Yonhap
12/24/2006
Chinese firms have bought a controlling stake in one of the largest copper mines in North Korea, industry sources said Sunday.
Sources familiar with business cooperation between North Korea and China said Hebei-based Luanhe Industrial Group and another privately owned company signed a deal that gives the firms control over Hyesan Youth Cooper Mine in Yanggang Province.
Joong Ang Daily
12/19/2006
Despite United Nations sanctions aimed at preventing the North Korean government from buying luxury goods for its ruling class, government sources here said a North Korean trading company is still busy providing Kim Jong-il loyalists with their perquisites.
Tian Ming Trading Company, in the center of this former Portuguese enclave now with the same China-affiliated status as Hong Kong, says its main business line is carpets, and little more. Three office workers said there were no North Koreans at the company and that it has never traded with North Korea. The company’s president was out of town on business, they said.
But a source with close ties to the trading economy here said that Park Su-dok, a 53-year-old North Korean, is in Macao and obtained a visa as an employee of the company.
Another source said, “Tian Ming is a joint venture by North Korean and Hong Kong investors, and its main business is buying luxury goods from Hong Kong for shipment to North Korea.” He added that Tian Ming’s president, a Hong Kong resident, is buying luxury watches, gold products and expensive liquor at North Korea’s request, using a Hong Kong branch office for the purpose.
Other Macao government officials said 18 North Korean firms were registered in Macao as of late November, and 115 North Koreans carry Macao visas as employees. Twenty have become Macao citizens, they added.
Since Washington threatened to impose sanctions on Banco Delta Asia here, allegedly for helping North Korea launder cash from its alleged dubious business lines, some of those companies have shut down. Ten are still in limited operation, however, these government sources said.
Separately, a South Korean banker in Hong Kong told the Joong-Ang Ilbo that a North Korean businessman had visited him in an attempt to sell gold bars through one of the South Korean bank branches in Hong Kong.
The banker reportedly spurned the overture, although the transaction would not have violated any South Korean laws or regulations on North-South dealings. He said he simply did not want to get involved in such a deal given the international attention being paid to commercial dealings with North Korea. The banker suggested that the offer may have been a sign of the foreign currency problems North Korea is facing because of the UN sanctions and U.S. pressure on financial dealings with North Korea.
Banco Delta Asia has said that between 2003 and 2005, it had sold 9.2 tons of gold bars that it had purchased from the North, where gold production is estimated to be about 25 tons per year, mostly for export.
Wall Street Journal
12/18/2006
Gordon Fairlcough, p.A1
Close-Out Sale: North Korea’s Elite Shop While They Can
A North Korean businesswoman with heavy makeup and a bouffant hairdo studied herself in a mirror as she modeled fur-lined leather coats at a small store in [Dandong, China] this frigid northeast border city.
During a three-day excursion late last month, the woman also tried on shoes and looked at large-screen television sets before buying furniture and fresh fruit and heading home to Pyongyang, North Korea’s capital city.
The United Nations has called for a crackdown on luxury-goods shipments to North Korea as a way of pressuring the country to drop its atomic-weapons programs, which came under new fire after an October nuclear test.
If anything, the uncertainty about the flow of fancy goods appears to have whetted the appetites of some privileged North Koreans — whose impoverished country cultivates a Spartan socialist image.
In Dandong, North Koreans, many wearing lapel pins with a picture of North Korea’s founding dictator, Kim Il Sung, stroll through hotels and department stores. Signs are often written in Korean, with storekeepers advertising computers, karaoke machines and the erectile-dysfunction drugs Viagra and Cialis.
A few North Koreans have bought new cars at a Toyota dealership near the Dandong customs checkpoint, according to a salesman. One man paid about $50,000 in cash for a luxury sedan.
Gold is also gaining a following. Wang Xiaoju, a saleswoman at the jewelry counter at Xin Yi Bai Department Store, says North Korean women come in nearly every day, mostly to buy gold chains and other gold jewelry.
Women from the North also are frequent visitors to a riverfront spa, favoring milk baths and massages, according to staff there. A saleswoman at the Xin Yi Bai L’Oreal counter says North Koreans are regular customers. Among the big sellers: body sculpting cream for women who want to look thinner.
In the first 10 months of this year, Chinese exports of fur coats and fake furs to North Korea soared more than sevenfold from the year-earlier period, according to Chinese Customs figures. Exports of televisions and other consumer electronics were up 77%, while perfumes and cosmetics were up 10%.
Some North Koreans are even buying real estate in Dandong. One high-rise building, where three bedroom apartments go for nearly $100,000 each, has sweeping views of a decrepit North Korean village with crumbling cinder-block houses across the border. A North Korean buyer recently purchased one of the units with cash, according to the building’s sales agent.
“Life is quite comfortable” for senior party members, military officers and traders, who have prospered despite widespread shortages of food, fuel and medicine in North Korea, says Pak Yong Ho, a former high-ranking North Korean official who defected to South Korea two years ago.
North Korea’s Communist Party has long had overseas agents in Macau, Switzerland and elsewhere dedicated to maintaining supplies of luxuries for top military and government personnel, according to former North Korean officials. Their jobs, in the wake of the U.N. sanctions, could get much harder.
The U.N. so far has let individual countries decide which high-end products to block. Washington has barred U.S. companies from selling everything from iPods to Harley-Davidson motorcycles. But that move was largely symbolic, as there is very little direct trade between the U.S. and North Korea.
Japan, which has for decades been a source of luxuries for the North Korean ruling class, has banned exports of 24 fancy products from caviar and gems to watches and art.
But the key to whether the sanctions will work is in the hands of China, North Korea’s largest trading partner.
A steel-girder bridge here spans the Yalu River, connecting Dandong to the city of Sinuiju in North Korea. That has helped Dandong, whose name means “Red East,” become a popular shopping destination for North Koreans with money. It is unclear how much that will change because of the sanctions.
So far, China hasn’t disclosed what specific kinds of high-end exports — TVs or luxury automobiles, for instance — it will block. A Chinese foreign-ministry spokeswoman, Jiang Yu, has said the list “should not be allowed to impact normal trade transactions” between the socialist neighbors.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, whose own taste for expensive French cognac and other imported luxuries is well known, uses money and goods liberally in an effort to buy the loyalty of the elite, according to U.S. and South Korean officials. Some of these officials say that depriving the ruling class of its creature comforts could alienate them from Mr. Kim, long known as “Dear Leader.”
But many North Korea watchers and North Korean defectors doubt that the elite would revolt against Mr. Kim’s government, because their fates are so closely tied to his now. “Under this regime, the privileged have had a very good life,” says Kim Dok Hong, the second-highest North Korean official to defect. “If the regime collapses, the people they’ve mistreated will be looking for revenge.”
At the peak of the famine that killed more than a million North Koreans in the mid-1990s, Mr. Pak, the former government official, says his parents weren’t short of food. Their home had three refrigerators regularly replenished with imported provisions by the Communist Party. Mr. Pak uses a pseudonym to protect family members still in the North from government retribution.
“The elites have had more freedom to do their own business” since economic overhauls in 2002, says Yang Chang Seok, a senior official at South Korea’s Unification Ministry, which oversees relations with the North. “People have earned a lot of money from trading.”
These days in Pyongyang, members of the ruling class are ferried around in imported cars and live in well-appointed — and well-guarded — apartment complexes. Their children race around city parks on in-line skates and play American computer games.
Says Mr. Pak: “If you can afford to pay, there’s nothing you can’t get.”
Joong Ang Daily
12/14/2006
A group of South Korean ginseng farmers will plant and process the medicinal herb in North Korea in the first inter-Korean ginseng venture.
Representatives of the United Korea Ginseng Farming Association Corp., based in South Chungcheong province in South Korea, will visit Pyongyang-based Kwangmyongsong General Corp. to discuss setting up a plant in the North Korean capital, said Lee Kyeong-hoon, president of the ginseng farmers’ association.
