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Politics, blood ties trump trump profits in north

Thursday, June 22nd, 2006

Joong Ang Daily
6/22/2006

In the ground floor ballroom of the Yanggakdo Hotel annex in Pyongyang, the North Korean Chamber of Commerce hosted a trade information and investors’ relations conference on May 16. Senior North Korean trade ministry officials gave presentations on North Korea’s economic policy and investment climate. Rim Tae-dok, chief counselor of the trade ministry, said Pyongyang protected property rights of foreign investors and guaranteed the independence of their management. The North Korean official stressed that foreign investors would enjoy tax benefits and that the legal process of establishing companies in the North has been largely simplified.

Another senior North Korean official, Kim Ha-dong, also gave a presentation about Pyongyang’s export policy. Mr. Kim, a senior researcher at the trade ministry, said the communist country had been issuing permits for exports and imports after only a short review process. He encouraged investors to participate in trade.

The North Korean presentations were not very different from those given in any capitalist country, but the concept of “self-reliance” was prominent.

“We will build a self-reliant economy of Koreans and carry out trade on top of that,” Mr. Kim said. He added that North Korea’s self-reliance must not be damaged or controlled by foreign economies through trade.

During the JoongAng Ilbo’s 10-day survey of the reclusive communist country’s economic sites, Pyongyang’s dilemma ― self-reliant socialism versus economic development by attracting foreign investments ― was apparent. Some North Korean officials showed skepticism about China’s model of partially opening its economy, claiming that their country had to be run in a different manner.

“I have toured special economic zones in China several times,” said Ju Tong-chan, the North’s chairman of the National Economic Cooperation Committee. “But we have different ways of managing our economy than China, and I believe we should run our special economic zones in different ways. We are still researching our options, but we will not do it that [Chinese] way.”

China was able to expand its economy at high speed after the central government opened up the economy. It gave local governments enough independence to run business autonomously in their areas and attract foreign investment. But Mr. Ju was obviously unconvinced by the success of China’s model. The opening of the economy could boomerang, becoming a threat to the North’s system, he worried.

On factories and farms, North Koreans were still caught up – or at least gave the outward appearance of being caught up ― in a personality cult centered on the nation’s founding family. At cooperative farms and factories, the senior managers’ introductory briefings were always about the lessons taught by Kim Il Sung, North Korea’s first president, and Kim Jong-il, who succeeded him but did not assume the title of national president. These managers’ presentations began with the number of visits by the Kims to the site. There were always paeans to the communist regime’s “military first” policy and slogans to that effect were emblazoned everywhere, making it clear that the military and politics take priority over the economy.

North Korean officials were also reluctant to lay out all pertinent information to investors and journalists.

Kim Yong-il, 45, the manager of the port at Nampo on the country’s west coast, refused to cite specific numbers about the port’s freight-handling capacity. He said only that it could deal with “large amounts” of cargo.

Mr. Rim, the trade ministry chief counselor, said North Korean politics were extremely stable, which guaranteed the security of foreign investments. He gave no data or examples to support that claim of stability, however, and completely ignored the question of North Korea’s nuclear programs and how they might or might not affect stability.

Reacting to the journalists’ remarks that South Korean firms were reluctant to invest in the North because it has been difficult to make profits there, Mr. Ju, the chairman of the National Economic Cooperation Committee, said, “Why is money the priority? Inter-Korean business must be about something more than just monetary calculations.”

He was also visibly upset about Seoul’s policy on economic cooperation. “We made extremely sensitive military restricted areas at Mount Kumgang and Kaesong available to the South,” Mr. Ju said. “But the South has just given us a lot of excuses and failed to cooperate.”

He continued, “To nurture the Kaesong Industrial Complex into a world-class production facility, electronic and advanced technology industries are crucial. But labor-intensive industries are the majority in Kaesong. In this information era of the 21st century, the South has failed to bring in computers for administrative use in Kaesong.”

He also vented some spleen about the United States, asking the journalists why Seoul was so careful not to irritate Washington. He cited the U.S. restrictions on the re-export without prior approval of so-called “dual-use” goods, those with civilian and military applications, to countries it has blacklisted, including North Korea. Other international accords, such as the Wassenaar Agreement, also prevent South Korea from providing the North merchandise and commodities that have “strategic” applications.

But Mr. Ju sounded firm about continuing operations at Kaesong. “It is the nucleus of inter-Korean economic cooperation, and we must make it a success first. Then we can move on to other projects.”

He also dismissed the U.S. concerns that workers in Kaesong were laboring under harsh working conditions, but seemed to sidestep the basic question. “It is a matter that we should deal with,” Mr. Ju said. “Since we manage businesses differently, we are trying to come up with the best resolution to make direct [wage] payments to the workers.”

South Korean economists and businessmen who listened to similar presentations and looked at some of the North’s accounts were troubled by Pyongyang’s rigidity in opening up the economy. That, they said, coupled with the simmering nuclear weapons problem, is the most serious obstacle to attracting foreign investments. Unless U.S. diplomatic ties with North Korea are established, investing in facilities in North Korea and selling “made in North Korea” products on global markets would be difficult and risky, they agreed.

“If a foreign investor wants to visit a factory in the North that he has put money into, he has to obtain an invitation every time, and his schedule and movements in the North are strictly controlled,” said Kwon Yeong-wuk, the trade promotion director at the Korea International Trade Association of Seoul. “Under such circumstances, the North should not expect much in the way of foreign investments.” He said Pyongyang had a “my way or the highway” approach to the economy: If you’re here, follow our rules. The rigidity, he reiterated, is a serious obstacle to investors.

Other experts and businessmen in South Korea said Pyongyang’s attitude toward inter-Korean business in particular makes it hard to earn profit. They complain about the stress North Korean officials put on the concept that business between the two Koreas should be based on the maxim “blood is thicker than water” and not on market principles. An official at North Korea’s National Reconciliation Council argued that South Korean conglomerates should make large investments there based on that concept.

A South Korean businessman who has been looking for business opportunities in the North said he has run into a series of dead ends. “South Korean firms are doing businesses in the global market,” he said. “The largest market is the United States, and not many people would want to give that up to do business with the North.” He added that North Korea’s cheap but skilled manpower is an attractive point, but that poor infrastructure, extremely low purchasing power and the difficulty of obtaining raw materials make China and Vietnam much more attractive investment locales. Kim Yeon-chul, an academic at Korea University in Seoul, agreed with that assessment. “Large companies in South Korea have already automated their production facilities, so labor costs are not important in deciding on investments,” he said. “North Korea must improve other conditions instead of stressing the merits of its manpower or blaming outside causes.”

Posted in Chamber of Commerce (DPRK), Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, International trade, Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), Labor conditions/wages, Mt. Kumgang Tourist Special Zone, National Economic Cooperation Federation, Sea shipping, South Korea | Comments Closed

Smoke signals from BAT’s North Korea venture

Wednesday, February 8th, 2006

Asia Times
Lora Saalman
2/8/2006

On January 10, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il traveled in a luxury train to China’s Guangdong province to sample socialist-flavored capitalism. Just a few months earlier, the North Korean Workers Party introduced reform measures granting foreign investors tax cuts and allowing them to sell goods produced in North Korea without tariffs.

For an economy that ostensibly issued halting economic reforms in 1984, these new measures constitute a revolution, albeit one with Chinese characteristics. In accordance with its giant neighbor’s model, North Korean economic reform is predicated as an alternative to the instability of political liberalization. Unforeseen social and political shifts are to be cushioned by financial solvency to keep the regime intact. With China’s assistance and unofficial aid, sustainable growth may one day be achieved in North Korea. Yet a darker side to North Korea’s economic awakening remains.

Kim Jong-il’s visit comes on the heels of accounts of North Korean money-laundering in Macau and the US decision last June and again in October to freeze the assets of various North Korean companies and financial institutions. While many of these firms are beyond the reach of US sanctions, implied misconduct has already led to runs on the North Korean-affiliated financial institution Banco Delta Asia in Macau.

As allegations swirl of money-laundering through counterfeit cigarettes and currency, a less-known story has emerged on British American Tobacco’s previously undisclosed four-year-old joint venture in North Korea. It presents the dilemma of doing business in a country in desperate need of revenue but with a poor track record of allocating resources to its people. This cautionary tale begs the question as to where exactly Pyongyang’s joint-venture profits are going.

For North Korea, which lacks many of the basic laws for financial transparency and good governance, capital investments are more than economically precarious. Shared contact information and dubious management practices among North Korean companies are ubiquitous.

Daesong-BAT is one of a handful of Western joint ventures in North Korea. The far-reaching tentacles of its North Korean partner illustrate the complexity of verifying the background and connections of any North Korean entity. Like many of its compatriots, North Korea’s Sogyong General Trading Corp (Sogyong) boasts circuitous and often indirect ties to entities engaged in proliferation, international trade, shipping, and money-laundering. These indicators point to larger concerns as to whether joint ventures, particularly Western ones, can be manipulated by North Korea for illicit financing of the regime or even to sustain its alleged WMD (weapons of mass destruction) programs.

