includes Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il’s works, the Ten Principles for the Establishment of the One-Ideology System, Juche ideology and related philosophical issues, documents that praise the morals and majesty of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, and various poems and songs praising the Kims.

The groups or individuals that win the competition get awards like a television and honor. But those who do not claim victory become the targets of criticism by the organizations to which they belong and the Party apparatus for slacking on studying ideology.

Restricting People Through Various Organizations

In North Korea, all people who are not part of the Workers’ Party must be mandatorily restricted by the Party’s quasi-governmental organizations.

Such organizations include the Kim Il Sung Socialist Youth League, the General Federation of Trade Unions of North Korea, the Union of Agricultural Working People, the Union of Democratic Women the and Korean Children’s Union.

The Kim Il Sung Socialist Youth League (the Youth League) is the biggest and most active political group, the only non-party member group for young people, and includes working youths, students, and military men.

The Youth League, by restricting the ideological culture and organized groups of all youths, monitors any changes in the society’s way of thinking that may happen with the change of generations. It also organizes all youths to be actively involved in production, construction and military service.

The Youth League plays the important role of restricting any form of opposition groups or actions among the youths of North Korea.

Youth League members who have reached the age of 30 but have not joined the Party must join the General Federation of Trade Unions, if one is a laborer or low-ranking manager, the Union of Agricultural Working People if one is a farmer, or the Union of Democratic Women if one is a housewife.

These workers’ organizations are managed by the work departments of the committees and the Central Committee of the Party.

Therefore, non-Party members in North Korea receive double supervision–from the organizations they belong to and from their workplace.

The Chosun Workers’ Party has been strictly restricting and supervising its people for 63 years, which is the period of disgrace of the Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il dictatorships.

Posted in Civil society, Democratic Women's Union, Federation of Trade Unions, Organization and Guidance Department, Socialist Youth League, Worker's Party | Comments Closed

Know the Party before Getting to Know Kim Jong Il

Wednesday, October 8th, 2008

Daily NK
Namgung Min
10/8/2008

As rumors regarding Kim Jong Il’s illness surfaced during North Korea’s 60th anniversary celebrations, opinion was divided on whether the military or the Party will rise in power post-Kim Jong Il.

It is true that the power of the military rose post-Kim Il Sung, according to the “military-first” political line. The National Defense Commission (NDC) began leading various agencies and councils, and came to hold greater power because Kim Jong Il was introduced as the National Defense Commission Chairman during North-South Summits.

Thus, the National Defense Commission under military-first politics began to appear to be North Korea’s sole power base, as news on general-level promotions was released publicly by the National Defense Commission.

However, despite military-first politics, it remains the Chosun (North Korea) Workers’ Party that fundamentally controls the North Korean regime. Therefore, in order to understand the North Korean regime, one must understand the Chosun Workers’ Party.

Upcoming October 10th is the founding anniversary of this most important of organizations. The eyes of the world are focused on whether Kim Jong Il will appear on this day or not.

Therefore, it is time to closely examine what the Chosun Workers’ Party does and how it controls the North Korean regime.

The Korean Workers’ Party claims to be the direct heir to the North Korean Branch of the Chosun Communist Party that was established during “The Chosun Communist Party Convention of Leaders and Devotees of the 5 Northwest Provincial Party Committees” held on October 10th, 1945. Hence the founding date is October 10th. In April, 1946 the name was changed to the North Chosun Communist Party, which then became the Chosun (North Korean) Workers’ Party after being merged with Chosun New People’s Party in August of the same year.

North Korea is operated under the leadership of the Chosun Workers’ Party, as previously seen in other socialist countries; the nation’s power is concentrated in the Party. This implies that as the Party controls the country, the country is evolving into a socialist society and from there into a communist society.

The Workers’ Party, venerable as it is, not only holds the highest position of authority in North Korea but thus stands above other national agencies, organizations or the military.

I. The positions and roles of the Chosun Workers’ Party

The positions and roles of the Workers’ Party are described in detail in the “Rules and Regulations of the KWP,” “Ten Principals for the Party’s Unique Ideological System” and the “Socialist Constitution of North Korea.”