“North Korean ginseng is the most expensive in overseas markets,” Mr. Lee said. “We expect higher profits in Hong Kong and China selling products grown in healthier soil and with traditional cultivation methods only available in North Korea.”
South Korea’s government received criticism from the opposition Grand National Party because of its support for North Korean projects like the Kaesong industrial complex after North Korea tested its first nuclear bomb on Oct. 9 and launched missiles in July.
The government rebuffed the criticism, saying the projects don’t support the North Korean weapons program.
Ginseng, a root herb mostly found in Korea, northern China and eastern Siberia, may help improve the survival of cancer patients, according to a March study by the Nashville, Tennessee-based Vanderbilt-Ingram Cancer Center.
North Korea is providing the buildings, water and electricity while the South Korean association is supplying ginseng seeds and processing facilities.
Asian Survey
November/December 2006, Vol. 46, No. 6, Pages 898-916
Jae Cheol Kim
Professor of International Studies at the Catholic University of Korea, Seoul.
PDF here: chinainDPRK.pdf
Conclusion:
China’s investment efforts suggest that it has begun to engage North Korea economically. By investing, the Chinese leadership has attempted to push the North to embrace economic reforms, which in turn could improve the North Korean economy and reduce the country’s potential for political instability. In order to lead the North to embark on reform policies, Beijing has tried to provide it with seed money and technology by encouraging Chinese companies to invest. This suggests that despite expectations and allegations from the West that China might abandon its long-time ally, China is committed to supporting North Korea.
The Chinese investment, however, has increasingly been influenced by commercial considerations. Officials in Beijing have stressed that economic exchanges with the North must be mutually beneficial. Chinese companies, which have become responsible for the majority of the investment, have paid increasing attention to market share and natural resources. That China has increasingly tried to gain economic advantage in the North suggests that Sino-North Korean relations are being transformed from being ideology-motivated to interestmotivated.
Despite a stiff increase over the past couple of years, it is hard to say that Chinese investment is either full-fledged or irreversible. Because the instability of North Korea prevents Chinese entrepreneurs from fully embracing the country, Chinese investment must be seen as a pilot project, with Chinese companies and entrepreneurs testing the water. Looking to the future, Chinese investment in North Korea is likely to increase. Despite problems, the Chinese leadership will probably continue to encourage further investment in an effort to exploit developmental opportunities while simultaneously curtailing the flow of direct aid to the North. In addition, China’s dynamic economic growth will propel its overseas investment. As China’s capital account is gradually liberalized, cash-rich Chinese companies will look for markets and resources abroad to fuel their development. The potential appreciation of the yuan will further force firms to relocate factories producing low-end products to countries where the labor cost is lower. Seen from this perspective, North Korea is a good candidate for future Chinese investment—if there is no major turbulence in bilateral relations.
Highlights:
North Korea has been reluctant to follow China’s path of reform and opening because it worried that the policy may create political problems. In an apparent response to China’s recommendation in the late 1990s for reform, for instance, Kim asked Beijing to respect “Korean-style socialism.” But China’s support for reform is not unconditional. Although Chinese leaders have repeatedly urged the DPRK to embrace market-driven reforms (even taking Kim Jong Il is on tours to see the results of China’s economic reforms), when North Korea decided to set up a special economic zone in Sinuiju, apparently without prior consultation with Beijing, China aborted the project by arresting Yang Bin, whom North Korea had designated head of the zone, in October 2002.
China, however, does not want to see turbulence on the Korean Peninsula, which could not only lead to the economic and political collapse of a socialist regime on China’s border but could also threaten regional stability. China thus has tried to sustain the Pyongyang regime by providing economic assistance–believing that reform and opening would not only revive the North Korean economy but also reduce the need for regular aid to prop up the regime, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said that the Chinese government would encourage more of its companies to invest and establish their businesses in North Korea.
For Chinese firms, the prime minister’s statement amounted to a government directive, with some entrepreneurs understanding that Wen’s statement was a signal for Chinese companies to invest. Organizations were formed to smooth such investment, including the Shenyang Municipal Association of Entrepreneurs (Shenyangshi Qiyejia Xiehui), Dandong Municipal Economic Consultation Center for the Korean Peninsula (Dandongshi Chaoxianbandao Jingji Zixun Zhongxin), and Beijing Sino-Korea Economic & Cultural Exchange Company (Beijing Chaohua Youlian). They organized explanatory meetings on investment, drawing numerous applicants.
Beijing attempted to boost investors’ confidence by signing an “Investment Encouragement and Protection Agreement” with Pyongyang in March 2005 when Premier Park Bongju visited Beijing. The framework for economic and technological cooperation was made clearer through the signing of an “Agreement on Economic and Technological Cooperation” that October. Chinese officials have given financial incentives and guarantees to firms that invest in North Korea. China’s state-run banks have not only provided companies with investment capital but also have underwritten Chinese investment for joint ventures. Beijing granted preferential treatment to products processed in the North, allowing them better access to the Chinese market. Products that were processed in the Rajin area with Chinese materials and then imported to China, for instance, were labeled domestic trade and were thus exempted from customs inspection.
The deputy CEO of Beijing Sino-Korea Economic & Cultural Exchange Company, a Beijing company that helps Chinese companies invest in the North, has been quoted as saying that whether a company is able to invest in North Korea depended not on the company’s will but on whether the North would accept it or not. Foreign investors, he added, needed to meet the criterion of “political reliability.” In practice, concerns about political contamination limit North Korea’s economic cooperation with South Korea, whose government has eagerly pushed economic integration with the North. North Korea’s opening therefore means an opening toward China, and this in turn gives Chinese companies very rare advantages.
Labor costs in the DPRK are low [compared to China], running only 70–80 yuan (about US$10) per month. Building a factory is very cheap, up to one million yuan (about $120,000). Chinese entrepreneurs see that what North Korea needs is largely light industrial products. Because brand consciousness there is weak, these investors believe that many Chinese companies, even small- and medium-sized ones, can compete in the North Korean market. The scope for making profits is bigger in North Korea than in China because manufacturers can charge more for similar products in the North. For example, the price of a cigarette lighter is three to five yuan ($0.36 to $0.60) in Pyongyang but only 0.5 yuan ($0.06) in Wenzhou, China.
Although big state-owned companies account for the majority of Chinese outward investments, they rarely invest in North Korea, leaving this to small- to medium-sized companies. In the past, most Chinese investors were Korean-Chinese merchants from two areas in China: Liaoning Province and the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture. They do not expect that they can make profits in the North Korean market right away; rather, they plan to be ready for when the North opens to the world, by moving into the market early.
Chinese investment projects in North Korea are not only small in number but also weak in scale. There are no detailed data available on their average size, but they likely are no exception to the fact that China’s outward investment is generally characterized by its small scale and low level of technology.
Although North Korea wants capital in such sectors as home appliances, construction materials, electronic communications products, and machine building, Chinese investment is heavily concentrated in the sectors where China’s needs lie, such as resource extraction, or where its companies can make a profit, such as service sectors. The official Chinese guideline for outbound investment, noted above, recommended investment only in such manufacturing sectors as textiles, clothing, and food products, leaving aside other sectors for which North Korea wants investment.
The North lacks basic frameworks needed for drawing in foreign investment. Policies, laws, and regulations about tax, for instance, are not in place. There is no well established market mechanism for running the economy. The government is still heavily involved in economic management; therefore, potential investors need to have personal networks to open doors, a point that worries potential Chinese investors. North Korea lacks a sound political environment for enticing foreign investment. The country’s economic policies, especially those related to reform, shift continuously, raising questions about the official commitment to reform.
