North Korean Economy Watch

Daily NK
Moon Sung Hwee
4/8/2008

April 8th is Postal Service Day in North Korea. Each province has a branch office of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications and Communication Maintenance Bureau. The postal system manages the distribution of letters, telegrams, telephone calls, TV broadcasts, newspapers and magazines. Additionally, they mint stamps and also operate an insurance agency in name only.

In the late 1990s, the national postal system was completely ruined

In North Korea, postal service offices are set up in each “ri”—a small village unit–, of each county to deliver letters, parcel posts and telegrams. Following the March of Tribulation in the late 1990s, the delivery system was completely destroyed and its formal structure was left in tatters. Even in the 1980s when the North Korean economy and people’s lives were relatively stable, it took around 15 days to two months on average to deliver a letter from Pyongyang to a rural village.

In the case of a telegram, it took generally 3 or 4 days to reach a postal office in a rural area. In the late 1980s, to guarantee efficiency within the telegram delivery system, the authorities supplied the offices with second-hand bicycles from Japan.

After the March of Tribulation, letters disappeared due to train delays and frequent blackouts, and the telegram service was virtually incapacitated due to the lack of electricity.

Telephones were restricted to control the outflow of national secrets

North Korea uses a separate electricity supply for its telephone system. Even if there is a power blackout in a village, villagers can still use the telephone network. In 1993, fiber-optic cables were installed and the use of mail and telegram services began to decline. North Korean people call fiber optic cable a “light telephone.”

North Korea built an automatic telecommunicates system by developing multi-communication technology with imports of machinery and by inviting engineers from China in 1998.

In 2003, authorities allowed cadres to use telephones in their houses and in 2005, they also allowed people to use the telephone at home as long as they paid 2,000 North Korean won (approx. USD0.6) a month (a monthly salary is 1,500 won per laborer).

In August, 2007, the government tightened regulations regarding the telephone system. People could make calls only within their province. Authorities said the reason was to prevent the outflow of national secrets.

The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications controls TV and other broadcasting. There is no cable TV in North Korea. Authorities set up an ultra-short wave relay station in each county to relay television broadcasts.

North Korea signed a contract with Thailand for satellite broadcasting and installed U.S.-made transmission and relay facilities in 2000.

People can now listen to “Chosun Central Broadcasting,” but in rural areas, it is difficult to recieve signals because the broadcasting facilities and cables have already begun to deteriorate.

People sarcastically say a “newspaper is not about news but about “olds.” The authorities pay special attention to the successful delivery of the Workers Party Rodong Shinmun bulletin. To deliver Rodong Shinmun from Pyongyang to each province or even to each city and county by train, it normally takes 4-5 days. Sometimes, it takes more than a week.

People also say they use an “oral-paper” to get information because rumors are faster than the Rodong Shinmun.

Postal service workers were dragged to prison camps

In 1992, the Minister and all related officials of Posts and Telecommunications were fired, and the Minister, the Vice Minister and their families were sent to political prison camps for having wasted national finances for the import of factory machinery to produce fiber-optic cables from the U.K.

They submitted a proposal to Kim Jong Il to buy factory machines in order to earn foreign currency through the production and export of fiber optic cables. However, in the end they eventually bought worn-out machines from the U.K. and failed to earn profits. In addition, they embezzled some of the funds.

In 2001, in Lee Myung Soo Workers-District of Samjiyeon, Yangkang Province, two office workers and a manager of a relay station broadcasted Chinese TV programs that they were watching to residents by mistake, so they were sent to a political prison camp and their families were expelled to a collective farm.

Agents of the National Security Agency are stationed at the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications in order to scrutinize mail, parcels, to tap telephone wires and to supervise residents.

The Ministry regularly dispatches professional engineers to the 27th Bureau, to the airwaves-monitoring station, and to the 12th Bureau, which was newly established to censor mobile phones.

On Postal Service Day, Chosun Central Agency often delivers praise for the development of North Korea’s postal system and facilities under the General’s direction.

However, most ordinary citizens will not be able to watch or read about it in time, for the lack of paper, electricity, infrastructure, and delivery systems.

Three weeks ago, the Daily NK specualted that preparations for North Korea’s political succession are leading to an end of “Songun” and a resurgence of the Korean Workers Party.  A recent story in the Donga Ilbo seems to be reinforcing this claim, noting that several assets in the military’s portfolio are being moved to various state institutions and ministries (where the Worker’s Party and probably Kim’s key supporters exercise more oversight).