It is written in Article 11 of the Socialist Constitution, amended in 1998, that “The DPRK shall conduct all activities under the leadership of the Workers’ Party.” Furthermore, the Workers’ Party is stated to be an organ that controls other agencies and organizations as the highest revolutionary organization leading all other working organs.

However, the socialist constitution and the rules of the Party are only for the purpose of propagating the notion of the rationality and legitimacy of North Korea abroad while concealing a dictatorship. The reality within North Korea is completely different from the actual contents of the constitution.

In actuality, the socialist constitution and the rules and regulations of the Party defines that all sectors such as government, military, administration, judiciary, and even public prosecutor’s office are led by the Party, while being utilized as the apparatus for Kim Jong Il’s Stalinist dictatorship. That is, the regulations recognize the Party’s leadership of the country and simultaneously state that the Party can only be operated and led by Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.

The Workers’ Party in legal terms is an organ that guides North Koreans, but in reality it is only an organ under the iron command of the supreme Leader. Therefore, the Leader stands in the highest position, above the Party, nation and sovereign organs.

II. The structure and functions of the Chosun Workers’ Party

The utmost decision-making organ of the Workers’ Party is the National Party Congress.

According to the rules and regulations of the Party, all decision making of the Party regarding policies, strategies, and tactics should be passed through the National Party Congress. However, in actuality the Party Congress only rubber stamps the decisions that were already made by the Central Committee of the Party.

It is theoretically a ground rule that the Party Congress meets once every 5 years. The first congressional meeting was held in August 1946, the Congress met for the 6th time in October 1980, but has failed to meet since; 28 years. The fact that the Congress is not meeting regularly signifies that the regime system is not operating according to accepted principles of socialist states in the past.

If the Congress fails to meet, the Central Committee of the Party functions as the highest decision-making organ. The Central Committee should meet and discuss issues once every 6 months.

During these meetings, the General Secretary, committee members and the Presidium of the Politburo and committee members of the Central Committee of the Party should be elected. The Central Committee also has the authority to organize the Secretariat and the Central Military Commission.

However, even these twice annual meetings have not been held since the 21st meeting of the 6th cohort in 1993. When the meetings are not held, then the Politburo needs to take authority. However, the Secretariat of the Central Committee, whose General Secretary is currently Kim Jong Il, currently does so.

The highest organ in a communist society is officially the Presidium of the Politburo. In North Korea, Kim Jong Il is the only left in the presidium after the deaths of Kim Il Sung and Oh Jin Woo. This is why North Korea is sometimes called a totalitarian state. In the Chinese government, the Politburo presidium is properly functioning and decisions are made here. From a “democratic” perspective, the Chinese Communist Party and the Chosun Workers’ Party are completely different.

In any case, within the Secretariat of the Central Committee there are specialty departments such as the Guidance Department, Propaganda and Agitation Departments, and the United Front Department, and it also includes departments that supply secret funding to Kim Jong Il such as the 38th and 39th Departments.

The provincial organs of the Party consist of party committees of provinces, cities and counties that even include the most basic low-level party committees such as elementary party committees and sector party committees.

The structure of the Workers’ Party can also be divided into permanent party organs and temporary collective leadership groups. The permanent party organs include all members who work in any specialty departments, from the Central Committee down to low-level provincial party organs. Temporary collective leadership groups signify councils of high-level or low-level leaders of the central and provincial organs, made to implant permanent authority within the society through various meetings.

There are approximately 4,000,000 members of the Workers’ Party, including Kim Jong Il, high-level officials to low-level members, and figures from the legislature, judiciary, and the administration.

III. Main Departments and Their Roles

The main government complex of the Central Committee of the Worker’s Party is located in Changkwang-dong, Joong-district of Pyongyang. There are many buildings in the complex which include Kim Jong Il’s personal office and most of the Central Committee departments.

The second government complex is located in Junseung-dong, Moranbong-district of Pyongyang. The Social Culture Department, United Front Department and Operations Department are included in this complex.

The Workers’ Party has placed all specialty departments under the authority of the Secretariat, to function as restriction and guidance on all areas of the party members, citizens and North Korea. There is a Guidance Department that observes party members then there are other departments that exercise political functions.

