Archive for the ‘International Governments’ Category

Kaesong wages set to increase (2011)

Friday, July 15th, 2011

UPDATE 1 (2011-8-10): Wages of North Korean workers in Kaesong Industrial Complex set to rise 5% for the fifth consecutive year. According to the Institute for Far Easter Studies (IFES):

The minimum wage for North Korean workers at the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) has risen annually at a rate of 5 percent since 2007. The year 2011 stands to mark the fifth consecutive year that such an increase has occurred.

Recently, the steering committee for the KIC and South Korean and North Korean authorities reached an agreement to accept a 5 percent wage hike for North Korean workers at the complex. Accordingly, as of August 1, 2011, North Korean workers at the KIC should earn USD 63.814 rather than USD 60.775 in monthly wages. South Korean authorities, as an exchange for accepting the North Korean demand for a wage increase, requested that productivity be elevated via the adoption of a more efficient method of worker placement.

At the meeting, the Kaesong Industrial District Management Committee, representatives of companies in the complex, and the head of corporations were in attendance and reached an agreement to form a task force specifically for the improvement of productivity of workers. While the overall output of the KIC has increased, the output per worker has not improved, leading to the decision to establish the task force, with the goal of enhancing the competitiveness of the complex.

The minimum monthly income of USD 60.775, which kicked in last August, remained in effect until July 31 of this year. The Labor Law of the KIC caps the wage increase at 5 percent; a 5 percent increase to the minimum wage this year would elevate the minimum monthly wage for workers to USD 63.814.

At the meeting, North Korea mentioned international wage levels and made demands for a wage hike of more than the upper limit. However, most of the companies that operate in the KIC adamantly oppose such demands.

Despite the May 24 sanctions implemented by the South Korean government after the March 2010 sinking of the ROK navy corvette Cheonan, the growth of the KIC has continued. The trade volume has increased by 24.23 percent while the production output has increased by 26.1 percent compared to the same period last year.

Although the eight-year old Kaesong Industrial Complex boasts its competitiveness against other industrial complexes in China and Vietnam, it still has many challenges that must be resolved, including employment flexibility and incentive system.

From the institutional perspective, there are many tax benefits that Kaesong offers that industrial complexes in China and Vietnam do not. For example, the enterprise profit tax in Kaesong is at 14 percent. In contrast, China and Vietnam abolished the preferential treatment for foreign companies in 2008 and 2009, respectively; they currently apply a 25 percent of enterprise profit tax to both domestic and foreign companies. Even in terms of labor and wages, the KIC would appear to offer better quality of labor. In addition, the labor productivity of the KIC is comparable to 71 percent of South Korea, which is much higher than that of China’s Qingdao Industrial Complex (60 percent) and Vietnam’s Tanttueon Industrial Complex (40 percent).

Another advantage is the KIC’s favorable geographical proximity to South Korea, which helps reduce distribution costs and time. This advantage helps to reinforce the sales competiveness of the companies in the complex. In addition, the KIC has sufficient potential for expansion into markets in China, and domestic markets in South and North Korea.

On the other hand, Kaesong has relatively low flexibility of employment due to the principle of indirect recruitment. Difficulties in applying an incentive system are also a disadvantage of the KIC.

ORIGINAL POST (2011-7-15): Kaesong wages set to increase. According to Yonhap:

The minimum wage for workers at the inter-Korean industrial park in the North Korean border town of Kaesong is likely to rise 5 percent this year, the same annual rate of increase since 2007, industry sources said Friday.

More than 46,000 North Koreans work at about 120 South Korean firms operating in the complex, despite the South’s suspension of all other economic ties with the North over the deadly sinking of a South Korean warship last year. The local workers currently earn a minimum monthly income of US$60.775 following a 5 percent increase that took effect last August.

This year’s new minimum rate goes into effect next month after negotiations between the factory park’s management officials from the two sides. Under the park’s labor regulations, the minimum wage can increase only up to 5 percent from the previous year.

“The North Koreans are demanding an increase of more than the upper limit (of 5 percent), citing wage levels in other parts of the world,” said an official from one of the South Korean firms in Kaesong. The person spoke on the condition of anonymity.