Here is an excerpt from the story:

A knowledgeable source on North Korea said yesterday, “[Leader] Kim Jong Il has ordered the military to transfer its foreign operations to his cabinet and is implementing radical reform of military authorities.”

Kim ordered to reduce the number of executives and the size of the ruling Workers’ Party, government and military by 30 percent at the end of last year.

The source also said officers in the chain of command including the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces, the National Security Council, the Ministry of State Inspection and the General Staff Department began retiring in January.

The North Korean leader is also reportedly streamlining troop distribution. The North’s Border Guard Brigade has removed regiments and the role of the minting agency has shrunk.

The Ministry of People’s Security, considered the North’s main police organization, is seeing its status rise. No longer under the control of the prosecution, the ministry can now probe corruption in the prosecution and civilian damage caused by the military.

An Anti corruption campaign and purges might also be a part of this transition.

Read the whole story here:
N.Korea Changing ‘Military-First’ Policy
Donga Ilbo
3/12/2008

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 08-3-22-1
3/22/2008

Recently, North Korea passed a measure prohibiting women younger then 49 from selling goods in markets, leading to clashes between police enforcing the rule and younger women wanting to work in markets.

The March 19th newsletter from ‘Good Friends’, an organization providing aid for North Korea, reported that on February 5th in Haeju, South Hwanghae Province, women who were not allowed to enter the local market and so were selling goods on a nearby corner physically clashed and police. This reportedly led to the arrest and detention of 9 people.

The newsletter reported, “The women held at the police station were subjected to harsh interrogation as to ‘who was the ringleader’, and after being subjected to four days of torture, one who could no longer hold out confessed to being the ringleader and was sent to a detention center, while the remaining women were all released.”

North Korean authorities announced the measure restricting women under 49 from selling goods in markets after December 1st last year, and that measure is being enforced not only in Pyongyang, but in rural areas as well.

According to Good Friends, “Just like other cities, Haeju City has received absolutely no food rations since March,” and “Women from households barely managing regular meals through market trading are being reduced to the weakest level by North Korean authorities’ prohibition on trading.”

It follows that in Haeju City, either authorities recognize that if these women can not sell in the markets their families will starve to death and so turn a blind eye to their activities, or these women, prevented from selling in markets, will continue to clash with authorities.

The newsletter also reported, “On March 3, in Chungjin City, North Hamkyung Province, organized protests by women prevented from market activities by the new regulations broke out, and Chungjin City authorities are now allowing all women, with no exception, to sell goods in markets.”

Immediately following organized protests by these women, Chungjin City officials reported the disturbances, but no policies to deal with the issue were forthcoming, and so it appears that all women, with no exception, are now allowed to conduct market activities.

In the words of Alejandro himself:

[The] Korean Friendship Association concluded its first busines [sic] delegation, headed by Mr. Alejandro Cao de Benos, Special Delegate and KFA President, in collaboration with the DPRK Committee for Cultural Relations, Ministry of Trade and the DPRK Chamber of Commerce. The group included companies from Australia, France, Spain and Lebanon in different sectors like ship building, foodstuff production, medicine, IT and infrastructure, etc. The visit was a big success and 75% of the investors signed letter of intentions and contracts. All of the participants agreed that DPR Korea has a huge potential and new market with many interesting opportunities with the lowest taxes and wages but with the most skilled, motivated workforce. The companies fullfiled [sic] all their plans and resolved the questions during the visit and they had meetings with their Korean counterparts as well as with the officials of Trade, Chamber of Commerce, Banking authorities and logistics.

They visited a Foodstuff factory,  Heavy Machinery complex, Ostrich farm as well as the ‘Kaesong Industrial Zone’ in the border with South Korea, were they had a briefing by the Director representative of Hyundai-ASAN.

After that, the investors visited a South Korean cable-making factory and a garment manufacturing plant specialized in high quality sport brands.

From KFA we congratulate the companies that concluded agreements and established Joint Ventures in the DPRK and wish them success in their projects.

From a follow up post on the KFA forum, one of the attendees appears to be Mr. Kevin Liu, head of Asian Division of London-based Exclusive Analysis.

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 08-3-3-1
3/3/2008

In the latest issue (February 3rd) of the DPRK Cabinet bulletin, “Democratic Chosun”, it was reported that the first extended cabinet meeting of the year opened in the beginning of February, with Premier Kim Young-il presiding. The bulletin stated that the issue of accomplishing this year’s economic plans was discussed.