The Guidance Department actualizes party guidance and restraint within communities. The department functions as Kim Jong Il’s right hand and as the core department by restraining the lives of all officials, members and citizens within the party.

The Guidance Department sub-divides into the inspection department, official department, party-member registration department, administration department and a communication department that allows direct reports regarding any incident or accident. The Guidance Department also manages the judiciary and the public prosecutor’s office.

The inspection department is responsible for inspecting any anti-party, non-party, undisciplined or unreasonable activities that develop within the regime or leadership of the Party and report to Kim Jong Il. The Guidance Department inspection section is strictly separated from other departments and North Korean party members or officials are all fearful of it.

There are approximately 20 specialty departments such as the Propaganda and Agility Department, the 38th and 39th Departments to supply fund to Kim Jong Il, the United Front Department dealing with South Korea, the International Department, the Science Education Department, and the Operations Department that carry out political activities.

Currently the Korean Workers’ Party is in the middle of the process of replacing 1st or 2nd generation leaders with 3rd or 4th generation, often more practical, personnel.

Posted in Administrative Department (KWP), Agitation and Propaganda Department, Bureau 39, Central Committee, Central Miltary Committee, Christian Federation, Democratic Women's Union, Federation of Science and Technology, Federation of Trade Unions, National Defense Commission, National Party Congress, Office 10, Operational Department, Organization and Guidance Department, Planning and Fiscal Affairs (KWP), Social Culture Department, Socialist Youth League, Third Building Secret Service, United Front Department, Worker's Party | Comments Closed

Elderly Women Should Stop Complaining and Start Participating

Tuesday, October 7th, 2008

Daily NK
Lee Sung Jin
10/7/2008

An inside source from North Korea reported on the 6th that the North Korean authorities have ordered that any woman under the age of 70 who is able to hear, see, and move should participate in the activities of the “Chosun (Korean) Democratic Women’s Union.”

According to the source, “The Central Committee of the Women’s Union Chairwoman Kim Soon Hee decreed that the elderly who are able to move must participate in Union activities, rather than uselessly sitting around and complaining about society.”

After the worsening food situation, the source said that the elderly often sit around and pour forth their complaints about society, saying that “We did not live like this before… If we worked, at least we received wages and provisions, but what kind of a situation is this nowadays?” and blaming the inadequate governance of officials.

Since the food crisis, there have been many instances of the elderly selling goods in alleyways or at street-stands. In particular, after the implementation of the regulation of December 2007 which prevents women less than 40 years of age doing business in the market, the elderly increasingly sell products at stands which are managed by young women from behind the scenes.

Elderly women who do business in the jangmadang (market) have been accordingly playing the role of circulators of all kinds of rumors and complaints, such as saying, “How many more years are left in our lives? At least our children must live well, but there is no sign of that and it is much worse than the Japanese colonial period; how can we not blame the world?”

The recent measure can be seen as another ploy to control the citizens by the North Korean authorities. However, involving elderly women in organizational activities to prevent the worsening of civilian sentiment has been protested against by constituents as well as the elderly.

The elderly who heard the recent news have complained, “It is difficult enough just to live until our 60s, how can they tell us to participate in the Women’s Union activities as well?”

Also, the source relayed elderly concerns over their livelihoods, “Members participate in study sessions twice a week and have to carry out tasks distributed by the Union, so they do not have time to sell in the market. In their free time during the difficult period, they have been doing business and helping their families get by. The changed regulation is a death sentence for these families.”

Currently, the total number of members in the Korean Democratic Women’s Union, which started out as the “North Chosun Democratic Women’s Union” on November 18, 1945, is around 200,000. Until now, the targeted entrants have been women over 31 and below 55 who do not belong in other organizations or working places. The main activities of the Women’s Union are studying political ideology regarding women and rolling out various projects.

Posted in Civil society, Democratic Women's Union, Food, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market) | Comments Closed

N.Korea’s Leading Apparatchiks

Thursday, September 18th, 2008

Choson Ilbo
9/18/2008

Gen. Hyon Chol-hae, the 74-year-old deputy director of the general political department of the North Korean People’s Army (KPA) has been North Korean leader Kim Jong-il’s most frequent companion on official occasions. Hyon has accompanied Kim, who is said to be recovering from a stroke, on 32 occasions this year.

