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North Korea’s Military-First Policy: A Curse or a Blessing

Thursday, June 8th, 2006

Nautilus Institute
Alexander V. Vorontsov
6/8/2006

The “Songun Chongch’i” or military-first politics mantra adopted by North Korean leader Kim Jong-il as a guideline for domestic governance and foreign policy has elicited mostly negative responses from Korea-watchers. Many view songun as the final phase in the deterioration of North Korea and a serious threat to neighboring states saying that an impoverished country of 24 million inhabitants supporting a military of more than 1 million soldiers is incapable of modernization and economic reform. They argue that greater military participation in politics creates a dual-pronged threat: the army may appropriate a greater share of already-dwindling state funds to increase its readiness and effectiveness; and the generals, supposedly the most militant sector of the policy-making structure, will have a louder voice in foreign policy formulation, which could lead to hostile rhetoric towards South Korea.

A less alarmist interpretation of military-first politics is that Kim Jong-il is trying to maintain the existing order, to strengthen his regime based on personal authority, and consolidate control of military forces with the goal of preventing an overthrow of the state.

So, is military authority a curse or a blessing? The lessons from history are ambiguous, as states ruled by the military have experienced both prosperity and hardship. But some argue that South Korea represents a relatively positive example in which it has experienced a national revival because of a period of military rule.

In 1961, Park Chung-hee, a colonel in the ROK army, seized authority South Korea in a bloodless coup and established a rigid dictatorship with his military comrades. Though politics became more repressive, the national economy grew exponentially and General Park is remembered by many as the “father of the South Korean economic miracle.” Few dispute that this economic growth planted the seeds for the ensuing process of democratization. So it is hardly accidental that, in recent years, Kim Jong-il has started to speak favorably of General Park and his role in the modernization of the Republic of Korea.

The implementation of songun in the mid-1990s increased the role of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) in daily life. The army began to participate even more in social and economic decision-making, from large-scale infrastructure development to providing its own food. While military personnel are required to serve for ten years, they spend most of their service participating in different areas of the country’s socio-economic life. Thus, the army is now not as heavy economic burden, and is serves as an important resource and catalyst for developing the national economy.

The movement to the military-first policy has accompanied a gradual transformation of North Korea’s planned economy to the direction of a mixed economy. The result may eventually be a network of large, less state-controlled corporations that share close ties with government agencies, similar to the “chaebol” that Park Chung-hee created in South Korea. Because of this, the North Korean military is now involved in different spheres of economic activity, including foreign economic ties and trade operations, and will likely play a key role in this ongoing process of privatization.

With songun also come changes in ideology. This change and its underlying goal of building a powerful and prosperous state – “kangsong taeguk,” are justified by flexible and creative interpretations of the bedrock ideal of self-reliance – “juche,” a nationalist ideology developed by revolutionary leader Kim Il-sung. The songun concept replaces the proletariat and the vanguard Communist Party with the army as the driving force in society. This innovation is significant because the army is typically a less ideological and more pragmatic institution than the Party.

The army’s role in society is not the only example of Kim Jong-il’s liberation from orthodox ideologies. Since the early 1990s, North Korea has shifted its emphasis from socialist ideals to historical and spiritual values. This is reflected in the use of Confucian norms in public policy and everyday life, and legitimizing the state through reference ancient Korean kingdoms. Again, the parallels with Park Chung-hee are very strong. Kim Jong-il has also sought to reduce the prevalence of the personality cult. From early 2004, for example, there could be only one portrait of Kim Il-sung in public places. Similarly, Kim Jong-il is to be described only by his official positions, rather than the use of laudatory epithets such as “Dear Leader.”

Songun should not be automatically dismissed as an ideological dead-end. As the experience of South Korea under Park Chung-hee demonstrates, military rule can have positive effects on society under certain conditions.

Posted in Economic reform, Juche, Korean People's Army, Military, Political economy, Songun, Worker's Party | Comments Closed

WFP asks ROK for DPRK AID

Friday, May 12th, 2006

any letters I missed in that title?

From the Korea Times:

WFP Asks South Korea to Contribute Food to North
By Christopher Carpenter

A representative of the United Nations World Food Program said on Friday that South Korea was considered a potential donor in the new North Korean food aid program.
At a press conference in Seoul, Tony Banbury, the WFP’s regional director for Asia, said he met with officials Friday at the South Korean Ministry of Unification and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade about contributing to the program.

“Our discussions were very positive,’’ Banbury said. “They are ongoing and I think I’ll leave it at that.’’