Joint ventures and front companies
In establishing Daesong-BAT, British American Tobacco teamed up with Sogyong General Trading Corp, a Pyongyang-based state trader best known for its carpet exports. Sogyong, however, also exports such products as handicrafts, furniture and agricultural produce, while importing machinery, electronics, fishing tackle, chemicals and fertilizer. It is not uncommon for North Korean state-run enterprises to deal in everything from machinery to fishing tackle. Yet eclectic product lists make trade in illicit drugs and weapons all the more difficult to track. Cigarettes are just one more product in the Sogyong export-import pantheon.

North Korean company product lists also rarely convey their full range of trade. Seemingly innocuous industries are often manipulated as front companies. Last year, for example, Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) listed what appeared to be an innocuous North Korean food manufacturer, Sosong Food Factory, for its participation in nuclear, missile, chemical and biological-weapons proliferation. Cigarettes, like food, have been used at times to mask the real objects being transferred. In one case, Japan in 2002 seized a Chinese vessel and found that the declared store of cigarettes on board actually contained drugs thought to have come from North Korea.

While not as licentious as drug or human trafficking, even the black-market trade of cigarettes could have a tangible impact on North Korea’s financing, as seen in Eastern European illegal cigarette rings. These factors highlight the danger of taking a North Korean food or even carpet manufacturer at face value.

North Korea’s network
Among the elements of obfuscation, the company name Daesong-BAT merits attention. Rather than combining or modifying the titles of the two partner companies to form Sogyong-BAT, Daesong-BAT combines British American Tobacco’s acronym with a name that could either point to North Korea’s Daesong district or Daesong General Trading Corp (Daesong). If it turns out to be the latter, Japan and other governments have prominently featured Daesong for its ties to missile and nuclear proliferation.

Incidentally, Daesong maintains one of the most extensive and convoluted North Korean networks, with more than 10 subsidiaries. It also is suspected of falling under Bureau 39, which earns foreign currency for North Korea. A direct connection between Daesong-BAT and the sinewy Daesong franchise has yet to be established but, as illustrated below, nothing is clear cut in North Korean business relations.

Because of the lack of transparency and convoluted nature of North Korean companies, contact information often serves as the first stencil for tracing overlap between industries. In the case of Daesong, the US Central Intelligence Agency’s Open Source Center follows the use of the same fax number to establish potential business and branch linkages. If the same logic is applied to Sogyong, another pattern emerges. Sogyong shares common fax numbers with at least two companies, Korea Foodstuffs Trading Corp (Foodstuffs) and Korea Kwail Trading Corp (Kwail). These companies in turn share fax numbers with nearly 100 companies in North Korea.

Among North Korean firms sharing contact information with Sogyong-linked entities, Japan’s METI and official European export monitors have listed at least six as end-users associated with North Korean WMD programs. In October, the US government targeted one in particular, Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corp (Ryonha), freezing its assets under US jurisdiction and placing it on the US Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list. Ryonha is a prime example of the complex web of North Korean subsidiaries. Last June, the US Treasury Department also targeted the assets of its parent company Korea Ryonbong General Corp, formerly known as Lyongaksan, which heads five other US-designated entities.

Ryonha is not an aberration among companies converging with Sogyong. Among other Foodstuffs and Kwail-connected entities, Korean company databases list Korea Pyongyang Trading Corp as a distributor of methane gas derived from animal excrement. Apparently, effluent is not its only fetid source of income. The Japanese government has listed the very same company, along with subsidiaries of two other firms tracing back to Sogyong, namely Korea Ryonhap Trading Corp and Korea Jangsu Trading Corp, for nuclear, missile, chemical and biological weapons proliferation.

Proliferation networks may not be the only mechanisms at Sogyong’s fingertips. Contact information also links the two Sogyong-connected associates with at least four North Korean financial institutions. Among these, Koryo Bank and Korea Joint Bank have alleged ties to the now-infamous Banco Delta Asia in Macau. Banco Delta Asia’s own purported involvement in counterfeit-currency distribution and counterfeit-cigarette smuggling does not bode well for Daesong-BAT, no matter how convoluted their connections. Banco Delta Asia may have three degrees of separation between it and Sogyong, but in North Korea’s fishbowl of finance this does not preclude cooperation.

Banco Delta Asia is also reported to maintain a close business relationship with Macau-based Zokwang Trading, which its own vice general managing director claims is a part of North Korea’s Daesong General Trading Corp. Daesong, as mentioned earlier, has a pervasive proliferation record. It also has reported links to Changgwang Sinyong Corp (Changgwang), which has been repeatedly sanctioned by the United States for its missile-proliferation activities and sales to Iran and Pakistan. Zokwang in turn deals in missiles and nuclear-power-plant components, all the while maintaining a partnership with the notorious Changgwang. Combined with Sogyong’s branch in the joint \-venture hub Shenyang, China, even indirect ties to Macau suggest that Sogyong has the ability to tap into proliferation, industrial and financial networks in China and beyond.

Proliferation, industry and finance mean little without the means to transport goods and technology. Sogyong-associated entities Foodstuffs and Kwail share fax numbers with North Korea’s national airline Air Koryo, which has also been cited by official European monitors for proliferation. A 2003 Far Eastern Economic Review article even named Air Koryo as the transportation mechanism for Daesong’s suspected military assistance to Myanmar. Sogyong’s own shipping vessels Sogyong 1 and 2, which were detained in Japan on safety violations in December 2004 and January 2005, complete the final leg of the contact-linked proliferation, financing and shipment triangle. This network belies a much more intricate set of alliances than the domestic-consumption-based joint venture touted by British American Tobacco and Sogyong General Trading Corp.

Standards of business conduct
British American Tobacco’s website advocates transparency in international business and laudably eschews bribery, corruption, illicit trade, and money-laundering. In October, BAT executives further contended in The Guardian that the company’s North Korean cigarette joint venture fuels only domestic consumption, not exports to China or elsewhere. In spite of these reassurances, BAT is no stranger to the dangers of black-market cigarette production and transshipment. A February 2000 article in The Guardian even accuses BAT of complicity, by knowingly allowing illicit smuggling of its cigarettes to occur.

In the case of Daesong-BAT, British American Tobacco officials have admitted to knowing little of the company’s North Korean joint-venture operations. Ominously, BAT has stated that an unnamed Singapore division controls its North Korean joint venture. Lack of oversight combined with a dubious North Korean offshore mechanism for managing an ostensibly domestic industry raises significant warning signs. The incestuous relationship between state-run North Korean entities that share fax numbers of companies and banks listed for WMD procurement and money-laundering through counterfeit tobacco should also elicit concern. These are not simply dilemmas for British American Tobacco, but pose challenges to any companies forming joint ventures in North Korea.

Economic integration, as in China’s case, may bring North Korea more into step with international norms and standards. Ironically, engagement that is likely to lead to greater future transparency may also be manipulated for North Korea’s short-term illicit gains.

In 2003, the British government pressured BAT to close down its cigarette factory operations in the military dictatorship of Myanmar because of concerns over that country’s lack of human rights. Given the legion of obstacles impeding transparency in North Korea, BAT and other Western firms could be contributing to the worsening of more than human rights. They could be aiding and abetting illicit North Korean financing that is alleged to fuel Kim Jong-il’s slush fund and WMD programs.

Posted in Arms shipment, Banking, British American Tobacco (BAT), Bureau 39, Counterfeiting, Daesong-BAT JV Company, Drug smuggling, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, Foreign direct investment, Illicit activities, Ryonha Machine Tool Factory (JV Company), Sogyong General Trading Corp | Comments Closed

DPRK “Soprano” State accusation

Wednesday, January 18th, 2006

North Korea, the ‘Sopranos’ state
Asia Times
By Todd Crowell

When US Ambassador to South Korea Alexander Vershbow recently called North Korea a “criminal regime”, he was not speaking metaphorically. He was not talking about the North’s abysmal human-rights record, illegal missile sales or efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.

No, he was talking about crime – as in counterfeiting US banknotes and cigarette packages, money-laundering and drug-trafficking. These issues have suddenly risen to the forefront of Washington’s agenda and become a major stumbling block in the renewal of the six-party nuclear-disarmament talks.

In September, Washington named Macau’s second-largest bank, Banco Delta Asia, as being “a willing pawn for the North Korean government to engage in corrupt financial activities through Macau”. It said senior bank officials were working with Pyongyang “to accept large deposits of cash, including counterfeit US currency, and agreeing to place that currency into circulation”.

In mid-December, the US Treasury Department issued a formal advisory concerning North Korea’s illegal activities and cautioned US financial institutions to take “reasonable steps to guard against the abuses of their financial services by North Korea, which may be seeking to establish new or to exploit existing account relationships”.

It was reported this month that a delegation of agents from the US Secret Service, which is responsible for counter-counterfeiting as well as protecting the life of the president, will travel to Seoul to meet with South Korean authorities over counterfeiting. Visits of this nature are not usually broadcast in such a public fashion.