“In effect, this is equivalent to demanding a wage rise of 5 percent,” the official said, adding that the businesses operating in the joint industrial park had tentatively agreed to accept the demand. After the increase, the North Korean workers will earn $63.814 monthly.

Meanwhile, production at the industrial zone has continued to grow, according to recent data. The park’s output of clothes, utensils, watches and other goods rose 26.1 percent last year from 2009. Since its opening in 2004 under former liberal South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, the complex has served as a source of tens of millions of dollars for the cash-strapped North annually.

Read the full story here:
Minimum wage for N. Koreans in Kaesong likely to rise 5 pct
Yonhap
2011-7-15

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Kaesong zone continues to undermine official DPRK narratives

Friday, July 15th, 2011

Pictured above (Google Earth): Two official marketplaces in Kaesong highlighted in yellow.  South Korean treats are popular in these markets.

According to the Daily NK:

Shin Ramen (a brand of instant noodles), Choco-pies and coffee mix, the snacks offered to Kaesong Industrial Complex workers, leak out and are now very popular in the jangmadang in Kaesong, according to sources.

The news was revealed by a South Korea government official and a staff member from an enterprise in the Kaesong Complex on the 15th.

North Korean workers often ask their employers for Shin Ramen uncooked and packed so that they can sell it in the jangmadang to augment their wages, according to the Ministry of Unification.

One staff member from a company stationed in the Kaesong Industrial Complex explained, “The time when the North Korean workers are given Shin Ramen, Choco-pies and coffee mix is the time they look forward to the most.”

“I am aware that North Korean workers take the several ramen given to them at snack times or when doing evening overtime back into North Korea,” he added. “They sell the ramen they take for roughly the same price as a kilo of rice. But it is not just Shin Ramen; Choco-pies are very popular with the North Korean workers, and they also use Shin Ramen soup as a seasoning at home.”

Kaesong Industrial Complex companies are known to get assistance from domestic companies, so pay less than market price for the Shin Ramen and other snacks that they offer to workers.

The company staff member said he saw the situation in a positive light, explaining,, “There have been almost no inter-Korean exchanges of late, so in this situation the Shin Ramen and Choco-pies and other things offered by enterprises provide a link between the North Korean people and South Korea. If the workers take the Korean-made products and sell them in the jangmadang then not just the workers but also the North Korean people get to know about South Korea.”

Unfortunately, meanwhile, although workers in the Kaesong Industrial Complex receive a wage of approximately $100/month, they are not free to keep it. 30% is taken by the North Korean authorities in the form of a ‘Socialist Culture Policy Tax’, and other costs are extracted as well. Therefore, the take-home pay is around $30/month, although even this is not paid in cash but in the form of an exchange coupon.

A Ministry of Unification explained one part of that system, saying, “Most of the money and other things that come from the South go to the central North Korean authorities, but a proportion goes to Kaesong city authorities. That money which goes to Kaesong City is meant to be for the purpose of buying rice for distribution to the local people.”

There are now approximately 46,000 North Korean workers in the Kaesong Complex, and complex operations are, as such, a $4.6 million monthly subsidy for the North Korean authorities.

Despite the measures put in place by the South Korean government following last year’s Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island incidents, the number of workers earning money in Kaesong has continued to expand. According to the Ministry of Unification, at the end of February there were 46,420 workers, an 11% increase on one year previously. Earnings have also risen significantly in the same period.

Donald Kirk was the first (of whom I am aware) to write about the subversive nature of Choco Pies back in May 2009.

Read the full story here:
Shin Ramen Popular in Kaesong Jangmadang
Daily NK
Kim Yong-hun
2011-7-15

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Lankov pessimistic on the DPRKs SEZs

Thursday, July 14th, 2011

Pictured above (Google Earth) is the electrified fence around the Rason special economic zone.

Lankov writes in the East Asia Forum:

SEZs are acceptable to the North Korean government because they are relatively easy to control. North Korean SEZs have been fenced off with barbed wire and all visitors have had their IDs carefully studied at checkpoints.

The North Korean government obviously hopes that small areas of controlled capitalism will generate enough income to make a difference — or at least to keep afloat the long-decaying economy.