In analysis of senior North Korean officials who have accompanied Kim on his inspections of various facilities until Aug. 14, Hyon was followed by Gen. Ri Myong-su (71), director of the administrative department of the National Defense Commission (29 occasions); Kim Ki-nam (82), director of the propaganda department of the North Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) (22 occasions); Pak Nam-gi (74), director of the planning and fiscal affairs department of the KWP (10 occasions); Kim Jong-gak (62), first vice-director of the KPA’s general political department, Pak To-chun, chief secretary of the WPK Jagang Provincial Committee, Kim Kyok-sik, chief of the KPA general staff (seven occasions); Jang Song-taek (62), director of the administrative department of the KWP (five occasions); and North Korea’s first vice foreign minister Kang Sok-ju (67) (five occasions).

During these inspections, Kim has given instructions to military officers, government officials and plant managers. The more often these elderly men accompany Kim, the closer the Unification Ministry, which carried out the analysis, considers them to the North Korean leader. Hyon, Ri, Kim and Pak ranked first through fourth in 2007 as well

Song Dae-sung, a senior researcher at the Sejong Institute, said there is no big change in the ranking order of those closest aides to Kim Jong-il, who are assisting Kim on his sickbed or governing North Korea on his behalf.

Hyon Chol-hae
The KPA’s general political department, which Hyon controls as deputy director, is in charge of the entire KPA organization. A graduate of the Mangyongdae Revolutionary School, which families and descendants of the anti-Japanese partisans attend, he controls the school’s graduates, most of whom serve in the military. During the Korean War, he was Kim Il-sung’s bodyguard. He accompanied Kim junior on his visit to China in 2001.

Hyon stood on the platform alongside other North Korean leaders during a military parade on North Korea’s 60th anniversary on Sept. 9. According to analysts, normally only vice marshals or higher-ranking military officers are allowed to stand on the platform, and Hyon, a general, was an unprecedented exception.

Suh Jae-jean, director of the Korea Institute for National Unification, said, “It seems that Hyon Chol-hae is currently running North Korea behind the scenes. He is expected to play a leading role in laying the foundation for the post-Kim Jong-il era according to Kim’s wishes.” The institute says Hyon also has connections with Kim’s second son Jong-chol (27).

Ri Myong-su
Ri is director of the administrative department of the National Defense Commission, North Korea’s de facto supreme leadership. As the NDC’s administrative department director, he controls inspection and intelligence activities within the KPA. Until last year, he was under Kim Jong-il’s direct command as the director of the KPA’s operations department.

Ri emerged as a strongman in the process of Kim’s succession to power in the 1970s, by displaying loyalty to him. He has been Kim’s second most frequent companion since 2003.

Ryu Dong-ryeol, a researcher at the Police Science Institute, said, “Hyon and Ri directly report to Kim Jong-il.”

Kim Ki-nam
Kim is a well-known figure in South Korea since making an unannounced visit to the Seoul National Cemetery when he was in Seoul as the chief of a North Korean delegation to a “Unification Festival” marking Liberation Day on Aug. 15, 2005. He is Kim’s mouthpiece as secretary for propaganda for the KWP Central Committee. He was the editor-in-chief of the Rodong Shinmun, the organ of the KWP Central Committee, in 1976. In 1985, he was appointed director of the propaganda department of the KWP Central Committee.

Lee Ki-dong, a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Strategy, said, “Kim Ki-nam will be in charge of publicizing at home and abroad Kim Jong-il’s decision about a successor.”

Pak Nam-gi
Pak is in charge of North Korea’s economy. Since 1976, he has worked as an economic expert as vice chairman of the State Planning Commission, the agency that controls North Korea’s planned economy.

As the first vice-director of the KPA’s general political department, Kim Jong-gak is in charge of propaganda within the military. Kim Kyok-sik assumed the post as the chief of KPA general staff in April last year, and Pak To-chun has served as the chief secretary of the KWP Jagang Provincial Committee since 2005.

