Archive for the ‘DPRK organizations’ Category

NK Baduk Software to Hit Seoul

Wednesday, September 6th, 2006

Korea Times
9/6/2006
Kim Tae-gyu

Starting today, a South Korean venture start-up will market a North Korean paduk computer game, Silver Star 2006, here that is arguably the most advanced program for paduk, also known as go.

ForOneBiz yesterday announced the scheme to launch Silver Star 2006 that has won the FOST Cup, the annual computer paduk championship participated in by global contenders, for the past three consecutive years.

“In June, we reached an agreement with the North’s Samcholli General Corp. to debut Silver Star 2006 here,” ForOneBiz chief executive officer Kim Byung-su said.

“We inked a commission-based deal, not the conventional lump sum-based ones. We will take roughly 90 percent of sales income while the remaining 10 percent will go to Samcholli,” he added.

The price of the program, which can be downloaded at the Web site of ForOneBiz (www.i-silverstar.com) or ordered by calling (02) 2115-6035, is 33,000 won ($34.5).

The Silver Star series, called Unbyol in Korean, was developed by the North’s state-run Korea Computer Center in the 1990s. Experts say it has the most outstanding algorithm for baduk.

“We plan to improve Silver Star 2006 further by cooperating with North Korea. It will work because the North has a competitive edge in software while the South today leads the world in offline baduk techniques,” Kim said.

This is not the first time for North Korean software to go on sale in the South.

Earlier in March, the Seoul-headquartered BH Partners began selling the Speed-K4.0, a computer program developed by the North Korean agency, at its Web site (www.bhpartners.co.kr).

People can download the input software, which helps them easily type in sentences from a word processor or e-mail, at 5,500 won.

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Kaesong golf course under consideration

Tuesday, September 5th, 2006

From the Joong Ang Daily

Kaesong golf course under consideration
9/5/2006

North Korea is in talks with a South Korean company other than Hyundai Asan Corp. for a golf course business in Kaesong, the Unification Ministry said yesterday.

Hyundai Asan, a Hyundai Group affiliate, holds an exclusive right to do business in North Korea.

According to the ministry, Unico, a real estate developer based in Daegu, signed an agreement with North Korea’s Asia Pacific Peace Committee to rent two sites near Kaesong Industrial Complex to build golf courses.

Under the contract, the North Korean committee will lease the two sites, one in the southwest and the other in the north, for $40 million over the next five decades.

Along with the golf courses, Unico plans to establish hotels and other entertainment facilities, said the ministry.

However, the same sites are part of the 16,337 acres of land that Hyundai Asan was allowed to use after reaching an accord with the North in 2000. The Korean company is in the middle of building an industrial complex on 816 acres.

Building golf courses on the sites Unico made a deal on was on Hyundai’s agenda for next year.

“The right to run a golf course business there belongs to us, as we forged the contract first,” said a senior executive from Hyundai Asan.

The company began consultations with Unico yesterday over the golf courses in the North, according to the source.

“If Unico comes up with an appropriate business proposal, we can let the company be a business partner,” he added.

A high-ranking manager from Unico said the company pushed ahead with the project as North Korea explained Hyundai Asan has the right to businesses in Kaesong Industrial Complex only.

The Unification Ministry said it would consider approving the golf course business in North Korea only if North Korea, Hyundai Asan and Unico reach a compromise.

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DPRK selling goods to Chinese trade fair

Monday, September 4th, 2006

From the Daily NK:
NK, A Pitiable Medicine Peddler at aTrade Exhibition
9/4/2006
Kim Young Jin

The Second China Jilin Northeast Asia Investment and Trade Expo commenced on September 2nd in Changchun, Jilin province where North Korea dispatched 100 people from economic and trade groups to set up 36 booths promoting and consulting trade and goods.

North Korea elected Kim Dong Myeong director of Chosun International Exhibition Co. to coordinate the North Korean booths at the trade event, and director in second department of Ministry of Foreign Trade Jeon Hyeong Jeong, vice secretary of Chosun Chamber of Commerce Yoon Young Suk, Chosun Manyeon Health Co. Lee Yong as department representatives. About 100 people were allocated to various booths in addition to 30 Chinese university students who acted as translating helpers.

‘Wooden spatulas’ and ‘Dried ferns?’

The exhibition was divided into categories such as food, cars, electronic goods, petrochemicals, metal goods, construction materials and medical machinery of which North Korea exceeded technicalities and opened 32 booths related to ‘food.’

In the division of construction materials, the Chosun Chongjin Metal Corporation Company had not organized their booth even after people began to enter the exhibition hall much to the embarrassment of sponsors. Clients passed by confused as in the next booth, ‘Inpung Trade Company’ from the Trade Department in Jagang province had set up a display of wooden spatulas, chopsticks and dried ferns totally unrelated to construction.

North Korean booths categorized as ‘foods,’ health and medical products were the focus of retail sale. Each booth stationed 1~2 consultants wearing a dress shirt and pants, 1~2 sales assistants wearing the traditional Korean costume and a Chinese translator sponsored by the event.

Rather than directly advising clients on product queries, the male consultants seem to sit clustered at the back of the booth supervising the female sales assistants and translating helper. As the translating helpers were all Chinese university students and partly inexperienced in English or Korean, it was obvious that they were having difficulty trying to explain product information to foreign clients.

Abundant medical products, chili paste and sesame oil unverified

Excluding Chosun Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies of D.P.R.K. (MOP), Chosun Minye Corporation and Chosun Suyangsa Trade Company which sold North Korean paintings, porcelain and handicrafts, the majority of booths sold ‘food’ or ‘medical’ products.

A spokesperson for ‘Tosung Korea Medicine Export Department of Pyongyang Trading Public Corporation’ drew the attention of clients by stating “The ‘Tosung 1 injection’ developed by our company is the leading panacea of this generation. This injection is known to have outstanding effect on various illnesses such as cancer, leukemia, diabetes and tuberculosis.”

In reply to a reporter’s question “If 1,000 injections are ordered, how many days it will take for delivery?” the assistant answered “It is difficult for me to give you a definite answer. However, if equipment is offered for a large-scale order, delivery should be made possible within 3 months.”

Of the North Korean sales assistant met by the reporter, the majority of workers knew only of the cost of products on display and when questioned of large-scale orders, delivery, North Korea’s proof of inspection, ‘clinical effectiveness’ and ‘medical approval’ assistants could not give any definite answers.

However a common scene amongst North Korean booths were appeals to clients “Although economic conditions nor equipment do not yet support mass production, not only has a new medical product has been successfully created but we ensure that the world’s best ingredients, effectiveness and skills are used.”

North Korean assistants asserted by showing ‘An innovative wonder drug’ developed by ‘Chosun Dongbang Drugs Center’ as an impotent drug ‘neo-viagra-Y.R,’ the bird flu antidote ‘Kumdang-2 injection’ by ‘Chosun Pugang Pharmaceutics Company’ and longevity foods ‘Angungwoohwangan’ developed by Korea Myongsung Health Food Pharmaceutical Factory.

According to a speech by a sponsor, various Northeast Asian countries such as South Korea, China, Japan, Mongolia, North Korea and 46 other countries participated in The Second China-Jilin Northeast Asia Investment and Trade Expo. Of 500 corporations in the world, 71 corporations participated in the event and promoted products in 2,200 booths.