Meanwhile, Pyongyang says it won’t return to the six-party talks unless the US lifts restrictions against its financial institutions, including those directed at eight state-owned trading companies that Washington cited in October as being involved in weapons trafficking, especially banned missile technology.

Rumors of North Korean counterfeiting and drug-trafficking have been circulating in Asia for years. Anyone who lived in Hong Kong for many years has heard them from time to time. North Korean companies have a long history of operating in the former Portuguese enclave of Macau, which for decades served the regime as a key window to the outside world.

The Zokwang Trading Co was considered Pyongyang’s de facto consulate in Macau, and the relationship between Zokwang and Banco Delta Asia is no secret. As far back as 1994 the bank found thousands of bogus US$100 bills allegedly deposited by a North Korean employee. The director of the Zokwang Trading Co was held and questioned, but no charges were pressed.

There have been several more recent instances of alleged North Korean counterfeiting.

Last April, the Japanese media reported that a hundred or so fake $100 bills were found among a stack of used currency aboard a North Korean freighter that called at a Japanese port in Tottori prefecture. The captain was reported telling police, “We were asked to bring the money to Japan so that the money could be paid for cars and other items.”

Also in April, a large stash of bogus notes was uncovered in South Korea. The Chosun Ilbo, which reported the story, did not say where or under what circumstances the money was found, though it went into great detail over the quality of the notes and quoted experts as saying it was “highly likely” they came from North Korea.

In August, the Federal Bureau of Investigation reported two “sting” operations in the US, colorfully described as Operation Royal Charm and Operation Smoking Dragon. The US government indicted 59 people on charges related to smuggling counterfeit US currency, drugs and cigarettes into the country. The announcement did not specify their origin, but other accounts have speculated that they came from North Korea.

David Asher, head of the US administration’s North Korea Working Group, published a lengthy essay in mid-November in which he described what he called “an extensive criminal network involving North Korean diplomats and officials, Chinese gangsters and other organized crime syndicates, prominent Asian banks, Irish guerrillas and a KGB agent”.

“North Korea is the only government in the world today that can be identified as being actively involved in directing crime as a central part of its national economic strategy and foreign policy … in essence North Korea has become the Sopranos state – a government guided by [Korean] Workers Party leaders, whose actions attitudes and affiliations increasingly resemble those of an organized-crime family more than a normal nation.” The Sopranos is a popular US television series about an organized-crime family.

But why is Washington suddenly pushing decades-old suspicions at this particular time? In September, Christopher Hill, the senior US negotiator at the six-party talks, announced a breakthrough in the negotiations. North Korea had agreed in principle to disarm in exchange for recognition and aid. That same month the Treasury Department issued a warning against dealings with the Macau bank.

In October came the sanctions against the eight North Korean trading companies. Also in October, Vershbow arrived in South Korea, and the new US ambassador quickly developed a reputation for making provocative statements. In November, the six-party talks quickly foundered on Pyongyang’s demands to lift sanctions.

No doubt American officials would solemnly swear they are motivated by a desire to protect the integrity of the US currency and nothing else. But even if the allegations are substantially true, which probably is the case, isn’t this really penny-ante stuff set against the much larger issue of North Korea’s nuclear-weapons program?

None of the other participants in the six-party talks has expressed any public concern about Pyongyang’s crimes. That includes Japan, which not only is supposedly the target of counterfeit money but also is on the receiving end of drugs manufactured in North Korea. (Japanese estimate that nearly half of the country’s illegal drug imports originate from there.) Yet it has said nothing.

Last week, the Chinese Foreign Ministry was forced to deny a report printed in the South Korean media that its government had found evidence of North Korean money-laundering in Macau. “China has never indicated that the government had confirmed North Koreans using Macau for money-laundering,” the ministry statement said.

Vershbow has likened North Korea to Nazi Germany as being only the second state-sponsored counterfeiter. He was referring to an operation whereby concentration-camp inmates forged millions of US dollars and British pounds to disperse in England in an effort to ignite inflation there and harm their enemies’ economies.

Yet the highest figure I have seen for the North Korean counterfeiting is the $45 million (over a decade) reported in the Washington Times, which is nothing set against the vast sums of dollars sloshing around Asia. Indeed, I’ve never heard even a whisper that North Korean counterfeits were affecting world currency markets or the value of the dollar in the slightest way.

It’s hard not to believe that the US administration is again listening to more hardline elements after a brief ascendancy of the “realists” in the State Department. Their purpose is to neutralize the talks (how does a nation negotiate with a criminal gang, after all?) and shift the issue away from nuclear disarmament back to the nature of the regime – with the ultimate objective of toppling that regime.

Todd Crowell comments on Asian affairs.

Posted in Banking, China, Counterfeiting, USA, Zokwang Trading Company | Comments Closed

The DailyNK Exclusive Verification of the North Korean “Super Note”

Tuesday, January 10th, 2006

Daily NK
Shin Ju Hyun
1/10/2006

Korea Exchange Bank double Assurance

For the verification of the North Korean-made counterfeit dollars, the so-called “Super Note,” The DailyNK bought these counterfeit dollars and requested examination of them at the Korea Exchange Bank (KEB).

The above photos are of the “Super Note,” which the The DailyNK bought in Dandong, China. They were taken to the KEB on January 5th at 3 pm for examination and identified it as a “Super Note made in 2003.”

The following is the process of how The DailyNK obtained the counterfeit bills made in North Korea and requested examination of it at the KEB.

The DailyNK correspondent in Dandong, China, on January 2nd, was introduced to a businessman who does trade business between North Korea and China through an acquaintance. The DailyNK asked the businessman, Mr. Lee, working for K Trade Company to buy him some counterfeit dollar bills recently made in North Korea.

Mr. Lee smiled and said, “That is not a problem.” He said half a day would be enough for him to buy some counterfeit bills. The correspondent set an appointment with Mr. Lee for the next day.

The next day, the DailyNk was able to obtain the “goods.” From a wad of bills, he pulled out a $100 bill. It cost him $80. He said, “If you buy directly from a North Korean tradesman, it first costs $80 then drops down to $70 on the second call.”

“This is a dollar bill I got directly from a North Korean tradesman, and it is in good condition,” said Mr. Lee. “I was asked to do a favor to sell the dollar bills at $70 each.” According to Mr. Lee, if you meet the same North Korean tradesmen more than twice, they all ask you to do them the favor of selling counterfeit dollars.

Mr. Lee said in the areas where North Korean trade companies are located, such as Dandong, Changbai, and Tumen, daily counterfeit dollar exchanges are made. In Dandong, there is the Sinheung Trade Company run by North Korea’s National Security Agency and the ‘** base of 3000 Bureau (General Federation of Rear Services) run by the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces.

Mr. Shim, who accompanied the meeting added, “Besides counterfeit dollar exchanges, it is a well known fact that fake (Chinese) Yuan bills are circulated as well.”

North Korean Tradesmen, First Deals for Counterfeit Dollars, Second for Drugs

“The Chinese government seems to know about this. If the counterfeit money becomes a problem between North Korea and the US, then China will also decide to take a hard-line policy against the North Korean counterfeit Yuan,” said Shim. “After deals for the counterfeit money are made, then comes deals for drugs. Drug deals are made much more carefully.”

The correspondent mailed the “Super Note” to The DailyNK headquarters in Seoul on January 4th. The DailyNK reporters in Seoul visited Korea Exchange Bank on January 5th for examination.

On the afternoon of January 5th, Suh Taek Seok at the financial office sales department at the KEB headquarters said, “It is certain that the bill is a sophisticated Super Note.”

“Some Super Notes made in 2001 are often circulated, but 2003 bills are very rarely found in South Korea,” he added.

After the close examination, “Although at the basic level, the quality of paper and print technique is very complicated, this Super Note bill could be considered one of the most sophisticated ones to be found,” explained Suh.

“The Super Note made in 2003 were circulated only from October 2005, thus some of the banks out there with detection machines still could fail to verify them.”

“Counterfeit Money from the Early 80s”

Suh said, “Without knowing where the Super Note bills came from, it is difficult to predict in which country the bills were produced. However, if it is true that if the bills were produced in North Korea, the problem could become quite a sensitive matter.”

“Apart from the quality of the paper, for the $100 bill, where it says ‘UNITED STATES’ on the left side of the Franklin portrait, there are white lines on the letter “N” and the picture of the grapes under the eagles is not so clearly printed. There are many more differences between real and fake bills.”

It seems the way the counterfeit bills are circulated also varies. Kim Chan Goo, researcher at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies of Kyungnam University who was devoted to relations with North Korea for a decade since 1989 testified, “Eleven years ago when I visited Pyongyang, the guide asked me if I would like to $100 bill for 30 dollars. I bought it as a souvenir, and asked for examination at the KEB when I came back to South Korea. It was verified that it was a counterfeit.”

Kim still kept the bill as a souvenir. “There were many cases of South Korean trade/businessmen who were asked to buy and sell as a broker between the consumers and the North Korean tradesmen in Dandung. Looking back, it can be deduced that North Korea started counterfeiting dollars in the early 80s.”