Bae Young-han, a spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade said that while he could not confirm the meeting with Banbury, South Korea was discussing participating in the WFP effort.

“In the past, we contributed through the WFP channel,’’ Bae said.

Banbury came to Seoul on the heels of signing a letter of understanding with Pyongyang Wednesday to resume aid to the North. It was discontinued in December 2005 when North Korea asked that food aid be replaced with developmental aid.

Banbury said assistance will not be on the scale it was when they left North Korea last year, but that the assistance being provided was better than discontinuing the program completely. Around 1.9 million people will benefit under the new agreement, down from the 6.5 million the WFP was feeding when it left in December.

“The alternative to this was closing down the operation entirely and walking away,’’ he said.

The new program will provide three types of assistance. Roughly half of the 150,000 tons of food that will go to the North over the next two years will be designated for pregnant and nursing mothers, and for babies that are younger than six months of age.

Primary aged school children will receive daily packages of enriched biscuits that provide 75 percent of their daily vitamin and mineral requirements. Finally, communities involved in projects that will increase their ability to produce food will be rewarded with food aid.

“As they do the work, we will pay them in food,’’ Banbury said.

The new program, which Banbury said the North considers a transitional program that will lead to development aid, allows the 10 WFP staff who will be in North Korea to monitor the food distribution system.

The staff will have access to the institutions where food is being distributed, to the community development projects, to areas of the country that may need further assistance and to the logistical operation that brings food into the country and stores it.

Banbury said the WFP would strictly enforce its monitoring policy of “no access-no food.’’

While Banbury said North Korean officials never admitted they needed emergency food assistance, the WFP offered to increase the scope of the program if it were wanted.

“That’s a conversation we might continue in the future,’’ he said.

Posted in Public Distribiution System (PDS), South Korea, UN World Food Program | Comments Closed

World Food Program back to DPRK

Friday, May 12th, 2006

From the Washington Post:

After a government-imposed shutdown of more than four months, the World Food Program announced Thursday that it would resume food aid to hungry North Koreans, but on a sharply reduced scale.

Tony Banbury, the U.N. agency’s regional director for Asia, said he signed an accord with the government in Pyongyang that will allow 10 staff members to operate a $102 million feeding program, helping 1.9 million of the neediest North Koreans over the next two years.

The accord, reached Wednesday after prolonged negotiations, ended the uncertainty that has prevailed since the DPRK government announced in August that it would accept development aid but no longer wanted food aid. That forced the World Food Program, which runs North Korea’s main feeding operation, to halt work at the end of December.

Banbury called the new agreement “an important breakthrough” for North Korea’s undernourished poor. But he said the number of people receiving food would drop considerably under restrictions laid down by North Korean officials — from 6 million in 163 counties under last year’s $200 million-plus program to 1.9 million in 30 counties under the new program.

“They explained this by saying they needed less food, that their crops were getting better and that they did not want to create a culture of dependency,” Banbury told reporters during a stop in Beijing.

Because Kim’s government is highly secretive, its assertion that more food aid was unnecessary could not be verified, Banbury said. But he expressed skepticism, noting that North Korea recently sought 500,000 tons of grain from South Korea and in recent years has consistently produced nearly 1 million tons less than its annual requirement of 5.3 million tons.

Economic reforms that began in 2002 have gradually loosened North Korea’s rigidly Stalinist system and injected some life into the economy, according to reports from Pyongyang. In particular, private food markets have been allowed in recent years, providing previously unheard-of choices for those with money. Food prices soared, however, prompting farmers to sell their crops in the private sector rather than to the public distribution system at controlled state prices. This in turn made life harder for the poorest among North Korea’s 23 million people, who rely on public rations.

In response, the government announced recently that the public distribution system would resume its monopoly on food grains. How this step ties in with the economic reforms was not explained. But Banbury said the agreement to resume U.N. food aid suggested that North Korean officials realized the public distribution system could not get food to everyone who needed it despite their earlier assertion that it was time to move on to development aid.

Production and distribution of U.N. food aid will resume immediately, he said, but it will take several weeks to get operations up to speed. As it was previously, most of the food aid will be in the form of vitamin-enriched biscuits for children, enriched porridge mixes for infants and supplements for pregnant women and the elderly.

Although the number of staff members has been shaved from 48 to 10, Banbury said U.N. officials would be able to verify that the food was going to the poor and not government officials or the military. Diversion of food has been a major concern of the United States and other U.N. donor countries since Kim proclaimed that soldiers and other officials have priority in North Korea.