Pyongyang Department Store No. 1
Zeng Changbiao, chief executive officer (CEO) of the Zhongxu Group, in a much publicized deal in 2004, signed a contract to run Pyongyang’s Department Store No.1 for 10 years. He said his main motive for investing was to take over the North Korean market. He wants to be dominant in the North Korean retail business by securing and expanding market share. But it is not clear whether the contract was put into practice. An article in a journal published by the National Development and Reform Commission, a ministry-level organization of the Chinese government, suggested that little had changed at the department store by the middle of 2005. South Korean officials also say that the store is still run by North Korea. Zhongxu Group’s Zeng received the lowest tax rate—5% income and 5% import—in the North Korean tax system.
This is one of three big department stores that were being run either by the Chinese alone or jointly. Shenyang Municipal Association for Trade Promotion opened Daesong Market in Pyongyang, the first wholly foreign-owned company in a non-science sector.
Musan
China has shown an interest in joint resources development projects. The best known case is the project to develop the Musan iron mines. It is not easy to draw an exact picture of Chinese investment in the mines because many press reports suggest different stories. According to a Korean report, a Chinese company from Jilin Province planned to invest about $500 million in the mines. Ta Kung Pao, a Hong Kong newspaper, reported that three companies from Jilin—Tonghua Iron & Steel Group (Tonggang), Yanbian Tianchi Company, and Sinosteel Corporation (Zhonggang)—contracted rights to exploit the Musan iron mines for 50 years. According to the report, the Chinese companies were going to invest 7 billion yuan (about $865 million) and planned to produce 10 million tons of iron ore each year. In the case of the Musan mines, 2 billion yuan (about $240 million) out of the 7 billion China committed to invest was allocated to building roads and railways from Musan to Tonghua in China. Sizable investment levels might help Jilin secure access to seaports in North Korea.
Similarly, the Chinese press has reported that the Musan iron mines development project was canceled by officials in North Korea, embarrassed by publicity over the deal because it highlighted the degree of foreign investment, a subject that Pyongyang would prefer to handle quietly.
Raijin
Rason International Logistics Joint Company-Rason International secured the exclusive rights to run the No. 3 and No. 4 piers of Rajin port for 50 years. In order to secure the rights, China committed to investing 30 million euros ($36 million) to build an industrial park, tourism facilities, and a road from the trade district of Rason city to Rajin Port. North Korea in turn committed to providing China with 5 to 10 square kilometers of land to build the industrial park.
Paul Tija
GPI Consultancy
October 10, 2006
IN PDF: IT_in_NKorea.pdf
Surprising business opportunities in Pyongyang
Dutch companies are increasingly conducting Information Technology projects in low-cost countries. Also known as offshore sourcing, this way of working means that labor-intensive activities, such as the programming of computer software, are being done abroad. Asia is the most popular software destination, and Indian IT firms are involved in large projects for Dutch enterprises such as ANB Amro Bank, KLM, Philips or Heineken. More recently, we notice a growth in the software collaboration with China.
As a Dutch IT consultant, I am specialized in offshore software development projects, and I regularly travel to India and China. Recently, I was invited for a study tour to an Asian country which I had never visited before: North Korea. I had my doubts whether to accept this invitation. After all, when we read about North Korea, it is mostly not about its software capabilities. The current focus of the press is on its nuclear activities and it is a country where the Cold War has not even ended, so I was not sure if such a visit would be useful. And finally, such a trip to a farshore country would at least take a week.
Nevertheless, I decided to visit this country. This decision was mainly based on what I had seen in China. I had already traveled to China five times this year, and the fast growth of China as a major IT destination was very clear to me. China is now the production factory of the world, but China’s software industry has emerged to become a global player in just 5 years. Several of the largest Indian IT service providers, including TCS, Infosys, Wipro and Satyam, have established their offices in China, taking advantage of the growing popularity of this country. However, I also noticed that some Chinese companies themselves are outsourcing IT work to neighboring North Korea. And since my profession is being an offshore consultant, I have no choice but to investigate these new trends in country selection, so I accepted the invitation to visit Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea. I happened to be the first Dutch consultant to research the North Korean IT-sector ever, and the one-week tour turned out to be extremely interesting. Quite surprisingly, the country offers interesting business opportunities for European companies.
Korea Computer Center
My study tour was organized by KCC (Korea Computer Center), the largest IT-company in the country. Established in 1990, it is state-owned and has more than one thousand employees. It is headquartered in Pyongyang and has regional branches in eleven cities. My accommodation has been arranged at the KCC campus, which comprises of several office buildings. It also has iown hostel, with a swimming pool, for foreign guests. These guests are mainly Asian (during my stay, there were Chinese delegations), so I had to get used to having rice for breakfast. In the evenings, the restaurant doubled as a karaoke bar, and some of the waitresses appeared to be talented singers. The campus is located in a rather attractive green area, and the butterflies flying around were the largest I had ever seen. It also has sporting grounds, and basketball was during my one-week visit the most popular game among KCC staff. An internal competition takes place during lunch hours.
Korea Computer Center is organized in different specialized business units. Before their representatives started with presentations, I received a tour through the premises. As is the case in India and China, the programmers at KCC also work in cubicles. KCC develops various software products, of which some are especially designed for the local market. Examples are a Korean version of Linux and translation software between Korean, Japanese, Chinese and English. They also produce software for Korean character and handwriting recognition and voice recognition. Other products are made for export, and North Korean games to be used on mobile phones are already quite popular in Japan. There are also games for PC’s, Nintendo and Playstation; their computer version of Go, an Asian chess game, has won the world championship for Go games for several years. The games department has a display showing all the trophies which were won during international competitions.
For several years, KCC is active as an offshore services provider and it works for clients in China, South Korea and Japan. For these markets, North Korea is a nearshore destination, and quite a few North Korean IT-staff do speak Chinese or Japanese. KCC also has branch offices in various Chinese cities, including Beijing and Dalian. It works for both foreign software product companies and end user firms, such as banks. For these clients, different types of applications have been developed, for example in the field of finance, security or Human Resources. Europe is a relatively new market for the North Koreans, and some of their products have been showed for the first time at the large international IT-exhibition CeBIT, in 2006 in Hannover, Germany.
The level of IT-expertise was high, with attention to quality through the use of ISO9001, CMMI and Six Sigma. KCC develops embedded software for the newest generation of digital television, for multimedia-players and for PDA’s (Personal Digital Assistants). Surprisingly, it also produces the software for the mobile phones of South Korean Samsung. I was shown innovative software which could recognize music by humming a few sounds. In less than a second, the melody was recognized from a database of more than 500 songs. Also applications for home use were developed, such as accessing the Internet by using a mobile phone to adjust the air conditioning. KCC also Photo: KCC campus in Pyongyang made software to recognize faces on photographs and video films. They gave me demonstrations of video-conferencing systems, and applications for distance learning. There was a separate medical department, which made software to be used by hospitals and doctors, such as systems to check the condition of heart and blood vessels.
Supply of IT-labor In countries such as The Netherlands, the enrollment in courses in Information Technology is not popular anymore among the youth, and a shortage of software engineers is expected. This situation is different in many offshore countries, where a career in IT is very ‘cool’. Also in North Korea, large numbers of students have an interest to study IT. I visited in Pyongyang the large Kim Chaek University of Technology, where there are much more applications, than available places. Although my visit took place during the summer holiday, there were still students around at the faculty of Informatics. In order to gain experience, they were conducting projects for foreign companies. I spoke with students who were programming computer games or were developing software for PDA’s. A large pool of technically qualified workforce is now available in North Korea. Some of the staff is taking courses abroad and foreign teachers (e.g. from India) are regularly invited to teach classes in Pyongyang.
