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The NSA Smuggling Ring

Wednesday, December 17th, 2008

Daily NK
Lee Sung Jin
12/17/2008

Recently in the North Korea-China border region, North Korean smuggling groups associated with the National Security Agency have been actively operating.

A source from Yangkang Province relayed in a phone conversation with the Daily NK on the 16th, “On the 9th in Songjeon-ri, Kim Jong Sook County in Yangkang Province, a van ferried on a raft fell into the water, so the border guards and the National Security Agents tried to get it out in the middle of the day. The van was being smuggled from China by the ‘national smuggling group.'”

The “national smuggling group,” or “NSA smuggling group,” which earned its epithet from the North Korean citizens, is directly operated by the National Security Agency and is composed of soldiers, well-to-do merchants, Chinese emigrants, and Chinese relatives of officials.

The group was organized in the fall of last year and has been in operation since then. The source added that its size, members, and range of traded items have significantly increased.

The source stated further, “In Hyesan alone there were at least three smuggling groups by the end of the summer, but with the passing by of the fall harvesting season, there are now about seven in operation. With the National Security Agency making profit from these groups, the No. 8 Bureau of the Chosun (North Korea) People’s Army (in charge of mobilizing war supplies) even formed a group last summer.”

In particular, it has become known that the No. 8 Bureau, under the patronage of the National Security Agency, sold a massive supply of medicinal herbs secured in North Korea to the Chinese merchants in exchange for Chinese rice.

The source emphasized, “Usually, there are four or five active members of a smuggling group. In the past, they only smuggled at night, but the groups have lately been taking advantage of quiet places during the day to hand over goods.”

He said, “When the groups engage in smuggling, the commander or vice-commander of the border guard unit will go on duty. After the National Security Agency calls the border unit, the smuggling group(s) goes out at a pre-determined time and hands over the goods.”

Goods that are currently handled by the groups are not only marine products or scrap iron, but are increasingly high-priced goods such as gold or drugs, because they can be traded for cash.

The source explained, “The smuggling groups have to give approximately 30 million North Korean won (approximately USD8,500) per person a month to the state, but ordinary smuggling does not suffice to make such a sum of money. The state severely punishes trading drugs or gold, but given the exorbitant sum which has to be paid to superiors, there has been a tendency to engage in the trading of such goods.”

He noted, “Nowadays, each unit acquires the necessary goods, so the border smuggling channel created by private individuals for trading has also been used by the national organization.”

Posted in Black markets, Economic reform, Illicit activities, Ministry of State Security (MPSS, NSA, SSD) | Comments Closed

(Updated) Kumgang/Kaesong update

Thursday, November 13th, 2008

UPDATE: Marcus Noland discussed this subject with the Daily NK. Joshua has some thoughts at One Free Korea.

ORIGINAL POST: Hyundai Asan (HA) was having a good year up through July 2008. At that point, inter-Korean trade volume had experienced a 23% year-over-year increase—reaching US$880 million. Commercial trade comprised 94% of this volume, up from 78%, and the number of firms conducting inter-Korean trade reached 526, up from 324.

…and then a South Korean tourist was shot by North Korean soldiers at HA’s flagship project, the Kumgang tourist resort. Shortly after the shooting, the South Korean government halted tourism to Kumgangsan until the DPRK agreed to launch a joint investigation into the shooting and guaranteed the safety of tourists—which never happened. As a result, the newly constructed six-star “Kumgang Ananti Golf and Spa Resort” desigend by Korean- American architect Min Sung Jin, sits unused, and revenues at HA are likely to fall to as low as 220 billion won (US$165 million), from about 300 billion won last year (Yonhap).

Despite the troubles at Kumgangsan, the joint-Korean projects on the west coast (Kaesong Industrial Zone and Kaesong tourism) remained unaffected. The Kaesong Industrial Zone, the most ambitious and risky project, has continued to receive support from both the North and South Korean governments, and the Kaesong tours have grossed the North Korean government nearly $10 million since the project was launched in December 2007.

Since I operate on the assumption that people will never turn down free money, even communist governments, I have been skeptical that the DPRK would jeopardize these investments. As of this week, however, it looks like my assumption is wrong. It seems the DPRK remains intent to cut off its nose to spite its face. On November 9, 2008:

A North Korean military team visited an inter-Korean industrial complex in Gaeseong, North Korea, last week to check personnel and facilities there.

Local experts speculated that the unprecedented survey is aimed at putting pressure on the South, whose civic groups continue to send propaganda fliers containing criticism of the North’s dictatorship.

Five military officials looked around the industrial park, Moon Moo-hong, chairman of the Kaesong Indutrial District Management Committee (KIDMAC), said.

“They made the rounds of 11 companies in the complex in the morning and asked about the amount of investment, capital, the number of workers, their salaries and working conditions,” he said.