“We will not be providing food to any areas of the country where our staff does not have full access,” Banbury said.

Posted in Agriculture, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Public Distribiution System (PDS), UN World Food Program | Comments Closed

Food aid update

Thursday, May 4th, 2006

From Yonhap:

A U.S. human rights organization on Thursday urged North Korea to allow international monitoring of food distribution, saying its recent policy changes on outside aid may cause renewed hunger among its people.

Recent decisions by Pyongyang to suspend the operations of the World Food Program in the country and revive the food rationing system may leave many in hunger, said Washington-based Human Rights Watch in a press conference in Seoul.

“North Korea has gone back to precisely the same place, when the famine began,” said Tom Malinowski, Washington advocacy director of the organization, referring to the mid 1990s in which two million North Koreans supposedly died of hunger.

North Korea adopted a series of policies last year that irked international human rights organizations. It asked the U.N. relief agency to end emergency food aid and its monitoring in September and then announced the reinstatement of the public distribution system, in which the government provides rationing of food and equipment to individuals.

Citing interviews with North Korean defectors and World Food Program officials, the rights watchdog said the food rationing system operates on a priority basis, feeding Workers’ Party members and military and police officers while leaving many ordinary people in hunger.

Despite its improved harvest in recent years, North Korea still suffers from a chronic food shortage, it said, with the country needing approximately 6 million tons of grain a year to provide basic nutrition for its 22 million people.

The North’s grain production hovers at 4.5 million tons and it receives 750,000 tons in aid from South Korea and China, but still falls short of demand, the organization said, citing statistics from the South Korean government.

It urged Seoul to strengthen the monitoring in the North to make sure the needy people get the food.

South Korea shouldn’t “simply passively accept that it is inevitable that North Korea cannot be influenced,” Malinowski said.

North Korea experts in Seoul, however, said the recent decisions by the communist country suggest it is making efforts to stand on its own rather than depend on emergency donations. And the revival of the public distribution system illustrates its improved food situation, they said.

“When the rationing system was reduced (in the late 1990s) it was because the government didn’t have food to distribute. Now that it has expanded the rationing system, it is in a better situation,” said Chon Hyun-joon, senior research fellow with the Korea Institute for National Unification, a public research body on North Korea in Seoul.

Posted in Public Distribiution System (PDS), UN World Food Program | Comments Closed

North Korean Food Rations Uncertain

Wednesday, April 26th, 2006

According to the Manilla Times and ABS/CBN Interactive:

North Korea could suspend food rations for ordinary citizens in Pyongyang next month due to its worsening famine, a South Korean aid group warned Sunday. The North Korean capital has had a better food supply than other areas despite a chronic food shortage since the 1990s.

“Pyongyang is no longer a safe zone in food supply,” Good Friends, a Seoul-based aid group for North Koreans, said in a newsletter. “Food supply officials in Pyongyang say food rations lasted only 10 days in April and will be suspended for ordinary citizens beginning in May,” the group said. The aid group said big businesses and state organizations would remain unaffected.

United Nations food aid to North Korea ended late last year after Pyongyang said it no longer needed emergency shipments from the World Food Program (WFP) and other international humanitarian agencies. The North Korean government said it instead wants development assistance and a smaller operation with fewer international staff whose monitoring activities would be restricted.

WFP has proposed a downsized aid plan to feed 1.9 million people, largely women and children vulnerable to malnutrition and disease. It used to feed 6.5 million people.

North Korea’s grain production rose 5.3 percent to 4.54 million tons last year, still far short of its annual demand of six million tons, South Korea’s unification ministry report says.

According to the Daily NK:

North Korean sources have claimed that since April only some areas of Pyongyang have gotten food rations, and local areas were already cut off. North Korea recently relaunched rationing on the Workers’ Party Foundation Day (10/10/2005), yet from the beginning, the program did not meet its objectives, and furthermore, from this spring even Pyongyang is seeing a shortage of food.

Mr. Kim, who is a North Korean trader and now stays in Dandong, China said, “Officials working at the central agencies (the Party, Ministries, Court) in Pyongyang have gotten rations, but workers in general factories and small companies in local cities have to resolve their April and June food prooblmes themselves.”

Mr. Kim stated, “Despite a severe shortage of food, some wealthy, powerful people are persisting well. Yet other people who rely on the food rationing of factories mainly go to local areas to exchange goods for food.” It led to a situation where North Koreans have to withstand starvation by all means, before new potatoes come out.

At the same time, price of rice at the Jangmadang 9farmers markets) began rising.