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North Korean Civil-Military Trends:

Friday, September 1st, 2006

“Military First” Politics to a Point
Ken E. Gause
Strategic Studies Institute
9/1/2006

Download PDF here:  Civil-Military.pdf

Summary
Unlike the study of other authoritarian regimes, first the Soviet Union and more recently China, which have given rise to a cottage industry of analysis on all aspects of things military, the same cannot be said of the Korean People’s Army (KPA), the armed forces of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). In the small world of Pyongyang watchers, articles and books devoted to the KPA are few and in most cases deal with the armed forces themselves (order of battle) rather than the high command that oversees the machinery.

This monograph examines the role of the KPA within the power structure of North Korea. The author describes the landscape of military and security institutions that ensure the regime’s security and the perpetuation of the Kim dynasty. He also highlights the influential power brokers, both civilian and military, and describes how they fit into the leadership structure. Finally, he considers the role of the KPA in regime politics, especially as it relates to the upcoming succession and economic reform.

An understanding of the North Korean leadership does not mean only recognizing the personalities who occupy the top political positions within the regime. In his landmark book, Shield of the Great Leader, Joseph Bermudez noted that over its 50-year history, the DPRK has developed into one of the most militarized countries in the world, with the KPA existing alongside the Korean Worker’s Party (KWP) as the two cornerstones of the regime. During this time, the role of the high command and its ties to the leadership and decisionmaking have changed.

The KPA was founded on February 8, 1948, approximately 7 months before the founding of the DPRK. As Kim Il Sung struggled to consolidate his power over the regime, his old comrades-in-arms, with whom he had fought against the Japanese, helped him purge the factional groupings and their leaders. After he had secured his power, Kim Il Sung relied on the KWP to rule the country. The high command played its role within the decisionmaking bodies of the state, but it paid its loyalty to the party and the Great Leader.

When Kim Jong Il succeeded his father as the supreme leader in 1994, he faced a regime divided among numerous factions, many of which did not owe allegiance to him. As a consequence, he embarked on a campaign of reshuffling briefs, purging the more dangerous elements of the regime, and making way for a new generation of leaders who would coexist and then slowly replace their elders. At the same time, he began to move more authority from the KWP and to place it within the purview of the military. This transformation of authority culminated in 1998 at the 10th Supreme People’s Assembly, when the National Defense Commission eclipsed the Politburo as the supreme national decisionmaking body. In the years since, the term “military-first politics” (son’gun chongch’i) has been used to signify the privileged status the KPA holds throughout North Korean society and to stress that the regime’s sovereignty rests upon the military’s shoulders.

This monograph tracks the rise of the military inside the North Korean leadership and presents the backgrounds of key figures within the high command and the formal and informal connections that bind this institution to Kim Jong Il. As the first generation has passed from the scene, Kim has consolidated his grip on the military slowly by promoting loyalists to key positions throughout the apparatus. He has promoted more than 1,200 general-grade officers on 15 occasions prior to April 2006. This has not only secured Kim’s power, many have argued it has enhanced the military’s influence over him, especially when compared with its influence over his father.

The question facing many North Korea watchers is the extent to which the military figures into decisionmaking. This report argues that, while the military has grown in stature and influence over the last decade, it remains one of many players within the North Korean policymaking process. The lines of authority and information within the regime are complex, consisting of formal and informal channels. The military has numerous avenues into the Kim apparatus, and on many issues have what amounts to a veto authority. This apparently was made clear recently by North Korea’s decision to cancel the test run for train services between North and South. But this does not mean that the military is the primary decisionmaker; that role still belongs to Kim Jong Il, even though he must weigh seriously military thinking on issues that reach far beyond the national security realm.

This monograph also argues that the KPA is not a monolith, but is made up of a range of views, some more hard line than others. Some senior figures within the high command are rumored to have pushed for reforms both internally and in terms of foreign policy, while many younger field commanders are believed to hold some of the hardest of the hard line views. But one area where there seems to be wide agreement throughout the military leadership is the need to fund the armed forces adequately because it is on their back that the nation’s security depends.

In the next few years, the North Korean leadership will face the implications of the “military-first policy” in very stark terms. If Kim Jong Il is to begin to bring the civilian economy out of the dark ages, the military will have to share some of the burden. But whether the high command will be willing to trade some of its “weapons for ploughshares” is not certain, given the current tensions on the peninsula. In the mix of what is already a contentious argument over guns versus butter is an unfolding succession struggle as Kim seeks to name his heir apparent. As in any totalitarian regime, the succession issue is huge and impacts decisionmaking across the board.

There is a note of caution when reading this report. The subject matter deals with information that is unfolding and will continue to shift in the coming months and years. The author has made every effort to validate through numerous sources the information contained on the various personalities, but in some cases it is still opaque. The reason for this is simple. Information on North Korean leadership issues is a closely held secret inside the Hermit Kingdom. The actions and activity of individual leaders are more often rumor than subject to check and verification.

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Koryo Asia to Buy U.S.-Sanctioned North Korean Bank (Update2)

Friday, September 1st, 2006

Bloomberg
Bradley K. Martin

Koryo Asia Ltd., a London-based financial adviser, said it will buy North Korea’s Daedong Credit Bank for an undisclosed amount and lobby the U.S. to lift sanctions on the foreign-run bank.

Daedong Credit is among North Korean banks whose accounts in Macau’s Banco Delta Asia SARL have been frozen since September 2005 after the U.S. Treasury Department alleged Banco Delta laundered money from North Korea and worked with front companies trafficking drugs for the communist state. The Macau government has taken control of the bank.

The value of Daedong Credit “would be enhanced if we can resolve the sanctions issue with the U.S.,” Koryo Asia chairman Colin McAskill said in an e-mail interview. Koryo Asia is adviser to London-based Chosun Development & Investment Fund LP, which aims to raise $50 million for investments in North Korea.

North Korea has demanded removal of the financial sanctions before it will return to six-nation talks to prevent the country from developing nuclear weapons. The U.S. and China urged North Korea to resume the talks that include South Korea, Russia and Japan, after the country in July tested a missile that may have the capability to reach the U.S.

Daedong Credit’s general manager Nigel Cowie confirmed the sale and that he would stay on. He declined further comment. Cowie said in an interview last year that the bank’s assets –including those frozen in Macau — totaled around $10 million.

A former HSBC Holding Plc banker, Cowie was hired in the mid- 1990s by Peregrine Investment Holdings Ltd. to start the bank. Following Peregrine’s 1998 collapse, Cowie and three other investors bought the 70 percent foreign stake from the liquidator in 2000.

Transparent

Koryo Asia signed an agreement to buy the majority share in Daedong through a wholly owned subsidiary that McAskill, 65, did not name. The majority shareholders had approached Koryo Asia to propose the sale, he said.

McAskill said he won’t take a direct management role in the bank, instead serving as a consultant to persuade U.S. officials to release as much as $7 million of Daedong’s and its customers’ assets in Macau. The total of frozen North Korean bank assets in Macau is about $24 million.

McAskill’s argument that Daedong Credit Bank serves only foreign, not North Korean, customers and that its transactions are legal and transparent may not win an audience at the U.S. Treasury Department.

“Given the regime’s counterfeiting of U.S. currency, narcotics trafficking and use of accounts worldwide to conduct proliferation-related transactions, the line between illicit and licit North Korean money is nearly invisible,” Stuart Levey, Treasury’s undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, said last month.

Asked if the purchase of Daedong Credit Bank is a big gamble, McAskill said, “Not a gamble — a gambit.”

He said his strategy is to demonstrate that Levey’s blanket condemnation of all North Korea-related finance is counter to U.S. interests.

Exempting Daedong on its merits from the sanctions would bring a potentially big payoff, he said, “an atmosphere in which Kim Jong-il can consider a return to the six-party talks.”