Similar SEZs with China to those recently declared have been attempted before. At Raseon a major problem was its isolated location and underdeveloped transport infrastructure, even by meagre North Korean standards. At Sinuiju there were numerous problems. One was North Korea’s choice of the Chinese entrepreneur Yang Bin to lead the project as he wanted to transform the city into a gambling centre, a Macau of the North. This was not welcomed by the Chinese government. Also, it did not help that the North Koreans, following their modus operandi, did not bother to liaise with the Chinese beforehand.

The success of KIZ might seem encouraging, but it is actually a very special case. It is viable because the South Korean government is willing to go to great lengths to support it. It has subsidised industrial development and has provided adventurous developers and companies with generous subsidies and guarantees that made the entire undertaking possible. This willingness is driven by a multitude of political considerations. Frankly, it is doubtful whether the Chinese side would be equally interested in subsidising a similar undertaking by Chinese companies in Sinuiju.

What will happen to these two planned new SEZs? The fate of Raseon seems pretty certain. Available evidence indicates it is largely about transportation links. Chinese Manchuria is landlocked, so Chinese companies will save a small fortune on transportation costs if they are given access to a seaport on the Eastern coast of the Korean Peninsula. If this is what happens in Raseon, it has a relatively bright future.

The future of the Hwanggumpyong SEZ is far less certain. Obviously Chinese businesses want to do there what their South Korean counterparts did in Kaesong, take advantage of low labour costs in North Korea. Even though Chinese labour is cheap, North Korean labour is much cheaper still, since US$15-20 a month would be seen by the average North Korean worker as a good wage. For the same labour, they would have to pay a Chinese worker between US$100 and US$150 a month.

But that said, the business reputation of North Korean managers leaves much to be desired. They are likely to intervene in operations − partially as a way to extort bribes, but largely because they will worry about excessive exposure of their population to dangerous Chinese influences. South Korean businesses in Kaesong accept such interference, but they are backed by the South Korean government. It remains to be seen whether the same situation will develop in a Chinese-led zone.

Previous posts on the Sinuiju (including Waudo and Hwangumphyong) can be fond here.

Previous posts on Rason (Rajin-Sonbong) can be found here.

Read the full story here:
North Korea-China special economic zones
East Asia Forum
Andrei Lankov
2011-7-14

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US Census forecast of DPRK population

Wednesday, July 13th, 2011

According to Yonhap:

North Korea is expected to become larger and older in 40 years with its population growing at a slower pace, data showed Tuesday.

According to the U.S. Census Bureau, North Korea’s population is estimated to rise 10 percent by 2050 to 26.96 million from this year’s 24.45 million.

The census bureau also projected that South Korea’s population will decrease 11 percent from 48.75 million last year to 43.37 million in 2050.

North Korea’s population has been on a steady increase since 1995, when it totaled 22.11 million, and the trend is likely to continue into 2050, the bureau said.

The population growth rate, however, is forecast to dwindle from 0.5 percent this year to a negative growth of 0.1 percent in 40 years, the data showed.

The slower rate of population growth will bring down the North’s ranking worldwide in 2050 to 64th among 228 countries. It ranked 48th this year, according to the agency.

North Korea’s birthrate is forecast to drop to 1.7 in 2050 from 2.0 in 2011, while its life expectancy is estimated to increase to 78 in 2050 from this year’s 69, indicating North Korea will face an aging society.

The agency did not mention what exactly would attribute to such changes in the country’s demographics, but said on its Web site that the estimates were based on the census each country conducted while also taking into account political and social variables alongside specific factors such as natural disasters.

A separate U.N. report published last year found that North Korea’s population is to increase by 600,000 to 24.6 million in 2050.

Information on the DPRK’s last census can be found here.

Read the full story here:
N. Korea’s population expected to rise to 27 mln by 2050
Yonhap
2011-7-12

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France to open Pyongyang office (Take 2)

Tuesday, July 12th, 2011

UPDATE 2 (2011-7-15): Adam Cathcard provides additional data in the comments.

UPDATE 1 (2011-7-12): Over a year after first making the announcement, France reiterates that it is opening an office in the DPRK.  According to the AFP:

France will open a cooperation bureau in North Korea, Le Monde newspaper said Tuesday, but underscored that Paris was not launching diplomatic relations with the reclusive Stalinist state.