Posted in Banking, Counterfeiting, Drug smuggling, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, Illicit activities, Sinheung Trade Company | Comments Closed

North Korea’s Kim Allows Tentative Stirrings of Profit Motive

Wednesday, December 28th, 2005

Bloomberg
Bradley K. Martin
12/28/2005

A sign of North Korea’s fledgling moves toward a market economy can be found at the Pyongyang monument commemorating the 1945 founding of the Workers’ Party. Beneath a 50-meter-tall rendition of the party’s logo — a hammer, sickle and writing brush — sits a street photographer.

A handmade sign displays her price list and sample photos, mostly of groups of North Korean visitors, with the monument as background.

The photographer is one of countless sidewalk entrepreneurs – – most of them selling food and drink — who have set up shop in North Korea since 2002. Before that, they would have been hauled off to re-education camps for profiteering. In the late 1990s, North Korea’s Civil Law Dictionary described merchants as a class to be eradicated because they “buy goods from producers at a low price and sell them to consumers at a high price by way of fraud, deceit and spoils.”

Since then, the party newspaper, Rodong Shinmun, has quoted Kim Jong Il, who’s held supreme power since the 1994 death of his father, Kim Il Sung, as favoring profits under socialist economic management.

North Korea, one of the world’s last Stalinist regimes, has gradually begun permitting commerce. On a four-day visit to Pyongyang, the capital, in October — arranged and scripted by the government — a group of 17 Western journalists got a glimpse of the changes. Clean, new restaurants were packed with paying customers while the streets — almost empty in 1979 and only lightly traveled in ’89 and ’92 — bustled with bicycles, motorbikes and Japanese sedans.

Casino Pyongyang

In the state-owned Yanggakdo Hotel on an island in the Taedong River, a mostly Chinese clientele played slot machines, cards or roulette at the Casino Pyongyang. Since 1998, Macau billionaire Stanley Ho, through his Sociedade de Turismo e Diversoes de Macau SARL, has invested $30 million in the casino, whose staff is also Chinese.

Now some investors from farther afield are joining pioneering Chinese and South Koreans in plunging into a country once so isolated it was known as the Hermit Kingdom. In September, Anglo- Sino Capital Partners, a London-based fund manager, said it had formed the Chosun Development & Investment Fund, which plans to raise $50 million for investments in North Korea.

“It’s the last virgin economy,” says Colin McAskill, 65, a director of Anglo-Sino and chairman of Koryo Asia Ltd., which is investment adviser to the new fund.

Natural Resources

Besides recent changes in the economic system, a 99 percent literacy rate and a minimum wage for workers in foreign-invested ventures of only $35 a month, McAskill says, he was drawn by North Korea’s rich natural resources — including iron ore, copper, lead, zinc, molybdenum, gold, nickel, manganese, tungsten, anthracite and lignite.

The fund will concentrate on North Korean companies that have been active internationally in the past, with track records as foreign currency earners, says McAskill.

He negotiated on behalf of North Korea with foreign bank creditors in 1987, when the country was unable to repay some $900 million in balance-of-payment loans that had enabled the regime in the 1970s to purchase Western industrial technology — Swiss watch-making machinery, for example — as well as such non-capital goods as 1,000 Volvo sedans from Sweden.

Oil Potential

The country’s petroleum potential lured Dublin-based Aminex Plc and its Korea-focused subsidiary, Korex Ltd., which in August announced the signing of a nine-year production-sharing agreement to explore and develop 66,000 square kilometers (25,000 square miles) of North Korean territory. The agreement covers areas in the Yellow Sea’s West Korea Bay and in the Sea of Japan as well as onshore.

While North Korea lacks proven petroleum reserves, according to the U.S. Energy Information Agency, the West Korea Bay in particular may contain hydrocarbon reserves, as it’s considered to be a geological extension of China’s oil-rich Bohai Bay.

More foreign investment may come, says Tony Michell, a Seoul- based consultant on North Korea. Michell, a 58-year-old Briton, says he has recently shepherded 20 senior managers of international companies, representing seven nationalities, to Pyongyang.

“They’re big players,” says Michell, declining to identify his clients by name or company. “They’re looking at everything, from services to manufacturing. They want to get the measure of the North Koreans and be ready if the six-party talks succeed.”

Six-Party Talks

The so-called six-party talks — between North Korea and China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the U.S. — are aimed at ending the country’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. In September, the six countries agreed on a statement of principles to govern further talks. It called for a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, a peace treaty and economic cooperation in energy, trade and investment.

Seoul-based Hyundai Research Institute, an affiliate of the Hyundai Group, projected in September that a successful outcome to the talks would be worth as much as $55 billion to the economy in the North — and more than twice that in the South.

Optimism about the economy has boosted the prices of defaulted North Korean debt originally owed to hundreds of creditors, mostly European banks, which in the 1970s began meeting as a London-based ad hoc group to discuss restructuring options. In the 1990s, that so-called London Club turned a portion of the debt into Euroclearable certificates, securities that were denominated in Swiss francs and German marks.

The certificates are trading at about 20-21 percent of face value, up from 12 percent in 2003, according to London-based Exotix Ltd., a unit of Icap Plc, one of a few financial firms that make an over-the-counter market in them.

Excessive Optimism

The debt’s price has risen in the past on excessive optimism about the country’s future. In early 1998, the debt was trading at nearly 60 percent of face value amid rumors that North Korea would collapse imminently and be absorbed by wealthy South Korea, which would then make good on the entire outstanding debt.

That had not happened by the time of the crash later that year in global emerging-market securities, when the North Korean debt price sank to about 25 percent of face value.

Exotix estimates that North Korea owes the equivalent of some $1.6 billion in principal and interest to banks out of a total $14 billion in principal and interest owed globally to mainly communist and formerly communist countries.

Although a cease-fire was declared in 1953 in the war between North Korea and China on one side and the United Nations — under whose flag the Americans, South Koreans and others had fought — on the other side, no peace treaty has ever been signed.

The U.S. maintains sanctions under the Trading with the Enemy Act that restrict trade and financial transactions with North Korea — and apply to Americans and permanent residents of the U.S. and to branches, subsidiaries and controlled affiliates of U.S. organizations throughout the world.

China, Russia

North Korea’s flirtations with capitalism are belated compared with those of China and the former Soviet Union, which began opening their economies in the 1970s.

North Korea did pass a law legalizing foreign investment in 1984. The law, which permitted equity joint ventures between state enterprises and foreigners, attracted only $150 million in investment during the following decade, largely because investors were put off by the country’s poor roads, railroads, power systems and phone networks and by official interference in joint ventures’ recruitment, dismissal and compensation of workers, according to a 2000 thesis by Pilho Park, a postgraduate student at the University of Wisconsin Law School in Madison.

Vietnam Example

In contrast, Vietnam lured $7.5 billion in investment in the first five years after it opened its economy to foreign capital in 1988, Park wrote.

Following the collapse of European communism in the early 1990s, North Korea opened the Rajin-Sonbong Free Economic and Trade Zone on the northeastern border with China and Russia. A brief flurry of investor interest ensued and then fizzled out when a crisis over the country’s nuclear weapons program took North Korea to the brink of war with the U.S. and South Korea in 1994.

In the mid ’90s, catastrophic floods, combined with the collapse of the global communist system of aid and preferential trade, caused a severe energy shortage that crippled the economy. As much as 70 percent of manufacturing capacity went idle, according to the South Korean central bank.

Also in the mid ’90s, famine killed as many as 2.5 million North Koreans, by the estimate of the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Food Insecurity

Since then, food aid from abroad, an absence of large-scale natural catastrophes and a 2005 harvest that was the biggest in 10 years have kept North Korea from the massive starvation that’s taken place elsewhere, including Niger, says Richard Ragan, North Korea director for the United Nations World Food Program.

Still, “the country faces chronic food insecurity,” Ragan says. “One of the things that happened with the food shortages is that marginal lands became less controlled. You see people trying to farm on some of the most inhospitable plots of land you could imagine.”

In October, steep, unterraced hillsides were plowed outside Pyongyang. The crops can then wash down, rocks and all, during rainstorms, harming water supplies and damaging farmland – fertility.

A second nuclear weapons crisis boiled up in 2002 when the U.S. accused the North of conducting a secret uranium enrichment program — to replace a plutonium program that it had frozen as part of a settlement of the earlier crisis.

Economic Rules

That same year, the regime proceeded with what then Prime Minister Hong Song Nam described as dramatic new economic measures, which helped bring arbitrarily set prices and foreign exchange rates closer to those prevailing on the black market.

The North Korean won consequently dropped to 150 won to the dollar in December 2002 from 2.15 to the dollar a year earlier. The official rate is currently about 170 won, while on the black market, one dollar can bring about 2,000 won.

The government also introduced pay incentives aimed at boosting worker productivity. The system is in operation at enterprises such as the Pyongyang Embroidery Institute, where some 400 women stitch elaborate pictures for framing and sale.

