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KINU “Business Conglomerates Appearing in North Korea”

Thursday, January 3rd, 2008

Daily NK
Yang Jung A
1/3/2008

Through its publication “North Korea is Changing” the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) highlighted numerous changes and reforms that have occurred in North Korea due to the 2002 “July 1st Economic Maintenance Reform Policy” (Hereon referred to as the “July 1 Policy”). This publication deals with the changes the North Korean economy is undergoing following the economic crisis of the 1990s, and expounds on the country’s prospects for future economic reform.

The following is a summary of the main points introduced in the publication.

The “Invisible Hand” at Work in North Korean Markets

Following the enactment of the July 1 Policy in 2002, agricultural markets transformed into general markets. Soon, industrial products were being sold alongside agricultural products as the free market spirit spread to the country’s distribution system.
Along with the rise of general markets, street markets, and individualized commercial activities, a new merchant class is emerging. People who are able to put to use business acumen and an understanding of market principles are able to accumulate personal wealth. This demonstrates that aspects of Western-style rationalist thinking, including the pursuit of profit-seeking are being instilled in the minds of the North Korean people.

It is difficult to say if this experiment in free market economics will be successful in the long run. More than anything, due to the rigidity of the North Korean regime, the realm in which the “Invisible Hand” can operate is greatly restricted. This is the fundamental paradox facing North Korea’s prospects for reform and opening.

“Hardworking Heroes” Become “People with Two Jobs”

As the economic difficulties became severe, work opportunities evaporated. Living off of the wages provided by the state became impossible. North Korean laborers responded to this by taking on side jobs or engaging in independent sales.

According to defectors living in South Korea, after the July 1 Policy, there has been an increase “People with Two Jobs.” These are people who are engaging in economic activities additional to their primary occupations. People are beginning to accept the notion that it is better to work for personal benefits than to receive the title of “Hardworking Hero.”

Such phenomena have also changed people’s perceptions about occupations in general. For example, the elite classes now prefer diplomatic positions and jobs where they can make international connections, rather than working in party or government positions. The common people prefer agricultural jobs with the benefits of access to the food distribution system and the ability to earn side profits by being a merchant. In addition, common people also prefer being personal drivers, photographers, workers at the Food Distribution Office, servicepersons, or fishermen.

Business Conglomerates Are Emerging in North Korea

With the implementation of the July 1 Policy, North Korea has witnesses the creation of its first business conglomerates. A case in point is the Korea Pugang Corporation, which has expanded to include 9 subsidiaries and 15 foreign offices engaging in various lines of work. The website of the “Korea Pugang Corporation” reveals that the company has around $20 million in capital and does an average of $150 million of business each year.

The executives in charge of the company’s growth are brothers Jon Sung Hun and Young Hun. President Jon Sung Hun is in his early 50s and studied abroad in Tanzania before returning home to teach English at Kim Il Sung University. He later became a businessperson. His English skills are among the top 10 in North Korea. Young Hun is in his 40s and is the president of a company affiliated with the Finance and Accounting Department of the Workers’ Party. His company dominates North Korean diesel imports.

If the Jon brothers are the representative examples of conglomerate-based new capital, Cha Chul Ma ranks high among those who earned capital due to their power in North Korean society. With his focus on doing business with China, Cha is known for his ability to earn foreign currency and dominates the foreign currency earning businesses belonging to the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly. His personal wealth is said to be over $10 million.

As the son-in-law of Lee Jeh Gang, the First Vice Director of the Guidance Department of the Workers’ Party, Cha gets some support from his father-in-law. Cha, who is known to live so freely that he was seen wearing Bermuda shorts on the streets of Pyongyang, is said to be a “Representative Case of a North Korean who succeeded in business on his merits, regardless of assistance from surrounding figures”.

The Number One Worry is Sustenance

North Koreans are said to live three different lives: their family lives, their working or school lives, and their political lives. Their lives are organized by politics from “cradle to grave,” and they must attend various political meetings, organizations, and study sessions. However, there are many people who are unable to participate in regular meetings of their political units due to economic difficulties. As they do not receive sufficient food distributions and their wages are too low, they must seek their food independently through individual economic activities.

Because the transportation infrastructure in the country is not advanced, it takes at least half a month to one month to go into the countryside to search for food and then they must return and sell the food or daily-use items they acquired, leaving little time for any other activities. Ninety percent of North Koreans engage in some form of business, and as a result, only an estimated 30% to 60% participate in required political activities.

Marriage Culture

These days, in North Korea, the ideal spouse is the one who makes the most money. Previously, when North Korean women chose their spouses, they considered the social status of their potential suitor. However, after the economic crisis, they started to prefer businesspersons and people who earn foreign currency, instead of discharged soldiers and cadres. For men as well, they now prefer money to looks as society increasingly revolves around the economy. As a result, an overwhelmingly higher proportion of men marry older woman than before.