Anselmo Teng, chairman of the Macau Monetary Authority, didn’t immediately return a phone call and e-mail to his office seeking comment on the sale and any impact the ownership change may have on the status of Daedong’s Banco Delta Asia accounts.

Korean Investment

McAskill said the Chosun Development & Investment Fund LP aims to raise funds for “transaction-based” investments, such as procuring mining equipment and receiving mine output in return.

“We believe we will fully subscribe the fund from investors in Europe, Asia, the People’s Republic of China and possibly South Korea,” he said. “Global investor interest in this potential emerging market was not affected by the missile launches in July,” he said, without giving details.

Taking over the bank “gives us a legitimate foothold and provides a conduit for investment in the country, whether through Chosun Fund or other sources,” McAskill said. “In the long term, the goal is to facilitate the resuscitation of the legitimate economy.”

Chosun Fund, managed by London-based Anglo-Sino Capital Partners Limited, is denominated in U.S. dollars. If the sanctions issue cannot be resolved, the fund has the option to switch to denomination in euros or pounds sterling, McAskill said.

“There’s no point in taking in U.S. funds if the United States is going to try and block them,” he said.

Room 39

The minority owner of Daedong Credit is Korea Daesong Bank, a unit of North Korea’s Daesong Group.

A 1995 U.S. government study cited close ties between Daesong and Room 39, an office of the ruling North Korean Workers’ Party said to handle foreign exchange-gathering projects for the country’s leader.

McAskill said the minority owner does not run the bank. Daedong is “not only majority foreign-owned and foreign- controlled but also foreign-managed,” he said, adding he was given access to all of Daedong’s activities and concluded it’s a legitimate business.

Only North Korean-owned banks can do business with state enterprises and North Korean individuals, Cowie said last year, so Daedong’s customers are all foreign — mostly Chinese, Japanese and Western individuals and institutions.

As of Aug. 17, that had not convinced Levey at the U.S. Treasury.

“The U.S. continues to encourage financial institutions to carefully assess the risk of holding any North Korea-related accounts,” he said.

The undersecretary traveled in Asia in July to push that line, which resulted in the closure of some North Korean banks’ accounts in Vietnam.

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N. Korea kept millions at Vietnam bank

Thursday, August 24th, 2006

From Kyodo News:

North Korea’s Tanchon Commercial Bank, which has been identified by the United States as the primary financial facilitator of that country’s ballistic missile program, had until recently held dollar and euro accounts at Vietnam’s Military Commercial Bank, a Military Commercial Bank official said recently.

The official said millions of both dollars and euros, respectively, had been deposited in the accounts.

But the funds were hastily transferred to other banks, including a German bank, in July after the State Bank of Vietnam, the country’s central bank, acceded to a U.S. request and began checking on any North Korean accounts involved in suspicious banking transactions.

Tanchon Commercial Bank is among North Korean entities that the United States has since June last year designated as proliferators of missiles and weapons of mass destruction, or their supporters, imposing sanctions aimed at denying them access to the U.S. financial and commercial systems.

The United States is urging other members of the United Nations to identify, track and freeze financial transactions and assets of such North Korean entities as the first step in implementing a binding U.N. Security Council resolution adopted last month.

The unanimous Security Council resolution, which condemned North Korea’s ballistic missile launches in early July, requires all U.N. member nations to prevent the transfer of financial resources that could help North Korea’s missile and WMD programs.       

The U.S. Treasury Department identifies Tanchon Commercial Bank as the main financial agent for North Korea’s sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons, which have provided Pyongyang with a significant portion of its export earnings and financially aided its own weapons development and arms-related purchases.

The Pyongyang-based bank held accounts at Macao’s Banco Delta Asia SARL, which the United States in September 2005 subjected to sanctions as a “primary money laundering concern” that had facilitated a range of North Korean illicit activities.

While it was not clear when the funds were deposited in the North Korean accounts at the Vietnam’s Military Commercial Bank, the bank official said they were transferred from a German bank and from the Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam, or Vietcombank.

According to sources, financial intelligence authorities of the United States, South Korea and Japan recently compiled a report on North Korea’s overseas bank accounts that singled out 23 accounts in 10 countries, including Russia, deemed suspicious. Among the total, around 10 were in Vietnamese banks.

U.S. Treasury Undersecretary Stuart Levey, responsible for terrorism and financial intelligence issues, visited Vietnam in mid-July and called for Hanoi’s cooperation in investigating and freezing the suspicious North Korean bank accounts.

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Nautilus Institute: DPRK Reform and PRC relations

Wednesday, August 23rd, 2006

Policy Forum Online 06-70A: August 23rd, 2006
DPRK’s Reform and Sino-DPRK Economic Cooperation

Analysis by Li Dunqiu
CONTENTS

I. Introduction
II. Analysis by Yi Li Dunqiu
——————————————————————————–
I. Introduction
Li Dunqiu, Director of Division of Korean Peninsular Studies at the Institute of World Development Center of Development Studies, writes, “Sino-DPRK economic cooperation is growing in depth and width but both sides adopt a low-profile and practical attitude… In fact Chinese enterprises, both private and state-owned, are looking for greater room for their future development as a result of the constantly improving market economy in China. Amid such backdrop, the DPRK naturally becomes their target…It is not difficult to see that laws of the market economy are the most fundamental reason behind Chinese enterprises’ investment in DPRK.”

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.

II. Analysis by Li Dunqiu
– DPRK’s Reform and Sino-DPRK Economic Cooperation
by Li Dunqiu
DPRK’s change is by no means accidental. It has its profound international and domestic backgrounds. DPRK has made tremendous efforts in shackling off the shadow of the Cold War and integrating into the constantly changing international community, but with little result. Leaders of DPRK have no choice but to explore a new way that suits its country. Amid this backdrop, DPRK is slowly but steadily promoting its reform, which is low-profile but pragmatic.

From the end of 1990s, DPRK has begun to make adjustments to its economic theories and policies, putting forward such new views and propositions as pragmatism, building a strong socialist country, focusing science and technology, new concepts and improving economic management modes. A series of “Measures to Improve Economic Management Order” was issued on 1 July 2002. The adjustment this time, comparing with previous ones, was strong in enforcement and wide in the areas involved, thus injecting new impetus in its economic recovery and development. Though DPRK’s economic reform is only introducing rational elements of the market economy to make up pitfalls of its planned economy with the prerequisite of adhering to the latter, it should be commended as a major innovation in DPRK’s theories and practice in building socialism. Early this year, we saw new phenomenon from the DPRK side. It started with Kim Jong Il ‘s visit to China accompanied by premiers of the State Council in mid-January to learn the successful experience of China’s reform and opening up, followed by Chang Song-taek’s eleven-day China inspection tour accompanied by over thirty high-ranking economic officials, and then Cabinet Premier Pak Pong Ju’s elaboration of this year main tasks in economic work on the Fourth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Supreme People’s Congress. These new changes were not only widely reported but also aroused great interest among the international community in the country’s economic changes.

I. DPRK’s Guiding Principle Undergoing Quiet Changes.

Basic Theories of DPRK’s Economic Reform

At present DPRK has not yet established systemic theories to guide its economic reform. But Chairman Kim Jong Il has proposed new ideas which have become the basis for its economic reform.

Pragmatism

It was first proposed by Kim Jong Il after he became General Secretary of the DPRK Labor Party. There is no works which systematically elaborates Pragmatism. But according to economists from DPRK, pragmatism has two meanings, i.e. to bring actual benefits for the people, and to be profit-oriented instead of suffering losses. The former is the principle while the latter is the detailed content.