The officials, in military uniforms, asked about how long it would take to empty the complex several times during the six-hour inspection, he added.

They did not show an amicable attitude either, saying they were not visiting to give out business cards and they had nothing to talk about.

A government official asking to remain anonymous said the visit can be read as a threat to drive out South Korean companies from the complex. (Korea Times)

Who was leading the military delegation? Lt. General Kim Yong Chol:

Kim is widely known as Pyongyang’s chief delegate to inter-Korean general-level talks in South Korea, but this time, he assumed the title of policy chief of the National Defense Committee, the most powerful organization in the North. While inspecting infrastructure and companies at the complex, he reportedly asked, “How long would it take for South Korean companies to pack up and go home?” (Donga Ilbo)

Economically, this is a terrible move:

The complex employs 35,000 North Korean workers who earn 55 dollars a month (63 dollars including social insurance), an amount considered extremely high by North Korean standards. Though the communist regime deducts a significant sum from their salaries, workers there are clearly healthier and better fed than their malnourished neighbors. If each of these workers is assumed to be part of a family of four, the complex feeds 140,000 North Koreans. (Donga Ilbo)

Yet yesterday, the implicit threat to close the border was made explicit:

[On] Wednesday, North Korea’s military threatened to “strictly restrict and cut off” all overland passage through the military demarcation line starting Dec. 1 in protest over Seoul’s “confrontational” policy. (Yonhap)

and

A Red Cross office in the North with the only civilian phone link will shut. (BBC)

Hyundai Asan Corp. said that it has yet to receive an official notice from North Korea on the suspension of its tour program to a historic city in the North, despite Pyongyang’s announcement to restrict border crossings. (Yonhap)

So what has made the DPRK so angry that its leaders are willing to take such drastic action? Judging only from the public statments by the DPRK’s military spokesmen, it seems to be the proliferation of balloons and anti-Kim Jong il leaflets that human rights groups are sending across the DMZ.

This seems bizarre because balloons have been crossing the DMZ for decades. The North Korean villages along the DMZ know exactly how to deal with these leaflets and it is fairly routine for work groups to be organized to go pick them up. Additionally, North Korea’s leaders are smart enough to know that the South Korean government has no legal authority to prevent its citizens from undertaking these activities. So the DPRK’s ultimate goals here must be greater than stopping human rights groups from sending the balloons.

Ironically, it is the same human rights groups that are sending the balloons across the border who are most vocal about closing down the Kaesong Industrial Zone and ending the Kaesong tourism project. This is because they believe that the revenues generated by these projects are diverted to support the government with little going to the actual workers. If the North Korean government ends these inter-Korean projects it will be delivering its most vocal opponents a double victory—the DPRK will end up with more balloons and less South Korean money. If I was in the business of sending balloons across the DMZ, I would be sending out fundraising letters right now telling potential donors how effective my strategy is.

Anyhow, if all of this was not strange enough, North Korea has slowed dismantling of the Yongbyon reactor (again), claiming the US owes it energy aid, and asserted that they never agreed to a nuclear verification deal which gives inspectors permission to collect samples and remove them from the country for analys. Are they just trying to squeeze more concessions out of the Six-Party talks? Or is this a calculated political strategy?

Posted in Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, Joint Ventures, Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), Manufacturing, Mt. Kumgang Tourist Special Zone, National Defense Commission, Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013), Tourism, Uncategorized | 1 Comment »

Know the Party before Getting to Know Kim Jong Il

Wednesday, October 8th, 2008

Daily NK
Namgung Min
10/8/2008

As rumors regarding Kim Jong Il’s illness surfaced during North Korea’s 60th anniversary celebrations, opinion was divided on whether the military or the Party will rise in power post-Kim Jong Il.

It is true that the power of the military rose post-Kim Il Sung, according to the “military-first” political line. The National Defense Commission (NDC) began leading various agencies and councils, and came to hold greater power because Kim Jong Il was introduced as the National Defense Commission Chairman during North-South Summits.

Thus, the National Defense Commission under military-first politics began to appear to be North Korea’s sole power base, as news on general-level promotions was released publicly by the National Defense Commission.

However, despite military-first politics, it remains the Chosun (North Korea) Workers’ Party that fundamentally controls the North Korean regime. Therefore, in order to understand the North Korean regime, one must understand the Chosun Workers’ Party.

Upcoming October 10th is the founding anniversary of this most important of organizations. The eyes of the world are focused on whether Kim Jong Il will appear on this day or not.

Therefore, it is time to closely examine what the Chosun Workers’ Party does and how it controls the North Korean regime.

The Korean Workers’ Party claims to be the direct heir to the North Korean Branch of the Chosun Communist Party that was established during “The Chosun Communist Party Convention of Leaders and Devotees of the 5 Northwest Provincial Party Committees” held on October 10th, 1945. Hence the founding date is October 10th. In April, 1946 the name was changed to the North Chosun Communist Party, which then became the Chosun (North Korean) Workers’ Party after being merged with Chosun New People’s Party in August of the same year.