At the meeting, Vice Premier Kwak Bum-ki stressed that accomplishing this year’s economic goals was “essential for opening the doors to a breakthrough for building an economically strong nation,” and that it was the “fundamental task laid out before the Cabinet.” He went on to reveal the tasks and directives needed to revitalize all realms of socialist construction, which he stated was necessary to create a powerful and prosperous nation by 2012, the centennial anniversary of the birth of the late Kim Il Sung.

In particular, he called for the production of the “lifeline of socialist construction”, and specifically, electricity, coal, metal, and railways, which he referred to as the “four lines for the advance of the people’s economy.”

Accordingly, the goal of carrying out overwhelming repairs to power generation facilities, and at the same time constructing new power plants in order to increase electrical production capabilities by several hundred thousand kilowatts, was proposed.

The meeting also stressed the need for concentrating efforts on geological exploration and exploitation industries in order to reasonably development and use natural resources, for a change in production of goods necessary for daily life, and for a resolution to the people’s ‘eating problem’ alluded to in the recent New Year’s Joint Editorial.

The bulletin also reported that there was discussion on creating a new five-year plan for the development of science and technology, going as far as to say, ”the role of science and technology in the building of an economically powerful nation is decidedly large, and in order to answer the very real calls for development, [the issue of] strengthening international economic projects” was brought up.

Premier Kim Young-il, Vice-Premier Kwak Bum-ki, Chairman Kim Kwang-rin, of the Committee on National Planning, Park Nam-jil, of the Power Supply Industry Bureau, and Kim Yong-sam, from the Railways Bureau, were among cabinet ministers present.

The international press (and just about every blogger on the planet-including myself) has written something about the NY Philharmonic’s visit to North Korea last week.  Whether one believes that this event is a significant breakthrough in cultural relations or not, what has evaded direct discussion in the media is the purpose of cultural relations in the North Korean system (and indeed its predecessor – the Soviet system).

At the end of World War II, the DPRK imported many Soviet party, state, and military organizations.  One of these was the USSR All Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (known as ‘VOKS’).  Publicly, the mission of VOKS was to promote peace and understanding between the Soviet people and other peoples of the world.  However, the actual mission of VOKS was to promote Soviet ideology, policy, and influence overseas. 

VOKS began its mission in the 1920s.  It undertook activities such as: Attempting to influence French intellectual circles; bringing sympathetic individuals and groups to tour the Soviet Union to see how the construction of the worker’s paradise was proceeding; bringing students from the developing world to be educated in the Soviet Union; sending Soviet scholars and technicians to undertake development projects overseas, etc.  VOKS was even influential in the USA, where it supported a number of pro-Soviet civil society organizations. 

VOKS also played an important role in establishing the legitimacy of Soviet hegemony in North Korea following World War II.  Cultural delegations of North Koreans were taken to the Soviet Union to bear witness to the great accomplishments of the worker’s revolution.  Their impressions were then distributed to the North Korean population at large, along with many other cultural goods produced by the Soviet Union. 

Although VOKS’ success at swaying public opinion in the west is an unresolved question (as far as I know), the details of their activities are well known to western scholars since Soviet archive materials are readily accessible. Effective or not, the take away from this history lesson is that socialist countries have historically treated cultural relations activities, like everything else, as regime-enhancing activities.  In other words, they promote the political incumbents. 

The North Koreans copied VOKS wholesale from the Soviets, and this organization is still functioning in the DPRK today.  It is the Korean Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (CCRFC).  Although this body has been around since the founding of the DPRK, it is perhaps most known in contemporary times for supporting the Korean Friendship Association, numerous pro-Pyongyang “Friendship Societies,” and to a lesser degree, several leftist organizations such as the National Lawyers Guild.  These organizations tend to toe the party line and echo Pyongyang’s perspective in international debates.  At a minimum, they promote a marginal distrust of western media and historiography.

Based on the comments I have made so far, many might be led to believe that I am pessimistic on the positive impact that cultural relations broadly, and the the NY Philharmonic visit specifically, might have in changing the North Korean system.  But this would be a mistake.  Since the Arduous March and Kim Jong Il’s rise to power, North Korean institutions have undergone such a transformation that comparison with their Soviet predecessors might not be useful for understanding their purposes today.