To follow the rule of pragmatism in economy is to seek economic benefits and for companies to make profits. To this end, the Fiscal Law amended by DPRK in April 2004 changed the ultimate goal of companies from “reducing cost” to “increasing net income”, so as to help them be profit-oriented. At present, pragmatism is the principle that must be followed in all DPRK’s economic work. Its economists have vividly compared it with China’s “seeking truth from facts”. It is fair to say that pragmatism will become theoretic basis for people in DPRK to liberate their minds and promote economic reform.

Theory with Economic Development at the Core

The strategy that DPRK has established with economic development at the core is mainly embodied in its goal of “building a strong socialist country”. Entering into the new century, DPRK has proposed three targets including building its country into a strong military, political and economic power. It maintains that it has already achieved the first two with the third one yet to achieve. As a result, the goal of “building a strong socialist country” means that economic development is its core task at the moment.

Theory of “New Thinking”

Labor News, DPRK People’s Army and Young Pioneers DPRK, in their joint editorials on the New Year Day of 2001, put forward the “new thinking”, stressing that “priorities at the moment were fundamental changes in ideas, ways of thinking, styles of struggle and work to meet requirements of the modern times”. Chairman Kim Jong Il also pointed out that, having entered the modern times, it is necessary to update thinking according to the new times instead of living the old way on the basis of the past, and that they should boldly abandon those that should be abandoned instead of being restricted to the old ideas and sticking to the past and the outdated. “In the 21st century efforts should be made to approach and solve all questions with new ideas and from new height.” In addition, DPRK’s Labor News pointed it out in its editorials that “they should be bold in reform”, “further improve DPRK’s economic management system to meet the requirement of the new environment and new atmosphere”, and that priorities for the Labor Party in the 21st century is to ensure that the ideas, ways of thinking and working styles conform with the requirement of the new century.

Approach the Word “Reform” with Prudence

Though DPRK introduced elements of the market economy through constitutional amendments in 1998 and consequently adopted some reform measures, it strongly dislikes such words as “reform” and “opening up” and they are forbidden in the adjustment of its economic policies.

Despite this, the essence is “reform”, though different in word, evidenced in their newly issued policies for economic adjustment which were targeted at the outdated demands and practices that were divorced from reality. DPRK’s Labor News pointed it out in an article entitled “On the Rules of Socialist Economic Development” on 21 November 2001 that “those who manage the economy, i.e. people of DPRK, do not have enough experience, there are still room for improvement and perfection due to short history of socialism, and that the economy cannot be developed if those that are outdated, backward and separated from reality are not abandoned.” It is clear that this kind of “abandoning” has the implication of “reform”. Therefore it is reform unsuitable for DPRK instead “reform” itself that it is opposed to. In fact it is nonetheless progressing with economic reform both in theory and in practice in spite of it all. It was not until June 2003 that DPRK’s Central News Agency finally used the word “reform” though it quickly dropped the word again. The reason behind its prudence with the word “reform” is because it once openly expressed its opposition to and criticism against reform in China and former Soviet Union in its major official media.

Learn Reform Experience from Foreign Countries

DPRK’s supreme leader Kim Jong Il has visited China for four times since 2000, most of which were aimed at inspecting China’s economy. His unofficial visit to China from 10 to 18 January 2006 and inspection of China’s economic work in Beijing, Hubei and Guangdong Provinces attracted great attention from the international community.

The nine-day visit in China was rich in content, clear in objective and profound in significance. Kim brought his team to Beijing, Wuhan, Yichang, Guangzhou, Zhuhai, Shenzhen and they listened carefully to introductions made by government officials and companies managers in those provinces and cities, with the aim of learning and drawing upon China’s experience. He was deeply touched and impressed and even had “sleepless night” when he arrived in Beijing following the tour in China’s south. He said that he was unwilling to see the current situation in DPRK and hoped to see further progress in its economic and social development by absorbing the vigor and vitality from the market economy while continuing its planned economy; that he hoped to learn from China and do a good job in DPRK’s future economic development by combining its national conditions with actual situation. It was the first time for him to voice such opinions, indicating that leaders of DPRK were transforming their mode of thinking, acknowledging and accepting China’s development concepts; and that they were exploring laws of economic development in order to prepare for profound and comprehensive reform with DPRK style.

It is more important to note that the visit gave him a chance to see the fact that China’s reform had neither weakened the leading role of the Chinese Communist Party nor aroused social upheaval. It had instead enhanced the reputation of the Communist Party and its international influence, which removed his worry that reform and opening up might undermine the stability of the authorities. Shock waves continued among the high-level officials after he came back from the visit. Unprecedented views were voiced and new explanations made on major theoretic questions like what was socialism, how to evaluate capitalism. High-level officials were asked to theoretically keep abreast with the times and unify their thinking.

Only two months later, Chang Song-taek, First Deputy Minister of the Department of People’s Group and Capital Construction of the Central Committee of the DPRK Labor Party, headed an “expert team” of over thirty high-ranking economic officials to the places that Kim had just visited. His 11-day visit was yet another demonstration of DPRK’s aspiration to learn from China. In addition, DPRK also sent various economic delegations to China to study its experience in reform. It started to send trainees to China, Viet Nam and countries in Europe since its economic reform in 2002, equipping them with knowledge of market economy, finance, trade and hi-tech in particular. It thus started its nationwide campaign from the top down to study economics.

II. DPRK’s Economy and Current Policy Options

From 2000 DPRK has gained positive economic growth from the previous negative one. Of course the rate was very low, around 0.5%–1% for six years in running. Some estimated that growth rate in 2005 reached 2%, an opinion shared by some DPRK officials though genuine figures were hard to obtain in the country. DPRK’s economy has recovered and is poised to continue its steady growth in 2006.

There are two sets of mechanisms in DPRK, i.e. the military and the civilian. The most important economic sectors are controlled by the military, a noticeable feature of its economy. Strength and efficiency of the factories run by the military are higher than their civilian counterparts. Take the Taean Glass Factory for example. It was built with the assistance of the Chinese Government. At first a civilian factory was designated but its workers were low in efficiency and poor in quality, with which the Chinese side became dissatisfied. Consequently a military factory took up the role and all went well afterwards. With good cooperation, the project was successfully completed. This example showed that talents of economic development are mostly with DPRK’s military. It is therefore, like China in its first phase of reform and opening up, formulating policy to transform some military factories into civilian ones to support local economic growth.

All signs show that economic work has become the priority of DPRK. Leaders of the country and the Labor Party are concentrating their time and efforts on economic work. Main measures for this year are as follows:

Agriculture is the main task of this year’s economic development.

The Fourth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Supreme People’s Congress was convened on 11 April, on which Premier Pak Pong Ju delivered a report entitled Review of Work in 2005 and Plan for 2006. He stressed that the central task of the economic development for this year was “to develop agriculture in a decisive manner to successfully solve the food problem for the people in DPRK”.

In recent years DPRK has always taken agriculture as the “primary task” of its economic development. In order to solve food shortage it launched “Potato Revolution” and “Seed Revolution” in 2001, advocating the growth of agricultural crops with short mature periods and great harvests. Agricultural technicians cultivated new breeds of potatoes with no virus and high yields, in order to “supplement rice with potatoes”. Thanks to increased government input in agricultural production and development in agricultural science and technology, grain production has risen in recent years, reaching 4.6 million tons in 2005, the highest in ten years. With experience accumulated and benefit gained, DPRK has realized the importance of agriculture. It will continue to take it as the priority and central task of this year’s economic work. It is especially notable that when Kim Jong Il visited China last January, he went to the Crop Institute of the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Science, a sign which fully vindicated the importance attached to agricultural science and technology.

Work Hard to Develop Foreign Trade and Attract Foreign Investment.