Business Process Outsourcing
Some companies in Pyongyang are involved in activities in the field of BPO (Business Process Outsourcing), an areas which includes various kinds of administrative work. Because of the available knowledge of the Japanese language, the North Koreans are offering back-office services to western companies engaged in doing business with Japan.
In order to get an understanding of this type of work, I visited Dakor, which was established 10 years ago in cooperation with a Swiss firm. This joint venture is located at the opposite side of Pyongyang, across the Taedong river. It works for European research companies, and it receives from them scanned survey forms electronically on a daily basis. It processes these papers and returns the results within 48 hours to their clients. The company is also conducting data-entry work for international organizations such as the United Nations and the International Red Cross. Their data, which is stored on paper only, is being made available for use online. Dakor is also offering additional services, such as producing 2D and 3D designs for architectural firms, and it is also programming websites.
Animation
North Korea is already famous as a production location for high quality cartoons and animation. Staff of the American Walt Disney Corporation described the country as one of the most talented centers of animation in the world. The specialized state corporation SEK Studio has more than 1500 employees, and works for several European producers of children films. New companies are being founded as well, and I visited Tin Ming Alan CG Studio. This firm was set up in early 2006, and is located in a new office building in the outskirts of Pyongyang. Its main focus is in Computer Graphics and in 2D and 3D animation it uses the latest hardware and software, including Maja. Some of the staff of Tin Ming Alan speak Chinese and the company has a marketing office in China. They are hired by Chinese advertisement companies to make the animation for TV-commercials. It also works on animation to be included in computer games. Several employees of this young company come from other animation studios and have more than ten years of experience in this field.
The North Korean IT sector seems to be dynamic, where new firms are being established, and where business units of larger organizations are being spun-off into new ventures. I visited the Gwang Myong IT Center, which is a spin-off from Korea Computer Center. It is specialized in network software and security, and it produces anti-virus, data encryption, data recovery, and fingerprint software. This firmis internationally active as well; it has an office in China and among its clients are financial institutions in Japan.
Issues of country selection
My study tour revealed that North Korea has specific advantages. The local tariffs are lower than in India or China, thus giving western firms the option of considerable cost reductions. The commitment of North Korean IT-firms is also high, and the country is therefore also an offshore option for especially smaller or medium sized western software companies. Outsourcing work to North Korea could also be used to foster innovation (e.g. developing better products or new applications). This country can be used for research as well (from Linux to parallel processing). Based from my interaction with Korean managers and software engineers, I do not believe that the cultural differences are larger than with China or India. My communication with them, both formal and informal, was pleasant. Communicating with North Koreans is clearly less difficult than with Japanese.
The North Korean companies have experiences with a wide range of development platforms. They work with Assembler, Cobol, C, Visual Studio .Net, Visual C/C++, Visual Basic, Java, JBuilder, Powerbuilder, Delphi, Flash, XML, Ajax, PHP, Perl, Oracle, SQL Server, MySQL, etc. They can do development work for administrative applications, but also technical software, such as embedded software or PLC’s. North Korea is very advanced in areas such as animation and games, and I have seen a range of titles, including table tennis, chess, golf, or beach volley. The design of many of their applications was modern and according to the western taste.
Over the recent years, North Korea is opening up for foreign business. This process makes offshore sourcing easier, and even investing in an own software subsidiary or joint venture can be considered. This does not mean that North Korea is potential software destination for every user of offshore services. The country is a subject of international political tensions. In addition, a number of circumstances require specific attention, such as the command of the English Language. As is the case with China, the North Korean IT staff are able to read english bu thtey do not speak it very well. Another issue is the relative isolation of the country, and in order to arrange an invitation, a visa is required. The limited number of direct flights is another disadvantage; one can only travel directly from Beijing or Moscow. If projects will require a lot of communication or knowledge transfer, it might be recommended to do some parts of the work in China, by the Chinese branches of the North Korean companies. Executing a small pilot project is the best way to investigate the opportunities in more detail.
Conclusion
North Korea has a large number of skilled IT professionals, and it has a high level of IT expertise in various areas. The country is evolving into a nearshore software destination for a growing number of clients from Japan, China and South Korea. An interesting example of their success is the work they are doing for South Korean giant Samsung, in the field of embedded software for mobile phones.
North Korean IT-companies are now also targeting the European market, and the low tariffs and the available skills are major advantages. Smaller and medium sized software companies can consider this country as a potential offshore destination, and should research the opportunities for collaboration or investment in more detail. Taking part in a study tour, as I have done, is an excellent way to get more insight in the actual business opportunities of a country – not only in the case of North Korea but for all nearshore and farshore destinations.
Paul Tija is the founder of GPI Consultancy, an independent Dutch Consultancy firm in the in the field of offshore IT sourcing. E-mail: [email protected]
GPI Consultancy, Postbus 26151, 3002 ED Rotterdam
Tel: +31-10-4254172 E-mail: [email protected] http://www.gpic.nl
Korea Times
9/6/2006
Kim Tae-gyu
Starting today, a South Korean venture start-up will market a North Korean paduk computer game, Silver Star 2006, here that is arguably the most advanced program for paduk, also known as go.
ForOneBiz yesterday announced the scheme to launch Silver Star 2006 that has won the FOST Cup, the annual computer paduk championship participated in by global contenders, for the past three consecutive years.
“In June, we reached an agreement with the North’s Samcholli General Corp. to debut Silver Star 2006 here,” ForOneBiz chief executive officer Kim Byung-su said.
“We inked a commission-based deal, not the conventional lump sum-based ones. We will take roughly 90 percent of sales income while the remaining 10 percent will go to Samcholli,” he added.
The price of the program, which can be downloaded at the Web site of ForOneBiz (www.i-silverstar.com) or ordered by calling (02) 2115-6035, is 33,000 won ($34.5).
The Silver Star series, called Unbyol in Korean, was developed by the North’s state-run Korea Computer Center in the 1990s. Experts say it has the most outstanding algorithm for baduk.
“We plan to improve Silver Star 2006 further by cooperating with North Korea. It will work because the North has a competitive edge in software while the South today leads the world in offline baduk techniques,” Kim said.
This is not the first time for North Korean software to go on sale in the South.
Earlier in March, the Seoul-headquartered BH Partners began selling the Speed-K4.0, a computer program developed by the North Korean agency, at its Web site (www.bhpartners.co.kr).
People can download the input software, which helps them easily type in sentences from a word processor or e-mail, at 5,500 won.
Policy Forum Online 06-70A: August 23rd, 2006
DPRK’s Reform and Sino-DPRK Economic Cooperation
Analysis by Li Dunqiu
CONTENTS
I. Introduction
II. Analysis by Yi Li Dunqiu
——————————————————————————–
I. Introduction
Li Dunqiu, Director of Division of Korean Peninsular Studies at the Institute of World Development Center of Development Studies, writes, “Sino-DPRK economic cooperation is growing in depth and width but both sides adopt a low-profile and practical attitude… In fact Chinese enterprises, both private and state-owned, are looking for greater room for their future development as a result of the constantly improving market economy in China. Amid such backdrop, the DPRK naturally becomes their target…It is not difficult to see that laws of the market economy are the most fundamental reason behind Chinese enterprises’ investment in DPRK.”
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
II. Analysis by Li Dunqiu
– DPRK’s Reform and Sino-DPRK Economic Cooperation
by Li Dunqiu
DPRK’s change is by no means accidental. It has its profound international and domestic backgrounds. DPRK has made tremendous efforts in shackling off the shadow of the Cold War and integrating into the constantly changing international community, but with little result. Leaders of DPRK have no choice but to explore a new way that suits its country. Amid this backdrop, DPRK is slowly but steadily promoting its reform, which is low-profile but pragmatic.
