Archive for the ‘Central Committee’ Category

Power Restructuring in North Korea

Tuesday, October 5th, 2010

Ruediger Frank writes in 38 North:

“Finally,” one is tempted to say. The years of speculation and half-baked news from dubious sources are over. The leadership issue in North Korea has been officially resolved. Or has it?

The third delegate’s meeting[1] of the Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK) on September 28, 2010 answered a few questions. Still, it left some unanswered and posed quite a few new ones as well. In the end, Kim Jong Il emerged the undisputed leader. But has his legitimacy become more independent of his father than it used to be? Kim Jong Un has been introduced to the people. Does this mean he is going to succeed Kim Jong Il? Or will he succeed Kim Il Sung? Kim Jong Il’s sister Kim Kyong Hui has been promoted to the rank of general and is part of the party leadership. Is she supposed to support her nephew, or is this part of a strategy to more broadly enhance the family’s power? Her husband Jang Song Thaek is also on board. Will he share the caretaking job with his wife? Are there any other members of the extended Kim family on the team?

The Hard Facts

(1) On Monday, September 27, 2010, Kim Jong Un was mentioned for the first time in official North Korean media when he was promoted to the rank of general. Now, at last, we know for sure how to write his name (we use the official North Korean version for English; it would be Kim Jong-ùn according to McCune/Reischauer).

(2) On the same day, Kim Jong Il’s sister was promoted to the same military rank as her nephew.

(3) On September 28, 2010, one day later, the first delegate’s meeting of the WPK in 44 years and the biggest gathering since the last (Sixth) Party congress in 1980 opened after a mysterious delay. It had originally been announced for “early September.”

(4) Contrary to western media speculation, Kim Jong Il did not step down nor did he hand over any of his powers to his son. Rather, he was confirmed as the current leader of the party, the military, and the country.

(5) From 1945 until 1980, the WPK held six Party Congresses and two conferences or delegate’s meetings. This means that on average, the WPK had one major Party event every 4.4 years. However, over the next 30 years, it had none. The 21st and so far last plenum of the WPK was held in December 1993. Now, the defunct leadership structure of the WPK has been restored and the delegates elected 124 members of the Central Committee (CC) and 105 alternates. From among the members, 17 were named to the Politburo (PB) of the CC, and 15 as alternates.

(6) The Politburo is headed by a Presidium or Standing Committee of five people, with Kim Jong Il at the top as the general secretary of the WPK.[2] It also consists of Kim Yong Nam (82 years old),[3] Choe Yong Rim (80 years old),[4] Jo Myong Rok (82 years old)[5] and Ri Yong Ho (68 years old).[6] The latter was promoted the day before the delegate’s meeting to the post of vice marshal. He ranks above Kim Jong Un and his aunt and is rumored to be a member of the Kim family, which if true, implies a particularly strong base for loyalty. Given the advanced age of most of its members, if the Presidium is not newly elected in a few years, who will remain? This makes Mr. Ri particularly interesting.

(7) All three known close relatives of Kim Jong Il received posts in the WPK. Kim Jong Un became vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (see below). His aunt Kim Kyong Hui became a member of the Politburo and her husband Jang Song Thaek was made an alternate. The names of regular and alternate members were not provided in alphabetical order, indicating a certain hierarchy. Kim Kyong Hui’s name was listed last out of 17 and Jang was 5th out of 15. A day later, he was 14th (out of 15) on a list of short bios of regular and alternate Politburo members. Kim Kyong Hui was the only member in addition to Kim Jong Il for whom no details were provided.

(8) Except for the Central Committee, there is not a single leadership organ where all three close relatives of Kim Jong Il hold a post. Kim Jong Un is excluded from the Politburo altogether; Kim Kyong Hui is not on the Central Military Commission; and Jang Song Thaek is only an alternate Politburo member. We could speculate that Kim Jong Il wants to prevent having too high a concentration of power in the hands of one of his relatives. He has made sure that the most crucial instruments of power are staffed with the most loyal of his followers who will be ready to walk the extra mile and fulfill his strategic decisions with all the energy of a family member and co-owner.

(9) As was expected, Kim Jong Un has not (yet) become a member or an alternate member of the Politburo, the second-highest leading organ of the party, but did receive a high-ranking post in the WPK’s Central Military Commission. As far as we know, this is essentially the organization through which the Party controls the military, and hence the most powerful of the WPK’s organs. It is no coincidence that this commission is chaired by Kim Jong Il himself. His son comes next in the hierarchy—he is the first of the commission’s two vice-chairmen. Jang Song Thaek is a member, too, but the one with the lowest rank, so it seems. His name was listed last out of 19. Kim Kyong Hui is not a member of the Central Military Commission.

(10) On September 29, 2010, an unusually long and detailed KCNA article was published with profiles of all Politburo members. In addition, a large group picture was published that showed the delegates and the complete Central Committee, including Kim Jong Un. The photo rather openly revealed the true hierarchy within the Party leadership; only 19 people were sitting in the front row, the others were standing. Kim Jong Un sat just one space away from his father, while Kim Kyong Hui sat five spaces away from the center. In a KCNA report on the taking of this picture, Kim Jong Un’s name came fourth after the Politburo Presidium members Kim Yong Nam, Choe Yong Rim and Ri Yong Ho. Kim Kyong Hui was number 18, and Jang Song Thaek was number 23 on that exclusive list of 33 leaders.

(11) A total of 14 department directors of the Central Committee were appointed, among them Jang Song Thaek and Kim Kyong Hui. However, contrary to predictions by many analysts, Kim Jong Un does not seem to have been appointed director of the Organization and Guidance Department (OGD), a post his father held before he was announced as Kim Il Sung’s successor.[7] This could be due to a number of reasons. Either, Kim Jong Un already effectively held that post—we may not know since the last time such positions were given officially was 1980—or the division of labor (and power) within the party has changed, for example in the context of the Military First Policy. In that case, the OGD post may simply not be as important as it used to be. This would imply that the Central Military Commission now makes all the important appointments, and the OGD is merely an administrative unit like any human resources department.

(12) The North Korean media published a message from China’s leader Hu Jintao only a day after the delegate’s meeting. He stressed the deep and traditional friendship, close geographical relationship, and wide-ranging common interests of the two countries. Hu pledged to defend and promote the bilateral relationship, always holding fast to it in a strategic view under the long-term discernment no matter how the international situation may change (KCNA, 29.09.2010). This was a message to the North Korean people and the international community: China is going to support the new North Korean leadership (model).

What Have We Learned?

The Party meeting provided final proof of what has often been doubted since Kim Jong Il took over as leader of North Korea after 1994. All the other things one might say about him notwithstanding, Kim Il Sung undisputedly was an able politician. He did not choose his eldest son Kim Jong Il as his successor by chance. Despite his health problems, Kim Jong Il is (still) able to play the power game. He paved the way for a new leadership without turning himself into a lame duck. He did so by not leaving any important posts to somebody else—although, at the same time, he did not monopolize those positions. He distributed power among a core group of family members and his father’s loyalists, while also ensuring that none of them can be certain to be significantly higher-ranking than any of their colleagues. As in juche, where in the end everything depends on the judgment of the leader, power in North Korea remains Kim’s sole domain. At the same time, he has done what any good CEO does: delegate authority to avoid energy-consuming micro-management of each and every aspect of his job.

The most important decision regarding human resources has been the introduction of Kim Jong Un as a member of the top leadership of the Party and of the military. He will now have to quickly develop a record (at least on paper) of spectacular achievements, so that he can be quickly presented to the people as the most logical and capable candidate for the next leadership post. Since Kim Jong Un was appointed with a clear reference to the military, Kim Jong Il appears to be following the same strategy his father did after 1980. At that time, North Korea analysts noticed that the late O Jin U, the top military official, was always standing close to Kim Jong Il. It would now be logical to expect that like his father before him, Kim Jong Un will be responsible for the promotion of top military officers, thereby ensuring their loyalty.

In terms of strategic decisions, its seems that the succession from Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un will be different from the last changing of the guard in 1994. As early as 2008, it seemed likely that the role of the Party would be strengthened substantially. The restoration of the WPK’s formal power organs and the many biographical details that were provided on the top leadership circle, including the group photo, indicate that the new leader will not be as autocratic as his predecessors. The new leadership will have more faces; we could observe something similar a few months ago in the case of the National Defense Commission. This is the reflection of a trend, not a spontaneous event.

What seems most notable is the renewed emphasis on Kim Il Sung as the sole source of legitimacy in North Korea. Kim Jong Il is not going to replace him, which would have been a precondition for the perpetuation of the current system of leadership. Therefore, in a sense, Kim Jong Un and all those who come after him will be, like Kim Jong Il, successors of Kim Il Sung.

Concerning the process of power transfer, as expected, a multi-stage approach is unfolding. At least one more stage will be needed. Chances are good that this will take place at the Seventh Party Congress, whose date is as of yet unannounced. 2012 would be a good time considering the health of Kim Jong Il and that year’s auspicious meaning—the 100th anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s birthday. As stated above, Kim Il Sung was a capable politician. He was clearly aware of the fact that sooner or later, his son would face the succession issue. It would be a great surprise if he hadn’t talked about this with him and jointly developed a rough plan as to how create a sustainable model of power succession. The two problems Kim Il Sung could not consider, simply for technical reasons, were who exactly would show the necessary capabilities to become the next successor, and how much time Kim Jong Il would have to oversee and guide that process.

The year 2008 indeed marked a watershed when, because of his illness, Kim Jong Il realized the need for a quick solution. The last thing an autocrat wants is to create the impression of being forced to act, and of time running out. So he used the already fixed year 2012 not only as the year of the celebration of his father’s 100th birthday, but also as the year when great changes will happen and the gate to becoming a Strong and Prosperous Great Country will be opened. From this perspective, I would argue that Kim Jong Il is indeed fighting a “speed battle,” but in the form of compressing a process that was planned long ago and supposed to last longer, rather than creating such a process from scratch and hastily.

The China Factor

The message of support from Hu Jintao along with the two visits of Kim Jong Il to China before the delegate’s meeting immediately lead to the question: What type of North Korea will China support? Clearly, the last thing China wants is for North Korea to collapse. Such a situation would create a serious dilemma for Beijing. It could either do nothing and watch the U.S. sphere of influence expand right to its border, or it could actively interfere. This would instantly shatter all Chinese efforts to display itself to the carefully watching countries in the region as a peaceful giant that is a real alternative to protection by the United States. In the end, this is what North Korea is all about—competition between Beijing and Washington. Pyongyang knows this.

A third path may be open to China. The North has realized that the economic reforms of 2002, which focused on agriculture and hence closely resembled the Chinese example of 1979, were in principle a good idea, but that conditions were so unlike those in China that the results inevitably differed. In principle, the understanding that economic reform is necessary remains but reservations against the political side effects of such reforms have grown substantially due to the chaos that emerged in the aftermath of the 2002 measures. Given North Korea’s structure as an industrialized economy, reforms need to take place in industry.

There is a well-established blueprint for this; we call it the East Asian model. In short, it consists of a strong state that controls a few big players in the economy—zaibatsu or keiretsu in Japan, chaebol in Korea, and the state owned companies in China. A core requirement for this model to succeed is a huge source of finance, coupled with a strong political partner that, for a while, is willing to turn a blind eye on protectionism. The United States played that role partly for Japan, and very strongly for South Korea. China is now willing to do this service for North Korea under certain political conditions.

Many signs point in the direction of North Korea “returning” to the path of orthodox socialism, or at least to its East Asian version. “Rule by the Party”—a collective with a first among equals at the top—is not only a key component of any socialist textbook case, it is also characteristic of the Chinese model since 1978. After two leaders of the Mao Zedong type, North Korea may now be getting ready for one similar to the position that the current Chinese President, Hu Jintao, occupies in China—that is, a strong leader who rules as the head of a collective. With some luck, Kim Jong Un might even turn out to be a Deng Xiaoping—a man who has the power and vision to use this post to initiate and execute crucial reforms.

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Worker’s Party conference wrap-up

Thursday, September 30th, 2010

1. Below are some photos of the conference posted on Daylife.com including the first official pictures of Kim Jong-un:

2. As mentioned in the previous post, Kim Jong-il’s sister and son were named to the KPA and various KWP offices.

3. Hu Jintao endorses the conference outcome.  According to KCNA:

I, on behalf of the CPC Central Committee and on my own behalf, extend warm congratulations to you on the successful WPK Conference, your reelection as general secretary of the WPK and the election of its supreme leadership body.

The WPK headed by General Secretary Kim Jong Il has achieved great successes in the cause of building Korean-style socialism through self-reliance and strenuous efforts by leading all the Korean people for many years.

In recent years the Korean people have made a series of admirable achievements in economic development, improvement of the people’s standard of living and other fields to build a great prosperous and powerful nation.

China and the DPRK maintain deep and traditional friendship and close geographical relationship with wide-ranging common interests.

It is the steadfast policy of the Chinese party and government to consolidate and develop the Sino-DPRK friendly and cooperative relations.

We defend and promote the bilateral relationship, always holding fast to it in a strategic view under the long-term discernment no matter how the international situation may change.

We will strive together with the DPRK side to steadily put the bilateral relations on a new stage and provide greater happiness to the peoples of the two countries and make greater contribution to achieving lasting peace and common prosperity of the region.