Jang Song-taek, Kim Jong-il’s brother-in-law, fell out of favor with Kim in May 2004. But he came back in 2006 and has since controlled powerful agencies such as the Ministry of Public Security and the State Security Department, and prosecutors’ offices. He is reportedly close to Kim’s eldest son Jong-nam (37).

Kang Sok-ju played a major role in reaching the U.S.-North Korean Geneva Agreement in 1994.

Posted in Administrative Department (KWP), Agitation and Propaganda Department, Korean People's Army, KPA General Political Bureau, National Defense Commission, Planning and Fiscal Affairs (KWP), Political economy, Worker's Party | Comments Closed

Kim Jong il asserts control of border regions

Thursday, July 31st, 2008

As reported earlier this year by the Daily NK, Kim Jong il’s brother in law, Jang Song Taek, was leading an anti-corruption campaign in North Korea’s northern provinces along the Chinese border. Aside from controlling financial leakages, these efforts could be interpreted as attempts by Kim to gain control over military-owned trade companies.

According to a past report:

The inspection group withdrew all trade certificates with exception of those certificates belonging to the families of anti-Japanese guerrilla fighters, and those certificates issued by the Ministry of Finance or the Shinuiju Municipal Administrative Committee. Therefore, presently at Shinuiju Customs, all import items without trade certificates issued by the above mentioned three groups have to be sent back to China.

Jang’s efforts, though seemingly effective at reasserting financial control of the region, had apparently taken their toll on local commerce:

In Hyesan, Yangkang Province, markets have been significantly reduced in size and scope recently, due to the anti-socialist group’s inspections[.]

[T]he merchants were at unease when under inspection by the National Security Agency (NSA) and other governmental organizations which govern the jangmadang [markets].

For example, transportation of goods by traders has withered away since last year, as the authority of the People’s Safety Agency (PSA) [controlled by Jang] rose and [it] launched [] a strict crackdown on traders’ belongings.

The source explained the situation in Hyesan, that “Hyesan had become the city where Chinese goods were traded for the cheapest value because Chinese goods [enter the country] at Hyesan[.] [During] the (PSA) inspection period [goods] could not be transported inland due to the inspection of trains and cars. Lives of the common people became even tougher than before, since goods could not be circulated through the jangmadang in spite of their low prices.”

“The more stringent the regulation became, the more bribes cadres received and worsened were the lives of people,” the source added.

(NKeconWatch: I have “cleaned up” some of the grammar here to make it more readable. If you want to see the original version, click here.)

And in Sinuiju:

The intensive inspection of Shinuiju, in which over 70% of Chinese-North Korean commercial traffic occurs, caused several aftereffects inside North Korea: commercial traffic passing through Shinuiju and Dandong decreased by half compared to the past, and the aftermath of the inspections in Shinuiju added fuel to the fire of price rises in jangmadang goods across the country.

For instance, sugar, which is a raw material for doughnuts or candies that are consumed the most by average civilians in the jangmadang, carried a price of around 1,500 won per kilogram before the inspections, but in mid-May, it rose to 2,100 won and vegetable oil hiked from 5,500 to 7,500 won per kilogram. Such an increase in prices also caused a significant threat to the survival of citizens who made a living off the jangmadang trade.

But the final result of the evaluation of the Shinuiju inspection, which caused quite a stir externally, has purportedly been negligible.

The source said, “The volume of trade has decreased over several months and the number of visitors to China has also been reduced by half. The results of the inspection have not produced too much difference, except for the execution of 14 corrupt officials.”

The source further noted, “The only change which has been visible to the eye is the rise in the cost of bribes offered to North Korean customs from 40 to 80 dollars per hundred kilograms of goods. There was a rumor that the loading volume carried into the North would be fixed at 120kg, from 360kg, but this has not been done yet.”(Daily NK)

The Daily NK now reports that in the wake of these developments, Kim Jong il’s National Defense Commission (NDC) has moved in and directly taken over the inspections—and economic conditions have improved:

[Markets] have become lively again in the past few days as inspections by the National Defense Commission (NDC) have gotten underway.

A source in North Korea reported to Daily NK on Friday that “Merchants in Hyesan these days are fish in water. They say that they would not mind at all going through such inspections for an entire the year!”