A senior French diplomat is currently in Pyongyang where he “will present to the North Koreans” the future French representative, the daily said, identifying him as Olivier Vaysset, a diplomat who has worked in Singapore.

“The opening of this office does not signify that France is opening as such diplomatic relations with this totalitarian country,” it said but added that it could serve as a “diplomatic intermediary.”

The proposed office will handle cultural cooperation, it said.

The French embassy in Seoul declined comment on the report, saying any comment would have to come from Paris.

The then-French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner said in March last year his country would not establish diplomatic relations with the North but would open an office to support non-governmental groups.

“We are not going to open an embassy, certainly not,” Kouchner told a news conference in Tokyo. “Open an office, yes, in order to help the NGOs there.”

France is the only major European Union member that does not have diplomatic ties with the communist state.

Paris has argued that the human rights situation must improve and has cited concerns over nuclear proliferation.

French special envoy to Pyongyang, Jack Lang, visited the North in November 2009. He said afterwards that France had offered to forge permanent cultural links with North Korea but not full diplomatic ties.

The French move comes as ties between North and South Korea are at their lowest ebb after Seoul accused Pyongyang of torpedoing a warship in March 2010, killing 46 sailors.

Original Post (2010-3-18): According to the AFP:

France will not open diplomatic relations with North Korea but plans to establish an office there to support non-governmental groups, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner said Thursday.

‘We are not going to open an embassy, certainly not,’ Kouchner said at a press conference in Tokyo. ‘Open an office, yes, in order to help the NGOs (non-governmental organisations) there.’

France is the only European Union country other than Latvia that does not have diplomatic ties with the communist state.

Paris has argued that the human rights situation in North Korea must improve and has cited concerns over nuclear proliferation.

In December the French special envoy to Pyongyang, Jack Lang, said France had offered to forge permanent cultural links with North Korea but not full diplomatic ties, hoping to pressure it on the nuclear issue.

‘Our proposal… is to open a permanent structure of cooperation with North Korea – humanitarian, cultural and linguistic cooperation,’ Lang told a hearing of members of the French parliament at the time.

Kouchner, asked to clarify the French position during his Japan visit, said that ‘we are not rewarding them at all in opening an office’ that would support French NGOs working in the isolated country.

Additional Information:

1. Kim Jong-il’s neice committed suicide in Paris.

2. The Kim family is fond of French doctors.

Read the full story here:
France rules out opening embassy in N.Korea
Associated Free Press
3/18/2010

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Sport in North Korea

Monday, July 11th, 2011

A German-language documentary was recently released on the sports facilities in the DPRK.  Featured in the film are the April 25th Sports Team football field, Moranbong Sports Team facilities, Kim Il-sung Stadium, Sosan Sports District, Pyongyang Indoor Stadium (A State of Mind), Pyongyang Primary School No.4, and Yangggakdo Stadium.  The documentary makers also apparently had access to the North Korean women’s team at the recently concluded Women’s World Cup.

Click on the image below to watch the film.

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DPRK seeks to learn about geothermal energy from PRC

Thursday, July 7th, 2011

According to the China Daily:

China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) have agreed to share their experience and beef up cooperation in exploring and utilizing renewable energy.

The agreement was made during a meeting on Wednesday between senior Communist Party of China (CPC) official Zhou Yongkang and a delegation from the Korean Workers Party (KWP), led by Thae Jong Su, an alternate member of the KWP’s Political Bureau and member of the Secretariat.

Thae told Zhou that the main purpose of his current China trip is to learn from China’s experience in developing geothermal resources, as specified by the DPRK’s top leader, Kim Jong-il.

The DPRK hopes to use geothermal energy in its efforts to develop its economy and build a strong and prosperous country, Thae said.

Zhou, a member of the Standing Committee of the CPC Central Committee Political Bureau, told Thae that China would like to enhance its exchanges with the DPRK in the field in order to jointly improve their capability to develop and utilize renewable energy.

“I once worked in China’s oil industry for a long time, so I fully understood the importance of energy to a country,” said Zhou, who is also secretary of the Political Science and Law Committee of the CPC Central Committee.

Zhou served as vice minister of the Ministry of the Petroleum Industry from 1985 to 1988 and went on to work as deputy general manager of the China National Petroleum and Natural Gas Corporation from 1988 to 1996.