From the end of 1990s, DPRK has begun to make adjustments to its economic theories and policies, putting forward such new views and propositions as pragmatism, building a strong socialist country, focusing science and technology, new concepts and improving economic management modes. A series of “Measures to Improve Economic Management Order” was issued on 1 July 2002. The adjustment this time, comparing with previous ones, was strong in enforcement and wide in the areas involved, thus injecting new impetus in its economic recovery and development. Though DPRK’s economic reform is only introducing rational elements of the market economy to make up pitfalls of its planned economy with the prerequisite of adhering to the latter, it should be commended as a major innovation in DPRK’s theories and practice in building socialism. Early this year, we saw new phenomenon from the DPRK side. It started with Kim Jong Il ‘s visit to China accompanied by premiers of the State Council in mid-January to learn the successful experience of China’s reform and opening up, followed by Chang Song-taek’s eleven-day China inspection tour accompanied by over thirty high-ranking economic officials, and then Cabinet Premier Pak Pong Ju’s elaboration of this year main tasks in economic work on the Fourth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Supreme People’s Congress. These new changes were not only widely reported but also aroused great interest among the international community in the country’s economic changes.
I. DPRK’s Guiding Principle Undergoing Quiet Changes.
Basic Theories of DPRK’s Economic Reform
At present DPRK has not yet established systemic theories to guide its economic reform. But Chairman Kim Jong Il has proposed new ideas which have become the basis for its economic reform.
Pragmatism
It was first proposed by Kim Jong Il after he became General Secretary of the DPRK Labor Party. There is no works which systematically elaborates Pragmatism. But according to economists from DPRK, pragmatism has two meanings, i.e. to bring actual benefits for the people, and to be profit-oriented instead of suffering losses. The former is the principle while the latter is the detailed content.
To follow the rule of pragmatism in economy is to seek economic benefits and for companies to make profits. To this end, the Fiscal Law amended by DPRK in April 2004 changed the ultimate goal of companies from “reducing cost” to “increasing net income”, so as to help them be profit-oriented. At present, pragmatism is the principle that must be followed in all DPRK’s economic work. Its economists have vividly compared it with China’s “seeking truth from facts”. It is fair to say that pragmatism will become theoretic basis for people in DPRK to liberate their minds and promote economic reform.
Theory with Economic Development at the Core
The strategy that DPRK has established with economic development at the core is mainly embodied in its goal of “building a strong socialist country”. Entering into the new century, DPRK has proposed three targets including building its country into a strong military, political and economic power. It maintains that it has already achieved the first two with the third one yet to achieve. As a result, the goal of “building a strong socialist country” means that economic development is its core task at the moment.
Theory of “New Thinking”
Labor News, DPRK People’s Army and Young Pioneers DPRK, in their joint editorials on the New Year Day of 2001, put forward the “new thinking”, stressing that “priorities at the moment were fundamental changes in ideas, ways of thinking, styles of struggle and work to meet requirements of the modern times”. Chairman Kim Jong Il also pointed out that, having entered the modern times, it is necessary to update thinking according to the new times instead of living the old way on the basis of the past, and that they should boldly abandon those that should be abandoned instead of being restricted to the old ideas and sticking to the past and the outdated. “In the 21st century efforts should be made to approach and solve all questions with new ideas and from new height.” In addition, DPRK’s Labor News pointed it out in its editorials that “they should be bold in reform”, “further improve DPRK’s economic management system to meet the requirement of the new environment and new atmosphere”, and that priorities for the Labor Party in the 21st century is to ensure that the ideas, ways of thinking and working styles conform with the requirement of the new century.
Approach the Word “Reform” with Prudence
Though DPRK introduced elements of the market economy through constitutional amendments in 1998 and consequently adopted some reform measures, it strongly dislikes such words as “reform” and “opening up” and they are forbidden in the adjustment of its economic policies.
Despite this, the essence is “reform”, though different in word, evidenced in their newly issued policies for economic adjustment which were targeted at the outdated demands and practices that were divorced from reality. DPRK’s Labor News pointed it out in an article entitled “On the Rules of Socialist Economic Development” on 21 November 2001 that “those who manage the economy, i.e. people of DPRK, do not have enough experience, there are still room for improvement and perfection due to short history of socialism, and that the economy cannot be developed if those that are outdated, backward and separated from reality are not abandoned.” It is clear that this kind of “abandoning” has the implication of “reform”. Therefore it is reform unsuitable for DPRK instead “reform” itself that it is opposed to. In fact it is nonetheless progressing with economic reform both in theory and in practice in spite of it all. It was not until June 2003 that DPRK’s Central News Agency finally used the word “reform” though it quickly dropped the word again. The reason behind its prudence with the word “reform” is because it once openly expressed its opposition to and criticism against reform in China and former Soviet Union in its major official media.
Learn Reform Experience from Foreign Countries
DPRK’s supreme leader Kim Jong Il has visited China for four times since 2000, most of which were aimed at inspecting China’s economy. His unofficial visit to China from 10 to 18 January 2006 and inspection of China’s economic work in Beijing, Hubei and Guangdong Provinces attracted great attention from the international community.
The nine-day visit in China was rich in content, clear in objective and profound in significance. Kim brought his team to Beijing, Wuhan, Yichang, Guangzhou, Zhuhai, Shenzhen and they listened carefully to introductions made by government officials and companies managers in those provinces and cities, with the aim of learning and drawing upon China’s experience. He was deeply touched and impressed and even had “sleepless night” when he arrived in Beijing following the tour in China’s south. He said that he was unwilling to see the current situation in DPRK and hoped to see further progress in its economic and social development by absorbing the vigor and vitality from the market economy while continuing its planned economy; that he hoped to learn from China and do a good job in DPRK’s future economic development by combining its national conditions with actual situation. It was the first time for him to voice such opinions, indicating that leaders of DPRK were transforming their mode of thinking, acknowledging and accepting China’s development concepts; and that they were exploring laws of economic development in order to prepare for profound and comprehensive reform with DPRK style.
It is more important to note that the visit gave him a chance to see the fact that China’s reform had neither weakened the leading role of the Chinese Communist Party nor aroused social upheaval. It had instead enhanced the reputation of the Communist Party and its international influence, which removed his worry that reform and opening up might undermine the stability of the authorities. Shock waves continued among the high-level officials after he came back from the visit. Unprecedented views were voiced and new explanations made on major theoretic questions like what was socialism, how to evaluate capitalism. High-level officials were asked to theoretically keep abreast with the times and unify their thinking.
Only two months later, Chang Song-taek, First Deputy Minister of the Department of People’s Group and Capital Construction of the Central Committee of the DPRK Labor Party, headed an “expert team” of over thirty high-ranking economic officials to the places that Kim had just visited. His 11-day visit was yet another demonstration of DPRK’s aspiration to learn from China. In addition, DPRK also sent various economic delegations to China to study its experience in reform. It started to send trainees to China, Viet Nam and countries in Europe since its economic reform in 2002, equipping them with knowledge of market economy, finance, trade and hi-tech in particular. It thus started its nationwide campaign from the top down to study economics.
II. DPRK’s Economy and Current Policy Options
From 2000 DPRK has gained positive economic growth from the previous negative one. Of course the rate was very low, around 0.5%–1% for six years in running. Some estimated that growth rate in 2005 reached 2%, an opinion shared by some DPRK officials though genuine figures were hard to obtain in the country. DPRK’s economy has recovered and is poised to continue its steady growth in 2006.
There are two sets of mechanisms in DPRK, i.e. the military and the civilian. The most important economic sectors are controlled by the military, a noticeable feature of its economy. Strength and efficiency of the factories run by the military are higher than their civilian counterparts. Take the Taean Glass Factory for example. It was built with the assistance of the Chinese Government. At first a civilian factory was designated but its workers were low in efficiency and poor in quality, with which the Chinese side became dissatisfied. Consequently a military factory took up the role and all went well afterwards. With good cooperation, the project was successfully completed. This example showed that talents of economic development are mostly with DPRK’s military. It is therefore, like China in its first phase of reform and opening up, formulating policy to transform some military factories into civilian ones to support local economic growth.