Rice prices at the Shinuiju Jangmadang are:

1,000W ($0.33) to 1,200W($0.4) per 1kg
Yongcheon rice is 1,200W 1kg
Chinese rice is 900W($0.3) to 930W($0.31) per 1kg

Corn is 300W($0.1) to 400W($0.133).

Shinuiju rice is a little more expensive than that of other cities, and its wheat flour is cheaper. It is because rice comes in from other cities, and Chinese wheat flour is distributed to each city via Shinuiju.

Mr. Lee hinted that travel permits to China are issued “conditionally.” That is, after visitors to China come back to North Korea, they have to offer some food to the National Security Agency, and people with no relatives have a harder time getting passes.

Mr. Lee said, “As for me, it is better because I found my older brother. However, other people living in our village go out to rivers to dig for gold and to mountains to dig for edible plants.”

March and April, called the ‘Barley Period (Borigogae)’ are the months when food crunches are most severe. This is when the crops and edible plants (side dishes) harvested last year begin to run out. When edible plants run out, North Koreans prolong their lives by eating grass or wild plants. However, because of death by starvation in the mid 90’s, which resulted in massive foraging, even wild plants like bracken are not easily found now.

Posted in Agriculture, Public Distribiution System (PDS), UN World Food Program | Comments Closed

Are US economic restrictions hurting the DPRK?

Friday, April 21st, 2006

From the BBC:

A recent report for the US Congress estimated that $45m of the notes are in circulation worldwide. South Korean police this month uncovered a haul of 700 fake $100 bills. “They’re about 95% identical to the real thing,” said Suh Tae-suk, South Korea’s leading expert on counterfeit currency, “but there’s a slight difference in the texture of the paper and the make-up of the chemicals, so experts can still spot them.”

Most of the notes are brought in from China; and organised crime networks are reported to be distributing them in Asia, and through Russia into Europe. American officials say they have no doubt the notes are manufactured in North Korea. High-level North Korean defectors back up some of Washington’s claims that Pyongyang is involved in counterfeiting and other illicit activities.

One former North Korean diplomat painted a picture of cash-strapped embassies that are expected to finance themselves, and of diplomats racking their brains for new ways to raise money. He asked not to be identified because he had left family behind in Pyongyang, who he now considers hostages of the regime. “We were each given a quota of foreign currency that we had to raise each year to show our loyalty to the state,” he explained. “I was expected to produce $100,000 a year and remit it to a bank in China”.

The former diplomat, who has lived in Seoul since his defection, said a superior once handed him fake US bank notes, mixed in with the real thing, to conduct a trade deal in South East Asia. He said he raised money from kick-backs on trade deals, but would also smuggle gold and “currency by the kilogramme” in diplomatic bags.

And there were other scams: Trading in tax-free cars, smuggling liquor into Islamic countries, and trafficking horns and ivory out of Africa to sell to Chinese businessmen.

At the centre of much of the trade is North Korea’s top-secret Bureau 39, which defectors say was set up in the 1970s to create a personal slush fund for Kim Jong-il.

“Bureau 39 has a monopoly on earning foreign currency,” said Kim Dok-hong, who worked for 17 years alongside the bureau’s agents at the North Korean Workers’ Party Central Committee. “Bureau 39 has a monopoly of trade in high-quality agricultural products like pine mushrooms and red ginseng. They also control the drug trade. Opium is produced across the country and then refined into heroin. Their other main role was distributing the supernotes,” he said.

North Korea denies the charges of counterfeiting. It accuses the US of counterfitting its own currency and trying to blame the DPRK.

North Korea has also asked the government of Switzerland to investigate the authenticity of a U.S. claim that Pyongyang secretly keeps US$4 billion in Swiss bank accounts, and then release a report on its findings.

The North Korean embassy in Switzerland sent a statement to Yonhap News Agency, branding the U.S. allegation a “conventional scheme to damage the image of our republic.”
North Korea has “made an official request to the Swiss government to investigate this matter and release the results of the probe on purpose to guarantee objectivity,” the statement said.

Posted in Bureau 39, Counterfeiting, International trade | Comments Closed

Dock No. 2 of Ryongnam Ship Repairing Factory Commissioned

Friday, March 24th, 2006

KCNA
3/24/2006

A commissioning ceremony of the Dock No. 2 of the Ryongnam Ship Repairing Factory took place on the spot on Friday. With the building of the large computer-aided dock capable of repairing tens of thousands of tons of several ships simultaneously at the factory the capacity of ship repairing has remarkably increased and firmer material and technological foundations have been laid to develop the shipping industry of the country as required by the new century. A message of thanks sent by the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea to officials and builders of the Ministry of Land and Marine Transport who performed great labor feats in the construction of Dock No. 2 was conveyed at the ceremony. The message said that the officials and builders of the ministry who turned out as one true to the behests of President Kim Il Sung on further increasing the capacity of the factory and the militant tasks of the WPK performed the great labor feats in completing the construction of Dock No. 2 in a big and bold way with their own efforts in a short span of time.