Marriage customs are simplifying as well. Before the economic crisis, women usually provided the domestic items for the household and men provided the estate. However, after the economic crisis, dowries have downgraded into simple things like clothes. Because the allocation of estates has been delayed, more and more people are living at their parents’ homes.

Especially for women, there have been some phenomenal changes. Many women consider marrying late or not marrying at all. Reasons for this include the fact that woman cannot marry men just because the men can’t work and needs a woman to bring home money. Even in such a patriarchal culture, such complaints are becoming increasingly common.

Posted in 2002 Economic reforms, Agriculture, Cabinet, Civil society, Dating/Courting, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Korea Pugang Corporation, Political economy, Public Distribiution System (PDS), Supreme Peoples Assembly, Transportation, Uncategorized, Worker's Party | Comments Closed

Hoiryeong Gives Special Holiday Provisions in Commemoration of Kim Jung Sook’s Birthday

Thursday, December 27th, 2007

Daily NK
Lee Sung Jin, Yang Jung A
12/27/2007

In contrast to the news that Kim Kyung Hee (Kim Jong Il’s blood sister) will visit Hoiryeong in commemoration of the 90th birthday of Kim Jong Suk, it was confirmed that only upper-level Party officers participated in the celebrations.

Rumors started circulating early this year that Kim Jong Il would visit Hoiryeong, North Hamkyung, which is the birthplace of Kim Jong Il’s mother Kim Jong Suk. However, with the commemorative event approaching, Kim Kyung Hee, instead of Kim Jong Il, was supposed to visit Hoiryeong.

A source in Hoiryeong said in a phone conversation with a reporter on the 23rd, “An event commemorating the 90th birthday of Kim Jong Suk was held in Hoiryeong from the 18th to the 20th of this month and after the 20th, celebrations were held in Pyongyang. Kim Kyung Hee, who was supposed to come, did not show up.”

He added, “Provisions resumed on the 21st in time for the holiday (Kim Jong Suk’s birthday). Items that were given out were rice, corn, noodles, and oil. Holiday provisions such as liquor, gum, juice, socks, hot pepper paste, snacks, and soap were disbursed starting on the 23rd.“

The footsteps of Pyongyang’s upper-level leaders have not ceased coming into Hoiryeong. Chairwoman Park Soon Hee of Union of Democratic Women, Im Kyung Sook of the Ministry of Commerce and other representatives females in North Korea visited Hoiryeong and participated in the 90th anniversary commemorations.

The news of Kim Jong Suk’s 90th birthday anniversary commemorations has been relayed through North Korea’s media.

The Chosun Central Television, with Kim Jong Suk’s birthday coming up, reported on the 21st that oath ceremonies at the party, army, and office levels took place in Hoiryeong on the 20th.

At the ceremony site, the broadcast relayed that large-sized banners were set up praising Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il and the propagandistic signs stating, “Our greatest tribute to Mother Kim Jong Suk, the anti-Japanese heroine. May the revolutionary life and the results of the struggles of the great brethren Kim Jong Suk be immortal!”

The participants in the commemoration were Kim Il Cheol (Minister of the People’s Armed Forces), Kim Jung Gak (First Vice Director of KPA General Political Department), Choi Tae Bok and Kim Ki Nam (the secretaries of the Central Committee of the Party), Yang Hyung Sup (the Vice-Chairperson of the Supreme People’s Committee), Jeon Seung Hoon (the Vice-Minister of the Cabinet), and others high level officials.

In Hoiryeong, a joint performance by the People’s Army’s orchestra opened the day with a concerto “May the loyalty go on forever.” On the 19th, the “Nationwide Youth Students’ Poetry and Singing” took place among 3,000 participants, which consisted of youth and related persons of the Youth League Central Committee in each region.

Even prior to this, the nationwide landscape and crafts exhibitions commemorating Kim Jong Suk 90th birthday anniversary were held on the 12th at the Pyongyang International Cultural Exhibition Hall and on the 18th, a variety of events such as the opening of the Central Arts Show at the Korean Fine Arts Museum was held.

One researcher at a national policy research institute said regarding Kim Kyung Hee’s absence, “It is known that she has been suffering from an alcohol addiction for a long time, so does not make frequent public appearances.”

Posted in Cabinet, Central Committee, Civil society, Domestic publication, Korean People's Army, KPA General Political Bureau, Public Distribiution System (PDS), Supreme Peoples Assembly, Worker's Party | Comments Closed

NK Forced to Revert to Agricultural Market System?

Tuesday, December 11th, 2007

Daily NK
Jung Kwon Ho
12/11/2007

Several sources in China have relayed that it is rumored North Korean authorities are planning to take extreme measures to prevent the sale of industrial products at the jangmadang (markets) next year.

One Chinese merchant, whom DailyNK met in Dandong, China on the 6th, said, “Rumors are circulating that a measure preventing all kinds of Industrial products from being sold in the jangmadang will be implemented next year, making Chinese merchants involved in trade between North Korea and China nervous.”

He informed that “In place of industrial products, only farm produce from the fields of homeowners will be allowed to sell in the jangmadang. Marine products that up to now have been selling in the jangmadang will only be made available at appointed marine shops, meat products at food shops, and industrial products at state operated stores.”