All signs show that economic work has become the priority of DPRK. Leaders of the country and the Labor Party are concentrating their time and efforts on economic work. Main measures for this year are as follows:
Agriculture is the main task of this year’s economic development.
The Fourth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Supreme People’s Congress was convened on 11 April, on which Premier Pak Pong Ju delivered a report entitled Review of Work in 2005 and Plan for 2006. He stressed that the central task of the economic development for this year was “to develop agriculture in a decisive manner to successfully solve the food problem for the people in DPRK”.
In recent years DPRK has always taken agriculture as the “primary task” of its economic development. In order to solve food shortage it launched “Potato Revolution” and “Seed Revolution” in 2001, advocating the growth of agricultural crops with short mature periods and great harvests. Agricultural technicians cultivated new breeds of potatoes with no virus and high yields, in order to “supplement rice with potatoes”. Thanks to increased government input in agricultural production and development in agricultural science and technology, grain production has risen in recent years, reaching 4.6 million tons in 2005, the highest in ten years. With experience accumulated and benefit gained, DPRK has realized the importance of agriculture. It will continue to take it as the priority and central task of this year’s economic work. It is especially notable that when Kim Jong Il visited China last January, he went to the Crop Institute of the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Science, a sign which fully vindicated the importance attached to agricultural science and technology.
Work Hard to Develop Foreign Trade and Attract Foreign Investment.
Premier Pak Pong Ju stressed in his above-mentioned report that it was necessary to work hard to develop foreign trade and actively explore foreign markets to achieve diversification and multi-lateralization of trade in accordance with the changing environment and practical demands. DPRK has enhanced foreign trade up to an unprecedented height, which was a new change itself. Though US had begun its financial sanction against DPRK since the end of last year, its foreign trade increased by a large margin in 2005, reaching 3 billion USD in total, the highest since 1991. Trade between DPRK and ROK reached 1.05 billion USD in 2005 and this figure was not included in the total volume. It is estimated that this year DPRK will actively explore new markets in the EU and ASEAN countries while continuing to grow its trade with China and ROK.
China is DPRK’s largest trading partner. Sino-DPRK trade reached a historic high at 1.58 billion USD in 2005, up 14%. China’s export accounted for two thirds of its total. DPRK mainly imported food and energy from China, up by 35.2% annually and reaching 1.08 billion USD in 2005. Growth in Sino-DPRK trade was partly attributed to decrease in bilateral trade between DPRK and Japan, which stood at 0.194 billion USD in 2005, down by 23%.
Meanwhile DPRK is working actively to introduce foreign investment, including capital and technology. It organized two international commodities fairs, one in the 1980s and the other in the 1990s, to be followed by annual fairs every spring since 2000. The fairs were then held twice every year since 2005, one in spring and one in autumn.
The 9th Pyongyang Spring International Fair was grandly held from 15 to 18 May 2006. The total area of the exhibition hall was 16.5 thousand sq meters and it hosted 217 companies from 13 countries and regions in the world including China, the Netherlands, France and Germany. Products on display ranged from chemicals, electronics, pesticides, agricultural machines to cosmetics, pharmaceuticals and foods. Of the 196 foreign participating companies, 179 were Chinese, with 80% from China’s Liaoning Province. Contractual value topped 100 million Euros.
Ms Choe Lian-shi, Division Chief of DPRK’s Bureau of International Exhibition, said in her interview with the Xinhua New Agency that the main purpose for such fair was to help DPRK companies to know the world and for the world to know DPRK’s market. It was also to help DPRK companies establish links with their foreign counterparts in order to promote export, explore international markets and introduce advanced foreign technology to promote its economic development.
She pointed out that during the fair held last year, contracts, both for import and export and joint ventures, valued 70 million Euro, among which, export contracts amounting 30 million Euro, import contracts 32 million Euro and joint venture 8 million Euro.
She also stressed that Chinese companies took up the bulk of the participants. They came this time with the China Committee for the Promotion of International Trade, which made them more orderly and organized. All this showed that economic relations between China and DPRK were constantly developing and trade has become more active.
Apart from this DPRK also cooperates with the relevant sides in China to hold commodity fair and trade and investment talks in Beijing, Dandong and other cities in China several times a year.
Recently DPRK has organized some companies suitable for foreign markets to go outside the country to conduct foreign trade and economic cooperation. Construction companies in DPRK like Foreign Construction Co. sent thousands of experts and technicians to scores of countries and regions including Russia, Bangladesh, Kuwait and Libya to engage in project and labor contracting. Mansudae Overseas Development Group undertook to build bronze statues, monuments and other works of arts, and fit out buildings and parks in over 70 countries and regions to earn foreign currencies for the country. President statues in the seven African countries like Equatorial Guinea, Togo and Gabon, monument of the people’s heroes in Ethiopia, and the grain museum in Malaysia were all works of the company. DPRK Industrial Tech Co. opened branches in China and other countries to conduct trade in new technology, inventions and patents by replying on the institute and production bases attached to DPRK’s Academy of Sciences.
Improve Modes of Economic Management
Premier Pak Pong Ju also stressed in the report that efforts should be made to improve modes of economic management, to ensure practical benefits while reflecting socialist principles. DPRK has carried out factory and company reform through market price instead of planned price. It will also partially give up the state plan in production and sale. These measures are not only suitable for small- and medium-sized factories and enterprises but also for large-sized ones. Governments may purchase products from them according to market prices. They are also allowed to introduce foreign capital, establish joint-ventures or earn profits through trade within their capacity.
Speed up Development of Science and Technology
Another agenda of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Supreme People’s Congress was extremely noticeable. It was the report entitled Speed up Development of Science and Technology to Build a Strong and Prosperous Country, delivered by Choe Thae Bok, Secretary General of the Central Committee of DPRK’s Labor Party. Development of Science and Technology as one of the priorities of DPRK’s future development, the report was regarded as indication of the importance attached to science and technology development and its aspiration to embrace the information society. A strategic goal of its science and technology development is to become a major software country by 2022.
It is not common for DPRK’s Supreme People’s Congress, its highest body of power, to add on the agenda the development of science and technology. Media in DPRK have stressed on many occasions that the 21st century is a century of science and technology and a century of information, and that without the development of science and development it is impossible to achieve the goal of “building a strong and prosperous country”. The Supreme People’s Congress deliberated carefully and adopted the report, fully testifying its importance on science and technology and the fact that science and technology development had become a nationwide consensus.
Special Economic Zones remains an important option for DPRK.
Kae-song Industrial Park is a successful cooperation between DPRK and ROK and the two sides have decided to expand its scale on the current basis. Covering an area of 10,000 sq meters, it is planned to expand to 1 million sq meters. Many small- and medium-sized enterprises in ROK intend to invest and start business in the park as labor price in China’s coastal region in the south east is rising. Products manufactured there can be regarded as ROK-made and exported to a third country.
The DPRK Government might copy China’s special economic zones to establish new such zones along the border areas between China and DPRK. It is reported that DPRK planned to establish a new economic zone on the Bidan Island on the lower reaches of the Yalu River and build it into a future financial center. The establishment of such zones remains an important option for DPRK but it is also very prudent due to previous failure.
III. DPRK’s Energy and Mineral Recourses
DPRK has severe shortage of energy, especially oil. 90% of its oil supply comes from China. It also has oil trade with Russia but the amount is trivial as it does not have enough foreign currency. Russian oil companies sell oil to DPRK at price lower than international market price. DPRK has almost no oil reserve to speak of. It is currently working actively with China to exploit oil in its West Sea.