It highly appreciated the officials and builders of the ministry for displaying intense loyalty to the Party and the leader and patriotic devotion and successfully building Dock No. 2 as a monumental edifice of the Songun era.

Speeches were made at the ceremony.

Present there were Vice-Premier of the Cabinet Ro Tu Chol, Minister of Land and Marine Transport Kim Yong Il and other officials concerned.

Posted in Manufacturing, Ministry of Land and Marine Transport, Sea shipping, Transportation | Comments Closed

Smoke signals from BAT’s North Korea venture

Wednesday, February 8th, 2006

Asia Times
Lora Saalman
2/8/2006

On January 10, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il traveled in a luxury train to China’s Guangdong province to sample socialist-flavored capitalism. Just a few months earlier, the North Korean Workers Party introduced reform measures granting foreign investors tax cuts and allowing them to sell goods produced in North Korea without tariffs.

For an economy that ostensibly issued halting economic reforms in 1984, these new measures constitute a revolution, albeit one with Chinese characteristics. In accordance with its giant neighbor’s model, North Korean economic reform is predicated as an alternative to the instability of political liberalization. Unforeseen social and political shifts are to be cushioned by financial solvency to keep the regime intact. With China’s assistance and unofficial aid, sustainable growth may one day be achieved in North Korea. Yet a darker side to North Korea’s economic awakening remains.

Kim Jong-il’s visit comes on the heels of accounts of North Korean money-laundering in Macau and the US decision last June and again in October to freeze the assets of various North Korean companies and financial institutions. While many of these firms are beyond the reach of US sanctions, implied misconduct has already led to runs on the North Korean-affiliated financial institution Banco Delta Asia in Macau.

As allegations swirl of money-laundering through counterfeit cigarettes and currency, a less-known story has emerged on British American Tobacco’s previously undisclosed four-year-old joint venture in North Korea. It presents the dilemma of doing business in a country in desperate need of revenue but with a poor track record of allocating resources to its people. This cautionary tale begs the question as to where exactly Pyongyang’s joint-venture profits are going.

For North Korea, which lacks many of the basic laws for financial transparency and good governance, capital investments are more than economically precarious. Shared contact information and dubious management practices among North Korean companies are ubiquitous.

Daesong-BAT is one of a handful of Western joint ventures in North Korea. The far-reaching tentacles of its North Korean partner illustrate the complexity of verifying the background and connections of any North Korean entity. Like many of its compatriots, North Korea’s Sogyong General Trading Corp (Sogyong) boasts circuitous and often indirect ties to entities engaged in proliferation, international trade, shipping, and money-laundering. These indicators point to larger concerns as to whether joint ventures, particularly Western ones, can be manipulated by North Korea for illicit financing of the regime or even to sustain its alleged WMD (weapons of mass destruction) programs.

Joint ventures and front companies
In establishing Daesong-BAT, British American Tobacco teamed up with Sogyong General Trading Corp, a Pyongyang-based state trader best known for its carpet exports. Sogyong, however, also exports such products as handicrafts, furniture and agricultural produce, while importing machinery, electronics, fishing tackle, chemicals and fertilizer. It is not uncommon for North Korean state-run enterprises to deal in everything from machinery to fishing tackle. Yet eclectic product lists make trade in illicit drugs and weapons all the more difficult to track. Cigarettes are just one more product in the Sogyong export-import pantheon.

North Korean company product lists also rarely convey their full range of trade. Seemingly innocuous industries are often manipulated as front companies. Last year, for example, Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) listed what appeared to be an innocuous North Korean food manufacturer, Sosong Food Factory, for its participation in nuclear, missile, chemical and biological-weapons proliferation. Cigarettes, like food, have been used at times to mask the real objects being transferred. In one case, Japan in 2002 seized a Chinese vessel and found that the declared store of cigarettes on board actually contained drugs thought to have come from North Korea.

While not as licentious as drug or human trafficking, even the black-market trade of cigarettes could have a tangible impact on North Korea’s financing, as seen in Eastern European illegal cigarette rings. These factors highlight the danger of taking a North Korean food or even carpet manufacturer at face value.