I heartily wish you and the WPK continued and greater fresh successes in the work to build a thriving nation by leading the Korean people.

Hu Jintao repeated support a couple of days later.  According to the  AFP:

Chinese President Hu Jintao on Saturday pledged to strengthen ties with the new leadership in North Korea, during a visit to Beijing by a senior delegation from Pyongyang, state media reported.

Hu’s comments come after ailing North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il this week offered senior posts in the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) to his son Jong-Un and promoted him to the rank of general — signs that he is the heir apparent.

China is North Korea’s sole major ally and provides an economic lifeline to impoverished Pyongyang.

“We believe that the WPK, the DPRK government and people will see new achievements in their national construction under the new WPK leadership,” Hu said, according to China’s official Xinhua news agency.

Hu, who has welcomed Kim to China twice this year, said the Communist party would work with the WPK’s new leaders to “promote and expand cooperation” and “strengthen communication” on regional and international issues, Xinhua said.

The leader of the North Korean delegation, party politburo member Choe Thae Bok, said Kim’s decision to dispatch a high-level group of envoys so soon after the WPK conference “shows the importance the DPRK attaches to the consensus reached by leaders of the two countries,” the report added.

4. KCNA recounts the conference outcomes:

WPK Conference Held
Pyongyang, September 28 (KCNA) — The Conference of the Workers’ Party of Korea was held with success in Pyongyang on Sept. 28.

Kim Jong Il, general secretary of the WPK and chairman of the National Defence Commission of the DPRK, was present at the Conference.

Present there were delegates elected at the meeting of WPK delegates of the Korean People’s Army and provincial and political bureaus’ meetings of delegates of the WPK.

Officials of the party, armed forces and power organs, working people’s organizations, ministries and national institutions, servicepersons and officials in the fields of science, education, public health, culture and arts and media attended the Conference as observers.

All the participants observed a moment’s silence in memory of President Kim Il Sung who successfully accomplished the cause of founding the Juche-type revolutionary party for the first time in history and developed the WPK into a powerful ever-victorious staff of the revolution.

Kim Yong Nam made an opening address.

Choe Yong Rim worked as chairman at the Conference upon authorization by the consultative meeting of provincial delegates.

The Conference elected its Presidium.

The Presidium included Kim Jong Il and Kim Yong Nam, Choe Yong Rim, Kim Yong Chun, Jang Song Thaek, Ri Yong Ho, Kim Jong Gak, Jon Pyong Ho, Choe Thae Bok, Yang Hyong Sop, Hong Sok Hyong, Kim Kuk Thae, Kim Ki Nam, Paek Se Bong, U Tong Chuk and Ju Kyu Chang.

The Conference decided on the following agenda items.

1. On the reelection of the great leader Comrade Kim Jong Il as general secretary of the WPK
2. On the revision of the WPK rules
3. Election of the central leadership body of the WPK

The Conference discussed the first agenda item.

Kim Yong Nam delivered a speech proposing Kim Jong Il’s reelection as general secretary of the WPK.

He said in his speech that Kim Jong Il has devoted his all to the prosperity of the country and the nation and the victory of the revolutionary cause of Juche only for decades since he embarked upon the road of the revolution.

The half a century-long history of Kim Jong Il’s revolutionary activities was a history of heroic struggles in which he blazed the path with his ceaseless thinking and pursuit and extraordinary energy and a history of victories in which he made gigantic creation and innovations with his iron will and pluck, the speaker said, and continued:

The recent meeting of WPK delegates of the KPA and meetings of provincial and political bureaus elected Kim Jong Il as a delegate of the WPK Conference reflecting the unanimous will of the army and people of the DPRK to invariably hold Kim Jong Il in high esteem as general secretary of the WPK.

Having Kim Jong Il at the top post of the WPK, organizer and guide of all victories of the Korean people, is the greatest happiness and highest honor of all the party members, servicepersons and people.

Kim Yong Nam courteously proposed to the Conference the reelection of Kim Jong Il as general secretary of the WPK reflecting the unanimous will and wishes of all the party members, servicepersons and people of the country.

Then followed speeches by Chief of the KPA General Staff Ri Yong Ho who is a delegate of the KPA party organization, First Secretary of the C.C., the Kim Il Sung Socialist Youth League Ri Yong Chol who is a delegate of the Pyongyang City party organization, Chairman of the C.C., the General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea Hyon Sang Ju who is a delegate of the Jagang Provincial party organization, Chairman of the C.C., the Union of Agricultural Workers of Korea Ri Myong Gil who is a delegate of the North Phyongan Provincial party organization and President of Kim Il Sung University and concurrently Minister of Higher Education Song Ja Rip who is a delegate of the Pyongyang City party organization.

The speakers fully supported and approved in unison the proposal of the Conference on reelecting Kim Jong Il as general secretary of the WPK.

A resolution of the WPK Conference on reelecting Kim Jong Il as general secretary of the WPK was read out there.

The Conference discussed the second agenda item.

A resolution on the revision of the WPK rules was adopted.

The Conference discussed the third agenda item.

The Conference declared that Kim Il Sung, founder of the WPK and outstanding leader who led the party and the revolution to victories only, would be always held in esteem at the supreme leadership organ of the WPK reflecting the unanimous will and wishes of all the party members, servicepersons and people.

It also declared that Kim Jong Il, general secretary of the WPK, was reelected as member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the C.C., the WPK, member of the Political Bureau of the C.C., the WPK, member of the C.C., the WPK and chairman of the Central Military Commission of the WPK according to the WPK rules and the detailed regulations for the election of the supreme leadership body of the WPK.

The Conference elected the central leadership body of the WPK.

Then followed the election of members and alternate members of the C.C., the WPK.

Candidates for the members and alternate members of the C.C., the WPK were elected as members and alternate members of the C.C., the WPK.

The members of the Central Auditing Commission of the WPK were elected.

Candidates for the members of the Central Auditing Commission of the WPK were elected as members of the commission.

The Conference notified its participants of the decisions of the September 2010 Plenary Meeting of the C.C., the WPK.

The results of the election of the Presidium of the Political Bureau and the Political Bureau of the C.C., the WPK and the secretaries of the C.C., the WPK and organization of the Secretariat were made public there.

The results of organization of the Central Military Commission of the WPK were released.

The appointment of the department directors of the C.C., the WPK and the editor-in-chief of Rodong Sinmun, an organ of the C.C., the WPK, and the results of election of the Control Commission of the C.C., the WPK were made public.

The Conference notified its participants of the decisions made at the First Plenary Meeting of the Central Auditing Commission of the WPK.

Kim Yong Nam made a closing speech.

The Conference marked a significant occasion that demonstrated the revolutionary faith and will of all the party members, servicepersons and people to glorify the WPK as the glorious party of Kim Il Sung for all ages and accomplish the Songun revolutionary cause of Juche started on Mt. Paektu by invariably having Kim Jong Il, peerless political elder and illustrious Songun commander, at the top post of the party and the revolution.

5. According to  KCNA the WPK rules were changed, but I am unsure how.

6. Official Report on Plenum of WPK Central Committee:

The meeting discussed the following agenda items:

1. Election of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee

2. Election of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee

3. Election of Secretaries of the WPK Central Committee and on Organization of the Secretariat

4. On Organization of the WPK Central Military Commission

5. On Appointment of Department Directors of the WPK Central Committee and the Editor-in-Chief of Rodong Sinmun, an Organ of the WPK Central Committee

6. Election of the Control Commission of the WPK Central Committee

The meeting elected the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee and the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee.

It elected secretaries of the WPK Central Committee and organized the Secretariat.

It organized the WPK Central Military Commission.

It appointed department directors of the WPK Central Committee and the editor-in-chief of Rodong Sinmun, an organ of the WPK Central Committee.

It elected chairman, vice-chairmen and members of the Control Commission of the WPK Central Committee.

7. According to KCNA: The Presidium of the Political Bureau of the Workers’ Party of Korea Central Committee is made up of Kim Jong Il, Kim Yong Nam, Choe Yong Rim, Jo Myong Rok and Ri Yong Ho.

8. According to KCNAMembers of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea are Kim Jong Il, Kim Yong Nam, Choe Yong Rim, Jo Myong Rok, Ri Yong Ho, Kim Yong Chun, Jon Pyong Ho, Kim Kuk Thae, Kim Ki Nam, Choe Thae Bok, Yang Hyong Sop, Kang Sok Ju, Pyon Yong Rip, Ri Yong Mu, Ju Sang Song, Hong Sok Hyong and Kim Kyong Hui. Alternate members of the Political Bureau are Kim Yang Gon, Kim Yong Il, Pak To Chun, Choe Ryong Hae, Jang Song Thaek, Ju Kyu Chang, Ri Thae Nam, Kim Rak Hui, Thae Jong Su, Kim Phyong Hae, U Tong Chuk, Kim Jong Gak, Pak Jong Sun, Kim Chang Sop and Mun Kyong Dok.

9. According to KCNA: The Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea is as follows: Kim Jong Il, general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea. Secretaries of the C.C., WPK Kim Ki Nam, Choe Thae Bok, Choe Ryong Hae, Mun Kyong Dok, Pak To Chun, Kim Yong Il, Kim Yang Gon, Kim Phyong Hae, Thae Jong Su and Hong Sok Hyong

10. According to KCNA: The Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea is as follows: Chairman Kim Jong Il, Vice-Chairmen Kim Jong Un and Ri Yong Ho and Members Kim Yong Chun, Kim Jong Gak, Kim Myong Guk, Kim Kyong Ok, Kim Won Hong, Jong Myong Do, Ri Pyong Chol, Choe Pu Il, Kim Yong Chol, Yun Jong Rin, Ju Kyu Chang, Choe Sang Ryo, Choe Kyong Song, U Tong Chuk, Choe Ryong Hae and Jang Song Thaek.

11. According to KCNA: Department directors of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea:  Kim Ki Nam, Jang Song Thaek, Kim Yong Il, Kim Phyong Hae, Ri Yong Su, Ju Kyu Chang, Hong Sok Hyong, Kim Kyong Hui, Choe Hui Jong, O Il Jong, Kim Yang Gon, Kim Jong Im, Chae Hui Jong and Thae Jong Su.  Kim Ki Ryong was nominated to be editor-in-chief of Rodong Sinmun, an organ of the WPK Central Committee.

12. According to KCNAMembers and Alternate Members of WPK Central Committee:The following are members of the WPK Central Committee: Kim Jong Il, Kang Nung Su, Kang Tong Yun, Kang Sok Ju, Kang Phyo Yong, Kang Yang Mo, Ko Pyong Hyon, Kim Kuk Thae, Kim Kyong Hui, Kim Kyong Ok, Kim Ki Nam, Kim Ki Ryong, Kim Rak Hui, Kim Myong Guk, Kim Pyong Ryul, Kim Pyong Ho, Kim Song Dok, Kim Song Chol, Kim Jong Gak, Kim Jong Suk, Kim Jong Un, Kim Jong Im, Kim Chang Sop, Kim Chol Man, Kim Chun Sam, Kim Thae Bong, Kim Phyong Hae, Kim Hyong Ryong, Kim Hyong Sik, Kim Hi Thaek, Kim Yang Gon, Kim Yong Nam, Kim Yong Chun, Kim Yong Il, Kim Yong Chol, Kim Yong Jin, Kim In Sik, Kim Won Hong, Kwak Pom Gi, Ryang Man Gil, Ryo Chun Sok, Ro Tu Chol, Ro Pae Gwon, Ryu Yong Sop, Ri Ryong Nam, Ri Man Gon, Ri Myong Su, Ri Mu Yong, Ri Pyong Sam, Ri Pyong Chol, Ri Pong Dok, Ri Pong Juk, Ri Thae Nam, Ri Hyong Gun, Ri Hi Hon, Ri Yong Gil, Ri Yong Su, Ri Yong Ho, Ri Yong Mu, Ri Yong Hwan, Ri Yong Chol, Ri Ul Sol, Rim Kyong Man, Mun Kyong Dok, Pak Kwang Chol, Pak To Chun, Pak Myong Chol, Pak Su Gil, Pak Sung Won, Pak Jong Sun, Pak Jong Gun, Pak Jae Gyong, Pak Thae Dok, Pak Ui Chun, Pyon Yong Rip, Pyon In Son, Paek Se Bong, Song Ja Rip, Jang Pyong Gyu, Jang Song Thaek, Jang Chol, Jon Kil Su, Jon Ryong Guk, Jon Pyong Ho, Jon Jin Su, Jon Chang Bok, Jon Ha Chol, Jon Hui Jong, Jong Myong Do, Jong Ho Gyun, Jong In Guk, Jo Kyong Chol, Jo Myong Rok, Jo Pyong Ju, Ju Kyu Chang, Ju Sang Song, Ju Yong Sik, Cha Sung Su, Chae Hui Jong, Choe Kyong Song, Choe Ryong Hae, Choe Pu Il, Choe Sang Ryo, Choe Thae Bok, Choe Hui Jong, Choe Yong Dok, Choe Yong Rim, Thae Jong Su, Han Kwang Bok, Han Tong Gun, Hyon Chol Hae, Hyon Yong Chol, Hong Sok Hyong, Hong In Bom, An Jong Su, Yang Tong Hun, Yang Hyong Sop, O Kuk Ryol, O Kum Chol, O Su Yong, O Il Jong, U Tong Chuk, Yun Tong Hyon and Yun Jong RinThe alternate members are: Kang Ki Sop, Kang Kwan Ju, Kang Kwan Il, Kang Min Chol, Kang Hyong Bong, Ko Su Il, Kim Kyok Sik, Kim Kye Gwan, Kim Tong Un, Kim Tong Il, Kim Tong I, Kim Tong Il, Kim Myong Sik, Kim Pyong Hun, Kim Pong Ryong, Kim Chang Myong, Kim Chon Ho, Kim Chung Gol, Kim Thae Mun, Kim Hui Yong, Kim Yong Suk, Kim Yong Jae, Kim Yong Ho, Kim Yong Gwang, Kim U Ho, Kwon Hyok Bong, No Kwang Chol, Tong Jong Ho, Tong Yong Il, Ryom In Yun, Ro Kyong Jun, Ro Song Sil, Ryu Kyong, Ri Kuk Jun, Ri Ki Su, Ri Myong Gil, Ri Min Chol, Ri Sang Gun, Ri Song Gwon, Ri Su Yong, Ri Jong Sik, Ri Jae Il, Ri Je Son, Ri Chan Hwa, Ri Chang Han, Ri Chol, Ri Chun Il, Ri Thae Sop, Ri Thae Chol, Ri Hong Sop, Ri Hi Su, Ri Yong Ju, Ri Yong Ho, Ri Il Nam, Pak Ri Sun, Pak Pong Ju, Pak Chang Bom, Paek Kye Ryong, Paek Ryong Chon, So Tong Myong, Son Chong Nam, Song Kwang Chol, Sin Sung Hun, Jang Myong Hak, Jang Yong Gol, Jang Ho Chan, Jon Kyong Son, Jon Kwang Rok, Jon Song Ung, Jon Chang Rim, Jong Myong Hak, Jong Pong Phil, Jong Pong Gun, Jong Un Hak, Jo Song Hwan, Jo Jae Yong, Jo Yong Chol, Ji Jae Ryong, Cha Kyong Il, Cha Jin Sun, Cha Yong Myong, Choe Ki Ryong, Choe Kwan Jun, Choe Tae Il, Choe Pong Ho, Choe Chan Gon, Choe Chun Sik, Choe Hyon, Choe Yong Do, Choe Yong, Thae Hyong Chol, Han Chang Nam, Han Chang Sun, Han Hung Phyo, Ho Song Gil, Hyon Sang Ju, Hong Kwang Sun, Hong So Hon, Hong Sung Mu, Hwang Pyong So, Hwang Sun Hui, Hwang Hak Won, An Tong Chun, Yang In Guk and O Chol San.