Employees who don’t perform up to expectations aren’t fired; they’re denied raises, says spokeswoman Woo Kum Suk. Unable to live on their minuscule basic salary, equivalent at black market rates to something over a dollar a month, non-performers eventually quit and go elsewhere, Woo says. Good workers can see their salaries raised as much as fivefold.

Consumers

“In my opinion, it’s good to have this system,” she says. “Although the government supplies things to us, sometimes there’s something more we want to buy.”

North Korea has some way to go before many investors rush in. According to a UN report, net investment inflow for 2003 — the most recent year for which statistics are available — was a negative figure: minus $5 million.

Currently the country is constructing a new special economic zone at Kaesong, just north of the South Korean border, where several small companies from the South already employ North Koreans to make clothing, footwear and household goods. Authorities declined to let Western reporters visit it, permitting only a glimpse from a highway bridge a mile away.

Those who are investing are taking a long-term view. Singaporean entrepreneur Richard Savage was looking at least five years into the future in 2001, when he formed a joint venture tree plantation with the Ministry of Foreign Trade. The company, Evergreen Kormax Paulownia Ltd., is 30 percent-owned by the government, which has assigned Savage 20,000 hectares (49,000 acres) on a 50-year lease with an option to extend for 20 more.

Timber Business

Savage, 58, says he, family members, friends and a few other investors have put $3 million into the project so far. Savage says he hopes that by the time the paulownia trees mature — they grow as fast as 7 centimeters (2.85 inches) a day on his farm, and some may be ready for harvesting five years after planting — he’ll be able to sell the wood in a unified Korean market.

When the Northern economy takes off, the first beneficiary will be the building industry, he says. “That’s why I’m in timber,” he says, adding that his fallback plan is to sell the wood to China, Japan and South Korea.

It’s not the first venture in North Korea for Savage, who wears a cowboy hat and whose e-mail moniker is WildRichSavage. In 1994, he introduced North Korean officials to Loxley Pcl, a Thai telecommunications company. In 1995, an affiliate formed for the purpose, Loxley Pacific Co., signed a joint venture agreement with North Korea’s post and telecommunications ministry to create modern telecommunications in the Rajin-Sonbong special economic zone. The venture earns about $1 million a year, Loxley Pacific Chief Financial Officer C.C. Kuei, 56, says.

Mining for Gold

North Korea’s 1992 Foreign Investment Law guaranteed that foreign investors’ shares of profits could be repatriated, a promise that’s now being tested by Kumsan Joint Venture Co., a gold mining concern that’s half owned by a Singapore-led group of Asian investors and half owned by Hungsong Economic Group, a large trading, mining and manufacturing group in Pyongyang that’s controlled by North Korea’s military.

Roger Barrett, a Beijing-based British consultant, has helped arrange financing and technology for Kumsan. Barrett, 50, introduced Kumsan to the foreign investors, whom he declined to identify.

The company used its investment to buy secondhand mining equipment from Australia in 2004 for the venture’s mine 2,000 meters (6,562 feet) above sea level near the city of Hamhung. In the first year the new equipment was used, Barrett says, the mine produced about 100 kilograms (220 pounds) of gold, half of which the foreign investors took out of the country. He says doing business with North Koreans has proved to be absolutely normal. “It’s working very well,” he says.

Foreign-Run Bank

The business environment in North Korea is surprisingly welcoming, says Nigel Cowie, 43, a former HSBC Holdings Plc banker who was hired a decade ago by Peregrine Investment Holdings Ltd. to start North Korea’s only foreign-run bank.

When Peregrine collapsed in 1998, Cowie and the North Korean joint venture partner kept the local unit operating. He and three other investors bought Peregrine’s 70 percent stake in it from the firm’s liquidators in 2000. Cowie, who’s general manager of what’s now called Daedong Credit Bank, says the bank has about $10 million in assets and has only foreigners as customers, mostly Chinese, Japanese and Western individuals and institutions. Only North Korean-owned banks can do business with state enterprises and North Korean individuals.

Better Living Conditions

Living conditions for expatriates have improved significantly in the past three or four years, Cowie says over a meal of Korean barbecue in the capital’s Koryo Hotel. “For me, personally, it’s things like creature comforts, more shops, Internet, e-mail,” he says. While the Internet is available to foreigners, it is forbidden to most North Koreans.

Cowie says his biggest challenge at the bank comes from outside North Korea. In September, the U.S. Treasury Department barred U.S. financial institutions from dealing with a Macau bank, Banco Delta Asia, that it said had been “a willing pawn” in corrupt North Korean activities and represented a risk for money laundering and other financial crimes.

The bank and North Korea both denied the charges, but the Macau government took over the bank and announced it would provide no services to North Korea in the future. Cowie says the action tied up a big chunk of Daedong Credit Bank’s customers’ assets because Banco Delta Asia had been a main correspondent bank for North Korean banks.

The Treasury Department in October broadened its dragnet by ordering a freeze of the assets, wherever in the world the U.S. could assert its jurisdiction, of eight North Korean companies it suspected of involvement in proliferating weapons of mass destruction.

`WMD Trafficking’

The department explained its action in an Oct. 21 statement on its Web site: “The designations announced today are part of the ongoing interagency effort by the United States Government to combat WMD trafficking by blocking the property of entities and individuals that engage in proliferation activities and their support networks.”

North Korea sought to connect the Treasury actions to Washington’s position in the six-party talks. The country’s Korean Central News Agency, using the acronym for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, said on Dec. 2 that “lifting the financial sanctions against the DPRK is essential for creating an atmosphere for implementing the joint statement and a prerequisite to the progress of the six-party talks.”

Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, the chief U.S. envoy to the talks, had said in a Nov. 11 press conference that the asset freeze wasn’t directly related to the talks.

Money Laundering Banned

Cowie says he doubts the U.S. action was intended to harm Daedong, which had already issued a manual prohibiting money laundering. He says he fears such U.S. actions could damp investor enthusiasm for North Korea. “It can cause the people doing legitimate business to just give up,” he says.

Cowie isn’t packing up to leave, though. Neither is Felix Abt, a Swiss native who heads a new European Business Association in Pyongyang. “I am very busy with visiting foreign business delegations,” Abt, 50, says. “Take it as a sign that the economy is developing and that more foreign business activities are under way.”

Outsiders’ investment on capitalism’s farthest frontier is gradually bringing benefits to North Koreans, too, says Savage, the tree farmer. “I can’t convert the whole country, but for the people who work for me, I’m giving them a better standard of living,” he says. “Slowly, people will prefer not to work for the government.”

If Savage and his fellow pioneers have their way, it’s only a matter of time before capitalism takes root in North Korea.

Posted in 1990s Famine, 2002 Economic reforms, Agriculture, Aminex, Arduous March, Arms shipment, Automobiles, Banking, Bicycles, Civil society, Communications, Counterfeiting, Daedong Credit Bank, Economic reform, Email, Energy, Euro-Asian Business Consultancy, Finance, Foreign direct investment, Forestry, Gambling, Gold, Hungsong Economic Group, Illicit activities, International trade, Internet, Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), Koryo Asia Ltd., Labor conditions/wages, Light Industry, Manufacturing, Mining/Minerals, Ministry of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Post and Telecommunications, Oil, Pyongyang Embroidery Institute, Rason Economic and Trade Zone (Rajin-Sonbong), Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013), Trade Statistics, Transportation | Comments Closed

Tobacco firm has secret North Korea plant

Monday, October 17th, 2005

The Guardian
Ian Cobain and David Leigh
10/17/2005

Firm with Tories’ Ken Clarke on payroll runs factory in country with grim human rights record

British American Tobacco, the world’s second largest cigarette company, has secretly been operating a factory in North Korea for the past four years, the Guardian has learned. The company opened the plant in a joint venture with a state owned corporation shortly before the regime was denounced by George Bush as a member of the “axis of evil”, and despite widespread concern over the country’s human rights record.

BAT has never mentioned the factory in its annual accounts, and it is thought that many shareholders are unaware of its links with the country.

The discovery of the secret factory comes two years after BAT was forced to pull out of Myanmar, formerly Burma, under pressure from the UK government and human rights campaigners. The human rights record of the communist regime in North Korea is widely regarded as even worse than that of the brutal military dictatorship in Burma.

The disclosure of the existence of the plant comes a day before the first ballot in the Conservative leadership election in which Ken Clarke, BAT’s non-executive deputy chairman, is a candidate.

BAT confirmed that Mr Clarke, who has been on the company’s payroll since 1998, was aware of the decision to invest in North Korea. The firm has also said that as chair of BAT’s corporate social responsibility audit committee, Mr Clarke “would oversee human rights reports on all countries where we operate”.

Mr Clarke declined to comment, although he has previously denied any impropriety in his role with BAT.

The anti-smoking group Ash said: “It seems that there is no regime so awful and no country so repressive that BAT does not want to do business there. It beggars belief that an MP like Ken Clarke could be taken seriously as a candidate to lead a major political party.”