North Korea’s network
Among the elements of obfuscation, the company name Daesong-BAT merits attention. Rather than combining or modifying the titles of the two partner companies to form Sogyong-BAT, Daesong-BAT combines British American Tobacco’s acronym with a name that could either point to North Korea’s Daesong district or Daesong General Trading Corp (Daesong). If it turns out to be the latter, Japan and other governments have prominently featured Daesong for its ties to missile and nuclear proliferation.

Incidentally, Daesong maintains one of the most extensive and convoluted North Korean networks, with more than 10 subsidiaries. It also is suspected of falling under Bureau 39, which earns foreign currency for North Korea. A direct connection between Daesong-BAT and the sinewy Daesong franchise has yet to be established but, as illustrated below, nothing is clear cut in North Korean business relations.

Because of the lack of transparency and convoluted nature of North Korean companies, contact information often serves as the first stencil for tracing overlap between industries. In the case of Daesong, the US Central Intelligence Agency’s Open Source Center follows the use of the same fax number to establish potential business and branch linkages. If the same logic is applied to Sogyong, another pattern emerges. Sogyong shares common fax numbers with at least two companies, Korea Foodstuffs Trading Corp (Foodstuffs) and Korea Kwail Trading Corp (Kwail). These companies in turn share fax numbers with nearly 100 companies in North Korea.

Among North Korean firms sharing contact information with Sogyong-linked entities, Japan’s METI and official European export monitors have listed at least six as end-users associated with North Korean WMD programs. In October, the US government targeted one in particular, Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corp (Ryonha), freezing its assets under US jurisdiction and placing it on the US Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list. Ryonha is a prime example of the complex web of North Korean subsidiaries. Last June, the US Treasury Department also targeted the assets of its parent company Korea Ryonbong General Corp, formerly known as Lyongaksan, which heads five other US-designated entities.

Ryonha is not an aberration among companies converging with Sogyong. Among other Foodstuffs and Kwail-connected entities, Korean company databases list Korea Pyongyang Trading Corp as a distributor of methane gas derived from animal excrement. Apparently, effluent is not its only fetid source of income. The Japanese government has listed the very same company, along with subsidiaries of two other firms tracing back to Sogyong, namely Korea Ryonhap Trading Corp and Korea Jangsu Trading Corp, for nuclear, missile, chemical and biological weapons proliferation.

Proliferation networks may not be the only mechanisms at Sogyong’s fingertips. Contact information also links the two Sogyong-connected associates with at least four North Korean financial institutions. Among these, Koryo Bank and Korea Joint Bank have alleged ties to the now-infamous Banco Delta Asia in Macau. Banco Delta Asia’s own purported involvement in counterfeit-currency distribution and counterfeit-cigarette smuggling does not bode well for Daesong-BAT, no matter how convoluted their connections. Banco Delta Asia may have three degrees of separation between it and Sogyong, but in North Korea’s fishbowl of finance this does not preclude cooperation.

Banco Delta Asia is also reported to maintain a close business relationship with Macau-based Zokwang Trading, which its own vice general managing director claims is a part of North Korea’s Daesong General Trading Corp. Daesong, as mentioned earlier, has a pervasive proliferation record. It also has reported links to Changgwang Sinyong Corp (Changgwang), which has been repeatedly sanctioned by the United States for its missile-proliferation activities and sales to Iran and Pakistan. Zokwang in turn deals in missiles and nuclear-power-plant components, all the while maintaining a partnership with the notorious Changgwang. Combined with Sogyong’s branch in the joint \-venture hub Shenyang, China, even indirect ties to Macau suggest that Sogyong has the ability to tap into proliferation, industrial and financial networks in China and beyond.

Proliferation, industry and finance mean little without the means to transport goods and technology. Sogyong-associated entities Foodstuffs and Kwail share fax numbers with North Korea’s national airline Air Koryo, which has also been cited by official European monitors for proliferation. A 2003 Far Eastern Economic Review article even named Air Koryo as the transportation mechanism for Daesong’s suspected military assistance to Myanmar. Sogyong’s own shipping vessels Sogyong 1 and 2, which were detained in Japan on safety violations in December 2004 and January 2005, complete the final leg of the contact-linked proliferation, financing and shipment triangle. This network belies a much more intricate set of alliances than the domestic-consumption-based joint venture touted by British American Tobacco and Sogyong General Trading Corp.