He said China has been actively promoting reforms in its energy sector during the country’s 12th Five-year Plan period (2011-2015).

Hailing the sound momentum of China-DPRK relations, Zhou recalled Kim’s successful visit to China earlier this year, during which Kim exchanged views with President Hu Jintao on major issues of common concern.

Kim also sent a congratulatory letter to Hu regarding the 90th anniversary of the CPC’s founding, Zhou said.

“We are glad to see that the two sides have engaged in high-level exchanges and substantial cooperation in various areas and made concerted efforts for common development and regional peace and stability,” he said.

Thae also conveyed greetings from Kim to Hu during the meeting.

The DPRK delegation is visiting China from July 5 to 9 at the invitation of the International Department of the CPC Central Committee.

Senior CPC official Liu Qi also met with the delegation later Wednesday afternoon.

Liu, a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and secretary of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC, said China and the DPRK currently boast “frequent high-level visits, increasing strategic communication, deepening economic cooperation and active cultural exchanges.”

“China is ready to make joint efforts with the DPRK to implement the consensus reached by the two top leaders and further expand exchanges and cooperation in all areas,” Liu said.

Liu said that he hopes the people of the DPRK see continued progress in the country’s development under the leadership of Kim.

Liu also briefed Thae on Beijing’s economic and social development.

In response, Thae said the DPRK and China now enjoy prosperous ties, which have been carefully nurtured by the countries’ top leaders. The DPRK is willing to work with China to carry out practical cooperation and bolster relations to a new high, he added.

Read the full story here:
China, DPRK to boost renewable energy co-op
China Daily
2011-7-7

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DPRK defectors in the US

Wednesday, July 6th, 2011

According to KBS Global:

The Voice of America (VOA) said Wednesday that two North Korean defectors were granted refugee status and settled in the U.S. in June.

The VOA referenced a report by the U.S. State Department that said from October last year through June, a total of 21 North Koreans entered the U.S. as refugees.

The VOA reported that since the passage of the North Korean Human Rights Act in the U.S. in 2004, the number of North Korean refugees entering the U.S. has increased to 122.

Previous stories stories about DPRK emigration can be found here.

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A.Q. Kahn claims Pakistan military sold nuclear technology to the DPRK

Wednesday, July 6th, 2011

 

According to the Washington Post:

The founder of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb program asserts that the government of North Korea bribed top military officials in Islamabad to obtain access to sensitive nuclear technology in the late 1990s.

Abdul Qadeer Khan has made available documents that he says support his claim that he personally transferred more than $3 million in payments by North Korea to senior officers in the Pakistani military, which he says subsequently approved his sharing of technical know-how and equipment with North Korean scientists.

Khan also has released what he says is a copy of a North Korean official’s 1998 letter to him, written in English, that spells out details of the clandestine deal.

Some Western intelligence officials and other experts have said that they think the letter is authentic and that it offers confirmation of a transaction they have long suspected but could never prove. Pakistani officials, including those named as recipients of the cash, have called the letter a fake. Khan, whom some in his country have hailed as a national hero, is at odds with many Pakistani officials, who have said he acted alone in selling nuclear secrets.

Nevertheless, if the letter is genuine, it would reveal a remarkable instance of corruption related to nuclear weapons. U.S. officials have worried for decades about the potential involvement of elements of Pakistan’s military in illicit nuclear proliferation, partly because terrorist groups in the region and governments of other countries are eager to acquire an atomic bomb or the capacity to build one.

Because the transactions in this episode would be directly known only to the participants, the assertions by Khan and the details in the letter could not be independently verified by The Washington Post. A previously undisclosed U.S. investigation of the corruption at the heart of the allegations — conducted before the letter became available — ended inconclusively six years ago, in part because the Pakistani government has barred official Western contact with Khan, U.S. officials said.

By all accounts, Pakistan’s confirmed shipments of centrifuges and sophisticated drawings helped North Korea develop the capacity to undertake a uranium-based route to making the bomb, in addition to its existing plutonium weapons. Late last year, North Korea let a group of U.S. experts see a uranium-enrichment facility and said it was operational.