Part of the reason for the turn around has been a change in focus. Whereas Jang’s work hit many “ordinary” North Koreans (particularly those working for the wrong trading companies), NDC inspections are focused on controlling the mid- to upper-level cadres. It is entirely speculatory to ask whether Kim’s strategy was to unleash Jang to get control of the region and afterwards assert direct control himself, or whether complaints from locals forced the NDC to end Jang’s campaign.

Of course this is all unverified information from inside North Korea, so who knows how much of it is correct!

Posted in International trade, Military, Ministry of Administration, Ministry of People’s Security (Criminal Police), Ministry of State Inspection, Ministry of State Security (MPSS, NSA, SSD), Political economy, Worker's Party | 1 Comment »

(UPDATED) South Korean tourist fatally shot at Kumgang

Monday, July 21st, 2008

UPDATE 13-August 28: Yoon Man-jun stepped down as CEO of Hyundai Asan over the July 11 killing of the 53-year-old South Korean woman by a North Korean soldier at the North’s Diamond Mountain resort, the company said in a statement. The company quoted Yoon as saying that he wanted to take “moral responsibility” for the death. (ETN news)

UPDATE 12-August 8: Despite bringing a halt to tourism in Kumgangsan, South Korea sent arrears to the DPRK. From the Choson Ilbo:

Despite stalemate over the shooting death of a South Korean tourist at North Korea’s Mt. Kumgang, tour operator Hyundai Asan made its July payment for tours to North Korea.

Asan said Thursday it paid US$675,250 to North Korea to cover costs accrued by 10,380 South Korean tourists who visited the mountain resort on July 1-11, until the tours halted after a South Korean tourist was shot and killed by a North Korean soldier at Mt. Kumgang.

Update 11-August 8: DPRK to expel all remaining ROKs from Kumgnag starting August 10.

UPDATE 10-Auguts 4: KCNA issues statement.

UPATE 9-August 3: Though no date was given, North Korea intends to expell most remaining South Koreans from Kumgang (Yonhap):

North Korea’s official media said earlier in the day that Pyongyang will expel all “unnecessary” South Korean personnel from the Mount Geumgang resort, where a South Korean tourist was shot dead by a North Korean soldier last month.

More than 260 South Korean workers are stationed at the scenic resort, according to Hyundai Asan, the South Korean tour organizer.

UPDATE 8-July 26: North Korea succeeds in preventing shooting concerns from being mentioned in official summary of ASEAN meeting.

UPDATE 7- July 23: South Korean government prevents South Korean civic groups from visiting DPRK until the North’s government agrees to participate in shoting investigation. (Donga Ilbo)

As of Tuesday, six organizations had been offered invitations to visit the DPRK (Donga Ilbo):

One hundred members of the Korean Teachers and Educational Workers’ Union applied for permits to visit North Korea during August. In addition, 120 South Gyeongsang Province officials including Governor Kim Tae-ho are reportedly planning to visit the regime.

Humanitarian organizations such as Good Neighbors International, Nanum International and the Korean Sharing Movement will reportedly send 40-150 delegates to the North in August (for the former two) and September. In addition, North Korean officials invited around 120 members of Peace Three Thousand, and the representatives of the two will meet in Gaesong on Saturday to discuss the invitation.

These organizations [would] stay two to four days in North Korea and [] attend joint meetings with the North Korean Teachers’ Union, visit North Korean industrial facilities, tour Mount Baekdu, and attend an Arirang performance – a play propagandizing the regime.

UPDATE 6- July 21: Suspension of the Kumgang Tours will cost the DPRK $20 million per year. If South Korea suspends the Kaesong tours (to the city, not the industrial zone) it will cost the DPRK government $15 million. (Choson Ilbo)

Maybe these numbers are sinking in. According to the Donga Ilbo:

North Korean officials recently followed one after another in expressing their perplexity regarding the incident, and fell over themselves to invite a horde of South Korean civic groups in August. These recent moves by the North have led some to believe that the North Korean authorities have somehow changed its stance towards the South.

An American source who recently met with North Korean officials in China and a working-level official at a South Korean civic group also said, “North Korean authorities told us that the shooter was a ‘very young’ person.”