13. According to KCNA: The plenum elected chairman, vice-chairmen and members of the Control Commission of the WPK Central Committee. Kim Kuk Thae was elected chairman, Jong Myong Hak first vice-chairman, Ri Tuk Nam vice-chairman and Cha Kwan Sok, Pak Tok Man, Cha Sun Gil and Kim Yong Son members of the commission.

14. According to KCNA: The First Plenary Meeting of the Central Auditing Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea was held here on Sept. 28.  Present there were Kim Chang Su, Pak Myong Sun, Choe Pae Jin, Kim Chol, Sim Chol Ho, O Ryong Il, Kye Yong Sam, Ryu Hyon Sik, Ko Myong Hui, Pang Yong Uk, Jang Jong Ju, Ho Kwang Uk, Ji Tong Sik, Jong Pong Sok and Choe Kwon Su, members of the commission elected at the Conference of the WPK. The meeting elected chairman and vice-chairperson of the commission. Kim Chang Su was elected chairman and Pak Myong Sun vice-chairperson.

15. The Daily NK offers a summary of the conference.

16. Mike has a summary at NK Leadership Watch.

17. The Choson Ilbo reports that the conference was scaled down:

The extraordinary congress of the North Korean Workers Party which convened Tuesday was apparently held at a smaller venue than previously expected. The Mansudae Assembly Hall (The Supreme People’s Assembly building), where it took place, seats 1,000, whereas previous guesses had put it at the 6,000-seater April 25 Cultural Hall or the People’s Cultural Palace, which has 2,000 seats.

That suggests only 500 to 700 delegates attended the congress since a half of the seats at a party congress are normally filled with audience members. In comparison, some 1, 323 delegates attended the second party congress in October 1966.

A high-ranking North Korean defector who saw photos of the latest party congress said it is clear that the event was considerably scaled down, in sharp contrast to the past event that had been held in a festive mood involving some 6,000 people.

A senior source in North Korea also put the number of delegates at about 500, saying even some very senior officials had not been selected as delegates.

The North seems to have downscaled the event due to anxiety over the leadership succession and a volatile mood in the country including signs of public unrest as food rations in Pyongyang were suspended, the source added.

Many people who were unable to fit into the main conference hall reportedly watched the congress on video screens installed at the April 25 Cultural Hall and the People’s Cultural Palace.

18. Previous posts on the conference can be found here in chronological order: here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here,  here.

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Kim Jong-un named to KPA and KWP-CC, and Central Military Commission

Monday, September 27th, 2010

UPDATE 4: Photos of the aspiring leader have been made public. Daylife.com has all of them here.

UPDATE 3: Just for fun…there appears to be at least one other “Kim Jong-un” in North Korea.  It will be interesting to see if he has to change his name (if he is still alive)!  Here is a KCNA story from April 23, 1997:

Press review
Pyongyang, April 23 (KCNA) — Papers here today frontpage reports that Secretary Kim Jong Il sent thanks and gifts to workteam members of the no. 7 excavator operating in Kumsan pit in Ryongyang mine for their collective innovation and thanks to servicemen and their families for setting examples in army-people relations. Reported in the press is the news that a monument to on-site guidance of Secretary Kim Jong Il, Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army, was erected at the unit that defends Cho Islet, a forward military post on the West Sea of Korea. Rodong Sinmun carries a letter sent to Secretary Kim Jong Il by participants in the meeting of senior officials of progressive parties of different countries held in Moscow to mark the 85th birth anniversary of President Kim Il Sung as well as a statement adopted at the meeting. Minju Joson comes out with an article headlined “Our General always stands on Height 1211”. Conspicuous in Rodong Sinmun is an article titled “devotedly defending headquarters of revolution is foremost mission of people’s army”. The paper gives nearly one whole page to the lyric epic “Supreme Commander and his vanguard soldiers” which is dedicated to heroic soldiers. The Swedish Government decided to take a humanitarian measure for Korea, the press reports. Rodong Sinmun runs an article “Korean-style socialism is the best”, written by Kim Jong Un, who came over to the northern half of Korea while serving in the south Korean puppet army. Papers comment on the disclosure of Kim Young Sam’s bid to conceal the truth as regards the “investigation” into the Hanbo incident. An article of Rodong Sinmun says that the south Korea-stationed U.S. forces’ possession of depleted uranium bullets proves that their moves for war reached an extremely grave phase. Seen in Minju Joson is an article on the triangular military tieup of the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries and the south Korean puppets.

UPDATE 2: Kim Jong-un was also named to the Central Committee of the Korean Worker’s Party.  According to KCNA:

Members and Alternate Members of WPK Central Committee
Pyongyang, September 28 (KCNA) — The following are members of the WPK Central Committee: Kim Jong Il, Kang Nung Su, Kang Tong Yun, Kang Sok Ju, Kang Phyo Yong, Kang Yang Mo, Ko Pyong Hyon, Kim Kuk Thae, Kim Kyong Hui, Kim Kyong Ok, Kim Ki Nam, Kim Ki Ryong, Kim Rak Hui, Kim Myong Guk, Kim Pyong Ryul, Kim Pyong Ho, Kim Song Dok, Kim Song Chol, Kim Jong Gak, Kim Jong Suk, Kim Jong Un, …

Mike has a good summary here.

UPDATE 1: Kim Jong-un has been named to the KWP Central Military Comission.  Kim Kyong-hui has joined th  According to Bloomberg:

Kim Jong Un was elected one of two Central Military Commission vice chairmen at a Worker’s Party of Korea meeting yesterday, a day after he was made a four-star general, the official Korean Central News Agency said. He also joined the party’s Central Committee, though not the more elite Politburo, at a meeting yesterday. His father’s sister, Kim Kyong Hui, was given several high-ranking posts, including politburo membership, KCNA reported.

The Kim family’s tightening grip on the military and party hierarchy underscores the challenge of transferring power to a son who had never before been mentioned in a KCNA dispatch. Kim Jong Un faces an increasingly disgruntled public in an economy squeezed by United Nations sanctions targeted at its weapons programs and a bungled currency revaluation.

“Even Kim Jong Il must be wary of public criticism should his son fail to improve economic conditions,” Paik Hak Soon, director of inter-Korean relations at the Seongnam, South Korea- based Sejong Institute, said before the commission appointment. “Domestic political stability will be Kim Jong Un’s key focus.”

Kim Jong Il, 68, was re-elected as party chief, general secretary and chairman of the military commission, KCNA said.

China’s President Hu Jintao congratulated Kim Jong Il on his re-election, pledging to strengthen ties with his country’s communist neighbor “to a higher level,” the state-run Xinhua News Agency reported today, without mentioning the son. Kim Jong Il made an unprecedented two trips to China this year, prompting speculation he was seeking endorsement of the power transfer from his nation’s main political and economic ally.

Here is the original KCNA story:

Central Military Commission Organized
Pyongyang, September 28 (KCNA) — The Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea is as follows:

Chairman Kim Jong Il, Vice-Chairmen Kim Jong Un and Ri Yong Ho and Members Kim Yong Chun, Kim Jong Gak, Kim Myong Guk, Kim Kyong Ok, Kim Won Hong, Jong Myong Do, Ri Pyong Chol, Choe Pu Il, Kim Yong Chol, Yun Jong Rin, Ju Kyu Chang, Choe Sang Ryo, Choe Kyong Song, U Tong Chuk, Choe Ryong Hae and Jang Song Thaek.

ORIGINAL POST: Kim Jong-un and Kim Kyong Hui named 4-star generals in KPA.  According to Yonhap:

North Korean leader Kim Jong-il has made his third son a military general in the clearest signal yet that Kim Jong-un is on track to becoming the next leader of the nuclear-armed communist state.

The promotion was announced early Tuesday through the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), just hours before North Korea was to hold its biggest political convention in three decades.

At the conference drawing top Workers’ Party delegates from across the nation, Kim Jong-un, whose name has never been mentioned in public and believed to be no older than 28, could be given other political posts, including one with the Politburo.

The KCNA report said Kim Kyoung-hui, the 64-year-old sister of Kim Jong-il, has also been promoted to a four-star general along with Choe Ryong-hae, a long-time aide to the Kim dynasty.

Kim Kyoung-hui, who oversees the country’s light industries, has recently emerged as a possible caretaker for a hereditary power transfer because Kim Jong-un lacks experience and support.

Her name was mentioned before Kim Jong-un’s in the KCNA dispatch.

Kim Jong-il, 68, is widely believed to have suffered a stroke in the summer of 2008 and since tried to make his third son his successor in what could be the communist world’s first back-to-back father-to-son power transfer. Kim took over the regime when his father and North Korean founder Kim Il-sung died in 1994.

Kim Jong-il officially became successor to his father in a Workers’ Party gathering in 1980. In a directive numbered 0051, Kim named a total of 39 generals on Monday, the KCNA said. Six of them, including Kim Jong-un and Kim Kyoung-hui, were four-star generals.

“The appointment clears the way for Kim Jong-un to forge deeper ties with power elites,” a South Korean Unification Ministry official said on the condition of anonymity.

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell said in a briefing in New York that his country is “watching developments in North Korea carefully.”

“North Korea has now made it official,” Yang Moo-jin, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul, said. “It is certain that Kim Jong-un will be named to a high-level Workers’ Party post in the upcoming convention.”

The KCNA said Kim Jong-il “firmly believes that the commanding members of the People’s Army will continue to support the leadership of the party and complete the revolutionary exploit that was first begun in Mt. Paekdu,” which symbolizes the Kim dynasty.

In a separate dispatch, the KCNA said Ri Yong-ho, chief of the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army, was promoted to the rank of vice marshal in a possible sweetener for the military class, whose support is crucial for Kim Jong-un to solidify his power.

Kim Jong-un was educated in Switzerland during his teens and is believed to resemble his father in appearance and personality. He has been shrouded in secrecy, and photos of him are extremely rare.

It remains to be seen whether the North’s official television media will unveil Kim Jong-un in its footage of the Workers’ Party convention on Tuesday.

“For one thing, blood is stressed much more in North Korea as something that defines character,” Brian Myers, a professor of international studies at Dongseo University in Busan, said in comments e-mailed earlier. “In a culture where myth and charisma are so important, the masses need a hero figure in the ‘glorious Paekdu tradition,’ not a faceless bureaucrat or a group of army officers.”

So there are several “big” stories in KCNA today.  Kim Jong-un’s (son of KJI) and Kim Kyong Hui’s (sister of KJI) promotion to KPA general and Kim Jong-il’s “re-election” as general secretary of the Worker’s party.  Here are the stories:

Kim Jong Il Issues Order on Promoting Military Ranks

Pyongyang, September 27 (KCNA) — General Secretary Kim Jong Il on Monday issued Order No. 0051 on promoting the military ranks of commanding officers of the KPA.