Since 1997, the North Korean CCRFC has been chaired by Mun Jae Chol, a North Korean policy elite.  I just finished watching the NY Phil performance-here-and Mun Jae Chol is indeed in the audience, as are several people who work for him who I have met.  Mun Jae Chol took over the committee in 1997 (as best I can put together from KCNA reports–his promotion was not formally announced in the news), and since then the mission of the organization seems to have changed significantly.  To start with, the cold war is over.  North Korean cultural relations activities are not going to convince the world’s people that the North Korean government is the legitimate governing authority for the whole Korean peninsula.  No one will ever believe that now.

Since the propaganda war is over, and resources are scarce, the CCRFC seems to be  focused on generating foreign exchange revenue from tourism, cultural exchanges, and brokering foreign direct investment (all under the guise of their previous mission, however).  Under established laws and customs, the staff of the CCRFC are permitted to interact with foreigners and make regular trips overseas.  They are the very people who have an incentive to promote interaction with the west because they will directly benefit financially from it.  True these people are not paragons of liberalism, but they all own western clothes, use digital cameras, listen to iPods, broker deals between private North Koreans and foreigners (smuggle goods), and travel to China on a regular basis.  There are procedures in place to control their entrepreneurial tendencies, such as never allowing one guide to be alone with a foreigner, however, these rules can be evaded at minimal cost.  They might repeat what they are told to say, but they certainly know better.

Staff of the CCRFC include influential party members and security personnel.  Raising the frequency and profile of cultural relations activities with North Korea will increase the income of these individuals who can buy support directly through cash transfers, or indirectly through business deals, ultimately greasing the cogs of change in the North Korean bureaucracy towards a greater acceptance of openness.  Maybe.

Comment from Dr. Petrov:
CCRFC (known in North Korea as Taewe Munhwa Ryeollak Wiwonhoe or simply TaeMun) is indeed struggling to survive in the changing economic environment. Although most of the projects they try to lure foreigners into are devoid of economic sense, they are still pretty powerful and even allowed to invite journalists to visit N.Korea. Cooperation with CCRFC is a game of unpredictability but in some cases can lead to success. See a success story here.

The Chosun-Shinbo reports (via the Daily NK) “North Korea can produce instant noodles again” because construction has been completed on Pyongyang’s newest (and largest) noodle factory, the Pyongyang Wheat Flour Factory.

“Starting this year, domestically produced instant noodles will likely be supplied to people on a large scale.”(Daily NK)

…signaling that the DPRK government still seems intent on re-launcing the collapsed Public Distribution System (which has floundered many times).

[The] Pyongyang Wheat Flour Factory is located in Samheong-dong of Mankyungdae District, in Pyongyang, and mainly produces wheat flour, cookie, noodle, and yeast. North Korea built its first noodle factory, Daedong River Instant Noodle Factory, with foreign capital in August 2000 along the Daedong River in Pyongyang.(Daily NK)

Last October Yonhap, reported that Hyundai’s 44,000-strong union donated US$553,800,  appx. $13 per worker, to help finance a corn noodle factory in Pyongyang.  This is likely the “older” Daedong River Instant Noodle Factory.  If this is the case, then Pyongyang has two noodle factories coming on line at about the same time.

The rest of the story:
Although the DPRK government is a newcomer to the noodle business, noodle production and consumption have been burgeoning in North Korea’s private economy, and there is supportive journalistic evidence that the business now suports those on the lower rungs of the  economic ladder (see here, here, here, and here).  Small scale noodle production requires little capital, so it is a natural fit for those who have nothing but have taken to supporting themselves. 

The opening of new government-operated food processing plants is tantamount to a “re-nationalization” of a “privatized” industry in the DPRK.  Past reports claim that noodle sales earned private vendors between 900 to 1,600 won.  Now these vendors, who operate at the fringes of North Korea’s semi-legal private economy, will at a minimum, be forced to compete with “free” or heavily subsidized government operators. 

What will be the result?  On the pessimistic side, we could claim that the DPRK government is attempting to monopolize the food supply to control the population (as it has in the past).  On the other hand, their ambitions might be more modest and they are only looking to establish some form of carrot they can point to as legitimization of the government’s leadership.

From an economic reform perspective, however, North Korea needs fewer government-run noodle factories and a better business environment for noodle entrepreneurs. 

The full stories can be found here:
North Korea Can Produce Instant Noodles Again
Daily NK
Park Hyun Min
2/12/2008

Hyundai Motor union leaders visit N. Korea for noodle project
Yonhap
10/31/2007

Daily NK
Yang Jung A
1/3/2008

Through its publication “North Korea is Changing” the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) highlighted numerous changes and reforms that have occurred in North Korea due to the 2002 “July 1st Economic Maintenance Reform Policy” (Hereon referred to as the “July 1 Policy”). This publication deals with the changes the North Korean economy is undergoing following the economic crisis of the 1990s, and expounds on the country’s prospects for future economic reform.