North Korea is operated under the leadership of the Chosun Workers’ Party, as previously seen in other socialist countries; the nation’s power is concentrated in the Party. This implies that as the Party controls the country, the country is evolving into a socialist society and from there into a communist society.

The Workers’ Party, venerable as it is, not only holds the highest position of authority in North Korea but thus stands above other national agencies, organizations or the military.

I. The positions and roles of the Chosun Workers’ Party

The positions and roles of the Workers’ Party are described in detail in the “Rules and Regulations of the KWP,” “Ten Principals for the Party’s Unique Ideological System” and the “Socialist Constitution of North Korea.”

It is written in Article 11 of the Socialist Constitution, amended in 1998, that “The DPRK shall conduct all activities under the leadership of the Workers’ Party.” Furthermore, the Workers’ Party is stated to be an organ that controls other agencies and organizations as the highest revolutionary organization leading all other working organs.

However, the socialist constitution and the rules of the Party are only for the purpose of propagating the notion of the rationality and legitimacy of North Korea abroad while concealing a dictatorship. The reality within North Korea is completely different from the actual contents of the constitution.

In actuality, the socialist constitution and the rules and regulations of the Party defines that all sectors such as government, military, administration, judiciary, and even public prosecutor’s office are led by the Party, while being utilized as the apparatus for Kim Jong Il’s Stalinist dictatorship. That is, the regulations recognize the Party’s leadership of the country and simultaneously state that the Party can only be operated and led by Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.

The Workers’ Party in legal terms is an organ that guides North Koreans, but in reality it is only an organ under the iron command of the supreme Leader. Therefore, the Leader stands in the highest position, above the Party, nation and sovereign organs.

II. The structure and functions of the Chosun Workers’ Party

The utmost decision-making organ of the Workers’ Party is the National Party Congress.

According to the rules and regulations of the Party, all decision making of the Party regarding policies, strategies, and tactics should be passed through the National Party Congress. However, in actuality the Party Congress only rubber stamps the decisions that were already made by the Central Committee of the Party.

It is theoretically a ground rule that the Party Congress meets once every 5 years. The first congressional meeting was held in August 1946, the Congress met for the 6th time in October 1980, but has failed to meet since; 28 years. The fact that the Congress is not meeting regularly signifies that the regime system is not operating according to accepted principles of socialist states in the past.

If the Congress fails to meet, the Central Committee of the Party functions as the highest decision-making organ. The Central Committee should meet and discuss issues once every 6 months.

During these meetings, the General Secretary, committee members and the Presidium of the Politburo and committee members of the Central Committee of the Party should be elected. The Central Committee also has the authority to organize the Secretariat and the Central Military Commission.

However, even these twice annual meetings have not been held since the 21st meeting of the 6th cohort in 1993. When the meetings are not held, then the Politburo needs to take authority. However, the Secretariat of the Central Committee, whose General Secretary is currently Kim Jong Il, currently does so.

The highest organ in a communist society is officially the Presidium of the Politburo. In North Korea, Kim Jong Il is the only left in the presidium after the deaths of Kim Il Sung and Oh Jin Woo. This is why North Korea is sometimes called a totalitarian state. In the Chinese government, the Politburo presidium is properly functioning and decisions are made here. From a “democratic” perspective, the Chinese Communist Party and the Chosun Workers’ Party are completely different.

In any case, within the Secretariat of the Central Committee there are specialty departments such as the Guidance Department, Propaganda and Agitation Departments, and the United Front Department, and it also includes departments that supply secret funding to Kim Jong Il such as the 38th and 39th Departments.

The provincial organs of the Party consist of party committees of provinces, cities and counties that even include the most basic low-level party committees such as elementary party committees and sector party committees.

The structure of the Workers’ Party can also be divided into permanent party organs and temporary collective leadership groups. The permanent party organs include all members who work in any specialty departments, from the Central Committee down to low-level provincial party organs. Temporary collective leadership groups signify councils of high-level or low-level leaders of the central and provincial organs, made to implant permanent authority within the society through various meetings.

There are approximately 4,000,000 members of the Workers’ Party, including Kim Jong Il, high-level officials to low-level members, and figures from the legislature, judiciary, and the administration.

III. Main Departments and Their Roles

The main government complex of the Central Committee of the Worker’s Party is located in Changkwang-dong, Joong-district of Pyongyang. There are many buildings in the complex which include Kim Jong Il’s personal office and most of the Central Committee departments.

The second government complex is located in Junseung-dong, Moranbong-district of Pyongyang. The Social Culture Department, United Front Department and Operations Department are included in this complex.

The Workers’ Party has placed all specialty departments under the authority of the Secretariat, to function as restriction and guidance on all areas of the party members, citizens and North Korea. There is a Guidance Department that observes party members then there are other departments that exercise political functions.