The Chinese source also maintained that, “There are quite a few overseas Chinese who, not knowing what will happen, have bought loads of industrial products with the idea that this might be their last chance, and they have brought them into the North.”

The North Korean authorities began unfolding a series of market regulations immediately following the Inter-Korea Summit in October. These included such policies as limiting the types of items for sale and imposing a minimum age limit on female merchants. However, limiting the sale of industrial products themselves, after having abolished permanent markets, can be seen as a means of returning to “agricultural markets,” where farmers traded only vegetables and a surplus of produce.

According to other Chinese merchants with whom DailyNK met in Dandong on the 3rd, “Under the name of the North Pyongan Party Committee in Shinuiju, a three-day meeting was held between the Secretaries of the Party and of the Army and enterprise managers, from November 20th to the 22nd.”

They informed that “The meeting was held to discuss whether to prohibit jangmadang operations and put people who have been trading in the market to work at enterprises or factories, since regular provisions will resume starting next year.”

The recent efforts to regulate the markets have been analyzed as means to revert the standard of societal regulation to that of the pre-90s by restoring the provision system and normalizing factory operations. However, such an extreme measure is likely to give rise to serious civilian opposition, so there are doubts as to whether or not it can be realized.

The North Korean civilians, before the mid-90s, relied on a complete provision system supplied by the State, which included the provision of goods such as soap, clothes and other necessities. However, after the food shortage, the national provision system completely collapsed. As a result, civilians began acquiring most necessities, goods and food items through the jangmadang.

However, agricultural markets, where miscellaneous cereals, vegetables and other agricultural items raised in home gardens were traded, existed around the time when North Korea’s provision system was in normal operation.

Following the execution of the “July 1st Economic Management Improvement Measure” of 2002, the North Korean government established general markets which brought simple agricultural markets out in the open in February 2003. Since then, individuals leasing stands from the city mercantile department have been able to sell all kinds of industrial products as well.

One source in Chongjin stated in a phone conversation on the 6th regarding the recent rumors, “If the sources are Chinese merchants, than the rumor is not likely groundless. A majority of citizens sustain their livelihoods through the jangmadang.”

He agreed that “It is highly feasible that measures to toughen the regulation of industrial products in the market will be executed.”

Posted in 2002 Economic reforms, Agriculture, Black markets, China, Civil society, Economic reform, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), International trade, Labor conditions/wages, Light Industry, Manufacturing, Price liberalization, Private property, Public Distribiution System (PDS) | Comments Closed

Pyongyang Citizens, “Life Has Gotten Tougher Since the Inter-Korean Summit”

Wednesday, November 28th, 2007

Daily NK
Kwon Jeong Hyun
11/28/2007

A source inside North Korea reported on the 26th of November that the country’s food distribution system did not operate properly and the regime strengthened its control over the market in the Pyongyang areas in the second half of November.

“Most residents of Pyongyang’s core districts such as Joong and Botongang district received their food rations. However, only a half of those who live in Moonsu-dong, Chungryu-dong and Soryong-dong of the Daedonggang district received their rations,” the source said.

“An announcement was displayed on a board in front of the Soryong- 2- dong distribution office in the Daedongdang district, stating, ‘Rice to be redistributed as soon as enough rice is secured,’” the source said. The source added that the crop distributed to the people was composed of 80 percent Annam rice and 20 percent corn, and many people complained about its poor quality.

The North’s food distribution system has worked out well in the west Pyongyang area such as Joongu, Botongang and Pyungcheon district. However, the regime has intermittently distributed food rations to residents in the east Pyongyang area such as Daedongang, Dongdaewon, and Sungyo district.

For instance, in August, no food was distributed in the east Pyongyang area. In September, only a half of residents in the area received food rations. In the following month, all received their food. In November, not all received their rations as in September.

When there is no food distribution, people have to procure rice by themselves in the market.

Unfortunately, that is not an easy task. Since the North Korean authorities have fixed the price of rice at 700 won/kg in the markets of Pyongyang, many merchants are not willing to bring out rice for sales. Instead, they clandestinely sell rice at 1,300 won/kg only to individuals with whom they are acquainted.

The price of rice went up to a high of 1,800 won/kg in the mid October, but now remains steady at 1,300 won/kg. As long as the regime tries to control the price of rice, few merchants would sell rice in the open market, thus contributing to a hike in prices.

In the mid November, corn was sold at 500 won/kg, pork at 3,000 won/kg, an egg at 200 won each, Chinese cabbage at 500 won/kg, and domestic cabbage at 300won/kg in the markets of Pyongyang. The rice of cabbage has rapidly dropped as the state released cabbage into the market because November is a season of preparing Kimchi for winter. Domestic cabbage was sold cheap due to its poor quality.

The regime continues to control the markets in Pyongyang. It prohibits all females under 48 years old from doing business in the market. In addition, merchants are not allowed to sell more than 15 items. The regime enforces its market regulatory measures by having organized groups of inspectors composed of young people and ordered them to regularly patrol markets.