Premier Pak Pong Ju stressed in his above-mentioned report that it was necessary to work hard to develop foreign trade and actively explore foreign markets to achieve diversification and multi-lateralization of trade in accordance with the changing environment and practical demands. DPRK has enhanced foreign trade up to an unprecedented height, which was a new change itself. Though US had begun its financial sanction against DPRK since the end of last year, its foreign trade increased by a large margin in 2005, reaching 3 billion USD in total, the highest since 1991. Trade between DPRK and ROK reached 1.05 billion USD in 2005 and this figure was not included in the total volume. It is estimated that this year DPRK will actively explore new markets in the EU and ASEAN countries while continuing to grow its trade with China and ROK.

China is DPRK’s largest trading partner. Sino-DPRK trade reached a historic high at 1.58 billion USD in 2005, up 14%. China’s export accounted for two thirds of its total. DPRK mainly imported food and energy from China, up by 35.2% annually and reaching 1.08 billion USD in 2005. Growth in Sino-DPRK trade was partly attributed to decrease in bilateral trade between DPRK and Japan, which stood at 0.194 billion USD in 2005, down by 23%.

Meanwhile DPRK is working actively to introduce foreign investment, including capital and technology. It organized two international commodities fairs, one in the 1980s and the other in the 1990s, to be followed by annual fairs every spring since 2000. The fairs were then held twice every year since 2005, one in spring and one in autumn.

The 9th Pyongyang Spring International Fair was grandly held from 15 to 18 May 2006. The total area of the exhibition hall was 16.5 thousand sq meters and it hosted 217 companies from 13 countries and regions in the world including China, the Netherlands, France and Germany. Products on display ranged from chemicals, electronics, pesticides, agricultural machines to cosmetics, pharmaceuticals and foods. Of the 196 foreign participating companies, 179 were Chinese, with 80% from China’s Liaoning Province. Contractual value topped 100 million Euros.

Ms Choe Lian-shi, Division Chief of DPRK’s Bureau of International Exhibition, said in her interview with the Xinhua New Agency that the main purpose for such fair was to help DPRK companies to know the world and for the world to know DPRK’s market. It was also to help DPRK companies establish links with their foreign counterparts in order to promote export, explore international markets and introduce advanced foreign technology to promote its economic development.

She pointed out that during the fair held last year, contracts, both for import and export and joint ventures, valued 70 million Euro, among which, export contracts amounting 30 million Euro, import contracts 32 million Euro and joint venture 8 million Euro.

She also stressed that Chinese companies took up the bulk of the participants. They came this time with the China Committee for the Promotion of International Trade, which made them more orderly and organized. All this showed that economic relations between China and DPRK were constantly developing and trade has become more active.

Apart from this DPRK also cooperates with the relevant sides in China to hold commodity fair and trade and investment talks in Beijing, Dandong and other cities in China several times a year.

Recently DPRK has organized some companies suitable for foreign markets to go outside the country to conduct foreign trade and economic cooperation. Construction companies in DPRK like Foreign Construction Co. sent thousands of experts and technicians to scores of countries and regions including Russia, Bangladesh, Kuwait and Libya to engage in project and labor contracting. Mansudae Overseas Development Group undertook to build bronze statues, monuments and other works of arts, and fit out buildings and parks in over 70 countries and regions to earn foreign currencies for the country. President statues in the seven African countries like Equatorial Guinea, Togo and Gabon, monument of the people’s heroes in Ethiopia, and the grain museum in Malaysia were all works of the company. DPRK Industrial Tech Co. opened branches in China and other countries to conduct trade in new technology, inventions and patents by replying on the institute and production bases attached to DPRK’s Academy of Sciences.

Improve Modes of Economic Management

Premier Pak Pong Ju also stressed in the report that efforts should be made to improve modes of economic management, to ensure practical benefits while reflecting socialist principles. DPRK has carried out factory and company reform through market price instead of planned price. It will also partially give up the state plan in production and sale. These measures are not only suitable for small- and medium-sized factories and enterprises but also for large-sized ones. Governments may purchase products from them according to market prices. They are also allowed to introduce foreign capital, establish joint-ventures or earn profits through trade within their capacity.

Speed up Development of Science and Technology

Another agenda of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Supreme People’s Congress was extremely noticeable. It was the report entitled Speed up Development of Science and Technology to Build a Strong and Prosperous Country, delivered by Choe Thae Bok, Secretary General of the Central Committee of DPRK’s Labor Party. Development of Science and Technology as one of the priorities of DPRK’s future development, the report was regarded as indication of the importance attached to science and technology development and its aspiration to embrace the information society. A strategic goal of its science and technology development is to become a major software country by 2022.

It is not common for DPRK’s Supreme People’s Congress, its highest body of power, to add on the agenda the development of science and technology. Media in DPRK have stressed on many occasions that the 21st century is a century of science and technology and a century of information, and that without the development of science and development it is impossible to achieve the goal of “building a strong and prosperous country”. The Supreme People’s Congress deliberated carefully and adopted the report, fully testifying its importance on science and technology and the fact that science and technology development had become a nationwide consensus.

Special Economic Zones remains an important option for DPRK.

Kae-song Industrial Park is a successful cooperation between DPRK and ROK and the two sides have decided to expand its scale on the current basis. Covering an area of 10,000 sq meters, it is planned to expand to 1 million sq meters. Many small- and medium-sized enterprises in ROK intend to invest and start business in the park as labor price in China’s coastal region in the south east is rising. Products manufactured there can be regarded as ROK-made and exported to a third country.

The DPRK Government might copy China’s special economic zones to establish new such zones along the border areas between China and DPRK. It is reported that DPRK planned to establish a new economic zone on the Bidan Island on the lower reaches of the Yalu River and build it into a future financial center. The establishment of such zones remains an important option for DPRK but it is also very prudent due to previous failure.

III. DPRK’s Energy and Mineral Recourses

DPRK has severe shortage of energy, especially oil. 90% of its oil supply comes from China. It also has oil trade with Russia but the amount is trivial as it does not have enough foreign currency. Russian oil companies sell oil to DPRK at price lower than international market price. DPRK has almost no oil reserve to speak of. It is currently working actively with China to exploit oil in its West Sea.

Electricity is also in short supply in DPRK though its supply is slightly better compared to oil. DPRK is rich in water recourses so the Government tries to develop small hydro power stations. And in accordance with the principle of those who develop will benefit, local governments are encouraged to build such projects according to their own conditions, and with good results. It is claimed by DPRK officials that the country is in fact equipped with conditions to build large hydro power stations. That’s why Kim Jong Il and other high-level officials in DPRK visited China’s Three Gorges Hydro Power Project in Yichang early this year. But because of its tension with US and its fear of conflicts or wars, the Government only encourages small- and medium-sized hydro power stations before its relations with US has improved. In addition, it also stresses thermal power since it is rich in coal and able to provide sufficient fuel. Consumption of coal ranks the first among all energy, to be followed by hydro power.

DPRK is now studying new energy and hopes to convert it into actual use in production and life, i.e. solar power and biogas.

There are four important recourses in DPRK: rich forest resources; important mineral resources like abundant coal, iron ore, graphite, gold, silver, lead, zinc, magnesite, all of which now allow the participation of foreign companies; 8600-kilometer coasts with no pollution, which are rare in the world and hold great potentials for fishing, aqua-culture, processing of sea food once foreign capital and technology are channeled in; rich tourist resources, that may become one of its future pillar industries.