The following is a summary of the main points introduced in the publication.

The “Invisible Hand” at Work in North Korean Markets

Following the enactment of the July 1 Policy in 2002, agricultural markets transformed into general markets. Soon, industrial products were being sold alongside agricultural products as the free market spirit spread to the country’s distribution system.
Along with the rise of general markets, street markets, and individualized commercial activities, a new merchant class is emerging. People who are able to put to use business acumen and an understanding of market principles are able to accumulate personal wealth. This demonstrates that aspects of Western-style rationalist thinking, including the pursuit of profit-seeking are being instilled in the minds of the North Korean people.

It is difficult to say if this experiment in free market economics will be successful in the long run. More than anything, due to the rigidity of the North Korean regime, the realm in which the “Invisible Hand” can operate is greatly restricted. This is the fundamental paradox facing North Korea’s prospects for reform and opening.

“Hardworking Heroes” Become “People with Two Jobs”

As the economic difficulties became severe, work opportunities evaporated. Living off of the wages provided by the state became impossible. North Korean laborers responded to this by taking on side jobs or engaging in independent sales.

According to defectors living in South Korea, after the July 1 Policy, there has been an increase “People with Two Jobs.” These are people who are engaging in economic activities additional to their primary occupations. People are beginning to accept the notion that it is better to work for personal benefits than to receive the title of “Hardworking Hero.”

Such phenomena have also changed people’s perceptions about occupations in general. For example, the elite classes now prefer diplomatic positions and jobs where they can make international connections, rather than working in party or government positions. The common people prefer agricultural jobs with the benefits of access to the food distribution system and the ability to earn side profits by being a merchant. In addition, common people also prefer being personal drivers, photographers, workers at the Food Distribution Office, servicepersons, or fishermen.

Business Conglomerates Are Emerging in North Korea

With the implementation of the July 1 Policy, North Korea has witnesses the creation of its first business conglomerates. A case in point is the Korea Pugang Corporation, which has expanded to include 9 subsidiaries and 15 foreign offices engaging in various lines of work. The website of the “Korea Pugang Corporation” reveals that the company has around $20 million in capital and does an average of $150 million of business each year.

The executives in charge of the company’s growth are brothers Jon Sung Hun and Young Hun. President Jon Sung Hun is in his early 50s and studied abroad in Tanzania before returning home to teach English at Kim Il Sung University. He later became a businessperson. His English skills are among the top 10 in North Korea. Young Hun is in his 40s and is the president of a company affiliated with the Finance and Accounting Department of the Workers’ Party. His company dominates North Korean diesel imports.

If the Jon brothers are the representative examples of conglomerate-based new capital, Cha Chul Ma ranks high among those who earned capital due to their power in North Korean society. With his focus on doing business with China, Cha is known for his ability to earn foreign currency and dominates the foreign currency earning businesses belonging to the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly. His personal wealth is said to be over $10 million.

As the son-in-law of Lee Jeh Gang, the First Vice Director of the Guidance Department of the Workers’ Party, Cha gets some support from his father-in-law. Cha, who is known to live so freely that he was seen wearing Bermuda shorts on the streets of Pyongyang, is said to be a “Representative Case of a North Korean who succeeded in business on his merits, regardless of assistance from surrounding figures”.

The Number One Worry is Sustenance

North Koreans are said to live three different lives: their family lives, their working or school lives, and their political lives. Their lives are organized by politics from “cradle to grave,” and they must attend various political meetings, organizations, and study sessions. However, there are many people who are unable to participate in regular meetings of their political units due to economic difficulties. As they do not receive sufficient food distributions and their wages are too low, they must seek their food independently through individual economic activities.

Because the transportation infrastructure in the country is not advanced, it takes at least half a month to one month to go into the countryside to search for food and then they must return and sell the food or daily-use items they acquired, leaving little time for any other activities. Ninety percent of North Koreans engage in some form of business, and as a result, only an estimated 30% to 60% participate in required political activities.

Marriage Culture

These days, in North Korea, the ideal spouse is the one who makes the most money. Previously, when North Korean women chose their spouses, they considered the social status of their potential suitor. However, after the economic crisis, they started to prefer businesspersons and people who earn foreign currency, instead of discharged soldiers and cadres. For men as well, they now prefer money to looks as society increasingly revolves around the economy. As a result, an overwhelmingly higher proportion of men marry older woman than before.