The Guidance Department actualizes party guidance and restraint within communities. The department functions as Kim Jong Il’s right hand and as the core department by restraining the lives of all officials, members and citizens within the party.

The Guidance Department sub-divides into the inspection department, official department, party-member registration department, administration department and a communication department that allows direct reports regarding any incident or accident. The Guidance Department also manages the judiciary and the public prosecutor’s office.

The inspection department is responsible for inspecting any anti-party, non-party, undisciplined or unreasonable activities that develop within the regime or leadership of the Party and report to Kim Jong Il. The Guidance Department inspection section is strictly separated from other departments and North Korean party members or officials are all fearful of it.

There are approximately 20 specialty departments such as the Propaganda and Agility Department, the 38th and 39th Departments to supply fund to Kim Jong Il, the United Front Department dealing with South Korea, the International Department, the Science Education Department, and the Operations Department that carry out political activities.

Currently the Korean Workers’ Party is in the middle of the process of replacing 1st or 2nd generation leaders with 3rd or 4th generation, often more practical, personnel.

Posted in Administrative Department (KWP), Agitation and Propaganda Department, Bureau 39, Central Committee, Central Miltary Committee, Christian Federation, Democratic Women's Union, Federation of Science and Technology, Federation of Trade Unions, National Defense Commission, National Party Congress, Office 10, Operational Department, Organization and Guidance Department, Planning and Fiscal Affairs (KWP), Social Culture Department, Socialist Youth League, Third Building Secret Service, United Front Department, Worker's Party | Comments Closed

N.Korea’s Leading Apparatchiks

Thursday, September 18th, 2008

Choson Ilbo
9/18/2008

Gen. Hyon Chol-hae, the 74-year-old deputy director of the general political department of the North Korean People’s Army (KPA) has been North Korean leader Kim Jong-il’s most frequent companion on official occasions. Hyon has accompanied Kim, who is said to be recovering from a stroke, on 32 occasions this year.

In analysis of senior North Korean officials who have accompanied Kim on his inspections of various facilities until Aug. 14, Hyon was followed by Gen. Ri Myong-su (71), director of the administrative department of the National Defense Commission (29 occasions); Kim Ki-nam (82), director of the propaganda department of the North Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) (22 occasions); Pak Nam-gi (74), director of the planning and fiscal affairs department of the KWP (10 occasions); Kim Jong-gak (62), first vice-director of the KPA’s general political department, Pak To-chun, chief secretary of the WPK Jagang Provincial Committee, Kim Kyok-sik, chief of the KPA general staff (seven occasions); Jang Song-taek (62), director of the administrative department of the KWP (five occasions); and North Korea’s first vice foreign minister Kang Sok-ju (67) (five occasions).

During these inspections, Kim has given instructions to military officers, government officials and plant managers. The more often these elderly men accompany Kim, the closer the Unification Ministry, which carried out the analysis, considers them to the North Korean leader. Hyon, Ri, Kim and Pak ranked first through fourth in 2007 as well

Song Dae-sung, a senior researcher at the Sejong Institute, said there is no big change in the ranking order of those closest aides to Kim Jong-il, who are assisting Kim on his sickbed or governing North Korea on his behalf.

Hyon Chol-hae
The KPA’s general political department, which Hyon controls as deputy director, is in charge of the entire KPA organization. A graduate of the Mangyongdae Revolutionary School, which families and descendants of the anti-Japanese partisans attend, he controls the school’s graduates, most of whom serve in the military. During the Korean War, he was Kim Il-sung’s bodyguard. He accompanied Kim junior on his visit to China in 2001.

Hyon stood on the platform alongside other North Korean leaders during a military parade on North Korea’s 60th anniversary on Sept. 9. According to analysts, normally only vice marshals or higher-ranking military officers are allowed to stand on the platform, and Hyon, a general, was an unprecedented exception.

Suh Jae-jean, director of the Korea Institute for National Unification, said, “It seems that Hyon Chol-hae is currently running North Korea behind the scenes. He is expected to play a leading role in laying the foundation for the post-Kim Jong-il era according to Kim’s wishes.” The institute says Hyon also has connections with Kim’s second son Jong-chol (27).

Ri Myong-su
Ri is director of the administrative department of the National Defense Commission, North Korea’s de facto supreme leadership. As the NDC’s administrative department director, he controls inspection and intelligence activities within the KPA. Until last year, he was under Kim Jong-il’s direct command as the director of the KPA’s operations department.

Ri emerged as a strongman in the process of Kim’s succession to power in the 1970s, by displaying loyalty to him. He has been Kim’s second most frequent companion since 2003.

Ryu Dong-ryeol, a researcher at the Police Science Institute, said, “Hyon and Ri directly report to Kim Jong-il.”