Electricity is also in short supply in DPRK though its supply is slightly better compared to oil. DPRK is rich in water recourses so the Government tries to develop small hydro power stations. And in accordance with the principle of those who develop will benefit, local governments are encouraged to build such projects according to their own conditions, and with good results. It is claimed by DPRK officials that the country is in fact equipped with conditions to build large hydro power stations. That’s why Kim Jong Il and other high-level officials in DPRK visited China’s Three Gorges Hydro Power Project in Yichang early this year. But because of its tension with US and its fear of conflicts or wars, the Government only encourages small- and medium-sized hydro power stations before its relations with US has improved. In addition, it also stresses thermal power since it is rich in coal and able to provide sufficient fuel. Consumption of coal ranks the first among all energy, to be followed by hydro power.
DPRK is now studying new energy and hopes to convert it into actual use in production and life, i.e. solar power and biogas.
There are four important recourses in DPRK: rich forest resources; important mineral resources like abundant coal, iron ore, graphite, gold, silver, lead, zinc, magnesite, all of which now allow the participation of foreign companies; 8600-kilometer coasts with no pollution, which are rare in the world and hold great potentials for fishing, aqua-culture, processing of sea food once foreign capital and technology are channeled in; rich tourist resources, that may become one of its future pillar industries.
DPRK has abundant mineral recourses, with over 360 kinds confirmed and 200 kinds economically viable. It is noticeable that the reserve of its magnisite ranks the first in the world, accounting for 56% of the world’s total. Its top ten minerals include tungsten, molybdenum, graphite, heavy spar and fluorite. The reserve of copper and ilmenite is calculated in tens of millions of tons and that of white jade, jadeite, black jade and sand jade is also abundant. Since it has such a large reserve of metal and energy mines, 70% of its industrial raw materials and fuels are self-sufficient. But there is no oil and pitch coal (raw material for charcoal), both of which are necessary for iron and steel industry though anthracite and brown coal are abundant. Coal, iron ore, lead and zinc core, limestone and magnisite take up the bulk of DPRK’s mineral industry but only 30% of the capacity is utilized due to restrictions of outdated equipment and poor technology. Iron ore is exploited in over 20 mines represented by Musan Mine. With a reserve of 1 billion tons, it is a famous open mine in the world and the largest in a country with an iron output of 8 million tons. Production of iron ore grew by 2-3% since 1970s, as a result of expansion and development of iron mines. But the growth has slowed down recently due to poor results of prospecting and outdated equipment. Foreign capital is now being introduced.
DPRK’s coal is divided into anthracite and bituminous coal. The former is mainly located in Pyongan-namdo and Pyongan-bukto while the latter in Hamgyong-bukto and Hamgyong-namdo. According to administrative division, there are four major coal mines in DPRK, namely Pyongan-namdo Mine, Pyongan-bukto Mine, Hamgyong-bukto Mine and Hamgyong-namdo. Currently there are over 100 national coal mines, 70 anthracite mines and 30 bituminous coal mines, and over 500 small- and medium-sized local mines.
In the 80-kilometer belt in the south of Pyongan-namdo stretching from east to west with Pyongyang at the center, the reserve of anthracite is abundant. Notable mines include Samsin (Samsindon, Daefon-gu) , Sadon (Sadon-gu), Ryongzen (Ryongzen-gu), Haelyong (Ladonza-gu, Haelyong, Gangdon-gun), Gangdon (Gangdon-gun), Gangso (Gangso-gun), Zencun (Zencun-gun), Wonstun (Wonstun-gun). There is anthracite in 668 sq kilometers in the north of Pyongan-namdo. Main coal mines there include those in Donstun, Syongbun, Jaenam, Joyang of Ganstun, Ganstun, Bonstun, Yamzum, Wyonlae, Xinlyon, Sonam of Bugstun-gun, Xiandon, Xinstun of Ensam-gun, Stunzen, Yongdae, Sunstun, Mujindae, Gigdon, and Ryongden, Ryongmun and Ryongcel of Kujang-gun, P’y?ngan-bukto.
Bituminous coal is mostly concentrated in the North Mine (north of Aoji) and South Mine (south of Chongjin) in Hamgyong-bukto and Anju Mine in Pyongan-namdo. Largest coal mines in the north include Aoji Mine in Undok-kun, Obun Mine in Musam, Hue Ryon Mine. There are seven ore strata that are 2-5 meters in depth in Anju Mine, producing brown coal of 5300kcal. With an annual output of 7 million tons, it is thus the largest mine in DPRK.
DPRK’s proven coal deposits are 14.74 billion tons, 11.74 being anthracite and 3 billion tons brown coal. Recoverable reserve, allowed by the current technology, is about 7.9 billion tons. Its coal production has dropped since the end of 1980s due to restrictions of technology and equipment. (See the table below for annual production since the 1980s)
*Unit: 10,000 tons
| Year | 1980 | 1985 | 1990 | 1993 | 1995 | 1999 | 2000 | 2002 |
| Production | 3,027 | 3,750 | 3,315 | 2,710 | 2,370 | 2,100 | 2,250 | 2,190 |
IV. Rapid Growth of Sino-DPRK Trade and Economic Cooperation
Sino-DPRK trade and economic cooperation grows at an eye-catching pace. With trade accounting for 40% of its total and investment 70%, China has thus become DPRK’s largest trading partner and source of investment. DPRK has been more dependent on China in food and energy supply. Main ports between the two countries have become or are becoming major vehicles of bilateral trade and economic cooperation. The friendly visit by Chinese President Hu Jintao to DPRK in October 2005 and Kim Jong Il’s China visit in January this year have further promoted political and economic cooperation between the two countries and injected new impetus in bilateral trade.
Trade between China and DPRK has increased by 14%, reaching 1.6 billion USD. DPRK import commodities like oil and corn from China, worth 1 billion USD, and export commodities like coal and iron ore to China, worth 0.5 billion USD. According to the statistics from Dandong Customs, 1.86 million tons of import and export went through the Dandong Port in 2005 at a value of 0.84 billion USD, up both in quantity and value by 10%, with 0.45 billion USD in China’s favor. It is estimated that DPRK will continue to expand trade with China this year. The two countries have planned to build a new road bridge across the Yalu River to meet the demands of the constantly growing trade.
Sino-DPRK Trade Volume from 1997 to 2005
*Unit: 100 million USD
Year DPRK’s Total Foreign Trade DPRK’s Trade with China China’s Export China’s Import
| Year | DPRK’s Total Foreign Trade | DPRK’s Trade with China | China’s Export | China’s Import |
| 1997 | 21.7 | 6.5 | 5.3 | 1.2 |
| 1998 | 14.4 | 4.1 | 3.5 | 0.6 |
| 1999 | 14.8 | 3.7 | 3.2 | 0.5 |
| 2000 | 19.7 | 4.8 | 4.5 | 0.3 |
| 2001 | 22.7 | 7.37 | 5.7 | 1.6 |
| 2002 | 22.6 | 7.33 | 4.6 | 2.7 |
| 2003 | 29 | 10.23 | 6.3 | 3.9 |
| 2004 | 31 | 13.85 | ||
| 2005 | 40.5 | 15.8 | 10.8 | 5 |
In recent years Chinese businessmen have accelerated their investment in DPRK. Those who took the lead in investing DPRK mainly came from Zhejiang, Jilin, Liaoning, Jiangsu and Guangdong Provinces with Zhejiang businessmen taking up the bulk. In 2003, 40 businessmen from Wenzhou, Yiwu, Dongyang, Cixi and Hangzhou headed by Lu Yunlei, agreed on cooperation intent with the operators of Pyongyang No. 1 Store. Guhui Trading Co. lead by Lu, obtained, unexpectedly, operating right of 15,000 sq meters of the store and corresponding 9,000 sq meters of warehouse. The deal was signed on 6 August 2003. Lu commented that what he valued was the market potentials in a country that was opening up. Lu also disclosed that he would invest several million of RMB to renovate the store and that operating space in the store would cover 10,000 sq meters, divided into over 300 booths to be further rented to Chinese businessmen to wholesale and retail small Chinese commodities, daily necessities in particular. The Zhejiang businessman commented opportunities in DPRK like this: “It is better to have our presence in the country but don’t expect too much from the first phase”.