Marriage customs are simplifying as well. Before the economic crisis, women usually provided the domestic items for the household and men provided the estate. However, after the economic crisis, dowries have downgraded into simple things like clothes. Because the allocation of estates has been delayed, more and more people are living at their parents’ homes.

Especially for women, there have been some phenomenal changes. Many women consider marrying late or not marrying at all. Reasons for this include the fact that woman cannot marry men just because the men can’t work and needs a woman to bring home money. Even in such a patriarchal culture, such complaints are becoming increasingly common.

Daily NK
Park Hyun Min
12/28/2007

The future dream of North Korea’s teenagers is no longer to become party leaders or soldiers, or even join the Party, but to become “merchants.”

“Good Friends,” an aid organization for North Korea, said through “Today’s News on North Korea” No. 104 on the 27th, “Most of the elementary and senior middle school students nowadays, upon being asked what they would like to do post-graduation, say they would like to be merchants.”

The source relayed, “Many of their peers have stopped going to school and have started doing business. It is too burdensome for some students to attend school, so they sell noodles or vegetables by sticking around the jangmadang (markets) and contribute to their families’ livelihoods.”

(more…)

Daily NK
Lee Sung Jin, Yang Jung A
12/27/2007

In contrast to the news that Kim Kyung Hee (Kim Jong Il’s blood sister) will visit Hoiryeong in commemoration of the 90th birthday of Kim Jong Suk, it was confirmed that only upper-level Party officers participated in the celebrations.

Rumors started circulating early this year that Kim Jong Il would visit Hoiryeong, North Hamkyung, which is the birthplace of Kim Jong Il’s mother Kim Jong Suk. However, with the commemorative event approaching, Kim Kyung Hee, instead of Kim Jong Il, was supposed to visit Hoiryeong.

A source in Hoiryeong said in a phone conversation with a reporter on the 23rd, “An event commemorating the 90th birthday of Kim Jong Suk was held in Hoiryeong from the 18th to the 20th of this month and after the 20th, celebrations were held in Pyongyang. Kim Kyung Hee, who was supposed to come, did not show up.”

He added, “Provisions resumed on the 21st in time for the holiday (Kim Jong Suk’s birthday). Items that were given out were rice, corn, noodles, and oil. Holiday provisions such as liquor, gum, juice, socks, hot pepper paste, snacks, and soap were disbursed starting on the 23rd.“

The footsteps of Pyongyang’s upper-level leaders have not ceased coming into Hoiryeong. Chairwoman Park Soon Hee of Union of Democratic Women, Im Kyung Sook of the Ministry of Commerce and other representatives females in North Korea visited Hoiryeong and participated in the 90th anniversary commemorations.

The news of Kim Jong Suk’s 90th birthday anniversary commemorations has been relayed through North Korea’s media.

The Chosun Central Television, with Kim Jong Suk’s birthday coming up, reported on the 21st that oath ceremonies at the party, army, and office levels took place in Hoiryeong on the 20th.

At the ceremony site, the broadcast relayed that large-sized banners were set up praising Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il and the propagandistic signs stating, “Our greatest tribute to Mother Kim Jong Suk, the anti-Japanese heroine. May the revolutionary life and the results of the struggles of the great brethren Kim Jong Suk be immortal!”

The participants in the commemoration were Kim Il Cheol (Minister of the People’s Armed Forces), Kim Jung Gak (First Vice Director of KPA General Political Department), Choi Tae Bok and Kim Ki Nam (the secretaries of the Central Committee of the Party), Yang Hyung Sup (the Vice-Chairperson of the Supreme People’s Committee), Jeon Seung Hoon (the Vice-Minister of the Cabinet), and others high level officials.

In Hoiryeong, a joint performance by the People’s Army’s orchestra opened the day with a concerto “May the loyalty go on forever.” On the 19th, the “Nationwide Youth Students’ Poetry and Singing” took place among 3,000 participants, which consisted of youth and related persons of the Youth League Central Committee in each region.

Even prior to this, the nationwide landscape and crafts exhibitions commemorating Kim Jong Suk 90th birthday anniversary were held on the 12th at the Pyongyang International Cultural Exhibition Hall and on the 18th, a variety of events such as the opening of the Central Arts Show at the Korean Fine Arts Museum was held.

One researcher at a national policy research institute said regarding Kim Kyung Hee’s absence, “It is known that she has been suffering from an alcohol addiction for a long time, so does not make frequent public appearances.”