The source added, “North Korean authorities told us that the incident equally took them aback. They added that especially at a time when the South Korean authorities are anxious to give them 50,000 tons of corn, those who thought the incident was intentional simply do not know anything about their regime.”

Unification Ministry spokesman Kim Ho-nyun also confirmed the Dong-A Ilbo’s report that North Korea invited a large group of South Korean visitors to Mount Baekdu and Pyongyang.

The Choson Ilbo remains skeptical.

UPDATE 5 – July 17: The North’s story has changed. DPRK rejects South’s inspectors. Seventy percent of officials of the United Front Department who were in charge of foreign affairs with South Korea were expelled from their positions early this year. It seemed to be an initiative step for taming the Lee administration and controlling the South’s policy (Daily NK).

UPDATE 4 – July 15: South Korea ups the ante by threatening to suspend tours of Kaesong unless the DPRK participates in the Kumgang shooting investigation (Bloomberg).

NKeconWatch analysis: Suspending tours to Kumgang is relatively expensive for both North and South. Hyundai and the South Korean government spent a lot of money developing the facilities, and by this time, the North Koreans who were earning from the project have grown accustomed to the cash flow. The tours of Kaesong are different, however. The South invested relatively little capital in the Kaesong tours, so suspending them idles few of their resources but hits the pocketbooks of the North Koreans who sponsor the program. Could the Kaesong Industrial Zone be turned into a bargaining chip?

UPDATE 3 – July 14: South Korea officially casts doubt on North Korea’s portrayal of events leading up to the shooting based on CCTV video and an eyewitness account. (Choson Ilbo)

UPDATE 2: This story in the Korea Times (h/t ROK Drop) seems to indicate that there was a witness to the shooting and that there were no substantial barriers or warnings that vacationers could wander into a restricted military zone.

UPDATE 1: The North Koreans expressed regret for the shooting, but says the responsibility lies entirely with Seoul. They also refuse to cooperate with the South Korean government in an investigation of the incident citing that they have already sorted things out with Hyundai Asan. Although South Korea’s President Lee Myung-Bak ignored the situation in a parliamentary speech he gave shortly after the shooting, the Unification Ministry has now publicly stated that the shooting was “wrong by any measure, unimaginable, and should not have occurred at all.”

ORIGINAL POST:Tourism numbers at the Kumgnag resort were up this year, despite high political tensions.

From the AP:

A North Korean soldier fatally shot a South Korean tourist Friday at a mountain resort in the communist North, prompting the South to suspend the high-profile tour program just as South Korean’s new president sought to rekindle strained ties between the divided countries.

The news of the unprecedented shooting of a 53-year-old woman at Diamond Mountain resort emerged just hours after new President Lee Myung-bak delivered a nationwide address calling for restored contacts between the two Koreas, which have been on hold since he took office in February.

Kim said South Korea would suspend future Diamond Mountain tours until it completes an investigation. The other some 1,200 tourists already at the resort are to complete their tours as scheduled by as late as Sunday, said Hyundai Asan, the South Korean company that operates the resort.

Links to full stories below the fold:

(more…)

Posted in Mt. Kumgang Tourist Special Zone, Tourism, United Front Department | 7 Comments »

The People’s Safety Agency’s Authority Is Strengthened

Tuesday, June 17th, 2008

Daily NK
Moon Sung Hwee
6/17/2008

The Central Committee of the Chosun (North Korea) Workers’ Party recently commanded the People’s Safety Agency (PSA) to increase its authority.

A source from North Korea reported in a telephone interview with Daily NK on the 11th that “According to a document from the Central Committee of the Party, the legal authority of agents of the PSA is being strengthened.”

The source explained that “From now on, agents of the PSA can investigate every criminal offense committed by the military, the National Security Agency, the public prosecutors and cadres of courts. This command from the Party was delivered to the cadres’ lectures over the country on May 10.

The most remarkable part is that in every field except anti-nation or anti-regime crimes the PSA can inspect and search the houses of suspects from the military, the Party, the NSA and the public prosecutor’s office.

Through this, control over the military, which abused its power and was acknowledged as a public enemy by average residents for a decade under the military-first policy, is being systematized.

The document stated clearly that the PSA has the right to detain anyone who disobeys the agents’ onsite inspections in their homes and even to arrest them, according to the source.