The source said, “As the food situation is getting worse and the state is intensifying its control over the market, Pyongyang citizens begin to express a sense of disappointment with South Korean President Roh.” The source said, “After the inter-Korean summit meeting, many fostered the hope that President Roh would help solve food shortage problems and the regime would adopt reform policies. However, that did not happen. As the state tightens its control over the market, life has gotten tougher.”

“Some even went to so say that President Roh should not have come to the North,” said the source, echoing the uneasy sentiments among Pyongyang citizens.

Posted in Agriculture, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Price liberalization, Public Distribiution System (PDS) | Comments Closed

Jangmadang Will Prevent “Second Food Crisis” from Developing

Friday, October 26th, 2007

Daily NK
Kim Min Se
10/26/2007

There is a prospect of the rise of “second food crisis” next year because of the flood disaster and the resulting food shortage.

A senior researcher at Korea Rural Economic Institute, Kwon Tae Jin said warningly, “Unless North Korea comes up with a special plan to secure food supply, there will come another food crisis next year, which is as severe as the one in the mid and late 1990s.”

Kwon anticipated that North Korea would need 5.2 million tons of grain for domestic consumption. Unfortunately, it is expected that North Korea would produce around 3.8 million tons of grain. This means there will be a shortage of 1.4 million tons of grain.

The statistics indicates there is a real possibility of a food crisis. North Korean authorities announced that the flood inundated about 2.2 billion ㎡ of farmland, which accounts for 14 percent of the country’s farmland. It is estimated that 2.2 billion ㎡ of farmland produces at least 500,000 tons of grain.

However, another prospect says that although food shortage is inevitable, it will not lead to mass starvation in North Korea as it did in the mid-1990s. Most of defectors from North Korea said, “Since the mid-2000s, things have changed. There won’t be any serious starvation.” They said that the current situation is different from that of those days under the central food distribution system. They added that the Jangmadang (markets) economy has changed a way for life among North Korea people.

◆ The amount of demand for food is overestimated

It should be double-checked whether North Korea really needs a minimum of 5.2 million tons of grain. There is criticism that the estimate of food demand which was calculated by some South Korean experts on North Korea and relief organizations is unrealistic. It is also pointed out that the estimate is calculated based on the nutrition standard of South Korea.

Defectors said that mass starvation would not have occurred if North Korea had at least a half of 5.2 million tons of grain in the mid 1990s.

Although the international standard for daily nutritional intake is between 2,000 and 2,500 kcal/day, North Korea sets the standard at 1,600 kcal/day, which amounts to 450 grams of grain.

It is easy to estimate the minimum amount of food demand needed in North Korea. Let us say every individual including children and the elderly needs 550 grams of grain per day, which is equal to the daily amount of food distributed to every adult by the state. With the population of 22 million in North Korea, the country then needs 12,100 tons of grain each day and 4.4 million tons of grain per year.

It is known that the North Korean government provides 550 grams of grain for adults and 300 grams for both children and the elderly. According to CIA’s World Fact Book 2004, the population aged between 15 and 64 in North Korea is around 15 million, which accounts for 67.8 percent of total population. This means the population of children and the elderly together reaches about 7 million. If we do the math, we come into conclusion that the amount of food needed in North Korea every year is 3,777,750 tons of grain.

Recall that North Korean people had received the aforementioned amount of food through the state food distribution until early 1990s. Of course, the country did not suffer from mass starvation back then.

The mass starvation during the mid-1990s resulted from huge decrease in food production between 1994 and 1998. In those years, North Korea produced about 2 million tons of grain, which fell far below the needed levels of food production. Hwang Jang Yop, former secretary of the Worker’s Party also testified that in the fall of 2006, while he was still in North Korea, he once heard the secretary of agriculture Seo Kwan Hee worrying about extremely low food production.

Therefore, it is correct to estimate the minimum amount of food needed in North Korea at 3,777,750 tons of grain. If the food production decreases below 3 million tons, then the food prices will skyrocket, and the possibility of mass starvation will be increased.

◆ A New way of life among North Korean people helps prevent them from falling victim to starvation.

North Koran people do not believe in the state authorities any more. The people know that they suffered from horrible starvation because they relied on the state and its food distribution system. During the crisis, many people had desperately waited for food to be distributed until they collapsed and died. Nowadays, North Korean people find a means of living by themselves at Jangmadang.

“There is no free ride” is the words on everybody’s lips in North Korea, which means that everyone must work hard in order to make a living. The lowest class became a day laborer.

The mass starvation of the mid-1990s has brought a significant change into North Korean society. Except a few, most of North Korean people do not rely on the state’s food distribution system. Instead, they have come up with a variety of survival techniques such as engaging in business, illegal trade with China or real estate transactions, receiving support from defected family members, and house sitting.