The letter Khan released, which U.S. officials said they had not seen previously, is dated July 15, 1998, and marked “Secret.” “The 3 millions dollars have already been paid” to one Pakistani military official and “half a million dollars” and some jewelry had been given to a second official, says the letter, which carries the apparent signature of North Korean Workers’ Party Secretary Jon Byong Ho. The text also says: “Please give the agreed documents, components, etc. to . . . [a North Korean Embassy official in Pakistan] to be flown back when our plane returns after delivery of missile components.”

The North Korean government did not respond to requests for comment about the letter.

Jehangir Karamat, a former Pakistani military chief named as the recipient of the $3 million payment, said the letter is untrue. In an e-mail from Lahore, Karamat said that Khan, as part of his defense against allegations of personal responsibility for illicit nuclear proliferation, had tried “to shift blame on others.” Karamat said the letter’s allegations were “malicious with no truth in them whatsoever.”

The other official named in the letter, retired Lt. Gen. Zulfiqar Khan, called it “a fabrication.”

The Pakistani Embassy in Washington declined to comment officially. But a senior Pakistani official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity “to avoid offending” Khan’s supporters, said the letter “is clearly a fabrication. It is not on any official letterhead and bears no seal. . . . The reference to alleged payment and gifts to senior Pakistani military officers is ludicrous.”

There is, however, a Pakistani-Western divide on the letter, which was provided to The Post by former British journalist Simon Henderson, who The Post verified had obtained it from Khan. A U.S. intelligence official who tracks nuclear proliferation issues said it contains accurate details of sensitive matters known only to a handful of people in Pakistan, North Korea and the United States.

A senior U.S. official said separately that government experts concluded after examining a copy of the letter that the signature appears authentic and that the substance is “consistent with our knowledge” now of the same events. Both officials spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the diplomatic sensitivity of the allegation.

Olli Heinonen, a 27-year vet­eran of the International Atomic Energy Agency who led its investigation of Khan before moving to Harvard’s Kennedy School last year, said the letter is similar to other North Korean notes that he had seen or received. They typically lacked a letterhead, he said; moreover, he said he has previously heard similar accounts — originating from senior Pakistanis — of clandestine payments by North Korea to Pakistani military officials and government advisers.

The substance of the letter, Heinonen said, “makes a lot of sense,” given what is now known about the North Korean program.

Jon, now 84, the North Korean official whose signature appears on the letter, has long been a powerful member of North Korea’s national defense commission, in charge of military procurement. In August, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed financial sanctions on his department for its ballistic missile work.

According to Khan, in the 1990s, Jon met then-Pakistani President Farooq Leghari, toured the country’s nuclear laboratory and arranged for dozens of North Korean technicians to work there. Khan detailed the payments Jon allegedly arranged in written statements that Henderson, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, shared with The Post. Henderson said he acquired the letter and the statements from Khan in the years after his 2004 arrest by Pakistani authorities.

Henderson, who has written extensively about Khan, said he provided the letter to The Post because he lacked the resources to authenticate it himself.

He said the letter and the statements constitute new evidence that Khan’s proliferation involved more-senior Pakistani officials than Khan himself. Khan has been freed from home detention but remains under round-the-clock surveillance in a suburb of Islamabad, where the government has recently threatened him with new sanctions for illicit communications.

Some of Khan’s past statements have been called into question. Pakistani officials have publicly accused Khan — who is still highly regarded by many in his country — of exaggerating the extent of official approval he received for his nuclear-related exports to North Korea, Libya and Iran. In 2006, then-Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf accused Khan of profiting directly from nuclear-related commerce.

Although Khan “was not the only one who profited from the sale of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons technology and components . . . by Pakistani standards, his standard of living was lavish,” and the disclosure of his private bank account in Dubai, the United Arab Emirates — with millions of dollars in it — was highly suspicious, said Mark Fitzpatrick, an acting deputy assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation during the George W. Bush administration.

Khan says the bank account was used by associates and a charity he founded, and the Pakistani government never asked him to return any money. He said that in 2007 — six years after his formal retirement and complaints of financial hardship — Musharraf arranged for a lump-sum payment equivalent to $50,000 and a monthly pension of roughly $2,500, which Khan says “belied all those accusations and claims.”