It was the private companies that gave rise to the first wave of investing in DPRK. The second wave in 2005 was mostly generated by large state-owned enterprises, in areas like heavy industry, energy, mineral recourses and transportation, different from the first one.
At present DPRK has agreed to the joint-venture between China National Metals and Minerals Import and Export Corporation and its ??Coal Mine. This is not only the first established by China outside DPRK’s special economic zone but also represents an important measure by DPRK to open its recourses. Rydongden Coal Mine is the largest anthracite mine in DPRK. Covering an area of 18.8 sq kilometers, it has a reserve of 0.15 billion ton, 0.125 billion of which is recoverable. Its annual output is 1 million tons, equal to a medium-sized coal mine in China.
According to report issued by the Development and Reform Committee of Jilin, the province has reached a “barter” agreement with DPRK, transmitting electricity to the country in exchange of the mining rights of its Youth Copper Mine. With a total investment of 0.22 billion RMB, it is a typical experiment by DPRK to exchange electricity with mineral recourses. Jinlin Tonghua Iron and Steel Group will obtain 50-year mining rights in Musan Iron, the largest in DPRK, at a price of 7 billion RMB. Musan Iron, located in Hamgyong-bukto is the largest open mine in Asia, with proven reserve of iron powder about 7 billion tons. With iron content as high as 66%, it is able to be smelted directly.
Gold reserves in DPRK are also very rich. Guoda Gold Shareholding Co. Ltd., in Zhaoyuan, Shandong Province signed an agreement in 2004 with DPRK on gold exploration and smelting project. According to the agreement, a joint-venture would be set up for gold mining in ??? and bring back the ore to the company for smelting. ??? Gold Mine, which was set up quite early, has a considerable reserve and at least 150 tons can be recoverabled. But due to the lack of capital and outdated technology, operation of the mine has been at a standstill.
In September 2005 DPRK sold the 50-year exclusive operating rights of Najin wharf to Huichun, Jilin, in order to get the latter’s support for building a road from Tongsungu, Wonstunli, Kasung-si, to Najin Port. Sources from the Administrative Committee of the Border Economic Cooperation Zone in Huichun, Jilin, disclosed that the sale this time of the wharf in Najin Port was more of a corporate instead of government act. It was said that Fan Yingsheng, a real estate developer from Hunan, was the mastermind behind the deal and he alone would channel half of the 60 million Euro in payment.
Capital from Hong Kong is also coming. Early investments were mainly channeled to hotels, restaurants and the entertainment industry. But according to a recent report from Hong Kong media, a local businessman Qian Haoming reached a 3-billion USD agreement with the DPRK Government and China’s Ministry of Railway to build a railway from Tumen, border city in China, to Chongjin, port in DPRK. The agreement signifies that the deadlock between railway authorities of the two countries is being broken. There used to be three pending questions with the DPRK railway, i.e. overstock, arrears and withholding of Chinese cargo carriages. This forced the Chinese railway authority to take measures to restrict transportation between the two countries, like intermittent loading and goods limits. Statistics show that over 2000 carriages were held up in DPRK in 2004, 260 of which were for coal. It is reported that Hong Kong International Industry Development Co. Ltd., headed by Qian Haoming, promised to provide 500 to 1000 carriages to DPRK as required by the agreement.
Preliminary agreements have been reached at the moment between China and DPRK concerning minerals, railway and port lease. Sino-DPRK economic cooperation is growing in depth and width but both sides adopt a low-profile and practical attitude. It is necessary to point out that such development has aroused concern from relevant countries in North East Asia, which mistake China for having political motives. In fact Chinese enterprises, both private and state-owned, are looking for greater room for their future development as a result of the constantly improving market economy in China. Amid such backdrop, neighboring country DPRK naturally becomes their target. There are plenty of Chinese enterprises with strength ready to come into DPRK, more active than the government policy allows. During the National People’s Congress last march, delegates from local enterprises proposed a motion to the Central Government, calling for policy and legal guarantees for expanded and deepened economic cooperation with DPRK, including the establishment of special economic zones and free trade areas. It is not difficult to see that laws of the market economy are the most fundamental reason behind Chinese enterprises’ investment in DPRK.
Korea Times
7/17/2006
KT, South Korea’s leading fixed-line telecom carrier, signed a 360 million won ($380,000) outsourcing contract last week with a North Korean agency to develop six smart software programs.
A Ministry of Unification official yesterday said the deal between KT and Samcholli General Corp. was struck last Thursday as planned (see the front page of The Korea Times, July 13 edition).
“Samcholli agreed to develop six computer programs in such fields as next-generation networks and voice recognition by the end of this year for 360 million won,’’ said the ministry official, who declined to be named.
“Under the contract, KT can refuse to pay the promised money, if Samcholli fails to meet pre-set requirements by the operator,’’ he added.
However, the two sides could not reach an agreement on the pilot run of value-added processing this year with a pair of telecom items _ polyvinyl chloride (PVC) and splitters _ for some reason.
They initially planned to ink a deal on the test run of the value-added processing, under which KT will provide raw materials while Samcholli will crank out final products in return for commission.
From the Korea Times:
KT to Sign Deal With NK Firm
By Kim Tae-gyu
Staff Reporter
South Korea’s leading fixed-line telecom carrier, KT, Thursday plans to sign a 360 million won ($380,000) outsourcing contract in Pyongyang with a North Korean institute to develop six sophisticated software programs.
A Ministry of Unification official said Wednesday two KT executives went via Shenyang, China, to the North Korean capital to sign the deal with the North’s Samcholli General Corp.
However, when contacted, KT refused to confirm the contract.
Nonetheless, the ministry official, who declined to be named, said: “Samcholli will develop six computer programs in such fields as next-generation networks and voice recognition for 360 million won by the end of this December.”
“Plus, they are to agree to launch a pilot run of valued-added processing this year with a pair of telecom products _ polyvinyl chloride (PVC) coffins and splitters,” he said.
Under the envisioned agreement on the valued-added processing, KT will provide raw materials to Samcholli, which will manufacture the products in return for some commissions.
The official said the range of valued-added products will be substantially expanded next year should this year’s trials proved successful.
Asked whether the step will be an issue given the North’s soured relationship with Seoul over the recent test-firing of seven missiles, the unnamed official flatly rebuffed such concerns.
“Basically, we think this kind of Inter-Korean cooperation between private entities should continue regardless of political landscapes,” he said.
“In addition, this is a commercial contract, not one aimed at helping the North. If Samcholli fails to meet requirements of KT, the latter can refuse to pay the promised money,” he added.
Indeed, KT struck a similar deal with Samcholli last year and the former state monopoly paid 164,000 euros (nearly 200 million won) only after Samcholli finished developing the telecom software as scheduled.
KCNA
7/10/2006
The Korea Advertising Company is doing well the famous commodity and trade advertising service. The company sponsored a commodity and trade advertising exhibition on the sidelines of the 9th Pyongyang Spring International Trade Fair held in May, thus contributing to deepening the friendly and cooperative relations among nations and to realizing many-sided intercourse, cooperation and trade transactions.
The company, which is doing commodity and trade advertising activities in a uniform way, makes and sets up advertising mediums of various forms and contents in streets, stadiums and international exhibitions and extensively advertising them through newspapers, TV and internet at the request of local and foreign industrial establishments and companies.
It also holds the exhibitions for introducing export goods, trade business and investment environment at home and abroad.