In that manner, North Korean people make money and use it to buy rice. An affiliate at the Bank of Korea who studies price trends of North Korea said, “Since the adoption of the July 1 Economic Improvement Measure, the price of rice and corn has increased the least.” If the prices go up, people would tighten their belts and decrease their spending on every item except rice. This means they are not that vulnerable to starvation as they used to.

◆ Businessmen are good at securing food.

Recently, a number of rich businessmen have emerged. Some have tens of thousands dollars, and others as many as several million dollars. Groups of Jangmadang businessmen have been organized with these rich businessmen as the leaders.

These businessmen come and go to China as they please and supply food and goods to Jangmadang in North Korea. If the rice price in North Korea is expensive than in China, they buy Chinese rice and sell it at Janmadang. In this way, they help balance supply and demand at the market.

Furthermore, Chinese residents in North Korea and Chinese businessmen also joined the North Korean businessmen as providers at the market. They too sell food produced in China at Jangmadang when food prices go up in North Korea. If possible, they even sell rice reserved for the People’s Army. There was an accusation that the state authorities supplied food aid from overseas for the People’s Army while collecting food produced in North Korea at the same time.

Of course, some businessmen could deliberately keep a hold on food supply anticipating an increase in food prices. However, that kind of unfair activity is temporary. Although it is too early to tell, the “invisible hand” of the market, however small it is, is operating in North Korea and acting as a preventive measure against starvation.

Posted in Agriculture, Arduous March, Black markets, Economic reform, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Political economy, Price liberalization, Public Distribiution System (PDS), Uncategorized | Comments Closed

Market Prices Are Skyrocketing in North Korea

Friday, October 19th, 2007

Daily NK
Lee Sung Jin
10/19/2007

A study reveals that market prices have skyrocketed in North Korea since the massive flood disaster in August.

According to the study conducted by DailyNK in late September this year, the rice price in the northern part of North Korea increased by 500 North Korean won on average between early July and September. In the market in Sinuiju of North Pyongan Province, the rice price rose from 980 Won/kg to 1,400 Won/kg.

The price of imported rice from China also went up to 1,250 won/kg. The rice from South Korea was sold at 1,450/kg. In Gwaksan of North Pyongan Province, the domestic rice was sold at 1,370/kg, the rice from China at 1,500/kg, the rice from South Korea at 1,300/kg.

In Hoiryeong of North Hamkyung Province, the price of domestic rice was 900 won/kg in July but rose to 1,250 won/kg. In Kilju of North Hamkyung Province, the domestic rice was sold at 1,200 won/kg. This shows that the rice price in North Hamkyung Province did not increase as highly as the price in Sinuiju of North Pyungan Province. In Hoiryeong, the price of rice has been rising steadily from 820 won/kg in March.

The rice in Hoiryeong is cheaper than in Sinuiju because demand for corn is relatively high and food distribution is partly being operated in Hoiryeong.

Between July and late September, the price of wheat also rose from 900 won to 1,200 won, and the price of noodles from 1,000 won to 1,600 won. However, the price of whole corn, the staple food for the low-income families remained stable for the same period.

It was believed that the surge in food prices resulted from the massive flood damage which stroke North Korea in early and middle August. When vast areas of land in South Pyongan and Hwanghae Province, the major granary of North Korea, were submerged during the flood, it was expected that domestic crop production would decrease.

After the food crisis in 1990s, the demand for rice increases in every fall during which rice price is low and people tend to purchase in advance one-year supply for food. In this fall, however, the price of rice greatly rose because the shortage of food was anticipated.

Meanwhile, the surge in rice price illustrates that overseas food aid was not distributed to the people of North Korean. The illicit sale of rice originally distributed to the party cadres or People’s Army has not been fully activated in the market. In addition, the rise in rice price was triggered by the fact that the number of wholesalers stocking up rice in advance increased with the news that there would be a shortage of food.

In early August, the price of rice once surged to a high of 1,950 won/kg in the market in Sinuiju. Thereupon, there was a rumor going around that the rise in rice price resulted from the state’s ban on rice sale and had nothing to do with the flood. Anyhow, the rice price has been on the decrease since then, and in September it had remained at around 1,500 won/kg.

As opposed to the rise in rice price, the price of corn, the main diet for the low-income families remained stable. This means the possibility of massive starvation in North Korea is low this year. Moreover, that the corn price remained moderate when rice price went up by 500 won reflects that the economic situation of middle class has been stabilized over the years.

Along with the rise in food prices, the prices of industrial products or others have been soaring sharply. The price of pork increased from 2,300 won/kg to 3,000 won/kg, and the price of frozen Pollack from 3,500/fish to 4,800/fish

The prices of brown seaweed or fruit juice went up to around 2,000 won each. The price of the popular imported cigarettes, Cat, rose by 200 won being sold at a cost of 1,500 won.

As winter is coming soon, the heating fuel price increased. Brown coal was sold at a cost of 1,300 won for 20 kg, gasoline at a cost of 3,000 won/liter

The exchange rate also increased from one dollar to 3,100 won to one dollar to 3,300 won.