Although U.S. officials disagreed for years about North Korea’s uranium-enrichment capability, the dispute was settled in November when the Pyongyang government invited Siegfried Hecker — a metallurgist who formerly directed a U.S. nuclear weapons laboratory — to see a newly renovated building at Yongbyon that housed more than 1,000 enrichment centrifuges.

Hecker said in an interview that although the government did not disclose their origins, their size, shape and stated efficiency were close to a centrifuge model, known as the P2, that Khan obtained illicitly from Europe. Khan has said that he helped give North Korea four such devices.

“The combination of the Pakistani design, the Pakistani training and the major [Pakistani] procurement network they had access to” allowed North Korea to “put the pieces together to make it work,” Hecker said.

According to Khan’s written account, the swap of North Korean cash for sensitive Pakistani technology arose during a squabble in 1996 over delays in Pakistan’s payment to North Korea for some medium-range missiles. U.S. officials said they had heard of this dispute.

In the letter, Jon first thanks Khan for his assistance to North Korea’s then-representative to Islamabad, Gen. Kang Tae Yun, in the aftermath of a bizarre shooting incident in which an assailant supposedly gunning for Kang accidentally killed his wife. But the heart of the letter concerns two key transactions: the provision of a kickback to speed the overdue Pakistani missile-related payments and additional payments for the nuclear-related materials.

Khan, in his written statements — including an 11-page narrative he prepared for Pakistani investigators while under house arrest in 2004 that was obtained by The Post — said the idea for the kickback came from a Pakistani military officer.

Khan said Kang responded by delivering a half-million dollars in cash in a suitcase to a top Pakistani general, who declined it. Khan said Karamat, a more senior officer at the time, then said: “I should arrange with Gen. Kang to pay this money to him for some secret [Pakistani] army funds. He would then sanction the payment of their outstanding charges.”

“I talked to Gen. Kang, and he gave me the $0.5 million in cash, which I personally delivered” to Karamat, Khan wrote. He says this payment only whetted the army’s appetite, however: Karamat, who had just become chief of the army staff, “said to me that he needed more money for the same secret funds and that I should talk to Gen. Kang.”

Kang then started bargaining, saying that his superiors “were willing to provide another $2.5 million, provided we helped them with the enrichment technology,” Khan wrote.

Once the details of that assistance were worked out, Khan wrote, “I personally gave the remaining $2.5 million to Gen. Karamat in cash at the Army House to make up the whole amount.” Khan said he transferred all the funds on two occasions in a small canvas bag and three cartons, in one case at the chief of army staff’s official residence.

On the top of one carton was some fruit, and below it was $500,000 in cash, Khan wrote in a narrative for Henderson. Inside the bag was $500,000, and each of the other two cartons held $1 million, Khan wrote.

If the account is correct, the ultimate destination of the funds in any event remains unclear. Pakistani officials said in interviews that they found no trace of the money in Karamat’s accounts after an investigation. But the military is known to have used secret accounts for various purposes, including clandestine operations against neighboring India in the disputed Kashmir region.

Karamat said that such a delivery would have been impossible and that he “was not in the loop to delay, withhold or sanction payments” to North Korea. He called the letter “quite mind-boggling.”

The letter also states that Zulfiqar Khan, Karamat’s colleague, received “half a million dollars and 3 diamond and ruby sets” to pave the way for nuclear-weapons-related transfers. Zulfiqar Khan, who later became the head of Pakistan’s national water and power company, was among those who had witnessed the country’s nuclear weapons test six weeks before the letter was written.

Asked to respond, he said in an e-mail that he considered the entire episode “a fabrication and figment of imagination,” and he noted that he had not been accused of “any sort of dishonesty or irregularity” during 37 years as a military officer. He denied having any connection to North Korean contracts.

The senior Pakistani official said that Karamat and Zulfiqar Khan were “amongst the first to initiate accountability” for Abdul Qadeer Khan and his colleagues, and that implicating them in illegal proliferation “can only be deemed as the vengeful reaction of a discredited individual.”

In the letter, Jon requests that “the agreed documents, components” be placed aboard a North Korean plane. He goes on to congratulate Khan on Pakistan’s successful nuclear test that year and wish him “good health, long life and success in your important work.”