DPRK has abundant mineral recourses, with over 360 kinds confirmed and 200 kinds economically viable. It is noticeable that the reserve of its magnisite ranks the first in the world, accounting for 56% of the world’s total. Its top ten minerals include tungsten, molybdenum, graphite, heavy spar and fluorite. The reserve of copper and ilmenite is calculated in tens of millions of tons and that of white jade, jadeite, black jade and sand jade is also abundant. Since it has such a large reserve of metal and energy mines, 70% of its industrial raw materials and fuels are self-sufficient. But there is no oil and pitch coal (raw material for charcoal), both of which are necessary for iron and steel industry though anthracite and brown coal are abundant. Coal, iron ore, lead and zinc core, limestone and magnisite take up the bulk of DPRK’s mineral industry but only 30% of the capacity is utilized due to restrictions of outdated equipment and poor technology. Iron ore is exploited in over 20 mines represented by Musan Mine. With a reserve of 1 billion tons, it is a famous open mine in the world and the largest in a country with an iron output of 8 million tons. Production of iron ore grew by 2-3% since 1970s, as a result of expansion and development of iron mines. But the growth has slowed down recently due to poor results of prospecting and outdated equipment. Foreign capital is now being introduced.

DPRK’s coal is divided into anthracite and bituminous coal. The former is mainly located in Pyongan-namdo and Pyongan-bukto while the latter in Hamgyong-bukto and Hamgyong-namdo. According to administrative division, there are four major coal mines in DPRK, namely Pyongan-namdo Mine, Pyongan-bukto Mine, Hamgyong-bukto Mine and Hamgyong-namdo. Currently there are over 100 national coal mines, 70 anthracite mines and 30 bituminous coal mines, and over 500 small- and medium-sized local mines.

In the 80-kilometer belt in the south of Pyongan-namdo stretching from east to west with Pyongyang at the center, the reserve of anthracite is abundant. Notable mines include Samsin (Samsindon, Daefon-gu) , Sadon (Sadon-gu), Ryongzen (Ryongzen-gu), Haelyong (Ladonza-gu, Haelyong, Gangdon-gun), Gangdon (Gangdon-gun), Gangso (Gangso-gun), Zencun (Zencun-gun), Wonstun (Wonstun-gun). There is anthracite in 668 sq kilometers in the north of Pyongan-namdo. Main coal mines there include those in Donstun, Syongbun, Jaenam, Joyang of Ganstun, Ganstun, Bonstun, Yamzum, Wyonlae, Xinlyon, Sonam of Bugstun-gun, Xiandon, Xinstun of Ensam-gun, Stunzen, Yongdae, Sunstun, Mujindae, Gigdon, and Ryongden, Ryongmun and Ryongcel of Kujang-gun, P’y?ngan-bukto.

Bituminous coal is mostly concentrated in the North Mine (north of Aoji) and South Mine (south of Chongjin) in Hamgyong-bukto and Anju Mine in Pyongan-namdo. Largest coal mines in the north include Aoji Mine in Undok-kun, Obun Mine in Musam, Hue Ryon Mine. There are seven ore strata that are 2-5 meters in depth in Anju Mine, producing brown coal of 5300kcal. With an annual output of 7 million tons, it is thus the largest mine in DPRK.

DPRK’s proven coal deposits are 14.74 billion tons, 11.74 being anthracite and 3 billion tons brown coal. Recoverable reserve, allowed by the current technology, is about 7.9 billion tons. Its coal production has dropped since the end of 1980s due to restrictions of technology and equipment. (See the table below for annual production since the 1980s)

*Unit: 10,000 tons

Year 1980 1985 1990 1993 1995 1999 2000 2002
Production 3,027 3,750 3,315 2,710 2,370 2,100 2,250 2,190

IV. Rapid Growth of Sino-DPRK Trade and Economic Cooperation

Sino-DPRK trade and economic cooperation grows at an eye-catching pace. With trade accounting for 40% of its total and investment 70%, China has thus become DPRK’s largest trading partner and source of investment. DPRK has been more dependent on China in food and energy supply. Main ports between the two countries have become or are becoming major vehicles of bilateral trade and economic cooperation. The friendly visit by Chinese President Hu Jintao to DPRK in October 2005 and Kim Jong Il’s China visit in January this year have further promoted political and economic cooperation between the two countries and injected new impetus in bilateral trade.

Trade between China and DPRK has increased by 14%, reaching 1.6 billion USD. DPRK import commodities like oil and corn from China, worth 1 billion USD, and export commodities like coal and iron ore to China, worth 0.5 billion USD. According to the statistics from Dandong Customs, 1.86 million tons of import and export went through the Dandong Port in 2005 at a value of 0.84 billion USD, up both in quantity and value by 10%, with 0.45 billion USD in China’s favor. It is estimated that DPRK will continue to expand trade with China this year. The two countries have planned to build a new road bridge across the Yalu River to meet the demands of the constantly growing trade.

Sino-DPRK Trade Volume from 1997 to 2005

*Unit: 100 million USD

Year DPRK’s Total Foreign Trade DPRK’s Trade with China China’s Export China’s Import

Year DPRK’s Total Foreign Trade DPRK’s Trade with China China’s Export China’s Import
1997 21.7 6.5 5.3 1.2
1998 14.4 4.1 3.5 0.6
1999 14.8 3.7 3.2 0.5
2000 19.7 4.8 4.5 0.3
2001 22.7 7.37 5.7 1.6
2002 22.6 7.33 4.6 2.7
2003 29 10.23 6.3 3.9
2004 31 13.85    
2005 40.5 15.8 10.8 5

In recent years Chinese businessmen have accelerated their investment in DPRK. Those who took the lead in investing DPRK mainly came from Zhejiang, Jilin, Liaoning, Jiangsu and Guangdong Provinces with Zhejiang businessmen taking up the bulk. In 2003, 40 businessmen from Wenzhou, Yiwu, Dongyang, Cixi and Hangzhou headed by Lu Yunlei, agreed on cooperation intent with the operators of Pyongyang No. 1 Store. Guhui Trading Co. lead by Lu, obtained, unexpectedly, operating right of 15,000 sq meters of the store and corresponding 9,000 sq meters of warehouse. The deal was signed on 6 August 2003. Lu commented that what he valued was the market potentials in a country that was opening up. Lu also disclosed that he would invest several million of RMB to renovate the store and that operating space in the store would cover 10,000 sq meters, divided into over 300 booths to be further rented to Chinese businessmen to wholesale and retail small Chinese commodities, daily necessities in particular. The Zhejiang businessman commented opportunities in DPRK like this: “It is better to have our presence in the country but don’t expect too much from the first phase”.

It was the private companies that gave rise to the first wave of investing in DPRK. The second wave in 2005 was mostly generated by large state-owned enterprises, in areas like heavy industry, energy, mineral recourses and transportation, different from the first one.

At present DPRK has agreed to the joint-venture between China National Metals and Minerals Import and Export Corporation and its ??Coal Mine. This is not only the first established by China outside DPRK’s special economic zone but also represents an important measure by DPRK to open its recourses. Rydongden Coal Mine is the largest anthracite mine in DPRK. Covering an area of 18.8 sq kilometers, it has a reserve of 0.15 billion ton, 0.125 billion of which is recoverable. Its annual output is 1 million tons, equal to a medium-sized coal mine in China.

According to report issued by the Development and Reform Committee of Jilin, the province has reached a “barter” agreement with DPRK, transmitting electricity to the country in exchange of the mining rights of its Youth Copper Mine. With a total investment of 0.22 billion RMB, it is a typical experiment by DPRK to exchange electricity with mineral recourses. Jinlin Tonghua Iron and Steel Group will obtain 50-year mining rights in Musan Iron, the largest in DPRK, at a price of 7 billion RMB. Musan Iron, located in Hamgyong-bukto is the largest open mine in Asia, with proven reserve of iron powder about 7 billion tons. With iron content as high as 66%, it is able to be smelted directly.