Kim Ki-nam
Kim is a well-known figure in South Korea since making an unannounced visit to the Seoul National Cemetery when he was in Seoul as the chief of a North Korean delegation to a “Unification Festival” marking Liberation Day on Aug. 15, 2005. He is Kim’s mouthpiece as secretary for propaganda for the KWP Central Committee. He was the editor-in-chief of the Rodong Shinmun, the organ of the KWP Central Committee, in 1976. In 1985, he was appointed director of the propaganda department of the KWP Central Committee.

Lee Ki-dong, a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Strategy, said, “Kim Ki-nam will be in charge of publicizing at home and abroad Kim Jong-il’s decision about a successor.”

Pak Nam-gi
Pak is in charge of North Korea’s economy. Since 1976, he has worked as an economic expert as vice chairman of the State Planning Commission, the agency that controls North Korea’s planned economy.

As the first vice-director of the KPA’s general political department, Kim Jong-gak is in charge of propaganda within the military. Kim Kyok-sik assumed the post as the chief of KPA general staff in April last year, and Pak To-chun has served as the chief secretary of the KWP Jagang Provincial Committee since 2005.

Jang Song-taek, Kim Jong-il’s brother-in-law, fell out of favor with Kim in May 2004. But he came back in 2006 and has since controlled powerful agencies such as the Ministry of Public Security and the State Security Department, and prosecutors’ offices. He is reportedly close to Kim’s eldest son Jong-nam (37).

Kang Sok-ju played a major role in reaching the U.S.-North Korean Geneva Agreement in 1994.

Posted in Administrative Department (KWP), Agitation and Propaganda Department, Korean People's Army, KPA General Political Bureau, National Defense Commission, Planning and Fiscal Affairs (KWP), Political economy, Worker's Party | Comments Closed

Kim Jong il asserts control of border regions

Thursday, July 31st, 2008

As reported earlier this year by the Daily NK, Kim Jong il’s brother in law, Jang Song Taek, was leading an anti-corruption campaign in North Korea’s northern provinces along the Chinese border. Aside from controlling financial leakages, these efforts could be interpreted as attempts by Kim to gain control over military-owned trade companies.

According to a past report:

The inspection group withdrew all trade certificates with exception of those certificates belonging to the families of anti-Japanese guerrilla fighters, and those certificates issued by the Ministry of Finance or the Shinuiju Municipal Administrative Committee. Therefore, presently at Shinuiju Customs, all import items without trade certificates issued by the above mentioned three groups have to be sent back to China.

Jang’s efforts, though seemingly effective at reasserting financial control of the region, had apparently taken their toll on local commerce:

In Hyesan, Yangkang Province, markets have been significantly reduced in size and scope recently, due to the anti-socialist group’s inspections[.]

[T]he merchants were at unease when under inspection by the National Security Agency (NSA) and other governmental organizations which govern the jangmadang [markets].

For example, transportation of goods by traders has withered away since last year, as the authority of the People’s Safety Agency (PSA) [controlled by Jang] rose and [it] launched [] a strict crackdown on traders’ belongings.

The source explained the situation in Hyesan, that “Hyesan had become the city where Chinese goods were traded for the cheapest value because Chinese goods [enter the country] at Hyesan[.] [During] the (PSA) inspection period [goods] could not be transported inland due to the inspection of trains and cars. Lives of the common people became even tougher than before, since goods could not be circulated through the jangmadang in spite of their low prices.”

“The more stringent the regulation became, the more bribes cadres received and worsened were the lives of people,” the source added.

(NKeconWatch: I have “cleaned up” some of the grammar here to make it more readable. If you want to see the original version, click here.)

And in Sinuiju:

The intensive inspection of Shinuiju, in which over 70% of Chinese-North Korean commercial traffic occurs, caused several aftereffects inside North Korea: commercial traffic passing through Shinuiju and Dandong decreased by half compared to the past, and the aftermath of the inspections in Shinuiju added fuel to the fire of price rises in jangmadang goods across the country.

For instance, sugar, which is a raw material for doughnuts or candies that are consumed the most by average civilians in the jangmadang, carried a price of around 1,500 won per kilogram before the inspections, but in mid-May, it rose to 2,100 won and vegetable oil hiked from 5,500 to 7,500 won per kilogram. Such an increase in prices also caused a significant threat to the survival of citizens who made a living off the jangmadang trade.

But the final result of the evaluation of the Shinuiju inspection, which caused quite a stir externally, has purportedly been negligible.

The source said, “The volume of trade has decreased over several months and the number of visitors to China has also been reduced by half. The results of the inspection have not produced too much difference, except for the execution of 14 corrupt officials.”

The source further noted, “The only change which has been visible to the eye is the rise in the cost of bribes offered to North Korean customs from 40 to 80 dollars per hundred kilograms of goods. There was a rumor that the loading volume carried into the North would be fixed at 120kg, from 360kg, but this has not been done yet.”(Daily NK)

The Daily NK now reports that in the wake of these developments, Kim Jong il’s National Defense Commission (NDC) has moved in and directly taken over the inspections—and economic conditions have improved:

[Markets] have become lively again in the past few days as inspections by the National Defense Commission (NDC) have gotten underway.