The Pakistani intelligence service interrogated Karamat in 2004 about Khan’s allegations, according to a Pakistani government official, but made no public statement about what it learned. Musharraf, who oversaw that probe, appointed Karamat as ambassador to Washington 10 months later, prompting further scrutiny by the U.S. intelligence community of reports that Karamat had arranged the sale of nuclear gear for cash.

Those inquiries, several U.S. officials said, ended inconclusively at the time because of Karamat’s denial and Washington’s inability to question Khan.

The letter can be found here.

For those of you who are interested, here is the biography of Jon Byong-ho from the Yonhap  North Korea Handbook (p. 796):

Jeon Byeong-ho
Current Posts: secretary (in charge of munitions), Workers’ Party of Korea Central Committee (wpK CC)
Educ.: Anju Middle School, Pyeongyang; Ural Engineering College, USSR
Born: March 1926 (Musan, North Harngyeong Province)
Career:
security staff, Anju Security Guards, South Pyeongan Province, Aug. 1945
security squad for Kim II-sung’s House, Aug. 1945
studied at Ural Engineering College, USSR, just before the Korean War, 1950
engineer, chief engineer, manager, Ganggye Tractor Factory (Military Logistics Factory), Jagang Province, End of 1951
vicedirector, Machine Industry Dept. (originally Military Logistics Dept.), Oct. 1970
alternate member, WPK CC, Nov. 1970
director general, General Bureau of Second Economic Committee, 1972
member, WPK CC, Oct. 1980-
delegate, Seventh SPA, Feb. 1982
chairman, Second Economic Committee, March 1982
awarded Order of Kim II-sung, Apr. 1982
alternate member, Politburo, WPK CC, Aug. 1982
delegate, Eighth SPA, Nov. 1986
secretary (in charge of munitions), WPK CC, Dec. 1986
member, Politburo, WPK CC, Nov. 1988-
delegate (Geumbit, South Hamgyeong Province), Ninth Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA), Apr. 1990
member, Military Committee; director, Military Industry Policy Inspection Dept., May 1990-
director, Economic Policy Supervisory Dept., March 1994
member (11th), Kim Il-sung Funeral Committee, July 1994
awarded title of Labor Hero, Feb. 1998
member, Tenth SPA (254th electoral district), July 1998
member, Military Committee, Sept. 1998

He has since taken a post at the National Defense Commission and “been put out to pasture” (see here also).  According to another Washington Post article: “U.S. officials confirm that he long directed North Korea’s defense procurement and nuclear weapons efforts, putting him in a position to know about the events the letter depicts.”

The Guardian and Arms Control Wonk also covered this story.

Read the full story here:
Pakistan’s nuclear-bomb maker says North Korea paid bribes for know-how
Washington Post
R. Jeffrey Smith
2011-7-6

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Air Koryo revives Pyongyang – Shanghai route

Monday, July 4th, 2011

According to the Choson Ilbo:

Chinese tourists arrive in Pyongyang on Friday [July 1, 2011] on the inaugural flight of North Korea’s national airline Air Koryo from Pudong Airport in Shanghai to the North Korean capital, in this photo released by Korean Central News Agency on Saturday.

It is the third direct route to Pyongyang from China after flights from Beijing and Shenyang and will operate every Tuesday and Friday.

Additional information:

1. I am not sure about the flights to Shenyang, but the Beijing-Pyongyang route takes place on Tuesday and Saturday.

2. Air Koryo temporarily ran a Shanghai-Pyongyang route last year for “Chinese volunteers” who wanted to visit North Korea for the 60th anniversary of the Korean war.

3. Air Koryo reportedly launched a Pyongyang-Kuwait route earlier this year.

4. No doubt these Chinese tourists will be enjoying the newly “acquired” properties in the Kumgang resort.

4. UPDATE: This from KCNA (2011-8-9):

Many tourists have come to the DPRK by chartered planes.

The Shanghai-Pyongyang air service, which started on July 1, is available on Tuesday and Friday every week.

Tourism through the Xian-Pyongyang air service began on July 28.

Malaysian tourists will come to Pyongyang through direct flight from Kuala Lumpur from August 19.

Along with the increase of tourists, their entry and exit procedures have been simplified.

Under the agreement between the DPRK International Travel Company and a Chinese immigration office, Pyongyang and Pudong airports offer visa exemption to tourists taking the Shanghai-Pyongyang air service.

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