He said in his order that all the servicepersons of the People’s Army and people are now significantly celebrating the 65th anniversary of the founding of the Workers’ Party of Korea with unbounded reverence for President Kim Il Sung who made a new history of building a revolutionary party in the era of independence and strengthened and developed the WPK into vanguard ranks of revolution with high prestige and invincible might.

He stressed that the WPK born from the deep and strong roots struck in the anti-Japanese revolution has honorably discharged its mission and duty as a political staff of the Korean revolution since the very day of its founding and performed immortal exploits to shine long in the history of the country.

The KPA is demonstrating its might before the world as a powerful revolutionary army of Mt. Paektu after growing to be a strong army of the leader and the party, devotedly defending the headquarters of the revolution with arms and performing heroic feats to shine long in history in the defence of the country and building of a thriving socialist nation, he noted.

Expressing the firm belief that the commanding officers of the KPA who have grown up under the care of the party and the leader would creditably discharge their honorable missions and duties as the mainstay and main force of the revolution in accomplishing with arms the revolutionary cause of Juche which started in Mt. Paektu, remaining true to the Party’s leadership in the future, too, he issued an order on promoting the military ranks of KPA commanding officers on the occasion of the 65th anniversary of the glorious Workers’ Party of Korea.

It is noted in the order that the military ranks of Kim Kyong Hui, Kim Jong Un and Choe Ryong Hae and three others are promoted to general, the military rank of Ryu Kyong to colonel general, the military ranks of Ro Hung Se and Ri Tu Song and four others to lieutenant general and those of Jo Kyong Jun, Jang To Yong and Mun Jong Chol and 24 others to major general.

Here is the story about Kim Jong-il’s re-election as general secretary.

Additional Information:
1. Here is coverage in the Washington Post.

2. Here is coverage in the New York Times.

3. Here is an article in the Taipei Times on Kim Kyong Hui (Kim Jong-il’s sister).

4. Here is a post about the first known (in the West) official mention of Kim Jong-un’s name in the DPRK–not in the official media.

5.  Here is information from Bradley Martin and Mike (NK Leadership Watch) on Choe Hyong-rae.

6. According to the Daily NK, North Koreans were not at all surprised by the announcement.

7.  The Daily NK has information on Ri Yong-ho.

Read the full story here:
N. Korean leader names his youngest son as general
Yonhap
Sam Kim
9/28/2010

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“Rubber-stamping” party conference update

Sunday, September 26th, 2010

Andrei Lankov writes in the Korea Times:

So, the third conference of the Korean Workers Party is officially scheduled to open on Tuesday ― at least, this is what the North Korean media reported last week.

The conference is expected to announce the new leadership which, at all probability, will include Kim Jong-il’s third son and his likely successor Kim Jong-un. The young man, now in his late 20s, will be formally introduced to the people and, perhaps, formally anointed as a “genius of leadership, fully capable of continuing the great Juche revolutionary tradition” (I am not sure about wording, but it will be flowery enough).

However, why do they need a party conference to have this announcement? Yes, it is true that Kim Jong-il himself was once anointed by a party congress (an enlarged version of a party conference) in 1980. But, on the other hand, when Kim Jong-il’s final promotion to the supreme leadership after his father’s death and three years of mourning took place in 1997, the North Korean autocrats did not bother to hold a conference or congress.

The coming conference might be another signal of a trend which was discussed by Pyongyang watchers recently: after years of relative neglect, Party is beginning to make a comeback.

Indeed, North Korea was initially established to be a typical Leninist party-state. In such a state, the Central Committee, as party’s central headquarters were known, controls everything and is clearly above the government, even though the Constitution does not even have references to such institutions as “Central Committee” or “Politburo.”

On paper, the Central Committee is a group of few hundred top bureaucrats who are elected by a party congress or party conference and who are supposed meet a few times a year to have the so-called “plenary session,” and also to elect a small permanent standing committee, known as Politburo.

However, as many other formal arrangements, those are seriously misleading. To start with, party congress or conference does not really elect candidates, but obediently and unanimously (always unanimously) vote for a pre-arranged list. Second, the infrequent ‘plenary sessions’ of the Central Committee are formal and ritualistic affairs, where participants sometimes hint at real issues but much more frequently spend time professing their loyalty to the current leadership. A communist state is run not by the “Central Committee” as such, but by its “Secretariat,” a large bureaucratic institution, whose top officials are appointed by the Politburo and/or party’s leader.

So, the top bureaucracy in a communist state is self-appointed. Politburo and its top leader appoint the Secretariat officials who are managing the country and those, in turn, appoint officials at lower levels. Usually, it is the top leader who makes most important decisions, but if a leader is weak, or absent, or just died, the Politburo (about dozen people, usually) can act as a collective dictator.

If the country is run by Politburo and Secretariat bureaucrats alone, why does it need to held congresses and the Central Committee “plenary sessions”? This is a good question. In the Soviet Union by some reasons they never asked this question and continued with the meaningless routine of congresses and plenary sessions.

In North Korea the leaders showed themselves to be more pragmatic and for a while it looked as if they decided to get rid of these formalities altogether. The last congress took place in 1980. The last party conference took place in 1966. It seems certain that after the death of his father in 1994, Kim Jong-il never even bothered to call a plenary session of the Central Committee and run the country via party bureaucracy which he appointed at will and with complete disregard for formalities.

And now we see the revival of the old (and, frankly, purely decorative) tradition. Why is it happening? The most likely explanation is that the old guard, the North Korean aging top bureaucrats, now have to think what will happen after the death of Kim Jong-il whose health seems to be deteriorating fast. Their major worry is, first, how to keep the country under control and, second, how to preserve one’s own power and privilege.

If this is the case, an existence of formally “elected” and hence more legitimate Central Committee will help. It is also remarkable that the person who seems to be best positioned to become the Prince Regent, Kim Jong-il’s brother-in-law Cang Song-taek, is clearly a party man who cannot rely on the military to legitimize his power.

So, it is possible that in the next few years we will see a lot of the good old political shows, which the world has not seen since the collapse of the communist bloc. We will see party congresses, and Central Committee plenary sessions, and a lot of “elections” (with pre-arranged results). The party might be coming back, even though it is not clear whether it will make any difference as long as the actual policy is concerned.

Previous posts on the delay in the conference opening can be found here.

Read the full story here:
Rubber-stamping session
Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
9/26/2010

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Lankov on the DPRK party conference

Monday, September 6th, 2010

Andrei Lankov writes in the Asia Times:

In the next few days, a large gathering of North Korean officials is expected to open in Pyongyang. This is an unusual event, to be sure, so it attracts much attention in the world media.

However, even a cursory glance at different publications demonstrates that many journalists and commentators who write on the issue do not quite realize what type of political gathering to expect. The function is variously described as a “meeting”, “convention”, or even as a “party congress”. The last description is wrong (the coming event is explicitly not a party congress) while the two others are far too nebulous. After all, the final match of the football World Cup could be described as a “meeting of 24 well-trained individuals for the purposes of physical exercise”. Factually true, but it does not tell us much about the nature of the event.

The misunderstanding can be easily explained by the changing spirit of the times. In the late 1940s, North Korea borrowed from the Soviet Union the basic structure of a communist state, and has kept it ever since.

Such states were once common, and in the 1970s the Western media would not be so clueless about the nature of such an event. However, nowadays, a Leninist state is a seriously endangered, almost extinct, species, so the younger generation of journalists is clearly at loss (nowadays, they probably are better informed about the specifics of various Muslim sects). Therefore, some background information is needed – if you like, a short memo on how North Korean state operates.

So, what is going to happen in Pyongyang soon? In the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) statute the scheduled event is defined clearly: this is a “party conference”, a gathering of the (supposedly) elected representatives of KWP members where specific issues of current policy are discussed.

The KWP, like all Leninist parties, is a rigidly centralized structure, somewhat akin to a military organization. However, for some reason those parties kept a number of institutions that were designed to appear democratic. Those were largely vestiges of a long-gone era, a reminder of times when in the early 1900s communist parties – or rather their predecessors – indeed had a vibrant internal democracy. Since then, the ostensibly democratic features have been kept partially out of respect for established tradition, but largely for propaganda-cum-decorative purposes.

One of those pseudo-democratic fictions is the system of party elections. The party-state is run by a hierarchy of committees, with the central committee and its powerful bureaucracy being the pinnacle of the entire structure, a central government in everything but name.

The party committees at all levels are essentially self-appointed. Communist functionaries become members of the central committee pretty much in the same way as the Catholic clergy become cardinals – they are appointed by the current leaders, but not without consulting and lobbying at the lower levels. At any rate, no elections are involved. Lower-level committees are manned in a similar manner.

However, on paper the committees – including the central committee – are elected. In the Cold War era most communist parties once every few years staged a large and pompous convention that was known as a “party congress”. This was where the new central committee was “elected”.

Actually, the elections were a fiction, pure and simple. The congress obediently voted for a candidates’ list that had been drafted weeks or months beforehand by the central committee bureaucracy and approved by the leadership. The tradition required that support for the list during a public voting ritual should be unanimous, and this indeed was the case.

The party representatives who attended the congress – and they could number in thousands – were themselves selected through a similar procedure: appointed by the local party apparatchiks, they were then formally “elected” by the relevant party groups.

Some of the representatives were prominent bureaucrats and officials, but a majority came from the party rank-and-file. Exemplary milkmaids and steel workers were dispatched to the congress to demonstrate the broad support communist rule allegedly enjoyed among the ”masses”. Nobody expected from them any meaningful discussion of political issues, and in most cases any attempt at such discussion would be promptly suppressed.

A party congress had other important functions. It was the place where the party supreme leader, usually known as its “general secretary”, delivered a speech in which he described the achievements of the party as well as the universal love and admiration it enjoyed among the people.

He also used the opportunity to criticize scheming enemies and remind about the need to remain vigilant. These speeches could be very lengthy. For example, in 1956, Kim Il-sung, the founder of the North Korean state and father of present dictator Kim Jong-il, spent six hours reading a voluminous text of such speech, and during party congresses in the Soviet Union in the 1970s, Leonid Brezhnev, the top Soviet leader, usually spent three of four hours reading similar texts in his less then audible voice. Kremlinologists, however, unlike the unlucky audience, had a field day with these speeches since among the boring nonsense there were some important hints that could indicate the direction a particular state was going to take.

Indeed, the party congresses (and conferences, of which more later) were largely convened to convey important messages about policies while also staging an only too transparent show of ”party democracy”. It is important to remember that no discussion took place at a congress of a ruling Leninist party.

The decisions were drafted well before a conference/congress began, were always voted through unanimously and without addition or amendment. The speeches of the participants were also usually checked and censored beforehand, and in the entire history of the communist bloc there were very few cases when a representative making critical comments about the system or leaders. Usually, the representatives extolled party wisdom, the greatness of its leaders and struggled to describe how great and selfless their own love of the system was.

The party statute stipulated that a congress should be convened at regular intervals, usually once every five years. After the 1950s, most communist countries complied with this demand.

Party statutes also stipulated that a minor version of a congress could be convened if the party leadership considered it fit. The minor version was known as a party conference (and this is what is going to meet in Pyongyang). Officially, a party conference met to discuss peculiar questions of current policy, but in real life it was, essentially, a minor version of the party congress. Generally speaking, the conferences were much less common then congresses.

In the Kim Il-sung era, North Korea, however, was remarkable in its relative disregard for legal niceties. The KWP’s statute has all the necessary articles, copy-pasted from Soviet regulations, but these have been ignored.

Throughout its 65 years history, the KWP has had six congresses, but none of them ever met within the officially prescribed interval. The last KWP congress took place in 1980, and was the venue at which Kim Jong-il was officially and publicly proclaimed the successor to his father. The next congress was supposed to meet five years later. It has never met (and the coming convention will be not be a congress, but a humbler conference).

The KWP’s party conferences took place twice, in 1958 and 1966. Both times they were convened to formalize the results of severe purges in the top leadership and ”elect” new leaders, free from “unmasked anti-party enemies”. After a 30-year hiatus, most observers came to the conclusion that North Korean leaders had decided to get rid off the pseudo-democratic institution altogether.

The “military-first” policy and the obvious attempts to play down the KWP’s role also strengthened such understanding. It was known that even central committee meetings were discontinued, so after his father’s death in 1994, Kim Jong-il has run the country with a remarkable disregard to institutional formalities.

However, in recent few years it seems the trend has been reversed: the KWP or, rather, its bureaucracy or people who have made a career within the party, are beginning to reassert themselves, slightly pushing the military aside. Decisions to convene a conference – ostensibly to publicly anoint the next hereditary dictator – seem to be another sign of these quiet changes.

But why did the North Korean leaders choose to convene a conference that is clearly a lower-level, less formal and less prestigious gathering, and not a full-scale party congress? The reasons might be economic. In North Korea it has become an established tradition that a party congress should be accompanied by lavish celebrations and expensive gifts to both the elite and the general public.

In 1980, when the KWP congress was last convened, humble housewives were given fresh fruit, mid-level officials were handed wristwatches while their superiors could even get a Japanese-made refrigerator. This tradition was burdensome, and in the mid-1980s Kim Il-sung complained to Soviet diplomats that he would like to have another congress but could not afford it due to the poor economic conditions of the country. The conference, on the other hand, is not expected to be celebrated on such a lavish scale.