Standards of business conduct
British American Tobacco’s website advocates transparency in international business and laudably eschews bribery, corruption, illicit trade, and money-laundering. In October, BAT executives further contended in The Guardian that the company’s North Korean cigarette joint venture fuels only domestic consumption, not exports to China or elsewhere. In spite of these reassurances, BAT is no stranger to the dangers of black-market cigarette production and transshipment. A February 2000 article in The Guardian even accuses BAT of complicity, by knowingly allowing illicit smuggling of its cigarettes to occur.

In the case of Daesong-BAT, British American Tobacco officials have admitted to knowing little of the company’s North Korean joint-venture operations. Ominously, BAT has stated that an unnamed Singapore division controls its North Korean joint venture. Lack of oversight combined with a dubious North Korean offshore mechanism for managing an ostensibly domestic industry raises significant warning signs. The incestuous relationship between state-run North Korean entities that share fax numbers of companies and banks listed for WMD procurement and money-laundering through counterfeit tobacco should also elicit concern. These are not simply dilemmas for British American Tobacco, but pose challenges to any companies forming joint ventures in North Korea.

Economic integration, as in China’s case, may bring North Korea more into step with international norms and standards. Ironically, engagement that is likely to lead to greater future transparency may also be manipulated for North Korea’s short-term illicit gains.

In 2003, the British government pressured BAT to close down its cigarette factory operations in the military dictatorship of Myanmar because of concerns over that country’s lack of human rights. Given the legion of obstacles impeding transparency in North Korea, BAT and other Western firms could be contributing to the worsening of more than human rights. They could be aiding and abetting illicit North Korean financing that is alleged to fuel Kim Jong-il’s slush fund and WMD programs.

Posted in Arms shipment, Banking, British American Tobacco (BAT), Bureau 39, Counterfeiting, Daesong-BAT JV Company, Drug smuggling, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, Foreign direct investment, Illicit activities, Ryonha Machine Tool Factory (JV Company), Sogyong General Trading Corp | Comments Closed

North Korean Grain production up 5.3% in 2005

Wednesday, January 25th, 2006

According to Financial Express:

North Korea’s grain production rose 5.3 per cent to 4.54 million tonnes in 2005, helped by better harvests and fertilizer shipments from South Korea, South Korean data showed today.

The 2005 harvest was still far short of the impoverished country’s annual demand, estimated at six million tonnes, South Korea’s unification ministry said in a report. North Korea received 500,000 tonnes of rice from South Korea last year, together with humanitarian food aid from the World Food Programme (WFP) and other international agencies.

UN’s food aid to North Korea, however, ended on December 31 after Pyongyang said it no longer needed emergency shipments from international agencies. Instead, Pyongyang called for long-term development assistance to end its chronic food shortages. But some experts regard the shift to development-oriented assistance as a tactic to dodge the WFP’s request for transparency in food distribution.

Posted in Agriculture, Foreign direct investment, Public Distribiution System (PDS), UN World Food Program | Comments Closed

DPRK “Soprano” State accusation

Wednesday, January 18th, 2006

North Korea, the ‘Sopranos’ state
Asia Times
By Todd Crowell

When US Ambassador to South Korea Alexander Vershbow recently called North Korea a “criminal regime”, he was not speaking metaphorically. He was not talking about the North’s abysmal human-rights record, illegal missile sales or efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.

No, he was talking about crime – as in counterfeiting US banknotes and cigarette packages, money-laundering and drug-trafficking. These issues have suddenly risen to the forefront of Washington’s agenda and become a major stumbling block in the renewal of the six-party nuclear-disarmament talks.

In September, Washington named Macau’s second-largest bank, Banco Delta Asia, as being “a willing pawn for the North Korean government to engage in corrupt financial activities through Macau”. It said senior bank officials were working with Pyongyang “to accept large deposits of cash, including counterfeit US currency, and agreeing to place that currency into circulation”.

In mid-December, the US Treasury Department issued a formal advisory concerning North Korea’s illegal activities and cautioned US financial institutions to take “reasonable steps to guard against the abuses of their financial services by North Korea, which may be seeking to establish new or to exploit existing account relationships”.

It was reported this month that a delegation of agents from the US Secret Service, which is responsible for counter-counterfeiting as well as protecting the life of the president, will travel to Seoul to meet with South Korean authorities over counterfeiting. Visits of this nature are not usually broadcast in such a public fashion.

Meanwhile, Pyongyang says it won’t return to the six-party talks unless the US lifts restrictions against its financial institutions, including those directed at eight state-owned trading companies that Washington cited in October as being involved in weapons trafficking, especially banned missile technology.