Posted in Agriculture, Economic reform, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Price liberalization, Public Distribiution System (PDS) | 1 Comment »

Rationing in Chongjin, Increased Control of the Civilians

Monday, September 17th, 2007

Daily NK
Moon Sung Hwui
9/17/2007

According to the inside source in North Korea, it was revealed on 13th that there has been partially a rationing in Chongjin, North Hamkyung since August.

This is the first time to have checked about nation rationing in Chongjin since the first Summit held on June 15, 2000.

This rationing has begun even before the flood occurred, which was prior to August. This is strong evidence that the North Korean food shortage was not in serious state. There has been acknowledgement that there has been food rationing even after the flood in the beginning of September.

There has been a case of rationing in Moosan, North Hamgyung and some other regions during the first Inter-Korea Summit in 2000. There is high probability that this rationing could have relation to the upcoming 2nd Summit in October.

The insiders spoke on the phone that, “All of a sudden the Chongjin distribution center opened and started supplying to the workers and their families, an old and feeble persons and wounded soldiers with a 15-days-worth of food since August.”

The special rationings that occurred on special occasions, like the birthdays of Kim Jong Il and Kim Il Sung was only given through the factories or People’s Units. The distribution center were often closed or usually used as the place for selling Chinese merchandises. The reason why the rationing has restarted through the distribution center is that the authorities are thinking of long-term rationings.

According to the inside source, the distributed food include corn, wheat and rice. It is hard to tell whether the rice was produced in the South or North because the rice was immediately packaged after it’s been produced from rice-polishing machines.

The inside source said that “Civilians are not in belief that there will be a continuance of rationing even in October, because there was just a 15-days-worth of rationing being distributed in September.” The rationing was only given to people who worked at particular factories which made profits.

Kim, who resides in Chongjin, staying in Hwoiryeong for his export business, claims that, “We have to get our attendance ballot stamped every day in our factory. For people who skip work for no particular reason, they are being ferreted out by the factory manager, and even the secretary of the Party. In the morning, there are so many meetings and conferences being held that it is difficult for us to think straight.”

Also, factories that had stopped functioning due to the electricity and resource loss, made workers show up at work and emphasized the importance of production culture and lifestyle culture, reinforcing the projects of fixing the buildings and cleaning the buildings.

“Our attendance is being reported on daily basis, so if we don’t go to work for several days, we are automatically taken to People’s Safety Agency immediately.”

For people who have made their livings through business are becoming increasingly dissatisfied by having to work in an inefficient factory. Some claim that, “Are we going back to how we used to be,” raising more concerns.

Kim states, “It’s not like they’re giving us abundant supply of food. We were able to breathe a little bit by doing our own business, but now it’s suffocating us to death.”

He added “We are now so strictly controlled with only a 15-days of rationing; can you imagine how much worse it can get if the rationing continues to supply fully in the future?”

The background of rationing has not been clear as of yet.

Kim Jong Il visited North Hamkyung for the onsite inspection in the beginning of August. This could be a temporary remedy taken by Kim Jong Il, to increase the effect of his visit. Furthermore, it could be his ways of increasing control on Hamkyung area, where the commute and trade with foreign countries is active.

The North Korean defector who came to South Korea in 2005, Park Jeong Chul (pseudonym) said, “The rationing can be a temporary remedy to appease the public anxiety with the upcoming Inter-Summit in October. It’s because North Korea has enough provisions for the army and there is pressure from the international society for North Korea to become more transparent, North Korea is pretending to oblige.”

Posted in Agriculture, Labor conditions/wages, Public Distribiution System (PDS) | Comments Closed

Price of Rice and Inflation

Sunday, August 19th, 2007

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
8/19/2007

Sometimes even Stalinist propaganda tells the truth. When the North Korean newspapers occasionally told grossly exaggerated horror stories about South Korean inflation, they stressed that nothing like that could possibly happen in North Korea. This was the case indeed. For nearly half a century, from the late 1950s to the late 1980s retail prices in North Korea remained essentially unchanged. One kilogram of rice cost 0.08 won in 1960. It was still the same price in 1990.

This was possible because almost nothing was actually “sold’’ in North Korea. Communist states often rationed goods distributed through retail trade, but in most cases it was only a handful of most prestigious goods that were subjected to rationing _ like, say, cars. North Korea went much further: by the early 1970s, retail trade in the North ceased to exist, being completely replaced by an elaborate public distribution system. Rations depended on a type of work performed, but also on one’s position within a complicated hierarchy of social groups, as well as one’s place of residence (inhabitants of major cities, and Pyongyang in particular, enjoyed much better rations than those in the countryside).

There were some markets, of course, barely tolerated by the government. But until the late 1980s markets were small, with their trade volume being almost negligible. It seems that most people were reasonably satisfied with what they could get from the state distribution system _ of course, it helped that they knew next to nothing about the situation in other countries, so they could not compare.