These economic considerations seem to be the reason why in Pyongyang we are going to see the third KWP conference, not the seventh KWP congress. Nonetheless, in practical terms, the difference between those two events are negligible.

Whatever the name, what should we expect? No policy debate will take place, for sure. The participants, overwhelmingly, but not exclusively, will be men in their 40s, 50s and 60s, clad in badly tailored suits, who will unanimously vote for all resolutions, showing outbursts of enthusiasm when instructed to do so. There will be some important statements, most likely related to the succession – otherwise, it would not make sense to convene the conference. Those statements will move the representatives to tears – if earlier North Korean propaganda is a clue, we are likely to see an entire hall of weeping functionaries.

A lengthy speech about the current situation will be delivered. In all probability it will not be done by Kim Jong-il, who seldom speaks in public, but by some other dignitary (the name might be important, since the person is likely to play a major role in the years ahead). The speech will be worth careful reading since it will have some important hints on the country’s course. Equally important for political analysts will be the lengthy lists of newly appointed officials.

At any rate, it will be a bit of a show. The world has not seen anything like this for years – China and Vietnam still hold similar gatherings, but their functions have lost much of their earlier flavor. So, the conference itself is a slightly bizarre reminder of a bygone era, and it is not impossible that it will become one of the last gatherings of this type to take place in front of an international audience.

Read the full story here:
North Korea blows off the cobwebs
Asia Times
Andrei Lankov
9/8/2010

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US freezes assets in DPRK proliferation case

Monday, August 30th, 2010

UPDATE 4: The following statement appeared on the Treasury Department web page:

In joint actions, the U.S. Departments of Treasury and State today announced the designations of five North Korean entities and three individuals under Executive Order (E.O.) 13382 for supporting North Korea’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) program. Executive Order 13382 is an authority aimed at freezing the assets of WMD proliferators and their supporters thereby isolating them from the U.S. financial and commercial systems.

Also today, President Obama signed an Executive Order that directs the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to target for sanctions individuals and entities facilitating North Korean trafficking in arms and related materiel; procurement of luxury goods; and engagement in illicit activities, including money laundering, the counterfeiting of goods and currency, bulk cash smuggling and narcotics trafficking. The new Executive Order supplements E.O 13382, under which North Korean entities have been designated to date, and is consistent with measures required in UNSCRs 1718 and 1874.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN list:

KIM, Yong Chol (a.k.a. KIM, Yong-Chol; a.k.a. KIM, Young-Cheol; a.k.a. KIM, Young-Chol; a.k.a. KIM, Young-Chul); DOB circa 1947; alt. DOB circa 1946; POB Pyongan-Pukto, North Korea (individual) [DPRK]

RI, Hong-Sop, c/o General Bureau of Atomic Energy , Haeudong, Pyongchen District, Pyongyang, Korea, North; DOB 1940; nationality Korea, North (individual) [NPWMD]

RI, Je-Son (a.k.a. RI, Che-Son), c/o General Bureau of Atomic Energy, Haeudong, Pyongchen District, Pyongyang, Korea, North; DOB 1938; nationality Korea, North (individual) [NPWMD]

YUN, Ho-Jin (a.k.a. YUN, Ho-Chin), c/o Namchongang Trading Corporation, Pyongyang, Korea, North; DOB 13 Oct 1944; nationality Korea, North (individual) [NPWMD]

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN list:

GREEN PINE ASSOCIATED CORPORATION (a.k.a. CHONGSONG YONHAP; a.k.a. CH’O’NGSONG YO’NHAP), Nungrado, Pyongyang, Korea, North; c/o Reconnaissance General Bureau Headquarters, Hyongjesan-Guyok, Pyongyang, Korea, North [DPRK]

KOREA HEUNGJIN TRADING COMPANY (a.k.a. HUNJIN TRADING CO.), Pyongyang, Korea, North [NPWMD]

KOREA TAESONG TRADING COMPANY, Pyongyang, Korea, North [NPWMD]

MUNITIONS INDUSTRY DEPARTMENT (a.k.a. MILITARY SUPPLIES INDUSTRY DEPARTMENT), Pyongyang, Korea,
North [NPWMD]

OFFICE 39 (a.k.a. BUREAU 39; a.k.a. CENTRAL COMMITTEE BUREAU 39; a.k.a. DIVISION 39; a.k.a. OFFICE #39; a.k.a. OFFICE NO. 39; a.k.a. THIRD FLOOR), Second KWP Government Building (Korean – Ch’o’ngsa), Chungso’ng, Urban Town (Korean – Dong), Chung Ward, Pyongyang, Korea, North; Chung-Guyok (Central District), Sosong Street, Kyongrim-Dong, Pyongyang, Korea, North; Changgwang Street, Pyongyang, Korea, North [DPRK]

RECONNAISSANCE GENERAL BUREAU (a.k.a. CHONGCH’AL CH’ONGGUK; a.k.a. KPA UNIT 586; a.k.a. “RGB”), Hyongjesan-Guyok, Pyongyang, Korea, North; Nungrado, Pyongyang, Korea, North [DPRK]

SECOND ACADEMY OF NATURAL SCIENCES (a.k.a. 2ND ACADEMY OF NATURAL SCIENCES; a.k.a. ACADEMY OF NATURAL SCIENCES; a.k.a. CHAYON KWAHAK-WON; a.k.a. CHE 2 CHAYON KWAHAK-WON; a.k.a. KUKPANG KWAHAK-WON; a.k.a. NATIONAL DEFENSE ACADEMY; a.k.a. SANSRI; a.k.a. SECOND ACADEMY OF NATURAL SCIENCES RESEARCH INSTITUTE), Pyongyang, Korea, North [NPWMD]

SECOND ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, Kangdong, Korea, North [NPWMD]

UPDATE 3: According to the Wall Street Journal:

The Obama administration outlined new financial sanctions on North Korea aimed at further choking off Pyongyang’s arms trade and the illicit businesses funding dictator Kim Jong Il’s government.

The U.S. specifically targeted a secretive unit of Pyongyang’s ruling Korean Workers’ Party, known as Office 39, which American officials believe serves as a private slush fund for Mr. Kim.

Washington also blacklisted nearly a dozen North Korean individuals and entities alleged to be overseeing Pyongyang’s development of conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction, as well as their sales to third countries.

Among those designated are the Second Economic Committee of the Workers’ Party and Yun Ho-jin, Pyongyang’s onetime ambassador to the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency. The U.S. also named to its sanctions list two top officials from Pyongyang’s General Bureau of Atomic Energy, Ri Je-son and Ri Hong-sop.

“When it comes to focusing on illicit activity, we have seen that the world reacts to this kind of thing very, very positively,” said Stuart Levey, the Treasury Department’s undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence. “We believe that this sort of program can have a very powerful impact.”

The new U.S. measures freeze any assets of the designated persons or entities inside the U.S. and bars American companies from conducting business with the listed North Koreans. Mr. Levey also said that any foreign entities conducting business with the sanctioned North Koreans could also face U.S. penalties.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced in June that the U.S. would enact new financial penalties on Pyongyang, in part, in response to the North’s alleged torpedoing of a South Korean naval vessel. The March sinking of the Cheonan killed 46 South Korean servicemen and has led to heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula.

U.S. officials fear the attack could be linked to a political succession process inside Pyongyang and could presage other provocative acts by the North. U.S. and Asian officials believe Kim Jong Il is seeking to pass power to his third son, Kim Jong Eun.

…U.S. officials said the targeting of Office 39 is among the most direct assaults on Kim Jong Il’s finances to date and illustrates Washington’s support for the North Korean people. Office 39 has been directly involved in procuring luxury goods for Mr. Kim and Pyongyang’s political elite, even as many North Koreans face starvation.

Office 39 was blacklisted under a new executive order signed by President Barack Obama on Monday that specifically seeks to end North Korea’s ability to raise hard currency through illicit activities like drug smuggling and counterfeit $100 bills. The Treasury said Office 39 was directly involved in a 2009 scheme to illegally export into North Korea two luxury yachts valued at $15 million for Kim Jong Il.

UPDATE 2: According to the Wall Street Journal:

A North Korean arms chief and Pyongyang’s former ambassador to the United Nation’s nuclear agency have emerged as key figures in an intensifying international effort to curb North Korea’s weapons-trading activities.

The global dealings of the two men, Chun Byung-ho and Yun Ho-jin, whom North Korea analysts believe to be related through marriage, date back to the 1980s. They have played leading roles in North Korea’s development and testing of atomic weapons, according to current and former U.S. officials, Asian intelligence analysts and U.N. nonproliferation staffers.

More troubling to officials, Messrs. Chun and Yun also oversee Pyongyang’s vast arms-trading network, which appears to be spreading. They have shipped components for long-range missiles, nuclear reactors and conventional arms to countries including Iran, Syria and Myanmar.

On Monday, the Obama administration announced economic sanctions against various individuals and entities involved in Pyongyang’s nuclear work and in alleged illicit trading activities. The Treasury Department named Mr. Yun and the North Korean body headed by Mr. Chun—the Second Economic Committee of Pyongyang’s ruling Korean Workers’ Party. The sanctions freeze any U.S. assets of those named and bar Americans from conducting business with them. Treasury also warned that foreign firms doing business with them risked sanctions.

The Second Economic Committee oversees a little-known foreign trade office with the Orwellian name of Office 99. The proceeds from the Office’s arms sales go directly to North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il and Pyongyang’s senior leadership, according to these officials and recent North Korean defectors.

“It is broadly believed that the Second Economic Committee…plays the largest and most prominent role in nuclear, other WMD and missile-related development programs, as well as arranging and conducting arms-related exports” for North Korea, says a report issued in May by the U.N. committee tasked with enforcing international sanctions on Pyongyang.

The U.S. and U.N. recently have intensified efforts to combat the Second Economic Committee and Office 99, alarmed by Pyongyang’s two nuclear-weapons tests and its alleged role in sinking a South Korean naval vessel in March. Last year, the U.N. formally sanctioned Mr. Yun and his arms company, Namchongang Trading Co.

North Korean arms shipments moving through Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, South Africa and the South China Sea have been seized or turned back by the U.S. and its allies over the past few years. A Japanese court convicted a Tokyo-based trading company in November of procuring military technologies for Pyongyang with the intent of shipping them to Myanmar.

Still, Messrs. Chun and Yun’s decades of experience in the weapons trade pose a challenge to an international community keen to disrupt Pyongyang’s proliferation activities, say U.S. and Asian officials. “There is no reason to assume that Chun and Yun won’t sell nuclear weapons,” says David Asher, a former Bush administration official who has tracked Pyongyang’s arms trade for a decade. “There needs to be an active effort to disrupt their WMD networks and drive them out of business now, before it’s too late.”

The two men have established a network of front companies in Asia, Europe and the Middle East and have partnered with Southeast Asian, Japanese and Taiwanese criminal syndicates to move cash and contraband, say U.S. officials. And Mr. Yun has used the political cover provided by Pyongyang’s closest ally, China, to openly conduct business in cities such as Beijing and Shenyang, drawing official rebukes from Washington.

North Korean diplomats at Pyongyang’s U.N. mission in New York did not respond to requests for comment. Messrs. Chun and Yun couldn’t be reached.

Current and former U.S. officials say North Korea’s operations resemble in both scale and tactics those of Pakistan’s Abdul Qadeer Khan—one of the most notorious arms dealers in recent years. U.S. officials fear that isolated North Korea, desperate for hard currency, could accelerate its arms exports in a bid to prop up Kim Jong Il’s finances.

Mr. Chun, now 84 years old, and his Second Economic Committee emerged as major global arms exporters in the 1980s, as North Korea shipped as much as $3 billion worth of rockets, pistols and submarines to Tehran during the eight-year Iran-Iraq war, say recent defectors and North Korea analysts.

Pyongyang assisted some communist and socialist countries militarily during the 1960s and 1970s, and provided fighter pilots to aid Egypt and Syria in their wars against Israel. But North Korea found a largely captive market in Iran, which faced a U.S.-led weapons embargo as the West threw its support behind Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein.

One senior North Korean defector who worked in Pyongyang’s munitions industries says he was dispatched to Iran by the Second Economic Committee in 1987 with the task of constructing missile batteries on the Iranian island of Kish to help Tehran better control the movement of ships through the Straits of Hormuz.

His main interlocutor was Iran’s elite military unit, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The former hydro-mechanic says camaraderie developed between his 100-man team and the Guard, despite their different backgrounds.

Mr. Chun’s control over the Second Economic Committee was tied to his close relationship with Pyongyang’s ruling Kim family, say defectors and North Korea experts. The Russian-trained bureaucrat served as a member of North Korean founder Kim Il Sung’s bodyguard unit. He rose up the ranks of the Korean Workers’ Party with the political support of Kim Jong Il, eventually securing a position on Pyongyang’s most powerful political body, the National Defense Commission.

North Korea’s high-level defector, Hwang Jang-yop, has identified Mr. Chun as the broker of a key barter trade in the 1990s with Pakistan that significantly advanced Pyongyang’s nuclear infrastructure. The agreement resulted in North Korea shipping parts for long-range missiles to Islamabad in exchange for A.Q. Khan sending centrifuge equipment used in producing nuclear fuel.