Mr Clarke could face an investigation by the Commons health committee over accusations that he gave false evidence to parliament when he denied BAT was embroiled in international cigarette smuggling. Mr Clarke dismissed the smuggling claims as “nonsense” five days after BAT’s lawyers had confirmed that certain claims were true, in an internal letter which subsequently came to light in the US. Mr Clarke has denied giving false evidence.

BAT launched its business in North Korea in September 2001 after forming a joint venture company with a state-owned enterprise called the Korea Sogyong Trading Corporation, whose main interest had previously been exporting carpets. BAT made an initial investment of $7.1m in the enterprise, and owns 60% of the company they formed, which is known as Taesong-BAT. It has since increased its investment, but declines to say by how much. This company employs 200 people at its factory in Pyongyang, the capital, producing up to two billion cigarettes a year. It initially produced an inexpensive brand called Kumgansan, named after a mountain in the east of the country, and is now producing brands that are known as Craven A and Viceroy. Despite its previous involvement in smuggling, BAT denies that any of its cigarettes produced in North Korea are intended for the Chinese market, and insists that they are all for consumption in North Korea.

The company says that it has worked to improve the working conditions of its employees in Pyongyang, that it provides workers with free meals, and that they are “well paid”. When asked how much the employees were paid, however, the company said it did not know. BAT even said that it had “no idea” how much its cigarettes cost on the North Korean market as the operation was run by the company’s Singapore division.

Questioned about its apparent reluctance to disclose the existence of its North Korean operation, BAT said that it listed only its “principal subsidiaries” in its accounts, and added that it was not obliged to inform investors about an investment of that size.

“It is a very small entity within the BAT group and, therefore, does little to justify a mention,” a spokeswoman said.

The spokeswoman denied the factory was “a secret”, adding: “If we are asked about our investment there, we respond appropriately. The investor community know of it.” Asked about North Korea’s human rights record, a company spokeswoman said: “It is not for us to interfere with the way governments run countries.” She said BAT could “lead by example” and assist the country’s development by meeting internationally accepted standards of businesses practice and corporate social responsibility.

In launching its North Korean enterprise, however, BAT is quietly doing business in a country which is regarded by some as having the worst human rights record in the world. Even one of BAT’s own public relations officers, in Japan, was astonished when questioned about the joint venture company. “Business with North Korea?” he asked. “Where there are no human rights?” The depth of concern about the suffering of people in North Korea is expressed in a series of reports by the United Nations and human rights watchdogs.

Last August, in an excoriating report presented to the UN General Assembly, Vitit Muntabhorn, special rapporteur on North Korea for the UN’s Commission on Human Rights, pointed to the “myriad publications” detailing violence against detainees. He expressed “deep concern” about reported torture, the killing of political prisoners, the large number of prison camps and use of forced labour. Finally, he protested at the “all pervasive and severe restrictions on the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, opinion and expression, peaceful assembly and association and on access of everyone to information”.

In its latest report on the country, Amnesty International highlighted concerns about the torture and execution of detainees, and worries over the lack of basic political freedom. The charity said that millions of North Korean people were suffering hunger and malnutrition. It added that there had been reports of public executions of people convicted of economic crimes, and that Christians, whose churches have been driven underground, were reported to have been executed because of their faith.

According to human rights observers in South Korea, about 200,000 people are held in prison camps in the north.

Human Rights Watch, meanwhile, describes the Pyongyang regime as being “among the world’s most repressive governments”, adding that its leader, Kim Jong Il, “has ruled with an iron fist and a bizarre cult of personality” since the death of his father, Kim Il Sung, in 1994.

BAT carried on its business in Myanmar for four years, running a cigarette factory in a joint venture with that county’s military dictatorship. It pulled out only after the UK government had asked it to withdraw and after Mr Clarke had been forced to admit, at a shareholders’ meeting, that “Burma is not one of the world’s most attractive regimes”.

FAQ: BAT in North Korea

What’s wrong with investing in North Korea?
Britain says it will not officially support investment there because of North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Others, such as Action on Smoking and Health (Ash), object to investment which props up a notoriously cruel communist regime.

What is BAT’s track record as a company?
BAT has refused to stop selling cigarettes around the world, despite proof that its product is addictive and bad for health. Instead, it has sought to increase profits despite western governments imposing more legal restrictions, by selling to unsophisticated consumers in the developing world.

What is Ken Clarke’s role in BAT?
He collects £170,000 a year in pay and perks, in return for the title of deputy chairman. As a former health secretary and chancellor, he gives BAT credibility and international connections.

Why has his behaviour caused controversy?
When the company was accused of being involved in the lucrative smuggling trade in China and Latin America, Mr Clarke falsely claimed to parliament the accusations were “nonsense”.

Posted in British American Tobacco (BAT), Korea Sogyong Trading Corporation, Labor conditions/wages, Light Industry, Manufacturing, Sinheung Trade Company, Tobacco | Comments Closed

The Big Picture

Tuesday, September 20th, 2005

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
9/20/2005

North Korea is a country of portraits _ portraits of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, that is. The portraits are ubiquitous. They are to be placed in every living room, in every office, in every railway (and, by extension, subway) carriage but, for some reason, not on buses or trolleybuses. The portraits adorn the entrances of all major public buildings, railways stations and schools. Reportedly, in the late 1990s, the largest portrait of Kim Il-sung within the city limits of Pyongyang graced the first department store in the very center of the North Korean capital. The portrait was 15 meters by 11 meters.

North Koreans have been living under the permanent gaze of the Great Leader for more than three decades. In the late 1960s, North Koreans were ordered to place these icons in their homes and offices. By 1972, when Kim’s 60th birthday was lavishly celebrated, North Korea had much greater density of portraits than could ever be found in Stalin’s Russia or Mao’s China _ the two countries that bestowed this peculiar fondness for the Leader’s portraits on Korea.

In the late 1970s, the North Koreans received another set of instructions. They were ordered to display the portraits of Kim Jong-il, the heir designate. This had to be done “unofficially.’’ The propaganda insisted that there was a widespread movement of North Koreans who, purely out of love for the son of their ruler, began to adorn their dwellings with his portraits. Only in the late 1980s did Kim Jong-il’s portraits appear in public space, and from the early 1990s on they have been the same size as those of his father and they are put together in rooms and offices.

All portraits are produced by the Mansudae workshops that specialize in making images of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il and their relatives. They are framed and glassed (and only the best glass and timber will do!).

In different eras, the Kims were depicted in diverse manners, and these changes tell a lot about changes in ideology and policy. In the 1960s and 1970s, Kim Il-sung wore a Mao suit, stressing the austerity and quasi-military character of the regime. In the mid-1980s, these portraits were replaced with new ones, depicting Kim Il-sung in a Western-type suit. This signalled the relative openness of the regime in the late 1980s. After Kim Il-sung’s death in 1994, the new portraits also showed him in suits (incidentally, these portraits were called a “depiction of the Sun’’ since in his lifetime Kim was “The Sun of the Nation’’). However, from early 2001, Kim Il-sung has appeared in newly issued portraits in the military uniform of a generalissimo.

Kim Jong-il’s portrait also underwent similar changes. Initially he was also depicted in the dark-coloured Mao suit, once his favourite. However, the 2001 version showed him in the grandeur of a Marshal’s uniform. This once again confirmed the importance of the “army-first policy’’ proclaimed by Kim Jong-il, North Korea’s Glorious Marshal who _ unlike a vast majority of North Korean males _ never served in the military himself.

Even within private houses, the portraits are treated with the greatest of care. They are put on one of the walls, and that wall cannot be used for any other images or pinups. There are rules prescribing how exactly these icons should be placed. When a North Korean family moves to another place, they must start by hanging the Kims’ portraits on the wall. Random checks are conducted to make sure that proper care of the portraits is taken.

In the military, the portraits are hung in all rooms in permanent barracks. When a unit departs for a field exercise (as North Korean units do often), the portraits are taken with them. Once the platoon prepares its tent or, more commonly, its dugout, the portraits are placed there, and only after this ritual is the provisional shelter deemed suitable for life.

Oftenl the portraits become an important part of ritual. In schools, students are required to bow to the portraits and express their gratitude to the Great Leader who, in his wisdom and kindness, bestowed such a wonderful life on his subjects. The portraits feature very prominently in marriage ceremonies as well. The couple has to make deep bows to the portraits of the Great Leaders. This tribute is very public and serves as a culmination of the wedding ritual. It does not matter whether the wedding ceremony is held in a public wedding hall or at home.

The portraits are jealously protected. Even incidental damage of the portrait might spell disaster for the culprit. But that is another story…

Posted in Art, Civil society, Education, Mansudae creative Company (art studio), Military, Political economy | Comments Closed

North Korea Seeks to Expand Sungho-ri Concrete Tie Factory

Thursday, May 27th, 2004

ROK Ministry of Unification (Via Global Security)
5/27/2004

1. Overview: North Korea is actively pursuing a project to expand and modernize Sungho-ri concrete tie factory in efforts to increase production of concrete railroad ties, the Central Broadcasting Station reported on May 9.