Gold reserves in DPRK are also very rich. Guoda Gold Shareholding Co. Ltd., in Zhaoyuan, Shandong Province signed an agreement in 2004 with DPRK on gold exploration and smelting project. According to the agreement, a joint-venture would be set up for gold mining in ??? and bring back the ore to the company for smelting. ??? Gold Mine, which was set up quite early, has a considerable reserve and at least 150 tons can be recoverabled. But due to the lack of capital and outdated technology, operation of the mine has been at a standstill.

In September 2005 DPRK sold the 50-year exclusive operating rights of Najin wharf to Huichun, Jilin, in order to get the latter’s support for building a road from Tongsungu, Wonstunli, Kasung-si, to Najin Port. Sources from the Administrative Committee of the Border Economic Cooperation Zone in Huichun, Jilin, disclosed that the sale this time of the wharf in Najin Port was more of a corporate instead of government act. It was said that Fan Yingsheng, a real estate developer from Hunan, was the mastermind behind the deal and he alone would channel half of the 60 million Euro in payment.

Capital from Hong Kong is also coming. Early investments were mainly channeled to hotels, restaurants and the entertainment industry. But according to a recent report from Hong Kong media, a local businessman Qian Haoming reached a 3-billion USD agreement with the DPRK Government and China’s Ministry of Railway to build a railway from Tumen, border city in China, to Chongjin, port in DPRK. The agreement signifies that the deadlock between railway authorities of the two countries is being broken. There used to be three pending questions with the DPRK railway, i.e. overstock, arrears and withholding of Chinese cargo carriages. This forced the Chinese railway authority to take measures to restrict transportation between the two countries, like intermittent loading and goods limits. Statistics show that over 2000 carriages were held up in DPRK in 2004, 260 of which were for coal. It is reported that Hong Kong International Industry Development Co. Ltd., headed by Qian Haoming, promised to provide 500 to 1000 carriages to DPRK as required by the agreement.

Preliminary agreements have been reached at the moment between China and DPRK concerning minerals, railway and port lease. Sino-DPRK economic cooperation is growing in depth and width but both sides adopt a low-profile and practical attitude. It is necessary to point out that such development has aroused concern from relevant countries in North East Asia, which mistake China for having political motives. In fact Chinese enterprises, both private and state-owned, are looking for greater room for their future development as a result of the constantly improving market economy in China. Amid such backdrop, neighboring country DPRK naturally becomes their target. There are plenty of Chinese enterprises with strength ready to come into DPRK, more active than the government policy allows. During the National People’s Congress last march, delegates from local enterprises proposed a motion to the Central Government, calling for policy and legal guarantees for expanded and deepened economic cooperation with DPRK, including the establishment of special economic zones and free trade areas. It is not difficult to see that laws of the market economy are the most fundamental reason behind Chinese enterprises’ investment in DPRK.

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DPRK tightening up Chinese border or vice versa?

Monday, August 21st, 2006

From the Joon Ang Daily:

Ties sour at North’s China border

Signs of discontent between those two closest of allies, China and North Korea, have begun to appear. Last month, despite Chinese urging, North Korea fired off a test salvo of seven missiles. Although the tests were generally considered to be a bid for international attention, they provided Japan with more domestic ammunition to change its constitutional bar on warfare as an instrument of national policy, a development China does not see as in its interests.

Some suggestions of those cooling ties can be seen in this Chinese border city. Recently, about 40 North Korean women were waiting in front of the customs office in preparation for returning to North Korea. One of the women said Chinese authorities had order the women, who had worked at a stuffed-toy factory, out of the country.

“We received a three-year approval originally to work there, but after less than a year we are going back,” the woman said. Customs officials said the women were working illegally, but other people here were skeptical. One noted that many Russians have no problems because of a lack of work papers. “When relations between China and North Korea were good, there were no problems,” one said. “These incidents are in line with the cooling ties in light of the North Korean missile launch.”

In all, about 300 North Koreans have been told to leave Dandung for their homeland. The head of a trading company here, who has been dealing with North Korea for 10 years, said another 300 North Koreans will be sent home from Dandung within a month.

A source in Beijing said the Labor Ministry headquarters told its subordinate offices earlier this month not to issue work permits to North Koreans who carry passports and visas issued to government officials. “In the past, these people were allowed to work, and given the fact that they already have a visa, this measure is probably a retaliatory move by Beijing,” this source said.

A South Korean trader with ties to the North and China said that custom checks at the border have been increased, resulting in longer delays in shipping goods. The Dandung Customs Office said concerns about drug trafficking was the reason for stepped-up measures, an explanation that some residents here say has no precedent.  

From the Daily NK:
8/17/2006

National Defense Commission’s Inspection Task Force Dispatched to Sino-Korean Border
By Kim Young Jin, Yanji of China
 
An inspection task force under the National Defense Commission (NDC) is deployed on the Sino-Korean border in order to review border security and to check defection from North Korea to China.

Kim Choon Il (a false name), a 36-year-old defector living in South Korea since 2003, said on Wednesday that in a telephone conversation with his family in North Korea on Tuesday, he was told that NDC’s inspection team came to the border area since the end of last July and inspection became much tighter.

Kim also said that the inspection task force, cooperating with local Workers’ Party office, National Security Agency, and police, blocked the Sino-Korean border.

This inspection task force is under the control of the highest state organ NDC, which surpasses the power of other previous inspection squads organized under the lesser authority.

Since the task force is directly responsible to Kim Jong Il, it is expected that the task force is granted some specific inspection guideline.

The NDC inspection squad was deployed after the UN resolution on North Korean missile crisis was passed. Also it was immediately after a flood killed thousands and created hundreds of thousands victims who lost their homes.

Dispatch of the inspection team is a measure against infiltration of outside ideology and culture and also to prevent massive defection due to recent internal and external crises.

North Korean authority sent a party inspection team to the border area in 1992 after China and South Korea normalized diplomatic relationship. Also, as the number of defectors increased since then, another inspection team under the combined control of five departments (army, security agency, prosecutor’s office, police and party) was sent.

NDC’s dispatch of an inspection task force represents the highest authority’s distrust of previous inspection teams’ activities. It’s been pointed out that due to corruption and bribery previous inspection squads were unable to root out crimes.

According to inside sources, NDC inspection task force’s primary mission is to thwart defection, leak of documents, infiltration of outsiders, guns trafficking and any other anti-socialist activities. It is confirmed that in Sino-Korean border area not only drug and counterfeit dollar bills but also guns and ammunition are smuggled.

The informant also reported that it is ordered illegal defectors and their families to be deported, and infiltrators from outside and missionaries to be executed publicly.

According to Han, a defector living in Inchon, South Korea, who is aiding North Korean refugee in China, among those who suffered flood, an increased number of them wants to escape to China or South Korea.

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Kim Jong Il’s latest film released

Friday, August 11th, 2006

From the Washington Post:

New North Korean movie is proletariat pleaser
By Jon Herskovitz
8/11/2006

The king of the summer movie box office is none other than North Korea’s Dear Leader Kim Jong-il, or at least that is what the communist state’s official media has been saying this week.

The biggest movie sensation of the season has been the film made under Kim’s wise leadership called “Diary of a Student Girl,” the North’s KCNA news agency said.

“(It) is screened before full houses in Pyongyang every day, evoking lively response from people of all walks of life,” it said.