As Mr. Chun pushed forward North Korea’s nuclear program from Pyongyang, Mr. Yun, believed to be the husband of Mr. Chun’s second daughter, emerged as a key player in procuring technologies for the Second Economic Committee from Europe, according to U.S., U.N. and European officials.

Mr. Yun, 66, arrived in Vienna in 1985 as Pyongyang’s ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency. The English and German speaker led negotiations with the U.N. agency aimed at forging a nuclear-inspection agreement with North Korea, and he helped oversee a 1992 tour of his nation’s Yongbyon nuclear facility for Hans Blix, the IAEA’s then-managing director.

“Yun was dedicated to turning things around. I truly believe that,” says Willi Theis, who worked closely with Mr. Yun as the head of the IAEA’s safeguards unit overseeing North Korea. Mr. Theis is now retired.

Still, concerns grew inside the IAEA about Mr. Yun’s activities, as relations between Pyongyang and the international community deteriorated, according to IAEA officials.

In 1993, North Korea broke off talks with the IAEA over the agency’s demands for an inspection of the country’s nuclear operations, and the U.S. charged Pyongyang with secretly stockpiling plutonium for atomic weapons. The next year, the Clinton administration threatened to bomb the Yongbyon facility if North Korea didn’t explain where the plutonium had gone. Mr. Yun grew embittered with the diplomatic process and mistrustful of the U.S. and its allies, according to IAEA staff and journalists who met with him.

Mr. Theis says he spent hours discussing the process with Mr. Yun and pressed the Agency to remain engaged with Pyongyang. The West German-born nuclear inspector says he grew suspicious of Mr. Yun’s many trips to other European cities and his contacts with local companies. Mr. Yun even hinted to Mr. Theis that he might have no choice but to directly support North Korea’s nuclear-weapons programs if relations with the IAEA collapsed.

“He came to the conclusion that dealing with the international community was totally disappointing,” said Mr. Theis in a phone interview from Austria. “Mr. Yun had definitely learned how to establish contacts with all types of people [while in Vienna]—not just from the IAEA, but managers of companies.”

Mr. Theis’s concerns about Mr. Yun would be borne out in 2003, when a German businessman, Hans Werner Truppel, was arrested and eventually convicted by a Stuttgart court of selling 22 metric tons of aluminum tubes to Mr. Yun.

The North Korean and his company, Namchongang Trading, used offices in Beijing and Shenyang, China, to place orders for the equipment, which is critical to building centrifuges needed to enrich uranium, according to a German Customs Bureau report. U.S. officials briefed on the case were alarmed that Mr. Yun conducted some of his business through the offices of Shenyang Aircraft Industry Co., a Chinese state-owned firm.

In the ensuing months, the State Department aired its concerns about Mr. Yun’s activities to China’s government, according to former U.S. officials. But Beijing took no action.

China’s ministries of foreign affairs and commerce didn’t respond to requests for comment. Shenyang Aircraft says it had no recollection of any dealings with Mr. Yun.

Messrs. Chun and Yun have sought to accelerate North Korea’s weapons sales and procurement in recent years and allegedly have played important roles in strengthening Pyongyang’s military ties to countries such as Syria and Myanmar, say current and former U.S. officials.

North Korea analysts believe most of these transactions have been conducted through Office 99, which they describe as an international sales office and slush fund for Kim Jong Il.

“Anything that has to do with the imports and exports of weapons flows through Office 99,” says Oh Kongdan, a North Korea expert at Virginia’s Institute of Defense Analyses, a Pentagon-funded think tank. “It’s a royal patronage system.”

U.S. officials say that since the late 1990s they detected through intelligence channels intensifying military cooperation between North Korea and Syria, focused on everything from the development of chemical weapons to missiles.

In September 2007, Israeli jets bombed a facility in eastern Syria that U.S. officials say was a nearly operational replica of North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear reactor. As many as 10 North Koreans died in the Israeli attack, according to U.S. officials. Mr. Yun and Namchongang Trading are believed to have played a central role in brokering development of the facility.

“That particular company was all over the nuclear trade. There’s no question about it,” says John Bolton, who served as the Bush administration’s top non-proliferation official. Both Syria and North Korea have denied cooperating on developing nuclear technologies.

Over the past two years, U.S. and U.N. officials have also voiced concerns about North Korea’s deepening military ties with Myanmar, the Southeast Asian country formerly known as Burma.

North Korea engineers have helped Myanmar build a maze of fortified bunkers to house senior government officials and military installations, according to Burmese defectors and commercial satellite photos. Current and former U.S. officials say Washington has intervened to block the transfer of Scud missiles to Myanmar from Pyongyang.

In June, Japan’s Ministry of Economy and Trade banned Tokyo-based Toko Boeki Trading Co. and device maker Riken Denshi from conducting international trade after three of their affiliated executives, one of them an ethnic Korean, were arrested trying to send machine tools on an export-control list to Myanmar using a dummy company in Malaysia. The equipment could be used to develop either ballistic missiles or centrifuges for a uranium-enrichment program, according to weapons experts. And the U.N. in its May report said it was examining “suspicious” ties between Mr. Yun’s Namchongang Trading and Myanmar, possibly linked to these activities in Japan.

The Obama administration, in response, has announced a stepped-up campaign to block North Korea’s ability to raise funds through the arms trade. In addition to the new sanctions, the Pentagon has said it will intensify the interdiction of ships and planes believed to be carrying North Korean arms.

Still, Mr. Theis and other North Korea experts believe that it is only through dialogue that the West will be able to curb the North’s proliferation threat. Mr. Theis says he is recently lobbied the IAEA to allow him to return to Pyongyang to hold meetings with Mr. Yun. So far, he says, the IAEA hasn’t agreed.

UPDATE 1: According to Reuters:

President Barack Obama on Monday broadened U.S. financial sanctions on North Korea, freezing the U.S. assets of eight North Korean companies or agencies and four individual citizens.

The U.S. Treasury released a fact sheet detailing U.S. allegations against the North Korean entities and individuals targeted under the new U.S. executive order and a previous one. The following is a summary:

Companies and Agencies

The Reconnainance General Bureau
The Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) is North Korea’s premiere intelligence organization, created in early 2009 by the merger of existing intelligence agencies. The RGB trades in conventional arms and controls the North Korean conventional arms firm Green Pine Associated Corporation, which was also identified for sanctions under Obama’s order for exporting arms or related materiel from North Korea, the Treasury said.

Green Pine Associated Corp.
Green Pine was brought under the control of the RGB in 2009. The Treasury said it specializes in the production of maritime military craft and armaments, such as submarines, military boats and missiles systems, and has exported torpedoes and technical assistance to Iranian defense-related firms.

Green Pine is responsible for approximately half of the arms and related materiel exported by North Korea and has taken over many of the activities of the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation, according to the Treasury.

Office 39
Office 39 of the Korean Workers’ Party engages in illicit economic activity to support the North Korean government, the U.S. Treasury fact sheet said. Office 39 has branches throughout the nation that raise and manage funds and is responsible for earning foreign currency for senior party leaders through illicit activities such as narcotics trafficking.

Office 39 controls a number of entities inside North Korea and abroad through which the Treasury said it is involved in the production, smuggling, and distribution of narcotics, and it has also been involved in the attempted procurement and transfer to North Korea of luxury goods.

Office 39 produced methamphetamine and was also involved in its supply to small-scale North Korean smugglers for distribution through China and South Korea. It also operates poppy farms and produces opium and heroin, the Treasury said.

In 2009, Office 39 was involved in the failed attempt to purchase and export to North Korea — through China — two Italian-made luxury yachts worth more than $15 million and destined for North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, the Treasury said.

Korea Mining Development Trading Corp. (KOMID)
KOMID is Pyongyang’s main arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons, with offices located in multiple countries around the world with the primary goal of facilitating weapons sales and seeking new customers for its weapons, according to the Treasury.

KOMID uses Korea Taesong Trading Company and Korea Heungjin Trading Company for trading purposes. Korea Taesong has acted on behalf of KOMID in dealings with Syria, and Korea Heungjin acts as the procurement arm of KOMID, the Treasury fact sheet said. Korea Heungjin is also suspected to have been involved in supplying missile-related goods to Iran’s Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, it said.

Korea Taesong was previously sanctioned by the U.S. Department of State in 2008 under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act.

Munitions Industry Department
The Treasury said the Munitions Industry Department is responsible for overseeing the development of North Korea’s ballistic missiles, including the Taepodong-2 which was first test-launched in 2006 and has a possible range of 4,100 miles.

The Second Economic Committee
The Second Economic Committee is responsible for overseeing production of North Korea’s ballistic missiles. It also directs the activities of KOMID, according to the U.S. Treasury.

The Second Academy of Natural Sciences
The Second Academy of Natural Sciences is a national-level organization responsible for research and development of North Korea’s advanced weapons systems, including missiles and probably nuclear weapons. It uses a number of subordinate organizations, including Tangun Trading Corporation, to obtain technology, equipment, and information from overseas for use in North Korea’s missile and probably nuclear weapons programs, the U.S. Treasury said.

Individuals

Kim Yong-chol
General Kim Yong-chol commands the Reconnaissance General Bureau.

Ri Je-son and Ri Hong-sap
The U.S. Treasury fact sheet said Ri Je-son and Ri Hong-sop act for or on behalf of the General Bureau of Atomic Energy (GBAE), which is responsible for North Korea’s nuclear program and manages operations at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center. GBAE was designated by the United Nations in July 2009 for its involvement in North Korea’s nuclear program and subsequently sanctioned by the State Department.

Ri Je-son is the director of GBAE and is responsible for facilitating several nuclear endeavors including GBAE’s management of Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center and Namchongang Trading Corporation, according to the Treasury.

Ri Hong-sop is a councilor for GBAE. He is also the former Director of Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center. In that capacity he oversaw the three core facilities that North Korea used to produce weapons-grade plutonium, the Treasury said.

Both Ri Je-son and Ri Hong-sop are also subject to the asset freeze and travel ban provisions under an earlier United Nations Security Council resolution.

Yun Ho-jin
Yun Ho-jin acts for or on behalf of Namchongang Trading Corporation (NCG), a North Korean trading company subordinate to GBAE. NCG has been involved in the procurement of Japanese- origin vacuum pumps that were identified at a North Korean nuclear facility, as well as nuclear-related procurement associated with a German individual.

Yun Ho-jin has acted on behalf of NCG in various capacities since the 1980s. As a senior official at NCG, he oversaw the import of items needed for North Korea’s uranium enrichment program.

Through an NCG office in China, Yun Ho-jin was also involved in purchases of sensitive material linked to the construction of a nuclear reactor in Syria, the Treasury fact sheet said.

He is also under U.N. Security Council asset freeze and travel ban sanctions.

ORIGINAL POST: Here is the full statement by the US Treasury Department:

August 30, 2010
TG-840

United States Designates North Korean Entities and Individuals for Activities Related to North Korea’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Program

WASHINGTON – In joint actions, the U.S. Departments of Treasury and State today announced the designations of five North Korean entities and three individuals under Executive Order (E.O.) 13382 for supporting North Korea’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) program. Executive Order 13382 is an authority aimed at freezing the assets of WMD proliferators and their supporters thereby isolating them from the U.S. financial and commercial systems.

Also today, President Obama signed an Executive Order that directs the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to target for sanctions individuals and entities facilitating North Korean trafficking in arms and related materiel; procurement of luxury goods; and engagement in illicit activities, including money laundering, the counterfeiting of goods and currency, bulk cash smuggling and narcotics trafficking. The new Executive Order supplements E.O 13382, under which North Korean entities have been designated to date, and is consistent with measures required in UNSCRs 1718 and 1874.

Korea Taesong Trading Company and Korea Heungjin Trading Company
Pyongyang-based entities the Korea Taesong Trading Company and Korea Heungjin Trading Company, are used by the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) for trading purposes. Korea Taesong Trading Company has acted on behalf of KOMID in dealings with Syria, and Korea Heungjin Trading Company acts as the procurement arm of KOMID. Korea Heungjin Trading Company is also suspected to have been involved in supplying missile-related goods to Iran’s Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group.

KOMID is Pyongyang’s premier arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons, with offices located in multiple countries around the world with the primary goal of facilitating weapons sales and seeking new customers for its weapons. It was listed in the Annex to E.O. 13382 of June 2005 and has been sanctioned by the United States repeatedly over the last 10 years for trading in missile technology. KOMID was also designated by the UNSCR 1718 Committee to be subject to the asset freeze provisions of UNSCR 1718.

Korea Taesong Trading Company was previously sanctioned by the U.S. Department of State in 2008 under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA). INKSNA provides for the imposition of measures on entities or individuals for the transfer to or acquisition from Iran, Syria, or North Korea of equipment or technology controlled under multilateral export control lists or otherwise having the potential to make a material contribution to the proliferation of WMD or cruise or ballistic missile systems.

Second Economic Committee, Munitions Industry Department and Second Academy of Natural Sciences
The Munitions Industry Department and Second Economic Committee are involved in key aspects of North Korea’s missile program. The Munitions Industry Department is responsible for overseeing the development of North Korea’s ballistic missiles, including the Taepo Dong-2.