A source in North Korea reported to Daily NK on Friday that “Merchants in Hyesan these days are fish in water. They say that they would not mind at all going through such inspections for an entire the year!”

Part of the reason for the turn around has been a change in focus. Whereas Jang’s work hit many “ordinary” North Koreans (particularly those working for the wrong trading companies), NDC inspections are focused on controlling the mid- to upper-level cadres. It is entirely speculatory to ask whether Kim’s strategy was to unleash Jang to get control of the region and afterwards assert direct control himself, or whether complaints from locals forced the NDC to end Jang’s campaign.

Of course this is all unverified information from inside North Korea, so who knows how much of it is correct!

Posted in International trade, Military, Ministry of Administration, Ministry of People’s Security (Criminal Police), Ministry of State Inspection, Ministry of State Security (MPSS, NSA, SSD), Political economy, Worker's Party | 1 Comment »

The People’s Safety Agency’s Authority Is Strengthened

Tuesday, June 17th, 2008

Daily NK
Moon Sung Hwee
6/17/2008

The Central Committee of the Chosun (North Korea) Workers’ Party recently commanded the People’s Safety Agency (PSA) to increase its authority.

A source from North Korea reported in a telephone interview with Daily NK on the 11th that “According to a document from the Central Committee of the Party, the legal authority of agents of the PSA is being strengthened.”

The source explained that “From now on, agents of the PSA can investigate every criminal offense committed by the military, the National Security Agency, the public prosecutors and cadres of courts. This command from the Party was delivered to the cadres’ lectures over the country on May 10.

The most remarkable part is that in every field except anti-nation or anti-regime crimes the PSA can inspect and search the houses of suspects from the military, the Party, the NSA and the public prosecutor’s office.

Through this, control over the military, which abused its power and was acknowledged as a public enemy by average residents for a decade under the military-first policy, is being systematized.

The document stated clearly that the PSA has the right to detain anyone who disobeys the agents’ onsite inspections in their homes and even to arrest them, according to the source.

One proviso only was added that when the agents undertake a house search of the cadres of the Party, they have to receive prior approval from upper levels within the PSA and they do not have the authority to arrest cadres of the Party on the spot as a suspect.

The source explained that up to this point general crimes committed by soldiers were just dealt with by the military police or the Defense Security Command of the People’s Army. Since the Shimhwajo Case in 1998, the PSA has not examined the cadres of the NSA or prosecutors.

The source relayed that regulations regarding punishment towards agents who intentionally overlook an inspection or who leak information on an inspection are specified in the document.

Since Jang Sung Taek, a brother-in-law of Kim Jong Il, led the Ministry of Administration of the Chosun (North Korea) Workers’ Party, the political authority of the PSA accordingly started being strengthened. The source explained that “In the past, the PSA was not able to intervene in any case without the permission of the prosecutors, but since October 2007 the agents of the PSA were granted the authority to deal with the arrest of criminals and with sending them to court themselves.

The position that Jang Sung Taek took in October 2007 was that the Director of the Ministry of Administration of the Chosun (North Korea) Workers’ Party is responsible for general public security organizations such as the National Security Agency, the People’s Safety Agency, the Central Prosecutor Office and the Special Court.

The source analyzed that “The Party did not push legislation on the expansion of the authority of the PSA, because political conflicts with other governmental organizations would be brought out.”

Some say that the background to the promotion of the PSA stems from Kim Jong Il’s fear that the authority of the NSA and of the military were too big while the Party’s power was extraordinarily weakened.

One other source said that “Although the military or information organizations have attempted many coups in human history, the police force has always sided with the government. Therefore, Kim Jong Il drastically strengthened the authority of the PSA.”

The source added that “Regarding the promotion of the PSA, the cadres of the Party took concrete examples of assassinations such as Nicolae Ceauşescu of Romania and Park Chung Hee of South Korea, emphasizing the Romanian police’s fight against the military in order to protest Ceauşescu.”

“The People’s Safety Agents,” which is a newspaper circulated just in the PSA, and lecture materials for the PSA lately describe the PSA as the “escort warrior for the General” or “the second Escort Bureau,” the source explained, regarding the change of the PSA’s state.

Posted in Cabinet, Central Committee, Korean People's Army, Ministry of Administration, Ministry of People’s Armed Forces, Ministry of People’s Security (Criminal Police), Ministry of State Security (MPSS, NSA, SSD), Political economy | Comments Closed

The end of ‘Songun’? Part II

Saturday, April 5th, 2008

Three weeks ago, the Daily NK specualted that preparations for North Korea’s political succession are leading to an end of “Songun” and a resurgence of the Korean Workers Party. A recent story in the Donga Ilbo seems to be reinforcing this claim, noting that several assets in the military’s portfolio are being moved to various state institutions and ministries (where the Worker’s Party and probably Kim’s key supporters exercise more oversight).