Rumors of North Korean counterfeiting and drug-trafficking have been circulating in Asia for years. Anyone who lived in Hong Kong for many years has heard them from time to time. North Korean companies have a long history of operating in the former Portuguese enclave of Macau, which for decades served the regime as a key window to the outside world.

The Zokwang Trading Co was considered Pyongyang’s de facto consulate in Macau, and the relationship between Zokwang and Banco Delta Asia is no secret. As far back as 1994 the bank found thousands of bogus US$100 bills allegedly deposited by a North Korean employee. The director of the Zokwang Trading Co was held and questioned, but no charges were pressed.

There have been several more recent instances of alleged North Korean counterfeiting.

Last April, the Japanese media reported that a hundred or so fake $100 bills were found among a stack of used currency aboard a North Korean freighter that called at a Japanese port in Tottori prefecture. The captain was reported telling police, “We were asked to bring the money to Japan so that the money could be paid for cars and other items.”

Also in April, a large stash of bogus notes was uncovered in South Korea. The Chosun Ilbo, which reported the story, did not say where or under what circumstances the money was found, though it went into great detail over the quality of the notes and quoted experts as saying it was “highly likely” they came from North Korea.

In August, the Federal Bureau of Investigation reported two “sting” operations in the US, colorfully described as Operation Royal Charm and Operation Smoking Dragon. The US government indicted 59 people on charges related to smuggling counterfeit US currency, drugs and cigarettes into the country. The announcement did not specify their origin, but other accounts have speculated that they came from North Korea.

David Asher, head of the US administration’s North Korea Working Group, published a lengthy essay in mid-November in which he described what he called “an extensive criminal network involving North Korean diplomats and officials, Chinese gangsters and other organized crime syndicates, prominent Asian banks, Irish guerrillas and a KGB agent”.

“North Korea is the only government in the world today that can be identified as being actively involved in directing crime as a central part of its national economic strategy and foreign policy … in essence North Korea has become the Sopranos state – a government guided by [Korean] Workers Party leaders, whose actions attitudes and affiliations increasingly resemble those of an organized-crime family more than a normal nation.” The Sopranos is a popular US television series about an organized-crime family.

But why is Washington suddenly pushing decades-old suspicions at this particular time? In September, Christopher Hill, the senior US negotiator at the six-party talks, announced a breakthrough in the negotiations. North Korea had agreed in principle to disarm in exchange for recognition and aid. That same month the Treasury Department issued a warning against dealings with the Macau bank.

In October came the sanctions against the eight North Korean trading companies. Also in October, Vershbow arrived in South Korea, and the new US ambassador quickly developed a reputation for making provocative statements. In November, the six-party talks quickly foundered on Pyongyang’s demands to lift sanctions.

No doubt American officials would solemnly swear they are motivated by a desire to protect the integrity of the US currency and nothing else. But even if the allegations are substantially true, which probably is the case, isn’t this really penny-ante stuff set against the much larger issue of North Korea’s nuclear-weapons program?

None of the other participants in the six-party talks has expressed any public concern about Pyongyang’s crimes. That includes Japan, which not only is supposedly the target of counterfeit money but also is on the receiving end of drugs manufactured in North Korea. (Japanese estimate that nearly half of the country’s illegal drug imports originate from there.) Yet it has said nothing.

Last week, the Chinese Foreign Ministry was forced to deny a report printed in the South Korean media that its government had found evidence of North Korean money-laundering in Macau. “China has never indicated that the government had confirmed North Koreans using Macau for money-laundering,” the ministry statement said.

Vershbow has likened North Korea to Nazi Germany as being only the second state-sponsored counterfeiter. He was referring to an operation whereby concentration-camp inmates forged millions of US dollars and British pounds to disperse in England in an effort to ignite inflation there and harm their enemies’ economies.

Yet the highest figure I have seen for the North Korean counterfeiting is the $45 million (over a decade) reported in the Washington Times, which is nothing set against the vast sums of dollars sloshing around Asia. Indeed, I’ve never heard even a whisper that North Korean counterfeits were affecting world currency markets or the value of the dollar in the slightest way.

It’s hard not to believe that the US administration is again listening to more hardline elements after a brief ascendancy of the “realists” in the State Department. Their purpose is to neutralize the talks (how does a nation negotiate with a criminal gang, after all?) and shift the issue away from nuclear disarmament back to the nature of the regime – with the ultimate objective of toppling that regime.

Todd Crowell comments on Asian affairs.

Posted in Banking, China, Counterfeiting, USA, Zokwang Trading Company | Comments Closed

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