The Second Economic Committee is responsible for overseeing the production of North Korea’s ballistic missiles. The Second Economic Committee also directs the activities of KOMID.

The Second Academy of Natural Sciences is a national-level organization responsible for research and development of North Korea’s advanced weapons systems, including missiles and probably nuclear weapons. The Second Academy of Natural Sciences uses a number of subordinate organizations to obtain technology, equipment, and information from overseas, including Tangun Trading Corporation, for use in North Korea’s missile and probably nuclear weapons programs.

Tangun Trading Corporation is subordinate to the Second Academy of Natural Sciences and is primarily responsible for the procurement of commodities and technologies to support North Korea’s defense research and development programs and procurement, including materials that are controlled under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) or the Australia Group. Tangun Trading Corporation was designated by the Department of State pursuant to E.O. 13382 in September 2009. Tangun Trading Corporation was also designated by the UNSCR 1718 Committee to be subject to the asset freeze provisions of UNSCR 1718.

Ri Je-son and Ri Hong-sop
Ri Je-son and Ri Hong-sop act for or on behalf of the General Bureau of Atomic Energy (GBAE), which is responsible for North Korea’s nuclear program and manages operations at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center. GBAE was designated by the United Nations in July 2009 for its involvement in North Korea’s nuclear program and subsequently sanctioned by the Department of State under E.O. 13382 in September 2009.

Ri Je-son is the Director of GBAE and is responsible for facilitating several nuclear endeavors including GBAE’s management of Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center and Namchongang Trading Corporation.

Ri Hong-sop is a councilor for GBAE. He is also the former Director of Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center. In that capacity he oversaw the three core facilities that the DPRK used to produce of weapons-grade plutonium: the Fuel Fabrication Facility, the 5MWe Experimental Reactor, and the Radiological Laboratory (Reprocessing Plant).

Ri Je-son and Ri Hong-sop were also designated by the UNSCR 1718 Committee to be subject to the asset freeze and travel ban provisions of UNSCR 1718.

Yun Ho-lin
Yun Ho-jin acts for or on behalf of Namchongang Trading Corporation (NCG), a North Korean trading company subordinate to GBAE. NCG has been involved in the procurement of Japanese- origin vacuum pumps that were identified at a North Korean nuclear facility, as well as nuclear-related procurement associated with a German individual. NCG was designated by the State Department pursuant to E.O. 13382 in June 2009.

Yun Ho-jin has acted on behalf of NCG in various capacities since the 1980s. As a senior official at NCG, he oversaw the import of items needed for North Korea’s uranium enrichment program.

Through an NCG office in China, Yun Ho-jin was also involved in purchases of sensitive material linked to the construction of a nuclear reactor in Syria.

Yun Ho-jin was also designated by the UNSCR 1718 Committee to be subject to the asset freeze and travel ban provisions of UNSCR 1718.

Identifying Information:
Entity: Korea Taesong Trading Company
Location: Pyongyang, North Korea

Entity: Korea Heungjin Trading Company
AKA: Hunjin Trading Co.
Location: Pyongyang, North Korea

Entity: Second Economic Committee
Location: Kangdong, North Korea

Entity: Munitions Industry Department
AKA: Military Supplies Industry Department
Location: Pyongyang, North Korea

Entity: Second Academy of Natural Sciences
AKA: 2nd Academy of Natural Sciences
AKA: Che 2 Chayon Kwahak-Won
AKA: Academy of Natural Sciences
AKA: Chayon Kwahak-Won
AKA: National Defense Academy
AKA: Kukpang Kwahak-Won
AKA: Second Academy of Natural Sciences Research Institute SANSRI
Location: Pyongyang, North Korea

Individual: Ri Je-Son
AKA: Ri Che-Son
DOB: 1938

Individual: Ri Hong-Sop
DOB: 1940

Individual: Yun Ho-jin
AKA: Yun Ho-chin

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Daily NK on Office 39

Monday, August 30th, 2010

Pictured above is the location of the First Caribbean International Bank

According to the Daily NK:

The existence of a secret bank account operated by the No.39 Department of the Chosun Workers’ Party has been publicly confirmed for the first time, bringing yet more attention to bear on the activities of banks in one of the western world’s renowned tax havens.

The No.39 Department, which is responsible for the management of Kim Jong Il’s private funds, holds the bank account with the British Virgin Islands branch of First Caribbean International Bank (FCIB), a prominent bank in the Caribbean region.

According to an expert source familiar with China and North Korea, the No. 39 Department’s secret overseas account exists under the name “Hana Holdings”. It is apparently held with the Road Town branch of the bank, which is based in Barbados and has branches in 17 countries.

Explaining the importance to North Korea of the No.39 Department account, the source told Daily NK, “Due to recent UN Security Council sanctions, the No. 39 Department is experiencing considerable difficulties with its overseas financial trade. Currently, excluding Chinese banks, their only active overseas account is that held with FirstCaribbean International Bank.”

Also, he added, “The only bank through which the No. 39 Department can make overseas transfers is FirstCaribbean International Bank in the British Virgin Islands, since their other secret bank accounts are all blocked.”

He said, “In cases of normal trade relationships with other companies, it used to be possible to transfer the money overseas from China. However, those routes are blocked as well. Since United Nation’s financial sanctions against North Korea make it difficult for North Korea to transfer money to accounts in third countries from Chinese banks, all foreign currency earning units including the No. 39 Department are experiencing the same difficulties.”

Generally, the No. 39 Department works by transferring money from secret overseas bank accounts to accounts with Chinese banks for money laundering.

The source explained, “No. 39 Department moves the management funds from third countries to FirstCaribbean International Bank, then sends the money to the Bank of China until it can be transferred to a North Korean bank or withdrawn.”

According to the source, the person in charge of transfers between FirstCaribbean International Bank and Bank of China is dispatched by the No. 39 Department under a false name. Also, the official allegedly travels to China frequently to deal with problems involving trade with the Chinese bank.

News of the FCIB account will not be too surprising to North Korea economy watchers. Entities in the British Virgin Islands were already suspected of doing business with the North Korean regime before this latest revelation because of the islands’ connection to the activities of Taepung International Investment Group.

The annual returns of the Taepung Group, as it is more commonly known, show that it was originally set up in September, 2006. However, it became better known early in 2010 when it was placed at the center of efforts to revive the North Korean economy through the creation of a state development bank.

Registered in Hong Kong, its only shareholder as of its 2010 Annual Return was Taepung International Investment Holdings Ltd, whose registered address is in Road Town, British Virgin Islands.

According to the same return, obtained by a keen observer of North Korea’s illegal activities, Ken Kato, the Taepung Group’s corporate secretary is Sai Ying Company Ltd, whose only shareholder, and corporate director, is JYBD Holdings Ltd. JYBD Holdings Ltd’s registered address is the same one in Road Town, British Virgin Islands.

This is not the first time that FirstCaribbean International Bank has run into trouble, either. In 2008, it was indicted on 113 charges of “failure to report suspicious transactions” between 2001 and 2005 by the Belize Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU).

However, the charges were dropped because, according to a Belize newspaper, they were threatening to destabilize the country’s financial sector. Instead, First International was ordered to pay for both an electronic reporting system for the country and the refurbishment of two parks.

There are known to be a substantial number of other North Korean accounts held in countries around the world. At the time of the report completed by the 1718 Committee (North Korea sanctions committee) under the UN Security Council last July, North Korean banks were said to hold a total of 39 accounts with 18 banks located in 14 countries. Allegedly, these accounts include a considerable number managed by the No. 39 Department.

17 of the 39 accounts were located with big Chinese banks like Bank of China, China Construction Bank and HSBC, according to the report. Bank of China in Macao had the largest number of North Korean accounts, while some other accounts were held with Beijing and Dandong branches.

In addition, at the time, North Korea had 18 accounts with 11 banks in 8 countries in Europe; Russia, Switzerland, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Italy, Germany, and Belarus; also, it had one account each in Malaysia and Kazakhstan.

As the 1718 Committee report explained, “The DPRK… employs a broad range of techniques to mask its financial transactions, including the use of overseas entities, shell companies, informal transfer mechanisms, cash couriers and barter arrangements. However, it must still, in most cases, rely on access to the international financial system to complete its financial operations. In structuring these transactions, attempts are made to mix illicit transactions with otherwise legitimate business activities in such a way as to hide the illicit activity.”

And also according to the Daily NK:

The newly revealed secret overseas bank account held by the No. 39 Department is just one of several accounts set up in various locations around the world to manage Kim Jong Il’s funds.

However, due to the financial sanctions brought about by two nuclear tests and multiple missile launches, the No. 39 Department’s secret overseas accounts are continuously shrinking. As one North Korean source in China put it, “Due to United Nation’s financial sanction against North Korea, the No. 39 Department’s management of its overseas secret accounts has become difficult.”

Now, due to the Cheonan incident, the U.S. is planning to put in place “customized” financial sanctions which incorporate existing UN Security Council and EU financial sanctions, so the No. 39 Department’s overseas accounts will only get more difficult to manage in the future.

The No. 39 Department’s overseas accounts, which allegedly contribute much to Kim Jong Il’s governing funds, are prime targets for financial sanction since they are key to transferring those funds generated by illegal activity.

According to intelligence authorities, the No.39 Department has a bank account with Daesung Bank in Pyongyang, and manages capital in some of the world’s most influential banks in Macao, Hong Kong, Germany, Japan, and England through a subsidiary of Daesung Bank, Gold Star Bank (Geumbyeol Bank) in Vienna, Austria.

The $25 million which was frozen in Banco Delta Asia in 2005 was allegedly known to be some of Kim Jong Il’s governing funds managed by the No. 39 Department.

Radio Free Asia reports that even the Luxembourg government seems likely to implement any new sanctions, quoting them as saying, “We are keeping a close eye on the illegal activities which can take place through North Korea’s overseas accounts.”

The No. 39 Department has 17 overseas branches, 100 trading companies and banks under its auspices. They generate foreign currency through loyalty funds collected from each agency and management of hotels and foreign currency stores. Also, they trade the country’s natural resources including pine mushrooms, gold and silver.

The department is also in charge of the production of “supernotes,” high quality counterfeit $100 bills, and has a role in weapons and the illegal drugs trade.

The funds are mostly spent on the living costs of the Kim family and the patronage network required to maintain his coterie of high officials. In 2008, the sum of luxury goods purchased by North Korea was estimated to be more than $100 million. For example, immediately prior to the anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s birth on April 15th, North Korea imported approximately 200 high grade vehicles from China.

Since foreign currency generation started to become difficult due to the sanctions, Kim Jong Il has allegedly revived the No. 38 Department, which used to be in charge of overseas currency earning and was only merged with the No. 39 Department in September of 2009, and replaced the head of No. 39 Department with Jeon Il Choon, an old high school friend.

As Kim Kwang Jin, a North Korean defector who worked for the Northeast Asia Bank of North Korea, pointed out in a recent press interview, “The UN Security’s North Korea sanctions and the United States’ Banco Delta Asia sanctions must have caused the shrinking of North Korea’s overseas accounts. It is possible that North Korea could try to open accounts under phantom company names to continue with its financial trades.”

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Pak Pong-ju rehabilitated

Saturday, August 21st, 2010

According to Yonhap:

North Korea’s former Premier Pak Pong-ju appears to have returned to power with the Workers’ Party, more than three years after he was ousted due to his economic reform drive, according to a Pyongyang broadcast report on Saturday.

The North’s Korean Central Broadcasting Station introduced Pak as the “first deputy director of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea,” reporting on the 50th foundation ceremony of Pyongyang’s flagship Okryu Restaurant held Friday with a number of senior officials and workers.

There is no other known figure with the same name among the North Korean power-holding elite.

Pak, a long-time industry technocrat and pragmatist, was named premier of the North’s Cabinet in September 2003. He spearheaded the North’s so-called July 1st Economic Measure reform drive toward market economy, which aimed to give more autonomy to state firms and gradually reduce state rationing of food and daily necessities.

But his strong initiative triggered a backlash from the party and the military that resulted in his dismissal. Pak was suspended from duty in June 2006 on charges of fund apprehension and was fired in April the following year. Kim Yong-il, then land and marine transport minister, replaced him.

Pak is believed to have been demoted to a managerial post at a clothing factory outside Pyongyang.

Cho Myung-chul, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy who has defected from North Korea, viewed Pak’s reinstatement as a signal of a shifting North Korean economic policy toward pragmatism, following its failed currency reform last year.

“Pak is an emblematic figure of the July 1st Economic Measure that promoted pragmatism. His reinstatement could be connected with an economic policy shift back to pragmatism after the anti-market currency reform failed.”

In a bid to curb the burgeoning merchant class and strengthen its socialist system, North Korea implemented a surprise currency reform in November, knocking two zeros off its denominations. But the move backfired, worsening food shortages and triggering social unrest.

Apparently taking responsibility for the botched reform, Premier Kim Yong-il was replaced by Choe Yong-rim in June.

The broadcast report on Saturday did not specify which department of the Workers’ Party Pak joined, but it is likely that he was posted to the light industry department, considering the ceremony involving a restaurant and the fact that he was the department’s first deputy director in 1993.

Pak is believed to be a close confidante to Jang Song-thaek, vice chairman of the National Defense Commission and brother-in-law of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. Jang is seen as the central figure in grooming Kim’s third and youngest son, Jong-un, as the next leader.