Here is an excerpt from the story:

A knowledgeable source on North Korea said yesterday, “[Leader] Kim Jong Il has ordered the military to transfer its foreign operations to his cabinet and is implementing radical reform of military authorities.”

Kim ordered to reduce the number of executives and the size of the ruling Workers’ Party, government and military by 30 percent at the end of last year.

The source also said officers in the chain of command including the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces, the National Security Council, the Ministry of State Inspection and the General Staff Department began retiring in January.

The North Korean leader is also reportedly streamlining troop distribution. The North’s Border Guard Brigade has removed regiments and the role of the minting agency has shrunk.

The Ministry of People’s Security, considered the North’s main police organization, is seeing its status rise. No longer under the control of the prosecution, the ministry can now probe corruption in the prosecution and civilian damage caused by the military.

An Anti corruption campaign and purges might also be a part of this transition.

Read the whole story here:
N.Korea Changing ‘Military-First’ Policy
Donga Ilbo
3/12/2008

Posted in Cabinet, Korean People's Army, Ministry of People’s Armed Forces, Ministry of People’s Security (Criminal Police), Ministry of State Inspection, Ministry of State Security (MPSS, NSA, SSD), Worker's Party | 1 Comment »

NSC’s Detection of Cell-phone Usage Is Strengthening

Tuesday, October 16th, 2007

Daily NK
Han Young Jin
10/16/2007

Several inside sources reported that a National Security Agency inspection group consisting of 40 agents was dispatched to Shinuiju on October 1st to keep control over the usage of cell-phones.

Mr. Kim, who resides in Shinuiju said that “An inspection group from Pyongyang is censoring the usage of cell-phones among citizens, staying in the office of the Province-Security Agency. They are tracing the frequency broadband of Chinese mobile communication to find users.

“At the beginning of last week, the agents unexpectedly entered several houses around 11p.m. in Bonbu-dong in order to arrest suspected cell-phone users. It looked like a spy roundup project. Although it failed to catch users, the citizens’ fear of the inspection group was quite enormous.”

He relayed that “If they find the numbers of the South Korean country code recorded in the confiscated cell-phones, the owners of the cell-phones will be severely punished.”

In 2003, North Korea planned to construct a mobile communication system on a nationwide scale, but it ceased abruptly for fear of damages to national security in 2004. China-North Korea traders and residents in the border areas have been using the Chinese mobile communication system for their businesses, but the control of the mobile usage has been strengthening since 2006.

Another source informed us that “the device that the Security Agency uses for detection is produced by ‘Rohdesch,’ a German company. No one can use cell-phones because the device can reportedly pick up the signals easily when the agents, allegedly carrying the device in their pockets, approach areas where people are using cell-phones.

The company mentioned by Mr. Lee is Rohde & Schwarz, a German company which produces broadcasting devices, radio communication systems and other precision gauges and devices.

An affiliate of the wireless radio wave detection department under the Ministry of Information and Communication said in a phone conversation with DailyNK that “it is difficult to find radio waves from a cell-phone if you are not adjacent to the cell-phone user. I presume that NSC may ransack only the limited area where the Chinese mobile communication’s signal can reach, that is, within a few kilometers of the border, to search for cell-phone users.”

An affiliate in charge of the Networking Device of SK Telecom explained that “the mobile phone detection device can catch phone signals when the phone is on and in use, just within a 2km radius. But even then, it is difficult to find the exact location of the user.”

The rumor seems not true that the National Security agents are searching for cell-phone users by carrying the detection device in their pockets.

Our source, Mr. Lee, said that “along the border areas, the only group of people who can use mobile phones legally are Chinese merchants. However, the authorities have asked them not to use the cell-phones, or if they must, use them only with the permission of the NSC.”

He added that “If someone is caught, the degree of punishment depends on to where he or she attempted to call. If they called someone in China, a $300 fine would be sufficient; but if the call was made to South Korea, they may be sent to long term reeducation camps following heavy interrogation from the NSC.

He said, “What did the South Korean President come here for? The Chosun (North Korea) regime’s attitude has never changed.”

Posted in Cell phones, Communications, Ministry of State Security (MPSS, NSA, SSD) | Comments Closed

N. Korea’s powerful commission in vanguard of flood recovery operations

Wednesday, August 22nd, 2007

Yonhap
Sohn suk-joo
8/22/2007

North Korea’s most powerful organization is leading efforts to clean up damage from heavy floods and restore the country’s infrastructure, the North’s state media reported Wednesday.

The National Defense Commission (NDC), the highest decision-making body under the communist country’s constitution that was revised in 1997 to reflect its “songun” or military first policy, supervises relief operations involving military forces and equipment.