The situation began to change around 1990 when the old distribution system collapsed under the pressure of an economic crisis. From 1993-94 there were increasing problems with rations, and from around 1996 rations pretty much stopped altogether. Some food was still distributed in major urban centers, but even there the distributed amount was so meager that nobody could survive on rations alone. A large-scale famine ensued, with at least half to one million dead (the oft-cited figure of three million victims seems to be an exaggeration).

People turned to trade and handicrafts, and with this arrival of a market economy inflation became a North Korean phenomenon as well. Even in the 1980s market prices exceeded the official prices in the state shops. By the mid-1990s, the difference was much greater. In theory, rice still cost 0.08 a kilo, but by 2000 its price on the market reached 45-50 won. Official wages remained unchanged, however, so around 2001 the average salary was approximately 20 times less than the income necessary for physical survival. People had no choice but to augment their income.

The government understood that there was no way to restore the old system: a decade of economic crisis had undermined the basic machinery of distribution and obviously the system was beyond repair. Thus, in 2002 the much trumpeted “July 1 Reforms” were introduced.

It’s difficult to describe these measures as “reforms”–the government simply gave official recognition to the situation which had existed for quite a few years.

The distribution system (long defunct) was curtailed. There was a dramatic increase in the retail prices of basic goods and services _ obviously in an attempt to approximate the prices of the market. Thus, that one-kilo of rice which cost 0.08 won since July cost 44 won.

Wages increased as well. Obviously, the wage increase was not even, and some groups have gained _ or lost _ more than others. It was estimated that the average increase in wages has been approximately 2500 percent (that is, 25 times). At the same time, prices have increased 3000-4000 percent (that is, 30-40 times). This necessitated the issue of 1000 won bills _ the largest denomination in North Korean financial history since the 1959 currency reform. Later, 5000 won bills were issued as well.

But the measures had another effect. The increase in salaries meant that the market was instantly flooded with cash. Needless to say, the only outcome could be inflation. Some people speculated that this was the intention of the Pyongyang leaders who hoped to kick-start the economy in such a way. Perhaps. But I would not be surprised if in 15 or 20 years down the track we learn from interviews and talks with the planners of this reform that they did not really expect inflation. Pyongyang economic managers have not had much exposure to market theory, and are sometimes very naive in their understanding of these questions.

Indeed, by October 2002 the market price of rice had increased to 120 won per kilo. In 2003, the price doubled to 250-300 won, and now it is about 1000 won. Inflation has become a part of North Korean life.

What will happen next? Will the North Korean leaders manage to stabilize the situation, or will a new wave of economic crisis wipe out the entire North Korean system? We do not know yet. But it is clear that there is no return to old days when a kilo of rice could be had for 0.08 won _ that is, if you were lucky enough to live in an area where they distributed grain rations in rice, not in maize.

Posted in 1990s Famine, 2002 Economic reforms, Agriculture, Arduous March, Black markets, Economic reform, Fiscal & monetary policy, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), International trade, Price liberalization, Public Distribiution System (PDS) | Comments Closed

Famine: A Disaster Waiting to Happen

Sunday, July 8th, 2007

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
7/8/2007

Nowadays, the severity of famine appears to be a thing of the past _ at least outside Africa. Indeed, modern technology makes it possible to feed crowded cities almost effortlessly. Thus, any reports of famine nowadays can be argued to be the direct result of mismanagement and deliberate political decisions. The recent North Korean famine of 1996-2000 vividly demonstrates this and supports such a theory.

Stalinist agriculture has never been very efficient. The lack of incentive makes it sluggish and wasteful. However, in some cases, the heavy investments in machinery and fertilizers did, in fact, help to overcome some of the deficiencies created by the inept social system.

This was the case in North Korea. In the late 1950s all North Korean farmers were herded into the so-called “agricultural co-operatives.’’ While less restrictive than the “people’s communes’’ in Mao’s China, they imposed a harsher control than Stalin’s “kolkhozs.’’

The North Korean government invested heavily in agriculture. Its efforts produced a remarkably energy-intensive agricultural system. Electric pumps were running huge irrigation projects; chemical fertilizers and tractors were used on a grand scale. In attempts to reclaim arable land, steep hills were made into terrace fields. These fields, endorsed by Kim Il-sung himself, remained the poster image of North Korean agriculture until the mid-1990s.

Initially these efforts seemingly paid off. In the 1980s North Korea produced some 5-6 million tons of grain (largely, rice and maize) a year. Its population never enjoyed anything like the present-day South Korean abundance: meat or fruits were rare delicacies. Nonetheless, the 6 million tons of grain was sufficient to feed the country’s population. This was done through the rationing system. Depending on one’s position in the complicated hierarchy of social groups, daily rations varied from 500 to 900 grams per adult _ sufficient to provide enough calories.

But in 1991 the situation changed. The much trumpeted “self-reliance’’ of North Korea proved to be a complete fake. The Soviet decision to discontinue sales of oil and other goods at hugely discounted prices wrought havoc in the country’s economy. The agricultural sector was especially vulnerable, since without the heavy input of energy and resources it stood no chance of survival. Tractors required diesel oil, which was not forthcoming, and electric pumps could not operate when power stations were idle due to a shortage of spare parts.