Unlike the big movies from Hollywood this summer, there are no pirates, animated cars or mutants making a last stand in the North Korean movie billed as a “close companion of life.”

North Korea’s student girl works with her younger sister in pursuit of scientific endeavors. Through their work they overcome hardships, better understand their parents and are instilled with pride in the nation and its military-first policy.

Even before it was released, official media said it would be listed as a masterpiece.

Minister of Culture Kang Nung-su praised the film as “the fruit borne under the wise leadership of Kim Jong-il, a great master in art,” KCNA reported.

And audiences indeed loved it: “The viewers make up their mind to live as the heroines do, saying that they want to see the film again,” the official agency said.

North Korea has made numerous movies that are low on special effects but high in messages that support the state’s communist ideology.

Kim’s official biography says the man known as the “Dear Leader” is an accomplished director who has made several award-winning films.

Kim is also suspected of kidnapping a South Korean director and his actress wife in order to boost North Korean cinema. Those close to him say he has a collection of thousands of movies.

North Koreans do not have a lot of choice when it comes to entertainment. Their radios have to be set to the official state station and they can get thrown in jail for watching foreign movies or listening to Western music.

As for Kim himself, it was not certain if he has sat through the latest movie. According to official media, he has not been seen for several weeks following Pyongyang’s decision to defy international warnings and test-fire seven missiles on July 5.

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ROK flood aid to DPRK II

Thursday, August 10th, 2006

North Welcomes Aid
Korea Times 
8/4/2006

North Korea’s Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Committee took a positive stance yesterday toward accepting humanitarian aid from South Korea, Yonhap News Agency reported.

“There’s no reason for us to reject flood relief from the South as long as it’s not politically motivated,” Kim Song-won, head of the committee said from Dandong, China.

The remark is the first positive comment from a North Korean official on flood relief from the South amid chilly inter-Korean relations following last month’s missile threats.

Hyundai to Deliver Aid for NK Flood Victims
Korea Times
8.8.2006

Hyundai Asan, a South Korean company in charge of North Korean business projects, said Tuesday it will send relief goods to victims of flooding near a scenic mountain on the southeastern coast of the communist country.

From Wednesday to Saturday, Hyundai Asan will deliver 500 tons of cement and 200 tons of flour, worth about 100 million won ($104,000), by trucks across the inter-Korean border for North Korean victims in the inner part of Mount Kumgang, the company said. It would be the second relief delivery from South Korea after North Korea was devastated by torrential rains late last month.

On Monday, a pro-North Korea newspaper in Japan, the Chosun Sinbo, reported at least 549 North Koreans were killed and 295 others missing, hit by floods last month.

The casualty figures were seen as the highest so far in North Korea, one of the world’s most isolated nations. y

North wants aid, just not those noodles
Joong Ang Daily
8/10/2006
 
August 10, 2006 ㅡ North Korea formally asked South Korean civic groups for humanitarian aid for its flood victims ― but it doesn’t want instant noodles.

The country said it does want construction materials, construction equipment, blankets and medicine, according to a fax sent from the communist country to a South Korean civic group. The message was the first formal request from the North seeking aid. The North Korean Committee for Implementation of the June 15 Joint Declaration sent the message to its South Korean counterpart yesterday, thanking the civic groups here for helping the North’s flood victims. In the message, North Korea specified what they prefer to be included in the aid package. Instant noodles and clothes were singled out as less-wanted items.

The South Korean committee will meet with its North Korean counterpart tomorrow at the Mount Kumgang resort to further discuss assistance. The South Korean committee has launched a fundraising drive for North Korean flood victims. Aid packages by some civic groups have already been sent to the North, and more were on their way yesterday from Incheon.

Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok is scheduled to meet today with Han Wan-sang, South Korea’s Red Cross chief, to discuss the government’s flood relief program for the North. Floor leaders of the five political parties will also meet today to discuss the aid to the North. 

Government to give aid, rice, to the North
Joong Ang Daily
8/11/2006

After consultation with the South Korean Red Cross, the government has agreed to provide an aid package including rice to help North Korean flood victims, a Unification Ministry official said yesterday. The government will announce today its official participation in an emergency relief program for the North, led by the Red Cross and civic groups here.

After the North fired seven missiles last month, the South withheld its previously promised rice and fertilizer aid in protest.

In his meeting with Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok, South Korea’s Red Cross president, Han Wan-sang, asked the government to help send goods to benefit North Korean flood victims. Mr. Han said rice and construction materials are such items. Mr. Lee agreed to that proposal.

The government and the Red Cross will discuss further the shipment schedule and amount of aid.

Mr. Han was quoted by Yonhap News Agency yesterday as saying the aid package will be prepared by the end of next week.

Floor leaders of political parties, including the conservative Grand Nationals, also met yesterday to discuss the need for humanitarian aid to the North. They encouraged the government to send food, medicines and construction materials. A Grand National Party spokesman said that the food aid should include rice, although strict monitoring should follow to make sure the grain is provided to flood victims in urgent need.

The governing and ruling parties also agreed to approve a supplementary budget for the aid if necessary.

Seoul offers W10b in aid to N. Korea
Korea Herald
8/12/2006

South Korea will contribute 10 billion won ($10.5 million) to civilian relief efforts for flood-hit North Korea, an official said yesterday.

The contribution is part of an aid package that Seoul plans to give to the North, reversing an earlier decision to suspend aid in protest against the North’s missile launches last month.

Besides the contribution, the South also plans to ship official aid supplies to the North via the Red Cross.

The decision came at a policy coordination meeting between the government and the governing Uri Party, which was attended by Seoul’s point man on North Korean affairs, Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok, as well as Prime Minister Han Myeong-sook.

Earlier this week, North Korea asked for help from the South to recover from devastating floods in mid-July that left at least 549 people dead and 295 missing.

The North had previously refused South Korean aid from the Red Cross, saying it would take care of the problem itself.

The Unification Ministry is to allocate the money from its inter-Korean cooperation fund, which will be used to match the funds raised by each civic organization, the ruling party official said.

A ministry official said civic organizations have so far raised over 9.8 billion won in funds and goods. Other ministry officials said the fund will be used to purchase emergency relief aid, such as rice, flour, medicine and equipment.

The government held a meeting with civic organizations yesterday to decide on the size of its support for each civic organization.

The ministry and the South Korean Red Cross agreed Thursday to provide large amounts of assistance, mainly rice, that would be “substantial enough” to help flood-hit North Korea, according to Red Cross chief Han Wan-sang.

Rep. Noh Woong-rae, a vice floor leader of the ruling Uri Party, hinted Friday that the Red Cross aid may amount to more than 70 billion won worth of goods.

“(The government) gave 70 billion won worth of support (to the North) through its Red Cross when the Ryongchon incident” took place, Noh said, referring to an explosion at a train station in a North Korean town bordering China in April 2004, which left over 160 people killed and thousands injured.

“This (the previous amount) would be considered in determining the size of its aid, but the fact that the size of the (flood-affected) area is so large this time will be considered,” he said.

South Korea has been cautious in providing assistance to the North because of its no-aid pledge over the missile crisis.

But growing public calls for aid to the North have emboldened the government. The country’s main opposition party, which has been skeptical of aid provisions to the communist state, has also been supportive of emergency aid to the North.

The aid decision boosted hopes for an improvement in inter-Korean relations, which chilled after North Korea strongly protested Seoul’s decision to halt rice and fertilizer supplies until the North resolves concerns over its missile and nuclear programs.

North Korea is one of the poorest countries in the world after natural disasters and mismanagement devastated its economy in the mid-1990s. The country relies on foreign assistance to feed its 23 million people.

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