2. Main Points of the Report

A. Within the very first several months of construction on expanding the Sungho-ri concrete tie factory, there has been great progress in the construction of the production building and various facilities such as a curing chamber, a boiler and a control room.

B. The Railway Ministry, concerned about the overall progress of the construction work, designated experienced party officials for systematic management of construction operations.

– The Pyongyang Railway Bureau is responsible for the construction of the control room and the curing chamber for concrete ties.

– Chongjin/Hamhung/Kaechon Railway Bureaus’ task force teams are responsible for overseeing the construction of the steel reinforcing factory.

– Various other factories including the Kim Jong Thae Electric Locomotive Factory and the September 18 Factory have made achievements in their technical support for the construction of facilities.

3. Analysis

A. To supply parts and materials for railway facilities, North Korea has relied on some ten factories that manufacture parts and materials for railway vehicles, including the Kim Jong Thae Electric Locomotive Factory.

– However, due to lack of capital and raw materials, the supply chain has become inadequate for improving railway facilities, which are showing signs of aging such as abrasion of rails, corrosion of concrete ties, among others.

– As a result, the risk for accidents has become high and the function of railways facilities is limited as a means of transportation.

B. In a bid to overcome such serious problems associated with the transportation system and to pursue a project for connecting TKR/TSR:

– Chairman Kim Jong Il paid inspection visits to the July 6 Railway Factory and the Rahung Concrete Tie Factory in Sept. 2001, immediately after his visit to Russia (Aug. 2001). Since then, North Korea has been actively engaged in the modernization of the aging railway facilities.

It is necessary to modernize concrete tie factories to increase the production of quality products to reinforce railways.¡± (01.9.14, during Kim Jong Il’s inspection of the factories)

– In order to improve the supply of railway materials to the factories, various efforts are underway such as the construction of power plants in order to supply electricity and a cooperative network among related factories and businesses in order to expand the railway materials supply capacity.

Once the construction of the Sungho Railway Youth Power Plant, which is in the final stage, is completed, it can ensure the supply of electricity needed for concrete tie manufacturing-related factories,¡± reported Rodong Sinmun on Mar. 25.

“The Sungho-ri Cement Factory is engaged in a massive campaign to increase the supply of cement to major construction sites,¡± reported Pyongyang Broadcasting Service on Mar. 25, 2003.

C. The construction work on expanding the Sungho-ri Concrete Tie Factory seems to be aimed at the following:

– To overcome problems in railway transportation by building a smooth operating supply chain for railway facilities

– To prepare for the future connection of TKR/TSR, and to improve railway facilities.

Posted in Railways, Sungho-ri concrete tie factory | Comments Closed

Foreign investors brave North Korea

Tuesday, April 13th, 2004

BBC
Lucy Jones
4/13/2004

“Got any nuclear weapons for sale?” is the response Briton Roger Barrett usually gets when he tells people at Beijing cocktail parties that he invests in North Korea.
The country’s admission to a nuclear weapons programme and its listing on George W Bush’s “axis of evil” means most people are staying well away.

But Mr Barrett, 49, a former troop commander in the British army who has 10 years experience of doing business in North Korea, recently opened a branch of his consultancy firm, Korea Business Consultants, in Pyongyang.

A self-confessed “business adventurer”, he says there is growing interest in the country after Chairman Kim Jong-il introduced economic reforms in 2002.

It’s like China in the eighties… The market reforms are very evident. It’s an exciting time to join the market.

Robert Barrett, Korea Business Consultants
He is also the enthusiastic publisher of what must be North Korea’s only business publication – the DPRK Business News Bulletin – which features some of the 250 companies he advises.

“It’s like China in the eighties… The market reforms are very evident. It’s an exciting time to join the market,” he says.

Mr Barrett is not alone.

Even in the middle of a nuclear crisis there are foreign investors in the country, and their numbers are increasing.

They say North Korea is a mineral rich country that needs everything and insist they have to get there first.

They also believe the 2002 economic reform is for real and that the country is gradually moving towards becoming a market economy.

Poverty

The little data there is on the country’s economy is hardly encouraging, though.

There has been a devastating famine and the UN says malnutrition is still widespread.

There are chronic heating and water shortages, and most North Koreans are paid less than £5 a month.

The country also has an appalling human rights record.

A BBC documentary on the country’s gulags this year contained allegations that chemical experiments are being carried out on political prisoners.

Meanwhile, the US says it is “highly likely” that North Korea is involved in state-sponsored trafficking of heroin.

In the political arena, the second round of six-nation talks aimed at resolving the nuclear crisis ended in Beijing in February without agreement, which means US and Japanese sanctions will remain in place.
‘Communism’ tourism

But the foreign entrepreneurs in North Korea are not put off.

Some are helped by UN employees who have worked in Pyongyang (among the few people to have had contact with the regime there) and many have a track record in China.

Pack a torch, conduct business meetings on the street to avoid big brother listening in and have plenty of “Asian patience” for the endless red-tape, they advise.

An Austrian company is reportedly buying pianos from the North Koreans, a French television station uses North Korean artists to produce cartoons, while a Singapore-based firm is developing forestry and tourism.

The Singaporeans intend to offer “adventure” stays on their North Korean forestry plantations.

Meanwhile, Western tourist agencies are gearing up to offer the last chance to see communism in action, and Fila and Heineken have reportedly entered into sponsorship deals with the North Korean regime.

North Korean labour

A German, Jan Holtermann owner of the computer firm KCC Europe, is putting North Korea online.

He hopes that by being there first he will be able to eventually tap into North Korean computer talent.

The country’s small number of internet users currently dial-up to Chinese providers, a costly process at about £1 a minute.

Mr Holtermann’s customers, who he hopes will number 2,000 by the end of the year, will have unlimited access for £400 a month.

As only a few North Koreans are permitted to have telephones, and as the internet service is costly, Mr Holtermann expects his customers to be government ministries, news agencies and aid organisations.

He has invested £530,000 in the venture, intending to get first pick when North Korean software programmers come onto the market.

“They are very talented,” he says.

“It’s this capacity we want to sell in Europe.”

The parcel delivery company DHL has operated in Pyongyang since 1997, when it was invited there by the government, and now has North Korean light manufacturing, textile and beverage companies on its books.

It sees itself as contributing to the country’s “slow but increasingly visible” economic reform programme.

British consultants

Former bank employee Mr Barrett is convinced North Korea is opening up much quicker than people think.

There are opportunities in banking, minerals, agriculture and telecommunications, he insists.

“There is the odd story of something going wrong,” he says.

“But when you walk around you notice construction going on.

“The people are feeling a change.”

High level contacts

But how to do business with one of the most isolationist regimes on earth?

Contacts are essential, say businessmen.

Though even knowing a North Korean minister is not enough, says Gerald Khor of Singapore-based forestry company Maxgro Holdings.

“You have to go above the ministers to the cabinet. You don’t have to know a member but you need to know people who can influence them,” he says.

“It is very important to get the favour of the dear leader (Kim Jong-il). Because when he says something, it gets done.”

Through a former UN employee, Maxgro got Kim Jong-il’s attention and has invested $2m in forestry, agreeing the state gets 30% of the profits.

“Kim Jong-il is an environmentalist,” Mr Khor says.

“We are confident we’ll get a return.

“We have dwindling supplies and this is high quality wood.”

To locate the forests elsewhere would cost much more, he adds.

Forced to change

Economic reforms introduced by the government in 2002 are seen as the first move away from central planning since the country adopted communism in 1945.

The government has been forced to change in order to survive, especially now it can no longer barter with Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, experts say.

“There is no real option not to carry out these reforms,” says UK-based Keith Bennett, who has taken trade missions to Pyongyang.

“But people don’t know where they will lead.

Chinese leaders have impressed on Kim Jong-il that there can be economic reform without fundamental political change.”

Way up on North Korea’s border with Russia and China is the Tumen economic zone, which was established in 1991 with UN help to lure investors.

The project has only had limited success and may indicate the type of problems those investing elsewhere in North Korea may face.

The North Korean section of the zone, Rajin-Songbong, hosts foreign-run hotels, telecommunications and restaurants, but that is about all.

“The North Koreans have sometimes been very co-operative and sometimes not, maybe because of policy change,” says Tsogtsaikhan Gombo, from the UN’s development agency.

“They were also disappointed when they didn’t see the investment.”

Vibrant Chinese economic zones nearby have put up fierce competition.

But even opening the door just slightly to let in capitalism has greatly improved the lives of the 150,000 people living in the zone, says Mr Gombo.

And many foreigners insist that small investments elsewhere in the country may have similar results.