Japan’s Mainichi Shimbun reported on Aug. 15, quoting multiple sources, that Pak and about 20 other figures close to Jang had been reinstated within the past two years. The report also said Pak has risen to the second highest spot in the party’s light industry department, which is headed by Kim Kyong-hui, Kim Jong-il’s sister and Jang’s wife.

According to the New York Times:

He is the latest among senior North Korean officials whose sudden banishment and equally unexpected reinstatement have sparked outside speculation about Mr. Kim’s intentions. Mr. Pak appeared to have fallen from Mr. Kim’s favor when he was fired from the premiership in 2007 and sent to work as a factory manager in a provincial town.

“His reinstatement could signal the return of pragmatists and reformists,” said Cheong Seong-chang, a North Korea analyst in the Sejong Institute south of Seoul. “We may be able to see him push the economic reform and openness he had once championed.”

Analysts in Seoul say that few North Korean officials wield much individual influence in Mr. Kim’s government. But they say that they can infer Mr. Kim’s plans from the way he punishes and rewards officials identified with various policy approaches.

“Pak’s reinstatement indicates that North Korea is shifting back to market reforms, even if grudgingly, after its botched attempt to re-enforce state control on the economy,” said Baek Seung-joo, the head of North Korea research at the government-financed Korea Institute for Defense Analyses in Seoul.

Mr. Pak, a lifetime technocrat, was best known as the architect of “Measures to Improve Economic Management Order.” Issued on July 1, 2002, they indirectly acknowledged the failure of the North’s ration system by instructing factories, collective farms and other economic units to provide their own daily necessities and give incentives for workers.

In September 2003 Mr. Pak was made prime minister, a post in charge of carrying out economic policies.

His reforms were necessitated by the collapse of the centrally planned economy after a famine in the mid-1990s. But they also coincided with — and fueled — the spread of private markets, which quickly emerged as a key source of food and other necessities for North Koreans.

But Mr. Pak’s reform programs irked the government’s old guard, especially in the hard-line military, which had grabbed the lion’s share in trade under the old system. The markets facilitated the influx of DVDs and other smuggled goods the government considered a capitalist threat.

Around 2005, North Korea began controlling markets. Its attempt to reinforce state control on the economy peaked late last year when it replaced its banknotes with a new currency, shut down markets and ordered people to buy goods only from state-run stores. The currency reform was aimed at stifling the markets by drastically reducing traders’ personal wealth in the old currency.

The moves quickly backfired. Inflation surged as traders hoarded their goods and government stores failed to meet demand. Sporadic protests were reported. Earlier this year, Pak Nam-gi, head of finance and planning who led the failed currency reform, was executed, according to South Korean news reports. North Korean markets began coming back to life, according to recent defectors.

Pak Pong-ju, the former prime minister, returns as North Korea prepares for a party caucus early next month. Officials and analysts in Seoul say they will monitor the meeting for changes in the cabinet and party leadership that might provide clues to Mr. Kim’s plans to hand over power to his third son, Kim Jong-un, who is in his late 20s.

Mr. Pak’s reinstatement adds to the growing influence of Jang Song-taek, Mr. Kim’s brother-in-law, said Mr. Baek, the researcher.

In June, Mr. Kim presided over a session of the rubber-stamp Supreme People’s Assembly where Mr. Jang, a potential caretaker for his son, was elevated to the No. 2 post in the ruling hierarchy. In the same meeting, Mr. Pak’s successor as prime minister, Kim Yong-il, who reportedly made a rare apology in February for the botched currency reform, was fired.

Mr. Pak, as first deputy director, is believed to report directly to Kim Kyong-hee, Mr. Kim’s younger sister and Mr. Jang’s wife, who works as party director in charge of the North’s light industries, Mr. Cheong said.

Read the full stories here:
N. Korean ex-PM Pak Pong-ju appears to be back in power
Yonhap
8/21/2010

North Korea Reinstates Market-Oriented Official
New York Times
Choe Sang-hun
8/23/2010

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Daily NK on the life of a pilot

Friday, August 20th, 2010

Story 2: The Inauspicious Life of Pilots
Daily NK
Yoo Gwan Hee
8/20/2010

…In North Korea, pilots receive top class treatment alongside submariners and the missile corps. They live above the law in many ways. For instance, if a pilot murders someone in society and then returns to their unit, M.P.s cannot arrest them.

While the top choice of middle school graduates is to work in the No.5 Department of the Central Committee of the Party, that which oversees every aspect of Kim Jong Il’s life, pilot is a popular second choice. The primary condition for selection is family background.

Until the 1980s, offspring of normal workers could be selected if they had a good academic record and enough physical strength. However, any person whose family had committed a political crime was excluded. Also, if a family member had sided with South Korea or went missing during the Korean War, they would be excluded, too.

Until this period, the occupation of pilot was deemed to be a dangerous job and children of the elite did not consider it as a career. However, as the economic crisis began in the 1990s, this view changed. Many of the children of elite officials now choose to become pilots.

Currently, pilots still receive ‘special treatment’ in North Korea; however, it is not particularly special any more. Compared to Party officials, who make money in business, the feeling of deprivation which pilots feel has increased a lot.

Pilots are still bound to the state for their living, while the elite increase their wealth and authority through foreign currency earning and market business.

Until the early 1990s, “No. 4 supplies,” which are given to pilots, were free and extras were sold to their families if necessary. Also, since North Korea was worried about the pilots’ mental states, they took care of family issues and distributed supplies to their families once a month.

Even during “The March of Tribulation” in the mid-1990s, normal food distribution was given to families of pilots. However, as the atmosphere in society changed, their stress is increasing. Children of pilots are becoming a target in schools; teachers demand much of pilots’ children first.

Air Force Units receive a relatively good coal supply, however, since the absolute quantity is still lacking, they need to prepare firewood on their own, too. Until the early 1990s, if one or two packs of cigarette, soybean oil, and beer were given to workers on a farm in the surrounding area or a forest ranger, firewood might come in return. However, the times have changed.

Wives of pilots also have to enter the battle. Wives sell distributed supplies to wholesalers or sell them directly in farming villages in the surrounding area.

However, even in the situation where a lot of workers receive not even a single grain of rice from the nation, the supply for pilots is still special. However, since pilots do not have the authority to use it for business and bribery like other officials; their practical standard of living is not very different from a person who sells home appliances in the market.

The biggest stress which North Korean pilots feel is their concern for their old age. Currently in North Korean society, the treatment you receive in active duty and that of the retired are very different.

Until the 1990s, North Korea praised pilots as a “treasure of the nation” and promised them lifelong care. But after 2000, the retired were completely abandoned. The national pension is worth less than a price of one kilogram of corn.

Usually in other countries, the rising generation has more discontent toward the government compared to the mature group, but in North Korea it is the opposite and this is the reason for the phenomenon. When retired, they need to farm or do business in the market, but retirees are short of market experience and strength. Current pilots, observing the lives of their former comrades, cannot feel comfortable about it.

Now we are in an era where even a pilot receiving “top” level treatment from North Korea attempts an escape, and this is not surprising anymore.

Story 1: Pilot Privileges Fade into History
Daily NK
Yoo Gwan Hee
8/11/2009

…[S]pecial employees, such as air force pilots or submarine captains, belong to a class which is treated as the most exceptional in North Korea (notwithstanding officials or members of elite organizations). Before the start of the 21st century, pilots enjoyed considerable privileges. The North Korean state paid special attention to cultivating pilots, showering them with preferential treatment. Goods provided to pilots and their family members were entirely free and a separate compensation-based ration system applied to the whole group.

So, in the North, the closest thing to a “summer vacation” as enjoyed by the people of the free world would inevitably be the “recreation” of pilots. In North Korea, pilots and their family members were permitted vacation once a year and once every two years, respectively. Submarine captains were entitled to similar terms.

Some of the recreation centers used by pilots and their families include the “Galma Recreation Center” in Wonsan, the “Sokhu Recreation Center” in South Hamkyung Province, and the “Jooeul Recreation Center,” among others. All are located near the ocean, and are unparalleled in terms of scenery. In the case of the Galma Recreation Center, there are two buildings housing bedrooms for the visitors standing side-by-side in a shady area, while a separate dining hall and indoor gymnasium can also be found.

Usually, three to four singles and four to five married households from one unit (regiment level) could use the recreation center at any one time.

Single and family rooms are separate. In the former, there are four single beds and in the latter, two double beds. According to regulations, only two children per family are permitted; those who need to bring three or four children have to work out an arrangement with the management office.

In the centers, there is no designated work, but meals and sleeping times must be strictly kept. Breakfast begins at 7:30 A.M., lunch at 12:30 P.M. and dinner at 6 P.M.; naps can only be taken between 2 and 4 P.M. Bedtime is fixed at 10 P.M. Guests have to strictly adhere to these times.

Besides these restrictions, the visitors have the freedom to spend time as they want. Some people play Chinese chess (janggi) and others cards while the rest may choose to head for the beach.

The menus for the week are displayed next to the windows from which the food is served. Soup and bowls of rice are distributed per person and up to four side dishes are distributed to each table (a table consists of two groups).

Until the early 1990s, the most popular food among those served at the recreation centers was bread made in the former Soviet Union. Every morning, a Russian bread called “Khleb,” on which butter or powdered sugar could be put, was provided. The fruit which was given to each person at lunchtime was also popular with the visitors.

The period of recreation enjoyed by pilots was usually 20 days. However, some families, rather than using up all of their days, left the recreation centers in a hurry to visit parents or relatives in their hometowns. Usually, an additional 15 days of vacation was added unto the 20 recreation days, during which many people take trips to their hometowns.

Some diligent wives would continue to work even while in the centers. Surrounding the Galma Recreation Center, located on the shore of the East Sea, or the Sokhu Recreation Center are heaps of seaweed which are washed ashore with the tides. The wives, after washing the seaweed in the ocean water, dried it on the seashore.

Two or three 50-kg bags are barely sufficient for that much dried seaweed. Wives sent these to their in-laws or families with satisfaction.

However, such extravagant levels of recreation for pilots began to disappear in the mid-1990s with the March of Tribulation. Now, even when the state issues recreation permits, people tend to take off for hometowns, not to recreation centers.

Further, with the decline in the national esteem of pilots in recent years and due to the fact that the items which are provided as rations tend to be sold in the markets for additional income, the luxurious lives of the special class are becoming less impressive all the time. Recently, some pilots have even been selling their cigarette rations (one month’s worth) in the jangmadang.

Corruption also afflicts pilots to no small extent. Schools request additional money and products from the children of pilots, due to the popular image of affluence they command.

The sense of deprivation among pilots and family members, who are supposedly among the most revered people in North Korea, has been growing. Their status has indeed decreased over the years; one cannot ignore the fact that the standard of living of private merchants or foreign currency earners has now outpaced that of pilots, who are dangerously dependent on rations for their survival.

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Daily NK proposes “pet sanctions”

Thursday, August 12th, 2010

According to the Daily NK:

It has been suggested that pets should added to the list of “luxury goods” sanctioned and supposedly out of reach of the Kim Jong Il regime.

While “thoroughbred horses” are already a luxury good on the EU’s list of banned products published in the final version of the “Report to the Security Council from the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874”, there is nothing about pets.

However, according to one anonymous source well-versed in North Korea matters, Kim Jong Il has been known to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars on pets from France and Switzerland.

The money for his purchases apparently comes from the No. 39 Department of the Central Committee of the Party, according to a Daily NK source, and since the funds generated by the No. 39 Department come from illicit activities such as selling weapons, drugs, counterfeit cigarettes and super notes, he believes this pet-related trading must also be put on the list of sanctioned “luxury goods.”

Among dogs, for example, Kim apparently has a preference for the Shitzu and has spent many thousands of dollars purchasing and raising them. Kim Chun Hyung, a Seoul-based veterinarian, confirmed the price of such fine breeds, saying, “The price of pets is very diverse, but when you import a purebred you may need to pay tens of thousands of dollars.”

Jang Jin Sung, a poet who was said to be Kim Jong Il’s favorite poet in North Korea until he defected in 2004, described how much Kim Jong Il loves his pet dogs in an interview on Wednesday, explaining, “I was invited to a no.1 event, in which Kim Jong Il is set to appear, at Kim’s Kalmacheon Villa in Wonsan, Kangwon Province. Security was so fussy that they forced us to disinfect our hands, and then I waited for him nervously.”

“All of sudden a small white puppy appeared, which made me wonder, but then Kim Jong Il entered the hall behind it,” Jang said. “While Kim was having dinner, the puppy walked around without restriction. When it approached Kim, he petted it many times.”

The anonymous source said that Kim is always accompanied by dogs to his onsite inspections, adding that their food and shampoo is all imported, from France in the case of shampoo.

When the animals fall sick, top quality vets from foreign countries are invited to Pyongyang or the animals are taken overseas for treatment, the source said, adding, “The reason why they go by plane is for ease of customs clearance.”

The responsibility for importing pets is the job of overseas-based officials, but due to Kim Jong Il’s picky taste, especially in cats, they find it hard to match the color of fur or eyes that Kim likes, according to the source. 

Read the full story here:
Pets Are Luxury Goods, Too
Daily NK
Shin Joo Hyun
8/12/2010

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