In 1992-1993 the North Korean media began to argue the benefits of having only two meals a day as opposed to the traditional three, claiming the latter was unhealthy and excessive. By 1994, people in some remote areas could not get food for days at a time. They were issued the usual rationing coupons, but no foodstuffs were available in the shops. Rations were also cut. These were signs of things to come.

However, the North Korean government did not follow the example of China or Vietnam, where the return to private agriculture led to an instant revival in food production. In the early 1990s the Pyongyang leaders saw how the reformist Communist governments of East Europe had been wiped out, and they considered any reform potentially dangerous to their own survival. Thus, no reform was undertaken, and in the years 1992-1995 agricultural production continued its free fall.

And then the real catastrophe came. In July and August 1995 unusually heavy rains led to disastrous floods. The North Korean authorities blamed the floods for all subsequent developments. In the aftermath of the disaster, they even decided to break with the decades-old tradition of covering or playing down all the problems of their country. Pyongyang stated that some 5.4 million people had been displaced by the 1995 floods (the subsequent U.N. survey indicated that the actual figure was much smaller _ probably, by an order of ten). Politically, this was understandable: if the country was hit by a natural disaster of unprecedented proportions, the authorities were not to be held responsible!

There is, however, good reason to doubt these statements. After all, the Korean Peninsular is small, but impact of the very same floods on the South was negligible. However, the contribution of the flood to the disaster is undeniable. The already strained power grid was destroyed, and entire irrigation systems were wiped out. Most of the terrace fields, the pride of the “juche agriculture,’’ were simply washed away.

In 1996, the country harvested some 3 million tons of grain _ just above half the pre-crisis level. This meant famine. It was to last for four years and take between half million and one million lives.

Posted in 1990s Famine, Agriculture, Arduous March, Juche, Public Distribiution System (PDS) | Comments Closed

Purchase Popular Jangmadang Goods at State-Operated Stores

Tuesday, July 3rd, 2007

Daily NK
Yang Jung A
7/3/2007

A North Korean insider source relayed on the 2nd that citizens’ complaints have been rising because the North Korean government recently gave guidelines to sell a portion of products which have been selling with popularity at the jangmadang (markets) only at state-operated stores.

This source, who resides in North Pyongan, revealed in a phone conversation with DailyNK, “Recently, plastic floors have been popular, so “plastic sales” is earning a lot of money. However, government authorities have mandated that the commerce office directly oversee plastic floors and that they be sold at state-operated stores.”

The insider relayed, “Families above middle-class have been showing a lot of interest in acquiring furniture. Besides floors, drawers on which TV can be placed and cabinets displaying wines and others are very popular.”

Previously, floors made of paper covered the floors of houses, but since North Korean civilians’ standard of living started rising recently, Chinese-made plastic floors decorated in flowers is drawing popularity.

He said, “Rumor has been leaking that pork (1,700 North Korean won per kg), the price for which has declined recently, is also directly managed by the commerce office, along with plastic floors.” “Besides this, the complaints of merchants have been rising since rumor starting circulating that the list of items to be overseen by the office will increase.”

He added, “Would they want to do any business given that individual sales are discouraged and turned over to national control when sales go even remotely well? There are grievances due to the fact that earning a livelihood through jangmadang sales is not even allowed, on top of the lack of provisions.”

Further, he said, “Regulations regarding people engaging in “Chapan-Jangsa (sales by trucks)” using privately-owned buses or trucks exceeding eight tons have begun. If one is caught, the vehicles become registered as national property and the vehicle owner receives a salary from the country instead.”

“Chapan Jangsa” refers to carrying out wholesale while ferrying the load on trucks. The “plastic floor” and “Chapan Jangsa,” along with what is popularly known as “ice (drug) sales” are counted are the top three business that brings in the most amount of money.

“The complaints of people are high, but the scope of regulation is wide-ranging, so there are people who think that the inspections will stop after several times.”

Even guideline to prevent wearing of wedding dresses

He also said, “Since October 2006, there were even guidelines to prevent wearing of wedding dresses at weddings. Not only wedding dresses, but wearing white gloves were also prohibited.”

In North Korea, wearing wedding dresses at weddings became a trend seven to eight years ago. Nowadays, many civilians are known to wear them. Even if they do not wear wedding dresses, North Korea’s general wedding culture is donning flowers on the chest part of dresses and on the head and putting on white gloves.

Additionally, the insider relayed, “The size of the flower of the groomsmen and the bridesmaids should not be bigger than the groom’s and the bride’s. The flower of the groom and the bride is fixed at 7cm and the flower of the groomsmen and bridesmaids fixed at 5cm. In the case with those who go against the orders and get their pictures taken after marriage, the photo volunteer in charge’s volunteer card (employment permit) can be revoked.”

Posted in Automobiles, Black markets, Civil society, Economic reform, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Price liberalization, Private property, Public Distribiution System (PDS), Real estate, Transportation | Comments Closed

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