One proviso only was added that when the agents undertake a house search of the cadres of the Party, they have to receive prior approval from upper levels within the PSA and they do not have the authority to arrest cadres of the Party on the spot as a suspect.

The source explained that up to this point general crimes committed by soldiers were just dealt with by the military police or the Defense Security Command of the People’s Army. Since the Shimhwajo Case in 1998, the PSA has not examined the cadres of the NSA or prosecutors.

The source relayed that regulations regarding punishment towards agents who intentionally overlook an inspection or who leak information on an inspection are specified in the document.

Since Jang Sung Taek, a brother-in-law of Kim Jong Il, led the Ministry of Administration of the Chosun (North Korea) Workers’ Party, the political authority of the PSA accordingly started being strengthened. The source explained that “In the past, the PSA was not able to intervene in any case without the permission of the prosecutors, but since October 2007 the agents of the PSA were granted the authority to deal with the arrest of criminals and with sending them to court themselves.

The position that Jang Sung Taek took in October 2007 was that the Director of the Ministry of Administration of the Chosun (North Korea) Workers’ Party is responsible for general public security organizations such as the National Security Agency, the People’s Safety Agency, the Central Prosecutor Office and the Special Court.

The source analyzed that “The Party did not push legislation on the expansion of the authority of the PSA, because political conflicts with other governmental organizations would be brought out.”

Some say that the background to the promotion of the PSA stems from Kim Jong Il’s fear that the authority of the NSA and of the military were too big while the Party’s power was extraordinarily weakened.

One other source said that “Although the military or information organizations have attempted many coups in human history, the police force has always sided with the government. Therefore, Kim Jong Il drastically strengthened the authority of the PSA.”

The source added that “Regarding the promotion of the PSA, the cadres of the Party took concrete examples of assassinations such as Nicolae Ceauşescu of Romania and Park Chung Hee of South Korea, emphasizing the Romanian police’s fight against the military in order to protest Ceauşescu.”

“The People’s Safety Agents,” which is a newspaper circulated just in the PSA, and lecture materials for the PSA lately describe the PSA as the “escort warrior for the General” or “the second Escort Bureau,” the source explained, regarding the change of the PSA’s state.

Posted in Cabinet, Central Committee, Korean People's Army, Ministry of Administration, Ministry of People’s Armed Forces, Ministry of People’s Security (Criminal Police), Ministry of State Security (MPSS, NSA, SSD), Political economy | Comments Closed

The end of ‘Songun’? Part II

Saturday, April 5th, 2008

Three weeks ago, the Daily NK specualted that preparations for North Korea’s political succession are leading to an end of “Songun” and a resurgence of the Korean Workers Party. A recent story in the Donga Ilbo seems to be reinforcing this claim, noting that several assets in the military’s portfolio are being moved to various state institutions and ministries (where the Worker’s Party and probably Kim’s key supporters exercise more oversight).

Here is an excerpt from the story:

A knowledgeable source on North Korea said yesterday, “[Leader] Kim Jong Il has ordered the military to transfer its foreign operations to his cabinet and is implementing radical reform of military authorities.”

Kim ordered to reduce the number of executives and the size of the ruling Workers’ Party, government and military by 30 percent at the end of last year.

The source also said officers in the chain of command including the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces, the National Security Council, the Ministry of State Inspection and the General Staff Department began retiring in January.

The North Korean leader is also reportedly streamlining troop distribution. The North’s Border Guard Brigade has removed regiments and the role of the minting agency has shrunk.

The Ministry of People’s Security, considered the North’s main police organization, is seeing its status rise. No longer under the control of the prosecution, the ministry can now probe corruption in the prosecution and civilian damage caused by the military.

An Anti corruption campaign and purges might also be a part of this transition.

Read the whole story here:
N.Korea Changing ‘Military-First’ Policy
Donga Ilbo
3/12/2008

Posted in Cabinet, Korean People's Army, Ministry of People’s Armed Forces, Ministry of People’s Security (Criminal Police), Ministry of State Inspection, Ministry of State Security (MPSS, NSA, SSD), Worker's Party | 1 Comment »

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