Posted in 1990s Famine, 2002 Economic reforms, Agriculture, Animation, Arduous March, Banking, Cell phones, Communications, Drug smuggling, Energy, Finance, Foreign direct investment, Forestry, Illicit activities, Internet, Korea Business Consultants, Korea Computer Center (KCC), Labor conditions/wages, Light Industry, Manufacturing, Mining/Minerals, Telephones, Tourism | Comments Closed

Summary of DPRK technological efforts

Monday, December 1st, 2003

From the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive:

North Korea: Channeling Foreign Information Technology, Information to Regime Goals Pyongyang is working with Koreans abroad and other foreign partners in information technology (IT) ventures, sending software developers overseas for exposure to international trends, granting scientists access to foreign data, and developing new sources of overseas information in a bid to develop the economy. Cellular telephones and Web pages are accessible to some North Koreans, while foreigners in Pyongyang have access to foreign television news and an Internet café. While such steps are opening windows on the world, however, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) oficials are largely limiting such exposure to areas required for economic development. Moreover, they are applying IT tools to develop new means of indoctrinating the public in North Korea and reaching audiences overseas.

Working With Foreign Partners in IT Ventures
North Korea is promoting cooperative ventures with foreign partners to develop IT, which DPRK media have repeatedly described as a priority area in science and technology. An editorial in the 10 November 2003 issue of the party newspaper Nodong Sinmun, for example, named IT as the first of three technical fields, along with nanotechnology and bioengineering, to which “primary efforts should be directed.”

North Korean media suggest that officials have grasped the potential of leveraging IT for national development. A recent article in the government’s newspaper asserted that (1) “IT trade surpasses the automobile and crude oil industries” and (2) “IT goods are more favorable in developing countries than they are in the developed nations” (Minju Choson, 7 March).

ROK analysts, such as those who compiled a survey of Pyongyang’s IT industry (Puhkan-ui IT Hyonhwang-mit Nambuk Kyoryu Hyomnyok Pangan, 1 January), have suggested that DPRK policies for promoting a domestic IT industry reflect the nation’s lack of capital, dearth of natural resources, and relative abundance of technical talent. Hoonnet.com CEO Kim Pom-hun, whose extensive experience in North Korea includes residence in Pyongyang from December 2001 to October 2002, has assessed North Korean IT manpower as resembling “an open mine with the world’s best reserves of high-quality ore” ( Wolgan Choson, 1 January).

Pyongyang is partnering with Koreans in South Korea, Japan, and China, as well as Chinese, in ventures to develop both software and hardware, including:

The Morning-Panda Joint Venture Company in Pyongyang, a partnership between North Korea’s Electronic Products Development Company and China’s Panda Electronic Group, which began making computers in late 2002.
The Pyongyang Informatics Center (PIC) and South Korea’s Pohang University of Science and Technology (PUST), which are cooperating to develop virtual reality technology. In addition:
The ROK’s Hanabiz.com and PIC launched the Hana Program Center in Dandong, China, in August 2001 (http://hanabiz.com/history.html) for joint software development and training of DPRK programmers.
IMRI—ROK manufacturer of computer peripherals—and CGS—a Tokyo-based software company affiliated with the pro-Pyongyang General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (GAKRJ, a.k.a. Chosen Soren)—joined hands in July 2000 to form UNIKOTECH (Unification of Korea Technologies) to develop and market software. Both partners maintain links to North Korean IT enterprises.
The ROK’s Samsung Electronics and the DPRK’s Korea Computer Center (KCC) have been developing software together at a Samsung research center in Beijing since March 2000 (Chonja Sinmun, 15 October).

Venturing Overseas To acquire information on foreign IT trends and to promote their domestic industry, North Koreans have begun venturing overseas in recent years.

State Software Industry General Bureau Director Han U-ch’ol led a DPRK delegation in late September 2003 to the China International Software and Information Service Fair in Dalian. The North Koreans joined specialists from China and South Korea in describing conditions in their respective IT industries and calling for mutual cooperation. Participants from China and the two Koreas expanded on the theme of cooperation at the IT Exchange Symposium, sponsored by the Dalian Information Industry Association, Pyongyang’s State Software Industry General Bureau, and Seoul’s Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST). Dalian Alios Technical Consulting, a company run by Chinese Korean Yi Sung-nam, hosted the exchange (www.kotra.or.kr, 15 October, http://hanabiz.com, 9 October).
Pyongyang opened, in April 2002 in Beijing, its first foreign exhibition of DPRK software products developed by Kim Il-song University, Korea Computer Center (KCC), PIC, and other centers of software development (DPRK Korea Infobank, 16 May 2002).
KCC Deputy Chief Technician Kim Ki-ch’ol led a delegation of DPRK computer technicians to the World PC Expo 2001, held in September 2001 outside Tokyo. KCC has worked with Digiko Soft—a company run by a Korean resident of Japan—to develop commercial software. Through Digiko Soft, the expo was the first show in Japan “of computer software developed in [North] Korea” (Choson Sinbo, 22 October, 1 October 2001).
KCC computer programmers Chong Song-hwa and Sim Song-ho won first place in August 2003 in a world championship software competition of go—an Asian game of strategy—held in Japan. KCC teams have visited Japan and China on at least eight occasions since 1997 to compete in program contests for go, taking first prize three times.

Gaining Access to Foreign Data North Korea has been acquiring foreign technical information from a variety of sources in recent years, benefiting from developments in technology, warming ties between the Koreas, and longstanding sympathies of many Korean residents in Japan.

Authorities have held the annual Pyongyang International Scientific and Technological Book Exhibition since 2001, bringing foreign vendors and organizations related to S&T publications to North Korea (KCNA, 18 August).
The Trade and Economy Institute, advertised as North Korea’s “sole consulting service provider” on international trade, has been exchanging information with “many countries via Internet” since September 2002 (Foreign Trade of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 1 April).
According to PUST President Pak Ch’an-mo, who has extensive DPRK contacts in academic and scientific circles, North Korea has been purchasing technical books from amazon.com and from South Korea (Kwahak-kwa Kisul, 1 April).
Pro-Pyongyang Korean residents of Japan have long sent technical literature to North Korea.
ROK organizations, including PUST and IT publisher youngjin.com, have been donating technical publications on IT in recent years to DPRK counterparts as a means of earning good will and contributing to the eventual unification of Korea (Chonja Sinmun, 11 August).

Cell Phones, Web Pages, and NHK
Within North Korea, the advance of IT technology has been suggested by a number of recent developments:

Approximately 3,000 residents of Pyongyang and Nason have reportedly purchased cell phone service since November 2002 (The People’s Korea, 1 March).
Installation of a nationwide optical-fiber cable network in 2000, launch of the Kwangmyong 2000 Intranet the same year, and establishment of computer networks have made available domestic access to extensive technical databases maintained by the Central Scientific and Technological Information Agency, the Grand People’s Study House, and other repositories of technical information.
Via North Korea’s Silibank Web site (www.silibank.com), established in Shenyang, China, in September 2001, registered foreign users can exchange e-mails with DPRK members.
In August 2002, Kim Pom-hun, CEO of the ROK IT company Hoonnet.com, opened an Internet café in Pyongyang, the only place in North Korea for the public to access the Internet. Most customers of the service, which uses an optical cable linking Pyongyang and Shanghai via Sinuiju, are foreign diplomatic officials or international agency staffers; steep fees reportedly keep most Koreans from going on line (Wolgan Choson, 1 January).
Foreign guests in Pyongyang hotels have had access to foreign news broadcasts of Britain’s BBC and Japan’s NHK since May 2003, according to a Japanese television report (TBS Television, 2 September).

Limiting Information to Technical Areas, Harnessing IT for Domestic Indoctrination and Foreign Propaganda Development of the nation, rather than empowerment of the individual, appears to be driving DPRK efforts to develop domestic IT infrastructure and industry. Officials, scientists, and traders can now access and exchange information pertinent to their duties within the domestic Kwangmyong Intranet. Those with a “need to know” can even surf the worldwide Web for the latest foreign data. While Kim Chong-il reportedly watches CNN and NHK satellite broadcasts (Kin Seinichi no Ryorinin, 30 June) and supposedly surfs the Internet, the public has no such freedom to learn of the outside world without the filter of official propaganda.

Indeed, Pyongyang is using IT to indoctrinate the public and put its propaganda before foreign audiences. In addition to studying the party line through regular group reading of Nodong Sinmun in hard copy, a practice for indoctrinating members of work units throughout North Korea, the installation of computer networks now brings the newspaper to some workplaces on line, as the photograph below shows:

Moreover, Pyongyang has put its propaganda on the Internet.

KCNA offers Pyongyang’s line in English, Korean, and Spanish at a Web site in Japan at www.kcna.co.jp.
News and views of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan and its affiliated organizations appear on the group’s site at www.chongryon.com.
DPRK media, including newspapers Minju Choson and Nodong Sinmun, have appeared on sites originating in China, such as www.dprkorea.com and www.uriminzokkiri.com.

Posted in Biotech, Cell phones, China, Chongryun, Communications, Domestic publication, Electronic Products Development Company, Foreign direct investment, International trade, Internet, Japan, Korea Computer Center (KCC), Pyongyang Informatics Center (PIC), Silibank, South Korea, State Software Industry General Bureau | Comments Closed

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