“We’ve achieved recovery and restoration by appealing to party, government and labor officials to go out to damaged areas under the guidance of the National Defense Commission,” Kim Kyong-san, a senior official of the Pyongyang Railway bureau, said in an interview with Radio Pyongyang.

According to North Korea watchers, North Korea’s cabinet has usually spearheaded flood relief efforts in the communist country in the past. The NDC’s involvement signifies the extent of the damage and is also meant to speed up restoration ahead of the summit between President Roh Moo-hyun and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, who leads the commission, they said.

Meanwhile, North Korea is in the final stages of restoring the railway line in Pyongyang.

“The Pyongyang railway line is fundamental in connecting the country to the east and west. All workers have labored hard and are urged to do more at the final stage,” Kim Kyong-san said.

Devastating floods are believed to have destroyed a revised 14 percent of the North’s farmland, South Korean officials said. South Korea, other countries and international agencies are extending a helping hand to the North.

The number of dead and missing is estimated at more than 300, with the homeless numbering about 300,000. An estimated 46,580 homes of 88,400 families were destroyed or damaged, according to the North’s media.

This year, South Korea is providing 400,000 tons of rice to the North, while it plans to send 7.1 billion won (US$7.5 million) worth of relief goods to North Korea.

On Tuesday, Pyongyang requested more help from the South, and South Korea is considering what to offer in response to the North’s plea for construction materials and heavy equipment.

The severe flood damage caused the two Koreas to postpone their second-ever summit, originally scheduled to be held late this month, until early October. Their leaders are to meet Oct. 2-4 in Pyongyang.

According to North Korean officials, the expressway linking Pyongyang and Kaesong has been damaged by heavy flooding, interfering with transportation. Roh plans to travel to Pyongyang via the overland route, and South Korean officials expressed hope that the expressway will be restored before the summit takes place.

Posted in Cabinet, Foreign aid statistics, International Aid, National Defense Commission, Railways, South Korea | Comments Closed

North Korea Concentrates Energy on Regulating Citizens during Provincial Elections

Tuesday, July 24th, 2007

Daily NK
Kim Young Jin
7/24/2007

The North Korean government, with the approaching Provincial People’s Assembly delegate elections on the 29th of this month, stepped-up one level the management of citizens and regulation of cell phones.

Kang Ki Ok (pseudonym), a civilian of Hyesan in Yangkang Provicne, said in a phone conversation with the reporter on the 20th, “Nowadays, I am afraid to turn on my cell phone. The People Safety agents and the National Security agents inspect us with fury in their eyes. People who use cell phones during the election season are punished, so there are people who bury their phones by putting them into jars.”

The North Korean government, when the People’s Assembly election season comes around every four or five years, concentrates on regulating the society by observing the movement of citizens and examining the registration cards.

The members of the elections preparations committee, composed of National Security agents, chairmen of People’s Units, and head officials of each provincial unit, are ordered to strictly investigate illegal acts occurring in their regions and to control them. Illegal acts are punished at the end of the elections.

According to Mr. Kang, the outflow of information has been secured at the border region with the upcoming delegate elections, so concentrated cell phone regulation were carried out. Further, the control of the border has been toughened recently, so the escape fee has skyrocked to the North Korean currency of 1 million won (approx. US$1,075).

Another source relayed, “Safeguarding Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il statues and research offices have been toughened by inspection units composed of each organ and enterprise farming laborers. Further, they are making sure that historic places and vestiges of battle are not destroyed.”

This source said, “Youth Leagues have also organized inspection units and are regulating unemployed persons and are strictly making sure that juveniles do not watch South Korean dramas and listen to illegal CDs and South Korean songs.”

On one hand, related to election preparation, each city, district, and county candidates were posted at the election site and citizens over 17 have gone into preparations such as conducting voter registrations through the election committee.

The source also relayed that the People’s Safety Agency have actively stepped up inspections by summoning civilians who have gone out to foreign sites to catch clam and mine gold for survival.

When the movement of the North Korean authorities to strengthen the solidarity of the regime was presented through this election, the citizens, in fear of being punished as trial cases, have produced a cautious atmosphere.”

At the time of the Supreme People’s Assembly elections in 2003, when thefts or acts of violence occurred, perpetrators were stringently punished regardless of whether or not they were members of the Workers’ Party. Further, in the case that teenagers got into fist fights, the parents were disciplined and jointly held responsible.

Mr. Kim, who defected in 2006, said, “At the time of the 1991 provincial elections, in the province where we were living, teenagers got into a fist fight. One of the gangs who started the fight accused the opponent of “stirring a political event destroying elections” and went to the parents and got compensation for damages by threatening them.”

Posted in Cell phones, Civil society, Communications, Ministry of State Security (MPSS, NSA, SSD), Political economy, Supreme Peoples Assembly | Comments Closed

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